Freud's Theory of Conciousness

8/12/2019 Freud's Theory of Conciousness

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1. Introduction

The topic of this dissertation is the Freudian theory of consciousness and affect:

consciousness is a sense organ for perception of mental processes and affect is

the primary sensory modality of the internal surface of consciousness. At the

same time, this dissertation represents an attempt to examine the

interdependence of two problems in the Freudian thought: the mind-body

relation and the relation of consciousness to mental life. The first chapter

attempts to see the Freudian thesis on the mind-body problem. Dualistic and

materialistic interpretations of the Freudian work will be examined and at the

end of the chapter we will try to clarify the difference between noumenalism

and anomalous monism. These two doctrines stand at the very center of the

present dissertation and they are intimately related to the Freudian theory of

consciousness as an organ of perception. Chapter 2 begins with an exposition of

the development of the Freudian theory of consciousness with respect to four

major Freudian works. At the end of the chapter, the model of consciousness as

perception will be discussed and it will be developed in chapter 4 in relation to

Mark Solms reading of the Freudian theory of consciousness. In the same

chapter, the crucial role of affect in this model will be clarified. Chapter 5 is

devoted to the possible relation of the Freudian theory of consciousness as

perception with two promising contemporary neuroscientific programs: Jaak

Panksepps Affective Neuroscience and Antonio Damasios model of

consciousness.

Although the decision to examine Freuds theory of consciousness may seem

paradoxical, because Freud was the thinker who dethroned consciousness, there

are good reasons that justify our decision. The primary stimuli that led to the

aforementioned choice of subject were given by the simultaneous reading of

Mark Solms paper What is Consciousness and Antonio Damasios book The

Feeling of What Happens : Body and Emotion in the Making of Consciousness.1

1 The possible relevance of these two works is intended to be investigated at the end of the

present essay.


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In 1915 Freud wrote an essay entirely devoted to the subject of consciousness

and it was intended to be one of the twelve chapters of the book, which

according to what Freud wrote to Abraham in May 1915, it would be called

Preparatory Essays for Metapsychology(Gay, 1988, p.363). Unfortunately, this

paper on consciousness was one of six metapsychological essays that werenever published and it is presumed to have been destroyed.

Silverstein (1986) writes :

We know that Freud was not happy with the consciousness essay from the

start. When on 1 August 1915 he told Abraham that he had completed all

twelve essays, and called them war-time atrocities, he also told him

Several, including that on consciousness, still require thorough revision.

In The Unconscious (1915a) Freud repeatedly recognized the need to

answer questions about the nature of consciousness and the mode of

functioning of the system Cs., but always postponed the discussion for a

later time, probably intending to deal with the issues in the

Consciousness essay. (p.181)

Smith (1999a), following Silverstein (1986), notes that Freud wrote

comparatively little about consciousness explicitly, although the enigma of

consciousness and the problem of mind-body interaction were topics that

afflicted during his whole life.

Freuds focus on consciousness is compatible with contemporary philosophy of

mind and neurosciences. Schweiger (1998) notes :

Freuds focus on consciousness as an important feature of his

theory, attributing causal role for it as a construct to be explained

within the framework of a scientific theory of the nervous system

and psychic life, has its parallels in contemporary philosophy of

mind and neurosciences. Many contemporary writers promoted the

importance of consciousness within a theory of brain behavior (e.g.

Baars, 1988 ; Brown, 1977 ; Searle, 1992 ; Penrose, 1994, Dennett

& Kinsbourne, 1992 ; Churchland, 1988). (p.109).

Even in the field of the philosophy of mind, a re-reading of the most well-

known aspect of Freuds work, that is the existence of the unconscious, can be

viewed as grounded in interlacing theories of mental representation and

consciousness that have a remarkably contemporary hue (Redding, 2000,


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p.119). Humphrey (1997) and Dennett (1987) advance the view that only in the

post-Freudian period, were philosophers and psychologists ready to begin to ask

the modern question: not, how and why is some of our mental life unconscious,

but how and why is any of it conscious? Humphrey comments that Freud, back

in the 1900, was already ahead of the game because he was asserting thatunconsciousness is the natural state of the things and thus it is consciousness,

and not unconsciousness, in need of explanation.

Finally, the development of a new paradigm within the neurosciences, that may

be called Affective Neuroscience, and its rapid progress contributed to the

genesis of a new hope: psychoanalysis may have found the chance to engage

into a scientific dialogue with a discipline that shares a lot of its fundamental

metapsychological hypotheses.

At the end of this introduction, I would like to thank Dr. Jim Hopkins for his

interest on my dissertation and his helpful comments and Dr. David Snelling for

his tutorials on Freud.


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2. Freud and the Mind-Body Problem

There is much controversy as far as Freuds position on the mind problem is

concerned. Opinion is divided: there are scholars who claim that Freud was a

dualist, while others hold that he was a materialist. Within these two camps

there are many variations. In this chapter, we will initially describe the status of

dualism and materialism in the 19thcentury. Afterwards, we will first consider

some arguments provided by the dualist camp and the existing variations among

the supporters of a dualistic interpretation of the Freudian work, and afterwards

we will refer to a series of materialistic interpretations of the Freudian work.

Finally, we will try to clarify the difference between noumenalism and

anomalous monism. These two positions, although they are both committed to

an ontological monism, they do have crucial differences: it is absolutely

essential for the purposes of the present dissertation to discuss the ontological

commitments of each position, their compatibility or incompatibility- with

Freuds theory of consciousness and their relation to the efforts made for

reconciling psychoanalysis and neurosciences.

Dualism and Materialism in the 19th

Century

Freud lived and worked in an intellectual atmosphere that was deeply confused

about the relationship between mind and body. Substance dualism, in both its

interactionist and parallelist forms, had been the dominant approach to the

mind-body problem for over three centuries and has managed to establish

separate and independent domains for body and mind. However, by the second

half of the 19thcentury, traditional dualism has been challenged by a series of

scientific events. The discovery of the law of the conservation of energy by

Helmholz, the Darwinian evolution of the species and the flourishing of the new

discipline of neuroscience threatened the coherency of dualism and

demonstrated the intimate relationship between mental and neurophysiological

events.

A philosophical response to these scientific challenges was provided by

epiphenomenalism (Huxley, 1874), according to which mind can be understood


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as the smoke above the factory of brain. According to one version of

epiphenomenalism, the brain has causal power to produce mental events, but the

mental events themselves have no causal powers. In that way,

epiphenomenalism succeeded in reconciling, at least provisionally, the dualist

intuitions with the scientific progress.Other solutions were provided by philosophers such as Spinoza, who

formulated the dual-aspect monism, and Kant, who proposed noumenalism as a

solution to the mind-body problem. These two positions are types of property

dualism that invoked a mysterious underlying substance noumenon, which

supports both physical and mental properties. It is clear that the thinkers of late

19thcentury were not in a position to entertain the sophisticated contemporary

physicalist alternatives such as Davidsons doctrine of anomalous monism,

which sharply distinguish between the concepts of token and type identity. The

same inability to think of the difference between token and type identity marked

Freuds thoughts on the problem and, as it is intended to be shown, this very

fact causes a lot of confusion in the discussion on Freuds solution to the mind-

body problem and his theory of consciousness.

Freud and Dualism

Anderson (1962) claims that Freud was an epiphenomenalist in 1888.

According to the epiphenomenalist thesis, there is a strictly one-way causal

relationship: the physical causes the mental, but the mental never causes the

physical. During the period 1892-93, Freud was obliged to accept the existence

of psychical causality, a thesis that conflicts with the epiphenomenalist position.

According to Anderson, Freud probably thought of psychical causality as

provisional models that were necessary due to the inadequate state of

neurological knowledge of his time. Andersons argument is based on a passage

from Freuds text Gehirn in which Freud states that whether or not an item

enters consciousness makes no difference in the neural processes giving rise to

the mental item.

Silverstein (1985, 1989) argues that Freud was a psycho-physical interactionist

and he based his argument on some early Freudian passages, such as the

Gehirn, the text On psychical or mental treatment (1890) and certain

passages from Hysteria (1888c). According to interactionism, physical events


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cause mental events and these mental events, in their own right, cause physical

events. According to Solms and Saling (1990) interactionism is incompatible

with the existence of an independent psychological science because within an

interactionist framework, the broken sequences of conscious mental life are

conceptualized with reference to non-psychological causes and effects (seeFreud, 1940a, p.158). Thus, Freud would not be able to construct an

independent psychological science if he was holding an interactionist thesis.

Solms and Saling (1986, 1990) have argued several times that Freuds position

on the mind-body problem was that of psycho-physical parallelism (Solms &

Saling, 1986, 1990). In their papers, they quoted a series of passages that dated

from Freuds pre-psychoanalytic papers, such as his book On Aphasia and his

encyclopedia articles Aphasia and Gehirn. According to psycho-physical

parallelism, the mental and the physical are two independent domains, each with

their own causality. Solms and Saling quote the following passage from Freuds

essay On Aphasia:

The relationship between the chain of physiological events in the

nervous system and the mental processes is probably not one of

cause and effect The psychic is a process parallel to the

physiological, a dependent concomitant. (Freud, (1891)[1953],

On Aphasia, p.57)

Freuds psycho-physical parallelism must be considered in relation to the work

of John Hughlings Jackson. Freud, in his book On Aphasia, endorsed Jacksons

views and he enlisted his support against the views of many German-speaking

authorities, such as Meynert and Wernicke. Jackson rejected localizationism on

both neuroscientific and philosophical grounds and he extended his

methodological dualism into ontological dualism, which he called the doctrine

of concomitance. Moreover, there are many passages in Jacksons work, which

imply that mental states are what Freud, called dependent concomitants of

neural states. Smith (1999a) claims that perhaps Jackson was groping towards

some form of token identity theory, such as Davidsons anomalous monism. But

at the end, Jackson remained a psycho-physical parallelist and he was never

concerned with the philosophical defects of such a position.

The thesis of psycho-physical parallelism led us to a fundamental problem

related to Freuds philosophy of mind and his position to the mind-body


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problem. His claim that the psychical is a process parallel to the physiological

(Freud, On Aphasia, p.57; also Freud, S.E., 14, p. 207) which, if not intended in

a merely methodological context, is compatible with parallelism and

epiphenomenalism, but incompatible with materialism and interactionism.

Psycho-physical parallelism can be either ontological or conceptual. In the firstcase it is presented as a variation of epiphenomenalism, and in the latter it is

compatible with non-reductive materialism, because it recognizes the

inescapable necessity of a distinct kind of mental conceptions and descriptions

which are not reducible to the physical.

Paul Redding (1999,2000) argues that by 1915 Freud had to abandon

parallelism as a doctrine of the mind-body relation because of its

incompatibility with his notion of the unconscious :

With the development of the idea of the unconscious, however,

such a form of parallelism (i.e. psychophysical) had to be

abandoned, seemingly because of the inability of psychophysical

parallelism to provide a place for unconscious mentality. In the

parallelist picture, all that could be unconscious is the workings of

the brain, but Freud wanted the gaps in the conscious chain of

psychological causes to be filled with something psychical but

unconscious, not something physiological.For the parallelist

position, unconscious mental processes would be such because they

were less energetic than conscious ones. But in Freuds picture the

reverse was actually the case. Unconscious mental processes were

typically more energetic than conscious ones. (1999, pp.64-65)

Freud and Materialism

Within the materialist camp there is a crucial difference which has to be

clarified. Identity theories, which equate the mind with the brain, are of two

kinds: there is the type identity and the token identity theory. According to type

identity theory which may also be called reductive materialism, mental states

are physical states of the brain. That is, each type of mental state or process is

numerically identical some type of physical state or process within the brain or

the nervous system. Token identity theory, and especially its Davidsonian

formulation under the name of anomalous monism, claims that although each


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mental event is identical with some neurophysiological event, there are no type

identities between mental and physical events: there are only token identities.

Anomalous monism guarantees the irreducibility of psychology to physical

sciences. Concerning Freud, some scholars claimed that he was a type identity

theorist, while others advocated that he was a token identity theorist, that is anon-reductive materialist. Before examining a crucial theme for the present

dissertation, that is the relation of the Freudian philosophy of mind to the

doctrines of Kantian noumenalism and anomalous monism, we will first refer to

the materialistic interpretations of the Freudian work.

Amacher (1965) believed that Freud was an identity theorist. According to the

identity theory, mental states are identical to certain brain states and Amachers

view implies that Freud assumed the workings of the mind and those of the

brain to function according to identical principles. Amachers argument was in

large extent based on a certain reading of Freuds Projectand on his view that

Freud was an identitist from the beginning of his career, but this is untrue as

Solms and Saling showed by citing a passage from On Aphasia which is

explicitly parallelist. Moreover, Amacher supported the view that

psychoanalytical metapsychology is tied to the 19thcentury neurophysiological

theory which is nowadays discredited. Solms and Saling (1990) used certain

passages from Gehirn to refute Amachers view and they concluded that Freud

was not an identity theorist, at least not a type identity theorist, because he did

not believe that the internal structure of mental processes can be reductively

explained in terms of reflex brain events.

Flanagan (1984) argues that Freud moved from a type identity reductionism to a

methodological dualism, which he calls Thesis of the Autonomy of

Psychological Explanation. This change happened, according to Flanagan, after

1895, that is after the unsuccessful attempt of the Project. Regarding Freuds

ontological thesis, Flanagan offers two plausible solutions: Freud held an

agnostic position, or he supported a non-reductive token identity theory.

Wallace (1992) claims that Freud was never an ontological dualist and that his

dualism had only a purely methodological character. Wallace states that from at

least 1888 onwards Freud was an ontological materialist. However, he

distinguishes two periods: a) 1888-1895 during which Freud was a type identity


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theorist, and b) 1895-1939 during which Freud was dual aspect monist. He

writes:

It is hard to know conclusively whether Freuds subsequently

untrammeled methodological dualism was held provisionally, in the

hope of eventual neurobiological reduction or whether it reflected atoken-token identity theory (Flanagan, 1986, p.59) or a dual-aspect

monism, either of which permits a materialistic metaphysic and an

open-ended methodological interactional-dualism (Wallace, 1988a;

1988b; 1989; 1990). Of these three possibilities, I lean toward dual-

aspect monism (Wallace, 1992, p.249)

According to Smith (1999a) we may divide Freuds views on the mind-body

problem in two periods. From 1888 until 1895, Freud was a dualist. From 1888

to 1890 he was a psychophysical parallelist or epiphenomenalist. In 1890,

according to Smith, Freud explicitly rejected epiphenomenalism in his paper

On psychical (or mental) treatment and in 1891 in his book On Aphasia, he

was a parallelist. From 1895 until his death, Freud was an identity theorist of an

unspecified type.

Freud and the Question of Ontology

Scholars such as Matthis (2000), Opatow (1999), Redding (1999) and Solms

(1997) have underlined Kants influence on the Freudian thought. They have

claimed that Kantian noumenalism provided Freud with the solution he needed

in order to formulate his position on the mind-body problem and his theory of

consciousness. Kantian noumenalism is committed to ontological monism

reality is one- and methodological dualism it can be perceived and is known in

two different ways: through the mental and through the physical. Although

reality is one, it is at the same time in itself unknowable, it is noumenal, it is

neither mental nor physical. The crucial difference between noumenalism and

anomalous monism which is also committed to ontological monism and

methodological dualism- is that anomalous monism is committed to an

ontological monism which recognizes as only existing reality the physical one.

Thus, reality in itself is knowable, it is physical and all mental events are

physical events but mental phenomena can not be given purely physical

explanations. (Davidson, 1970).


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The aforementioned scholars have supported, not without taking their

precautions, the view that Freud was a noumenalist and based the majority of

their arguments on their interpretation of Freuds last major paper An Outline of

Psychoanalysis. In this paper, which may be considered as Freuds testament to

the psychoanalytic movement, Freud stated two fundamental hypothesesconcerning the unconscious and consciousness. The first hypothesis dealt with

localization: there is one topos for conscious processes and another for

unconscious processes. We assume that mental life is the function of an

apparatus to which we ascribe the characteristics of being extended in space and

of being made up of several portions which we imagine, that is, as resembling

a telescope or microscope or something of the kind (S.E., 23, p.145). The

second hypothesis concerned the nature of the psychical. Freud wrote:

[Psychoanalysis second fundamental hypothesis] explains the supposedly

somatic concomitant phenomena as being what is truly psychical, and thus in

the first instance disregards the quality of consciousness (S.E., 23, p.158). Irine

Matthis (2000) in her paper Sketch for a metapsychology of affect advances

the view that these two fundamental hypotheses found in Freuds last paper

signify a radical change in the Freudian metapsychology. According to this

new epistemology, both body and mind are categories established by

consciousness, they are notions and they exist as such only for consciousness:

neither body, nor mind exists as such, beyond consciousness. Matthis reading

of An Outline of Psychoanalysis is in accordance with the ideas expressed by

scholars such as Mark Solms and Luis Chiozza who both tried to sketch a

metapsychology of affect, which will permit the integration of mind and body

on the basis of affect. Within this framework, Freuds following words take

their full meaning:

The unconscious is the true psychical reality; in its innermost nature

it is as much unknown to us the reality of the external world, and it

is as incompletely presented by the data of consciousness as is the

external world by the communications of our sense organs (1900,

S.E., 5, p.613).

It is argued (Matthis, 2000; Opatow, 1999; Solms, 1997) that this line of

argument must lead us to the formation of the view that Freud was a

noumenalist. Freud repeatedly warned us not to equate perceptions by means of


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consciousness with the truth of reality (Freud, 1915, 1917). Affect serves to

conceptualize the mind-body connection because it is defined as the psychical

aspect of the somatic concomitant phenomena which Freud held to be the

truly psychical, and consequently research must be directed to the examination

of an embodied agent, not a disembodied consciousness. Thus, the twoquestions What is affect? and What is consciousness? will lead us to a

better understanding of how Freud conceptualized the mind-body problem.

Solms (1996d) writes:

So the psychical and the somatic manifestations of affect are

simply two ways of representing the same underlying thing. The

unknowable internal happening that we call affect is registered on

both perceptual surfaces simultaneously, it is perceived as an

emotion on the internal surface of consciousness, and as a somatic

state on the external surface of consciousness. This simple fact

explains why affect is both an essential subjective state and

something that is inextricably connected with the body(p.495).

The dichotomisation of the human being into mind and body is retained insofar

each one is perceived into different modalities of consciousness, pointing in

different directions. The underlying reality that these different modalities

represent is one and the same, although unknowable in itself.

The interesting question for the purposes of this dissertation is whether the

efforts of scientists such as Mark Solms can be established on the basis of

anomalous monism. It can not be easily understood why noumenalism seemed

inescapable to these efforts. In effect it seems that Solms model can work

because it guarantees the necessary methodological dualism and at the same

time it avoids the reducibility of the mental to the physical: a danger that is

always present in a materialistic thesis. But, on the other hand, Freuds work

and Solms model are not incompatible with other doctrines such as this of

anomalous monism which is also committed to ontological monism reality is

one and it is physical- and methodological dualism the mental is not reducible

to the physical. Richard Wollheim seems to be right when he wrote (1982):

Freud answered yes to this question, he was a materialist, but there

are shades and shades of materialismFreuds materialism was not


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based on linguistic considerations and he rejected reductionism. His

theory requires the mental language (pp.124-5).

Even Solms and Saling (1990), after exposing their arguments for the case of

psycho-physical parallelism and without understanding their own contradiction,

seem to accept the possibility that Freud was a non-reductive materialist. Theywrite:

It also seems plausible to interpret Freuds (1888b2) statements to

imply that he was a non-reductive materialist (see Davidson, 1980,

for an account of this position), and numerous comments in Freuds

later works would tend to support this interpretation (p.118)

As a conclusion, it may be noted that Freud was, even from the beginning of his

career, a methodological dualist. As far as his ontological thesis is concerned,

there is much ambiguity: he was a noumenalist or a materialist? The relative

bibliography can not provide a definite answer and even Freud himself was

never certain of his ideas on the topic. It seems more reasonable to seek the

answer in the needs of the current efforts of reconciling psychoanalysis with

neurosciences. Obviously, the thesis of noumenalism will not work in the

direction of reconciling these two disciplines because it violates the ontological

commitment of neurosciences. On the other hand, a doctrine such as that of

anomalous monism, can be proved useful and even indispensable for the

program of neuro-psychoanalysis, because at the same time it is committed to

the ontological monism of the physical, and it guarantees the methodological

dualism, which was, after all, Freuds major priority.

.


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3. The Development of the Freudian Theory of Consciousness

Mackay (1986) writes:

When Freud discusses the mind-brain issue it is almost always in the context

of another and, for Freud, closely related issue: that of the relationship between

the mental and the conscious. (p.390)2

In this chapter, reference is made to the development of the Freudian theory of

consciousness with respect to four major Freudian papers: The Project for a

Scientific Psychology, The Interpretation of Dreams, The Ego and the Id and An

Outline of Psychoanalysis. Our intention is to expose the view that

consciousness is a sense organ with two surfaces one directed towards the

external world and the other towards the internal- for the perception of mental

processes and, that affect is the primary sensory modality of the internal surface

of consciousness. Affect as a sensory modality of consciousness will be

extensively discussed in the next chapter.

Consciousness in the Project for a Scientific Psychology

The physicalist model of the mind presented by Freud in the Project for a

Scientific Psychologyposits two fundamental types of element and a principle

of operation. The elements are the units of structure, the material particles out

of which the apparatus is constructed, and they are known as neurones, which

form a complex network. Secondly there is energy or quantity, known as Q,

whose flow through the network of neurones obeys to the laws of motion. The

working principle of the model is that of neuronic inertia or the Constancy

Principle, according to which the apparatus has a tendency to divest itself of

2It must be noted that Freud was explicit as far as his view on the mental-conscious relation is

concerned. In his paper The Unconscious (1915, S.E., 14), Freud denied the equation of mind

with consciousness for the following reasons: a) the equation of mind with consciousness is

inconsistent with the principle of mental continuity, b) the equation of mind with consciousness

poses problems for the understanding of the interaction between mind and brain, c) this equation

overvalues the causal power of conscious mental states and d) this equation delimits the field

into which psychoanalysis and every psychology can be applied. See also Smith (1999a, p.67).


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unconscious, but we still have to find a place for the qualitative content of

consciousness in the quantitative processes.

The problem of quality is the question where do qualities originate?

According to Freuds answer, qualities are sensations which are different in a

great multiplicity of ways and whose difference is distinguished according to itsrelations with the external world (Ibid.,308) and they do not originate in the

external world, nor in the or system. Thus we summon up courage to

assume that there is a third system of neurones perhaps [we might call it]-

which is excited along with perception, but not along with reproduction, and

whose states of excitation give rise to the various qualities are, that is to say,

conscious sensations. (Ibid.,308)

As far as the question how do qualities originate, Freud formulated the period

thesis, according to which: the neurones are incapable of receiving Q, but

instead they appropriate the period of the excitation and that this state of theirs

of being affected by period while they are filled with the minimum of Q is the

fundamental basis of consciousness The filling of neurones with Q can no

doubt only proceed from , since we do not wish to admit any direct link

between this third system and . (Ibid.,310-311)

But, besides the series of sensory qualities, consciousness exhibits also the

series of sensation of pleasure and unpleasure. Since, the trend in psychical life

is to avoid unpleasure, Freud identified this trend with the primary trend

towards inertia. Unpleasure is related to a raising of the level of Q or an

increasing quantitative pressure and unpleasure would be the sensation when

there is an increase of Q in . Respectively, pleasure would be the sensation of

discharge Pleasure and unpleasure would be the sensations in of its own

cathexis, of its own level; and here and would, as it were, represent

intercommunicating vessels. In this manner the quantitative processes in too

would reach consciousness once more as qualities (Ibid.,312).

In the Project, Freud tried to account for the phenomena of consciousness

into the structure of quantitative psychology and he was aware of the fact that

no attempt, of course, can be made to explain how it is that excitatory

processes in the neurones bring consciousness along with them (Ibid.,311).

But at the same time he admitted that in his theory, consciousness possess

causal powers : consciousness is the subjective side of one part of the physical


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processes in the nervous system, namely of the processes; and the omission of

consciousness does not leave the psychical events unaltered but involves the

omission of the contribution from .(Ibid.,311).3

In a letter to Fliess on 1st January 1896, Freud changed his model of

consciousness by putting neurones between and . He wrote:The neurones are those neurones which are capable of only very

little quantitative cathexis. The coincidence between these minimal

quantities and the quality faithfully transferred to them from the end

organ is once more the necessary condition for the generating of

consciousness. I now [in my new scheme] insert these neurones

between the neurones and the neurones, so that transfers its quality

to , and now transfers neither quality nor quantity to but merely

excites that is, indicates the pathways to be taken by the free

energy.(There are, so to say, three ways in which the neurones affect

one another : (1) they transfer quantity to one another, (2) they transfer

quality to one another, (3) they have an exciting effect on one another in

accordance with certain rules.)

On this view the perceptual processes would eo ipso (from their very

nature) involve consciousness and would only produce their further

psychical effects after becoming conscious. The processes would in

themselves be unconscious and would only subsequently acquire a

secondary, artificial consciousness through being linked with processes of

discharge and perception (speech-association) (Ibid.,388-389)

According to Pribram & Gill (1976), Freud placed between and , rather

than to put between and , because he was interested in establishing that

was moved by quality without any transfer of quantity. But in one instance

3Freud was aware that the theory of consciousness he was proposing was different from the

ones proposed by two other powerful lines of thought. The first one was a mechanistic theory,

according to which consciousness is a mere appendage to physiologico-psychical processes and

its omission would leave the physical events unaltered (that is consciousness is deprived of any

causal role). The second one postulated that consciousness is the subjective side of all psychical

events and is thus inseparable from the physiological mental processes. In Freuds own words,

his theory of consciousness lies between these two.


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Freud was obliged to reconsidered this placement: that was the case of

awareness of pleasure and pain and word images from within. In this case Freud

postulated that consciousness reaches through and he accordingly revised

the relationship between , and .

In a letter of 6 December, Freud returned to his model and he substitutedpsychological for neurological terms. The neurones are now named

Wahrnehmungen (perceptions). These perceptual neurones are not modified

by the passage of information which, before reaching consciousness, is analyzed

by three more systems: (1) the Wahrnehmungzeichen (indications of speech)

which arranges information in terms of associations by simultaneity, (2) the

Unbewusstsein (unconsciousness) which arranges information in terms of

causal and conceptual relations and finally (3) the Vorbewusstsein

(preconsciousness) which corresponds to our official ego. (Smith, 1999,p.91)

In the 6 December 1896 model, episodes of consciousness precede and follow

unconscious mental processing and Freud states explicitly that consciousness

attaches to perceptions. Smith (1999a) presumes that Freud understood this

attachment of consciousness to perceptions as consisting of uninterpreted raw

sensations which are afterwards subjected to cognitive processing before their

emergence into preconsciousness as interpreted sensory experience. This

hypothesis explains why Freud thought of preconsciousness as secondary

thought consciousness.

A final note concerning the theory of consciousness in the Project must be

made: it has been proposed that Crick and Kochs recently developed theory of

the neurophysiological basis of consciousness as synchronized neural

oscillations was anticipated by Freud in his 1895 Project. As aforementioned,

Freud attempted to solve the problem of quality by hypothesizing that

information concerning conscious sensory qualities is transmitted by means of

neural periods (see Smith, 1999b).


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Consciousness in the Interpretation of Dreams

The draft that is believed to have inspired the chapter VII of the Interpretation

of Dreamswas based on Freuds January 1896 revision of the Project. (See

Solms & Saling, 1986). Despite the profound similarities between the chapterVII of the Interpretation of Dreamsand The Project for a scientific psychology,

Freud explicitly declares the displacement of his interest:

I shall entirely disregard the fact that the mental apparatus with which

we are here concerned is also known to us in the form of an anatomical

preparation, and I shall carefully avoid the temptation to determine

psychical locality in any anatomical fashion. I shall remain upon

psychological ground, and I propose simply to follow the suggestion that

we should picture the instrument which carries out our mental functions as

resembling a compound microscope or a photographic apparatus or

something of the kindWe will picture the mental apparatus as a

compound instrument, to the components of which we will give the name

of agencies, or systems. (S.E., 5,pp.536-537)

According to the model proposed in The Interpretation of Dreams, the mental

apparatus has a sense or a direction: Freud ascribed a sensory and a motor end

to the apparatus. At the sensory end lies the system Pcpt. that receives

perceptions and at the motor end lies the system M. that opens the way to motor

activity. According to the direction prescribed, psychical processes are in

general directed from the perceptual end to the motor end. The system Pcpt.

remains unaltered by the passage of stimuli and its cognitive function is to

transmit the perceived information to an array of memory systems, which are

called Mnem. systems and which are the neurones of the earlier model. In

accord with Freuds earlier formulations, it is the perceptual system, which

provides consciousness with the whole multiplicity of sensory qualities

(Ibid.,539) and the -systems of memory and consciousness are mutually

exclusive.

In the normal case, stimuli go through the apparatus from the perceptual end

and then the memory systems towards discharge through the motor end.

Obviously, information must pass through the system unconscious before it

reaches motor discharge. After passing through the unconscious, information


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enters the system preconscious which holds the key to voluntary movement

(Ibid.,541) and hence consciousness, provided that certain conditions, such as a

certain degree of intensity, are fulfilled.

A misunderstanding may occur by the comparison of the schematic diagrams

presented in The Interpretation of Dreamsand the discussion of Freuds modelof the mind included in the same text. In the schematic diagrams the Pcpt.

system abuts the Mnem. Systems, rather than feeding directly the system Cs.

But finally, in a footnote in the 1919 edition Freud recognized that we should

have to reckon with the fact that the system next beyond the Pcs. is the one to

which consciousness must be ascribed in other words Pcpt.=Cs. (Ibid.,541).

Thus, Freud seems to have retained his thesis that perceptual stimuli pass

through consciousness in an uninterpreted form before being subjected to

unconscious cognitive processes and prior to their re-emergence into

consciousness in an interpreted form. We must also note that this formulation is

compatible with the condensation of the perceptual and consciousness systems,

as it was expressed in the 1stJanuary 1896 letter in which Freud recognized that

the consciousness-producing system is a functional unit of the perceptual

system.

In effect, when Freud posed the question what part is there left to be played in

our scheme by consciousness ? he replied explicitly that consciousness can

only play the role of a sense organ for the perception of psychical qualities

(Ibid.,615). Even the mechanical properties of the system Cs. are similar to

those of the system Pcpt., because both systems are susceptible to excitation by

qualities and they are both incapable of retaining traces of alteration. This is not

the first time that Freud stated the incompatibility of memory and consciousness

and of memory and perception. Moreover, just as the psychical apparatus is

turned towards the external world via the sense organs of the Pcpt. system, the

psychical apparatus is itself the external world in relation to the sense organs of

the system Cs.. Thus, the system Cs. receives excitations from two directions:

from the Pcpt. system and from the interior of the apparatus itself, whose

quantitative processes are felt by the Cs. system in a qualitative way in the

pleasure-unpleasure series.

As far as the function of consciousness is concerned, Freud wrote that just as

the system Pcpt. directs a cathexis of attention to the paths along which the


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sensory excitation is spreading and thus functions as a regulator of the discharge

of the mobile quantity in the psychical apparatus, the system Cs. serves a

similar function: it perceives new qualities, it directs the mobile quantities of

cathexis and it distributes them in an expedient way. Moreover due to the

perception of the pleasure-unpleasure series, system Cs. influences thedischarge of the cathexes by the means of displacement of quantities into the

psychical apparatus which is in its essence unconscious. Freud thought that even

if in the first instance this displacement of cathexes was made automatically by

the unpleasure principle, consciousness of these qualities would introduce a

second and more discriminating form of regulation. This form of regulation

perfected the efficiency of the apparatus because it could now cathect and work

over even the stimuli that were associated with the release of unpleasure.4

4During the period 1910-1923, Freud published several papers, the following of which are in

some respect of interest to the present discussion of the Freudian theory of consciousness.

In A formulation on the two principles of mental functioning (1911), Freud once more

described consciousness as attached to the sense organs and he retained his view that thought is

essentially unconscious and only becomes conscious through connection with verbal residues.

In A note on the Unconscious in psycho-analysis (1912),Freud wrote:

Unconsciousness is a regular and inevitable phase in the processes constituting our

psychical activity ; every psychical act begins as an unconscious one, and it may eitherremain so or continue developing into consciousness (S.E.,12,p.262)

Thus, since perception is a psychical activity, then perceptual stimuli are transmitted to the

unconscious systems without first passing through consciousness. This view is in

accordance with the innovation introduced in his 1910 paper on the psychogenic

disturbance of vision.

In The Unconscious (1915), Freud describes the relationship between unconscious and

conscious processes in the following way: every psychical act passes through two phases; in

the first phase the psychical act is unconscious, and thus it belongs to the system Uncs.;

then it passes through censorship or testing, before becoming part of system Cs.. We must

note that here Freud uses the abbreviation system Cs. for the preconscious part of the

mental apparatus and he stated :

For the present let it suffice us to bear in mind that the system Pcs. shares the

characteristics of the system Cs. and that the rigorous censorship exercises its office at

the point of transition from the Ucs. to the Pcs. (or Cs.) (S.E., 14,p.173)

In A metapsychological supplement to the theory of dreams (1917b), Freud returns to the

issue of the relationship between the two systems: Pcpt. and Cs. .He wrote :


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Consciousness in The Ego and the Id and An Outline of Psychoanalysis

In The Ego and the Id (1923), consciousness is described as lying at the surface

of the mental apparatus in both a functional and an anatomical sense. Freud

wrote that consciousness is a system which is spatially the first one reachedfrom the external world (S.E., 19,p.19) and that all perceptions which are

reached from without (sense-perceptions) and from within what we call

sensations and feelings- are Cs. from the start (ibid.), while thinking is in the

first instance unconscious and the unconscious items become preconscious by

becoming linguistically indexed. It must be noted at this point that Freud

probably did not mean that all perceptions are conscious. While all conscious

events are perceptions according to his model, it does not happen the same with

perceptions. In The psychoanalytic view of psychogenic disturbance of

In The Interpretation of Dreams we were already led to a decision to regard conscious

perception as the function of a special system, to which we ascribed certain curious

properties, and to which we shall now have good grounds for attributing other

characteristics as well. We may regard this system, which is there called Pcpt., as

coinciding with the system Cs., on whose activity becoming conscious usually

depends.(S.E., 14,p.232)

In addition, the system Cs. of 1917 controls motility and has at its disposal a motor enervationwhich determines whether the perception can be made to disappear or whether, it proves

resistant [i.e., the mechanism of reality-testing](p.233).

In his paper A difficulty in the path of psychoanalysis (1917a), Freud described introspective

consciousness as a form of inner perception and thought of the consciousness-producing system

as a component of the ego.

In Beyond the Pleasure Principle (1920), Freud described consciousness as a function of the

system Cs.. Moreover, because consciousness registers information from within the body and

from the external world, Cs. must be located at the borderline between inner and outer and is

probably identical to some portion of the cerebral cortex. Excitatory processes that impinge

upon consciousness leave no permanent traces in Cs., because consciousness must always be

ready for the reception of new stimuli. The part of consciousness which is directed towards the

external world possess a barrier against the extremely intense external stimuli. At the same time,

Freud held, that Cs. has no such direct stimulus barrier directed towards the endogenous stimuli

because these are not so intense as the exogenous stimuli. In the case of excessive quantities of

internal stimulation (unpleasure), the mind has the tendency to treat endogenous stimuli as if

they were exogenous and in that way it brings the stimulus barrier against them (e.g. projection).


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becomes a conscious experience of unpleasure to the extent that this state

physically impinges upon the system Pcpt.. And he went on to remark that:

We then come to speak, in a condensed and not entirely correct

manner, of unconscious feelings, keeping up an analogy with

unconscious ideas which is not altogether justifiable. Actually, thedifference is that, whereas with Ucs. ideas connecting links must be

created before they can be brought into the Cs., with feelings, which

are themselves transmitted directly, this does not occur. In other

words: the distinction between Cs. and Pcs. has no meaning where

feelings are concerned; the Pcs. here drops out -and feelings are

either conscious or unconscious. Even when they are attached to

word-presentations, their becoming conscious is not due to that

circumstance, but they become so directly (S.E., 19, pp.22-23).

Freud, then, went on to clarify the nature of the ego and he noted that the ego is

that part of the id which has been modified by the direct influence of the

external world through the medium of the Pcpt.Cs.: in a sense it is an extension

of the surface-differentiation (Ibid.,25). Another factor that have played a

crucial role in the formation of the ego and its differentiation from the id, and

thus caused a part of the ego to become conscious, is a persons own body and

above all its surface. Freud wrote:

A persons own body and above all its surface, is a place from

which both external and internal perceptions may spring. It is seen

like any other object, but to the touch it yields two kinds of

sensations, one of which may be equivalent to an internal

perception. Psycho-physiology has fully discussed the manner in

which a persons own body attains its special position among other

objects in the world of perception. Pain, too, seems to play a part in

the process, and the way in which we gain new knowledge of our

organs during painful illnesses is perhaps a model of the way by

which in general we arrive at the idea of our body.

The ego is first and foremost a bodily ego; it is not merely a surface

entity, but is itself the projection of a surface. If we wish to find an

anatomical analogy for it we can best identify it with the cortical

homunculus of the anatomists, which stands on its head in the


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cortex, sticks up its heels, faces backwards and, as we know, has its

speech-area on the left hand side. (ibid., pp.25-26)

In Freuds last work,An Outline of Psychoanalysis(1940), there are no changes

in his model of consciousness. Once more consciousness is viewed as an

internal sense organ, which perceives the subjects mental processes. Freud(1940) wrote:

The process of something becoming conscious is above all linked

with the perceptions, which our sense organs receive from the

external world. From the topographical point of view, therefore, it is

a phenomenon that takes place in the outermost cortex of the ego. It

is true that we also receive conscious information from the inside of

the body the feelings, which actually exercise a more peremptory

influence on our mental life than external perceptions; moreover, in

certain circumstances the sense organs themselves transmit feelings,

sensations of pain, in addition to the perceptions specific to them.

Since, however, these sensations (as we call them in contrast to

conscious perceptions) also emanate from the terminal organs and

since we regard all these as prolongations or offshoots of the

cortical layer, we are still able to maintain the assertion made above

[at the beginning of this paragraph]. The only distinction would be

that, as regards the terminal organs of sensation and feeling, the

body itself would take the place of the external world. (S.E., 23,

pp.161-2)


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4. Consciousness and Affect: Mark Solms Model

Freud understood consciousness as similar to an internal sense organ taking

mental processes as its objects. (Laplanche & Pontalis, 1980; Smith, 1999;

Solms, 1997; Herzog, 1991).

Herzog (1991) writes:

The close and essential connection between consciousness and

perception is nowhere more evident than in Freuds evolving view

of the consciousness of instinctual or affective processes what, for

lack of a better word, I have termed feeling. (p.55).

In the present chapter, we will initially discuss the primary role of affect in

the proposed model of consciousness and the differences between the

consciousness of external and internal stimuli. Next, we will consider Solms

reading of the Freudian model of consciousness and especially the function

of affect as modality of consciousness and as a bridge of linking the mind

with the body.

On the Primacy of Affect

Ontologically and phylogenetically speaking, consciousness of qualities of

pleasure and unpleasure precede consciousness of the external world. In the

Formulations on the Two Principles of Mental Functioning (1911), Freud

wrote:

The increased significance of external reality heightened the

importance, too, of the sense-organs that are directed towards the

external world, and of the consciousness attached to them.

Consciousness now learned to comprehend sensory qualities in

addition to the qualities of pleasure and unpleasure which hitherto

had alone been of interest to it. (S.E., 12, p.216)

Another passage that supports the primary position of the internal stimuli over

the external ones in the ontogenesis and phylogenesis can be found in Beyond

the Pleasure Principle (1920):

The excitations coming from within are, however, in their intensity

and in other, qualitative, respects in their amplitude, perhaps- more


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commensurate with the systems method of working than the stimuli

which stream in from the external world. This state of things

produces two definite results. First, the feelings of pleasure and

unpleasure (which are index to what is happening in the interior of

the apparatus) predominate over all external stimuli. And secondly,a particular way is adopted of dealing with any internal excitations

which produce too great an increase of unpleasure: there is a

tendency to treat them as though they were acting, not from the

inside, but from the outside, so that it may be possible to bring the

shield against stimuli into operation as a means of defense against

them. (S.E., 18, pp.28-29)

These two passages aptly demonstrate Freuds view that organisms are born

fundamentally affective, and only with maturation they become ever

increasingly cognitive.

External and Internal Stimuli

There is a crucial difference between external and internal stimuli in the

Freudian model of consciousness. In regard to the operation of the external

senses, Freud noted:

It is characteristic of them that they deal only with very small

quantities of external stimulation and only take in samples of the

external world. They may perhaps be compared with feelers which

are all the time making tentative advances towards the external

world and then drawing back from it (S.E., 18, pp. 27-28)

On the other hand, the internal perception of endogenously generated stimuli

lacks any shield against excessive stimuli, as it is the case for the external

stimuli.

[T]he difference between the conditions governing the reception of

excitations in the two cases have a decisive effect on the functioning

of the system and of the whole mental apparatus. Towards the

outside it is shielded against stimuli, and the amounts of excitation

impinging on it have only a reduced effect. Towards the inside there

can be no such shield; the excitations in the deeper layers extend

into the system directly and in undiminished amount, in so far as


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certain of their characteristic give rise to feelings in the pleasure-

unpleasure series. (S.E., 18, pp.28-29)

Solms extension of the Freudian theory of Consciousness

On May 7, 1996, Solms presented his paper What is consciousness? as theCharles Fisher Memorial Lecture at the New York Psychoanalytic Society.

Solms reply to the question posed by the title of his lecture was based on a

contemporary reading of the Freudian theory of consciousness in relation to the

neurosciences and the philosophy of mind.

Schematically, Solms (1997) argued that:

1.

Consciousness is not caused by neurobiological processes in the brain.

2. The fundamental proposition of psychoanalysis is that all mental

processes are in themselves unconscious.

3. Consciousness is a reflection of mental activity, or a perception of mental

activity which is itself unconscious.

4. Freud followed Kant in believing that we can be aware only of

phenomena: things in themselves can never be known because beyond

every phenomenon is an unknowable noumenon.5

Based on these primary assumptions, Solms developed his reply in the direction

of considering consciousness as a sense organ for perception of the mental

processes. Consciousness, according to Solms reading of the Freudian theory,

5Solms advances the view that Freud was in great extent influenced by Kant and he quotes the

following passage: The psycho-analytic assumption of unconscious mental activity appears to

us as an extension of the corrections undertaken by Kant of our views on external perception.

Just as Kant warned us not to overlook the fact that our perceptions are subjectively conditioned

and must not be regarded as identical with what is perceived though unknowable, so psycho-

analysis warns us not to equate perceptions by means of consciousness with the unconscious

mental processes which are their object. Like the physical, the psychical is not necessarily in

reality what it appears to be (S.E.,14, p.171). Thus, according to Solms, Freud held the view

that both the internal and the external reality are in themselves unknowable: reality is

ontologically one, though it is knowable to us under distinct attributes of extension (physics)

and thought (psychology). (Opatow, 1999). For a similar line of argument regarding Freuds

relation to Kants philosophy, see Paul Redding (1999), The Logic of Affect, New York : Cornell

University Press and Barry Opatow (1999), Affect and the Integration Problem of Mind and

Brain,Neuro-Psychoanalysis, 1: 97-110.


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represents a kind of internal sensory modality, which perceives the processes

occurring within us.

Solms (1997) writes:

We are aware of two different aspects of the world simultaneously.

First we are aware of the natural processes occurring in the externalworld, which are represented to us in the form of our external

perceptual modalities of sight, sound, touch, taste, smell, etc.

Second, we are aware of the natural processes occurring within our

own selves, which are represented to us in the form of our

subjective consciousness. We are aware of nothing else. These are

the only constituents of the envelope of conscious awareness, which

defines the limits of human experience. (p.685)

In developing Freuds model, Solms states that the envelope of consciousness is

derived from six primary perceptual modalities. On its external surface, we find

quantitative stimuli presented to us in the qualitative modalities of vision,

hearing, somatic sensation, taste and smell. On its internal surface, we find

quantitative stimuli in the qualitative modality that we call affect.6 In Solms

model, affect is the primary sensory modality of the internal surface of

consciousness.

According to Solms, what is special about Freuds formulation is that the

natural processes occurring within us are represented consciously by means of a

sensory modality that faces inward and this modality is the sense of affect. We

construct the images of ourselves by processing constantly conjoined patterns of

stimuli derived from the internal sensory modality of affect, in accordance with

various algorithms, and thereby generating inferred entities experienced as

subjective feelings.(ibid.p.692).

The space that lies between the two poles of awareness the internal and

external surfaces of consciousness- is what is described in psychoanalysis as the

ego. Thus, Solms goes on to note that the totality of human consciousness

consists in three things: (1) primary external perceptions, (2) primary internal

6 Of course this classification is an oversimplification, because normally every modality

comprises other modalities or submodalities as well.


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Regarding the effects of these oscillations on consciousness, Solms and

Nersessian (1999a) write:

For this, according to Freud, is what affect is: Feelings of pleasure

and unpleasure are the psychical quality attaching to transpositions

of energy inside the apparatus (1915a); they are the qualitativeform in which oscillations in the tension of instinctual needs

become conscious (Freud, 1940, p.198). Around this core, all the

other aspects of affect are organized. (pp.7-8)

Solms model is constructed around the definition of affect as lying on the

frontier between the mental and the somatic (Freud, 1915a) and the nature of

consciousness as an internal embodied sense organ.

In the next chapter, we will discuss the possibility of building bridges between

Solms metapsychological conceptions of affect and consciousness and the

recent progresses made by neuroscientists such as Antonio Damasio and Jaak

Panksepp.


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5. Affect and Consciousness: From psychoanalysis to

neurosciences

In the mid-1990s two popular books written by neuroscientists, Descartes

Error: Emotion, Reason and The Human Brainby Antonio R. Damasio and The

Emotional Brain: The Mysterious Underpinnings of Emotional Lifeby Joseph

LeDoux, marked a profound change in the way emotions and consciousness

were treated by cognitive scientists. Not only they provided a new framework

for research, but they also criticized severely the cognitive paradigm:

cognitivism had abstracted almost all the phenomenological characteristics of

emotions and feelings from the scientific research of emotions and

consciousness. Paradoxically, many scientists had already concluded that within

the cognitive paradigm emotions had become affectless and they criticized it

for its neglect of the phenomenal consciousness of emotions (Tomkins, 1995;

Zajonc, 1984; Armon Jones, 1991). Paul Redding (1999) writes:

A striking feature of these books was the support they offered for

the Jamesian thesis that the felt-center of emotion consists of

informational feedback from states of the body. Another, given their

convergence with accounts such as Zajoncs, which discussed the

(access) unconscious aspects of emotion, was the indirect support

they provided for some of the basic tenets of another late-

nineteenth-century, early-twentieth-century psychologist, Sigmund

Freud. Curiously, both books have the feel of the late-nineteenth-

century Zeitgeist, a naturalistic outlook strongly based in

evolutionary biology but willing to talk about consciousness and

subjectivity in a way that has been excluded from most of the

twentieth century. (p.17).

In the following years, two other similar books appeared The Feeling of WhatHappens: Body and Emotion in the Making of Consciousness by Antonio R.

Damasio andAffective Neuroscienceby Jaak Panksepp. In all these efforts it is

made explicitly clear that the mind had to be first about the body and that the

body representation is the brains permanent background reference for the

structuring of the self and its relation to the world. Within this new framework


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affects, emotions and feelings stand at the critical point of integration of mind

and body and they provide the basis for what Panksepp calls affective

consciousness or what Damasio calls core consciousness.

During the twentieth century many attempts of integration of psychoanalysis

and neurosciences have been made.7

Probably, the most striking problem in allthese efforts was the quest of an adequate methodology and the problem of

translatability of the different vocabularies of the two disciplines. In this final

chapter we will try to delineate certain points of agreement between

psychoanalysis and the aforementioned neuroscientific models. This attempt to

reconcile psychoanalysis with neurosciences was inspired by a recent effort,

made under the editorship of Mark Solms and Edward Nersessian, which led to

the publication of the journal Neuro-Psychoanalysis.8 We will examine

consecutively the possible points of agreement between the Freudian

metapsychology of affect and consciousness with the works of Panksepp and

Damasio.

7E.g., Epstein (1987, 1989, 1995), Erdelyi (1985), Frick (1982), Galin (1974), Hadley (1983,

1992), Harris (1986), Hartmann (1982), Heilbrunn (1979), Hosmins (1936), Joseph (1982,

1992), Kaplan-Solms & Solms (2000) Kokkou & Leuzinger-Bohleber (1992), Levin (1991),

Maclean (1962), McLaughlin (1978), Meyersburg & Post (1979), Miller (1991), Negri (1994),

Olds (1992), Ostow (1954, 1955a, 1955b, 1955c, 1956, 1959), Palombo (1992), Peterfreund

(1971, 1975), Reiser (1984, 1990), Schilder (1935), Schore (1994), Schwartz (1987,

1988),Solms (1996a, 1996b, 1996c, 1997, 1998),Solms & Nersessian (1999), Solms & Saling

(1990), Stone (1977), Winson (1985), Zueler & Maas (1994).8The first issue ofNeuro-Psychoanalysis: An Interdisciplinary Journal for Psychoanalysis and

Neuroscienceswas devoted to the topic of affect.


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Jaak Panksepp and Affective Consciousness

Affective neuroscience is based on the premise that emotional process and the

subjectively experienced feelings do play a causal role in the chain of events

that control the actions of both humans and animals. The methodology proposedby Panksepp in order to examine these emotional systems can be summed up to

the following steps: (a) the examination of the major categories of human

affective experience across individuals and cultures, (b) the study of the natural

categories of animal emotive behaviors and (c) the analysis of the brain circuits

from which the tendencies arise (Panksepp, 1998).

At the last chapter of his book Affective Neuroscience, Panksepp defends his

proposal concerning the fundamentally affective nature of primal consciousness.

He writes (1998):

Considering this possibility, I would argue that basic affective

states, which initially arise from the changing neurodynamics of a

SELF-representation mechanism, may provide an essential psychic

scaffolding for all other forms of consciousness. Thus, a primitive

affective awareness may have been an evolutionary prerequisite for

the emergence of perceptual-cognitive awareness. If so,

computational and sensory-perceptual approaches to consciousness

must take affective bodily representations into account if their

higher extrapolations are to be correct. From such a vantage,

Descartes faith in his assertion I think, therefore I am may be

superseded by a more primitive affirmation that is part of the

genetic makeup of all mammals: I feel, therefore I am. (p.309)

Moreover, Panksepp does not hesitate to acknowledge Feuds rightness

regarding the central place that affects occupied in psychoanalysis and in his

theory of consciousness. Freud recognized, just as Panksepp tries today to prove

it, that affects register the importance of salient events and thereby permeate

the higher conscious functions of the mental apparatus. Another point of

agreement between Freud and Panksepp can be found on the causal role that

both of them ascribe to affects and their relation to consciousness.

Freuds insights on the nature of affects were prescientAffective

states, arising from a variety of emotional and motivational


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processes, may constitute the ground in the figure-ground

relationships that constitute ordinary conscious experiences. Even

though our conscious mind is not prepared to focus on the ground

processes as readily as on the figurative contents of mind,, those

affective states may be absolutely essential for any type ofconsciousness to have emerged in brain evolution.

In the mammalian brain, all higher forms of consciousness may still

be grounded on the most primitive forms of consciousness, which I

assume were affective in nature. As already mentioned, without the

ground of affective experience, I suspect that individuals would

present themselves as the proverbial zombies of philosophical

discourse.(Panksepp, 1999a, p.20)

As far as the neural substrate that permitted the emergence of affective feelings

in brain evolution is concerned, Panksepp hypothesizes that they provide the

primitive foundation for ego development and he proposes that the ego

germinates from these primitive areas of the brain where the basic emotional

systems interact with the basic neural representations of the body.

In An Outline of Psychoanalysis, Freud posed the following question that

modern neuroscientists, such as Panksepp, try to answer: by what means and

with the help of what sensory terminal organs these perceptions [affective

feelings] come about (Freud, S.E., 23, p.198). In their attempt to find the neural

correlates of Freuds functional topography, neuroscientists faced the dilemma

of whether the perceptual system, which registers primary affective

consciousness, is to be located in deep subcortical structures (principally in the

region of PGA) or in neocortical forebrain structures (principally the prefrontal

lobes). LeDoux proposed that the most crucial role in sustaining every form of

consciousness is played by the core brainstem structures, although he attributes

the generation of conscious quality to working memory. Panksepp, on the other

hand, seems to follow Damasio who distinguishes between animals having

feelings (a function served by subcortical structures) and knowing that they

have feelings (a function which requires forebrain processing.

This distinction between subcortical and cortical consciousness-generating

systems led Panksepp to propose a further distinction between two types of

consciousness, cognitive and affective consciousness, which are sustained


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by distinct dorsal/neocortical and ventral/limbic systems respectively. This

conclusion resembles Freuds own proposal that consciousness is registered by

two perceptual surfaces, one oriented toward the external world, and the other

toward the interior of the body. Freud (1940) wrote:

The id, cut off from the external world, has a world of perceptionsof its own. It detects with extraordinary acuteness certain changes in

its interior, especially oscillations in the tension of its instinctual

needs, and these changes become conscious as feelings in the

pleasure-unpleasure series (S.E., 23, p.198)

However, it must be emphasized that Feuds model of consciousness, and

especially its two perceptual surfaces, is a functional model, like all of his

topography, which can not be mapped onto anatomical structures in a simple

and isomorphic fashion.9

9 Damasio (1999b) warn us: Likewise, I would caution against the neophrenological slip of

considering selected regions as providers of large-scale functions. The interconnectivity among

regions is of such a degree that, in all likelihood, the relevant neural patterns arise in a cross-

regional and supraregional manner(p.39).


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Antonio Damasio and Core Consciousness

Damasios first book Descartes Error is based on two basic hypotheses: (1)

emotions play a positive role in the adaptive functions of the mind, and (2) they

do so by bringing the current state of the body to conscious awareness. Damasio(1994) writes:

Feelings offer us a glimpse of what goes on in our flesh, as a

momentary image of that flesh is juxtaposed to the images of other

objects and situations; in so doing, feelings modify our

comprehensive notion of those other objects and situations. By dint

of juxtaposition, body images give other images a quality of

goodness or badness of pleasure or pain(p159)

Damasio in his first book constructs a new theory that combines the James-

Lange paradigm with contemporary neuroscientific knowledge and it

incorporates many components of Freuds metapsychology.

Just like Freud, Damasio conceptualizes the mental apparatus as a

phylogenetically evolved sympathetic ganglion that mediates between

compelling demands arising from the internal milieu of the body, on the one

hand, and the practical constraints of external reality on the other.

Moreover, Damasio, like the early Freud, suggests that emotions contribute to

the regulation of this adaptive, self-preservative process by generating signals of

pleasure and unpleasure, which reflect the vicissitudes of the internal milieu

with reference to an underlying economic or homeostatic principle:

Achieving survival coincides with the ultimate reduction of

unpleasant body states and the attaining homeostatic ones, i.e.,

functionally balanced biological states. The internal preference

system is inherently biased to avoid pain, seek potential pleasure,

and is probably pretuned for achieving these goals in social

situations (Ibid.,179; see also p.262).

In his second book, The Feeling of What Happens, in a fusion of developmental

biology, clinical neurology and physiological psychology, Damasio argues that

human consciousness emerged out of the development of emotion. According to

Damasio, feeling an emotion is a simple matter, consisting as it does of mental

images arising from the neural patterns that represent the changes in the body


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that make up an emotion. But having consciousness of that feeling, feeling the

feeling, is the crucial step in the development of human consciousness. Having

feelings is of extraordinary value in the orchestration of survival. But beyond

that, Damasio asserts that the mechanisms that permit consciousness may have

prevailed because it was useful for organisms to know of their emotions.Emotional processes target both body and brain: the brain nuclei primarily

concerned with managing the life processes regulating heart function,

mediating pain, controlling breathing- are closely interconnected with those

concerned with attention, arousal, sleep and consciousness. Thus, the fact that

the regulation of life process and of consciousness are so intimately connected

is not due to an anatomical accident, but it is rather a development of real

evolutionary worth.

Central to his theory is the idea that the part of the mind we call self is

biologically speaking- grounded on a collection of nonconscious neural patterns

standing for the part of the organism we call the body proper. Behind the notion

of self, there is the notion of the singular, stable individual. Consciousness

depends on the internal construction and exhibition of new knowledge

concerning an interaction between the organism and an object. In the same line

of argument, we may say that for Damasio, affect arises out of interaction

between internal milieu and outside world and that the essential context of

affect is defined by the self in relation to the object.

Damasio (1999a) does not hesitate to avow his influences:

The view of consciousness I adopt here connects historically with

those expressed by thinkers as diverse as Locke, Brentano, Kant,

Freud and William James. They believed as I do that consciousness

is an inner sense. Curiously, the inner sense view is no longer

mainstream in consciousness studies. (p.126).

Damasio further distinguishes core consciousness, which is concerned with the

here and now, from extended consciousness, which includes autobiographical

memory and the perception of time. Core consciousness is a second-order state

of the mind/ brain located in some specific regions, and capable of representing

the relation between representations of objects and representations of the soma,

while the latter is almost invariably reacting emotionally to some object or

another: Core consciousness occurs when the brains representation devices


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generate an imaged, nonverbal account of how the organisms own state is

affected by the organisms processing of an object, and when this process

enhances the image of the causative object, thus placing it saliently in a spatial

and temporal context (Ibid.,169). As far as the connection of core

consciousness to emotions is concerned, Damasio asserts that emotions and coreconsciousness tend to go together and that both emotions and core

consciousness require, in part, the same neural substrates.

For the relation of his work to the Freudian metapsychology of affect, Damasio

(1999b) writes:

I believe we can say that Freuds insights on the nature of affect

are consonant with the most advanced contemporary neuroscience

views. Emotion and feeling are operated in the brain, neurally

speaking, in the manner everything else is operated neurally, and

yet, emotion and feeling are distinctive on several counts: Emotions

are genomically preset and largely innate; they have an

indispensable ingredient (pleasure or unpleasure); and there is a

unique within-ness about them. I have proposed (without thinking of

Freud but coincident with him), that the body, real, and as

represented in the brain, is the theater for the emotions, and that

feeling are largely read-outs of body changes really enacted in the

body and really constructed in an as-if mode in body-mapping

brain structures. (pp.38-39)

To the extent that Damasios theory is compatible with Freuds theory, it

provides as a provisional working model of the neurophysical correlates of the

metapsychology of affect. Correlations of this sort are useful to psychoanalysis

in its present stage of development, for the reason that they create a conceptual

and experimental bridge between psychoanalysis and contemporary

neuroscience.

Solms and Nersessian (1999b) have argued that Freuds conceptualization of

affect as an internally directed perceptual modality is relatively easy to reconcile

with current neuroscientific views and researches. The aforementioned

perspectives on the Freudian theory of consciousness constitute initial and

cautious steps in the field of neuro-psychoanalysis. Hopefully, these preliminary

efforts will lead to the realization of more detailed and experimental programs.


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Ho

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Freud's Theory of Conciousness

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