From Afghanistan to Somalia

Chronic Failures in the War on Terror

From Afghanistan to Somalia

London, April 2008

Chronic Failures in the War on Terror: From Afghanistan to Somalia

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First published in April 2008 by MF Publishing Ltd

59 Russell Square, London WC1B 4HP, UK

ISBN: 0-9555008-4-2

Printed and bound in Great Britain


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Contents

Preface p.4

Executive Summary p.6

Recommendations p.14

Glossary p.16

A. Somalia p.18 1 Somalia Conflict History

2 Dynamics of the Current Political Situation in Somalia 3 Comparison of Somalia Conflict Dynamics to Afghanistan

B. Somaliland p.60

1 Recent History of Somaliland 2 Somaliland Today

Appendices p.72

I. Insurgency Propaganda

II. US Designation of Al-Shabab


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Preface The Senlis Council has studied the conflict dynamics in Afghanistan for over three years,

and has used this as a base to compare the country with another key staging post in the United States' self-proclaimed ‘War on Terror'1, Somalia.

The conflict theatres of Somalia and Afghanistan share a number of similarities, not least regarding the tactics, techniques and motivations utilised by their respective insurgencies.

Field research undertaken by The Senlis Council in both countries has enabled the identification of shared dynamics and the interplay between various levels of actor engaged

in both conflicts, and these are depicted in the schematic below.

COMMONALITIES BETWEEN THE SOMALI AND AFGHAN CONFLICTS

These three levels of conflict can interact on any level, and be used to justify the actions of

one actor at the expense of another. For instance, in the Afghan context, Pashtun tribes have used the US ‘War on Terror' as a cover to try and settle old tribal scores by

characterising opposing tribes as Taliban sympathisers or part of Al-Qaeda.

Similarly, pre-existing nationalistic struggles have been tapped into by Al-Qaeda/Taliban/Al-Shabab as recruitment tools for their own campaigns.

1 In 10 April 2006, President Bush defined the War on Terror as follows: "...today's war on terror is

like the Cold War. It is an ideological struggle with an enemy that despises freedom and pursues

totalitarian aims....I vowed then that I would use all assets of our power of Shock and Awe to win

the war on terror. And so I said we were going to stay on the offense two ways: one, hunt down the enemy and bring them to justice, and take threats seriously; and two, spread freedom."

http://www.state.gov/r/pa/ei/wh/rem/64287.htm


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Executive Summary By comparing the conflict dynamic in two different theatres central to the United States'

self-proclaimed War on Terror, a number of chronic failings in the US' approach have become evident. Foreign policy projection under President Bush has been both insular and

divisive, with the overly simple ‘with us or against us' axiom being a blanket formula applied to all parts of the globe with results that can best be described as unequal.

Reliance upon such a blunt measure has contributed in no small measure to much of the

increased instability present around the globe. Immediate term, traditional military ‘victories' against the armed forces of states accused of harbouring terrorist movements

make for spectacular 24/7 viewing in Anytown, USA. As the US military unleashes the latest cutting edge technology upon the most primitive of landscapes, commentators chatter

excitedly about ‘surgical strikes' and ‘laser-guided precision munitions'.

But after the fireworks display, comes the problematic ‘what next?' phase of post-conflict

reconstruction. Following expulsion of the bad guys (for now, at least), populations traumatised by decades of conflict and/or internal repression naturally expect their lives to

improve in the aftermath of such overpowering external intervention.

It is precisely at this point that the War on Terror starts to struggle. As previously controlled political spaces suddenly have their shackles removed, repressed movements of

every political and tribal hue burst into life, keen to reassert their presence. The experiences of Afghanistan and, most notably, Iraq, demonstrate that such unregulated

space will eventually be filled by sub-state armed groups backed by armed militias, which flourish at a greater speed than emergent civil society and state institutions. Such security

vacuums are also a ripe ground for Islamic extremism.

Afghanistan's resurgent Taliban provide a bleak example of how failing US-led War on Terror policies have promoted extremists to a level of political legitimacy they would never

ordinarily achieve. The Taliban and Al-Shabab are successfully exploiting policy mistakes such as aerial bombings, ongoing poverty, and aggressive foreign military presence to the

extent that they are increasingly viewed by local populations as representatives of their legitimate political grievances.

The War on Terror: a chronically dysfunctional policy

The stark realities of the WOT dominates more subtle foreign policy discourse by the

international community, and has resulted in a number of chronic problems that have led to both policy paralysis and increasing instability in WOT conflicts such as Afghanistan and

Somalia:

1. An absence of quantifiable metrics by which to measure success and failure, and lack of limitations upon the scope of military action, has allowed the US to act with relative

impunity and without necessary levels of emotional intelligence or diplomatic sensitivity. Short-term approaches to highly complex problems have simply deepened

existing fissures in WOT ‘target states', and created a panoply of new ones;

2. An over-militarised solution has resulted in a mounting number of civilian casualties,

and made it impossible for the international community to deliver critical aid to those in most need (i.e. southern Afghanistan; Mogadishu) – a triple failure in humanitarian,

effective COIN, and ‘smart power' policies. Immediate term humanitarian needs in WOT theatres are not at the top of international priority lists, and it is a primary duty of

care to resolve this situation;


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3. The international community is failing to condemn actors that are not making a

positive contribution towards reconciliation (for instance, US aerial strikes in Somalia and Afghanistan);

4. The international community is exceeding its competency level in trying to manage

multiple conflicts simultaneously, resulting in military overstretch and donor fatigue. There is an inverse correlation between the complexity of states within which WOT

operations are being waged, and the effectiveness of those operations;

5. US must coordinate its WOT policies with other regional and international actors; unilateral action simply serves to isolate the country on the global stage.

WOT: A Fast Track for action needed

There are gradual signs that the Bush Administration is toning down its WOT rhetoric,

particularly in relation to Iraq and Pakistan, but change is come far too slowly and conflicts are spreading and intensifying at a far greater rate than US can change its approach to suit

each theatre.

Although too late to right the multiple wrongs that have been committed in several of the

War on Terror's ‘battlegrounds', a modified approach is already under serious discussion in Washington, and should be embraced by President Bush in the last months of his

presidency.

A doctrine of ‘Smart Power', as formulated by Joseph Nye and Richard Armitage, is gaining ground in the US military and policy communities, and its basic premise was encapsulated

by General Anthony C. Zinni, USMC (Ret.) and Admiral Leighton W. Smith, Jr., USN (Ret.) at the Senate Foreign Relations Committee (5 March 2008):

“It is time, past time, for a new strategic triad – diplomacy and

development, as well as defense – to prepare us for the challenges ahead.”2

Over-reliance upon conventional ‘hard power' as a blunt instrument to eradicate terrorism has failed in Afghanistan and Iraq, and is also failing in Somalia. Recent aerial strikes upon

‘High Value [terrorist] Targets' in southern Somalia indicate that the US still has a long way to go before the promising allure of kinetic operations disappears.

2 See “A Smarter, more Secure America,” Report of the Center for Strategic and International Studies

Commission on Smart Power, November 2007, [online] Available at:

http://www.csis.org/component/option,com_csis_pubs/task,view/id,4156/type,1/. Full Senators' testimony available at:

http://www.senate.gov/~foreign/testimony/2008/ZinniTestimony080305a.pdf


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COMPARATIVE INDICATORS: AFGHANISTAN, SOMALIA AND SOMALILAND

INDICATOR AFGHANISTAN SOMALIA SOMALILAND

STATISTICAL SNAPSHOT

Number of suicide attacks

in 20073

137 3 No evidence of such

attacks

Number of refugees4 3 million 600,000 <10,000

Corruption Perception

Index (Transparency

International)5

1.8 (ranked 174) 1.4 (ranked 179) n/a

Status (Freedom House)6 Partly free Not free Partly free

Civil Liberties Score

(Freedom House)

5 7 4

Political Rights Score

(Freedom House)

5 7 5

ECONOMIC STATISTICS

International aid received

in 2007 (USD)7

1.6 billion 216 million n/a

GDP per capita (USD)8 1,000 600 (in 2003) n/a

Percentage of population

below the poverty line9

53% 43.3% 73%

POLITICAL INDICATORS

Free and fair elections 2004 elections had a

good turnout; low levels of intimidation

Elections not held since

1969

2005 Parliamentary

elections were regarded as free and fair, and a

test of independence

Civil Society Increasingly active;

people are using

traditional structures do

develop society

Flourishing in absence

of State

Strong and resilient Civil

Society in response to

international isolation

Rule of Law Developing institutions;

State's writ yet to

expand to all provinces

Country has been in

anarchy since 1991

Strong progress towards

democratic reforms, but

institutions still fragile

State monopoly on violence Very tenuous;

Government and

international community

struggling to dominate

the Taliban

Non-existent, TFG

doesn't even have full

control of the capital

Investment in security

forces has ensured the

government has virtual

monopoly on violence,

but clan militias still exist

Role of Diaspora Economic support,

advocacy, business

investment, and

development of civil

society

Mostly economic

support, conducted over

complex, clan-based

systems to transfer

money

Core provider of

remittances and support

on the international stage

3 Javed Hamim, “2007 ends with 137 suicide attacks in Afghanistan: PAN”, Afghan News Agency, 1

January 2008, [online] available at: http://www.afgha.com/?q=node/5510; Senlis Council research 4 UNHCR, Refugees International 5 Note: CPI Score relates to perceptions of the degree of corruption as seen by business people and

country analysts, and ranges between 10 (highly clean) and 0 (highly corrupt). Source: Transparency

International, “Corruption Perception Index 2007”, [online] available at: http://www.transparency.org/policy_research/surveys_indices/cpi/2007 6 Freedom House is a United States-based international non-governmental organization that conducts

research and advocacy on democracy, political freedom and human rights. Note: Score ranges from 1

to 7, with 1 being the highest level of freedom and 7 being the lowest. Source: Freedom House, “Map of Freedom in the World”, [online] Available at:

http://www.freedomhouse.org/template.cfm?page=363&year=2007 7 OECD, Development Co-operation Directorate (DCD-DAC) and Financial Tracking Service, UN Office

for Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA) 8 CIA Worldfactbook and UHUBSO (UK-based Somaliland charity) 9 European Commission, UHUBSO, and The Global Call to Action against Poverty (GCAP)


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Somalia

Somalia is a state in name only. Aside from the briefest of intervals, the last 17 years has been characterised by varying degrees of chaos as a wide array of actors seek to impose

their own imprint upon the country, invariably at the cost of other interested parties. An abject lack of governance has created a huge political and security space for non-state

actors to fill and exploit for their own purposes, while the areas of Puntland and Somaliland exist well outside the orbit of the central ‘government'.

Efforts to introduce stability have been frequent in both number and outcome. The

international community's insistence upon viewing this most complicated of conflicts through a standard prism of war/peace (and, even less effectively under President Bush,

good/bad) has met with predictable levels of success.

The approach currently being adopted by the international community is underpinned by

the following logic: Somalia is a failed state, ergo it poses a significant threat to international security as it provides shelter for militant Islamists. This situation can only be

addressed by a functioning central government backed by reformed security services, and the first stage towards achieving that aim is staging a ‘peace conference'.

Unfortunately such gatherings are invariably hamstrung by numerous domestic and regional

actors who seek to control the restoration of a functioning state. Even if a political resolution was reached, the vast levels of capital inflow required to establish functioning

security forces have never been evident.

“The longer law and order is absent from Somalia, the greater the chance that international

terrorists will use its territory as a safe haven, creating significant regional and

international threats to peace and security.”

United Nations Security Council

Report of the Secretary-General on the situation in Somalia

14 March 2008, p.4

Somalia’s Chronic Problems

Somalia is blighted by a number of chronic problems that require addressing if it is to pull itself out of the quagmire. While all specific to the country itself, some are indicative of the

underlying inability of the international community to act collectively and intelligently in conflict zones and failing states. For instance, measures are frequently designed to achieve

short term tactical successes, with long term benchmarks apparently not featuring in strategic planning.

Credible reconciliation plan

Since the fall of Siad Barre's regime in 1991, at least 15 national reconciliation conferences

have been convened, each seeking – and failing – to resolve internal political differences and establish a credible and effective central government.

An inability to secure the involvement, purposefully or not, of all parties in the

reconciliation process was depicted as the key impediment to Somalia's stability.

Prime Minister Nur Hassan Hussein's efforts for political reconciliation focus on addressing

the failure to engage all opposition groups, promising to talk to all Somali groups without precondition and releasing political prisoners. This unconditional offer to engage in


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dialogue with opposition forces has triggered increased consultation with these groups,

raising hopes for a political resolution. Support for these measures by the UN's Special Representative provides another scrap of positive news in a bleak landscape.

Dire humanitarian situation

The current humanitarian situation in Somalia is at a level not seen since 1991, and the

international community's response is woefully inadequate. An unprecedented food emergency and constant fighting between myriad warring factions have elevated the

humanitarian crisis to record levels. Unlike Darfur, where billions of dollars of aid are being invested and thousands of aid workers operate, Somalia remains a place to avoid. The

United Nations estimates that the country received less than USD 200 million in 2007, and the number of aid workers in the country continues to decrease in direct proportion to the

violence that affects Somalia.

External militaries and non state armed groups

While a military presence is required to bring stabilisation to Somalia, the current mix of

forces in theatre is poorly-conceived and inflammatory. Ethiopian forces backed by US ‘surgical strikes' and an ineffective African Union force have worsened the country's security

landscape. Clan militias, militant Islamists and the TFG's own armed forces are also engaged in multi-layered violence, and unravelling this intra- and inter-state conflict lies at the core

of the international community's challenge.

A record of failure

Every actor involved in Somalia has contributed to the anarchic state that exists today:

a. United States

Although the State Department claims that fighting terrorism is part of a ‘comprehensive strategy,' one element clearly dominates their approach.10 In applying the binary logic of

the uncoordinated “War on Terror” to the complex political situation in Somalia, the Bush Administration has undermined the worthy reconciliation efforts of new Somali prime

minister Nur Hassan Hussein and UN Special Representative for Somalia, Ahmedou Ould-Abdallah, to achieve a political breakthrough through ‘open door' mediation in the following

ways:

An ill-timed designation of Al-Shabab as a terrorist organisation has enhanced their domestic status;

Launching ‘targeted aerial strikes' upon suspected militant strongholds has inflamed local sentiment against the US and the TFG;

These bombings and sponsorship of a proxy Christian army – Ethiopia – to fight in Mogadishu have provided militant Islamists with abundant propaganda material.

10 During a testimony to the US Senate Foreign Relations Subcommittee on Africa on 11 March 2008,

Assistant Secretary for African Affairs Jendayi E. Frazer outlined the US' strategy for Somalia:

“Fighting terrorism in Somalia is not our sole priority, but rather is part of a comprehensive strategy to reverse radicalisation, improve governance, rule of law, democracy and human rights, and improve

economic growth and job creation”.


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b. Transitional Federal Government

The Somali TFG generally and the President in particular have acted as a spoiler in recent

years. Whilst the new Prime Minister is acting as a positive agent for change, his ability to prosecute a progressive policy agenda is severely undermined for the following reasons:

The TFG is an incoherent body characterised by a ‘zero sum game' mentality. It is a

loose collection of frequently opposed clan-based groups that seek to maximise their position at the expense of their rivals;

It is failing to deliver any government services, security or aid, prompting the worst humanitarian crisis since early 1990s;

It is unable, or unwilling, to provide a basic level of agreement and consent between the various factions, clans and sub clans, and is perceived to be guilty of clan

favouritism. It has failed to re-establish the seat of government in Mogadishu; Aside from the Prime Minister's bloc, many key figures in the TFG retain armed militias;

A number of internal and external forces continue to exert control over the TFG's various factions through a network of commanders that exist outside of the government's orbit.

President Abdullahi Yusuf, Mohamed Dheere, Abdi Qeybdiid and various regional and

district administrations all have a stake in the TFG, as does Ethiopia. A significant proportion of the criminality rife throughout southern Somalia is linked to these forces,

many of whom engage in violent acts against a defenceless civilian population; TFG forces have been responsible for a variety of attacks against civilians in Mogadishu,

including widespread pillaging and looting of civilian property; rape; attacks on humanitarian workers; mass arbitrary arrests and mistreatment of detainees;

The TFG has also failed to provide effective warnings to civilians of impending military operations, interfered with and sometimes obstructed delivery of humanitarian

assistance, and repeatedly closed independent media outlets.

c. International Community

The international community's stance is characterised by inertia and a lack of clarity. Its collective failure to push back on the US or other actors when they act contrary to the

interests of reconciliation contributes to Somalia's ongoing instability.

For instance, recent actions by the US (bombings in Somalia and the timing of its inflammatory designation of Al-Shabab as a terrorist organisation) were met by a collective

silence from the international community.

The international community has also failed to censure Ethiopia for excessive use of force,

to investigate credible allegations of war crimes, or to respond to the UN's Special Representative's appeal to end impunity in Somalia.


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Somaliland

If Somalia is a state in name only, Somaliland is a state-in-waiting without formal recognition.

Of all of the states in the Horn of Africa, it is the self-declared yet internationally

unrecognised aspirant state of Somaliland that offers President Bush with his most viable opportunity to claim an African success story. By all rational indicators of a state's post-

conflict development, Somaliland represents impressive progress, and consolidating an area of stability and governance in the Horn of Africa will reduce the vacant space for instability,

conflict and extremism to fill.

Somaliland has achieved an extraordinary level of political and physical stability after being

raised during the bitter civil war of the early 1990s. An embattled population found the resolve to reconstitute itself, establishing functioning organs of government without little

upheaval – a rarity in post-conflict reconstruction. Its drive to create multi-party democracy upon a backdrop of relative peace and security has been impressive, if not without flaw.

Somaliland's considerable achievements must not continue to go unheralded, and the only

substantial way to reward it is through full statehood. Regional and international actors cannot tacitly assume that its position as a regional anchor of stability will endure

indefinitely, as a number of latent spoilers could undermine progress. These include:

Internal power struggles translating into violent clashes between armed militias; Public protests at the lack of tangible government achievements;

Militant Islamist movements embedding themselves within the territory; Deepening conflict with Puntland;

Armed conflict with TFG forces.

Somaliland's claim for full state independence is distinct from the majority of similar requests of other separatist enclaves/exclaves. Rather than seeking to secede from Somalia,

Somaliland is looking to be re-constituted as an independent state. It held this status for

five days between 26 June and 1 July 1960 - being recognised by 35 states in the process - before voluntarily uniting with Italian Somalia within the Somali Republic.

Given the turmoil that characterises the bulk of Somalia, the international community needs

to be reawakened from its torpor on Somaliland while relative calm exists, a calm that shows troubling signs of being disrupted by bomb attacks in the capital, Hargeisa, in April

2008 and the subsequent deployment of troops by the President. The policy vacuum needs to be filled by constructive engagement on the issue of Somaliland's status at every

diplomatic level, most notably within the African Union and United Nations. While this dialogue should necessarily be framed by the need for regional stability, the aim of some

parties to establish a Somali Federation need not be an immediate focus of such discussions.


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Recommendations In order to adorn the twilight of his presidency with a success story in his self-proclaimed

‘War on Terror', President Bush should implement a high-intensity, Fast Track policy for Somalia and Somaliland that pushes the former towards stability and rewards the latter for

its significant achievements over the past decade. Fast tracking Somaliland recognition will send a shock wave to Somalia, and send a clear message that peace and prosperity can be

rewarded without the need to use overpowering military force.

To date, efforts to resolve the crisis that has blighted Somalia have been half hearted and misconceived. Meanwhile, the Horn of Africa's beacon of stability – Somaliland – continues

to toil in relative anonymity, receiving little recognition for its remarkable progress towards creating a viable, stand-alone state.

Somaliland has succeeded where the TFG has failed because it possesses precisely those attributes that Somalia lacks: democratically elected institutions with domestic legitimacy,

institutions that serve as a repository of nationalism and sovereignty etc. Fighting terrorism is therefore a domestic priority (it was enshrined in the constitution long before 9/11)

since extremist violence threatens the institutions of statehood and the common aspiration to international recognition.

Somaliland has not abandoned 'hard' CT tasks (intelligence gathering, capture/kill etc), but

its placement of these tasks within a broader, integrated national framework has been successful. The TFG will not be able to succeed at CT, despite US and Ethiopian support,

unless it follows Somaliland's example.

Somalia

Efforts to stabilise Somalia are in desperate need of reinvigoration. The lack of strategic

acumen present in the War on Terror-driven approach is entrenching the chaos present throughout the country, making the prospect of a rebuilt and fully functioning Somali state

a Utopian vision that will never be realised.

Successfully navigating a path through the minefield that is Somali clan politics a patient and nuanced approach. For instance, it is essential that all constituent parts of the TFG feel

equally rewarded by any resolution, but are not allowed to dominate or control the country as a result.

A re-engineered counter-terrorism campaign based upon Smart Power tenets should include

the following Key Success Indicators, which can be separated into high-impact quick wins and long-term developmental measures.

High Impact, Quick Win

1. Deliver aid to refugees outside of Mogadishu; 2. Support the prime minister and United Nations Special Representative's efforts at

reconciliation process, including moderate elements of Islamic Courts; 3. Halt all kinetic operations in Somalia;

4. The culture of impunity in Somalia must end. Counter-productive elements of the TFG must be identified and stripped of their diplomatic rights, regardless of their seniority;

5. Transitional tasks should be identified and an action plan for their resolution established: cessation of hostilities, security arrangements, constitutional dialogue,

and electoral system/process need to addressed before longer term developmental issues are addressed.


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Long Term, Developmental

1. Higher levels of engagement with the Somali people, in particular key stakeholders in

civil society and moderate Islamist movements. Somalia is an ‘accountability-free zone', and this needs to be addressed. For instance, the TFG should empower a number

of targeted communities to assume control over the promotion of peace in their locality;

2. Structural elements of the conflict must be addressed; natural connectors between disparate groups need to be identified and nurtured. Only efforts at resolving the

underlying drivers of instability can promote a link between the ordinary Somali, a nascent government in Mogadishu, and the international community. Hence land

disputes, clan grievances, unemployment, economic stagnation, and lack of equitable

wealth distribution must all form part of a policy framework for Somalia; 3. An early conclusion of a cessation of hostilities should stipulate the phased withdrawal

of Ethiopian troops in coordination with deployment of a UN Peace Support Operation. This force should be composed of at least 20,000 troops, contain no forces from

contiguous states, and contain a significant number of Muslims from African countries; 4. The raison d'être of the international military mission in the country must be clearly

articulated, and come to be viewed as a positive force for change. It must cease all activities against the state, and start to act in the interests of ordinary Somalis by

delivering aid and securing stable zones for IDPs; 5. The country's multitude of clan elders and politicians must engage with the peace

process, otherwise a credible government of national unity cannot eventuate.

A Road Map to Somaliland Recognition

A fast track to recognition is urgently needed for Somaliland:

1. It should be encouraged to hold a free and fair referendum on independence that adheres to internationally agreed standards – this will remove any uncertainly over the

significance of its last referendum on the Constitution, held in 2001; 2. Transition to an open, multi-party system must be completed, and the balance between

the executive and legislature entrenched; 3. Judiciary firmly established, with enforceable rule of law extending throughout the

country; 4. Resolution to territorial dispute with Puntland, through international arbitration if

necessary; 5. The capacity of Somalia to block any progressive discourse on Somaliland within the

African Union entrenches organisational inertia. This de facto veto capacity must be rebalanced;

6. The United Nations should grant Somaliland the capability to make direct representations to the Security Council;

7. The US government should rebalance its aid outlays in order to reward Somaliland.11 Overall levels of development assistance are also woefully inadequate; US aid to

Somalia overall stood at just USD 73.7 million in 2007.12

11 According to General Accounting Office report GAO-08-351, In FY01 and FY03, about 90 per cent of

US developmental assistance funds were targeted at Somaliland and Puntland. By contrast, in FY07,

the majority of these funds went to south-central Somalia 12 Testimony by Assistant Secretary for African Affairs Jendayi E. Frazer Evaluating US Policy Objectives and Options on the Horn of Africa, Senate Foreign Relations Subcommittee on Africa, 11

March 2008.


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Glossary

AQ Al Qaeda

ARS Alliance for the Re-liberation of Somalia

AU African Union

ICG International Crisis Group

ICU Islamic Courts Union

IDP Internally Displaced Person

NATO North Atlantic Treaty Organisation

SNM Somali National Movement

TFG Transitional Federal Government

TFP Transitional Federal Parliament

TNG Transitional National Government

UN United Nations

US United States

WOT War on Terror


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Part A: Somalia

PROFILE: SOMALIA

Area

246,200 square miles

(637,660km²)

Capital City

Mogadishu

External Borders

Kenya, Ethiopia, Djibouti

Population

8.7 million

Major languages

Somali, Arabic, Italian,

English

Religion

Sunni Islam, with a small Christian minority

Life expectancy

47 years (men); 49 years

(women)

Main exports

Livestock, bananas, hides, fish

Primary ports and

airports

El Maan, Adan Adde

International, Kismaayo

Bender Qasim

International (Puntland)

Economy

1980s economy: The informal economy made up an estimated 70% of economic activity13

Post-1991 economy: The Somali economy does not operate on the basis of a totally free market and, in the absence of a state, other forces including kinship and security play a role in regulating

the market, i.e. businessmen from unarmed and less powerful clans are dependent on others for the

protection of their business; economic productivity remains below pre-war levels and GDP per

capita (PPP) has declined in real terms from USD 1,330 to USD 79514. First official trade deal since

1991 was established in 2005 with Kenya

Human development

Ranked 161 out of 163 countries in 2001 on UN Human Development Index; considered a low-income country with an estimated 45% of the population living on less than USD 1 a day

13 P. Little, “Somalia: Economy without State,” 2003 (Oxford: James Currey) p.4 14 UNDP, “Somalia Human Development Report,” 2001, p. 90, 150, 204


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A.1 Somalia Conflict History

Somalia's recent history has been marked by instability, dictatorship and disintegration. Although the country democratically elected its first President in 1960, the government was

soon overthrown by the regime of Major General Mohamed Siad Barre, who imposed a dictatorship which lasted until 1991. In the absence of a functioning central government

for over 17 years, Somalia has been ravaged by sweeping conflict and has experienced an endemic humanitarian crisis. Throughout this period, Somalia has struggled to remain

united. In May 2001, north-western Somalia unilaterally declared itself independent as the Republic of Somaliland. Three years earlier, in August 1998, the north-eastern Puntland

State of Somalia was established as a self-governing entity, seeking to become part of a federated Somalia at a later stage.

An ongoing struggle to establish a central government

In efforts to resolve the political differences and establish a credible and effective central

government, at least fifteen national reconciliation conferences have been convened since 1991. The thirteenth such effort, held in Djibouti in 2000, resulted in the formation of a

Transitional National Government (TNG). Nonetheless, this new national government was

incapable of establishing itself beyond parts of the capital city of Mogadishu, and its three-year mandate expired in summer 2003.

Emergence of the Transitional Federal Government and the Islamic Courts Union

In 2004, another national reconciliation conference held in Kenya led to the creation of the

Transitional Federal Government (TFG), whose official aim is to bring peace and security in the country. The Transitional Federal Charter provides a transitory legal basis for the interim

five-year government – comprising a President, the Prime Minister, and cabinet – and calls for a new constitution and a nation-wide poll.

High expectations of stability and progress in Somalia following the TFG's creation failed to

materialise: in June 2006 the Islamic Courts Union (ICU) defeated the US-backed coalition of warlords which had been established as an instrument of counter-terrorism policy. The

ICU then extended its authority to the central and south regions of the country, rendering the TFG ineffective.

Ethiopian intervention in support of the Transitional Federal Government

In December 2006, in what was widely perceived to be an opportunity to force durable

stability in Somalia, Ethiopian troops intervened in the country and together with TFG forces, ousted the ICU from areas in the south and central regions, allowing the TFG to gain

control of Mogadishu. On 20 January 2008, the TFG relocated from the south-eastern town of Baidoa to the capital city of Mogadishu, with a pledge of national reconciliation and

desperately-needed stability.

“Before the Ethiopian invasion, Somalia was in hell. Somalia needs help preparing its

security forces, and then Ethiopia can leave. The United Nations cannot do anything here,

but the Ethiopians know Somalia. Others do not.”

Government supporter

Mogadishu, March 2008

Insurgency activities increasing: the return of the ICU and rise of Al-Shabab

However, once again expectations and promises have fallen short. The intervention of a

foreign military and the reinstatement of the TFG have led to frequent and large-scale conflict between anti-government forces and government troops. ICU remnants and clan


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militias have repeatedly challenged the authority and legitimacy of the TFG, and resisted

the foreign occupation of the country. Deadly clashes have recently escalated, leading to widespread chaos and lawlessness.


“Force is being used as first resort rather than last resort.”

“In Somalia, and in Mogadishu, the one who has the gun, he’s the boss.”

Identities withheld


SOMALIA CONFLICT HISTORY AT A GLANCE

26 June 1960 Independence from Britain and Italy

1 July 1960 Somaliland and Italian Somalia unite to become the Republic of Somalia

1969 Siad Barre takes power in a coup

1977-78 Ogaden War with Ethiopia

1980s Barre increasingly relying on external financial sources and losing internal support

1991 After growing pressure from various rebel movements, the Barre regime falls. No

central government institutions survive

April 1992 UN peacekeeping operation in Somalia

December 1992 US-led Unified Task Force enters Somalia, but is soon drawn into heavy fighting

March 1995 UN and US troops withdraw amid rising violence

2000 Transitional National Government established, but is ineffective outside

Mogadishu

2004 Transitional Federal Government formed with support from Kenya and Ethiopia.

Abdullahi Yusuf Ahmed is named President

2006 TFG parliament established in south-eastern Baidoa Militia force the Alliance for the Restoration of Peace and Counter-Terrorism is

formed with US support, to counter Islamist influences in Mogadishu

June 2006 Union of Islamic Courts defeats the ARPC and confronts the TFG in Baidoa.

Six months of relative security follow, with diminished violence and conflict

December 2006 Ethiopian troops invade to support the TFG The Union of Islamic Courts disbands under pressure from local business.

January 2007 US airstrikes in Somalia, aimed at alleged Al-Qaeda cells operating there

Current situation

Ethiopian troops remain in Somalia, while the TFG attempts to establish authority. The US- and

Ethiopian- sponsored transitional government is hampered by internal divisions and the popular perception that it is a foreign puppet.


21

A.2 Dynamics of the current political situation in Somalia

Shifting alliances and rivalries

The political situation in Somalia remains multifaceted and constantly changeable. Following the 17-year absence of a credible and functioning central government, a number

of national players have striven to garner popular support by opposing foreign interference in the country and criticising the TFG for its lack of accountability. A political Islamic

movement has already emerged in Somalia whilst an extremist movement is currently

surfacing. Notably, opposition to the government is not homogenous. The dynamics and relationships between the main political players and armed groups are mercurial, with allies

often quickly becoming rivals.

Clans: Somalia’s complex political framework

Somalia's strong social structures also play an important part in the country's political processes. Somalia is a lineage-based society where clan affiliation is a complex yet

principle source of identity and security. In the context of Somalia's current situation of lawlessness, these social units have been mobilised and represent a dominant political

dynamic at the local and national level. Somali clans and sub-clans have neither a unified nor a consistent stance on current Somali politics. Even those clans that accept the

authority of the TFG may actively oppose it on certain issues and build coalitions with other groups.

Somali politics marked by international involvement

At the same time, international stakeholders continue to intervene in the country, including

through military support of opposing groups, to exert influence over Somalia's future. Neighbouring countries and the United States have intervened in the country, either in an

attempt to gain a regional stronghold or as part of the global War on Terror. In contrast, the United Nations has sought to bring about stability in the country by mobilising the

African Union, and promoting a genuine conciliatory political process between all Somali parties.

“The great majority in Somalia want peace but there are some who are heavily invested in

the violence and do not want a stable government in place, as it would remove power and

economic wealth from them. They will attend the peace talks to put on a show but will

ensure that peace is never possible.”

Businessman




22

WHO’S WHO IN SOMALIA: A POLITICAL GUIDE TO KEY STAKEHOLDERS

NATIONAL LEVEL

TRANSITIONAL FEDERAL GOVERNMENT (TFG)

PRESIDENT ABDULLAHI YUSUF AHMED (10/2004-)

From the Darood clan;

A military man and

former clan warlord;

Former President of the

northern Puntland

region.

PRIME MINISTER NUR HASSAN HUSSEIN (11/2007-)

From the Abgal sub-clan

of the Hawiye clan; He

enjoys popular support

and is considered neutral,

fair and uncorrupted; He

promotes a conciliatory

process.

SPEAKER OF PARLIAMENT (Transitional Federal Parliament TFP) SHEIKH ADAN MUHAMMAD NUR "ADAN

MADOBE" (01/2007 - )

He is from the Sagal sub-clan of the Rahanwein clan. A former businessman, with

some Islamic credentials; He was one of the founders of the Rahanwein Resistance

Army (RRA) in 1995; Madobe remains one of Ethiopia's most trusted allies in Somalia

AUTONOMOUS REGIONS

SOMALILAND PUNTLAND

PRESIDENT DAHIR RAYALE KAHIN (05/2002 - )

The self-declared Republic

of Somaliland is

dominated by the Isaaq

clan; The President, from

the Gadabursi sub-clan of

the Dir clan, held the

rank of Sergeant (Civilian

Intelligence) in Siad

Barre's National Security

Service.

PRESIDENT MUHAMMAD MUSE XIRSI 'ADDE'

(01/2005 -)

The northern Puntland

region is dominated by the

Darood clan; The

President hails from the

Majerteen sub-clan and

maintains good relations

with Somaliland


23

WARLORDS

MAYOR OF MOGADISHU, MUHAMMAD UMAR

HABIB 'DHEERE' (05/2007 - )

Somali warlord of

the Abgal sub-clan

of the Hawiye

clan, supported by

the TFG; Long-

term ally of

Ethiopia; Former

leader of the

Somali

Reconciliation and

Restoration

Council; Dheere is

reported to have worked with US intelligence

agencies, helping them capture local Al-Qaeda operatives.

MILITIA LEADER, ABDI HASAN AWALE QEYBDIID

Affiliated with the Somali National

Alliance and a member of the

Haber Gedir sub-clan of the

Hawiye clan; Served as Police

Chief under Siad Barre and was

implicated in extrajudicial killings;

In the early 1990s he was among

General Aideed's closest advisers,

including during the clashes with

UN forces, and was arrested by the

US; In 2006 he led the Battle of

Bandiradley on behalf of the TFG

and backed by Ethiopian troops.

INTERNATIONAL LEVEL

UNITED NATIONS

SPECIAL REPRESENTATIVE OF THE UN SECRETARY- GENERAL FOR SOMALIA, AHMEDOU OULD ABDALLAH

(09/2007 -)

Adballah remains in close contact with the TFG and representatives of civil society

and business, promoting a political dialogue with opposition groups; In December

2007 he called on the international community to actively support the Somali people.

AFRICAN UNION MISSION IN SOMALIA (AMISOM)

In January 2008, the African Union Peace and Security Council extended the

mandate of AMISOM for another six months; Currently, there is 2,600-strong

deployment in the country, mainly consisted of Burudian and Ugandan troops.


24

UNITED STATES

US STATE DEPARTMENT

On 29 February 2008,

Secretary of State

Condoleezza Rice

designated Al-Shabab as a

foreign terrorist

organisation.

The US Embassy in Somalia

has been closed since the

collapse of Siad Barre's

regime in 1991. Since then

it has managed its

activities for Somalia from

Nairobi, Kenya.

As of June 2006, Michael

Ranneberger serves as US

Ambassador to Kenya.

US DEPARTMENT OF DEFENCE

The Chairman of the Joint Chiefs

of Staff, Admiral Michael Mullen

(left) and Under-Secretary of

Defence, James Clapper (below),

advise the Defence Secretary

Robert Gates and President Bush

on military and intelligence

matters.

Since December 2007, there have

been four US missile attacks on

Somali ground, targeting

terrorists.

The Bureau of African

Affairs, the division of the

Department of State that

advises the Secretary about

African Affairs, is headed

by the Assistant Secretary

Jendayi Frazer.

Theresa Whelan currently serves

as the Deputy Assistant Secretary

of Defence for African Affairs

within the Office of the Secretary

of Defence.

In March 2008 Deputy

Assistant Secretary James

Swan has defended the

designation of Al-Shabab

as a foreign terrorist

organisation saying it

poses a threat to the

Somali people and has

close links to Al-Qaeda.

COMBINED JOINT TASK FORCE HORN OF AFRICA (CJTF

HOA), US CENTRAL COMMAND

The War on Terror related CJTF HOA was initially formed

in 2002 as a seafaring force aimed at blocking terrorists

fleeing Afghanistan from establishing a new safe haven.

Based in Djibouti, the Force is strategically located next

to Somalia and engages in military exercises.

Rear Admiral James M. Hart is

currently serving as Commander of the CJTF HOA.


25

ETHIOPIA ERITREA

PRIME MINISTER MELES ZENAWI (1995 - )

Similar to his

predecessors, Zenawi

preferred a united but

federal nation that

included the Eritrean

state; Ethiopia and the

TFG share the same

secular values, arguing

that religion and state

should stay separate;

Ethiopia labels the ICU

as jihadists; Zenawi

faces some political opposition demanding the

withdrawal of Ethiopian troops from Somalia.

PRESIDENT ISAIAS AFEWERKI (1993 - )

Expresses frustration

regarding the tense relations

with Ethiopia; highly

influential on the Sudan

peace process; his

Government is accused of

arming and financing the

insurgency in Somalia, and

the US is currently

considering designating

Eritrea as a “State sponsor of

terrorism”.

OPPOSITION/INSURGENT GROUPS

SUPREME COUNCIL OF ISLAMIC COURTS

(SCIC) OR ISLAMIC COURTS UNION (ICU)

Following the collapse of Siad Barre's regime in

1991, a group of Sharia Courts became the

dominant system of governance and

administration. Until the end of 2006 when the

ICU was ousted by Somali TFG forces and

Ethiopian troops, it controlled most of southern

and central Somalia, and enjoyed the support of

Eritrea. Currently, the ICU calls for jihad against

Ethiopia. ICU insurgents enjoy popular support

and receive funding from local businessmen.

AL-SHABAB

Radical Islamist group founded a few years ago as the

militant youth movement of ICU. It has now

regrouped with the backing of Islamic Jihadist groups

and supporters in the Middle East. The group's

ultimate goal is to help Muslims worldwide create a

unified Islamic State. On 29 February 2008, the US

Secretary of State designated Al Shabab as a foreign

terrorist organisation, calling it a violent and brutal

extremist group with a number of individuals affiliated with Al-Qaeda.

LEADER SHEIKH SHARIF SHEIKH AHMED

Sheikh Ahmed is of the

Abgal sub-clan of the

Hawiye clan and

studied in Libya and

Sudan; He has made a

longstanding Islamist

accusation that

Ethiopian forces

intervene in Somalia;

Now the leader of the

Alliance for the Re-

Liberation of Somalia

(ARS), the Eritrea-

based opposition

group.

SENIOR COMMANDER ADEN HASHI FARAH "AYROW"

Ayrow, hailing from the Ayr sub-clan of the Hawiye

clan, is reported to had trained with Al-Qaeda in

Afghanistan prior to 2001; He has issued statements

praising Osama Bin Laden and inviting foreign jihadists

to a holy war against foreign troops in Somalia; During

Ethiopia's intervention in late 2006 to oust the ICU,

Ayrow is thought to have led an elite-commando army

which fiercely resisted Ethiopian troops in the Baidoa

region.


26

SHEIKH HASSAN DAHIR AWEYS

Head of the 90-member

Shura Council of the ICU;

Viewed as one of the

Union's radical leaders;

He is on the US terrorist

list for his associations

with Al-Qaeda; Attended

the ARS conference held

in Eritrea in September

2007 but has rejected

claims he holds a formal

position in the Alliance.

MUKHTAR ROBOW (AKA ABU MANSOOR)

Senior military commander

spokesman for al-Shabab;

Provided logistical support for

Al-Qaeda operatives inside

Somalia, and called for

attacks on African Union

forces.

HASSAN ABDULLAH HERSI AL-TURKI

An Islamist, military leader born in Ethiopia, now runs a military training camp near

the Kenya-Somalia border; He is widely considered to lead a chapter of the Al-Shabab

though he has not disowned the ARS; In June 2004 he was designated by the US

under US Presidential Executive Order for terrorist financing and associations with Al-

Qaeda.

Other senior members of Al-Shabab include Ahmed Abdi Godane and Ibrahim Haji

Jama (aka al Afghani), who had been trained and fought with Al-Qaeda in

Afghanistan. Both have been designated by the US as terrorists. Abu Zubeyr and

‘Emir' have also been recently named as senior members of Al-Shabab.

AL-QAEDA OPERATIVES IN EAST AFRICA

SALEH ALI SALEH NABHAN

Senior Al-Qaeda

operative in East

Africa; Wanted for

questioning in

connection with the

2002 attacks against a

hotel and an Israeli airliner in Mombasa,

Kenya.

FAZUL ABDULLAH MOHAMMED (AKA HARUN FAZUL)

Senior Al-Qaeda operative;

Was indicted for his alleged

involvement in the bombings

of US Embassies in Tanzania

and Kenya in 1998.

ISSA OSMAN ISSA

Implicated in the 2002 attacks in Mombasa, Kenya;

Has maintained contact with the leaders of the Al-

Shabab and in the past commanded militia fighting

for the ICU in the Baidoa region.

ABU TALHA AL-SUDANI

Senior Al-Qaeda figure in East Africa since early 1990s;

implicated in the 1998 bombings of the United States

Embassies in Dar es Salaam, Tanzania, and Nairobi,

Kenya; skilled with mortar weapons, planned a trip to

Somalia in 1993 with other al-Qaeda figures to oppose

U.S. forces there; cased the U.S. military base in Djibouti

in 2003 in preparation for possible attacks.


27

A.2.1 Recent Developments

Appointment of new Prime Minister and Cabinet

2007 marked political crises that led to the resignation of the former Prime Minister, Ali

Mohamed Gedi, and the appointment of a new cabinet. Under a clan power-sharing deal announced in November 2007, President Abdullahi Yusuf Ahmed, from the Darood clan,

appointed respected Hawiye clan figure Nur Hassan Hussein as Prime Minister. The TFG is currently dominated by the Darood/Majerteen, Hawiye/Abgal and Rahanwhein clans and

sub-clans. The Hawiye clan holds the greatest influence in the capital Mogadishu. After the Majerteen, the Rahanwein reportedly comprise the second largest clan grouping in the TFG

army.

“The government must be a government for everyone, not just those that support the

government.”

Government Representative


In response to public criticisms regarding the formation and quality of the cabinet, and considering the recommendations of the National Reconciliation Congress, the newly

appointed Prime Minister appointed a new cabinet with members chosen from both within and outside parliament. Prime Minister Hussein's efforts to establish a government of

national unity, to reach out to rival groups and engage with all Somalis were regarded as a renewed opportunity for a peaceful transition to a democratic regime.15 Nonetheless,

internal divisions, a lack of transparency and power rivalry have hindered these efforts and continue to thwart the authority and legitimacy of the TFG.

As the TFG's five-year mandate draws to a close in 2009, the chances of the TFG holding

national elections to establish a functioning Somali state and a permanent government look increasingly bleak. Public disillusionment over the lack of national unity and the TFG's

broken promises is growing; the TFG's inaction over insecurity is pushing people toward

more radical positions as a matter of survival.

15 In his latest Report on the situation in Somalia, the UN Secretary-General Ban Ki-moon welcomed

the appointment of the new Prime Minister stressing that this is an “opportunity to make further progress in the reconciliation process and to successfully complete the remainder of the transition

period”, Security Council, S/2008/178, 14 March 2008


28


Failed attempts at national reconciliation

Since the fall of Siad Barre's regime in 1991, at least 15 national reconciliation conferences

have been convened, each seeking to resolve the internal political differences and establish

a credible and effective central government.

Major National Reconciliation Conferences since 1991

1993 15 warring parties signed two agreements for national reconciliation and disarmament;

fighting resumed and agreements soon fell apart.

1996

The Sodere conference in Ethiopia achieved agreement among a large group of faction

leaders on a National Salvation Council and related institutions. It was aborted by the

convening of the Cairo conference.

1997

25 factions attended the Cairo Peace Conference leading to an agreement to form a

transitional government of national unity; factions ultimately opposed to the proposed settlements and the peace process was declared ‘dead' a few months later.

2000

The Somalia National Peace Conference held in Djibouti resulted in the formation of the Transitional National Government (TNG); the TNG was unable to implement a cease-fire and

establish itself beyond parts of Mogadishu.

2004

During the Eldoret and Mbagathi processes, major factions agreed to the formation of the

TFG with a five-year mandate; the TFG lacks necessary internal legitimacy and parties have

yet to disarm.

The most recent National Reconciliation Conference was held in July-August 2007. The international community expressed its broad support for this attempt, providing USD 8

million through United Nations Development Program to strengthen the capacity of its independent oversight body, the National Governance and Reconciliation Committee.16

While the conference resulted in key resolutions aimed at resolving the conflict, efforts

proved to be restricted by the lack of participation of several important opposition parties. Accordingly, the groups not involved in the discussions denounced the resolutions.

16 United States Government Accountability Office, “Somalia: Several Challenges Limit US and International Stabilisation, Humanitarian and Development Efforts“, February 2008 [online] Available

at: http://www.gao.gov/htext/d08351.html


29

Prime Minister urging dialogue with all parties

The inability to secure the involvement, purposefully or not, of all parties in the

reconciliation process was depicted as the key impediment to Somalia's stability by the new Prime Minister Hussein. His efforts for political reconciliation focused on addressing the

failure to engage all opposition groups, promising to talk to all Somali groups without precondition and releasing political prisoners. The Prime Minister's declaration of an

unconditional offer to engage in dialogue with opposition forces has triggered increased consultation with these groups, raising hopes for a political resolution. The Somali public

welcomed these confidence-building steps and urged the Prime Minister to build on this positive momentum.17

However, the Prime Minister's attempts were faced strong resistance from within the TFG and from its international partners, primarily the US. President Abdullahi Yusuf has often

undercut the Prime Minister and sought to obstruct talks with those he labels radical Islamists. The internal backlash was illustrated in February 2008, when TFG security forces

launched an attack in Bakara market, where the armed opposition had dominated. It is believed that the incident aimed to block the emerging alliance between moderate

opposition forces and the Prime Minister.18

“The Prime Minister’s efforts should be supported. Everyone supports him no matter what

clan or political interest. The only people who don’t actually support him is the President

himself, and the Ethiopians. He is just one man, and deserves the support of everyone who

wants peace.”

Elder


Transitional Federal Government lacks credibility and legitimacy

It has become increasingly apparent that the TFG is little more than a loose assembly of frequently competing individuals, lacking transparency and credibility. Efforts to establish a

government of national unity have been faced with strong resistance by those TFG members who believe that a genuine reconciliation process is not in their interest. Prime Minister

Hussein has promised to talk to the opposition without precondition and has actively supported the engagement of all Somalis regardless of their political affiliation. His

decision to release some of Mogadishu's elders and journalist detainees in January 2008 and

to promote an inclusive political process was welcomed by the UN and the majority of Somalis.

17 See also “The new TFG Prime Minister Nur Hassan Hussein Adde's Charm Offensive: A Welcome

Change“, Hamarey News [online] Available at: http://www.hamarey.com/news/readarticle.php?article_id=51 18 “Somalia: Fractured TFG undermines security prospects“, Oxford Analytica, 7 April 2008


30

TFG forces, Mogadishu, March 2008

In contrast, President Abdullahi Yusuf's tone is less conciliatory and more militaristic,

allowing personal agendas within the TFG to derail political resolution. Reports of TFG soldiers engaging in widespread looting combined with poor governance and increased

insecurity have further compromised the President's authority.

“The government forces are hyenas wearing shoes.”

“The government forces are basically out of control bandits.”

Identities withheld


Although Prime Minister Hussein appears vulnerable with no control over the TFG's finances

and security forces, the Somali public respects and endorses his efforts. Within a government that lacks cohesion and is regarded by its people as increasingly illegitimate,

only the prime minister's credibility and popularity continues to rise.

Opposition remains fragmented

Similar to the TFG's lack of cohesion, opposition based inside and outside Somalia is not homogenous. Some opposition groups appear more moderate and have responded to the

calls for political dialogue and reconciliation.

In contrast, others have espoused a belligerent approach toward the transitional government. The Eritrea-based umbrella organisation Alliance for the Re-Liberation of

Somalia (ARS) headed by the ICU leader Sheikh Ahmed and former parliamentary speaker Sharif Hassan, who chairs the ARS Central Committee. The ARS represents the most powerful

opposition group comprised of ousted Islamists and fairly moderate ICU members, former

parliamentarians, civil society including business people, and the diaspora. The Alliance was officially formed during an opposition conference attended by 200 delegates, which was

held in Asmara, Eritrea in September 2007. The balance between the ICU and parliamentary groups is central to the political identity and character of the ARS. Radical ICU leader Aweys

also attended the conference but rejected claims he holds a formal position in the Alliance. Notably, the Alliance has influence primarily within the Hawiye community though, even

within this group, there are divisions.

Some elements of the ARS have exploited the recent US designation of Al-Shabab as a terrorist group to further distance themselves from Al-Shabab, and portray themselves as a

legitimate opposition to the TFG.


31

International Crisis Group on the current situation in Somalia

The International Crisis Group (ICG) has warned that various factors could frustrate the Somali

Prime Minister Nur Hassan Hussein's recent attempts at reconciliation with opposition groups. In a recent briefing to the UN Security Council, the ICG pointed to the internal divisions within the

TFG and its opposition, particularly on the issue of non-military reconciliation.

According to the ICG analysis, Ethiopian troops present in Somalia do not increase security but, instead, they exacerbate the crisis. Furthermore, the ICG criticises the United States for “its

failure to distinguish between terrorist and national resistance groups among the Islamic

movements”. It has pointed out that this failure results in aggressive acts –such as airstrikes –against Somali political organisations, which undermine the Prime Minister's efforts at

reconciliation.19

Insurgency rife

In addition to the various stakeholders, including former members of the Somali Transitional Federal Parliament, members of the Somali diaspora and clan elders, there are

also a number of armed insurgent groups. The armed opposition is being waged primarily by four groups: ICU forces loyal to the ARS; ICU forces acting independently of the ARS; clan

militias (including some secular nationalists); and the more radical Al-Shabab which aims to establish a regional caliphate. In contrast, ICU remnants aim to regain control in Somalia

and call for jihad to expel Ethiopian troops from Somalia.

Public support for these groups is not directly related to the groups' ideology but instead to what is perceived to be their contribution to Somalia's liberation efforts. In particular, hard-

line ICU elements enjoy growing popular support and reportedly receive funding from local businessmen, especially following the Bakara market attacks. Although many businesses

seek the restoration of peace and security, Hawiye businessmen in particular perceive (with

considerable justification) the TFG to be hostile to their interests. As such, businessmen are becoming important security actors: their private security forces represent some of the

largest armed militias, particularly in Mogadishu. The Bakara militia has reportedly been functioning well and has brought a degree of security to one of Mogadishu's most violent

areas. There has been some degree of communication between the different insurgent groups; however, tensions and power struggles remain dominant.

“The designation of Al-Shabab as terrorists is outrageous. They are resistance fighters!”

Identity withheld


19 See International Crisis Group “Somalia: Reviving the Political Process and Achieving Sustainable

Peace”, Memorandum to Members of the United Nations Security Council, 2 April 2008


32

Still from “Jihad in Somalia,” October 200720

Incoherent international stance on Somalia

Neighbouring countries, foreign powers and international organisations have sought to promote a particular course of action in Somalia. Whilst the UN Secretary-General through

its Special Representative in Somalia has striven to support Prime Minister Hussein's efforts at promoting genuine reconciliation in the country, other international partners have

sought to obstruct this process and, instead, favour opposing stakeholders in the conflict. This lack of a unified international stance (and in fact an often conflicting international

stance) on Somalia has exacerbated internal divisions and friction.

Neighbouring states and long-term adversaries Ethiopia and Eritrea have their own strategic agendas and are essentially conducting a proxy war in Somalia. Since its invasion in Somalia

in December 2006 to back TFG forces against the then dominant ICU, Ethiopia has been supporting President Abdullahi Yusuf and maintains a substantial number of troops on

Somali ground.

Eritrea has supported Somali opposition groups; the powerful Alliance for the Re-Liberation of Somalia is based in the country and the Eritrean government has been accused of arming

and financing the insurgency in Somalia. The rivalry between Ethiopia and Eritrea has contributed to undermining peacemaking efforts and further destabilising and weakening

Somalia. The US intervention in Somalia as part of its global War on Terror is also distinct from

international and Prime Minister Hussein's conciliatory efforts. The US is not only directly

funding selective branches of the TFG21 but has recently also exerted pressure on Prime Minister Hussein to restrict the number of those with whom he was prepared to engage in

dialogue, in an attempt to exclude individuals on the US list of designated terror suspects such as principal ICU figures Hassan Abdullah Hersi al-Turki and Sheikh Hassan Dahir

Aweys22.

20 Video can be accessed on YouTube at: http://youtube.com/watch?v=21ko-1Hrnek&feature=related

21 International Crisis Group Memorandum on “Somalia: Reviving the Political Process and Achieving Sustainable Peace“, 2 April 2008 22 “Somalia: Fractured TFG undermines security prospects“, Oxford Analytica, 7 April 2008

http://youtube.com/watch?v=21ko-1Hrnek&feature=related


33

In another measure that undercut the Prime Minister and disrupted the reconciliation

process with all opposition parties including radical Islamists, US Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice designated Al-Shabab a foreign terrorist organisation.

An issue of grave public concern pertinent to the TFG's legitimacy is foreign intervention in

the country and, particularly, the continuing presence of Ethiopian troops. The persistence of President Abdullahi Yusuf on this issue has not only hindered national unity, with the

Somali public now increasingly viewing the TFG as a puppet regime guided by the interests of neighbouring countries and foreign powers, but has also led to frequent and large-scale

conflict between anti-government forces and government troops. ICU remnants and clan militias resisting foreign intervention in Somalia are gaining increasing popular support and

continually challenge the authority and legitimacy of the TFG. The TFG's perceived dependence on neighbouring Ethiopia, the strong US influence and the president's

complicity in the foreign intervention have weakened severely the TFG's credibility as a national entity.


“We are extremely disappointed by the role of the international community. There is lots of

money for the war and none for the ordinary people.”

Identity withheld Mogadishu, March 2008

“We are tired of incompetent Americans. Either both President Bush and his staff are really

incompetent, or they intended to act in ways that spreads extremism in Somalia.”

Businessman



34

A.2.2 Conflict Dynamics Somalia has been a de facto collapsed state for almost two decades. Efforts at political

consolidation and stability have materialised, leading to the effect disintegration of the state. In the absence of credible and functioning government institutions, widespread

disorder and insecurity have thrived, in turn allowing extremism to grow and international militant Islamists to use Somalia as a staging post. Somalia's barely functioning transitional

government has also permitted neighbouring countries and foreign powers to intervene, further undermining Somalia's national unity and entrenching divisions.


35

INCIDENTS OF INSURGENCY-RELATED VIOLENCE IN SOMALIA, NOVEMBER 2007-MARCH 08

A combination of unrelenting internal and external dynamics has aggravated security and living conditions in Somalia. With millions of Somalis experiencing the catastrophic effect

of this intractable and multifaceted conflict, hopes for a viable peaceful solution are

becoming increasingly bleak.


36

“What is really striking about Somalia is the lack of engagement from the International

Community: ‘don’t want to know, it’s too difficult, we don’t have the capacity, someone else

should deal with it’.”

Member of the international community

Nairobi, March 2008


Primacy of clan affiliation

The traditional Somali society is primarily lineage-based with clan affiliation being a

principle source of identity. Seventeen years of disorder and a flagging sense of national unity have allowed clans and sub-clans to mobilise and become the dominant political

factor at the local and national level, providing the basis for human security. Their political primacy over the moderate practice of Sufi Islam has also been palpable, with Sufi

brotherhoods often complementing the clan dominance. Notably, clans and sub-clans have control over different regions and cities in Somalia; the Hawiye clan holds the greatest

influence in the capital Mogadishu whilst the Ayr sub-clan controls most of Galguduud and the Lower Shabelle region. Conversely, the Darood/Marehan sub-clan controls mainly the

Gedo region and the town of Kismayo.

Somali clans and sub-clans do not share a unified political stance and, though they can be conducive to Somalia's political reconciliation, they can equally prove to be the most

important spoilers in the reconciliation process.

“The clans can be a force for good or for bad. The bad aspects are the revenge killings, the

forced marriages, and the violence. But in rural areas, the clans provide social cohesion and

support systems.”

Elder


The TFG is dominated by the Darood/Majerteen, Hawiye/Abgal and Rahanwein clans and sub-clans, and also includes several warlords and factional elements aligned with the Somali

Restoration and Reconciliation Council. This alignment with the TFG, however, is not consistent and there are sub-clans that have actively opposed the transitional government

on certain issues and have built coalition with opposition groups. For instance, though the


37

Darood/Marehan sub-clan declares its loyalty to the TFG, the group has control over the

Kismayo town, which is currently in a state of rebellion and had recently driven TFG forces out of the town.

Conversely, the Supreme Council of Islamic Courts is primarily dominated by the Hawiye

clan, though no longer clearly led by the Ayr sub-clan. Parts of the Hawiye clan are considered central to Somalia's conflict and, as such, encompassing these groups within a

genuine reconciliation process would be instrumental to building lasting peace.

Major Somali Clans and Sub-clans

Note: This represents a simplified Somali lineage chart, highlighting only those clans and

major sub-clans of particular political relevance, as referred to in this report.

Darood Hawiye

Rahanwein Dir

MarehanSiad Barre

MajerteenPresident Yusuf

Puntland President Adde

AbgalPrime Minister Hussein

ICU Leader Sheikh AhmedMayor of Mogadishu Dheere

Gedir/AyrAl-Shabab Leader AyrowRadical ICU Leader AweysMilitia Leader Qeybdiid

SagalTFP Speaker Adan Madobe

GadabursiSomaliland President Kahin

Isaaq

Dominance in Somaliland

Steady flow of arms into Somalia

In January 1992, the UN Security Council, alarmed at the rapid deterioration of the situation in Somalia and concerned that the continuation of the conflict is a threat to

international stability and peace, called on all states to refrain from any action conducive to increasing tension in Somalia, imposing an arms embargo upon the country (Resolution

733).23 In the years to come, notwithstanding proclamations to refrain from any action in

contravention of the arms embargo, there have been continuing violations. Notably, arms shipments from Ethiopia to the Transitional Federal Government (TFG) and Eritrea to Islamic

militias respectively have continued, further impeding efforts to establish security in

Somalia through a peaceful political settlement. 24

The UN Security Council has repeatedly condemned the significant increase in the flow of weapons and ammunition supplies to and through Somalia, calling primarily on regional

states to take all necessary steps to hold violators accountable. In its Resolution 1724

23 The UN Security Council “decides, under Chapter VII of the Charter of the United Nations, that all

States shall, for the purposes of establishing peace and stability in Somalia, immediately implement

a general and complete embargo on all deliveries of weapons and military equipment to Somalia until

the Security Council decides otherwise”, UN Security Council Resolution 733 (Implementing an Arms Embargo on Somalia) (1992) 24 Small Arms Survey, “Small Arms Survey 2007:Guns and the City”, August 2007, p. 93


38

(2006), the Security Council sought to further promote compliance by requesting the re-

establishment of the Monitoring Group to investigate violations and to facilitate the implementation of the arms embargo; the Group, which also operated in 2004 and 2006,

was re-established in July 2007 for a period of six months.

The Monitoring Group has identified a number of countries violating the arms embargo in Somalia – in addition to Ethiopia and Eritrea, Djibouti, Egypt, Iran, Libya, Saudi Arabia,

Syria, Uganda and Yemen were cited as violators.

Although the weapon markets were ostensibly shut down by the TFG, the trade has continued to flourish underground, and the main flow of arms into Somalia currently passes

via Bosaso, the north-east port city nominally aligned with the TFG. Almost all weapons

confiscated by the TFG and other militias are resold on the weapon markets in Mogadishu.25

In recent months, prices for a lot of weapons have dropped significantly; for instance the price of a second-hand AK-47 was around USD 200 in May 2007 while field research

conducted in March 2008 suggests this may now be as low as USD 150. Notably, the equivalent prices in Kandahar City and Lashkar Gah, the two cities in the southern part of

Afghanistan where the Taliban insurgency is strongest, are USD 275 and USD 400 respectively.

OVERVIEW OF ESTIMATED WEAPON AND AMMUNITION PRICES AT THE BAKARA ARMS

MARKET IN MOGADISHU (USD, UP TO MAY 2007)26

Weapon Before ICU

(up to mid 2006) During ICU After ICU May 2007

Zu-23 anti-aircraft gun 70,000 10,000 5,000 25,000

DShK heavy machine gun 14,000 5,000 3,000 8,000

B-10 recoiless rifle 7,000 2,000 1,500 6,000

PKM machine gun 12,000 6,000 4,000 2,000

Kalashnikov (AK-47) - old 400 250 200 200

RPG-2 Grenade Launcher 500 300 150 1,500

Ammunition

Zu-23 7 3 0.50 3.20

DShK 3.50 1 0.50 Not available

B-10 120 30 3 Not available

PKM 5 0.50 0.35 1

AK-47 0.75 0.50 0.35 0.30

RPG-2 150 100 25 120

“People have fled; you cannot imagine the fighting we have seen.”

Elder


25 SAACID, Light Weapon Prices – Mogadishu, March 2007 to February 2008 [online] Available at:

http://www.saacid.org/Weapon%20charts/Small%20arms%20data%20-%20year-on-

year%20tracking%20chart%20-%20February%202008.pdf. 26 Report of the Monitoring Group on Somalia in accordance with paragraph 3(i) of Security Council Resolution 1724 (2006) [online] Available at:

http://daccessdds.un.org/doc/UNDOC/GEN/N07/383/15/PDF/N0738315.pdf?OpenElement


39

HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH ON THE CURRENT SITUATION IN SOMALIA In a recent statement to the United Nations Security Council, Human Rights Watch laid out in

stark detail the ongoing violations of Somalis basic human rights, noting that “each of the parties to the armed conflict has committed serious violations of international humanitarian

law. In some cases, where individuals knowingly or recklessly committed these violations, the violations amount to war crimes.”27

Violations by the forces allied to the Transitional Federal Government (TFG)

TFG forces have been responsible for a variety of attacks against civilians in Mogadishu,

including widespread pillaging and looting of civilian property; rape; attacks on humanitarian workers; mass arbitrary arrests and mistreatment of detainees. The TFG has also failed to provide

effective warnings to civilians of impending military operations, interfered with and sometimes

obstructed delivery of humanitarian assistance, and repeatedly closed independent media outlets.

Violations by Ethiopian National Defence Forces

Ethiopian troops have violated fundamental provisions of international humanitarian law by

failing to distinguish between civilians and military objectives. Ethiopian troops repeatedly used “area bombardment” in populated urban areas, killing and wounding hundreds of civilians. They

have deliberately targeted hospitals, and have also carried out targeted attacks on civilians.

Several reports describe Ethiopian troops slitting the throats of victims, including that of a two-year-old child.

Violations by insurgent forces

The term “insurgent forces” is used here to describe a range of anti-TFG and anti-Ethiopian

forces. Insurgent forces have repeatedly and indiscriminately attacked civilians with mortars, small arms and remote explosive devices; killed and mutilated captured combatants on several

occasions; killed TFG officials and threatened civilians, including journalists and aid workers;

and jeopardized civilians through their deployment in densely populated areas.

Somali boy loses arm during fighting in Mogadishu, March 2008

27 Human Rights Watch, “The Human Rights Crisis in Somalia,” Statement prepared by Human Rights Watch for the Arria Formula meeting on Somalia, 31 March 2008, [online] Available at:

http://hrw.org/english/docs/2008/03/31/somali18408.htm


40

Foreign intervention undermining conciliatory efforts

Ongoing Ethiopian military action in Somalia

Ethiopia has striven to promote its own strategic agenda in Somalia, to offset the influence

of its neighbouring adversary Eritrea, which has purportedly been arming and financing the insurgency in the country. The two countries are essentially conducting a proxy war in

Somalia. By late 2006, Ethiopia had deployed up to 30,000 troops28 to Somalia in support of

the TFG, to defend against the threat that Somali Islamist groups could pose to Ethiopia. The Ethiopian government attempts to conceal the financial and human costs of

maintaining its military mission in Somalia, though it is reported that over 200 Ethiopian

soldiers have been killed since their unofficial deployment in November 2006,29 and their

subsequent official deployment in December 2006.30


Four weeks after Ethiopia's December 2006 intervention in Somalia, Ethiopian Prime Minister Meles Zenawi attempted to remove Ethiopian troops from the country, urging the

African Union to support TFG security forces during the pull-out process.31 Nonetheless, so

far, despite the presence of 2,400 Ugandan and Burundian African Union troops,32 several

thousand Ethiopian troops are still operating in Somalia at an increasingly grave cost to both Ethiopia and Somalia. In particular, the continued presence of Ethiopian troops in

Somalia has undermined the TFG's independence and credibility as a national entity.

The dynamics of the relationship between Ethiopia and the US also brings to light drivers behind Ethiopia's intervention in Somalia. The Ethiopian Government believes it has a lot to

gain from its alliance with the US, especially regarding its rivalry with Eritrea and, thus, it has overall sought to keep its powerful ally content with its intervention in Somalia. The

28“The Ethiopian government has closely guarded details of the number of troops deployed in Somalia

and statistics of casualties incurred in the fighting, but credible sources told Human Rights Watch

that by early 2007 Ethiopia may have had as many as 30,000 troops in Somalia,” Human Rights Watch Report: ‘Mogadishu Under Siege, January–April 2007, [online] Available at:

http://hrw.org/reports/2007/somalia0807/4.htm 29 Mohamed Ali, “Witnesses: 6 Ethiopians soldiers killed in ambush by Somalia's Islamic fighters,”

International Herald Tribune, 19 November 2006 [online] Available at: http://www.iht.com/articles/ap/2006/11/19/africa/AF_GEN_Somalia.php 30 Weitz, Richard, “AU Mission to Somalia Faces Deteriorating Situation with Inadequate Resources,”

World Politics Review, 10 August 2007 [online] Available at:

http://www.worldpoliticsreview.com/Article.aspx?id=1013 31 “Ethiopia starts Somalia pull-out” BBC News, 23 January 2007 [online] Available at:

http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/africa/6289781.stm 32“Q&A: Somalia conflict,” BBC News, 26 March 2008, [online] Available at:

http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/world/africa/4760775.stm; See also the testimony to the Senate Foreign Relations Subcommittee by Assistant Secretary for African Affairs Jendayi E. Frazer, “Evaluating US

Policy Objectives and Options on the Horn of Africa,” 11 April 2008.


41

Republican US Administration, for its part, considers Ethiopia's contribution significant in

fighting terrorism in Somalia and counter-balancing those regional countries which allow extremism to flourish. Although the US officially contributes only a fragment of Ethiopia's

defence budget, there has been speculation that it has helped pay for the rising costs of

Ethiopia's army and that the Pentagon wishes to make Ethiopia a bulwark in the region.33

“The United States bringing Christian Ethiopians, who have been our enemies for centuries,

in here to support a puppet government, is like putting the Jews in to run Palestine.”


“The Government is in the hands of the Ethiopians, who for centuries have been the enemy of

the Somali people. Ethiopia is controlling the situation in a way that is not acceptable to

Somalis.”

Identity withheld


US interference in Somalia to fight terrorism

The US intervention in the Horn of Africa region - and Somalia in particular - is projected as part of its global War on Terror. With lawlessness and extremism thriving in Somalia, the

country has been identified by the US as a safe haven for international terrorists. Accordingly, the US has recently unleashed a series of attacks targeting suspected Al-Qaeda

operatives and training bases on Somali soil. As a result, numerous civilian casualties had

been reported, fuelling public frustration against American intervention in the country as well as against the TFG for its complicity in the foreign interference.

33 The Economist, “A loveless liaison: America and Ethiopia need each other, but their needs are not

equal”, 3 April 2008


42

US AIR STRIKES IN SOMALIA, 07-08

Date Location Casualties34

8 Jan 07 Hayi; near the Kenyan border, an AC 130 gunship targeted

suspected members of Al Qaeda and the 1998 US Embassy

bombers35

27 killed36

8 Jan 07 Badmado Island; an AC 130 gunship targeted a suspected

training base37

10-12 killed

22 Jan 07 Raskamboni and Kulbiyow; an AC 130 air strike targeted

suspected Al-Qaeda operatives in these southern villages38

Numerous casualties

1 June 07 Bargal; US Navy bombed Puntland village suspected to be harbouring Islamist fighters39

Unknown number of casualties

3 March 08 Dhoobley; two Tomahawk missiles targeted a facility harbouring suspected terrorists40

6 killed and 20 injured

34 Though the US military seeks to avoid causing civilian casualties, most of the deaths incurred

during the recent air strikes were civilians. 35 Mohamed Olad Hassan, “US Launches Two Airstrikes in Somalia,” AP, 9 January 2007, [online]

Available at: http://globalresearch.ca/index.php?context=va&aid=4398 36 “US Somali air strikes 'kill many'” BBC News, 9 Jan 2007, [online] Available at:

http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/world/africa/6243459.stm 37 “US Somali air strikes 'kill many'” BBC News, 9 Jan 2007, [online] Available at:

http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/world/africa/6243459.stm 38 “Somalia: Human Rights Are Crucial for Peace,” AllAfrica.com, 7 February 2007 39 “US navy attacks Islamic militants' base in northeastern Somalia,” English People's Daily Online, 3

June 2007, [online] Available at:

http://english.people.com.cn/200706/03/eng20070603_380323.html 40 Barbara Starr “US fires missiles at Somalia terror target,” CNN, 3 March 2008, [online] Available at:

http://edition.cnn.com/2008/WORLD/africa/03/03/somalia.us/index.html


43

US Air Strikes in Somalia, 2007-08

“The psychological effect of the US bombings is very significant. Everyone is horrified by

these actions. They cannot be justified. They never hit any bad people.”

Government supporter



44

In addition to its militarised intervention in Somalia, the US Administration has frustrated

efforts to promote a genuine and all-inclusive reconciliation process in the country. The US has been directly funding selective departments of the TFG and has supported Somali

President Abdullahi Yusuf in his efforts to undercut Prime Minister Hussein's reconciliatory efforts. In February 2008, the US government disrupted negotiation talks with all

opposition parties - including hardline Islamists - by exerting pressure on the prime minister to exclude certain groups and individuals from a reconciliation process, particularly

those included in the US list of designated terror suspects.


Effectively sabotaging the prime minister's efforts to reach out to radical elements, on 29

February 2008 - shortly before a US air strike near the Somali-Kenyan border - the US Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice designated Al-Shabab as a Foreign Terrorist

Organisation under Section 219 of the Immigration and Nationality Act and as a Specially Designated Global Terrorist under Section 1(b) of Executive Order 13224. Even though Al-

Shabab enjoys little public support in southern Somalia, the untimely announcement of the designation was criticised by Somali opposition groups and the wider public.

“The Shabab are a product of the United States’ policies here. They are a mirror image. If the

United States and Ethiopia stay in the country the Shabab garden will grow. If they leave,

Al-Shabab will not be necessary.”

Identity withheld


“The designation of Al-Shabab as terrorists completely undermined what the Prime Minister

is trying to do: it really makes you doubt the US commitment to the reconciliation process.”

Landowner



45

In its statement which was released on 18 March 2008, the US State Department underlined

that –

“Al-Shabab is a violent and brutal extremist group with a number of individuals affiliated with Al-Qaeda. Many of its senior leaders are believed to have trained and fought with Al-Qaeda in Afghanistan. Al-Shabab has used intimidation and violence to undermine the Somali government and

threatened civil society activists working to bring about peace through political dialogue and reconciliation. The group scattered leaflets on the streets of Mogadishu warning participants in last year’s reconciliation conference that they intended to bomb the conference venue. Al-Shabab promised to shoot anyone planning to attend the conference and to blow up delegates’ cars and hotels. Although Al-Shabab did not carry out these

particular threats, the group has claimed responsibility for shooting Deputy District Administrators, as well as several bombings and shootings in Mogadishu targeting Ethiopian troops and Somali government officials. Al-Shabab’s leader, Aden Hashi Ayrow, has ordered his fighters to attack African Union (AU) troops based in Mogadishu. Ayrow has also called for foreign fighters to join Al-Shabab in their fight in Somalia. Given the threat that Al-Shabab poses, the designation will raise awareness of al-Shabab’s

activities and help undercut the group’s ability to threaten targets in and

destabilize the Horn of Africa region.”41

Furthermore, as part of its strategy to reverse radicalisation and fight terrorism in the Horn of Africa region, the US Government considers Eritrea a pariah state, accusing its

government of arming and financing the insurgency in Somalia. If the US insists on designating Eritrea as a “state sponsor of terrorism,” the dynamics within the Horn of Africa

-particularly Ethiopia's role- would change significantly and the task of achieving regional stability would become immeasurably more difficult.

“What the United States is doing in Somalia goes against all classic counter-insurgency

principles and common sense. It is all based on Rumsfeld-style thinking about some sort of

collective punishment for Somalia.”



Privatisation of security

Governments and civilians are increasingly turning to private military companies for security

provision. There is considerable debate as to whether these can provide human security and stability in those areas where public institutions are weak, as in Somalia where private

security companies have now been contracted to secure the city's Bakara market. In the absence of strong regulation, private militias and security companies are unlikely to be held

accountable for their actions and it is, therefore, doubtful these can increase public security in the long run.

In Somalia, police, military and justice institutions have not been restored to full working

order since the fall of the state in 1991. While competing powers recruit militias, private businesses have also contracted private military companies both in order to access markets

and to create secure trading areas and routes. At present, Somali trade is primarily

41 US State Department, Media Note “Designation of Al-Shabab”, 18 March 2008 [online] Available at:

http://www.state.gov/r/pa/prs/ps/2008/mar/102338.htm


46

protected through private security groups. In Bakara market, where household goods and

weapons lie side by side, traders have taken action following a series of fires and recent attacks. Local businessmen are funding a private military company to secure the market

area. Some see traders and businessmen as potential spoilers, as their private security forces represent some of the largest militias, particularly in Mogadishu. The recent market

attacks by TFG forces have created frustration amongst the business community and have pushed local businessmen further into the hands of hard-line ICU elements. Reportedly, the

latter enjoy the growing support and receive funding from local businessmen.

A view of the Bakara market in Mogadishu, March 2008

“The private security companies are really just the business community’s militias.”



Locals have mixed reactions to this new development. Where there is no recourse to reliable

public security, many see private companies and militias as the only viable solution. Others, however, feel it undermines the creation of legitimate security forces and amounts to

protection racketeering.

FROM RIO DE JANEIRO TO MOGADISHU: PRIVATE SECURITY COMPANIES AND MILITIAS Even where strong bureaucratic institutions exist, low public confidence in the police tends to

prompt private solutions to security. For example, since the 1980s, rival youth factions financed by the drug trade have taken over large parts of Rio de Janeiro, Brazil. In parallel to rising

violence, the private security sector has expanded significantly across the city. While private

security guards are prevalent in higher income areas, vigilante groups, or militias, have ousted drug factions from a number of slum areas. The experience of Rio over the past two decades

indicates that private companies specialising in violence may develop autonomous power from state forces.

In both Rio and Mogadishu, police, private security companies and militias are made up of the

same actors. The private and public security industries provide employment for young males, and off-duty police moonlight for extra wages. The existence of multiple private security companies,

in whatever form, demonstrate a lack of confidence in the public system. Meanwhile, private

services by nature offer unequal security coverage, leaving sectors of the population exposed.


47

Fierce competition for resources

Somalia, one of the poorest countries in the world, has been long suspected to be rich with

natural resources, particularly gas and oil. These natural resources are thought to be concentrated in the Puntland peninsula in the north east of the country and to a smaller

extent in the Ogaden desert. The struggle over natural resources is a cross-cutting issue both within the Somali conflict - at the tribal and institutional level, Puntland's governance

issue - and in the regional and international context.

Oil: Throughout the 17 years of disorder in Somalia, the conflict over the oil issue has

intensified and the authority over oil exploration deals has highlighted the frailty of the

transitional government and its dependency on warlords and feudal powers. Oil is also a stake in the international arena with the country's potential oil industry attracting a

number of international players. For instance, it is argued - though the US denied allegations - that the AMOCO, CONOCO and CHEVRON contracts in Somalia were a major

consideration in the US intervention in Somalia in 1992.42 In recent years both China and

Russia have been attempting to make deals with the Somali government for exploration purposes, whilst an Australian company is at the centre of the Puntland–Mogadishu dispute

after the contract for exploration rights signed in 2005 is now contested by the TFG. Indonesian, Kuwaiti and Canadian oil companies have also negotiated deals over

percentages of the Somalia Petroleum Corporation, creating further tensions. In the context of Somalia's instability, international interest at this stage is more likely to exacerbate the

conflict as opposed to fostering the economic development needed for the country's recovery.

Water: Somalia is also facing fierce competition of another scarce resource: water.

Receiving just 50 cm of water per year, Somalia suffers chronic water shortages.43 To date,

fights between various sub-clans over water resources have resulted in considerable

casualties. Decentralised traditional tribal negotiations for water sharing may be an

appropriate way to resolve water conflicts between clans and sub-clans.44 Water is a factor

of controversy also in the wider regional context, exacerbating rivalry with and between

neighbouring countries Ethiopia and Eritrea.

Lack of government accountability

Public perceptions of the TFG's legitimacy, fairness and accountability are central to Somalia's conflict. The ICU, although it promoted radical policies whilst in power, also

appealed to a common identity and created a sense of public security. In contrast, the TFG has failed to provide public order and build national unity.

“Somalia is an accountability free zone. No one is held accountable to international laws or

human rights; the donors are not accountable to their own principles; the Transitional

Federal Government is not accountable to its own charter, no one is accountable to the

Somali people. The essential missing element is an accountability framework. There are no

benchmarks, and no measures of success.”

Member of the international community

Nairobi, March 2008

42 Fineman M, “The Oil Factor in Somalia”, Los Angeles Times 18 January 1993 43 World Bank quoted in Hughes K. Butts, “The Strategic Importance of Water”, in Parameters, spring

1997 [online] Available at: www.carlisle-www.army.mil/usawc/parameters/97spring/butts.htm 44 Jobin W, Somalia's Water Crisis [online] Available at:

http://www.loe.org/shows/shows.htm?programID=93-P13-00004#feature2


48

In the absence of a centrally administered trained police service and an independent

judiciary, legal judgment and actions are taken on an arbitrary basis, engendering a widespread sense of impunity. Corrupt officials and TFG soldiers engaging in widespread

looting, arbitrary arrest, kidnapping and killing have undermined public trust toward President Abdullahi Yusuf and his administration. The vast majority of the Somali

population now considers that decisions taken by TFG officials lack the necessary transparency, credibility and accountability.

Furthermore, in view of the fact increased international donors' pledges result in only a

fraction of these actually being disbursed and reaching the poor and vulnerable Somali groups, the population has lost faith to the international community and their TFG partner.

Fund mismanagement and corruption are creating divisions and are further alienating Somalia from the TFG. Somali civil society is gradually finding a voice, calling for a broadly

representative and reliable government that would provide for and protect its people. Crucially, with poor governance and violations of human rights being played to the interests

of radical elements, public confidence in the TFG is crumbling.

“Warlords: this gives an important title to complete and utter criminals. Anyone with 250

men was a warlord and then the United States thought they had to give them a place at the

table. These people have no good intentions. So we now have a government full of very bad

actors.”

Human rights worker

Hargeisa, March 2008



49

A.2.3 Dynamics of the Humanitarian situation in Somalia The current humanitarian situation in Somalia is catastrophic,45 but there is little evidence

to suggest that the international community is paying much attention.46 An unprecedented food emergency and the constant fighting between myriad warring factions have elevated a

crisis that has been a constant presence in the Horn of Africa for decades, threatening the stability of the whole region. Unlike Darfur, where billions of dollars of aid are being

invested and thousands of aid workers operate, Somalia remains a place to avoid. The United Nations estimates that the country received about USD 200 million in aid in 2007,

and the number of aid workers in the country continues to decrease.47

“The International Community says they are concerned with the Somali conflict but we don’t

see them doing anything competent to resolve it.”

Identity withheld


Starvation: failing harvests, droughts and insecurity driving up food prices

A lethal combination of factors, including record food prices, droughts, consecutive poor

harvests, hyper-inflation, plagues and pervasive insecurity mean that Somalis are currently facing the lowest level of food security in years.48 Record levels of famine are expected, as

the malnutrition rates throughout the country raise above the emergency threshold.

Outskirts of Mogadishu, March 2008

45 Aweys Yusuf, “Somali Islamists seize key town of Jowhar,” ABC News, 26 March 2008, [online]

Available at: http://www.abcnews.go.com/International/wireStory?id=4525529 46 “Cast adrift,” Economist, 17 November 2007. 47 Jeffrey Gettleman, “As Somali Crisis Swells, Experts See a Void in Aid,” New York Times, 20

November 2007, [online] Available at:

http://www.nytimes.com/2007/11/20/world/africa/20somalia.html?pagewanted=1&_r=1 48 “Somalia fighting prompts warning,” BBC News, 26 March 2008, [online] Available at:

http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/world/africa/7313911.stm


50

The harvest in Somalia's traditional crop regions appears to have failed. In early March 2008

the Food Security Analysis Unit for Somalia reported that over two million Somalis are now in need of humanitarian assistance, but the World Food Programme will only be able to

provide food aid to a quarter of those in need this year.49 According to the International Committee of the Red Cross, people in central Somalia are

facing life threatening shortages of food and water, with some families relying on a single meal each day.50

Appalling living conditions in Mogadishu, March 2008

Further complicating matters, sharp rises in the cost of fuel have increased the costs of transporting water supplies and food, further impacting on prices. Rising fuel costs have

also altered the trading dynamics of Mogadishu's Bakara market.

49 Food Security Analysis Unit-Somalia, “2007/08 Post Deyr Analysis,” Report No. V.14, 7 March 2008,

[online] Available at: http://www.fsausomali.org/fileadmin/uploads/1268.pdf. In its report, the Unit identified three defining elements of the current hunger crisis: a humanitarian crisis in the Shabelle

Regions; swelling numbers of Internally Displaced People; and a deepening drought in Hiran and the

Central Regions. 50 ICRC, “Somalia: concern over worsening humanitarian situation,” Operational Update, 11 March 2008, [online] Available at:

http://www.icrc.org/web/eng/siteeng0.nsf/htmlall/somalia?opendocument


51

Delivery chokepoints: Available international aid not getting through

Piracy and theft is preventing vital food relief packages from reaching hundreds of

thousands of Somalis. The constant attacks off the Somali coast mean that maritime freight companies are refusing to deliver essential aid packages to Somalia.51 For the food aid that

does reach Somalia, there are no guarantees that it will reach those in need, because the informal taxes on food deliveries within the country are so high. Militias control the aid

delivery routes: there are now more than 330 informal roadblocks throughout the country. Roadblocks on the Mogadishu-Afgoye road, where an estimated 200,000 internally displaced

people (IDPs) now live, are now charging aid delivery trucks USD 475 to pass.52

“The United Nations is good and bad. They mean well but everyone knows the people are

suffering, but what is the UN doing? Nothing but moving their hands about!”


“The actors on the ground in Somalia and here in Kenya are not senior strategists, but the

people who make the decisions in DC are taking the simplistic view. The decisions are made

so far away, the structure and donor attention are dysfunctional.”

Identity withheld


Mass displacement: refugees and IDPs

In late March 2008 the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees warned that since the start of the year more than 70,000 people have fled Mogadishu and that at least 15,000

have sought refuge in neighbouring Kenya,53 Djibouti, Ethiopia and Sudan.54

Humanitarian agencies report that a quarter of Somalia's one million Internally Displaced People are now concentrated along the fifteen kilometre stretch of road between Mogadishu

to Afgoye, in what constitutes, according to UN, "probably the single largest IDP gathering in the world today."55

51 Thomas Land, “Somalia Pirates Beware,” New African magazine, February 2008 52 UN Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs, "Seize window of opportunity to bring

peace," 19 March, 2008, [online] Available at: http://www.irinnews.org/PrintReport.aspx?ReportId=77358 53 Kenya had previously closed its border with Somalia in January 2007, to stall the entry of

suspected extremists, following Ethiopian troops' ouster of the Islamic Courts Union. “Somali

refugees head south”, IOL, 2 April 2008, [online] Available at: http://www.int.iol.co.za/index.php?set_id=1&click_ id=68&art_id=nw20080402090548490C508967 54 UNHCR, “Stepped-Up Action Needed To Spur Somali Economic Growth And Peace,” UN News Centre,

31 March 2008, [online] Available at:

http://www.un.org/apps/news/story.asp?NewsID=26155&Cr=somali&Cr1= 55 “Relief agencies: Somalia too dangerous for us to work,” CNN, 25 March 2008, [online] Available

at: http://edition.cnn.com/2008/WORLD/africa/03/25/somalia.crisis/


52

Limited international aid contributions to Somalia

Since 2000, Somalia has received an average of USD 200 million per year in aid from

international donors,56 almost half in the form of food shipments. Health, agriculture, water and sanitation, shelter and economic recovery are the lowest in spending priority.57

INTERNATIONAL AID CONTRIBUTIONS TO SOMALIA, 200758

Country USD million

United States 73.759

Non-Specified Donors 35

Norway 31.8

The Netherlands 11.3

Canada 7

Sweden 6.6

Japan 6.3

Germany 6.1

Italy 6.1

Ireland 4.7

UN agencies 3.4

European Commission 3.2

Australia 2.8

United Kingdom 2.5

Private 2.2

Others 14.3

TOTAL 217

56 DFID, Somalia Factsheet, [online] Available at: http://www.dfid.gov.uk/pubs/files/somalia-

factsheet.pdf 57 FTS, UN-OCHA. 58 All figures (unless otherwise specified taken from the Financial Tracking Service of the United

Nations' Office for Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA). 59 Testimony by Assistant Secretary for African Affairs Jendayi E. Frazer Evaluating US Policy Objectives and Options on the Horn of Africa, Senate Foreign Relations Subcommittee on Africa, 11

March 2008.


53


54

Taliban fighters, Afghanistan (undated)

A.3 Comparison of Somalia Conflict Dynamics to Afghanistan

The conflict theatres of Somalia and Afghanistan share a number of similarities, not least regarding the tactics, techniques and motivations utilised by their respective insurgencies.

There are a number of factors that propel each militant Islamist group. For instance, the sophisticated use of propaganda in both countries has assisted in the intimidation and

radicalisation of local populations. The presence of foreign forces also underpins this, with militant Islamists able to depict incoming forces as aggressive Christian armies intent upon

repressing the indigenous Muslim populations. Notably, in both Afghanistan and Somalia, the current governmental authorities enjoy greater legitimacy with the international

community than within their own borders.

A.3.1 The rise of political Islamism in Somalia and Afghanistan

There are strong historical parallels in the rise of political Islamism in Somalia and

Afghanistan, and although key differences remain in substance, since 9/11, the international community has harboured fears about the ‘Talibanisation' of Somalia. These

fears were seemingly fulfilled when the Islamic Courts Union (ICU) came to power in 2004.

Both countries endured sustained

periods of civil war after the collapse of weak, illegitimate and divisive

states. Repression under the two ostensibly Socialist regimes politicised

Islamist groups, and Islamism emerged as a powerful ideology, with

the distinct capacity to mobilise across clan, tribal, ethnic and class

lines. The internal legitimacy of the Taliban and ICU regimes was grounded

in the ability to provide widespread, relatively inclusive security. As war

and hardship took their toll, physical security became of paramount

importance for vulnerable populations and the business communities in need

of secure markets and trade routes.

“Local people supported the Islamic Courts because they wanted security. The safe movement

of goods, security and movement of people is what people want, and if the Islamic Courts

can deliver these basics, then they will be acceptable. Security is what people care about.”

Identity withheld


By 2000, the Taliban brought Afghanistan's warlords under control, and controlled 95% of the country. In 2006 the ICU eradicated the roadblocks manned by warring militias and

brought security to Mogadishu for the first time in seventeen years, and also secured much of south-central Somalia. Both the Taliban and the ICU abstained from factionalism and

controlled disciplined forces that did not rape or loot. The ICU and the Taliban both declared that terrorists caught on national soil would be tried by national courts and not

handed over to the international community. However, both regimes proved short-lived: the


55

Flag of the Islamic Courts Union

Taliban fell after the US invasion in 2001 and the ICU fell just six months after establishing

its authority, following invasion by US-backed Ethiopian troops in December 2006.

As war continues between international forces against both the Taliban and the

ICU, the differences between the regimes are also telling. Where the ICU

in 2004-6 represented an uneasy coalition of Islamist institutions, from

moderate to extreme, Taliban politics are based on conservative Islam.

However, while this led to tolerance of Al-Qaeda training bases in Afghanistan,

the only evidence of Al-Qaeda in Somalia has been one small cell.60

Although some extremist groups operate in Somalia, such as Al-Shabab, local security issues remain important and calls for international jihad have not gained significant support as

yet.

“Somalia shares features with the Afghanistan insurgency, and there is a strong sense of

frustration with the lack of response from the International Community policy community.”

Identity withheld

Nairobi, March 2008

Mogadishu, October 2007 (Still from “Jihad in Somalia”)

60 ICG, “Counter-Terrorism in Somalia: Losing Hearts and Minds?” July 2005, Africa Report no. 95,

page 3, [online] Available at: http://www.crisisgroup.org/library/documents/africa/horn_of_africa/095_counter_terrorism_in_soma

lia.pdf


56

A.3.2 Tactics and drivers As the complexities of the conflict are unravelled, it becomes apparent that there are three

tiers of actors that interact for a variety of tactical and strategic reasons:

COMMONALITIES BETWEEN THE SOMALI AND AFGHAN CONFLICTS

In addition to the commonality of actors, an examination of the factors that compel fighters to join militant Islamist movement is telling:

MOTIVATIONS FOR MILITANT ISLAMISM IN SOMALIA AND AFGHANISTAN

Factor Somalia Afghanistan

Coercion

At present, Al-Shabab fighters do not

appear to be coerced into joining the

movement, although should the movement follow a similar dynamic to

the Taliban, then this development can

be expected to eventuate as its

geographic spread widens.

Widespread evidence of people

joining movement after threats to

their family/property/business. Strong anecdotal evidence to this

effect from Musa Qala in the

aftermath of the Afghan National

Army's operation there in December 2007.

Tribal/clan

issues

Externally influenced militant Islamism

has not embedded itself within Somalia

easily. Foreign militants' lack of

knowledge of the country's complex clan system has often brought them into

direct conflict with Somalis. Resistance

to TFG/Ethiopian/US actions is found

throughout Somalia communities transcending borders.

Insurgency movement and operations

are based on traditional lines and in

accordance with tribal history. This

history supersedes borders; hence what happens in Pakistan's tribal belt

directly impacts upon Afghanistan.

Ideology Al-Shabab is driven by the creation of a regional Islamic state, the ‘Islamic

Emirates in the Horn of Africa'. The

movement actively encourages foreign

jihadists to fight in Somalia. They differ from the Islamic Courts, who view their

Only a small, hardcore Taliban element is compelled to fight out of

a sense of ideological fervour. Many

of these are not naturalised Afghans,

but are instead foreign fighters.


57

struggle as being chiefly domestic.

Legitimate

grievances

In Afghanistan, the Taliban are exploiting Afghans' legitimate political

grievances which have resulted from the US-led international community's policy

mistakes in the country (bombings, crop eradication, poverty, aggressive foreign

presence). By acting as ‘spokespersons' for Afghans on these legitimate political grievances whilst simultaneously following an extremist terror agenda, the

Taliban is now entrenched in the legitimate political life of Afghanistan. The

same situation is now unfolding in Somalia, with Al-Shabab exploiting Somalis'

legitimate grievances which have arisen from the US' bombings and its support of Ethiopian military presence and corrupt state officials.

Poverty and

unemployment

A key driver in both theatres. Deprived of alternative sources of income, a sense

of alienation from society and lack of identity, young men are easy prey for the

insurgencies.

Limited

education

An increasing number of fighters in Afghanistan and Somalia have known

nothing but war in their lifetimes. In such circumstances, it is common for the

sole source of education to come from faculties outside of the mainstream, such as radical madrassas. Such establishments frequently indoctrinate students into a

mindset that leaves them vulnerable to recruitment by militant Islamists.

Anecdotal evidence in both countries suggests that backing from Gulf States is

playing an increasingly important role in funding such schools.

Expel foreign

invader

Presence of Ethiopian/AMISOM forces within the country is used as a rallying

point by Al-Shabab. Jihadist propaganda

capitalises on perceptions that Ethiopia

is a majority Christian state. Jihadists have aligned themselves with other

resistance forces opposed to foreign

occupation of their country. Although

there is little public support for their ideology, they are tolerated/supported

because they are perceived to be

contributing to a nationalist (i.e.

liberation) struggle. The presence of

external forces exacerbates this trend.

Presence of NATO forces within the country used as a rallying point by

the Taliban. As with Somalia, rhetoric

focuses upon the overwhelmingly

Christian composition of NATO forces. Their propaganda frequently points to

the negative impact that NATO

operations has upon the population.

Diaspora

support

Al-Shabab gains significant funding from the diaspora, where there is

considerable sympathy for the viewpoint

that these are indigenous Somalis

fighting for the country.

There is a well-documented money trail between mosques in diaspora

communities and Pakistan, from

where a significant number of Taliban

recruits are drawn.

“If you don’t remove the reason why Al-Shabab exists, it will just be replaced by another

group tomorrow.”

Elder


“The recent beheadings are used to exert psychological control over the population.

Insurgency cannot take and hold territory, but and neither can the government or the

Ethiopians. The Al-Shabab is using hit and run tactic to broaden their areas of control.”

Identity withheld

Nairobi, March 2008


58

Tactical shifts in Somali insurgency

Somalia has long been considered a safe haven for terrorists, but there is little evidence to

suggest that it has served this purpose on any appreciable scale. While the presence of high profile terrorists in Somalia over the years is beyond dispute, the phenomenon of

beheadings and suicide attacks - traditionally associated with the Al-Qaeda/radical Islamist culture - have not been a common feature of conflict in the country.

Security reports from Somalia show that beheadings are an extremely rare event, with only a handful of cases recorded in the past three years. The earliest reports about beheadings

come from the brief period of domination of the Islamic Courts Union, when its leaders allegedly put the practice into use against some warlords or threatened to use it as a

religious punishment.61 Although still a rare tactic, on 13 March Al-Shabab fighters killed and beheaded three soldiers.62 Regarding the other high profile Al-Qaeda inspired tactic,

suicide attacks, there are four recorded cases of such attacks in Somalia. These are invariably used as an asymmetric tool of resistance against occupying forces.

TIMELINE OF SUICIDE ATTACKS IN SOMALIA:

Date Event Detail

19 April 2007 Suicide bomber attacks Ethiopian military base in Mogadishu. No known casualties.

04 June 2007 Suicide car bombing outside Somalia's Prime Minister residence kills seven people.

11 Oct 2007 Suicide car bombing explodes in an army base in Baidoa, killing two Ethiopian

Soldiers.

08 April 2007 Suicide bomber targets African Union troops in Mogadishu, killing four civilians and

injuring some soldiers.

Aftermath of a car bomb, Lashkar Gah Afghanistan, November 2007

61 Jeffrey Gettleman, “Somali Town Falls to Insurgent Raid,” The New York Times, 1 April 2008,

[online] Available at:

http://www.nytimes.com/2008/04/01/world/africa/01somalia.html?_r=2&ref=africa&oref=slogin&ore

f=slogin; Mark Steyn, “Re-Primitivized World,” The New York Sun, 12 June 2006, [online] Available at:

http://www2.nysun.com/article/34268?page_no=2; Greg C. Reeson, “Somalia and the War on

Terrorism,” OpinionEditorials.com, 27 December 2006, [online] Available at:

http://www.opinioneditorials.com/freedomwriters/greeson_20061227.html 62 Aweys Yusuf, “Islamists behead three soldiers in Somalia,” Reuters, 13 March 2008, [online]

Available at: http://www.reuters.com/article/africaCrisis/idUSL13808924


59

“The extreme version of Islam is a reaction to the US policies and actions.”

Identity withheld


“Al-Qaeda and others’ extreme ideologies should have met substantial resistance in Somalia

as Somalis are moderate Muslims and have historically separated their religion from political

or governance matters. But now the US has created this sense of being under siege and we

have unified against that threat: this is creating a great political opportunity for Al-Qaeda.”

Teacher



60

Part B: Somaliland

PROFILE: SOMALILAND

Area: 176,210 km²

Capital city: Hargeisa

Borders: Somalia, Ethiopia, Djibouti

Population: 3.5 million (estimate)

Major languages: Somali, Arabic, English

Religion: Sunni Islam

Life expectancy: n/a

Main exports: Livestock, some agricultural products and quarrying

Post-1991 economy:

Trade in livestock, mostly to Saudi Arabia, has and continues to be the most important economic

activity63;

Non-recognition of the country prevents most investment and ODA64;

Somaliland is believed to have oil deposits65 as well as other valuable natural resources.

Primary ports and airports:

Berbera, Boorama, Burao, Erigavo, Hargeisa

63 “Somaliland: Stability amid economic woe”, BBC, 22 March, 2005, [online] Available at:

http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/world/africa/4372189.stm 64 Ibid 65 “Somaliland: Ten Years On”, BBC World Service, March 30, 2001, [online] Available at:

http://www.bbc.co.uk/worldservice/people/highlights/010430_somaliland.shtml


61

B.1 Recent History of Somaliland

Colonial Period Somaliland was declared a British protectorate in 1886 and despite popular revolt from 1899

to 1920 and a brief occupation of the protectorate by Italian troops in 1940-41, the British maintained colonial rule until 1960. British interests in Somaliland lay mainly in the

strategic position of its coastline as a trading point, and they invested very little in physical or social infrastructure, leaving Somaliland with just one secondary school at

independence. However, in contrast to Italian rule in south-central Somalia, where patronage and violence undermined Somali social organisation, the British system of

indirect governance favoured administration through existing clan authorities. British

absence reinforced a relatively cohesive traditional authority in Somaliland.66

Post-colonial period

Somaliland declared independence on 26 June 1960 and was immediately recognised by

thirty-five states,67 but just five days later on 1 July, Somaliland voluntarily united with Italian Somalia to become the Republic of Somalia.68 However, the north was soon

neglected in favour of central government priorities, causing local resentment.

President Siad Barre's regime (1969-1991) ruled through patronage based on weak alliances, and as Somaliland was considered strategically important, the region was politically

sidelined and subject to early efforts at ‘clan cleansing.' When war broke out between Somalia and Ethiopia in 1977, a disproportionate concentration of casualties amongst

north-west troops fuelled further resentment in the northern region.

Between 1969 and 197869 the Barre regime exercised significant control over Somalia's national territory, and in much of the Republic local patrons of the regime used violence to

control economic opportunities. However, while Barre's divide and rule tactics fractured south-central Somalia (his early favourites would emerge as competing militia leaders in the

early 1990s), in north-west Somalia exclusion and repression by the central government reinforced the legitimacy of alternative forms of local governance. Throughout the 1980s,

clan authorities developed strong social and economic ties with the Somaliland

population.70

By the 1980s, the central Somali government was dependent on external sources of revenue and was pacifying rivals with aid handouts, to growing popular unrest. Several rebel

movements formed. In London, frustrated Diaspora intellectuals affiliated to the Isaaq Somaliland clan established the Somali National Movement (SNM).

66 Mark Bradbury “Living with Statelessness: The Somali Road to Development”, The Journal of Conflict, Security and Development, 2003, Vol. 3, no. 1: p.12 67 States which recognised Somaliland included the five permanent members of the Security Council,

the USA, the UK, China, India and the Soviet Union, as well as Egypt, Israel, Ghana and Libya. 68 For a year before independence, extensive discussions had taken place for the creation of ‘Greater Somalia', encompassing the areas where ethnic Somalis, who share a common language and religion,

are situated. This area included the Ogaden in Ethiopia, French Somaliland (now Djibouti) and

today's Northern Frontier District in Kenya. For more on pan-Somalism, see David H. Shinn, “The Horn

of Africa: How does Somaliland fit?,” for ‘A Discussion Seminar Introducing Somaliland,' March 2003, Umea Sweden, reprinted in The Somaliland Times, 8 March 2003, [online] Available at:

http://www.somalilandtimes.net/2003/59/5908.htm 69 Barre's control over the country started to slip in 1978 when the Somali Salvation Democratic Front

(SSDF) rebellion started. 70 William Reno (2003) “Somalia and Survival in the Shadow of the Global Economy”, QEH Wording

Paper 100 [www3.qeh.ox.ac.uk/pdf/qehwp/qehwps100.pdf] P.31


62

SOMALILAND HISTORICAL TIMELINE

26 June

1960

Somaliland declares independence from Britain

1 July 1960 Somaliland unites with Italian Somalia, to form the Republic of Somalia

1961 Somaliland inhabitants reject the unitary constitution in a referendum

1977-78 Ogaden War with Ethiopia stokes local resentment in the northern region due to

high casualties and an influx of refugees in the aftermath of the war

1981 Formation of the rebel group, the Somali National Movement in London by

Diaspora intellectuals SNM bases established in Ethiopia

1983 Significant SNM incursions into Somaliland begin

1988 SNM rebels capture Hargeisa and Burao

The Barre government reacts by bombing northern cities, causing an estimated 50,000 deaths and hundreds of thousands of refugees

1991 Barre regime collapses

SNM and clan elders declare Somaliland independent

May 2001 Referendum on ratification of independent Somaliland constitution

The Somali National Movement operated from neighbouring Ethiopia. However, in 1988, after a Somali agreement with Ethiopia threatened their bases, SNM rebels dramatically

escalated their operations Somaliland. The central government reacted with a brutal bombing campaign, intensifying hostility in the region.

The regional capital Hargeisa was near-destroyed, an estimated 50,000 people were killed,

and a further half a million displaced.

When Barre fell in 1991, along with the country's political, economic and administrative institutions and any semblance of central government, the Somali National Movement was

the largest power in the north. On 18 May 1991, the SNM revoked the 1960 Act of Union, and declared Somaliland independent. No country has officially recognised its statehood.


63


64

B.2 Somaliland Today

B.2.1 Political Dynamics

In contrast to the foreign programmes in the south-central region, Somaliland has been characterised by a lack of external intervention. The region has also been conspicuous for

its stability and security in an otherwise violent and lawless locality. After some initial problems with banditry and a serious intra-SNM factional conflict in 1992, a National

Charter was formed in 1993 and the SNM handed power to Mohammed Egal. Egal was appointed President of an administration combining modern and traditional forms of

governance. The region's business and clan groups lent legitimacy by providing vital support

to the new government, which could draw on local social and economic ties formed under the corrupt Barre state.71

Hargeisa, Somaliland, March 2008

A functioning state apparatus

Unlike Somalia, an internationally recognised state without a functioning government, Somaliland has a fully functioning central administration but no recognition. The

Somaliland authorities have concentrated on achieving the milestones of an independent

state, establishing security within a territory and forming a functioning administration capable of entering into relations with other states.72 It carried out a successful

demobilisation campaign and established police forces and judicial systems in the towns.73 When security had been stabilised, basic service delivery and a taxation infrastructure were

established, and economic growth and trade increased steadily. Somaliland has a Constitution – ratified in a referendum in 2001 – which institutionalises the separation of

71 William Reno, “Somalia and Survival in the Shadow of the Global Economy,” QEH Wording Paper

100, 2003, p.4, [online] Available at: www3.qeh.ox.ac.uk/pdf/qehwp/qehwps100.pdf 72 These are the criteria set by the 1933 Montevideo Convention on the Rights and Duties of States. 73 The incorporation of former militiamen into the Somaliland forces has been a means for the

government to provide employment. However, informal clan militias are present throughout the

country, although since the end of active fighting in the mid-nineties, these groups have remained

largely inactive. Sources suggest that clan elders continue to control weapons as insurance against future civil conflict. These clan militia can thus be easily mobilised, both to protect the clan, but

also (albeit not the Dolbahante and Warsangeli militias) to protect Somaliland.


65

central authority's power, active opposition parties, an independent press,74 and in 2003,

held multi-party competitive Presidential elections.75 The next presidential elections are due to take place in August 2008, with tight controls against vote tampering.

“For a long time Somaliland has been ignored. But we have been patient, because the reality

on the ground is what matters: making peace, building democracy, establishing schools,

generating revenue, establishing law and order, demobilising combatant militia. We did it

ourselves. Eventually these achievements will be recognised.”

Elder


“Somaliland is a gift to the International Community at this moment. If they recognised

Somaliland they would get immense returns on that investment.”

Somali businessman

Djibouti, March 2008

In return for economic and political support, Hargeisa has provided security for the business

community, as well as the general population. To ensure that Somaliland remains a peaceful region while wars rage on its borders, it has spent heavily on military defence and policing

at the expense of health and education programmes, for which it has been criticised by some human rights organisations. However, sustained economic growth and personal

security represent an enormous achievement in the region, and are highly valued by the general population.76 The military and police also provide targeted employment for young

males, many of whom own personal arms and have military experience, and could otherwise be a cause of insecurity.

Roadside khat (qat) shop in Hargeisa, Somaliland, March 2008

74 The President is elected by popular vote; the Parliament is separated into an advisory House of

Elders and a House of Representatives elected by popular vote on the basis of proportional representation. See African Union (2005) “Resume: AU fact-finding mission to Somaliland” (Ethiopia:

African Union) 75 International Crisis Group, “Somaliland: Time for African Union Leadership,” May 2006, [online]

Available at: http://www.crisisgroup.org/home/index.cfm?id=4131 76 The Senlis Council's field research has shown security to be the overriding concern of many Somalis

and Somalilanders, both in the region and the Diaspora.


66

Islamists in Somaliland

In 2003 and 2004, a number of attacks were carried out on foreign aid workers in

Somaliland, prompting fears that radical Islamist groups were operating in the region. Almost all Somalis are Sunni Muslims of the Shafi'i school and Islam is one of the few

movements that can cut across clan divides and historical tensions. However, radical Islam is opposed by many, and in Somaliland, religious authorities and the general population

have shown intolerance for such movements.77

The government of Somaliland has been consistently hostile to radical Islamist influences, but considers its struggle against terrorists to be a domestic issue, not part of the United

States' global War on Terror.78 However, Somaliland also cooperates with US counter-

terrorism efforts, and this cooperation has resulted in some arrests.

“The people at grassroots level are not supportive of extremism here. Extremists are seen as

external attackers, not internal defenders. However, they do operate freely in some areas.

They are involved in the economy and in schools.”

Elder


Despite minimal local support for extremism in Somaliland, there is some concern that

radical Islamism could be gaining ground. The limited budget of the government means that there is a gap in educational provision. In some areas this gap is being filled by Arab-

funded madrassas teaching radical Islamist ideology. There are concerns that radical Islamism is also being imported by Somalilanders radicalised in other countries. Positive

diplomatic relations with the international community and greater funding for local educational systems could counter this influence.

External relations

In 2004, former Puntland President Abdullahi Yusuf Ahmed was appointed President of Somalia's Transitional Federal Government. He has loudly opposed Somaliland independence,

calling for a unified Somalia. Although Somalia's Prime Minister Nur Hassan Hussein has recently talked about reconciliation with political opposition within south-central Somalia,

he has made no similar comments about Somaliland. With Somalia's Transitional Federal Government focused on the extreme problems in Mogadishu and south-central Somalia,

there are currently no indications that it is willing to negotiate a peaceful settlement recognising Somaliland's independence.

To date, no states have recognised Somaliland's independence. Despite this, Somaliland's

government has adopted a pragmatic relationship with its neighbours. Economic ties and diplomatic relations with Djibouti have improved since 2003, partly due to strong clan ties

(the current President of Somaliland is from the Dir clan, predominant in Djibouti).

Political engagement with Ethiopia is necessary due to the nomadic Somali populations that move across the border, bringing local land and clan conflicts with them. Ethiopia is a

stronger and more powerful state, however it is landlocked; Somaliland's Berbera port is an

important trade point to which Somaliland granted Ethiopia formal access in 2000. Ethiopia has a Trade Liaison Office in Hargeisa, headed by a diplomat with the rank of Ambassador,

and Somaliland also has a Liaison office in Addis Ababa.

77 Matt Bryden (2003) “No Quick Fixes: Coming to Terms with Terrorism, Islam and Statelessness in

Somalia”, Journal of Conflict Studies, Vol. XXIII, no. 2. Field interviews conducted by the Senlis

Council in 2008 reinforced this assertion. 78 The Somaliland constitution, adopted by Parliament on 30 April 2000 and approved by referendum

on 31 May 2001, requires the government to oppose terrorism and similar acts.


67

“There is a fear that Ethiopia will grow in influence: we need to stabilise Somaliland so we

don’t have to be so concerned about this. If Ethiopia grows in influence in Somaliland, this

will provide fertile ground for the growth of Al-Shabab ‘nationalism’ in Somaliland.”

Elder


Ongoing issues of concern in Somaliland

A number of issues could derail Somaliland's progression towards official recognition. Some of the territory's clans remain politically marginalised, and allegations of political

corruption have been raised. In addition, fears that political positioning prior to the upcoming Presidential elections could spill over into violence appear to be realised, as

evidenced by the series of explosions in April 2008 in Hargeisa.79 However, despite these issues of concern, it is clear that Somaliland has achieved a significant level of progress and

stability, particularly when measured against Somalia.

INTERNATIONAL CRISIS GROUP ON SOMALILAND

The ICG advocates that the African Union lead the way on international recognition of Somaliland's right to statehood. In a special report, the research and advocacy group make a

clear political and legal case for recognition. ICG's research suggests an independent Somaliland

would add to regional stability, rather than representing a further cause of instability in the Horn. The International Crisis Group argues that Somaliland's case is unique, and would not, as

some AU members fear, set a precedent regarding African secessionist movements.80

B.2.2 International Stance on Somaliland

African Union: initial findings

Although the African Union (AU) has made some positive noises about the possibility of recognising Somaliland's independence, it has done little to convert these sentiments into

action, and AU member states have not taken a collective position regarding recognition. An AU fact-finding mission to Somaliland in April-May 2005 generated some apparently

positive findings:

“Going by the clear presentation and articulate demands of the authorities and people of Somaliland concerning their political, social and economic history, Somaliland has been made a “pariah region” by default. The Union established in 1960 brought enormous injustice and suffering to the people

of the region. The fact that the “union between Somaliland and Somalia was never ratified” and also malfunctioned when it went into action from 1960 to 1990, makes Somaliland’s search for recognition historically unique and self-justified in African political history. Objectively viewed, the case should not be linked to the notion of “opening a Pandora’s box.” As such, the AU should find a special method of dealing with this outstanding

case.”81

79 “Explosion Rocks Somaliland's Parliament Building,” Garowe Online, 9 April 2008, [online] Available at:

http://www.garoweonline.com/artman2/publish/Somalia_27/Somalia_Explosion_rocks_Somaliland_P

arliament_building.shtml 80 See International Crisis Group (2006) “Somaliland: Time for African Union Leadership”, Africa Report no.110, 23 May 2006 81 African Union, “Resumé: AU fact-finding mission to Somalia (30 April to 4 May),” 2005


68

Attempts by the government of Somaliland to have the AU re-visit the region with a mission

including member state representatives were rebuffed at the AU Summits in January and July 2007. As well as Somali President Abdullahi Yusuf Ahmed's opposition to recognising

Somaliland, other member states such as Egypt have expressed interest in keeping Somalia unified as a regional counterweight to Ethiopia.

Other AU states oppose Somaliland recognition on the grounds that it could set a precedent

for separatist movements elsewhere on the continent. However, following the January 2008 AU meeting in Addis Ababa, the United States' Assistant Secretary of State for African

Affairs, Dr Jendayi Frazer, called for the AU to send another senior delegation to Somaliland.

United Nations: careful consideration

The UN Security Council insists on using quotation marks when referring to Somaliland or

terming it “northern Somalia”. In assessing the region's dynamics, the March 2008 Secretary-General's report on Somalia did not encompass a visit Somaliland. Despite this,

the report determined that security in Somaliland is “fragile” and only “relatively better” than in south-central Somalia.82

However aside from the border with Puntland, almost every other study on Somaliland

contradicts this assertion, including reports by the United States' Government Accountability Office, the International Crisis Group and The Senlis Council's field research

in Somaliland.83 The Security Council report does recognise the need for “careful consideration” of the state identity of both Somaliland and Puntland, but assumes this will

occur in the context of a Somali federation.

“Regarding international recognition of Somaliland, if [the international community] can

recognise warlords, why can’t you recognise law-abiding citizens? Why be afraid of spending

money on something good when you have spent so much money on something bad?”

Human rights worker


European Union: supporting presidential elections

The European Union pays scant attention to Somali or Somaliland affairs. Italy is a strong

advocate of unification, and few European countries have sought to make an issue out of the remote country. Nonetheless, Denmark, Sweden and particularly the UK have been

supportive. In a demonstration of international contradictions regarding Somaliland, President of the European Commission Jose Manuel Barroso recently pledged European

Commission support of free and fair Presidential elections there, despite the fact no formal EU recognition of the Somaliland government exists.84

82 United Nations Security Council (2008) “Report of the Secretary-General on the Situation in

Somalia”, no. S/2008/178, March 14th 2008: Annex III, part 3 83 Government Accountability Office, “Somalia: Several Challenges Limit US and International Stabilization, Humanitarian and Development Efforts,” Report to Congressional Requesters February

2008, p.7; International Crisis Group, “Somaliland: Time for African Union Leadership,” Africa Report

no. 110, 23 May 2006; African Union, “Resumé: AU fact-finding mission to Somalia (30 April to 4

May),” 2005 84 Jose Manuel Barroso, in a letter to Annemie Neyts-Uyttebroeck, President of the European Liberal,

Democrat and Reform Party, 8 February 2008.


69

United States: building state capacity

The United States Assistant Secretary of State Jendayi E. Frazer's recent testimony to the

Senate Foreign Relations Subcommittee on Africa praised Somaliland's achievement of “a commendable level of stability, largely without external support or assistance, which the

international community must help to sustain regardless of the question of formal recognition.”

Of Somaliland's democratic processes, Assistant Secretary Frazer commented that “we are

witnessing the patient, methodical emergence of representative institutions.” Despite the lack of formal recognition, the United States government has channelled limited amounts of

aid for capacity-building in Somaliland's parliament and to support elections.85 Following

Assistant Secretary Frazer's meeting with Somaliland President Riyale, a US State Department spokesman stressed that the US was not planning to recognise Somaliland.

However, he did state that, “there is a process underway that the AU is engaged in and we are going to be watching very closely that situation”.86

“If you knock back [Somaliland‘s request for recognition], you’re neglecting the

achievements of democracy, security and stability… there is a need for a stable presence in

the region.”

Mohamed, 26, from Somaliland

London, April 2008

“The majority of people want support for independence. Recognition is their main focus.”

Journalist



85 Testimony by Assistant Secretary for African Affairs Jendayi E. Frazer Evaluating US Policy

Objectives and Options on the Horn of Africa, Senate Foreign Relations Subcommittee on Africa, 11

March 2008, p.1, 6-7 86 Sean McCormack, Daily Press Briefing 17 January 2008, [online] Available at:

http://www.state.gov/r/pa/prs/dpb/2008/jan/99443.htm


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SOMALILAND: A LEGAL CASE FOR SELF-DETERMINATION The United Nations Resolution 1514, the 1960 Declaration on the Granting of Independence to

Colonial Countries and Peoples, states that “all peoples have the right to self-determination”. However, the Declaration was written in the context of declining European colonialism, and

independence movements considered legitimate are those that do not challenge colonial borders.87 The African Union has ratified this agreement in order to minimise interstate tensions

and it is on this basis that the international community has not recognised Somaliland's

independence.88 However, this legal justification is unfounded.

Somaliland’s right to self-determination previously recognised

Upon independence from Britain, Somaliland was recognised internationally as a state. Somaliland then voluntarily unified with Italian south-central Somalia. Somaliland's border with

Puntland is a colonial border, dating back to the Anglo-Italian Protocol of 1894. This border, like those with Djibouti and Ethiopia, was legally constituted upon independence on 26 June

1960. As such, Somaliland's independence is in accordance with international law,89 and the

region has historical legal rights to self-determination.

International precedents for withdrawal following voluntary union

Somaliland may cite international precedents for voluntary withdrawal following union. Ethiopia and Eritrea were joined in 1952 but separated in 1993, and Egypt and Syria, and Senegal and

Mali also entered unions and later withdrew. The breakup of Czechoslovakia and the Soviet Union also represent voluntary separations, largely peaceful and supported by the international

community.

Negotiated political settlements favoured by the international community

When Spain pulled out of Western Sahara in 1975, Morocco and Mauritania invaded, despite the

presence of a nationalist movement, the Polisario Front. Although Mauritania has since withdrawn, the area is divided between Polisario and Morocco. The issue is not resolved, but the

response of the international community has been more flexible than in Somaliland. In Western Sahara, the UN advocates a peaceful political settlement based on mutual agreement.

Somaliland lacks de jure statehood because no Somali government has ever signed an agreement

to this effect, either out of reluctance or a lack of effective governance structure. Under international law, Somaliland's brief period of statehood means it does not legally need to

request permission from Somalia. However, historical precedents demonstrate that a peaceful

route to the breakup of states lies in mutual accord, suggesting the international community should encourage the Transitional Federal Government to negotiate with Somaliland.

87 UNHCR, “Declaration on the Granting of Independence to Colonial Countries and Peoples,” 14

December 1960, [online] Available at: http://www.unhchr.ch/html/menu3/b/c_coloni.htm 88 William Reno, “Somalia and Survival in the Shadow of the Global Economy,” QEH Wording Paper

100, 2003, p.3, [online] Available at: www3.qeh.ox.ac.uk/pdf/qehwp/qehwps100.pdf 89 Former UN advisor on Somalia, John Drysdale, quoted in The Republican, Issue 159, 5 May 2001,

[online] Available at: http://somalilandforum.com/news/the_republican/Republican-Issue-159.htm


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B.2.3 Somaliland Conflict Dynamics: Skirmishes with Puntland

Although no country has ever formally recognised Somaliland, the self-declared state experienced no challenges to its physical or political independence for seven years. In

August 1998, the northern region of Puntland, on Somaliland's south-eastern border, was established as an autonomous region. Like Somaliland, Puntland has enjoyed relative

stability and its government provides basic services. However, the political objective of the local administration is a unified or federated Somalia. Since 1998, there has been sporadic

conflict between Puntland and Somaliland over the border regions Sool and eastern Sanaag.

The Puntland authority has appealed to clan loyalties in the areas, as they belong to the same Harti clan family predominant in Puntland. Troops are currently at a stand-off, but

control over the border region continues to shift, and any political and economic interventions in the areas risk increasing tensions.


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Appendices

I. Insurgency Propaganda

Night letters

Taliban night letter 1

Translation

Warning The aims of Al Omer Media Centre

Our media centre issues the voice of poor and Mujahid Afghan people and our main

aim is to inform our Afghans about the war against Islam, also about the dirty tricks and decisions of the Anti-Islam war unit, we are trying to keep the minds of our

people clean from the untruth and poisonous propagandas.

Al Omer Media Centre, Department of

Advertisements

Dear [religious] scholars, tribal elders, jihadi leaders:

Since the inception of the US-led Crusade under the leadership of [Hamid] Karzai and [Marshal Mohammad Qasim] Fahim [former Afghan defence minister], the crusaders, exploiting the puppet regime, have strived to seize

governance and legitimacy from the Afghan nation through a wide range of vicious approaches.

They have been trying to obscure their crimes of invasion and aggression by introducing a new constitution and

holding Loya Jirgas. With this in mind, it is the duty of all fellow countrymen to endeavour to foil their conspiracies against Islam and our nation. You should, therefore, fulfil your duty by voicing your disapproval to the so-called

constitution and refusing to cooperate with and participate in the Loya Jirga.

We warn you, and also shall take you as witnesses to testify against those who would cooperate with the Loya Jirga, that any assistance and cooperation with the process will cause you dire consequences. We shall not allow

anyone to exploit his powers against Islam and Afghanistan’s independence. The perpetrators will be dealt with

stringent Sharia Law.

To help the truth prevail, I shall not forgive anyone. Amir al-Mominin

(leader of Muslims - a title referred to Taliban Leader Mullah Omar by his followers)

It is your religious responsibility to help distributer this leaflet to all Afghan people.


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Taliban night letter 290

Translation We are requesting the principle of the girl’s school to immediately close the school. In this school they are teaching infidel books to girls, and we don’t want these girls to become infidels. I, Mullah,

for the last time, convey this message to you.

Dear Principle:

I don’t want you or the students to die at this young age. Also, tell all teachers not to come to school. If you want to live, dear students and teachers, this is the last warning to you, to not come to this school. And if you are tired

of your life, then come, and your blood will be on your hands.

I am giving this last warning. Give this letter to the principle of the girls’ school. This is the last time; I am telling

you once again that your blood will be on your own hands.

Dear teachers if you want to live, sit at home. I say this to everyone.

90 Letter received by the Principal of a girls' school in Laskkar Gah, Helmand Province, Afghanistan,

March 2007.


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Somalia: night letter 191

Translation

SERIOUS WARNING!!! Awil Dibitaati

Drop the work you are conducting in the neighbourhood!

Think about the problem that you are bringing to Islam and its community!

If you don’t desist, you will receive a rapid response in accordance with what Islamic Shari’a prescribes for your

activities.

May God guide us!

91 Letter received by Awil Dibitaati, Mogadishu, March 2008.


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Somalia: night letter 292

Translation

SERIOUS WARNING!!! 1. Abdulqadir Shiino (District Deputy Chairman)

2. Abdul Oday (Department Chairman) 3. Baadil (Department Chairman)

4. Istaahil, “Tabele” Supervisor

5. Ambaro (Deputy Department Chairman) 6. Faadhig (“Tabele” Chairman)

7. Mohamud Waalow (District Spy)

8. Mohamed Salah (Spy)

All of the people mentioned above are traitors who assist the occupiers who attacked the country, and we warn

them to consider the disgraceful matters in which they are involved and the false responsibilities they hold. If they

92 Letter received by the National Security Agency of the Transitional Federal Government of Somalia,

on or about 22 March 2008.


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do not renounce these matters through the Radios, Newspapers or Mosques within 48 hours, we will take clear steps

consistent with the Islamic Shari’a.

Furthermore anyone involved in such actions whose name does not appear here should be aware that they are also

served notice by this WARNING.

Those who assist the attacking Infidels are Apostates, and the sentence for the Apostate is death. You have taken

actions that make it legal to spill your blood, so return to Islam if you want to save yourselves from the sword.

Glory is in Islam but hypocrites don't know it! Those who reject Islam, die in disgrace! We will forget you,

die in disgrace

Internet

The Internet is an important means of recruiting international Jihadists. In 2006 both Bin

Laden and Al-Zawahiri called on mujahideen “to stand with the brothers in Somalia,” and in March 2007 Abu Yahya al-Libi, an Al-Qaeda leader in Afghanistan called on the revival of

jihad in Somalia. These calls have been widely distributed on Islamist websites.93 In 2001 Al-Qaeda established As-Sahab, a multimedia company whose aim is to encourage jihadists

to join the fighting in Iraq, Somalia, Sudan and Afghanistan.

As well as releasing Bin Laden's and Al-Zawahiri's comments and speeches, As-Sahab also produces videos of Al-Qaeda operations in Afghanistan and elsewhere. To make the

materials accessible to the West these are often translated or subtitled in foreign languages, and can often be found on video-sharing sites such as YouTube and Liveleak.94

A key example of Somali Jihad propaganda is the hour-long video posted in November 2006

by the Al-Fajr Information Centre titled “The Apostate Hell in Somalia.” According to the SITE Institute95 the video shows operations against enemy forces and features ICU leaders,

Osama Bin Laden and a female Mujahid. Pro-US warlords are branded “criminals.”

93 The Middle East Media Research Institute, “An Urgent Call by Abu Yayha Al-Libi to Revive the Jihad

in Somalia,” Islamists Website Monitor No.81, Special Dispatch Series 1526, [online] Available at:

http://memri.org/bin/articles.cgi?Page=archives&Area=sd&ID=SP152607. Because of their often

illegal content Islamist websites are frequently suspended from the web. Their URLs change often, and it is difficult to find the original calls. However, Jihadwatch, the Islamist Monitoring Project and

the SITE Intelligence Group post key messages and translations - see www.jihadwatch.org,

www.memri.org and www.siteintelgroup.org. For further discussion see H. Rogan, Abu Reuter and the

E-Jihad Summer/Fall 2007 [93] ROGAN Culture & Society [94] Georgetown Journal of International Affairs. 94 For example, the video “Somalian Holy Fighter” can be accessed on YouTube at:

http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=dMcpTYEx0Co; and the video “Somalias most wanted” can be

accessed at: http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=fncogODBUkg. 95 SITE Publications 30 November, 2006, [online] Available at:

http://clearinghouse.infovlad.net/showthread.php?t=5176 (date accessed April 7, 2008)


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Jihad knowledge transfer

As well as disseminating propaganda, Islamist websites also serve instructive purposes.

Information can be found on best kidnapping tactics, the use of chemicals in guerrilla warfare and the production of improvised explosive devices (IEDs) used in roadside and

suicide bombs. The Al-Fajr Information Centre publishes a bi-monthly magazine “Technical Mujahid,” which provides information on Jihad internet forums and tips on how future

Jihadis can surf these sites securely.96

Still from ‘Jihad in Somalia,’ October 2007

96 For further detail, see Abdul Hameed Bakier, Jamestown Foundation Terrorism Monitor, volume 5,

issue 6, 2007, http://jamestown.org/terrorism/news/article.php?articleid=2370293


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II. US Designation of Al-Shabab

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