Friedrich Schleiermacher's Theory of the Limited Communitarian State

Canadian Journal of Philosophy

Friedrich Schleiermacher's Theory of the Limited Communitarian StateAuthor(s): Jeffrey HooverSource: Canadian Journal of Philosophy, Vol. 20, No. 2 (Jun., 1990), pp. 241-260Published by: Canadian Journal of PhilosophyStable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/40231694 .

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CANADIAN JOURNAL OF PHILOSOPHY 241 Volume 20, Number 2, June 1990, pp. 241-260

Friedrich Schleiermachefs Theory of the Limited Communitarian State

JEFFREY HOOVER Coe College Cedar Rapids, IA 52402 U.S.A.

While Friedrich Schleiermacher's thought has been of overwhelming importance for theology during the nineteenth and twentieth centu- ries, his influence as a philosopher is much more circumscribed and as a social and political thinker it is almost nil.1 This article seeks to excite an interest in Schleiermacher's theory of the state not only because it presents an interesting juxtaposition to the thought of his contemporaries, especially Hegel, but because his attempt to balance both liberal and communitarian values also speaks to an on-going discus- sion within political philosophy.

Western political thought has been dominated by liberal political theory which takes pluralism and the pursuit of private goods to be the primary aims of the state. The origin of this view is to be found in the modern natural law tradition.2 However, while western political thought has been dominated by this tradition, it has not gone without challenge. A competing political tradition arose out of a dissatisfaction with liberal ideals and is associated with the thought of the German romantics. In opposition to the primacy of private interest, this tradition emphasizes communal values.3 The romantics, like the so-called

1 It may come as a surprise to those familiar with Hegel's popularity at Berlin that Schleiermacher's lectures on the state were even more popular with the students in Berlin during this time than Hegel's. However, after Schleiermacher's death the popularity of his political thought was quickly eclipsed by the Hegelian lega- cy and has consistently been overlooked in the years since.

2 By 'modern natural law' I mean to refer to the political tradition associated with the doctrine of the social contract, which includes Hobbes and Locke and extends as well to figures such as Kant and Rousseau.

3 The most prominent members of this tradition are: Herder, the later Fichte, Novalis, Schelling, Friedrich Schlegel, Joseph Gorres, Adam Miiller, and Franz von Baader.



242 Jeffrey Hoover

'communitarians' of today,4 believed that individuals receive their sense of identity as persons only through interaction with others and through participation in shared social practices and institutions. The proper role of the state according to the romantics, then, was to foster among all citizens some substantive conception of the public good by regulating the public life within which citizens constituted their identity. Rather than making a strict demarcation between the private and the public realm in the manner of liberal theorists, the romantics fashioned political life so as to express the moral ideals of private life. The romantics sought to promote the moral ends of citizens by means of the state.

However, liberals argued then, as they do now, that enforcement of a communal value scheme poses dangers of exclusivism and totalitarianism. In a state conceived on communitarian principles, the claims of individuals against society are discounted in favor of the common good. Accordingly, liberals then and now claim that in order to ensure respect for the claims of individuals against society, the state must allow for pluralism in order that individuals may pursue their own personal conceptions of the good. Schleiermacher developed his theory of the state in the context of this debate as it was being waged between the German romantics and the modern natural law theorists at the turn of the nineteenth century. As an heir to both the liberal and the romantic traditions, Schleiermacher sought to reconcile the political aims of the respective traditions: ensuring the ability of citizens to pursue individual ends on the one hand while maintaining community on the other. Schleiermacher's unique political theory is an attempt to promote both communal values and pluralism.

Schleiermacher envisions the mature form of the state as a nation- state - a state based on a single Volk. The Volk, is understood by Schleiermacher to be composed of unique individuals, each of whom stands in a unique relation to the community and constitute themselves as individuals by virtue of their life within this community. In the politically mature nation-state the members of the Volk identify with the ends of the community. This identification is mediated by a common- consciousness which is historically rooted in the unconscious bonds between individuals who have natural, pre-political ties to one another on the basis of a commonality of locality, ancestry, customs, culture, etc.

4 Included among contemporary communitarians are such thinkers as Michael San- del, Alasdair Maclntyre and Charles Taylor who warn of the loss of community values in western societies due to the individualistic nature of the liberal conception of the state. Contemporary liberal theorists such as John Rawls, Charles Lar- more and Ronald Dworkin, on the other hand, are primarily concerned that the rights of individuals are respected and that persons are free to pursue ends that are their own.



Friedrich Schleiermacher's Theory of the Limited Communitarian State 243

Despite his romantic conception of the nation-state, Schleiermacher does not view individuals' ties to the state as totalizing as did other romantics. Schleiermacher outlines three primary spheres of social interaction which are more or less distinct from the state, namely, the church, academia and free sociality. All three of these spheres are to be free from the intervention of the state. The latter of these, free sociality, involves a form of interaction in which the personal assets and interests of citizens are allowed to flourish. Social alliances in the realm of free sociality are left to configure themselves according to the needs and interests of the participating individuals. Here autonomous individuals develop their own unique individuality in free fellowship with others. This unique conception of the pluralistic domain of free sociality will be the focus of the first part of this article.

Schleiermacher attempts to limit the state's sphere of influence and allow for pluralism within the individualistic pursuits of free sociality while claiming that the aim of the state is to maintain community among its citizens. If Schleiermacher is able to show that the pluralism embod- ied in free sociality is compatible with his romantically conceived state, then he has ameliorated the liberals' concerns that communitarian conceptions of the state lead to a disavowal of pluralism and ultimately to intolerance and exclusivism. Accordingly, an examination of Schleier- macher's conception of the communitarian state and its compatibility with pluralism will occupy the second part of this article.

I Free Sociality: The Unfettered Interaction of Free Persons

It is likely that Schleiermacher's notion of free sociality was inspired in part by the lifestyle that he shared with his romantic compatriots while he was a young man in Berlin. Schleiermacher had been intro- duced into the salon society of Berlin by the son of his employer, Count Alexander Dohna. It was in these circles that Schleiermacher made the

acquaintance of the Schlegel brothers as well as Novalis, Wackenroder and Tieck. In the salons they came together as individuals from vari- ous stations for fellowship and the free exchange of ideas. In the year 1799, while firmly ensconced in the midst of this heady environment of the Berlin romantic scene and in an intimate friendship with the

younger Schlegel, Friedrich, Schleiermacher anonymously published a little-known work entitled Toward a Theory of Sociable Conduct.'5

5 'Versuch einer Theorie des geselligen Betragens/ appeared in the year 1799 in the January and February issues of Berliner Archiv der Zeit und des Geschmacks. The

essay reached to thirty pages altogether and was to be continued, but the



244 Jeffrey Hoover

In this short work Schleiermacher began a systematic treatment of the blossoming realm of social interaction that he had discovered in Ber- lin society in which the old boundaries between the classes, profes- sions, sexes and races were succumbing to the Enlightenment ideals of equality and fraternity.

In this essay Schleiermacher claims that humans have a natural impulse for association with others which underlies our social relations. This impulse, which he called 'free sociality,' is an unavoidable 'natural tendency which is personally present in every human being.'6 The word that Schleiermacher uses to refer to this sociable tendency, 'Gesel- ligkeit,' had been brought into philosophical use by Kant.7 Unlike Schleiermacher, however, Kant maintained that this 'natural propensity to enter into society' was an 'ungesellige Geselligkeit' [unsociable sociability] since it does not result in an immediate intimacy with others, but in a reservedness that stems from our anticipation of 'resistance' to our selfish desires. This anticipation of resistance coupled with our natural propensity for society, results in a natural sociability that Kant describes as 'unsocial.'8

Although there is a similarity in Kant's and Schleiermacher's use of 'Geselligkeit' to refer to a natural propensity underlying social relations, Schleiermacher adds additional content to this notion by using it to refer also to a social sphere characterized by a certain form of interaction. 'Free sociality appears only as its own organization, one that is completely separate from the state.'9 This use of 'Geselligkeit' as desig- nating a sphere of social life distinct from the state in which a particular form of private association flourishes is, in fact, the dominate usage in Schleiermacher.

additional installments never appeared. The plan that was presented in the existing portion of the essay included three laws of social activity. Only the first of these, the formal law, was covered in depth, leaving the analysis of the material and quantitative laws to our speculation. See the editorial introduction to this essay in Schriften aus der Berliner Zeit (1796-1799), Vol. 1.2 of Kritische Gesamtaus- gabe (Berlin: Walter de Gruyter 1984), 1-liii.

6 Schleiermachers Werke: Auswahl in vier Banden, II, Otto Braun and Johannes Bauer, eds. (Aalen: Scientia 1967), 7

7 Kant uses the term 'Geselligkeit' in the Critique of Judgement, and in the essays, 'Idea for a Universal History with a Cosmopolitan Purpose' and The Supposed Origin of Human History' and also in a review of Herder's writings.

8 I. Kant, Idee zu einer allgemeinen Geschichte in weltburgerlicher Absicht,' Schriften zur Anthropologie, Geschichtsphilosophie, Politik und Padagogik II, vol. XI of Werkaus- gabe in Zwolf Baden (Frankfurt: Surkamp 1968), 37; also Kant's Political Writings, Hans Reiss, ed. (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press 1970), 44

9 Schleiermachers Werke II, 367



Friedrich Schleiermache/s Theory of the Limited Communitarian State 245

Schleiermacher begins his essay on 'Sociable Conduct' by pointing out the importance of social interaction that is distinct from professional and domestic activity. These latter two forms of social interaction are insufficient by themselves to provide a social context within which persons can properly cultivate their individuality. In the professional sphere one's relations are determined by the nature of one's occupa- tion - one is either an artisan, a tax assessor, a professor, etc. The interaction in the professional sphere is thus limited by the one- dimensional nature of one's identity in this sphere. The domestic sphere, on the other hand, does not pose these limits on relations. In the home one is not defined by a particular professional role, but is allowed a multifarious personality - a husband, a father, a lover, a friend, a provider, etc. The domestic sphere has its own drawback, however, in that it provides fewer occasions for social interaction. The number of personal contacts within this sphere is small and usually involve the same persons. Consequently, this sphere poses its own lack of diversity. Since Schleiermacher assumes that individuals constitute themselves as persons in community with others, he deems it essential that individuals participate in a sphere of interaction that has sufficient range of diversity for cultivating unique personalities. The limitations of professional and domestic life are to be overcome therefore by means of a sphere in which rational and mutually constituted persons associate freely.

Schleiermacher characterizes this sphere of free association as being 'neither tied to nor determined by any external purpose.' In relating to one another in free sociality, individuals expel 'all limitations of domestic and professional relationships as far as they are able.' The aim of this realm of free activity is the development of each members' unique personality in a manner that is impossible in the professional and domestic spheres. Thus, a realm of social activity is fostered in which 'the sphere of an individual is present in such a way that it is intersected by the spheres of others as diversely as possible.'10

Schleiermacher gives a more specific account of the nature of free

sociality by distinguishing both the form and the purpose of interaction in this sphere from other types of interaction. The form of interaction in free sociality is one of 'complete reciprocity' while its purpose is described as the 'free play of ideas and feelings.' When discussing the form of interaction in free sociality Schleiermacher is careful to distin-

guish it from the form found in what he calls a 'constrained sociality' (gebundene Geselligkeit) such as a theater or lecture audience. Audiences

10 Ibid., 3



246 Jeffrey Hoover

of this sort, he claims, are hardly to be considered a society at all since they are formed for some determinate effect and cannot react back upon the artist or the lecturer but behave passively.11 Free sociality is set apart from these constrained socialities in that the participants of free sociality are actively engaged with each other and are not merely a collec- tion of persons who have in common only the fact that they are being acted upon by the same person or persons. In constrained socialities, by contrast, there is no reciprocity between the audience and the artist or lecturer. In regard to the form of interaction, free sociality requires a reciprocity among its members.

Schleiermacher also cites the example of a group of dancers at a ball as failing to constitute the proper form of interaction. Here there is at least a certain amount of reciprocity between the individuals who make up each pair. However, in this example Schleiermacher finds a certain exclusivism that violates true reciprocity. Schleiermacher writes that 'in regards to its form, then, the true character of a society should be a reciprocal action interwoven among all the participants.... Accordingly, a ball is no society since each dancer actually stands in relation only to the partner of the moment, and the two partners treat all the rest as only means or instruments.'12 The form of reciprocity that exists in free sociality must be one that is present among all members of the group, if not actively, at least dispositionally so that each is ready to extend the reciprocal interaction to all.13 The second require- ment which social relations must fulfil in order to be considered an example of free sociality, then, is that their form reflect a reciprocity that is 'complete' - it must be possible that these relations could occur between any of its members.

Since the form of interaction in free sociality is described as complete reciprocity, one might be led to suppose that the notion of free sociality is identical to that of community. However, Schleiermacher wishes to maintain a distinction between free sociality and community by distinguishing between the nature of the purposes found in these two forms of social relations. Schleiermacher writes:

If we now look at the purpose that is to be attained under this form of thorough- going reciprocity, we notice that the predicate of freedom implies that there should be no mention of a single and determinate purpose in free sociality, since this

11 Ibid., 8-9

12 Ibid., 9

13 Schleiermacher remarks that a game comes closer to being a true society since it includes everyone. He goes on to point out that the English manner of remain- ing with one's wife for the duration of a ball makes it even harder to consider a group assembled for a ball a society in the true sense.



Friedrich Schleiermacher' s Theory of the Limited Communitarian State 247

conditions and limits the activity in conformity to material and objective rules. There should be no particular action executed communally, no product brought about jointly, nor any judgement methodically acquired. The purpose of society is not at all to be conceived as lying outside it.14

Free sociality, as we see in this passage, differs from community in that it is neither organized around a communal end nor produces a single effect. 'Community7 signifies for Schleiermacher, and for romantics in general, a commonality in thought or feeling. Schleiermacher does envision a commonality of this sort existing within the politically mature state. However, free sociality is conceived as a private sphere which exists outside the state. Community builds upon the commonality of its members whereas free sociality is allied with the task of bringing about each person's cultivation and individuality. Unlike the state, free sociality is intended to amplify the individuality of the participants. Each individual enters into free sociality with others for his or her own aims. Thus, the ends of activity in free sociality are private whereas in a community they are communal.

This is not to say that individuals who relate to one another in free sociality might not share common ends. Relations of free sociality often arise from the awareness that others have similar private ends as one- self, which may be realized more effectively if pursued jointly. The difference between the pursuits which characterize relations of free sociality and those that characterize community lies in the fact that the ends which guide free sociality are private; the objects of interest are those which make primary reference to the good of an individual. On the other hand, the ends of community are communal - they make primary reference to the good of a corporate entity. The difference between community and free sociality, then, is that the former is constituted by relations which aim at individual and common ends, and the latter by relations which aim at communal ends. Thus, groups that dis- play free sociality may in fact be organized around a single integrating interest, but it will be an interest that each member has qua individual and not qua member.

Schleiermacher conceives of interaction in the domain of free sociality as exemplified by the intellectual intercourse of the Berlin intelligentsia of his day. In the essay on 'Sociable Conduct' Schleiermacher writes that 'there is no place in free sociality for any particular lesser purpose; the activity of higher powers is not sustained by the attention that must always be dedicated to the affairs of the lower powers, where one is concerned with the external world. Here persons are totally within the

14 Schleiermachers Werke II, 9-10



248 Jeffrey Hoover

intellectual world/15 Schleiermacher fashioned this realm of interaction as an intellectual give and take which cultivates the 'higher powers' of individuals. However, free sociality is not to be confused with the institutionalized intellectual sphere of academia. Although the interaction in the sphere of free sociality involves intellectual expression, it is to be conceived as spontaneous and natural. The kinds of interaction that Schleiermacher has in mind are voluntary associations of the soft that one can enter and exit with relative ease. These include on the one hand organized interest groups and social clubs which may be on-going, and on the other hand they include gatherings that are spontaneous or one-time events.

The intellectual character that Schleiermacher gives to his descrip- tions of associations of free sociality smacks of an elitism that is un- necessarily restrictive. One might wonder why activities aimed at personal enjoyment that are not of an intellectual nature (athletics, hob- bies, crafts, for instance) are not considered candidates for free sociality. Schleiermacher's emphasis on intellectual and artistic activities when describing free sociality might be explained merely in an auto- biographical manner. As a member of the intelligentsia of his day, these are the sorts of voluntary associations that he valued the most and these values are reflected in his social and political writings.

However, there is a more significant motive for the distinctively intellectual cast that Schleiermacher gave to his conception of relations of free sociality. Schleiermacher viewed intellectual activity as essential to the development of individuals in a manner in which other forms of social activity are not. Schleiermacher's social and political thought is grounded in the fundamental value that he places on the cultivation of the unique self. As noted above, Schleiermacher views one's personality as being developed through interaction with others in society. For Schleiermacher 'the essence of a person is the meeting of shared reason and particularity of existence in a single living point. . .it is the middle-point of contact of a community.'16 This constitutive view of the self that Schleiermacher adopts cannot be understood apart from his teleological conception of the process of self-development. The fully actualized self is the rational, self-conscious individual. For example, when Schleiermacher describes the development of persons in his pedagogical writings he traces the growth of individual consciousness along a continuum which begins with unclear feelings and ends in self-

15 Ibid., 4

16 Ibid., 448




conscious clarity.17 The end of the Bildungsprozeji of individuals as Schleiermacher sees it is their development into self-conscious, rational persons. In light of the essential role that the private associations of free sociality play in cultivation of the self and given the primacy that he places upon the intellectual ends of persons, it is not surprising that Schleiermacher gives relations of free sociality an intellectual cast.

Another consequence of Schleiermacher's constitutive conception of the self and the value that he places on self-development is his emphasis on a plurality of differentiated spheres of free sociality within which individuals can participate. A diversity of associative relations is necessary for the development of unique individuals. As a private sphere of associations distinct from the state, free sociality multiplies the opportunities that individuals have for engaging in diverse relations and for expressing their individuality.

Schleiermacher's defense of this pluralistic domain does not spring from traditional liberal values, however. Modern liberal society has presided over the gradual advance of public management into the network of voluntary associations. This development has not been acciden- tal. In an attempt to limit the powers of the state and protect the rights of individuals, liberals have yielded more and more legal status to

groups outside the state. Schleiermacher's motive in erecting free sociality (not to mention the church and academia) as a sphere of volun-

tary associations that is private and distinct from the state is not simply to safeguard the rights and liberties of citizens. Schleiermacher's primary concern is, instead, to promote the development and individu-

ality of persons. Schleiermacher does not want merely to make room for individuality in society. In the spirit of romanticism he seeks instead to create an environment in which individuality flourishes. In-

dividuality thrives best, he believes, in small informal structures where the parties involved are all voluntary participants and have some personal interest at stake. The domain of free sociality therefore provides a network of small social unions through which individuals can cultivate themselves. Thus, private society ceases to be an aggregation of individual atoms, but becomes instead a system of non-exclusive

groups, a shifting array of voluntary attachments. The fundamental value of individuality which motivates Schleier-

macher's social and political thought causes him to oppose legalism within this realm of private association. The constraint of rules is

17 Schleiermacher, Padogogische Schriften, C Plate, ed. (Langensalza: Hermann Beyer and Sohne 1902), 159



250 Jeffrey Hoover

viewed as an intolerable obstacle to the mature development of unique individuals. Schleiermacher maintains that the forms of activity in free sociality must not be rigidif ied so as to form institutions or strict principles of interaction. Nor does he allow that rules for interaction in this sphere be imposed on individuals from above. If the activity of free sociality is allowed to ossify or be constrained in this manner, it will no longer reflect the spontaneity and mutability which social alliances exhibit in their natural, unfettered state. Schleiermacher's primary concern here is not the development of community, but the cultivation of individuals. He maintains accordingly that social alliances in the realm of free sociality should be left to conf igure themselves according to the needs and interests of the individuals. He even ventures the claim that the activity of free sociality 'must be relinquished completely to the individuals themselves just as in matters of taste/18 Schleiermacher clearly rejects any form of coercive authority as an enforcer of the conventions of free sociality. In this domain 'each is a law-giver to himself' and is 'ruled by no law except that which he issues himself.'19 Free sociality is fashioned as a sphere of social interaction which is ideally constituted by free and unique individuals whose identities are formed not only by the natural ties such as family and locality, but also through a plurality of continually shifting voluntary associations.

In accord with this emphasis on voluntarism Schleiermacher maintains that relations of free sociality are to be free of limitations and bar- riers imposed on social relations by economics. Schleiermacher argues, rather uniquely for his time, that one of the aims of the state is to strive for a certain amount of economic equality among its citizens.20 The state is to seek to secure for its citizens enough freedom from economic worries that they are able to pursue their intellectual and ethical ends in other areas of social life. This means, on the one hand, that the state must ensure that a minimal means for a livelihood is available to everyone. On the other hand, it means that the state ought not to impose such strict control on the wealth of individuals that it hampers their pursuit of higher ends. Thus, Schleiermacher conceives the economy as part of the public domain and as falling within the sphere of the state (see below).21

18 Schleiermachers Werke II, 340

19 Ibid., 3-4

20 Scheiermacher, Die Lehre vom Stoat, Pt. 3, Vol. VIII of Friedrich Schleiermachers Sammtliche Werke, Chr. Brandis, ed. (Berlin: Georg Reimer 1845), 116-18

21 The non-economic and intellectual nature of the private sphere of free sociality sets it apart from Hegel's notion of civil society. Human activity in the domain of free sociality is driven by the pursuit of personal intellectual and ethical goods




Although Schleiermacher is in agreement with liberal political theorists in his support for the separation of the public and private spheres, and similarly seeks to foster pluralism and autonomy within society, he is motivated by non-liberal principles. Social and political organization ought to seek to secure that which promotes the development of unique individuals. Rather than grounding his conception of the limited state in an argument concerning the rights of citizens, Schleier- macher is motivated by an attempt to secure the conditions for the cultivation of individuality in society. This is not to imply that Schleier- macher's guiding principle is anti-liberal. The commitment to the cultivation of individuality is not necessarily antithetical to liberal aims. This traditionally romantic motive has been defended by J.S. Mill, among others. In his essay, On Liberty, Mill points out that human nature is not to be thought of as governed by a fixed set of principles and responses, like a piece of machinery. Instead, he likens human nature to a tree 'which requires to grow and develop itself on all sides according to the tendency of the inward forces which make it a living thing.' At least part of Mill's argument for freedom of expression and

pluralism in this essay invokes the romantic thesis that the end of the human individual is not something given, some fixed telos, but that of self-development itself. In fact, Mill begins his argument along these lines with a quotation from Schleiermacher's associate, W. von Hum- boldt, in which it is maintained that 'the end of man... is the highest and most harmonious development of his powers to a complete and consistent whole.'22 It is precisely this view of human ends that is the basis of Schleiermacher's argument for the limited state and it is neither antithetical to nor inconsistent with liberal aims.

The domain of free sociality is just one sphere alongside three other spheres of social activity in Schleiermacher's theory, namely, religion, academia, and the state. These other three spheres, unlike free social-

ity, are dominated by institutions. Schleiermacher conceives these other institutional spheres of social life as separate from one another, each

having its own distinct ends and forms of interaction. Thus, not only is the sphere of the state curtailed by the presence of the private realm of free sociality, but is even further limited by the separation of the

and not the satisfaction of desire (as is the case in Hegel's civil society). There

can be no question of Hegel's influence upon Schleiermacher's conception of free

sociality since Schleiermacher outlines this sphere of private association already in 1799 in the essay Towards a Theory of Sociable Conduct' whereas Hegel did not articulate civil society as a domain distinct from the domestic and public realm until the 1817 lectures on the Philosophy of Right.

22 J.S. Mill, On Liberty (Oxford: Oxford University Press 1948), 71-3



252 Jeffrey Hoover

church and academia from the state. As in the case of free sociality, religious and academic activities are conceived to be beyond the direct influence of the state. Schleiermacher's affirmation of religious and academic freedom was not only an intellectual commitment, but was a practical one as well. Throughout his life Schleiermacher's strong commitment to limiting the authority of the state placed him at odds with the Prussian authorities. Schleiermacher's defense of academic freedom was perhaps most dramatically displayed by his attempts to block the efforts of the reform-minded Prussian minister of culture from imposing his will upon the academic affairs of the Royal Academy of Sciences in Berlin.23 Even more celebrated was Schleiermacher's strug- gle with the King over the issue of a state-appointed liturgy for the newly formed union of the Reformed and Lutheran Churches. Schleier- macher maintained in opposition to the King that the ecclesiastical community had the right to determine its own liturgy.24 Schleiermacher's activities on behalf of academic and religious freedom are rooted in his support for the diversity of ends represented by these distinct arenas of social life. The state presents just one form of social activity among many, all of which are necessary for the cultivation of unique and self-conscious individuals.

While Schleiermacher describes all four social spheres as distinct from one another, free sociality is related to the other spheres in a unique manner. Free sociality as the sphere of relations which exhibit the form of complete reciprocity is also the basis for the interaction that is institutionalized in the other three arenas of social life. Free sociality as described above designates a distinct sphere of social activity (interest groups, social clubs, impromptu gatherings, private parties, etc.) which exists alongside of the state, church and academia. However, free sociality also designates the form of interaction that ultimately underlies political, religious and academic institutions as well. These institutions have their origin in non-institutional interaction characterized by the reciprocal relations of free sociality. Thus, Schleiermacher pic- tures the religious, political and academic spheres as themselves spheres of free sociality, in a certain sense.25 While relations of free sociality are not properly institutional, they give rise to and make possible these other forms of social institutions.

23 See Jeffrey Hoover, The Origin of the Conflict Between Hegel and Schleiermacher at Berlin/ Owl of Minerva 20, 1 (1988), 69-79.

24 See Martin Redeker, Schleiermacher: Life and Thought, John Walhausser, trans.

(Philadelphia: Fortress Press 1973), 187-99.

25 Schleiermachers Werke II, 129-30



Friedrich Schleiermache/s Theory of the Limited Communitarian State 253

This claim that relations of free sociality underlie certain social institutions, is developed in more detail in the case of the state. The earli- est antecedents of the state are, to be sure, not voluntary associations of the form found in free sociality as depicted above. Instead, the pre- political origins of the state according to Schleiermacher are to be discovered in natural and involuntary ties such as blood and locality. How- ever, these organic commonalities give rise in turn to reciprocal relations among individuals - relations that resemble those of free sociality in- sofar as they are reciprocal. Thus, reciprocal relations resembling those of free sociality are a precondition of the state in that they establish conditions that make possible the institutionalized form of recognition found in legal and political regimes.26

Schleiermacher's view that relations of free sociality are a precondition of the appearance of the state serves as the basis for his main criticism of social contract theory. It is clear to Schleiermacher that the state, understood as a community of individuals who have been institution- ally granted recognition, could be established only where there was a prior ground of reciprocal recognition. Institutions of recognition cannot be the result of a deliberate contract between individuals who do not yet recognize each other. The formation of a contract requires that a ground of recognition already exist. A contract cannot be the origin of that which it presupposes, namely recognition. The spontaneous relations of free sociality that grow out of shared customs, ancestry, and locality establish the pre-political recognition which is necessary for the appearance of political institutions. These spontaneous relations of free sociality, then, are among the origins of the state. The communal ends that dominate the state do not originate in a conscious, collective decision to pursue these ends. The state begins instead as a kind of free sociality, as a 'mere gathering without a particular purpose.'27

II The Communitarian State

Schleiermacher views the state, then, as a form of community which originates in naturally-appearing bonds such as blood, locality, lan-

guage and custom rather than in the process of rational choice as claimed by liberal political theory. These natural origins ultimately give rise to a nation-state that is dominated by communal ends. This 'ethical'

26 Ibid., 139

27 Schleiermacher, Pddogogische Schriften, 159



254 Jeffrey Hoover

community found in the mature state is a rational expression of the commonality of a Volk that has achieved political consciousness. Schleiermacher observes a continuity between the unconscious bonds among persons in a clan or tribe and the rational consent of the mature state such that the consciousness found in a politically mature Volk is to be understood as a more advanced form of the common-feeling which unites the more primitive Volker.28

The basis of the state is discovered according to Schleiermacher in the common-feeling (Gemeingefuhl) and its conscious counterpart, the common-spirit (Gemeingeist). The expression 'common-spirit' in Schleiermacher's philosophical writings refers to 'a particular connec- tion of persons to one another, especially to the civil condition.'29 It signifies a collective interest on the part of the members of a civil association in their particular association. The common-spirit of a state is unique and can be thought of as embodying the collective personality of that civil association. Schleiermacher defines the common-spirit by expressly opposing it to private interest; it is 'the consciousness of the unity of the whole' which is 'dedicated to non-partisan considera- tions.'30 Indeed, a common-spirit in its mature form involves a conscious identification with the state on the part of the citizens.31

Schleiermacher claims that the political formation which allows for the greatest degree of common-consciousness is constitutional monarchy. Schleiermacher's defense of this form of government, however, employs democratic values. A single organization of popularly elect- ed officials cannot simply be imposed on a large nation-state as a whole without a measure of political disenfranchisement. If individuals are to retain a sense of political agency, the immediate political associations with which they identify must be preserved. The integrity of these smaller political units is best preserved by means of a national political structure that allows for a variety of intermediate political entities. Schleiermacher rejects popular representative democracy because it

28 For a more detailed account of Schleiermacher's views on the grounding of the state and his critique of social contract theory, see Jeffrey Hoover, 'The Founda- tion of the State in the Thought of Friedrich Schleiermacher/ History of Political Thought 10, 2 (1989), 1-18.

29 Schleiermacher, Pddogogische Schriften, 382

30 Schleiermacher, Lehre vom Stoat, 166; and 'On the Concepts of Different Forms of the State/ Friedrich Schleiermachers Sdmmtliche Werke, Pt. Ill, Vol. 2, 262. The English text is to be found in, The Political Thought of the German Romantics: 1793-1815, H.S. Reiss, trans. (New York: Macmillan 1955), 185.

31 Schleiermacher, Lehre vom Stoat, 125




undermines the smaller units of which the nation-state is composed. When these smaller political unities are ignored, their members become estranged from the larger nation-state since they experience it as something foreign. The citizens are thereby robbed of their most immediate unit of political identification and are left without any intermediate organ to mediate their identification with the larger nation-state. It is this tendency toward alienation and political disenfranchisement within large-scale popular democracies that Schleiermacher is aiming to avert. In the name of the democratic ideals of political entitlement and participation, then, Schleiermacher rejects popular representation at the national level and defends a monarchic federalism.32

Although representative democracies allow for intermediate levels of representation whereby citizens could identify with a body that is more immediate than the national assembly, Schleiermacher's concern is to preserve the traditional political unities. Prior to the historical emer- gence of a nation-state there exist more immediate units of political identification. The nation-state, which is built upon these smaller unities, must accordingly choose a principle of political organization which does not violate the natural ties between individuals in these smaller unities. By imposing a single system of political organization all the way down - a popular democracy, for example - the traditional political units become disengaged from the political process. The larger nation- state can only hope to foster an identification with the whole by building upon these smaller natural unities. Only a non-despotic monarchy is able to preserve the integrity of a diversity of smaller unities.

Within the monarchic nation-state, then, Schleiermacher maintains that the component states should relate to the larger political entity in a manner analogous to the way households relate to the state in the smallest democracies, namely, each is directly represented as a whole. Accordingly, Schleiermacher argues that the component states be given equal representation as a unit in the highest assembly of the nation-state.33

While Schleiermacher shuns a system of popular representation for the nation-state, he does not adopt in its place an estatist model as did many of his romantic contemporaries who shared his dissatisfaction of large-scale representative democracies.34 In fact, Schleiermacher

32 Ibid., 51-2

33 Ibid., 52

34 The most prominent estatist theorists among Schleiermacher's contemporaries were Hegel, Friedrich Schlegel, and Adam Miiller.



256 Jeffrey Hoover

sees the spirit of the estates as directly opposing the common-spirit of the nation-state. One of Schleiermacher's primary arguments in support of public education was its ability to combat the parochialism of the estates. Private education and homeschooling was imbued, according to Schleiermacher, with the selfish pettiness and narrowness that characterizes the estate mentality.35 Schleiermacher parts company with many of his romantic compatriots and also Hegel when he denies that the class interests of the estates are instances of limited public interest which need only to be incorporated into a national political structure in order to foster a true public interest. Schleiermacher views the estate interests as the worst form of private interest - one which cuts individuals off from the possibility of free sociality with one another.36

The unity of the nation-state, according to Schleiermacher, is aided by monarchic federalism, not by estatism. The monarch provides a check on the provincial interests of the smaller units and promotes the common interest of the whole Volk. Given the composite nature of the nation-state, Schleiermacher views constitutional monarchy as the only form of state authority which is viable over a long period of time. The monarch, who is chosen by hereditary succession rather than election, is to have no personal property and is not to be attached to the aristocra- cy. During periods of upheaval, then, the monarch acts as a stabiliz- ing force and can act without regard for private interest.37

As in the views of many of his romantic contemporaries, in Schleier- macher's theory the monarch is the one who issues all national laws. However, the monarch is not the independent author of laws. The monarch is to make only those laws that are in accord with the will of the people. The will of the people is mediated to the monarch through the legislative process which is divided into three moments: proposal, deliberation and decision. The first moment, proposal, is lo- cated within the community of subjects where it begins as private opinion. Deliberation, on the other hand, usually occurs in a special assembly where matters proposed by the subjects are discussed and recommendations are made. Decision is the moment which is reserved for the monarch. If we take the legislative process as composed of all three of these moments, as Schleiermacher clearly intends us to, then law does not originate with the monarch even though he decrees all laws. Legislative activity may end in the monarch's decree, but it

35 Schleiermacher, Pddogogische Schriften 383-4

36 Schleiermacher's Werke, II, 129; 367

37 Schleiermacher, Sammtliche Werke, m, 2, 278-80; Reiss, The Political Thought..., 196-7. Also Lehre vom Stoat, 35-6.




begins in public opinion. Since citizens are given the right of petition, Schleiermacher's theory cannot be considered a form of government which proceeds from the top-down. Instead, the monarch proclaims as law 'only such acts of will as his subjects will approve of once the highest political consciousness has developed in them.'

In addition to the national assembly, the legislative organ which provides a voice to states as wholes, Schleiermacher provides for more immediate organs of government. He describes a corporativistic political structure composed of a hierarchy of naturally appearing subsidiaries of the central authority. The largest of the sub-units that he mentions are the provinces, with regions as the next smallest and communes (Communen) as the smallest.38 Provinces, as the largest of these subsidiaries, correspond to states and communes, as the smallest, correspond to local or municipal polities. Schleiermacher sees these local units as being democratically organized while provinces are vaguely aristocratic in structure.39 These intermediary organs of the state participate not only in the legislative process, but in the executive processes as well. The degree to which authority is invested in the smaller or-

gans as opposed to the larger ones is a function of the level of common- spirit found within the subordinate communities. The more pro- nounced the consciousness of the Volk as a whole is among these smaller units, the more decentralized the government will be. If public authority in a given nation-state is highly centralized, it implies that there is a lack of political consciousness within these smaller units and that the government must rely more on an outward show of unity to maintain cohesion:

If there are communes, conflicts can arise in the state, but they will be small and more numerous. If there are provinces there will be fewer conflicts, but more significant ones. The fear of these conflicts is the measure of centralization, the amount of confidence in the common-spirit and the corporate-consciousness (Gesammt-

bewufitsein) is the measure of localization. If the whole administration in all its forms is localized, it means that the appearance of the unity of the state is relin-

quished to what is inward, in the confidence that it will dynamically continue in the common-spirit and the corporate-consciousness. If the whole administration is centralized it means that conflict or the absence of consciousness is feared in all moments and that the common-spirit and corporate-consciousness is only found in the higher government.40

38 Schleiermacher, Lehre vom Stoat, 139

39 Ibid., 226

40 Ibid., 111-12



258 Jeffrey Hoover

In accord with his view that the development of political consciousness is an historical process, Schleiermacher maintains that there is an evolution within the nation-state that tends towards the decentrali- zation of government. In fact, he goes so far as to claim that in the development of a state 'it is impossible for us to conceive a movement from localization to centralization.'41 As a nation develops it must always proceed from a condition of less common-consciousness to a condition of more consciousness. A nation cannot begin its development from a point of maturity without first going through the earlier stages of development.

The mature nation-state will retain its monarchical form, but a monarchical state can be of two different sorts. On the one hand, it can be the epitome of the aristocratic structure, or it can 'rest uniformly on the whole.' Schleiermacher's decentralized monarchy takes the latter form.42 Schleiermacher depicts the mature nation-state as one in which the monarch reigns over a corporativistic structure of political entities where the majority of the activity of government occurs at the local level. However, this decentralized structure is maintained only if the common interest in the whole nation is present even at the local level. In order to preserve the common-spirit of the whole nation, Schleier- macher retains both the monarch and the accompanying corporativistic structure as an expression of the unity of the nation.

It is unclear from Schleiermacher's account whether we are to un- derstand the corporativism as being a true territorial distribution of power in which the intermediary organs of government would have sovereignty on certain matters, or whether he merely meant for there to be a functional distribution of power which emanates from the central organs of government. In either case, Schleiermacher presents us with a model of a decentralized state that relies on the fostering of a communitarian spirit.

Communes in Schleiermacher's theory are small social formations that were formed prior to the modern state, arising in conjunction with the appearance of the division of labor. These naturally appearing social formations are subsequently incorporated into the political life of the modern state. One of the many functions that communes have in addition to the more familiar governmental roles is to ensure the economic well-being of their members. As noted above, Schleiermacher is com- mitted to freeing individuals from economic worries so that they can pursue intellectual and ethical goods. This task of ensuring the

41 Ibid., 112

42 Ibid., 113




economic security of individuals falls to the state. However, Schleier- macher does not envision a strict centralized control over economic activities, but relegates the job to the communes. The communes exercise a type of financial guardianship over the people, making sure of the proper division of labor, and ensuring that each person has the means for making a living. When individuals no longer have the means by which to support themselves, the communes provide financial assistance.

It is unclear how much authority the communes are to be given - at one point Schleiermacher remarks that 'one can choose no business that the commune does not want.' This could mean that such things as the choice of one's vocation is to be regulated by a public authority, but it could also mean that the communes are so small that necessity itself dictates that one cannot choose a vocation for which there is insufficient demand. In any case, a commune is not open to whoever will attach themselves to it, since its role is to provide economic security to its members. Force, however, is never mentioned as a means to achieve the ends of the commune and it may be that Schleiermacher never considered communes to have such authority.43

While Schleiermacher develops his theory of the state in terms of structures more common to his era than our own, it is readily appar- ent that he is not describing any specific historical state - certainly not Prussia of his day. Schleiermacher is best understood as attempt- ing to indicate the form that the nation-state in general must take if it is to promote the development of unique, self-conscious individuals. The particular form that he gives to this political formation just happens to be those which he conceives of as a European writing in the early decades of the nineteenth century.

The amount of emphasis that Schleiermacher places on the natural and historical associations that underlie the modern state is distinctly romantic. To the extent that Schleiermacher attempts to preserve these associations he is motivated by similar concerns as contemporary communitarians. By preserving the integrity of historical communities and

emphasizing the importance of traditional social bonds, contemporary communitarians hope to avoid the problems of fragmentation and es- trangement which plague modern liberal society. Schleiermacher's

43 Ibid., 91-4. Schleiermacher also discusses another social formation which has as its aim the economic security of its members, namely, the guild. However, he subjects the guilds to severe criticism, describing them as exclusive groups of tradesmen who are organized to protect trade secrets and to keep out competi- tion. The basis of such guilds he claims is jealousy and as such they are com-

pletely 'useless' and are neither an arm of the state nor of the commune. Only when guilds have as their end that which is best for the trade does Schleiermacher allow that they proceed from political sentiment (Lehre vom Stoat, 94-5).



260 Jeffrey Hoover

approach to these problems of modern liberal society, however, is not to promote a society lacking pluralism, as communitarians sometimes have. Instead, Schleiermacher avoids these problems by building on the naturally-appearing ties within society to form a democratized and decentralized political structure whose sphere of influence is strictly limited.

In contrast to most contemporary communitarians Schleiermacher's primary motivation is not simply to promote the integration and participation of individuals in society. Instead, Schleiermacher seeks to foster the development of unique, self-conscious individuals. This end can be achieved only by ensuring that individuals are provided the oppor- tunity to pursue their own conceptions of the good within the context of unique primary communities with which they strongly identify. If we are to encourage self-development among members of modern societies Schleiermacher understands that we must reestablish a social arrangement of stable primary communities which at the same time allows for pluralism. Accordingly, Schleiermacher conceives a communitarian state that is not only decentralized, but one that is limited.

Although Schleiermacher advances a communitarian conception of the state, he does not intend the state itself to be totalizing, that is, he does not intend for the aims of the state to dominate all areas of social life. Schleiermacher sets strict limits to the state's authority by opposing its intervention into academic and religious affairs as well as the private associations of free sociality. Alongside the communal ends that dominate political life, individuals are allowed to actualize their freedom through the pursuit of private intellectual goods in the realm of free sociality. Schleiermacher's emphasis on the pursuit of private goods, albeit of a non-economic sort, within the sphere of free sociality, separates him not only from the romantics of his own day, but from many communitarians of today.

Schleiermacher's theory of the state is pluralistic in the sense that a communitarian conception of a decentralized state is set alongside other arenas of social activity which allow for a variety of individual pursuits. The sphere of the state's influence and regulation is therefore limited and conceived as only one arena of social activity among others, each of which has its own distinct ends. Consequently, Schleiermacher's ver- sion of the communitarian state, unlike the classical model employed by romantics and communitarians alike, is compatible with pluralism. In this respect Schleiermacher avoids the polarity forced on us by contemporary political philosophy - either communitarianism or pluralism.

Received: September, 1988 Revised: June, 1989

January, 1990



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Friedrich Schleiermacher's Theory of the Limited Communitarian State

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