16 April 2014 | Vol. 5, № 12.
From the Editor’s Desk
Dear FDI supporters,
Welcome to the Strategic Weekly
Analysis. We begin this week’s edition in
Indonesia, with an assessment of what
might be expected from a Joko Widodo
presidency.
Returning home, we review the success of
Australia’s North-Asia Trade Mission and
the likely benefits of new trade
agreements with Japan and South Korea.
We then assess some of the possible
effects of the scrapping of the $1.5 million
Community Food Grants programme.
Next, we look at the grim news for India’s
water security contained in the latest
United Nations World Water
Development Report. Then our next
article evaluates the latest tussle for
control of the highly strategic Chagos
Archipelago, home to the Diego Garcia
military base.
We then head to Africa, with an analysis
of the steps being taken by the Kenyan
Government to counter the presence and
influence of the Somali al-Shabaab militia
in its territory.
We conclude this week’s edition in the
non-recognised, but otherwise
functioning, state of Somaliland, in the
wake of new interest from China in its
resources sector.
I trust you will enjoy this edition of the
Strategic Weekly Analysis.
Major General John Hartley AO (Retd) Institute Director and CEO Future Directions International
*****
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Indonesian Election: Hopes Boosted with Likely Jokowi Win,
but Won’t Be All Smooth Sailing for Australia-Indonesia
Relations
The recent victory of the PDI-P suggests that little now stands in the way of Joko Widodo
becoming the next president of Indonesia. While commentators have suggested his
election will be a boon for Australia, it will not be all smooth sailing for Canberra as it
seeks to boost relations with Jakarta.
Background
Hopes have been boosted that Australia-Indonesia relations could thaw, following the
victory of the Indonesian Democratic Party – Struggle (PDI-P) at the 9 April parliamentary
elections. While it must form a coalition to take power, Jakarta’s popular governor, Joko
Widodo, is still the favourite to succeed President Susilo Bambang. Barring a major surprise
on 9 July, he should take office in October. Commentators are optimistic that his election
could kick-start Australia-Indonesia relations, following a tense diplomatic stand-off
between the two in recent times. But a new president will also present a significant
challenge for Canberra, especially with the departure of Yudhoyno, a long-term supporter of
Australia.
Comment
The PDI-P won the Indonesian parliamentary election on 9 April, with unofficial tallies
suggesting it will claim just fewer than 19 per cent of the vote. Following the PDI-P were the
Golkar and Gerinda parties, which look set to gain around 15 and 12 per cent of the vote
respectively. As expected, the ruling Democratic Party was punished by voters, limping in at
fourth place and claiming just ten per cent of the vote. Marred by corruption and ineptitude
in its second term, the blue party now expects to lose around 90 seats out of the 692 being
contested around the country.
While most expected the PDI-P to claim victory, the biggest surprise was that they did not
win by a larger margin. With Megawati Soekarnoputri, the party’s enigmatic leader and
daughter of Indonesia’s first president, Sukarno, recently anointing Jokowi as its presidential
candidate, many analysts had predicted a whitewash. Some suggested, in fact, that the
party, buoyed by the “Jokowi Effect”, would easily win the 25 per cent of the popular vote,
or 20 per cent of parliamentary seats, needed to nominate their presidential candidate
outright. Instead, the party will now have to form a coalition to satisfy Indonesia’s electoral
rules, though there is no shortage of minor parties vying to run on Jokowi’s golden ticket.
With no party winning the right to nominate a presidential candidate, the horse trading and
deal making will continue for some time. But a general picture has emerged: the presidential
election on 9 July, in all likelihood, will now be a three-way race between Jokowi, Aburizal
Bakrie of Golkar, and Prabowo Subianto, the former military general, who will run for
Gerinda. The overwhelming favourite is still Jokowi, despite a weaker-than-expected
showing for the PDI-P at the recent election.
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In any case, the splintered election results do not bode well for whoever succeeds
Yudhoyono. Whichever party eventually wins, the next government will almost certainly be
a weak coalition. That is bad news, as the country faces major challenges in opening up
industries to foreign investment, instituting labour reforms and rolling back the subsidies
that continue to cripple the country’s economy. Last year, the parliament blocked ministers’
attempt to water down the controversial mineral ore ban and the Government faced a steep
challenge before finally pushing through a reduction in fuel subsidies. With any new
parliament likely to be even more unstable, and with nationalist sentiment running high
among presidential hopefuls, many investors, including those from Australia, fear the worst.
But the presidential election may yet provide Canberra with an opportunity to kick-start
relations. While the two states have traditionally enjoyed a close relationship, the recent
spying scandal and the controversial “turn back the boats” policy, have led to a tense
diplomatic stand-off; the Indonesian Ambassador to Australia was recently recalled and has
not been back to Canberra for over three months. With a new head of state to take office in
October, however, hopes are high that relations may thaw. As Ross Taylor, head of the
Indonesia Institute, told ABC News last month, ‘the election of a new president, which would
hopefully be Jokowi, could represent a new start for bilateral relations between Indonesia
and Australia’. He said a new leader could ‘provide a circuit breaker for the diplomatic stand-
off’.
Yet even if Jokowi does claim victory as expected, a new president will still present a
challenge for Canberra. Yudhoyono has been a staunch supporter of Australia; not only did
he visit several times during his tenure, but his son also attended Curtin University in Perth.
Jokowi, meanwhile, is unlikely to share the same fervour or warm feelings towards Australia.
Moreover, with limited international experience and mounting domestic issues to address,
the relationship will not be high on his agenda. If Canberra is serious about improving
relations with Jakarta, it must seriously reach out to Jokowi after the election. Having often
taken its northern neighbour for granted, Australia cannot afford to do so much longer.
Andrew Manners Research Analyst Indian Ocean Research Programme [email protected]
*****
North Asian Trade Mission to Bring Gradual Gains for Farmers
Despite Stalled China FTA Talks
Last week, Prime Minister Abbott concluded trade negotiations for an Economic
Partnership Agreement (EPA) with Japan and signed a Free Trade Agreement with South
Page 4 of 14
Korea (KAFTA). While the domestic beef industry emerges as the key winner of the trade
agreements, doubts have been raised over the holistic benefit to Australia’s agricultural
sector.
Background
Japan and South Korea are Australia’s two largest agricultural export markets. Seven years of
trade negotiations with Japan came to a head last week, as Prime Minister Abbott concluded
EPA negotiations with Japanese Prime Minister Shinzo Abe. The agreement grants Australian
agricultural products gradual preferential access to a market historically known for its
protectionism. Following his visit to Tokyo, Abbott signed the KAFTA with South Korean
President Park Gyen-hye, consolidating the agreement reached in December last year. The
third stop of the mission, China, was less successful, with the visit failing to bring the two
countries any closer to finalising an agreement.
Comment
Australian farmers stand to benefit under the Japan-Australia EPA, with Australian beef and
dairy industries predicted to gain $2.8 billion over the next twenty years. Beef tariffs will be
reduced on Australian products from 38.5 to 19.5 per cent over eighteen years, with an
immediate tariff reduction to 30.8 per cent. Chilled beef tariffs will be reduced to 20.5 per
cent within fifteen years. Slight tariff reductions in Australian canned fruit and vegetables
were also agreed upon, while the quota of duty-free cheese was increased by 20,000 tonnes.
Australia will remove tariffs on Japanese industrial products and automotives in return. The
Foreign Investment Review Board threshold was also lifted to $1.078 billion on both
Japanese and South Korean investments, although review thresholds for agricultural land
($15 million) and agribusiness ($53 million) are in effect.
Australian agricultural exports are expected to increase by 75 per cent over 15 years under
the KAFTA agreement. South Korea will progressively eliminate its forty per cent tariff on
Australian beef products over this period. Cheese, butter and infant formula quotas and
tariffs will also be eliminated between 2017 and 2037. Fruit and vegetable exporters will
enjoy improved access too, with the phasing out of tariffs between 30 and 54 per cent from
2019 to 2029. South Korean consumers are expected to benefit to the tune of $1.6 billion,
over a period of ten years from the ratification of the KAFTA, but South Korea faces a
continued trade deficit with Australia.
The trade agreements reached with Japan and South Korea will bring gradual improvements
for some of Australia’s agricultural industries. The timeline of tariff and quota reductions, of
fifteen to twenty years for some products, however, will assist Japan and South Korea to
improve their own agricultural competitiveness. The Australian National Farmers Federation
has stated that, while there are benefits to the Japan EPA, it does not improve, or only
marginally improves, access for dairy, sugar, grains, pork and rice producers. The Federation
expressed similar views on the KAFTA.
Prime Minister Abbott failed to achieve any meaningful results during talks with Chinese
President Xi Jinping. The Coalition Government has signalled that Australia will provide
special treatment to Chinese state-owned enterprises, releasing restrictions on several
Page 5 of 14
forms of investment, yet it has fallen short of Chinese demands to expressly issue 457 visas
to Chinese workers. The Coalition Government faces a conundrum in dealing with domestic
concerns over a possible surge in Chinese state-owned enterprises investing in agriculture
and infrastructure, while attempting to forge a trade agreement with China.
The projected economic benefits of bilateral agreements such as the Japan EPA and KAFTA
may be overstated. A 2010 Productivity Commission Report into bilateral and multilateral
agreements refuted arguments that recent bilateral deals, such as the TAFTA and the AUSTA
in 2005 (with Thailand and the US, respectively), can provide substantial economic benefit.
The report states that: ‘The main factors that influence decisions to do business in other
countries are likely to lie outside the scope of such agreements’. The report also suggests
that there are risks involved in investor-dispute resolution processes, intellectual property
and government procurement requirements which would incur significant costs and affect
domestic policy. While these bilateral agreements in North Asia may provide benefits to
select agricultural industries, and demonstrate strong diplomatic relations with partner
countries, there is cause to argue that unilateral domestic reform would be more useful
instead of maintaining home tariffs as a bargaining chip for future agreements.
Jack Di Nunzio Research Analyst Global Food and Water Crises Research Programme [email protected]
*****
Setback for Local Markets as Community Food Grants Axed
Cuts to the Community Food Grant programme will financially affect many independent
organisations that provide healthy and locally sourced food alternatives to consumers.
Background
The Federal Government has announced that it will discontinue the $1.5 million Community
Food Grants programme. The grants have financed non-profit projects led by food hubs,
food rescue groups and local food producers.
Comment
Farmers’ markets, food banks and community gardens took a hit last month, with the
Federal government decision to discontinue the Community Food Grant programme. The
grants were a key initiative of the National Food Plan proposed by the previous Labor
Government, aimed at strengthening ties between local farmers and their communities.
Local markets and community gardens represented an important agricultural and social
asset in the National Food Plan, particularly for their potential to improve food security and
create new opportunities for Australia’s primary industries.
Page 6 of 14
The termination of the programme has left 200 grant applicants, whose grants had already
been approved, with limited alternative options. In Australia, there are more than 350
farmers’ markets, providing fresh and local produce to various communities. Along with
community gardens, the markets are a means of assisting local food security and an
alternative source of fresh, nutritious food. Community gardens have the potential to
address food insecurity for those who are financially unable to buy fresh and affordable food
or are geographically isolated.
Local farmers also benefit from interacting directly with consumers, as transactions increase
their market power and access, cutting out the middle retailer. Moreover, in larger
commercial supermarkets, fresh fruit and vegetables are selected for sale based on their
“cosmetic”, or visual, appeal. That which does not meet standards is discarded despite the
produce being fit for consumption. With cosmetic standards unnecessary in farmers’
markets, the potential for food wastage is also reduced.
Farmers’ markets have the potential to contribute significantly to Australia’s local economy.
In the United Kingdom, estimates indicate that the London Farmers’ Markets have
contributed more than £3 million ($5.3 million) to the local economy in the past eight years.
In the United States, the Department of Agriculture is sponsoring and certifying a great
majority of the country’s 3,100 markets, praising the benefits they bring to communities and
local economies.
Some commentators have expressed concerns that local markets may pose a threat to
biosecurity. Mandatory monitoring and evaluation of compliance with rigid health and
safety regulations, however, suggest that potential risks are being managed appropriately.
Farmers’ participation in selling to these markets is only approved following such checks on
their produce.
The proliferation of markets and community gardens across Australia reflects the
increasingly popular food movement that is gaining traction in many Western countries. The
markets provide consumers with the opportunity to purchase fresh local food, with the hope
that this will ultimately inspire a healthier dietary regime. The produce is both affordable
and sustainably sourced.
Moreover, farmers’ markets and community gardens have the potential to support
Australia’s long-term domestic food security and diversify domestic markets. Supplies from
local markets, combined with export strategies, could prove critical in meeting predicted
growth in domestic and global food demand, while ensuring affordable access to healthy
food for the population.
Maria Rosaria Torrisi Research Assistant Global Food and Water Security Research Programme
*****
Page 7 of 14
UN Report Stresses Upcoming Water Crisis in India
The United Nations has released the World Water Development Report and its predictions
for India’s water security are grim. There are possible solutions to improve India’s water
use efficiency, but issues involving water sharing remain a concern for the future of the
region.
Background
A UN report released recently predicts that as many as 3.4 billion people will be living in
“water-scarce” countries by 2025. The report is particularly grim when it refers to India’s
water security. While India is home to 18 per cent of the world’s population, it only holds
four per cent of global usable water resources. Water insecurity would have dire
consequences for India’s economy, food and health security. With energy demand expected
to rise, India needs to focus on improving water use efficiency and ensuring
co-operation in the use of shared water sources, to work towards water security.
Comment
A report by the UN states that 29 per cent of India’s groundwater assessment blocks are
categorised as semi-critical, critical or over-exploited and the situation continues to
deteriorate. Approximately 97 million Indians already lack access to safe water and the UN
estimates that the overall water demand in India will exceed the available quantity of usable
water by 2050.
The report identifies Asia as the future hotspot for conflict over water extraction. The Aral
Sea and the Ganges-Brahmaputra, Indus and Mekong River basins, are not only crucial for
India, but also for Pakistan, Bangladesh and China, which all depend on those sources for
water supplies.
Water in India is used inefficiently; 85 per cent of the rural population depends on
groundwater reserves, and extraction from those sources at the current usage rates, is
unsustainable. The Green Revolution led to the acceleration of agricultural development and
groundwater usage, severely degrading groundwater resources as irrigation expanded. As a
result, water resources today are critically mismanaged and wastage and inefficiency are
widespread.
The water security challenges facing India require a holistic and inter-disciplinary
management approach. The government needs to take major policy decisions to ensure
better usage and conservation. Some policies that could bring a positive change include:
rational water pricing; encouraging a reduction in domestic and industry water use; and the
development of an effective national legal framework for water governance.
Rainwater harvesting is an important part of the solution to India’s water problems.
Currently, 65 per cent of rainwater is wasted. Holding on to this water is crucial. If collected
properly, it could reduce the pressure on water demand in the agricultural sector.
Page 8 of 14
A better use of technology in both the agricultural and energy sectors, would also improve
water use efficiency. Education on the scarcity and economic value of water is also required,
if the country is to achieve long-term changes.
Water is likely to become the new source of conflict between India and its neighbours. In
2013, India voiced its concerns that China was building three new dams on the Yarlung
Tsangpo River. Although China stated that its projects would not harm downstream flows,
the lack of transparency has not alleviated Indian fears. Increased regional co-operation and
formal agreements are critical to avoid potential conflict. China does not have any
multilateral water sharing agreements with its neighbours. As a result, increasing
transparency and co-operation on projects impacting shared water sources is crucial.
Solutions to India’s internal water issues will be costly and will take time to produce tangible
change. If the crisis is to be managed effectively, however, insecurity must be addressed
now. External pressures created by shared sources will prove even more difficult to manage
than local issues. Governments from the region need to show willingness to work together.
Conflict might not be inevitable, but considerable co-operation and practical compromises
will be required to avoid it.
Cécile Levacher Research Assistant Global Food and Water Security Research Programme
*****
A New Landlord for the Diego Garcia Military Base?
If the United Kingdom loses control of the Chagos Archipelago and with it Diego Garcia,
Washington may find itself negotiating with a new landlord: Mauritius.
Background
In 1960, the United Nations declared that all peoples may freely determine their political
status and pursue their economic, cultural and social development free from colonialism.
Importantly, the boundaries of post-colonial states would be as they were when
independence was achieved.
The atoll of Diego Garcia, which supports what is arguably the United States’ most important
military base, was originally within the territory of Mauritius when independence talks
began in the early 1960s. The British Government excised the Chagos territory before
independence was granted in 1968, keeping it under UK sovereignty and allowing the newly-
created British Indian Ocean Territory to be leased to the US.
Page 9 of 14
Comment
A large part of the controversy stems from the
timing of the excision of the Chagos Archipelago in
relation to Mauritian independence. Although, on
paper, the excision took place prior to
independence, the United Nations General
Assembly noted in 1965 that, to detach certain
islands from the territory of Mauritius for the
purpose of establishing a military base would be in
contravention of its prior declaration.
This means that the majority of UN members at that
time believed that the excision of the Chagos
Islands was wrong and that it was originally
Mauritian territory. Whitehall claimed that Diego
Garcia had no inhabitants and that the agreement
with Mauritius had been made prior to the split.
Both claims, however, have been contested.
First, London had informed Mauritius that its independence effectively depended on the UK
retaining the Chagos Islands, which would be returned after the termination of British
interests there. Mauritius would be compensated through import concessions for its sugar.
Second, close to 2,000 people lived on the Chagos Islands in 1973, when they were removed
to allow construction of the Diego Garcia military base. Reports indicate that these people
were left on the docks in the Seychelles and Mauritius without either housing or funding.1
Ownership of the Chagos Archipelago has again come into debate recently, as the 50 year
lease granted to the US for Diego Garcia, comes to a close. The lease is due to terminate in
2016 and, while the UK would be unlikely to refuse to renew it, it is claimed that it has no
legal right to do so. Washington has recently invested US$32 million ($34.1 million) in the
installation of a submarine facility on the island. The proximity to targets of possible interest
in the Middle East, plus past and current investments, all allied to its isolation, make Diego
Garcia prime real estate for a military compound, one that the United States will not
relinquish.
Fortunately for the US, it will not have to. Although Whitehall has refused to accept
Mauritius’s claim to sovereignty, international law may indicate otherwise. The European
Court of Human Rights will deliver a judgement this month, which may entail a permit for
the Chagossians to return,2 placing more pressure on the UK. The United States, however, is
still refusing to allow their return.
1 Ross, S., ‘Diego Garcia Military Base: Islanders Forcibly Deported’, Global Research, 27 October 2009.
<http://www.globalresearch.ca/diego-garcia-military-base-islanders-forcibly-deported/15840>. 2 Robertson, G., ‘Diego Garcia, a Mauritius Island, Is Crucial Real Estate for U.K. and U.S.’, Daily Beast,
6 September 2012. <http://www.thedailybeast.com/articles/2012/06/09/diego-garcia-a-mauritanian-island-is-crucial-real-estate-for-u-k-and-u-s.html>
Page 10 of 14
London may ultimately be kept to its promise to return the islands to Mauritius when it no
longer has an international interest in them; and that day may not be so far away. It is even
possible that, by the end of 2016, Mauritius will be receiving the rent for Diego Garcia.
Kyle Sargon Research Assistant Indian Ocean Research Programme
*****
Kenyan Security Crackdown: Concerns Valid but
Disproportionate Measures Must be Avoided
Kenya has ramped up security measures recently, in a bid to prevent further terrorist
attacks on its soil – such as the strike by al-Shabaab on Nairobi’s Westgate Shopping Mall.
While counter-terrorism measures are necessary, there is a risk that disproportionate
action will further marginalise Kenya’s large Somali community.
Background
Recent weeks have seen large-scale arrests of ethnic Somalis in Kenya, restrictions on the
movement of Somali refugees and the deportation of Somali “illegals.” These measures
follow a number of terrorist attacks inside Kenya by the Somali extremist group, al-Shabaab.
Facing public pressure, the Kenyan Government has claimed that Somali communities and
refugee populations in Kenya serve both as a hideout and breeding ground for Al-Shabaab
extremism. There are also concerns that recent territorial gains against al-Shabaab in
Somalia, by AMISOM forces, will push fighters into Kenyan territory and result in further
retaliatory attacks.
Comment
On 9 April, over 4,000 Kenyan-based Somalis were arrested in a vast security operation in a
Nairobi district. While many remain in custody, 82 of those detained were forcibly sent back
to Somalia for not having the necessary legal documents. The Interior Minister, Joseph Ole
Lenku, has cited security reasons for the crackdown, ‘For the last few months we’ve had
heightened insecurity. Time has come for a mop up to restore order.’
Kenya’s new counter-terrorism measures are developing on two fronts, focussing on
processing large Somali communities in Nairobi and flushing out al-Shabaab fighters who
hide in large refugee populations. The security concerns are valid. Last September’s
Westgate Shopping Mall attack in Nairobi was staged by al-Shabaab. On 24 March, six
people died in an attack on a church in Mombasa.
Page 11 of 14
In retaliation, the Kenyan Anti-Terrorism Police Units (ATPU) have been raiding houses and
arresting suspected al-Shabaab militants. The ATPU has been accused, however, of
assassinating radical Imams. The well-known cleric, Ibrahim “Mukaburi” Shariff, blacklisted
by the UN Security Council as a recruiter for Al-Shabaab, was shot outside his home on 1
April.
A recent agreement between the UN Refugee Agency and the two East African countries
may be used as a pretext for forced repatriations from the large Somali population, to a still
unstable Somalia. As part of the agreement, the UN High Commissioner for Refugees was
supposed to help facilitate the voluntary return of Somalian refugees to their home state. In
November last year, however, Lenku told the 400,000 refugees in the Dadaab refugee camp
that soon they would all be forcibly repatriated.
Al-Shabaab claimed the Westgate and other recent attacks were retaliatory strikes for
Kenyan intervention in Somalia. In 2011, Kenyan troops entered Somalia to fight as part of
the UN-mandated AMISOM force. In March this year, AMISOM regained major cities and
population centres from al-Shabaab for the fledgling Somali Republic. While al-Shabaab is a
fractured and fragmented movement, there is a credible threat that the extremists can cross
the porous border with Kenya and strike there at will.
A major grievance among Kenya’s Somali population, as well as the country’s wider
underclass, is the alleged disproportionate use of force by the security forces. In the post-
2007 election violence, security forces allegedly contributed to much of the instability and
violence. Kenyan security policy must strike a balance between addressing legitimate
security concerns and upholding citizens’ rights, maintaining the rule of law and its
obligations to genuine refugees.
The presidency of Uhuru Kenyatta passed its one-year mark last week. Much of his first year
in office has been marred by security problems and his indictment by the International
Criminal Court for alleged involvement in the violence in 2007-08. An already tribally and
ethnically polarised country, it does not need a further backlash from overzealous security
measures and the further disenfranchisement of a large segment of the population.
Kenya is a fast-growing political and economic leader of East Africa. While inequality is rife
and social mobility poor, it has the potential to further expand its burgeoning business,
finance and capital markets. If Kenya is to reap the dividends that peace provides, its
security policies must not undermine stability through disproportionate measures.
Hugo Seymour Research Assistant Indian Ocean Research Programme
*****
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Somaliland: Reaping Recognition from Resources?
Somaliland has yet to be officially recognised as an independent country, but its new friend
China has shown interest in mineral exploration there. Its resources sector could be what
puts Somaliland on the map.
Background
On 8 April, the Somaliland Minister of Energy and Mineral Resources, Hussein Abdi Dualeh,
welcomed a visiting delegation of Chinese businesspeople, consisting of 20 representatives
from energy company Guangzhou Dongsong Energy Company (GDEC) Limited. The
delegation was in Somaliland to begin work on the exploration, mapping and extraction of
coal, as part of the development of Somaliland’s energy sector.
Comment
GDEC and the Somaliland Government had previously agreed on the work in February 2014,
after the company became convinced Somaliland has good oil and mineral prospects. The
agreement could have immense benefits for Somaliland, by enabling it to more fully benefit
from its resources.
Regular electricity supplies would be a specific benefit to the residents of the capital,
Hargeisa. For over a week now, sections of the town have been without electricity due to
power outages. The development of coal-powered energy under the GDEC agreement would
go a long way towards solving that problem. The Somaliland government’s agreement with
GDEC includes the construction of a power plant, which will produce electricity from locally
mined coal.
This could be the beginning of a new China-Somaliland bilateral relationship. One of the
delegates from GDEC hinted at the future strengthening of bilateral ties, when he said that
the survey would be of ‘important significance in the signing of future agreements and
contracts’ between the two parties.
There may be even more benefits for Somaliland. China has pledged to open new doors for
it and an invitation has been extended to Somaliland’s President, Ahmed Mohamed
Mahmoud Silanyo, to visit China in the near future. GDEC has even gone to the extent of
promising to establish a Chinese language website, to promote what Somaliland has to offer
to the Chinese people. The company also talked about opening an office in the industrial city
of Guangzhou, aimed at promoting Somaliland’s interests; which could also be used as a
commercial office. The office would, in the future, issue visas and facilitate diplomatic
relations between the Somaliland and Chinese Governments.
On a political level, Somaliland is not yet recognised as an independent country; although it
is, seemingly, a viable, functioning and reasonably well-governed state. The new and
promising ties with a contending superpower, and United Nations Security Council
Permanent Member, would be of immense help to a country still trying to make its mark on
the map. Aiding Somaliland with its energy supplies and development of the resources
Page 13 of 14
sector, while also helping to promote it abroad, could mean a new ally for China in eastern
Africa.
Adil Cader Research Assistant Indian Ocean Research Programme
*****
What’s Next?
Trade and Investment Minister Andrew Robb wraps up his visit to the United Arab Emirates and Saudi Arabia on 16 April.
The two-day Tenth Session of the Pakistani-Saudi Joint Ministerial Commission finishes in Riyadh on 16 April.
The Central Asian Business Opportunities Conference bringing together public and private sector participants from Pakistan, Afghanistan, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan, Uzbekistan, Kazakhstan and Kyrgyzstan, ends in Islamabad on 16 April.
South Korean Prime Minister Chung Hong Won concludes a three-day visit to Pakistan on 16 April that included his attendance at the Korea-Pakistan Investment Co-operation Forum.
King Juan Carlos of Spain, together with Minister for Foreign Affairs and Co-operation José Manuel García-Margallo, Minister for Defence Pedro Morenés, Minister for Public Works Ana Pastor and Minister for Industry, Energy and Tourism José Manuel Soria, finish their visit to the United Arab Emirates and Kuwait on 16 April.
On 17 April, India begins phase four of its nine-phase Lok Sabha polls. The process ends on 13 May.
The African Standby Force will conclude the second round of its operational emergency response exercise, AMANI-AFRICA II, in the Lesotho capital, Maseru, on 17 April.
Burmese opposition leader Aung San Suu Kyi arrives home on 17 April after a week-long visit to France and Germany.
Afghanistan will finish counting the votes from its national election on 20 April.
Page 14 of 14
Any opinions or views expressed in this paper are those of the individual authors, unless stated to be those of Future Directions International. Published by Future Directions International Pty Ltd. 80 Birdwood Parade, Dalkeith, WA 6009 Tel: +61 8 9389 9831 Fax: +61 8 9389 8803 E-mail: [email protected] Web: www.futuredirections.org.au