1FCIX : 11-12 June 2013

French stress testson FCFs

Emeline CLUZELPierre JUAN

ASN : Nuclear Safety Authority (France)

Waste, Research Facilities and Fuel Cycle Facilities Department

2FCIX : 11-12 June 2013

Outline

� General overview of French civil nuclear facilities

� Complementary safety assessments methodology• Priorization• Milestones• Technical scope

� ASN’s opinion and resolutions – Hard core

� La Hague example

� Next steps

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Fuel cycle(enrichment, fabrication, retreatment))

Waste disposal sites

Research centers

Laboratories

Gravelines

PenlyPaluel

Fontenay-aux-Roses

Soulaines-Dhuys

Flamanville

La Hague Chooz

Cattenom

Fessenheim

Bugey

Chinon St-Laurent

Blayais

Golfech

MarcouleCadarache

Tricastin

St-Alban

Civaux

Dampierre

Saclay

Grenoble

Belleville

Brennillis(Monts d’Arrée)

Cruas

Romans

Creys-Malville

NogentOrsay

Caen

Veurey-Voroize

58 + 1PWR GraphiteGaz1450

MWe

GazHW 1 FNR

1300 MWe

900 MWe

300 MWe

1600 MWe

Nuclear Facilities in France

� Whole fuel cycle� 4 major operators� 150 basic nuclear installation (BNIs)

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French cycle

conversion

enrichment

fuel assembliesfabrication

recycling

MOX

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Paris

Mélox

FBFC RomansR

hône

Seine

French fuel cycle facilities

14 Fuel Cycle Facilities

• Reprocessing plant in La Hague (AREVA NC) : • UP3• UP2-800• STE3• UP2-400• STE 2 A• HAO• Elan 2B

• Conversion and enrichment plants in Tricastin• Eurodif (GB I)• SET (GB II)• AREVA NC – TU5• Comurhex• Socatri

• MOX plant, MELOX

• UOX plant, FBFC

All FCFs operators are AREVA subsidiaries

Tricastin

La Hague

in operation

in decommissioning

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French processus

After the accident of Fukushima Daiichi

� March 23, 2011: Prime Minister asked ASN to carry out complementary safety assessments (CSA) for all nuclearfacilities , in priority NPPs

� March 25, 2011: Conclusions of the European Council, asking for stress tests on NPPs

⇒ the French processus is based on these 2 requests, regarding all French nuclear facilities, NPPs and other nuclear facilities (FCF, WM, research)

⇒ Hence, complementary specifications to ENSREG’s ones wereadded so that the French specifications are relevant for all facilities

Influence of sub-contracting was included

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Priorization is needed for CSAs

All nuclear facilities targeted

Nuclear power plants

58 reactors (+1EPR)

Other nuclear facilities

About 90 facilities

Priority facilities

(First batch)

All NPPs

+20 other nuclear facilities

(including all FCFs)

Second batch

22 other nuclear facilities

Other nuclearfacilities

during periodicsafety assessments

CSAs in 2011 CSAs in 2012

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Paris

Marcoule

Romans

Cadarache

Saclay

Rhô

ne

Seine

20 priority non-NPP facilities concerned in 2011

14 Fuel Cycle Facilities• 7 facilities in La Hague : • 5 facilities in Tricastin :• Melox• FBFC Romans

5 research reactors• RJH and Masurca, CEA Cadarache• Phénix, CEA Marcoule• Osiris, CEA Saclay• RHF, ILL Grenoble

1 research laboratory• ATPu, CEA Cadarache

Tricastin

La Hague

Grenoble

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Milestones

� ASN Opinion on licensees’ CSA methodologyJuly 19 2011

� Advisory expert committee meeting on CSA methodologyJuly 6 2011

� French licensees’ CSA reports sent successfully to ASN (first batch ).

Sept. 15 2011

� French licensees’ CSA methodologies sent to ASNJune 1st 2011

� Declaration of the French Prime minister asking for national audit to be carried out for all French nuclear facilities, in priority for NPPs

March 23 2011

� ASN Commission adopted 12 resolutions requiring licensees of French nuclear facilities to conduct a complementary safety assessment (CSA)

May 5 2011

� Fukushima AccidentMarch 11 2011

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Milestones

� Joint meeting of the French advisory expert committees, based on the French TSO IRSN review of the CSAs

Nov. 8-10 2011

� Joint Meeting of the French advisory expert committ ees for 1st batch non-NPPS

April 3-4 2013

� Joint Meeting of the French advisory expert committees for NPPs

December 2012

� Long term planification on post-Fukushima feedback actions and new requirements (hazard level, hard core …)

� French TSO IRSN reviews complements and proposalsJune 2012To April 2013

� ASN issued its opinion on French CSAsJan. 3 2012

� ASN resolution : Complement to CSA + proposals for safety hard core

June 26 2012

� ASN’s report on CSAsDec. 2011

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Technical scope of the CSA

Fukushima feedback : limits of the probabilistic approach,consider extreme events beyond safety case

� Initiating events to be taken into account• Earthquake• Flooding• Other extreme natural events

� Consequential loss of safety functions to be analyzed• Loss of electrical power, including station blackout (diesels, etc.)• Loss of the ultimate heat sink• Combination of both� Deterministic approach

� Severe accident management

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Information expected from licenseesin the CSA reports

� Safety margins taken in the facilities design basis and plant conformity to its design requirements

� Assessment of the facilities robustness beyond their design basis• Available design margins, diversity, redundancy, physical

separation…• Identification of weaknesses• Assessment of the cliff-edge effects beyond which fundamental

safety functions would be lost and consequences would be severe

� Identification of potential improvements and means to maintain fundamental safety functions , including support and emergency functions taking into account the damage that would be likely done (isolated site)

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ASN opinion on the CSAissued in January 2012

� ASN made public its report on the CSA carried out for the priorityfacilities in 2011

� ASN considers that• the facilities offer a sufficient level of safety, so that ASN doesn’t request

the immediate shutdown of any of them• At the same time, for the continuation of their operation, an increase of

the robustness of the facilities to extreme situations beyond theirexisting safety margins is necessary, as rapidly as possible

� ASN has therefore required that the licensees take measures and reinforce the safety requirements related to natural hazards(earthquake and flooding) => June 26th 2012 resolutions

� ASN considers that the complete analysis of the feedback of the accident could take up to 10 years

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ASN resolutions for FCFsissued in June 2012

� I. Facility compliance - conformity– specific requirements regarding the periodic safety reviews

� II. Reinforced material and organizational measures –Hard core

� III. Additional requirements to complete the CSA report� IV. Emergency preparedness organization� V. External hazards : earthquake, flooding� VI. Recovery of legacy waste� VII. Social, organizational and human factors

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Resolutions for FCFs

� I. Facilities compliance - Conformity - Specific requirements regarding the safety re-assessment

Assessment of the conformity with design requirements,

• Periodic safety reviews required in the current regulatory framework• Necessary referential evolutions: definition of important elements for

protection (former important elements for safety) and their associated safety requirements

• Delay for safety re-assessment• Conformity exams can be anticipated depending on the referential

(31/12/2014)• safety re-assessment by 2017 for all facilities (decree of 2nd November

2007)

=> Not directly related to CSAs

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Resolutions for FCFs

II. Hard core of material and organizational measur es

This hard core is designed to ensure control of the fun damental safetyfunctions in extreme situations

� Requirement applied to all nuclear facilities

� Robust material and organizational measures designe d, for extreme situations, to• Prevent a severe accident or limit its progression• Mitigate large-scale releases• Enable the licensee to perform its emergency manage ment duties

Both remediation and prevention means

� Definition of associated safety requirements, taking into account common modes for their definition=> operational under extreme situations(=> spectrum of extreme earthquake ? => conformity criteria ?)

� Proposals for hard core submitted to ASN on June 30th 2012

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Resolutions for FCFs

III. Complements to CSA report

Operators must provide additional information for their CSA:

• Feared situations;• Induced accidents : fire, explosion, criticality, toxic

leakage, transport operations, crane fall-out…• Justify the robustness of certain back-up equipments or

buildings;• …

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Resolutions for FCFs

� IV. Management of emergency situations

• Control rooms: with high robustness, take into accountcriticality and chemical risk for control rooms protection, possibility of monitoring the facilities until a sustainable safe state is reached

• Organization if accident happens on several facilities

• Industrial neighborhood

• Improving crisis coordination on industrial zone

• Hospital convention

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Resolutions for FCFs

� V. External hazard : earthquake, flooding

• Study earthquake resilience

• Specify safety automatism associated with earthquake detection system

• Define procedures to be followed after occurrence of an earthquake

• On Tricastin facilities: study the flooding hazard considering a breach in the dam

• Take into account aging on specific material

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Resolutions for FCFs

� VI. Recovery of legacy waste

⇒ For La Hague in particular (old silos)⇒ Not directly related to CSAs

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Resolutions for FCFs

VII. Social, organizational and human factors :An additional requirement beyond ENSREG’s specifications,

for all facilities

• Definition of human actions required to manage an emergency � Specific training to face a very stressful emergency

• Organization for the renewal of the licensees workforces and skills� a fundamental issue at a time when a new generation of staff is

taking over a more experienced one

• Same requirements are demanded for subcontractors

ASN sets up a working group including licensees, trade-union organizations, Ministries

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Example : AREVA NC La Hague

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Essential safety functions : - keeping the water level,- ensuring the cooling.

Potential consequences of their loss :- overheat,- damage of fuel cladding,- radioactive release into the environment.

Safety requirements : - robustness of civil engineering,- robustness of the cooling systems,- monitoring systems,- redundancy of equipments,- backup generator and backup water supply.

Complementary Safety Assessments :- assessment of the conformity with design requiremen ts,- robustness beyond safety design requirements

Consequences of the loss of cooling systems identif ied in the CSA :- T0 + 2 days : pool water boils,- T0 + 6 days : 1st cliff-edge effect => 2 mSv/h at poolside

T0 + 10 days : 2nd cliff-edge effect => dewatering of the spent fuel b egins.

La Hague spent fuel wet storage safety

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Example : AREVA NC La Hague

� Hardened safety core includes means necessary to the management of emergency situations (mobile devices stored in robust buildings, communication devices, measurements tools, dosimeters, mobile diesel, neutron detector)

� For the spent fuel storage pools : implementation of complementary strengthened measures to prevent dewatering of the fuel (means of replenishing the water from an off-site source, pumps, piping)

� For HA liquor tanks (concentrated fission products tanks) : the hard core shall enable the cooling (replenishing water for the cooling systems)

� Face both situations : loss of cooling and fire

� Studies on hydrogen explosion risk

� Impact of boiling water on pool design basis and cool water injection (thermal shock) on pool structure

� Overflow hazard on SF pools in case of earthquake

� Protection of the underground water table

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Next steps

� Continue inspections related to Fukushima feedback to check implementation of identified and prescribed improvements within scheduled time

� Hard core propositions assessed by the TSO and the expert committees in April 2013

� New resolutions are being prepared by ASN (for 1st batch : both NPPs and non-NPPs)

� Need for the definition of the CSA earthquake spectra for each site within 2013� Hard core SSC scope� Schedule for means implementation � Schedule of activities ending (because no hard core defined)

� While new studies and justifications are sent by the licensees and are assessed

� Exchanges with our colleagues abroad : • Bilateral review on the stress-tests of La Hague and Sellafield• Meetings with JNES and NISA• FCIX

To be continued…

26FCIX : 11-12 June 2013

Further information

ASN website

http://www.french-nuclear safety.fr/index.php/English-version/Complementary-safety-assessments

27FCIX : 11-12 June 2013

Thank you for your attention