front line states.pdf

7/28/2019 front line states.pdf

1/19

Zambezia (1984/5), XII.THE FRONT-LINE STATES, SOUTH AFRICAAND SOUTHERN AFRICAN SECURITY:MILITARY PROSPECTS AND PERSPECTIVES*

M. EVANSDepa rtment of History, University of Zimba bwe

SINCE 1980 THE central strategic feature of Southern Africa has been the existenceof two diametrically opposed political, economic and security groupings in thesubcontinent. On one hand, there is South Africa and its Homeland satellitesystem which Pretoria has hoped, and con tinues to hope , will be the foundationstone for the much publicized, but as yet unfulfilled, Constellation of SouthernAfrican States (C O N SA S) - first outlined in 1979 and subsequently reaffirmedby the Sou th African M inister of Defence, General M agnus Ma lan, in N ovem ber1983.1 On the other hand, there is the diplomatic coalition of independentSouthern African Front-line States consisting of Angola, Botswana, Mozambi-que, Tanzania, Zambia and Zimbabwe. This grouping, originally containing thefirst five states mentioned, emerged in 1976 in order to crisis-manage theRhodesia- Zim babw e w ar, and it was considerably strengthened w hen theresolution of the conflict resulted in an independent Zimbabwe becoming thesixth Front-line State in 1980.2 Subsequently, the coalition of Front-line Stateswas the driving force behind the creation of the Southern African Developm entCo-ordination Conference (SADCC) and was primarily responsible for bluntingSouth Africa's CONSAS strategy in 1979-80.The mom entou s rolling back of Pretoria's CO N SA S scheme can, in retrospect,be seen as the opening phase in an ongoing struggle between the Fro nt-line Statesand South Africa for diplomatic supremacy in Southern Africa in the 1980s.Increasingly, this struggle has beco m e om inously militarized for the Front Line;therefore, it is pertinent to begin this assessment by attempting to define theregional conflictuai framework which evolved from the initial confrontation of1979-80 between the Front-line States and South Africa. In this period the tworival pow er blocs were promo ting SA D CC and C O N SA S respectively as future

"This paper is based upon a lecture delivered at the Zimbabwe National Army Staff College inSep tem ber 1984 and subsequently as a public lecture unde r the auspices of the Faculty of Arts of theUniversity of Zimbabwe in February 1985.1 See the interview with General Malan in Defence (1983), XIV, 684 -6.2 R.S . J aster, A Regional Secu rity Role for A frica's Front-line States: Experience and Prospects(L on do n , Th e In ternat io nal Ins t i tu te for S t ra teg ic S tud ies , Ad elp h i Pap er 180 . 1983 ) , 8 IS .


2/19

regional orders in Southe rn Africa a nd the consequent conceptual and ideologicalcollision was a watershed event in shaping the current environment of conflict,security and destabilization.In 1979, after five years of faltering regional diplomacy, South Africa wasdetermined to establish a constellation system in Southern Africa that woulcsecure her subcontinental military, political and economic objectives.3 In linewith these themes the South African Foreign Minister, R.F. 'Pik' Botha,announced the Zurich Declaration in March 1979 calling for an 'anti-Marxist'Constellation of Southern African States south of the Cunene-Zambezi linewh ich w ould form a regional security and econom ic bloc of between seven andten states. These were South Africa, the Homeland 'states' of Transkei,Bophuthatswana and Venda, Botswana, Lesotho and Swaziland, Malawi,Zimbabwe and possibly Mozambique.4

This CO N SA S was to be controlled by means of multilateral councils and aninternational secretariat w hile the entire concept was prom oted with vigour andconfidence by Pretoria.5 Ho wev er, the scheme was opposed with equal vigour bythe Front-line States, who, in July 1979, countered South Africa's moves byissuing the Arusha Declaration which called for the creation of SADCC toprom ote econom ic liberation and the developm ent of a regional communicationsstrategy in order to reduce econ om ic dependence on Pretoria.6 The rea*l test to seewhich grouping would emerge as dominant became intimately intertwined withthe resolution of the turbulent Rhodesia-Zimbabwe conflict. Apart from SouthAfrica, Zimbabwe possessed the strongest economy and transport system inSouthe rn Africa and potentially was the anvil upon which any SA D C C wou ld beforged.The stakes were enorm ous although, at the time, this regional competition wasobscured by the Zimbabw ean electoral process. If Zim babw e fell into C O NSA Sthen the South African government would be able to claim an incipient regionalconstellation and a major diplomatic and security triumph. Alternatively, ifZimbabwe fell in with the Front-line States then SADCC would become anoperational reality while the regional isolation of South Africa would beaccom plished. In the event the rivalry between the Pretoria bloc and the Arushabloc climaxed over Zimb abwean independence in February 1980 when ZA NU -PF eclipsed the UANC and led Zimbabwe into membership of the Front-line

' For a useful an alysis of the constellation plan, see D. Geld enhu ys, The Constellation of SouthernAfrican States and SADC C: Toward a New Regional Stalemate? (Braamtbmein. South Africaninstitute of International Affairs. 1981).* Ibid.. 2.s D. Geiuenhuys, The Diplomacy of Isolation: South African Foreign Policy Making (Johannes-burg, Ma cm illan, 1984), 41 ; see also Jaster, A R egional Se curity Role for Africa's Front-line States.27.ft Geldenhuys, The Constellation of Southern African States and SADCC. 16 20.


3/19

States and m ade possible the true birth of SA D CC . South Africa's high hopes forher C O N SA S or 'Fortress Sou thern A frica' scheme were dashed, reduced only tothe inclusion of her Homeland clients.7 Certainly the Republic remained theeconom ic and military colossus of the subcon tinent bu t her diplomacy had againfaltered. Southern Africa was now almost uniformly ideologically hostile andpolitically antagonistic towards Pretoria.Thu s the collapse of CO N SA S, the strengthening of the Front-line States by themembership of Zimbabwe and the ability of the Front-line diplomatic coalitionto found SADCC, represented, for South Africa, the most shattering regionalpolitical defeat since the foundation of the modern Afrikaner Repub lic in 1961.In addition, the CONSAS failure reinforced a creeping international perceptionof South Africa as a helpless giant, unab le to translate her military and econ om icmight into regional diplomatic supremacy despite a decade of initiatives andschemes.The failure of South African diplomacy in 1980 precipitated a majorreassessment of Pretoria's regional strategy within the Afrikaner elite, and beforeexamining the regional security role of the Front-line States it is necessary toanalyse the na ture of this reassessment and the challenge that it has posed for theFront Line. In 1 98 0-1 the South Africans w atched with increasing consternationas SADCC was institutionalized and internationalized through a series ofeconomic and donors' conferences, all of which represented a triumph for theFront-line States' vision of an independent Southern Africa evolving towardsstable economic infrastructures.8 In addition, the Zimbabwean experiment ofmultiracial reconciliation was a sym bolic challenge to the ideological squalor ofapartheid.9 But abov e all, the confidence of the Front-line States and SA D C Cconfiguration had infected and reinvigorated the urban-guerrilla campaign of theAfrican National Congress of South Africa (A NC), as was dram atically displayedby the expert sabotage of the SASOL refinery in mid-1980.10

Initially there was some hesitation in Pretoria as to how to proceed in the faceof this new subcontinental economic and security environment created by theFront-line States. In the 1960s and 1970s South African regional security policyhad been formulated by a small closed elite, centred a rou nd the Prim e M inisterand drawn from the Department of Information, the Department of Foreign

' Jastcr. A Regional Security Role for Africa's l-'roni-linc Slates. 27 32.* For a fine analysis of the post-1 980 Southern African regional security and econ om ic equ ation, seeB. W eim er. "Europe, the Ln ited Slates and the } runtime States of Southern Africa: The case forcloser co-operation", Atlantic Quarterly (1984 ). II. 67 87.11 The Zimbabwean challenge is assessed by S. Jenkins, "Deslabilisation in Southern Africa", TheEconomist (16 July 1983), 20. 23 4."' For the A NC resu rgence, see the two articles b\ S. Jen kin s. 'The survival ethic: Sou th Africa: Asun ey" . ibid, (19 Sept. 19 81), 11 . and 'De siabilisaiion in Sou thern Africa'. 16 17.


4/19

Affairs, the Bureau of State Security and the Broederbond intelligentsia. Themech anics of South African decision-making w ere based on a rather haphaza rdand curious blend of military bluster, diplomatic engagement and economicdom ination as practised by Joh n Vorster and his eminence grise, General Hendrikvan den Bergh.11 Such an informal system proved too clandestine, too limitedstructurally and above all too reactive to prevent the steady disintegration ofregional strategic equilibrium following the collapse of the Portuguese AfricanEmpire in 1974; and by 1980 the information scandal had swept away theVo rster-Van den Bergh kitchen cabinet. Into the vacuum swept the B otha -M alannational security state management system based on a super cabinet, the StateSecurity Council (SSC), which, co-ordinated by the National Joint PlanningCentre, has virtually transformed the South African executive into a civil-military junta increasingly impervious to Parliament.12 The rise of this techno-cratic order has been accomplished by the spectacular emergence of the SouthAfrican military, which was facilitated by the visible failure of South Africansecurity policy in the face of the resurgence of the ANC and the Front-lineStates.13

The new military techn ocrats in the SSC p reached a regional strategic policybased on arm ed pow er in order to reverse the grounds well of Pan-Africanism andANC insurgency. General Magnus Malan and his collegues in particular,General Constand Viljoen, Chief of the South African Defence Force (SADF)and Lieutenant-Ge neral Pieter van der Westhuizen, Chief of Staff, South AfricanMilitary Intelligence rapidly instituted a new counter-revolutionary warfarestrategy of destabilization which was dubbed 'the policy of swadrdmag' (thepower of the sword) by the Director of the National Intelligence Service, DrLukas Barnard. The aims were, and remain, simple: smash the stability of theFront-line States and blunt the development of SADCC while simultaneouslystriking at the AN C an d its host nations.14 Th e result has been a deadly brew ofoffensive counter-revolutionary warfare, tactical escalation, economic bludgeon-ing and the utilization of proxy forces the MNR in Mozambique, UNITA in

1 ' Geldenhuys, The Diplomacy of Isolation, 71 8 8 ,1 4 7 -8 , provides a useful analysis of Pretoria'sdiploma cy du ring Vorster's premiership. Interviews (3 Mar. and 1 and 4 A pr. 1982) with formersenior officials of the Rhodesian Central Intelligence Organization provided further insights into therole of General van den Bergh in regionai foreign policy.12 M, Hough, National Security in the RSA... (Pretoria, Pretoria Univ., Institute for StrategicStudies, Publication 9, 1981), 1-16. This provides a detailed analysis of South Africa's nationalsecurity management system based around the State Security Council.13 See P.H. Frank el, Pretoria's Praetorian s: Civil-M ilitary Re lations in South Africa (Cambridge,Cambridge Univ. Press. 1984). 29-70, for the rise of the SADF and the theory of total strategy.14 See Je nk in s, ' Destabilisation in Southern Africa', 15- 20, 23 -4 , 27 -8 , and K.W .Grundy, TheRise of the South A frican Security Establishment: An Essay on the Changing Locus of State Power(Braamfontein, South African Institute of International Affairs, Bradlow Series 1, 1983).


5/19

5Ang ola, the Lesotho Liberation Arm y, the Zam bian Mushala group and variousZimbabwean dissidents.15This, then, is the South African national security state as a regional su perpow er,reinvigorated by professional military intellectuals, weary of the limited policiesof the 1970s and determined to dominate the subcontinent in the 1980s byfuelling dissidence, sabotage and economic chaos in Front-line States. This isSouth African counter-revolutionary 'total strategy' on the offensive, utilizingmilitary m ight and destabilization in an attem pt to force the Fron t-line States toaccept de facto South African regional dom ination and so emasculating the AN Cand forcing all concerned to accommodate themselves to the apartheid system.16

This, then, is the security challenge to the Fron t-line S tates, and inevitably thequestions arise: How should the Fron t Line react? How much p otential is there inindepen dent Southern Africa for join t security? Should the Front-line States andS A D C C think in terms of developing a Southern African Defence Organization(SADO), and is this a practical military option? Can the Front-line States in factcontain a South African state practising ruthless kragdadigepolitiek (powerpolitics), a state that increasingly resembles a rogue elephan t on the ram page? W ecan on ly begin to answ er these questions by analysing the character an d modusoperandi of the Front-line States.In character, the Front-line States represent a unique idosyncratic diplom aticalliance fully committed to the anti-apartheid cause and the South Africanliberation movements. It is an alliance, moreover, which has increasingly beenforced into a serious consideration of security posture. Front-line summits haveregularly called for a 'closing of ranks' against South African destabilization, butconcrete jo int security action has not so far been forthcoming. Ra ther, the patternhas been to give diplom atic and m oral suppo rt to the states most directly affected,namely M ozam bique and Ang ola. None of the remaining Front-line States have

up to now deployed any troops to assist Maputo and Luanda. 17 Zimbabweantroops in Mozambique are there primarily for transport security, while none ofthe Fron t-line States have any enthusiasm for becom ing militarily involved in theNamibian-Angolan imbroglio. Such action would probably only exacerbatewhat is already an acute regional security crisis and one complicated by East-West involvement in the situation.15 Jenkins. 'Destabilisation in Southern Africa', 28.16 Ibid., 17-20. 23-4. 27-8. See also C. Cokcr, 'South Africa: A new military role in SouthernAfrica 1969 82", Survival {1983). XXV, 59 -67 .17 Jaster. A R egional Security Role for Africa's front-line States, 3 7 -8 . However, in August i 985the BBC reported the alleged presence of up to 20,000 Front-lines States' troops in Mozambique:7,000 Tanzanian troops in the north, 3,000 Zambian troops in Tete province and 10,000Zimb abw ean troops in the south. These appear to be independent operations w ith each of the threestates mentioned assuming an 'area defence zone', BBC World Service Interview with EvoFernandes, Secretary Genera! of the Mozambique National Resistance movement (MNR) alsoknown as the Resistcncia National Mocambicano (Renamo), 18 Aug. 1985.


6/19

Nevertheless, despite a primary emphasis on d iplomatic action, the F ront-lineStates have, under the impact of South Africa's regional militarization policy,moved inexorably towards more formal military consultation, if not towards anopen and formal defence pact.18 Zimbabw e, M ozam bique and Botswana have allheld security talks over the past three years, the most recent being the Z imbabw e-Mozambique talks of February 1985, while in July 1983, following thedevastation being wreaked on Mozambique and the SADCC, Defence andSecurity Ministers of the Front-line S tates, along with L esotho , met in Nyanga fortalks.19 After this meeting the Zambian State Secretary for Defence and StateSecurity, Grey Zulu, issued a communique announcing the strengthening ofFront-line security ties. It is unclear whether this involves a pooling of militaryintelligence or frequent meetings between Chiefs of Staff and other militaryofficials.

Nevertheless, it is quite evident that the Fron t-line States are moving tow ards afar m ore substantial role in regional security affairs. H ow ever, the military optionsthat this may actually open up to independent Southern Africa in the future arereally dependent on the modus operandi of the grouping. Th ere are four pointsworth noting concerning the mechanics of the Front-line States' coalition andwhich explain its workings. Firstly, Africa's elder statesman, President Nyerere ofTanzania, is the Chairman of the Front-line States by informal consensus.Secondly, the Front-line States have no permanent secretariat or institutionalconsultative body and therefore summits can be called at short notice. Thirdly,regional issues are decided usually by informal consensus, with any disagreementssimply allowed to stand. Fourthly, individual diplomatic initiatives are notinhibited by the Front-line States group. This accounts for the 1982 Kaunda-Botha summit, the 1984 Lusaka Understanding and, most significant of all, theNkomati Accord of March 1984.20The result of this procedure is a type of diplomatic machinery that is highlypersonalized and informal and which takes into account each country's particularinterests. Indeed the F ront-line States are reminiscent of a ninteenth-century style

'* See, for instance, the security summit held in Harare on 12 June 1985 between Zimbabwe,Tanzania and Mozambique. The Mozambican delegation was composed almost exclusively ofdefence officials including the Ministei for Foreign Affairs, Joaquim Chissano. the Minister ofDefence, Alberto C'hipende. and General Sebastian Maboie. Deputy Minister for Defence and Chiefof General Staff, along with Secretary of Defence. Gideon Ndobe, and Air Force Commander,Colonel-General Hama Thai. This meeting probably decided on a form of Zimbabwean andTanzanian military assistance to Maputo, The Herald (Harare). 13 Jun e 1985.19 Zimbabwe M inistry of Information Press Statement 50 /8 5 /M A /S C , 'Zimb abw e-M ozam -bique Review Security Co-operation', 5 Feb. 1985. The talks involved the respective Ministers ofSecurity, Eimmerson M unangag wa and Sergio Vieira, and affirmed the regularity of bilateral securityconsultations between the "two sister republics'. For the Nyanga summit of the Front-line States, seeThe C hronicle (Bulaway o), 13 July 1983.


7/19

'concert of powers'. The F ront-line States seek equilibrium in the face of SouthAfrican counter-revolution and represent a loose coalition bound by commonperceptions and beliefs concerning regional liberation and Africanist ideology.W heth er such an alliance could sustain a join t m ilitary arrangem ent in the futureis highly debatable. Before discussing the potential form and substance of anyFront-line military initiative, it is necessary to exam ine the structures and strengthof the armed services of the six Front-line States and compare them with theSADF in order to understand fully the regional military balance of power.

COMPARISON OF THE COMBINED MILITARY FORCES OF THEFRONT-LINE STATES AND SOUTH AFRICA 21

PopulationArmed forcesArmy strengthParamilitary forcesArmoured forcesField artillery"Air strength

Front-line States55.5 million155,750 troops148,000 regulars602.360 police andmilitial,962 l812207 combat jets

South Africa26.8 million"404,500 m enb197,400 regulars,conscripts andreservistsb145,000 police andreservists3,350d230304 combat jets

'includes 4.6 million Whites"on full mobilization'main battle tanks, armoured ears and armoured personnel carriers"main battle tanks, mechanized infantry combat vehicles, armoured cars and armoured personnelcarriersself-propelled and towed field guns, but excluding rocket launchers, missile systems and mortars

21 This comparison of forces has been compiled from data in Internationa! Institute for StrategicStudies, The Military Balance 1984 19X5 (London, The Institute, 1984), 74-86, and J. Keegan(ed.). World Armies (Damn. Gale Research, 2nd ed n. 1983). See also H-R. Heitman. South AfricanWar Machine (Joh an nesb urg , Cen tral News Agency, 198 5), 20 72; International Defence and AidFund, The Apartheid Wa r Ma chine: The Strength and Deploym ent of the South A frican ArmedForces (London, The Fund. Fact Paper on Southern Africa X. 1980), 19 46: and KAV. Grundy,


8/19

The military establishments of the Front-line states are, in order of strength:22Angola 43,000Zimbabwe 41,300Tanzania 38,500Mozambique 15,650Zambia 14,300Botswana 3,000

Of these six states three, namely Mozambique, Angola and Zimbabwe, areinvolved in internal security operations, and this raises the entire question of howthe armed forces of the Front-line States rate in terms of a potential regionalmilitary alliance.23A ngolaAngola's armed forces (FAPLA) are really too involved in fighting UN IT A andSA D F incursions against SW A P O of Namibia to becom e a meaningful mem berof a Front-line States defence alliance. However, Angola would welcom e such aninitiative on the basis that it would be the main beneficiary of the alliance . Cubantroops in Angola mainly act as a security garrison for the MPLA governmentleaving FAPLA to face the daunting task of dealing with the challenge of SouthAfrica and UNITA, which to da te has cost Angola U S$7 billion of infrastructuraldamage and is currently absorbing half the Angolan budget.24MozambiqueSince 1981 the Mozambican armed forces (FAM) have been severely tested bySouth African-based MNR insurgents. By 1983 the campaign in SouthernM ozam bique, com bined with drought, had ma de the area a zone of anarchy anddevastation so threatening to Ma pu to that the Nko m ati A ccord of March 1984was signed with South A frica a trade-off of the AN C for the M NR, com binedwith South African-Mozambique mutual non-aggression pact.25 This, in theory.

22 International Institute for Strategic Studies, The Military Balance, 1984-1985, 74-86 .23 i am indebted to various discussions with senior members of the Directing Staff of theZimbabwe National Army Staff College and with members of the British Miltary Advisory andTraining Team (BMATT) between January 1984 and February 1985 for many insights on theregional military power of the Front-line States. However, the views expressed in this paperregarding military establishments of ihe Front-line States are solely those of the author.:A L.I.. Mathews, 'Angola', in Keegan. World Armies, 15-17 . See also D.J. Alberts, 'Armedstruggle in Angola1, in B.E. O'Neill, W.R . H eaton an d D .J. Alberts (eds.), Insurgency in the ModernWorld (Bou lder. Westview Press, 1980), 235 67 : Jen kins, 'Destabilisation in Sou thern Africa', 17;and 'Angola: The doctor's dilemma". Africa Confidential (1985), XXV I, iv. 2 -5 .~?? For assessments, see International Institute of Strategic Studies, Strategic Survey 1984-1985(London , The institute, 1985), 1 06 -8; G. Gun n. Post-NkomatiMozambique: CSIS Africa Notes (8


9/19

makes Mozambican participation in a potential Front-line SADO problematicand rather unlikely. Strategically speaking, the weakness of the two Front-lineflanks, Angola in the west and Mozambique in the east, is regrettably notencouraging for Front-line State regional security planning.TanzaniaThe Tanzanian People's Defence Force (TPDF) is the least threatened of theFront-line armed forces, since, in geographical terms, Tanzania is really an EastAfrican, not a Southern African state. However, Tanzanian foreign policy haslong been enm eshed in Southern African affairs as a result of President Nyerere'sphilosophy of Pan-African liberation. In addition, Tanzania does border bothZam bia and M ozambique, The TP D F is a much m ore com petent military forcethan either FAPLA or FAM. The Tanzanian Army has had long experience intraining guerrillas and in the financial and logistical requirements laid down bythe Tanzania-dominated O AU Liberation Com mittee. Operationally, Tanzaniantroops were deployed defensively in Mozambique during the Rhodesia-Zim babw e war and some 300 military training personnel still operate there and inthe Seychelles. Moreover, the Tanzan ian Arm y is one of the few African armies tohave had a taste of conventional warfare. In 1978-9, 10,000 Tanzanian troopsdemolished with methodical skill Idi Amin's Ugandan Army and easily routedsome 2.000 Libyan troops supporting the Ugandans.26 Nevertheless, there are realimped iments to Tanzan ia's participation in a major Front-line State security rolein the form of severe econom ic problem s, distance, logistics and insufficient airliftcapacity to project force. Most importantly, perhaps, Tanzania is not physicallythreatened in the true geostrategic 'front line' against South Africa.ZambiaThe Zambian armed forces have an unfortunate military tradition of beingobservers rather than participants in regional security affairs. In 1978, in theiroperational test against the Rhodesian armed forces during 'Operation Galling',the Zambian Airforce w as grounded and Z ambian A rmy opposition was brushedaside by Rhodesian troops.27 In 1982 the SADF swept parts of western Zambiawith impunity in search of SWAPO guerrillas. Therefore, the available evidencewould seem to indicate a limited Zambian military combat capacity.28Nevertheless, improvements may have taken place under the current ArmyCommander, General Masheke. But, overall, it is difficult to clinically assess

:t l See L.L. Mathews, 'Tanzania', in Keegan. World Armies, 574- 6,: : B, Cole, The Elite: The Storv of the Rhodesian Special Air Service (Amanzimtoti. ThreeKnights Publishing. 19X4). 232.: s "Zambia: Double "S" sword", Africa Confidential i 198 2).-XXIII. x, 5, fur an assessment of


10/19

10Zambian defence capabilities at present, except to say that given Zam bia's severeeconomic problems, there is a limited potential for their participation in theregional security of the Front-line States.29 How ever, Lusaka rem ains a haven forexiled revolutionary politicians of the ANC.BotswanaThe 3,000 strong Botswana Defence Force was a creation of the Rhodesia-Zimbabwe war and there is little to say about it except that its miniscule sizerenders its regional role almost insignificant.30ZimbabweIn a very real sense, the Zim babw e National Arm y (ZN A) is geostrategically thetrue 'front-line' force, and the Zimbabwe Army is probably the best in theFront-line region. This is a rem arkab le achievem ent when one considers the sheerscale of the integration process in 1980. Integra tion, and the transform ation of thenew Z NA into a regular conventional force, was a staggering task and one quiteunprecedented in African military history. Yet restructuring and retraining wasaccomplished with speed and success by 1983 and must rate as the Zimbabwegovernm ent's greatest achievem ent since independence.31 Like M ozam bique, theZNA faces provincial insurgency which has meant that internal securityoperations have tended to predom inate over w ider regional-defence thinking although the latter has not been neglected, given South Africa's proximity anddestabilizing activities. The ZNA symbolizes national unity and reconstructionand stands guardian over a new multiracial order, all of which is unwelcome toPretoria.32 Since 1983, the deteriorating security situation in Mozambique andthe military weakness of Botswana have made Zimbabwe's eastern and westernflanks vulnerable which may suggest that Pretoria's aim is the ultimatestrategic isolation of Zimbabwe, followed in the future by a brand ofkragdadigepolitiek to force Harare into a political accom modation with Pretoria

29 Desp ite these constraints Evo Fern ande s, Secretary G eneral of the MN R, has alleged that 3 ,000Zambian troops are operating in Tete, Mozambique, BBC World Service Interview, 18 Aug. 1985.The report is unconfirmed.30 See L.L. Mathews. 'Botswana', in Keegan. World Armies, 64. Mathews states that Botswanahas considered amalgamation with the South African homeland of Bophuthatswana for securityreasons. For Botswana's vulnerability to South Africa, see the report on the June 1985 Gaboroneraid in The Herald, 15 June 1985.J1 See the remarks of Brigadier Edw ard Jone s. Comm ander. BM AT T 198 3- 5, that the standardsachieved in the ZNA in tour and half years were "nothing short of miraculous', The Herald, 25 Jan.1985. The evolution of the ZNA has been meticulously followed by Africa Confidential:'Zim babw e: Military progress' (19 81) . XX II. xiii. 4 5: "Zimbabwe: Beyond Nk om o' (1982), XX III,v. 1 4; "Zimbabwe:"The arm y' (19 82). XX III. 4 5; 'Zim babw e: Fear'is the key" (1984 ), XX V. viii.1 3; 'Zim babw e: The political u ndertow' (19 84). XXV . xvii. 5 8.! : South Africa's dislike for the Mugabe Government is considered by Geldenhuys, The


11/19

I Iand so curtail Zimb abw e's vital Front-line roie. How ever, at the mom ent this ispurely speculative and likely only if South Africa's security situation shouldworsen.

Therefore, one can ascertain that the problems of internal dissidence affectingAngola, Mozambique and Z imbabw e, com bined with the econom ic weakness ofTanzania and Zambia and the smallness of Botswana's forces, will make anyformal military collaboration among the Front-line States very difficult. Inaddition there are a number of other factors that also inhibit their securityprogramming. These include organizational difficulties, logistical problems,differences in m ilitary doc trine and the disparity in the regional balance of pow erin military terms.33

Orga n isational Difficu hiesThe Front-line States have no organizational structure through which to actionjoint defence. The ad hoc and informal nature of the group is designed forinternational diplomacy, and the flexibility conferred tends to obscure theideological differences between Angolan and Mozambican Marxism-Leninismon one side and Zambian Humanism and Botswana's multiparty democracy onthe other, with Tanzanian Ujamaa and Zimbabwean socialism ranged in themiddle. If the Front-line States were institutionalized for military purposes thegrouping would probably disintegrate, as Botswana and Mozambique are, forexam ple, more vulnerable to South Africa than, say, Tanzania. Thus, institutional-ized collective defence could well destroy the unity of the Front Line.34

Logistical Problem sThe six Front-line States encompass a geographical area of 500,000 sq. km. andtherefore the logistical command, control and communication requirements ofjoint defence would be staggering. The necessary security infrastructure, airdefence and airlift capabilities are simply not present and any regional joint highcommand would sink under the sheer weight of operational logistics and co-ordination problems.35'' Discussions with senior ZNA officers during 1984. Conclusions arrived at. however, are solelythose of the author.34 Jastcr, A Regional Security R ole for Africa's Front-line States. 33 43.35 The severe difficulties that the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) has faced are thesupreme exam ple of the problems of modern military standa rdization: see. for exam ple, K. Hartley,NATO Arms Co-operation (London. Allen and Unwin. 1983). 5; R. Sloan, 'In search of a newtransatlantic bargain'. Survival (1984 ). XX VI. 242 51; and W . Wallace, 'European defence co-operation: The reopening debate", ibid.. 2 5 ! 61 . Nevertheless, Gh ana's M ajor-General Em manuelErskine. Chief of Staff of the United Nations Truce Organization (L'NTSO), has suggested anAfrican Defence System based on 'apportioned areas of responsibility' in which various countrieswould take up logistical and administrative tasks. This may have some relevance for the Front-lineSlates: see Erskine's essay in Africa Now (May 1982). 8!.


12/19

12Differences in Military DoctrineThe six Front-line States lack standardization in military doctrine, training andweaponry, all of which are of critical importance in joint defence and combinedoperations. These factors work to inhibit a Front-line military alliance.36Disparity in the Regional M ilitary Balance of Pow erIn any conventional military confrontation with South Africa, the Front-lineStates are simply no match for the highly integrated and standardized SA D F. 3 7 Inthis sense any joint-defence com m and of the Front-line States holding m anoeuv-res might be interpreted by Pretoria as a convenient casus belli and thus activeFront-line military co-operation in the field wo uld, ironically, merely increase theprobability of South African aggression. However, all the Front-line leaders areaware of how this disequilibrium in regional military power limits their securitymaintenance capability.38

Is, then, all hope of a regional security role for the F ront-line States an illusion?Not qu ite. The re are three areas where the armed forces of the Front-line Statescould collaborate meaningfully. These areas are as follows:Com bined M ilitary Intelligence StaffA Front-line C om bined M ilitary Intelligence Staff w ould be a major step forwardin monitoring South African military activities and in unifying and tighteningsystematic regional security perception. Ironically, a good model for the Front-line States would be the South African-Rhodesian- Portuguese A LC OR Aintelligence system which operated in the years 1964-74.3 9

Military Staff Exchange ProgrammeA Front-line systematic Military Staff Exchange Programme would certainlyhelp forge a consensus among senior officers of regional security problems and

'"'' Sec Jaster, A Regional S ecurity Role for Africa's Front-line States, 3 7 8 .37 See Hcitman. South African War Machine, 20 -8 . tor the structure of the S AD F.1K R.S. Jastcr, Southern Africa in Conflict: Implications for U.S. Policies in the 1 980s(W ashi ngto n. A merican Enterprise Institute for Public Policy Research, 19 82), 14 20 . discusses thefragility of the Front-line States. See also Jaster, A Regional Security Role for Africa's F ront-lineStates. 19 32.*" Interview with a former senior official of the Rhod esian C IO , 17 Mar. 1982. AL C O R A appearsto refer to the Astral concep t of Africa, a reference to the four capitals of the pre-197 4 W hite Sou th:Luanda, l.ourengo Marques, Salisbury and P retoria. The alliance has also been know n as AS PR O(Africa do Sol, Portuguese Territories in Southern Africa, R hodes ia): see B. W eim er's impo rtant andlucid study Die A llianz der Frontlinien-Staaten in Sudlichen A frika: Vom 'M ulungushi-Club' (1974)zum 'Skomali-Akkord' (1984) (Ebenhausen, Stiftung Wissenschaft und Politik, 1985). 233-9(English summary). I am indebted to Mr Weimer for making this study available to me at short


13/19

13could prove invaluable in familiarizing them with the structure and training ofneighbouring armed forces.40Joint Defence Procurement and Weapons Systems Study GroupW ith the w orld on the brink of the age of intermediate m ilitary technology, thereare indications that, by the early 1990s, relatively low-cost precison-guidedmunitions (PG M ) might well revoiutionalize the conventional battlefield. Fo r thefirst time since the 1930s, armoured forces are threatened by defensive missiletechnology and such developments give labour-intensive African defenceforces the prospect of acquiring an infantry-operated anti-tank and air defencecapability which wo uld be cost-effective and militarily credible, based on m an-portable and crew-portable seeker guidance and lock-on targeting PGMsystems.41 A most pressing need, therefore, is.for the arm ed forces of the Fron t-line States to create a weapons system study group that would help forge adoctrinal and technical consensus on potential defence procurement and futureweapons acquisition for Southern African security based around PGM. Theoverall benefit for the armed forces of the F ront-line States w ould be the futureprospects of mo unting a m obile defence that is econom ically sensible and whichcould act as a deterrent against South African armour and air power. It is hightime th at the South Africans be taug ht that their helicopters, tanks a nd infantryfighting vehicles will, in the future, be endangered and indeed eliminated bymissile-armed infantry of the Front-line States' armies during cross-border raids.PG M is not the complete answer to defence in indepe nden t Southern Africa bu t itis the m ajor alternative to expensive tanks and jets an d, therefore, represents a realmilitary option in the future for the Front-line States. In addition, PGM doesprovide some form of deterrence against the SADF's material superiority.

Given the above assessments of the problems that the Front Line faces inactioning meaningful joint defence, along with the obvious military superioritytha t Sou th Africa enjoys in the region, one might legitimately ask the followingquestions: If South Africa is so powerful, then why h as she spent millions of ra ndon destabilizing states tha t represen t no military th rea t to her? If South Africa is soomnipotent militarily, then why the strategy of instigating regional chaos againstthe Front-line States? Th e answ er to these questions lies in ideology in this casethe ideology of Pan-Africanism an d Black Sou th African or Azanian nationalism.

40 Zim bab w ean -M oza m bica n military staff co-operation has already begun with British m ilitaryadvisers and Zimbabwean instructors training Mozambiean officers at the ZNA Battalion BattleSchool at Nyanga and at the ZNA Staff College, Harare.41 See R. Burt, 'New weapons technologies: Debate and directions'; J. Digby, 'Precision-guidedweapons'; and J.J. Mearsheimer, Precision-guided munitions and conventional deterrence', in J.Alford (ed.), The Impact of New Military Technology (Aldershot, Gower for the InternationalInstitute for Strategic Studies, Adelphi Library 4, 1981), 46-77; 78-89 and 102-10, respectively.


14/19

14There is an inherent paradox in the strategic equation between South Africa andthe Front-line S tates; it is this: Sou th Africa is strong militarily and econom icallybut she is weak ideologically since 80 per cent of her popu lation reject apartheid.In contrast the Fron t-line States are strong ideologically bu t are weak militarilyand economically.Therefore, the Front-line States threaten the South African racial systemsimply by existing,let alone prospering through the SADCC. Their ideologicalappeal threatens to increase the already burning impact of Black Consciousness inSouth Africa. It threatens the stability of the South African labour force and, inconsequence, the entire econom ic infrastructure, including the military-industrialcomplex. In short, the powerful Africanist ideology of the Front-line States,added to the strength of the ANC as the symbol of Black South Africanaspirations, is profoundly destabilizing to the apartheid regime.42

The SADF has, therefore, faced the acute problem of fighting an idea. Thestrategy they have adopted is essentially offensive, involving the repression of theinternal sym ptoms of Black unrest while striking at the external roots of the ANCand bludgeoning those Fron t-line or SA D C C states which aid revolution. So theFront Line is faced with a two-fisted coun ter-revolutionary strategy of destabiliza-tion and dissidence, fuelled from Pretoria, that has the ultimate aim of convertingindependent Southern Africa into what Simon Jenkins has called 'a shield ofinstability' behind which South Africa will perpetuate the essentials of apart-heid.43 Such a military policy dearly compensates for serious ideologicalweakness and lack of domestic Black political support.Indeed, South Africa is powerful bu t she is far from invincible, and it pays toexamine her politico-military weakness with respect to regional security. Firstly,the SADF has developed a destabilization strategy based on dissident forcesbecause there are limitations to the deployment of South African military powerthroughout the entire region on a coast-to-coast basis. The SADF is alreadyheavily committed in Namibia and, until recently, in Angola. In operations inthese areas, the South Africans have used up to 11,000 troops for large-scale,single combined-arms tactical incursions.44 Not suprisingly, General MagnusMalan is on record as stating that open-ended external regional militaryoperations by South Africa might well increase domestic Black unrest and

4 : Jenkins, 'Oestabiiisatson in Southern Africa", 15-20, 23-4.4? Ibid.. 28 . Sec also Co ke i. 'Sou th Africa: A new m ilitary role in Southe rn A frica 1969 82 ',62 6.:'4 Co ker. "South A frica: A new m ilitary role in Southe rn Africa 1969 82 ', 60 1. For furtheranalysis of SADF external operations, see F, Toase, "The South African army: The campaign inSouth-West Africa/Namibia since 1966', in I.F.W. Beckett and J. Pimloti, Armed Forces and


15/19

15insurgency, creating a potential anarchic internal situation.45 TheOctober 1984Sebokeng operation involving 7,000 police andtroops and therecent deploymentof South African Army units into the Eastern Cape to quell unrest is indicativethat in future the South African military maywell be increasingly required forinternal security operations,46 Thus the competing needs of external militarismand internal repression maywork to put a degree of restraint on South Africa'sregional pow er projection. Inadd ition, there arelimits to theamount of availablemanpower which theS A D F can draw upon without dislocating the economy.47Secondly, and more seriously, there exists within South Africa a very realpotential for a civil-military crisis over the next decade as Afrikaner politicalunity increasingly disintegrates over the issue of reform simply because theparameters of defensible political reforms are so ill-defined.48 The managerial-technocratic security state is ironically paralysing the White electorate and isbreeding notoptimism but an aggressive political fatalism. South African politicstoday represents a potentially explosive cauldron which ultimately only themilitary may beable tocontrol In the 1981 general election, fought over themostcautious reform plans, 33 per cent of the Afrikaner vote deserted the NationalParty in favour of the extreme Afrikaner right-wing. In 1982, the awesome andlong-dreaded Afrikaner volkskeuring (division of the people) occurred asAndries Treurnicht led sixteen MPs into the fanatical laager of Verwoerdianracial reaction.49 With him he hascarried theAfrikaner working classs fearful ofany hint of Black advancement. The Afrikaner workers and the Treurnichtverkramptes (reactionaries) nowvirulently oppose the Bo tha-M alae alliance ofthe military, the verligie (pragmatic) technocrats and English-speaking bigbusiness.50

To compound the agony of Afrikaner fragmentation has come the Blackchallenge of Front-line States Africanism, ANCinsurgency, United DemocraticFront (UDF) agrtation, and militant trade unionism and civil disorder in theEastern Cape. South Africa is thus caught in a spiral of rabid multidimensionalpolitical conflict to which there seems noeasy so lution. There is novision of truemultiracial reform, and there is nocharismatic Afrikaner deGaulle poised to savethe volk from racial catastrophe. Instead, as White South Africa's politicaloptions become more stalemated and atrophied and as Black South Africa

45 S.Je nk ins , 'Th e Great Evasion: South Africa: ASurvey", TheEconomist (21 Jun e 1980), 23 -5 .See also Frankel, Pretoria's Praetorians, 2 9 -7 0 .46 The use of troops in theSebokeng operation was thefirst tim e since the 1960 disturbances thatthe South African armed forces were used in internal security operations (ISOPS).47 See Grundy, Soldiers without Politics, 120-3 .48 H. Giliomee, The Parting of the Ways: South African Politics 1976-82 (Cape Town. DavidPhilip, 1982), 158-61 .49 Ibid., 159.50


16/19

16becomes more turbulent, more assertive and more organized, so Afrikanersecurity will become the dominant theme and militarism will inevitably gainascendency.51 Already , General M alan has referred to the problem of reconcilingSouth Africa's White democracy with the total strategy imperatives of thenational security state;52 already, industry has been integrated into the managerialsecurity system by m eans of a Defence A dvisory Board,53 already, the Head of theArmy's Civic Action Department has been involved in a scandal to disruptparliamentary control over aspects of the defence budget;54 already, the SouthAfrican press has gloomily referred to the rise of the 'Executive Sta te', defined asthe silent 'Malanite' verligte dictatorship;55 and, above all, the militarized SCCunder an executive State President, has proven how utterly cosmetic the newtricameral multinational parliament is in policy matters.South Africa is poised, then, between the Scylla of White repression andreaction born of a fearful confusion and the Charybdis of Black revolution andinsurgency bo rn of utter frustration. T o prevent anarc hy, South Africa may wellend up under martial law with the iron men of the military facing mass labourunrest and the spectre of social chaos in a variation of the Polish So lidarity crisis.56Ruling generals are not new to Sou th African politics, as the case of Louis Bothaand Jan Smuts demonstrate, but at least they were constitutionalists. The trueAfrikaner 'man on horse back ' has yet to visibly appear either to dictate directly orto broker power between faction-ridden Afrikaner politicians and antagonisticAfrican revolutionaries. Given the stark absence of any internal politicalmechan isms of resolving racial conflict the m ilitary w ill probably emerge as thefuture arbiters of power. This will symbolize the ultimate moral bankrupcy ofapartheid as a governing system.57 It will also mark the end to the powerfulpsycho-political m etaphor of the Afrikaner's Grea t Trek. The myth will die as itwas born in the wilderness and in despair.

51 Grundy, Soldiers without Politics, 232-7; Frankel, Pretoria's Praetorians, 161-83 .52 Sunday Times (Johann esburg), 13 Mar. 1977. See also Frankel, Pretoria's Praetorians, 5 7 - 6 3 .53 Giliomee, The Parting of the Ways, 34.54 The officer concerned was Major-General P. Pretorious, a psychological warfare specialisttrained in the United States. The document that detailed steps to nullify the Progressive FederalParty's (P FP ) criticism of the Prime M inister, P. W . Botha. D r Frederick van Zyl Slabbert, leader ofthe PF P, responded by calling the Defence Fo rce 'The National P arty in uniform'. For discussions ofthe scandal, see Grundy, Soldiers without Politics, 109-10, 124; Geldenhuys, The Diplomacy ofIsolation: South African Foreign Policy Making, 144; and The Cape Times, 26 Apr. 1980.55 Giliomee, The Parting of the Ways, 34, and Frankel, Pretoria's Praetorians, 173-83 .56 Frankel, Pretoria's Praetorians, 171 , com me nts that widespread public disorder and urbanterror along with mass industrial action could trigger military intervention 'displacing civilianauthority as a dem onstrably incomp etent mechanism for upholding the state and the interests of themilitary within it1.57 Ibid., 1 3 2 - 3 , 17 3- 9. provides some perspectives on the future political role of the SA D F; seealso G rundy, Soldiers without Politics, 2 3 2 - 7, who com men ts: 'a civilian and military jun ta is not out


17/19

17What conclusions, then, can one make regarding Southern African regionalsecurity over the next few years? Th e only thing tha t is certain is that everythingwill be unc ertain. It is temp ting to view the Fron t-line States and S outh Africa asrepresentative of a regional stalem ate; bu t given the fluidity and volatility of the

subcontinent, such an analysis may well prove superficial. Nevertheless, onpresent trend s it seems likely that the F ront-line States will continue their systemof informal sum mitry, perh aps alongside a modest but positive degree of militaryco-o pera tion, an d therefore the Fron t Line will remain an ideological tho rn in theflesh for Pretoria. South Africa, for her part, will probably continue to try andneutralize the independent subcontinent wth her destabilization strategy andpromotion of CONSAS. Thus the Front-line States will remain vulnerable tosuperior South African military and econo mic pow er. Finally the question arises;On whose side is time? Afrikaner intellectuals would argue that the continentalAfrican econom ic crisis will force the Fro nt-line States and the SA D C C into anopen a ccommoda tion with apartheid . Front-Sine leaders would argue that the tideof history is upon the Afrikaner; that whether he submits or defies he will still beengulfed; that the legend of the V oortrekker and of the last frontier has vanished;and that apartheid, no matter what its modifications, will be destroyed by acombination of internal and international forces.

All of this again highlights, in this unfolding Wagnerian drama of SouthernAfrican turbulence and change, how the Front-line States and South Africainteract upon each other, how they are doom ed to coexist yet are also doom ed toconfrontation. Ultimately, Southern Africa cannot survive 'half racist and halfnon-racist'. It must become one thing or the other, either all CONSAS or allSADCC. There are great moral issues involved, perhaps the greatest of the latetwe ntieth century, yet I fear th at any chan ge in South Africa will be a by -produc tof bullets and barricades. And so, like the Roman before me, I am filled withforeboding and I seem to see not the. Tiber, but the L impo po, the V aal and theOrange, foaming with much blood.


18/19

18BIBLIOGRAPHY

ALBER TS, D .J. 'Armed Struggle in Angola', in B.E. O'Neill, W .R. Heaton andD.J. Alberts (eds.), Insurgency in the Modem World (Boulder COS WestviewPress, 1980), 235-67:A LF OR D , J. (ed.) The Impact of New Military Technology (Aldershot, Gower forthe International Institute for Strategic Studies, Adelphi Library 4, 1981).BURT, R. 'New weapons technologies: Debate and directions', in J. Alford (ed.),The Impact of New Military Technology (q.v.), 46- 77.CO KER , C. 'South Africa: A new military role, in Southern Africa 1969-82 ',Survival (19% % XXV, 59-67.COLE, B. The Elite:The Story of the Rhodesian Special A ir Service (Amanzimtoti,Three Knights Publishing, 1984).DIGBY , J. 'Precision-guided weapons', in J. Alford (ed.), The Impact of NewMilitary Technology (q.v.), 78 -90 .FR ANK EL, P.H. Pretoria's Praetorians: Civil-Military Relations in South Africa(Cambridge, Cambridge Univ. Press, 1984).GELDENHU YS, D . The Constellation of Southern African States and SADCC:Toward a New Regional Stalemate?(Braam fcnte in, South African Institute ofInternational Affairs, 1981).The Diplomacy of Isolation: South African Foreign P olicyMaking (Johannesburg, Macmillan, 1984),GILIOMEE, H. The Parting of the Ways: South African Politics 1976-82 (CapeTown, David Philip, 1982).GRUNDY, K.W. Soldiers withoutPolitics: Blacks in the South African Arm edForces (Berkeley, Univ. of California Press, 1983).

The Rise of the South African Security Establishment AnEssay on the C hanging Locus of State Power (Braamfontein, South AfricanInstitute of International Affairs, Bradlow Series 1, 1983).GUNN, G. Post-Nkomati Mozambique: CSIS Africa Notes (8 Jan. 1985),XXXVIII (Georgetown Univ., Center for Strategic and International Studies).HARTLEY, K. NA TO Arms Co-operation (London, Allen and Unwin, 1983).HEITMAN, H-R. South African War Machine (Johannesburg, Central NewsAgency, 1985).HOUGH , M. National Security in the RSA... (Pretoria, Pretoria U niv., Institute forStrategic Studies, Publication 9, 1981).INTERNATIONAL D EFENCE AND AID FU ND TheApartheid WarMachine:The Strength and Deploymentof the South African A rmedForces (London, TheFund, Fact Paper on Southern Africa 8, 1980).INTERNATIONAL INSTITUTE FOR STRATEGIC STUDIES The MilitaryBalance 1984-1985 (London, The Institute, 1984).Strategic Sur-vey 1984-1985 (London, The Institute, 1985).


19/19

19J ASTER, R.S. A Regional Security Role for Africa's Front-line States: Experi-ence and Prospects (London, The International Institute for Strategic Studies,Adelphi Paper 180, 1983).

Southern Africa in Conflict:Implications for U.S. Policies in the1980s (Washington, A merican Enterprise Institute for Public Policy Research,1982).JENKINS, S. 'The great evasion; South Africa: A survey1, The Economist (21Juoe 1980), 3-30.'The survival ethic: South Africa: A survey', The Economist (19Sept. 1981), 3-18.'Destabilisation in Southern Africa', The Economist (16 July 1983),15-20, 23 -4, 27 -8.'America and South Africa', The Economist (30 Mar. 1985),17-34.KEEGAN, J. World Armies (Detroit, Gale Research, 2nd edn, 1983).M EA RSHE IME R, J.J . 'Precision-guided munitions and conventional deterrence',in J. Alford (ed.), The Impact of New Military Technology (q.v.), 102-10.SLOA N, R. 'In search of a new transatlantic bargain5, Survival (1984), XXVI,242-51.TO ASE, F . 'The South African army: The campaign in South West Africa/Namibiasince 1966', in I.F.W. Beckett and J. Pimlott, Armed Forces and ModernCounter-Insurgency (London, Groom Helm, 1985), 190-221.W AL LA CE , W . 'European defence co-operation: The reopening debate', Survival(1984), XXVI, 251-61.WE1MER, B. 'Europe, the United States and the Frontline States of SouthernAfrica: The case for closer co-operation', Atlantic Quarterly (1984), II,67-87. Die Allianz der Frontlinien-Staaten in Sudlkhen Afrika: Vom'Mulungushi-Club'(1974)zum 'Nkomati-Akkord'(1984) (Ebenhausen, StiftungWissenschaft und Politik, 1985).

MAGAZINES AND NEWSPAPERS: Africa C onfidential (London)Africa Now (London)The Cape Times (Cape Town)The Chronicle (Bulawayo)Defence (Eton)The Herald (Harare)The Sunday Times (Johannesburg)

Date post:	03-Apr-2018
Category:	Documents
Upload:	maria-paula-meneses
View:	231 times
Download:	0 times

front line states.pdf

Documents