Freud’s view on the nature of affect and the implications of Damasio’s view of the body/brain.

7/30/2019 Freuds view on the nature of affect and the implications of Damasios view of the body/brain.

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A discussion of Freuds view on the nature of affect and the implications of

Damasios view of the body/brain relation for this aspect of psychoanalysis.

Crispin Balfour MNZAP Registered Psychotherapist

Introduction

In this paper I will explain Freud's view on the nature of affect and discuss the

implications of Damasio's view of the body/brain relation for this aspect of

psychoanalysis.

I will proceed by a careful reading of Freud's texts for references to affect, trying

to grasp the "internal consistency more than by considering the isolated facts to

which he drew attention." (Green, 1999b, pp.40-44) I will also be guided by, and

refer to, Andr Green's book 'The Fabric of Affect in the Psychoanalytic

Discourse' (1999)

I will ground my understanding of Damasio's view of the body/brain relation in

his book 'The Feeling of What Happens' (2000) but also in references and

critiques of his work by other writers. I will use this understanding to think about

the implications for psychoanalysis.

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Freud

In order to explain Freuds view on the nature of affect, this essay will follow the

development of his thinking on the subject as it evolved over the course of his life.

Freud's later thought includes, rests upon, and only sometimes, supersedes the

earlier, in a manner somewhat reminiscent of the evolution of the brain. Just as an

evolutionary perspective is helpful in understanding the brain, so also will it be

helpful in understanding his view of affect.

Hysteria

Freuds interest in affect began when working clinically with Breuer on hysteria.

They observed their patients had a surplus of excitation in their nervous system,

which manifested in symptoms. (Freud, 2001a, pp.49-50) Freud linked this

excess psychic energy with alterations in their patients thoughts, and

magnification and suppression of feelings (Freud, p.49). He came to understand

hysterical symptoms as the result of a failure to maintain, through appropriate

discharge, a constant sum of excitation in the nervous system. (Breuer, J. &

Freud, 2001, p.12) When this imbalance of psychical energy was corrected

through appropriate discharge of their feelings, the symptoms disappeared:

For we found, to our great surprise at first, that each individual hysterical

symptom immediately and permanently disappeared when we had

succeeded in bringing clearly to light the memory of the event by which it

was provoked and in arousing its accompanying affect, and when the patient

had described that event in the greatest possible detail and had put the

affect into words. Recollection without affect almost invariably produces no

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result. (Breuer & Freud, 2001, p.6) (emphasis in the original)

Freud's experience with hysterical patients alerted him to the relationship between

the ideational content of memories (the representations) and the affect associated

with them. Affect seemed more of the nature of an energetic phenomena, and

could be understood as contributing a quantitative aspect to psychic contents:

I refer to the concept that in mental functions something is to be

distinguisheda quota of affect or sum of excitationwhich possesses all

the characteristics of a quantity (though we have no means of measuring it),

which is capable of increase, diminution, displacement and discharge, and

which is spread over the memory-traces of ideas somewhat as an electric

charge is spread over the surface of a body. (Freud, 2001b, p.60)

The Project

Freud developed his interest in the energetic aspects of mental phenomena in the

'Project for a Scientific Psychology' (1950), which, although never published in

his lifetime, set the scene for his work over the next twenty years and made

important contributions to his understanding of affect. In 'The Project', Freud

begins by discussing the tendency of the psychical apparatus to minimise its

psychical energy through the principles of 'inertia', 'flight from the stimulus' and

'discharge', and yet is required, owing to its complexity, to retain a certain quantity

to maintain life and the capacity for specific action. (Freud, 2001m, p.318) He

then proceeds, by way of his understanding of neuronal processes and

consciousness, to attend to affectual experience.

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Investigating the Experience of Satisfaction Freud suggests our experience of

need is the result of neurones being gradually filled with cathexis, leading to an

effort to discharge (Freud, 2001m, p.317). This process of gradual filling he

calls summation (Freud, p.322), whereby endogenous stimuli of an intercellular

nature accumulate until they become psychical by engaging the neural network. In

response to this filling, at first the naive organism attempts internal change

through the expression of emotions, screaming, vascular change (Freud, p.317),

but since the stimulus (for example hunger) is arising from within, the organism is

not able to withdraw or flee and must seek specific action in relation to the

external world, such as the supply of nourishment (Freud, p.318). This subjects

the individual to the exigencies of life (Freud, p.297). Infants are helpless to

carry out the specific action for themselves and need help from outside. Freud

notes: In this way this path of discharge acquires a secondary function of the

highest importance, that of communication, and the initial helplessness of human

beings is the primal source of all moral motives (Freud, p.318).

Andr Green (1999a) comments as follows:

One can hardly stress too strongly this primary link between discharge

through emotivity and motricity, and the function of communication, from

which language springs. Better still from now on satisfaction will be

associated with the image of the object that first aroused it and the moving

image of the reflex movement that allowed its discharge. (p.24)

Freud writes that the residue of this experience of satisfaction is a wishful state

(desire), because it leaves 'facilitations' in the neuronal network that result in a

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positive attraction of a compulsive kind towards the mnemic image of the

desired object, which in turn greatly increases the cathexis of perception of an

actual object. (Freud, 2001m, p.322)

Freud then turns his attention to "Pain", which he understands as irruption into

the psychical apparatus of excessive quantities of excitation (Freud, 2001m,

p.307). Pain is experienced as unpleasure owing to the rapid increase of cathexis,

which the organism wants to rid itself of as quickly as possible.

In the case of pain caused by an external phenomenon, the source of the

overwhelming excitation is the environment. When pain arises from perceiving,

but not being impinged upon by, a hostile object (previously-experienced-pain-

producing-thing), Freud suggests the perception accesses memories which release

unpleasure from the interior of the body through the action of secretory or key

neurones (Freud, p.320). These 'secretory neurones' increase the endogenous

production of psychical energy supplying it in roundabout ways (Freud, p.320)

which Freud suspects may include chemical products (Freud, p.321). He

compares the process to "sexual release" (Freud, p.321).

In either case the overwhelming excitation seeks discharge, resulting in both a

strong reaction to the hostile object - a reflex defence (Freud, p.322), and also a

disinclination to keeping the hostile mnemic image cathected (Freud, p.322).

Freud notes it is harder to explain this latter abandonment of the mnemic image

which he names as primary defence or repression. He suggests an answer lies

in the way the pain was brought to an end, which resulted in the emergence of

another object in place of the hostile one: This signal of the end of pain teaches

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the organism biologically to seek to reproduce the state which marked the

cessation of pain. Freud adds another consequence is that painful memories will

tend to be forgotten by their association with an increase in excitation. (Freud,

p.322)

Only the internal discharge, endogenous and secretory, bound up with the

memory-trace of the hostile object is specifically affect in Freuds schema

(Green, 1999a, pp.25-26), and it is associated with violence, body and defence:

A dimension of violence is added here in the reaction and bodily

participation that confer this specificity upon it. It should also be stressed

that the affect is produced during the repetition of the bodily experience of

pain. It is this reproductive quality that gives it its properly psychical

dimension. Note, furthermore, the stress laid on the closeness of the bonds

between the affect and the defence that it mobilises. This defence is aimed at

an ever more advanced sensitivity of the psychical apparatus to the

evocation of the affect, qua the signal mobilised by the increasingly discrete

cathexes of the memory-trace of the hostile object. (Green, 1999a, p.26.)

Although desire involves an affective state in the everyday sense of the terrn,

Green suggests Freud does not include it as such (Green, 1999a, p.25). However

Freud seems to be suggesting both pain and desire are the result of a process of

accumulation of endogenous stimuli of an intercellular nature accumulating. The

difference between pain and desire is that in the former case (pain) the

accumulation is too rapid and overwhelming, whereas in the latter (desire) it is

measured. As Green notes, Laplanche and Pontalis overcome this disparity by

suggesting the traumatic character of any instinctual manifestation prior to the

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satisfaction or unsatisfaction that follow it. (Green, 1999a, n.1, p.26)

The Interpretation of Dreams

Freud's great break with his "epistemological roots" comes with the publication of

'The Interpretation of Dreams' (1900) (Green, 1999, p.31) and he returns to affect,

asserting its importance in dreams (Freud, 2001c, p.460): He suggests affects, in

contrast with ideational content, remain unaltered by dreams (Freud, p.460).

Freud then apparently contradicts himself by suggesting affects are changed by

elimination, diminuition and reversal (Freud, p.477). However there remains a

difference between the way a dream treats the representative contents (thoughts),

which are subject to all manner of distortions, and the way a dream treats affects:

Affects remain as wholes and resist fragmentation. (Green, 1999a, p.34)

The reversal of affect (Freud, 2001c, p.471), mentioned above, appears again in

Freuds analysis of Dora (Freud, 2001d, p.28), where he links affect with another

feature of the instinctual life, 'contrasted pairs', which Freud mentions in his

analysis of Little Hans:

The emotional life of man is in general made up of pairs of contraries such

as these. Indeed, if it were not so, repressions and neuroses would perhaps

never come about. In the adult these pairs of contrary emotions do not as a

rule become simultaneously conscious except at the climaxes of passionate

love; at other times they usually go on suppressing each other until one of

them succeeds in keeping the other altogether out of sight. But in children

they can exist peaceably side by side for quite a considerable time. (Freud,

2001d, p.113)

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This double structure of the affect (Green, 1999a, p.37) leads Freud to thinking

about ambivalence and the ways in which opposed feelings may subsist side by

side. (Freud, 2001e, p.239)

Repression

Freud returns to affects in his metapsychological paper 'Repression' (1915a): He

divides what is repressed into two elements, the idea and the quota of affect

(Freud, 2001g, p.152). The fate of the repressed idea is that it should vanish from

consciousness, whereas the quota of affect may either:

i) Be completely repressed along with the drive;

ii) Appear as a qualitatively defined affect;

iii) Change into anxiety. (Freud, p.153)

Freud has made a distinction here between a quota of affect and a qualitatively

defined affect. Quota of affect refers to ... the instinct in so far as the latter has

become detached from the idea and finds expression, proportionate to its quantity,

in processes which are sensed as affects. (Freud, 2001g, p.152) Qualitatively

defined affect has become the subjective transposition of the quantity of

instinctual energy (Laplanche & Pontalis, 1973, p.14)

In terms of repression, Freud places affect centre-stage, since the whole aim of

repression is the total inhibition of the affect of unpleasure: If a repression does

not succeed in preventing feelings of unpleasure or anxiety from arising, we may

say that it has failed, even though it may have achieved its purpose as far as the

ideational portion is concerned. (Freud, 2001g, p.153)

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The third possible fate of affect subject to repression (mentioned above) is that it

should be transformed into anxiety. Freud does not think anxiety should be

distinguished in nature from the other affects, both anxiety and the other affective

states are reproductions of very early, perhaps even pre-individual, experiences

of vital importance comparable to universal, typical and innate hysterical

attacks (Freud, 2001k, p.133, quoted in Laplanche & Pontalis, 1973, p.14)

The Unconscious

In his next metapsychological paper 'The Unconscious' (1915b) Freud asks the

question whether affects can be unconscious, either as quota of affect,

qualitatively defined affect, or anxiety. Although feelings originate in instincts,

which can never become conscious and even in the unconscious only exist as

represented by an idea, it is of the essence of an emotion that we should be aware

of it. (Freud, 2001h, p.178) Freud is certain there can be no unconscious affects

in the same way as ideas, because ideas are cathexes of memory traces, whilst

affects and emotions correspond to processes of discharge. (Freud, p.178.)

Freud suggests when an affect is repressed it remains only as a potential

beginning that is prevented from developing. (Freud, 2001h, p.178) He mentions

how repression therefore extends beyond just withholding things from

consciousness, to include both preventing development of affectivity and also

preventing the muscular activity that is the external expression of such, noting that

Affectivity manifests itself essentially in motor (secretory and vaso-motor)

discharge". The effects of this are twofold: Firstly, "an (internal) alteration of the

subject's own body without reference to the external world"; and secondly,

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"motility, in actions designed to effect changes in the external world. (Freud,

p.178)

However Freud considers repression of affectivity is necessarily uncertain,

resulting in a constant battle between the two systems Cs. and Ucs. as to its fate.

Where affect proceeds directly from the system Ucs. it always has the character of

anxiety, for which all repressed affects are exchanged. (Freud, 2001h, p.179)

Most often however the repressed instinctual impulse will wait until it finds a

substitute idea in the system Cs. and this idea will determine the nature of the

affect that manifests.

The Ego and the Id

In 1923 Freud published The Ego and the Id and took up the problem of affects

again. He begins his enquiry considering what it means to make something

conscious now he has moved to a dynamic model of the psyche. He refers back to

Beyond the Pleasure Principle where consciousness is related to the perceiving

surface of the mental apparatus (Freud, 2001i, p.25-27) which receives sense-

perceptions from without and within. (Freud, p.19) However other internal

processes such as thoughts and affects, which are not sensate as such, present a

special problem. Freud is of the opinion that only what may be perceived by the

perceptual system can be thought of as conscious:

... it dawns upon us like a new discovery that only something which has

once been a Cs. perception can become conscious, and anything arising

from within (apart from feelings) that seeks to become conscious must try to

transform itself into external perceptions. (Freud, 2001j, p.20).

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In the case of thoughts, Freud suggests the difference between an unconscious

thought (idea) and a conscious thought (idea) consists in linking the unconscious

idea with a word-presentation which brings it into the preconscious where it is

available to consciousness. These word-presentations are memory-traces, that is

they are mnemic residues of something that was once conscious (perceived), and

as such may become conscious again.

On the other hand, feelings occupy a special place, arising as they do in the most

diverse and certainly also in the deepest strata of the mental apparatus ... they are

more primordial, more elementary, than perceptions arising externally and they

can come about when consciousness is clouded (Freud, 2001k, p.21-22) They are

multilocular arising in different parts of the organisms interior much like

external perceptions arise from the different senses:

... the excitations in the deeper layers extend into the system directly and in

undiminished amount, in so far as certain of their characteristics give rise to

feelings in the pleasure-unpleasure series. The excitations coming from

within are, however, in their intensity and in other, qualitative, respectsin

their amplitude, perhapsmore commensurate with the system's method of

working than the stimuli which stream in from the external world. This

state of things produces two definite results. First, the feelings of pleasure

and unpleasure (which are an index to what is happening in the interior of

the apparatus) predominate over all external stimuli. (Freud, 2001i, p.29)

Freud suggests the best examples of these sensations and feelings are those

belonging to the pleasure-unpleasure series and he wonders whether the

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quantitative and qualitative something that they are, can become conscious in

the place where it is, or whether it must first be transmitted to the systemPcpt.

(Freud, 2001j, p.22) He reminds us that these inner sensations and feelings can

compel the ego without it noticing, only becoming conscious if they encounter

some form of resistance to their influence. (Freud, p.22)

Freud does not elaborate on how these compulsions become conscious, although it

is clear they must enter the systemPcpt. but unlike ideas (thoughts) they do so

directly without the intermediary of language (word-presentations). Feelings are

either conscious or unconscious (Freud, 2001j, p.23). As Green puts it so

succinctly: Affect may allow itself to be expressed by language, but it is

essentially outside it. (Green, 1999a, p.48-49)

How affects are perceived might be inferred from the following Freud writes a

few pages later:

Another factor, besides the influence of the systemPcpt., seems to have

played a part in bringing about the formation of the ego and its

differentiation from the id. A persons own body, and above all its surface, is

a place from which both external and internal perceptions may spring. It is

seen like any other object, but to the touch it yields two kinds of sensations,

one of which may be equivalent to an internal perception ... The ego is first

and foremost a bodily ego; (Freud, 2001j, pp.25-26)

I understand Freud here as indicating affects become conscious through their

effect on the body which is available to the systemPcpt. in various ways. This

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makes sense in terms of his suggestion mental processes are in themselves

unconscious (Freud, 2001h, p.171). Therefore mental events of the nature of

affect come to consciousness through being perceived in their effect on the body

(including the brain) and mental events of the nature of idea come to

consciousness through being linked with memory-traces of previous perceptual

events (words).

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Caution

At this point, as we teeter on the edge of reducing the psychical to the physical,

we would be wise to remind ourselves of Freuds opening remarks to his essay on

'The Unconscious' (1915):

... mental processes are in themselves unconscious, and ... (we may) ... liken

the perception of them by means of consciousness to the perception of the

external world by means of the sense organs ... Kant warned us not to

overlook the fact that our perceptions are subjectively conditioned and must

not be regarded as identical with what is perceived though unknowable, so

psycho-analysis warns us not to equate perceptions by means of

consciousness with the unconscious mental processes which are their object.

Like the physical, the psychical is not necessarily in reality what it appears

to us to be. (Freud, 2001h, p171.)

Damasio

Damasio, by his own admission, is a relative stranger to Freud (Damasio, 1999,

p.38). He was working as a behavioural neurologist before he turned his attention

to neuroscience and the nature of emotions and consciousness. He is a member of

the editorial board of neuropsychoanalysis and has conducted extensive

neurological research with subjects with brain lesions into the functioning of the

brain and consciousness.

According to Damasio, both emotions and consciousness are evolutionary

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adaptations aimed at ensuring an organisms survival, and both are rooted in the

representation of the body. Damasio is careful to organise his semantic territory:

There are three stages to the process of emotions beginning with a state of

emotion which is an organisms somatic response to an emotions-inducing object;

then proceeding to a state of feeling, which is the organisms perception of the

changes the emotion has manifested in the organism, and; finally, consciousness

of the feeling as a feeling. Damasio suggests that emotion is vital to processes of

reasoning and decision-making, noting that either too much of it or too little can

interfere with our ability to make good decisions. However the combination of

feelings and consciousness is for Damasio the key to our success as a species.

Proto-self

Damasio is interested in the mechanics of how emotions contribute to the

phenomenon of consciousness, suggesting a proto-self, which is a coherent

collection of neural patterns which map moment by moment, the state of the

physical structure of the organism in its many dimensions. (Damasio, 2000,

p.154)

The brain structures that implement the proto-self are:

1. Several brain-stem nuclei;

2. The Hypothalamus;

3. Some of the somatosensory cortices, specifically

the insular cortex

the cortices know as S2

the medial parietal cortices, located behind the splenium of the

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corpus callosum.

We are never conscious of the proto-self. (Damasio, 2000, p.174.)

Core self

Damasio believes consciousness first arises as a result of the core self, which

inheres in the transient second-order nonverbal account that occurs whenever an

object modifies the proto-self ... continuously generated and thus appears

continuous in time (Damasio, 2000, p.174.)

Autobiographical self

The core self is the basis of the autobiographical self , which is constituted by

implicit memories of multiple instances of individual experiences of the past and

of the anticipated future ... partially modifiable with further experience.

(Damasio, 2000, p.174-175)

Evolution of feelings

Damasio records five steps in the evolution of a feeling:

1. Perceptual engagement by the organism of an emotion-inducing

object, either actual or as-if;

2. Emotion-induction neural sites in the brain that are preset to respond

to the particular class of object are activated by the perceptual signals;

3. The activated emotion-induction neural sites trigger signals

(neurological and chemical) towards the body and other brain sites,

unleashing a range of body and brain responses that constitute

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emotion;

4. Neural structures associated with the proto-self represent changes in

body and brain state and feelings emerge although still unconscious;

5. The inaugural proto-self, the pattern of neural activity at the emotion-

induction sites and the ensuing changes in the proto-self are mapped

in second-order neural structures and the feelings are felt. (Damasio,

2000, p.283)

Freud and Damasio

As has been commented on by Mark Solms (1997) in his review of 'Descartes

Error', Damasios approach to emotions has much in common with early Freud:

Like the early Freud, Damasio conceptualizes the mental apparatus as a

phylogenetically evolved sympathetic ganglion (Freud 1950, p. 303) that

mediates between compelling demands arising from the internal milieu of

the body, on the one hand, and the practical constraints of external social

reality on the other. Also like the early Freud, Damasio suggests that

emotions contribute to the regulation of this adaptive, self-preservative

process by generating signals of pleasure and unpleasure, which reflect the

vicissitudes of the internal milieu with reference to an underlying economic

or homeostatic principle. (Solms, 1997, p.959)

Giampaolo Sasso (2007) writes: "Freud ... would today certainly agree with

Damasio's description of how the organism responds to changes induced by the

object and how emotions is at the basis of consciousness." (Sasso, 2007, p.53)

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Solm's suggests Damasios contribution is his attempt to delineate thephysical,

neurological organisation of these basic mental mechanisms (Solms, 1997, p.960

emphasis in the original), and because of the near correlation of aspects of his

schema to Freuds it invites the possibility of being able to map some of the

affectual processes Freud has suggested onto a physiological model, providing a

conceptual bridge between psychoanalysis and contemporary neuroscience.

(Solms, p.962)

However Solms sounds a note of caution, because Damasio lacks a clear

conceptualisation of the nature of the relationship between the mind and body in

psychoanalysis. Damasio conceptualises consciousness as mental and

unconsciousness as physical, and the mind is the product of the brain. and, neural

representations ... become images in our minds. (Damasio, 1994, p. 90, quoted in

Soms, 1997, p.962)

The implications for psychoanalysis of Damasio's view of the brain/body relation

are uncertain beyond this mapping of Freud onto the organs of the brain. Perhaps

it lends some support to the psychoanalytic method, and perhaps it might lead to

an attempt to demonstrate the usefulness of psychoanalysis. However I suspect the

model of the brain being developed by Edelman and Tononi is more likely to offer

psychoanalysis useful insights into its practice. (Edelman & Tononi, 2000)

I will end by quoting Edelman and Tononi (2000):

... emotions are fundamental both to the origins of and the appetite for

conscious thought ... we think it likely that it was mainly emotions that

impelled him to create his magnificent edifice of thought. Value systems and

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emotions are essential to the selectional workings of the brain that underlie

consciousness. Further neuroscientific research on these systems and their

modification by learning should shed light on an important issue: the place

of value in a world of facts. (p.218)

Conclusion

I have followed the trajectory of Freud's thinking on the subject of affect from its

beginnings in his studies of hysterics to his mature conceptualisation of the

dynamic unconscious in order to arrive his view of affect.

I have briefly summarised the thinking of Damasio in linking emotion and

consciousness and critiqued it from the vertex of the psychoanalytic neuroscientist

Mark Solms.

I have concluded there are limited implications of Damasio's thinking on the

relationship between body and brain for psychoanalysis and suggested a more

fruitful collaboration with Edelman and Tononi.

Crispin Balfour

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Freud’s view on the nature of affect and the implications of Damasio’s view of the body/brain.

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