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From Cold War to détente

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From Cold War to détente From Cold War to détente
Diapositiva 1From Cold War to détenteFrom Cold War to détente
NSC-68On April 1950 the US National Security Council adopted a resolution (NSC-68NSC-68) that revised significantly the mainly defensive theories of the containment doctrine. The new document stated that:
the USSR was pursuing a hegemonic policy
the USSR was becoming militarily superior
Therefore it was deemed urgent a substantial increase of the military expenditure from 7% to 20%
this ignited a new rush toward rearmament and increased political tensions
A generational change: the USANovember 1952: Eisenhower succeeded to Truman in the Presidency
A hero of WW2 and NATO commander in Chief, Eisenhower appointed John Foster Dulles as his State Secretary
An expert of international relations, Dulles supported a more aggressive USA foreign policy focusing on: Redefinition of relations with Europe Increase of Europe's military expenditure Roll back Massive retaliation First strike capability
John Foster DullesJohn Foster Dulles
Nuclear weaponsNuclear weapons
It was a key point in Dulles theory of foreign policy Already in an article published on May 52 (A Policy of
Boldness) he had criticised the Truman administration He had particularly focused on the containment doctrine
accused of being ineffective and too expensive “Ours are treadmill policies which, at best, might
perhaps keep us in the same place until we drop exhausted”
To invert this trend he suggested: More emphasis on USA technological superiority
particularly in the sector of atomic armaments From this perspective the strengthening of US nuclear
capability is seen mainly in terms of deterrence rather than real warfare
To this end JF Dulles developed the theory of brinkmanship
Theory that suggested to push to the extreme any future confrontation in order to ripe the best political bargain
In JF Dulles words brinkmanship meant:
“the ability to get to the verge without getting into the war”
The issue of communismThe issue of communism
Foster Dulles saw in the fast rise of communism one of the major threats to the Western world
At the same time he suggested that the quick expansion of communism could have caused also its failure
He was thus referring to the contradictions within Soviet Union strategies and management of alliances
Therefore he suggested to focus on those contradictions and particularly on:
The problems related to the so-called Soviet “ discipline” (USSR relations with its partners)
Chinese dissatisfaction with Soviet rule Therefore he foresaw that the Soviet system
would have collapsed because of its inner contradictions
Dulles developed a doctrine that was a mix of doctrinarism and pragmatism
On October 26 1953 the USA diplomatic relations with Spain were restored
On August 9, 1954 USA succeeded in having Yugoslavia, Turkey and Greece signing a treaty of alliance known as the Balkan Pact
This Pact was expected to last 20 years though the next year Yugoslavia denounced it as a “dead letter”
- In JF Dulles vision, Europe was perceived as a secondary partner
In other words Europe was demoted from subject to object of international relations
Operation Ajax Operation Ajax (August 15-20 1953)(August 15-20 1953)
1941 with the pretext of alleged pro-nazi feelings GB had invaded Iran and unseated the Shah Reza Pahlevi
In 1951, the control of Iran's oil fields went under a British company (the Anglo-Iranian Oil Company, or AIOC)
The Iranians thought that the existing deal between the Iranian government and AIOC unfairly benefited the company
In August the Iranian Parliament appointed Mohammad Mossadeq Prime Minister
Operation AjaxOperation Ajax First move of Mossadeq was to ask for the renegotiation
of the deal and finally he moved to the nationalisation of oil fields
Emphasising the fear of communism, GB pushed for USA intervention
In August 1953 the USA “solved” the Anglo-Iranian crisis with a CIA led intervention that overthrew Mossadeq
Mossadeq was replaced by Fadlollah Zahedi and a more submissive government
Operation Ajax and Baghdad Pact Operation Ajax and Baghdad Pact
A first result was the establishment in 1954 of a consortium of oil companies with 40% of US shares
February 14, 1955, Baghdad pactBaghdad pact
It was a defensive organization for promoting shared political, military and economic goals established by Turkey, Iraq, Great Britain, Pakistan and Iran under USA pressure.
Its main aim was to prevent communist presence in the region
Central Treaty Organization (CENTO)
The pro -Soviet Iraqi “revolutionary” government that was established after the coup d’état of 1958 rejected the “defensive” strategy of the pro-Western Baghdad Pact and accused Britain, the United States, and Turkey of imperialist designs in the Persian Gulf region
As a consequence in 1959 the Baghdad Treaty was replaced by Central Treaty Organization (CENTO)Central Treaty Organization (CENTO) a unified military command
without Iraq was established
A generational change: the USSRThe end of Stalinism March 5 , 1953 Death of Stalin The last period of Stalin rule had been marked by
violent purges addressed to political enemies, being them real or imaginary
Stalin left a quite complex political heritage The USSR had experienced an impressive economic and
military growth However, this growth was hampered by serious
structural limitations
A generational change: the USSRThe end of Stalinism USSR economic logic was the opposite of market
economy Priority was given o the development of heavy industry
and armament sector rather the production for the internal consumption
Economic choices were subject only to the unquestionable decision of the Communist Party and mainly to its Central Committee
A generational change: the USSRThe end of Stalinism Little attention was paid to costs/benefits assessments The state monopoly over economic life made the USSR
system isolated, self-sufficient but also self-referential Investment policies expressed political choices rather
than economic ones
A generational change: the USSRThe end of Stalinism At Stalin death, power was handled in a collegial way by
Malenkov (Prime minister), Molotov (Foreign Affairs), Berija (Internal Affairs), Bulganin (Defense), e Kaganovic (Economy), Khrushchëv (Secretary General of the CPSU)
This apparent collegial system masked a bitter successions struggle which ended with Khrushchëv victory on February 1956
Khrushchëv, little known in Europe (he was one of the main responsible for the elimination of the little peasant property) managed to represent himself as the new face of the USSR
Nikita KhrushchëvNikita Khrushchëv
Nikita KhrushchëvNikita Khrushchëv
He managed to impose the idea that the USSR had to gain more from a policy of détente rather than confrontation
The major political initiative of Khrushchëv was his speech at the 20th Congress of the USSR Communist Party on February 1956
Khrushchëv’s speech at the 20Khrushchëv’s speech at the 20thth Congress Congress
In this occasion he made two separate speeches
1. A public speech on international politicsA public speech on international politics
In this speech Khrushchëv: developed the notion of peaceful coexistence condemned the theory of proletarian
internationalism declared that the theory of the unavoidability of
war was obsolete
Khrushchëv’s speech at the 20Khrushchëv’s speech at the 20thth Congress Congress
2. He then delivered a secret speech secret speech (addressed only to Soviet delegates)
In this speech Khrushchëv: Criticised bitterly Stalin policies Made official figures about Stalin persecution and
crimes against political opponents (70% of the members of the Party were object of persecutions)
He opened a deep fracture within the Soviet alliance
Khrushchëv Khrushchëv speechspeech
“After Stalin's death, the central committee began to implement a policy of explaining concisely and consistently that it is impermissible and foreign to the spirit of Marxism-Leninism to elevate one person, to transform him into a superman possessing supernatural characteristics, akin to those of a god. Such a man supposedly knows everything, sees everything, thinks for everyone, can do anything, is infallible in his behaviour”
Khrushchëv Khrushchëv speechspeech
“At present, we are concerned with a question which has immense importance for the party now and for the future - with how the cult of the person of Stalin has been gradually growing, the cult which became at a certain specific stage the source of a whole series of exceedingly serious and grave perversions of party principles, of party democracy, of revolutionary legality”
Khrushchëv Khrushchëv speechspeech
“Lenin taught that the party's strength depends on its indissoluble unity with the masses, on the fact that behind the party follows the people - workers, peasants, and the intelligentsia. Lenin said: "Only he who believes in the people, who submerges himself in the fountain of the living creativeness of the people, will win and retain power."”
Khrushchëv Khrushchëv speechspeech “The party led a great political-ideological struggle against
those in its own ranks who proposed anti-Leninist theses, who
represented a political line hostile to the party and to the
cause of socialism. This was a stubborn and a difficult fight but
a necessary one, because the political line of both the
Trotskyite-Zinovievite bloc and of the Bukharinites led actually
toward the restoration of capitalism and toward capitulation
to the world bourgeoisie.
Khrushchëv Khrushchëv speechspeech
Let us consider for a moment what would have happened if in 1928-1929 the political line of right deviation had prevailed among us, or orientation toward "cotton-dress industrialisation," or toward the kulak, etc. We would not now have a powerful heavy industry; we would not have the kolkhozeskolkhozes; we would find ourselves disarmed and weak in a capitalist encirclement
Khrushchëv Khrushchëv speechspeech
Stalin originated the concept "enemy of the people.enemy of the people." This
term automatically made it unnecessary that the ideological
errors of a man or men engaged in a controversy be proven.
It made possible the use of the cruellest repression, violating
all norms of revolutionary legality, against anyone who in any
way disagreed with Stalin, against those who were only
suspected of hostile intent, against those who had bad
The concept "enemy of the people" actually eliminated the
possibility of any kind of ideological fight or the making of
one's views known on this or that issue, even [issues] of a
practical nature. On the whole, the only proof of guilt
actually used, against all norms of current legal science,
was the "confession" of the accused himself. As
subsequent probing has proven, "confessions" were
acquired through physical pressures against the accused. ”
Khrushchëv Khrushchëv speechspeech
“Not Stalin, but the party as a whole, the Soviet
government, our heroic army, its talented leaders and
brave soldiers, the whole Soviet nation - these are the ones
who assured victory in the Great Patriotic War. ”
Khrushchëv Khrushchëv speechspeech “The July plenum of the central committee studied in detail the
reasons for the development of conflict with Yugoslavia. It was a
shameful roleshameful role which Stalin played here. The "Yugoslav affair"
contained no problems which could not have been solved through
party discussions among comrades. There was no significant basis
for the development of this "affair." It was completely possible to
have prevented the rupture of relations with that country. This does
not mean, however, that Yugoslav leaders made no mistakes or had
no shortcomings. But these mistakes and shortcomings were
magnified in a monstrous manner by Stalin, resulting in the break-
off of relations with a friendly country. ”
International reactions
China: looked at this speech as a reformist move and condemned it
Poland: public demonstration and clashes on the street (anti-USSR not anti-communist)
Hungary: clashes between Kadar & Imre Nagy Yugoslavia was rehabilitated On 1956 the Cominform was dismantled
Atomic diplomacyAtomic diplomacy 1957-1963 marked the apex of the terror based
diplomacy USA: aimed at achieving their superiority through
strategic bombardiers and nuclear submarines USSR aimed at achieving their superiority through
European role The issue of nuclear weapons and their launchers
affected European diplomacy It introduced two main questions:
– A. ownership of weaponry
– B. sharing defence expenses
The 1957 developments 44 nuclear experiments USA confidence in their superiority Shock caused by the launching of the Sputnik
(4/10/1957) and Gagarin (12/04/1961) space trip These developments engendered panic in the USA USA delegate at the UN submitted a proposal for a
negotiation on an international system for the control of nuclear weapons
Main obstacles to this plan Presence of nuclear armaments in Germany USSR internal contradictions USSR threatening perception of missile basis close to
its own borders
Berlin crisis In a diplomatic note on November 27, 1958 the
USSR threatened to:
1. Sign a separate peace treaty with Eastern Germany within six months
2. transfer the capital of Easter Germany to Berlin
3. The formal acquisition of sovereign duties by the DDR
Berlin crisis: causes Adenauer’s pressures on the USA He insisted on a more intransigent policy of the USA Adenauer exasperated the already radical “Hallstein Hallstein
doctrinedoctrine” that declared the German Federal Republic as the only legitimed expression of Germany
Berlin crisis: causes Ulbricht pressures on the USSR Development of the “Ulbricht doctrineUlbricht doctrine” Concern of the DDR for the atomic power of the
German Federal Republic Tensions due to the increasing number of DDR
citizens escaping to Western Germany
Berlin crisis:causes
The Chinese issue Relations between China and the USSR had
deteriorated afer the rapprochement with Jugoslavia and the end of Stalinism
China accused the USSR of revisionismrevisionism and social-social- imperialismimperialism
1958 Outbreak of a crisis over the Quemoy and Matsu islands which jeopardised regional stability
Berlin crisis:causes
Both China and the GDR put a lot of pressure on the new USSR foreign policy attempted by Krushev
Geneva May 11 1959: The foreign ministers of Britain, France, the Soviet Union and the United States met in Geneva for a 17 day conference on the reunification of Germany, without coming to an agreement
this date marked a significant change as the USA accepted to give up to the nuclear strengthening of Western Germany
It affected the cohesion of the Atlantic Treaty
The Cuban crisisThe Cuban crisis: a test for new policies: a test for new policies
The alliance between petty rural bourgeoisie, peasants and urban proletariat led to open revolt
1953 Fidel Castro took the leadership of the revolt and tempted an insurrection
Jailed and later amnestied Castro went to Mexico where he founded the movement July 26
1956: this movement tried to land on Cuba but the attempt failed and they were forced to hide on the Sierra Maestra mountains
The Cuban crisisThe Cuban crisis
1959 finally the guerrilla prevailed and took power Initially the USA endorsed the political change hoping
for a liberal development February 1960 the USSR Vice Prime Minister, Mikoyan
made an official visit to Cuba The USSR signed an agreement that included the
purchase of the whole sugar-cane production at fixed price in exchange for a loan of US $ 100 million with an interest rate of l 2,50 %
Soviet missiles in CubaSoviet missiles in Cuba
Krushev looked at Cuba in terms of an opportunity to solve the problem of USSR military gap
Cuba was considered as equivalent to Turkey Missile installations in Cuba could reduce the gap
between USSR and USA atomic strength This was confirmed by the USA decision to dismantle
its missile basis in Italy and Turkey (which the USSR ignored)
Strategy behind Soviet missiles in CubaStrategy behind Soviet missiles in Cuba
Aimed at pushing the USA to a serious and structural engagement on the issue of nuclear experiments
July 1962 Raul Castro went to Moscow to discuss the details of the plan
45000 military forces, construction of facilities able to launch 40 missiles
The crisisThe crisis October 16 1962 USA intelligence alerted President
Kennedy of the work in progress for the creation of the missile basis
Kennedy created a task force to assess the situation and take decisions
Discourse to the nation of October 22 1962 Discourse to the nation of October 22 1962
Kennedy announced the decision of enforcing a naval blockade around Cuba ( “quarantine line”)
Nobody was authorised to trespass this line without being subject to search
24 October ordered Soviet naval forces not to force the blockade
26 October private letter to Kennedy Proposed to stop the project Asked for USA engagement not to invade or
destabilise Cuba 27 October with an open letter linked the Cuban
crisis with the issue of missiles in Turkey
KhrushchKhrushchëëv’s second letterv’s second letter “You are disturbed over Cuba. You say that this disturbs you because it is 90 miles by sea from the coast of the United States of America. But Turkey adjoins us; our sentries patrol back and forth and see each other. Do you consider, then, that you have the right to demand security for your own country and the removal of the weapons you call offensive, but do not accord the same right to us? You have placed destructive missile weapons, which you call offensive, in Turkey, literally next to us. How then can recognition of our equal military capacities be reconciled with such unequal relations between our great states? This is irreconcilable.”
Kennedy reactionKennedy reaction He replied publicly to the private letter and
declared his readiness to acknowledge Cuban sovereignty
Accepted also the formula of “renouncing to the missile in exchange for no-intervention”
replied indirectly to the open letter of the 27 by declaring his readiness to discuss the issue of missiles in Italy and Turkey
The final agreementThe final agreement
On the same day, October 27 Robert Kennedy met the USSR ambassador and they reached an understanding
However the agreement was kept secret and officially denied
August 5 1963 was signed the Test Ban Treaty
Analysis of this crisisAnalysis of this crisis
Why Khrushchëv kept secret an agreement apparently favourable to him and accepted to appear as the loser?
Khrushchëv probably assumed that this solution of the Cuban crisis would have paved the way to the detente
Moreover Khrushchëv had to deal with his “internal front”
Analysis of this crisisAnalysis of this crisis Centrality of the debate on USSR economic policies Khrushchëv aimed at increasing the productive
capability to a level of private consumption similar to that of the USA by 1970
This plan implied a drastic reduction of military expenditures and a different distribution of productive investments
Analysis of this crisisAnalysis of this crisis
The USA had to face the same problem in the early 50s The USA solution had been an increase in their industrial
productivity associated with investments in technology Khrushchëv had guessed much earlier than everybody
else in the USSR the main structural weakness of the Soviet system
This probably was one of the reasons behind his deposition on October 1964
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