Governing the Commons: A Case Study of Rupa Lake Rehabilitation and

Fishery Cooperative

by

Tayler Jenkins

Honors Thesis

School of Sustainability

Arizona State University

Spring 2015

i

Acknowledgements

This project could not have been completed without each of the wonderful people

who have helped throughout the process of formulating, researching, and writing this

thesis. First and foremost, I would like to thank my thesis director Dr. Netra Chhetri who

has been there every step of the way. Words cannot express how much he has done for

me, from taking me to Nepal with him to guiding me in every single aspect of the thesis

project. I would also like to thank Dr. Nalini Chhetri for her kindness in helping make it

possible for me to go to Nepal and for providing her support before, during, and after the

trip. Additionally, a huge thanks goes out to Dr. Ben Minteer for agreeing to be my

second reader and offering his wisdom and feedback in my writing endeavors.

Also, the Neely Charitable Foundation deserves a huge thank you for funding my

research excursion to Nepal. Without their assistance, it would not have been financially

possible for me to travel to Nepal and this project would not exist.

Next, there were an abundance of people who helped me complete my research

while in Nepal. The resourceful and kind people at LI-BIRD helped me to assimilate in a

new country, provided office space, selflessly devoted their time to help me formulate

survey questions and create a plan of action for my surveying endeavors. So, I would like

to thank Dr. Pashupati Chaudhary, Puspa Tiwari, Feros Chaudhary, Mira Dhakal,

Thomas Gegg, and numerous others. Also, I want to thank Ganga Gurung for providing

transportation on numerous occasions.

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During the survey collection process, there were many people that were

tremendously helpful to me and without them this thesis would not have been completed.

Soni Kumari Das deserves a special thank-you for her fantastic work as an interpreter and

friend throughout our time in Sundari Danda, translating for me every step of the way as

we collected surveys, hosted a focus group discussion, and chatted with locals. I also

want to thank Ram Lamichanne and his family for their kindness and hospitality in

providing lodging. I’d like to thank Manharka Adhikari for his hospitality and generosity

in helping Soni and I throughout the entire survey process, including providing

transportation across the lake. A big thank you also goes to the 42 people who allowed us

to survey them and others who provided their opinions and knowledge at the focus group

discussion. I would like to specifically mention Lekanath Dhakal, the chairman of Rupa

Lake Rehabilitation and Fishery Cooperative, for his valuable help and insight. Finally, I

would like to thank Saraswati and Surya Adhikari for allowing me to stay with them for

an extended period of time, for the delicious food, the priceless knowledge and

experience gained from helping out on the farm, and for treating me like a daughter and

making me feel at home.

Finally, I must mention some of the people nearest to my heart that have been

supportive of me in all my endeavors: my parents, grandparents, brothers, boyfriend,

close friends, and numerous other family members. Thank you for always motivating me

to do my best and for allowing me to vent in times of frustration. Special thanks to those

who read my drafts and offered suggestions. I would be nowhere without your love and

support.

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Abstract

This case study explores the institutions and governing strategies involved in the

management of Rupa Lake in Kaski district in Western Nepal, particularly Rupa Lake

Rehabilitation and Fishery Cooperative. Methods used for data collection include key

informant interviews, household interviews, a focus group discussion and archival

records. Institutions were examined for their effectiveness in sustaining natural and

socioeconomic systems as perceived by community members. Based on a literature

review and the results of the data collected, this thesis builds a case study highlighting

Rupa Lake Rehabilitation and Fishery Cooperative’s strategies for governing its local

watershed and formulates a framework for commons institutions that aim to achieve

sustainable outcomes. Based on findings, I argue that no single form of governance is a

panacea for solving commons problems, governing strategies should be implemented on

a case-by-case basis, and institutions should be involved at multiple levels and always

include local input. Additionally, a sustainable institution should provide benefits to

society that it can see, function democratically and with transparency, promote a

biodiverse ecosystem, elevate marginalized groups, and collaborate with other

institutions. These “clumsy” institutions create a series of complex interactions that are

robust and adaptive to reflect the ever-changing systems they aim to govern.

Key words: institutions, governance, commons, sustainability

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Table of Contents

Acknowledgements..................................................................................................ii

Abstract...................................................................................................................iv

Introduction..............................................................................................................1

Literature Review..........................................................................3

Characteristics of Successful Institutions...................................12

Cross-Scale Governance.............................................................17

Project Area and Background................................................................................19

History of Rupa Lake Rehabilitation and Fishery Cooperative..23

Research Methods..................................................................................................26

Key Informant Interviews...........................................................27

Household Surveys.....................................................................28

Focus Group Discussion.............................................................29

Archival Data..............................................................................30

Findings and Discussion........................................................................................30

Findings: Local Impacts..............................................................30

Implications: Governance of the Commons...............................36

Eliciting Sustainable Outcomes..................................................37

Implications: Criteria for a Sustainable Institution.....................43

Discussion...................................................................................45

Conclusion.............................................................................................................48

Bibliography..........................................................................................................52

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I. Introduction

In the past few decades, concern over environmental degradation has heightened interest

about the governance of common-pool resources (CPRs). Due to their non-excludability

(meaning they are easily accessible, difficult to prevent others from using, and have high

risk of degradation from misuse), CPRs are particularly vulnerable to overexploitation

(Hardin 1968). Rangelands, forests, riverbanks and lakes—natural capital of which

members of a community share access—constitute CPRs. Misuse of the CPRs (often

from improper governance) leads to their demise—a phenomenon that Hardin (1968) has

termed the tragedy of the commons. According to Hardin (1968), this tragedy occurs

when use of a resource by people acting in their own self-interest leads to the demise of

the CPRs as an unintended consequence. Although individuals experience the benefit of

the resource, all share negative outcomes due to overuse of the CPRs.

The tragedy of the commons can be illustrated via the example of a herdsman

who, “as a rational being…seeks to maximize his gain” (Hardin 1968:1244). In this case,

the decision is whether to add a new animal to his herd, which shares a common pasture.

Hardin explains that there are two components to this decision. The positive component

(+1) is the additional animal the herdsman receives and the benefit is experienced by the

herdsman himself. The negative component of overgrazing (-1) is shared by all of the

herdsmen, so the individual herdsman’s loss is only a fraction of this. Therefore, as a

rational being he determines that adding an animal to his herd will be beneficial to him.

However, when all of the other herdsmen sharing the pastureland come to the same

decision, “therein is the tragedy. Each man is locked into a system that compels him to

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increase his herd without limit in a world that is limited” (Hardin 1968:1244). Examples

of the tragedy of CPRs are abundant and include over extraction of groundwater in rural

India (Pearce 2007); immense degradation of coral reefs in the South China Sea (Hughes

et al 2012); water scarcity issues in Northeast China (Xie et al 2009); shrinkage of the

Aral sea due to irrigation in Central Asia (Micklin and Aladin 2008); and the unregulated

use of the atmosphere and oceans (Araral 2014).

Governing CPRs in a sustainable manner is challenging. Yet, deep in Nepal’s

Himalayan foothills lies a potential exception to the many failed cases of resource

governance. In a municipality called Lekhnath, also known as the Garden City of Seven

Lakes, lies Rupa Lake, a CPR that has been receiving increasing attention due to

innovative local efforts to sustain the lake’s ecosystem. The governing institution is

officially known as Rupa Lake Rehabilitation and Fishery Cooperative (hereafter Rupa

Cooperative).

This case study sheds light on the collaborative management of natural resources

in the lake and its surrounding watershed based on research conducted in the summer of

2013. The purpose of this research is to explore which form(s) of governance can create

effective processes for yielding sustainable outcomes, including the sustainability of

natural resources as well as the socioeconomic systems that depend on them. In this case

study, these socioeconomic systems refer to the well-being of the families using the lake,

including the social benefits and livelihood opportunities received from the lake.

Through methods such as archival data, household interviews, and a focus group

discussion, I studied: (a) form(s) of governance (b) benefit sharing mechanisms (c)

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engagement with communities across the lake’s watershed, and (d) Rupa Cooperative’s

work on lake rehabilitation.

Existing literature on institutional design and governance has extensively

addressed frameworks for governing the commons, but has not always incorporated

holistic sustainability principles that take into consideration more than just sustaining the

resource itself—here, these principles refer to environment, economy, stakeholder

interests, and social equity (these will be further elaborated on in the discussion portion

of this thesis). In this case study, governance via Rupa Cooperative will be compared to

existing frameworks and, based on this analysis, a new framework for successful

governance is proposed. This new framework is seen as mechanisms of the cooperative

that fit into existing strategies with new ideas that emphasize the importance of more than

just the resource itself and basic community needs. This research will expand upon

existing ideas by emphasizing the importance of sustaining the economic and social well-

being of locals regardless of status, being inclusive of differing cultural perspectives and

elevating marginalized groups.

Literature Review

Frameworks for governance of the commons have been commonly studied in political

science literature. Two major approaches for promoting sustainability of the commons

include top-down (Hardin 1968) and bottom-up approaches (Ostrom 1990). Although the

processes are quite opposing in nature, both strive for sustainability as an outcome.

3

Hardin’s framework is exclusive in decision-making, favoring governance from

external authority and arguing that “freedom in a commons brings ruin to all” (1968:

1244). He challenged Adam Smith’s (1776) popular idea that when individuals are acting

in their own self-interest in a free market, the results will be beneficial for not only the

individual but also society as a whole—an idea that has become known as the theory of

the invisible hand. This theory is touted to work not only due to the fact that the exchange

benefits both parties involved, but also because a wide range of positive externalities such

as new inventions and philanthropy are said to result from such transactions (Narveson

2003). However, Hardin (1968) argues that this theory does not always hold up.

Hardin (1968) coined the term “tragedy of the commons” to describe situations in

which the invisible hand fails, particularly in the case of natural resources. Hardin’s

solution to the tragedy is privatization of the commons and mutual coercion, passing laws

mutually agreed upon by citizens to protect the commons. In his famous essay, he argues

that appeals to conscience and guilt are not enough to stop people from exploiting the

commons and insists that, despite claims of losing “freedom,” laws can actually make

people freer (1968:1258). He explains, “Individuals locked into the logic of the commons

are free only to bring on universal ruin; once they see the necessity of mutual coercion,

they become free to pursue other goals” (1968:1248). Therefore, for Hardin, top-down

control is the ideal, and perhaps the only, approach for governing the commons

sustainably. Hardin’s argument, though widely accepted during the two decades after its

publication, has since been met with much criticism. Although his stance theoretically

has the democratic element that decision-making is mutually agreed upon, top-down

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regulation is not always democratic in practice. Some argue that regulation is often made

“via ill-considered ideology,” harming companies without providing any real

environmental benefits (Narveson 2003: 209). Similarly, the top-down approach may

neglect to include the expertise of locals who use the resource, instead relying on the

opinions of bureaucrats (and scholars) who cannot understand the natural system they are

governing as well as the locals do. This kind of external control may harm the livelihoods

of the local people or destroy the resource they had been intending to preserve.

Additionally, privatization may cause land that was previously governed by local

communities to be given to corporations (Araral 2014). Wildlife conservation is often

guilty of many of these criticisms—in many instances, “farmers, herders, swiddeners, and

hunters have been evicted from lands and forests which they have long occupied to make

way for parks, sanctuaries, and wildlife reserves” (Guha 1997:14), paving the way for

oppression, conflict, and tension between conservationists and locals. This one-sided

approach to sustainability conserves (or attempts to conserve) particular token species,

but does so at the expense of local communities who also have a right to sustain their

livelihoods (and often have smaller environmental footprints than those pointing fingers

at them) (Sarkar 1999).

Ostrom (1990) critiques Hardin by asserting that the tragedy of the commons is

not inevitable and that collective action by individuals in the community can also lead to

sustainability of the system, especially in the case of smaller, localized commons. She

asserts that in order to solve CPR problems it is necessary to find ways to both restrict

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access to the resource as well as create incentives for those who use the resource

correctly (e.g. without overexploiting it).

Ostrom, therefore, favors a more inclusive bottom-up framework for governing

the commons involving community-based resource management (CBM). This broad

concept cannot be defined concisely, but essentially refers to a group of local users of the

CPRs involved in conserving and protecting the resources they use, often by preserving

habitat integrity and biodiversity (Kumar 2005). The thrust is that the rightful users

govern their own CPR.

Management of resources by local institutions has been documented in many

cases worldwide with mixed results. According to a case study of the Kalahari

Rangelands in Botswana, privatizing the pastureland to prevent overgrazing actually

increased the problem due to land-use intensification. Introducing a participatory

framework enabled many kinds of stakeholders to be included, such as “communal and

commercial pastoralists, rich and poor, extension workers, researchers and policymakers”

(Fraser et al 2005:121). Based on preliminary results, it seems that this inclusion has

empowered the community and shows promise for the future. Sultana and Thompson

(2007) found that, in the case of a tight-knit community with common interests,

community-based management has been able to restore a small floodplain. However,

they noted that many of the management committees in their case studies were “heavily

dependent on support from NGOs [nongovernmental organizations]…for example in

organizing elections and in technical advice on fishery management” (Sultana and

Thompson 2007:544).

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Does freedom in the commons always end in tragedy? There is no binary answer

to this basic question. It depends on the nature of the resource, its governance, and

societal pressure. For this reason, it is important to explore perspectives on the

governance of CPRs as well as the role of institutions.

Institutions: There are a few major approaches to defining institutions:

institutions-as-equilibria, institutions-as-norms, and institutions-as-rules. The first

approach emphasizes the stability created when behavior is optimized and actor

preferences are mutually understood—in this approach, institutions are “stable patterns of

behavior” (Crawford and Ostrom 1995: 582). The key idea is that social order is not

created by external enforcers, but by individuals who are a part of the order.

The other two approaches focus on communicative constraints that impact mutual

human behavior and actions. The institutions-as-norms approach assumes that shared

beliefs and perceptions of how people should behave are the basis for patterns of

interaction that we observe (Crawford and Ostrom 1995: 583). The institutions-as-rules

approach focuses on the actions mandated or forbidden by rules, as well as their

regulation. North (1995:7) takes this further and defines institutions as being “humanly-

devised constraints that structure human interaction… composed of formal rules (statute

law, common law, regulations), informal constraints (conventions, norms of behavior,

and self-imposed codes of conduct), and the enforcement characteristics of both.” By

defining institutions in this fashion, North (1995) distinguishes institutions from

organizations, i.e. individuals with a common purpose that drive institutional change.

Institutions governing CPRs in particular “define access rights and specify appropriate

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behaviors” (Berkes 1999:205). Users of the CPRs are challenged to form institutions that

manage resources in such a way as to “reduce or eliminate externalities,” and are

successful when they “last over time, constrain users to safeguard the resource, and

produce fair outcomes” (Agrawal 2001: 1650).

For the purposes of this research, commons-oriented institutions entail a

combination of these approaches to form a more inclusive institutions-as-shared-

strategies approach, which Crawford and Ostrom (1995:582) define as “enduring

regularities of human action in situations structured by rules, norms, and shared

strategies, as well as by the physical world. The rules, norms, and shared strategies are

constituted and reconstituted by human interaction in frequently occurring or repetitive

situations.” In line with other research, institutions here have to do with the collective

agreements between individuals to regulate and strategize their actions. Here, it is

important to note that the purpose is to achieve a desired outcome, or a common goal. In

this case study, Rupa Cooperative is the major institution studied. It fits into this

definition because it is constituted by rules and strategies formed by individuals,

particularly locals, in governing the natural resources they depend on in order to achieve

outcomes such as prosperity of locals and environmental quality of the lake. Other

institutions involved in managing Rupa Lake will be discussed later. Rupa Cooperative is

made up of people, which have different values; therefore, understanding Cultural Theory

can help us better understand their interactions which make it successful.

Cultural theory and commons: Cultural Theory is an attempt to understand the

dynamics of culture and can provide insight regarding human interaction within and

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between institutions. Beginning with the work of Mary Douglas (1966), research in this

arena originally aimed to explain conflict related to risk through differences in risk

perception as a result of the social structures that reinforced them. The four cultures as

coined by Michael Thompson (2000) are individualistic, hierarchical, egalitarian and

fatalist, and each has its own set of ideologies that inform perception.

Now, cultural theory has been applied to a variety of disciplines, including the

understanding of the role of institutions in society. Because institutions are formed by

humans, who have norms and values that are unique to each community, culture feeds

directly into institutions’ rules, functions, and limitations. None of these ideologies are

“wrong,” but cultural theory recognizes that agreement cannot be reached when arguing

from different premises. When values are not in sync, it can be difficult to come to an

agreement since each way of perceiving has its own idea for the proper solution. Here, I

will discuss the three perspectives that are applicable in this debate: individualistic,

hierarchical, and egalitarian.

Individualists favor a free market and conversion of commons into private or

public goods, and may relate to Ostrom’s people-centric approach to governance. The

individualistic view considers natural resources to be commodities that can be privatized

and should be properly priced according to supply and demand. If there is a shortage in a

resource, it is due to improper pricing. The individualist opposes the egalitarian approach

because the latter considers the welfare of the environment to be above humans and

arguably suppresses innovation; similarly, hierarchical investments in infrastructure are

not the answer since they may increase taxes. Many individualists may relate to the

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influential Adam Smith, who in The Wealth of Nations (1776) describes a process that

has evolved into the theory of the Invisible Hand, stating that when individuals are acting

in their own self-interest in a free market, the results will be beneficial for not only the

individual but also society as a whole. Therefore, like Smith, an individualist may

consider the ideal solution to the tragedy of the commons to be converting the commons

into a private or public good.

The hierarchical view favors rational planning and management of resources in

order to account for long-term solutions (Latch et al 2006). This includes investments in

infrastructure and science to deal with vulnerability and reduce uncertainty as well as

cooperation between agencies. Individualist solutions, they argue, focus too much on

short-term economic gains and do not properly incorporate long-term management

strategies and infrastructure. They oppose egalitarian localized management because it

creates fragmentation, increases boundary issues, and lacks sufficient resources, such as

research, that a larger institution would have access to (Latch et al 2006). Thus, an

institution favoring the hierarchical approach to governance may emphasize scientific

research and infrastructure to solve commons issues.

The egalitarian view favors a more eco-centric approach to resource management

solutions and often aligns with the environmental and environmental justice movements

(Latch et al 2006). This perspective values limiting growth, de-centralization,

acknowledging the rights of nature and poor or indigenous people, and using technology

for conservation. The egalitarian argues that life-sustaining resources cannot be assigned

a dollar value and that individualistic solutions are often inequitable towards nature as

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well as poor and indigenous populations (Latch et al 2006). Additionally, to the

egalitarian, hierarchical solutions such as infrastructure will not change people’s actions

and will not be inclusive enough of voices of certain players, especially the

disadvantaged (Latch et al 2006). Institutions using an egalitarian approach to the

commons, therefore, may use governing strategies focusing on conservation and attention

to the needs of local community members and disadvantaged groups.

Each of these three perspectives, though they share a common goal of sustaining

CPRs, have differing ideas on what the governing process should look like. Each is

valuable and unique, but also narrow in scope. This means that collaboration within and

between institutions may be challenging, but case studies have demonstrated that it is

certainly not impossible. Although each perspective may conjure up brilliant plans

separately, truly sustainable solutions are not so one-sided and instead integrate the

highlights of each perspective to create seemingly messy, but well-rounded solutions.

What it means to create sustainable outcomes will be more thoroughly addressed in the

discussion portion of this thesis. By looking at institutions through the lens of Cultural

Theory, we can discern why certain institutions function the way they do and why there

may be fundamental disagreement about how to best govern. From there, progress can be

made to create functioning institutions that balance the dynamics of each perspective.

This is important for informing the governance of CPRs because it recognizes that

institutions are as diverse as the people who constitute them and, thus, no two institutions

will be alike no matter what resource they are governing. For example, an institution

made up of indigenous people living in a remote area will function completely different

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than one constituted by first world bureaucrats, even if it aims to govern the same

resource. Thus, in the case of Rupa Cooperative, we know that the way the watershed is

governed is largely a product of the culture of its governors, particularly the ideologies of

local community members. According to Thompson (2000), institutions which

successfully “maintain and nurture all this dynamic plurality…have been termed clumsy

institutions” (5). He argues that it is pointless to argue about which model of democracy

is correct because, “if we fail to clumsify ourselves— then we have not got democracy”

(9).

Characteristics of Successful Institutions

Based on empirical studies, common themes in successful management of CPRs include

“small size of a user group, a location close to the resource, homogeneity among group

members, effective enforcement mechanisms, and past experiences of cooperation”

(Agrawal 2001: 1653). After comparing communities and observing which ones

demonstrated successful governance, Ostrom created an outline of 8 important principles

displayed by institutions that successfully manage CPRs (1990). These I have grouped

into three major categories (resources, users, and state) and illustrated in Figure 1.

Theoretically, when all of these design principles are met in the governance of a

particular resource, management is more likely to be effective, successful, and

sustainable. The eight design principles are:

1. Clearly defined boundaries: Boundaries of the resource and community users

should be clearly laid out in order to internalize benefits. It may be argued that this is too

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rigid since in actuality resource boundaries are not clear-cut, but in this case a fluid

boundary system may be applied, such as in the case of pastoralists in Sahelian Africa

accessing overlapping pastures or even jointly managing them (Niamir-Fuller 1998).

2. Rules for resources should be tailored to local needs and conditions: The

“rules” in this case refer to both appropriation and provision, which should be congruent

with each other and the local spatial, temporal and cultural conditions. If rules do not take

these into consideration, negative consequences may result. For example, in the

Dhulikhel municipality, a ban imposed on forest products contradicted resource

conditions and normal village rules, leading to ineffective monitoring and low

compliance with the new rules (Cox et al 2010). On the other hand, when appropriations

and provisions are perceived as fair, users are more inclined to contribute to the

sustainability of the system—this is highlighted in the case of Huayncotas irrigation

system in the Andes. Here, farmers determine how much they must contribute to the

irrigation system’s maintenance based on how much land they irrigate with it and, as a

result of this feeling of equitability, farmers readily contributed to sustaining the

management system (Trawick 2001).

3. Collective-choice arrangements: According to Cox et al (2010: 38), a “lack of a

functional collective-choice arrangement is frequently correlated with CPR management

failure.” Indeed, local users have firsthand knowledge about their resource, which is an

advantage when developing effective rules and strategies for management. Due to this

local expertise and the fact that resource users are most affected by rules imposed on it,

they should be able to participate in creating and modifying these rules.

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4. Monitors should be accountable to the appropriators: This principle requires

that monitors be present to enforce community rules, and that these monitors should be

accountable to community members. Monitoring may be inherent in management style or

a hired, compensated position. Whether they are community members or not, it is

important that monitors are accountable to the community in order to ensure adequate

performance.

5. A monitoring system of graduated sanctions run by community members should

be in place to enforce rules: Graduated sanctions are a form of intervention in which

punishments for rule violations become incrementally more severe based on number or

severity of violations. This is to ensure that rules are not broken to an excessive degree

and remain proportional to the degree of the violation. This is supported by Ghate and

Negendra (2005) in a study of three forest management communities, the only one that

was successful had strictly implemented graduated penalties.

6. Conflict resolution mechanisms: According to Ostrom (1990), when conflicts

can be resolved in a low-cost and readily accessible manner, management may be more

successful. Since conflict over commons resources is likely (perhaps even inevitable), it

is important that mechanisms for resolution be established in order to keep communities

on track for reaching the common goal of resource sustainability.

7. Respect for community’s self-governance: Higher authorities such as

government agencies should recognize and respect the institutions created by local

communities without imposing their own rules upon them. According to evidence cited

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by Cox (2010: 38), challenging or disregarding local authority “can be associated with

less successful community-based resource management regimes.”

8. For larger CPRs, governance should exist at multiple levels from the local

scale to the entire system (nested enterprises): This principle highlights the importance of

nesting smaller institutions within larger-scale institutions. This can refer to nesting user

groups within one another or embedding user groups within government agencies. In

either case, it means that systems have the potential to become more robust since they can

rely on each other in case of failure and are also accountable to each other. Marshall

(2008) argues that nested governance can be advantageous because higher governance

can help solve problems that more localized units do not have the capacity to handle

themselves and also “enables information about rules that have worked for one unit to be

conveyed more easily to other units.”

Ostrom’s solution is not without its limitations and critique. Although CBM has

shown success in local systems, it has been questioned whether CBM can also be applied

to larger, global systems. For example, greenhouse gases are emitted at a large scale at

every moment of every day. Those emitting the gases do not often realize that it is

affecting them since climate change happens on a global scale as a result of an

aggregation of local emissions. Further, since climate change takes place over extended

periods of time, emitters may not even experience the long-term costs of their pollution

and instead push the burden onto future generations. As “independent, rational, free-

enterprisers,” (Hardin 1968), humans are hardly inclined to stop emitting when their

15

personal benefits of releasing greenhouse gases outweigh their portion of the shared

costs.

The scaling-up challenge for CBM is not easy to address, but proponents of CBM

argue that in such cases there should be many groups and subgroups at multiple levels

governing the resource. For example, in the case of a large watershed, governance could

be divided into collaborative subgroups as small as the sub-tributary level and scale up

from there, incorporating interaction and sharing between groups once governance is

successfully established at the smallest scale (Ostrom and Walker 2003). The key here is

to promote communication and inclusivity and encourage cooperation between groups

even with differing ideologies.

Figure 1: A CBM approach based on Ostrom's design principles

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Cross-Scale Governance

Of course, bottom-up and top-down governance are just two methods on opposite ends of

a wide spectrum of possible approaches. These two extremes may create seemingly

elegant and “clean” solutions, but since sustainability issues are notoriously complex,

robust solutions can be as messy and complicated as the problems themselves. For

example, solutions may utilize social mechanisms such as institutional flexibility and

coping mechanisms for environmental surprises (Berkes et al 2000). These collaborative

and messy solutions have been called “clumsy” solutions in literature, going beyond

elegant and coherent solutions and instead creating a series of complex interactions that

adapt to reflect ever-changing systems.

This is where cross-scale institutions and solutions come in, which incorporate

varying spatial or temporal scales. For example, Maine soft shell clam fisheries share

resource management power and responsibility, governing “from the citizen to the

state…nested in ascending levels of authority” (Berkes et al 2000: 1258). In this system,

the state-created “shell” supports environmentally sustainable land use based on

traditional beliefs of the Huastec. Yearly tasks, such as communal hunts, include users in

management plans and serve to evaluate prey populations. In another case, a mangrove

area in the Caribbean was suffering from two decades of uncontrolled use. Three major

things contributed to its restoration: the evolution of a local knowledgebase and

management system over a 25-year span, recognition of resource use rights of charcoal

producers, and the work of an NGO. The major change that occurred was that it shifted

from open-access to a communal resource. Whereas previously it was open wood for

17

people to use freely, it is now harvested by an organized group of community charcoal

producers. The improved security and resource use rights contributed to a change in

behavior and attitude that made restoration and long-term sustainability of the mangrove

a priority (Berkes 1999).

Latch et al (2006) provides case studies of clumsy solutions in California that

incorporate differing perspectives (individualist, hierarchical, and egalitarian) in their

strategies. In Southern California, three water districts created an innovative rate structure

for water usage which utilizes a base rate as well as a conservation target which, once

surpassed, increases the rate for additional water (although they found that the base rate

was rarely exceeded). This approach satisfies all three of the previously mentioned

perspectives on governance: the individualist can still pay to use more water if they so

desire; each household receives a fixed amount of water for consumption, thus satisfying

egalitarian views; and the strategy is hierarchical in the sense that it was implemented

rationally with carefully proportioned allocations.

Similarly, in the Bay Delta, water problems were addressed partially using the

Environmental Water Account (EWA), which provides water for fish protection via

market-like mechanisms as a change from relying on state and federal regulations (Latch

et al 2006). The EWA also forced relationships with actors such as fishery managers and

water facility operators, fostering in each group a new understanding of the challenges

faced by the other. The individualist viewpoint is satisfied here due to the market-like

arrangements moving the water; it is hierarchical because hierarchical organizations are

the major actors; egalitarian ideals are met because the interests of the fisheries are

18

addressed explicitly in water management agreements (Latch et al 2006). Thus, these two

examples illustrate resource management strategies that appeal to each perspective,

demonstrating that it is indeed possible to foster robust and sustainable solutions despite,

or more likely as a result of, including differing perspectives.

However, cross-scale governance is no panacea and comes with its own set of

challenges. Crossovers between institutions can lead to miscommunication, lack of

coordination, or conflicting interests. Institutions should be aware of these challenges and

take action to prevent and mitigate them by emphasizing communication and

transparency.

According to Berkes (1999), there are two major requirements for making a

commons work: controlling the access of all potential users by establishing property

rights and making/enforcing rules for resource users. Institutions guide this process and,

once these rules are established, costs and benefits to individuals or groups from the

management plan will encourage conservation. In this research, I intend to determine:

what kinds of governance and governing institutions yield sustainability outcomes in

society? Based on the following case study, I argue that although there is no panacea for

governing the commons, a highly effective strategy involves cross-scale institutions at

local, regional, and national levels that are collaborative, inclusive, and mindful of the

principles of sustainability.

II. Project Area and Background

Research took place in the Lekhnath Municipality in the Kaski District of Nepal

(28008'39.72''N and 84006'29.29''E) which lies 120 km west of Kathmandu, the country’s 19

capitol (see Figure 2). The site researched was the watershed of Rupa Lake, one of the

district’s seven lakes. Rupa Lake is 115 hectares (ha) in area with a 30 square kilometer

watershed area, lying at an elevation of about 600 meters above sea level with an average

depth of 3 meters (Udas 2007). Perennial streams feed Rupa Lake, mainly from Talbesi.

The average annual temperature is 19.30C and it receives 3157 mm precipitation per year

on average (International Lake Environment Committee 2012).

Figure 2: Location of research area (Rupa Lake not to scale)

The watershed of Rupa Lake is home to some 15,000 people and is part of Lekhnath

Municipality (Central Bureau of Statistics, 2011). Major ethnic groups within the

watershed include Brahmin, Chhetri, Gurung, Magar (Thapa), Jalahari, Newari, and

occupational caste. Ethnic groups such as Majhi and Jalahari are “totally dependent on

wetland resources for their livelihood” (Udas 2007: 7). Many locals farm for subsistence

Rupa Lake

20

or have restaurants as side businesses. Additional sources of income for locals include

agricultural wage labor and income from the sale of farm surplus. However, this trend is

beginning to change as an increasing number of young people begin to look for work

elsewhere.

Groups of lake users are divided by their proximity to Rupa Lake. Interestingly,

these spatial differences are perceived by locals as being a more distinct way to define

communities than by ethnic groups. Downstream communities Sisuawa bazaar and

Majgun enjoy fertile land and ample transportation infrastructure. These have the highest

membership in the cooperative and are the most active. Midstream communities are Rupa

Kot, Sundaridanda, Bangora, and Pachbaya. Upstream communities, including Tal Besi

and Chower, are more isolated, often relying on rainwater for seasonal crops but have the

best access to firewood. Rupa Cooperative helps to strengthen social capital despite the

spatial differences of these two groups.

The watershed of Rupa Lake is home to a variety of plant and animal species,

including white lotus, wild rice, 36 species of waterbirds, 24 species of fish, and 11

species of mammals (Kafle et al 2008; LI-BIRD 2014). A variety of crops are also

cultivated in the watershed, such as rice, coffee, maize, finger millet, cowpea, banana,

papaya, sponge gourd, broadleaf mustard and taro, among many others. Rupa Lake is

also well-known for its beauty, which attracts many tourists. For the nearby communities

that depend on it, Rupa Lake is an essential natural resource, relied on for fish and plants

for consumption and medicine, fodder for livestock, water for bathing and washing

clothes, and biodiversity.

21

Figure 3: Rupa Lake Watershed

There is an interesting history shaping the current outcomes of the Rupa Lake

watershed. Before 1950, many forests in Nepal were privatized. In 1957, the Forest

Nationalization Act was passed in order to release control of land from the powerful few

and to manage forests in a more equitable manner. Unfortunately, this also undermined

local management systems and took away some local rights, which led to increased

deforestation during the 1960s-70s as locals began to overharvest forest goods illegally

“due to loss of a sense of ownership and accountability in forest management” (Maharjan

2005:198). It was around this time that Rupa Lake’s watershed experienced substantial

forest destruction and subsequent soil erosion from removal of plants for firewood and

fodder. This contributed to sedimentation in the lake, decreasing its surface area and

negatively affecting the quality of lake water (e.g. dissolved oxygen), contributing to fish

mortality and potentially a host of other impacts. According to Udas (2007), the lake has 22

decreased in volume over the years from 215 ha in 1964 to 115 ha as of the year 2000.

Further contributing to sedimentation in the lake has been the construction of roads and

other infrastructure in the area over the past few decades. Farming practices have also

contributed to degradation of the overall health of the watershed and the lake’s aquatic

systems—use of chemical fertilizers, pesticides, and electro-fishing and poisoning are

just a few examples.

Later acts beginning in the late 1980s aimed to decentralize forestry governance

and return power to locals. For example, the Local Government Act in the 1980s gave

local village governments more decision-making rights, and the Forest Act of 1993

recognized communities as “self-governing institutions with rights to acquire, sell and

transfer forest products” (Capistrano and Colfer 2005: 70).

History of Rupa Lake Rehabilitation and Fishery Cooperative

In 1984, CARE-Nepal, an INGO (International Nongovernmental Organization),

launched a watershed management program in order to prevent the degradation of Begnas

and Rupa Lake’s watershed and conserve soil. During the 13-year period of the project,

which officially ended in 1997, CARE-Nepal also provided training to farmers in agro-

forestry and conservation agriculture using participatory approaches that actively

involved locals, including women, in “planning, implementing, follow-up, and

maintaining community watershed resources” (Bogati, n.d., “Abstract”). This changed

the way in which people in the communities interacted with their environment, as they

were now equipped with the knowledge and awareness necessary to protect the watershed

from further degradation. 23

Still, according to longtime local residence, soil erosion and invasive plants

threatened the lake’s ecosystem. In 2000, seven locals were cage fishing on a small

portion of the lake when they noticed that the fish seemed to be cleaning the lake by

eating the plants covering the surface. They decided that increasing the fish population in

the lake would significantly reduce this invasive plant problem as well as provide

benefits to the larger community. That same year, two local conservation groups, two

farmer cooperatives, and representatives from the lake’s watershed collaborated to form

Rupa Lake Rehabilitation and Fishery Cooperative (Rupa Cooperative) in order to

improve the environmental health of the lake and provide livelihood options for

communities around the lake. Local Initiatives for Biodiversity Research and

Development (LI-BIRD), a national NGO, played a key role in the process of setting-up

Rupa Cooperative.

The cooperative utilizes a shareholder system—households pay a fee to become

members, and subsequently twice per year during festivals they receive a share of the

income generated from selling fish caught on the lake using a cage system. Cooperative

leadership is elected democratically and equitably, with two vice president positions

reserved for a traditional fisher and a female cooperative member. The cooperative

provides employment for locals who work in the cooperative office or are employed to

catch fish on the lake.

Initially, formation of the cooperative was not well-received by all community

members. Formation of the cooperative led to the prohibition of individual fishing on the

lake. Many shifted their fishing practices to Rupa Lake’s outflowing river, and Jalahari

24

fishermen in particular were encouraged to switch to cage fishing (the cooperative’s

fishing method) or become agriculturalists. This marginalized group was initially not in

favor of the cooperative, spearheaded by more elite community members. This began to

change, as the inclusive nature of the cooperative enabled them to be given the rights they

deserve, financial assistance through cooperative programs, and, for many, employment

within the cooperative.

What began with 36 members expanded to 319 members in the first year, and

today the cooperative has 741 members. Rupa Cooperative holds monthly meetings for

executive members and yearly meetings for all members in order to keep the community

up-to-date on progress and gather local input.

Enforcement of rules is done by cooperative employees. These employees patrol

the lake in order to ensure that no illegal fishing occurs (i.e. the fisherman does not

contribute his catch to the cooperative), and to deal with illegal activity by issuing a

warning, reporting it to government police (who support the cooperative’s efforts), and

potentially confiscating equipment. Forest land conservation, which is undertaken by

community forestry groups (see below), is enforced by group members who take turns

patrolling certain forest areas each day to ensure that no deforestation occurs outside of

the 7-day period designated for collecting wood.

However, it would be incorrect to assume that the cooperative is completely

community-based with no external assistance. LI-BIRD has played a significant role in

the cooperative, contributing to its success through facilitating knowledge sharing,

conservation strategies, technology, and community awareness. Other NGOs donate

25

money and assess projects undertaken by cooperative groups. These organizations

complement the work of locals by synthesizing their “expert” knowledge and resources

with local knowledge of community members. Other organizations in the area include:

Pratigya Farming Cooperative (established by an NGO), Chigavan Savings Cooperative,

Honey Bee Cooperative, and multiple community forestry groups (established by

government programs and supported by Rupa Cooperative).

III. Research Methods

Methods utilized in this study were interviews, a focus group discussion, and data

collection from Rupa Cooperative’s archives. First, community leaders were interviewed

for their knowledge of the management of the lake and its history. Second, household

interviews were conducted in order to learn how cooperative members view the changing

conditions of the lake, benefits they receive from the lake, and management of the lake.

Third, a focus group discussion was held with cooperative leaders in order to learn more

about the cooperative’s establishment and history. Fourth, archival records from Rupa

Cooperative’s office were sought out to gather data about demographics within the

cooperative such as gender ratios, ethnic group ratios, and fish catches.

Conducting interviews with open-ended questions was chosen as the primary

method of data collection for this study because it has the capacity to yield subjective and

in-depth responses. These kinds of responses were desired for this study in order to

obtain a more complete view of the community members’ ideas and opinions regarding

the cooperative. In addition, interviewing enables a connection to be made between the

26

interviewer and interviewee in which the interviewer can gain a deeper understanding of

the interviewee’s attitudes about the subject matter and clarify any ambiguous answers.

However, a limitation of conducting interviews as the primary form of data collection is

that it does not allow for high statistical extrapolation, making data analysis difficult and

time consuming with large amounts of data. The results tend to be messy, nonlinear (or

not easily discernible), and time-consuming to transcribe (Mears 2009).

An interpreter was hired to bridge the language gap between the community

members and myself (the interpreter assisted during interviews as well as during the

focus group discussion). This was essential for the study and provided more benefits than

merely translating—the assistance of the interpreter, a Nepali girl, made community

members feel more comfortable than they may have felt being confronted solely by

someone who seemed foreign to them. Additionally, her knowledge about Nepali culture

ensured that I understood responses from a local cultural perspective rather than looking

at them from my own outside understanding as an American. However, the drawback of

hiring an interpreter is that survey questions and responses are no longer direct. Instead,

they must travel through another medium before they are written in English. This

increases the likelihood of missing nuances and details embedded in expression by the

interviewees.

Key Informant Survey

The first prong of data collection involved interviewing leaders in order to learn basics

about the lake and cooperative from those who are the most involved and informed. Key

informants include the manager of Rupa Lake, chairperson of the Mother Group 27

(women’s group), watchman of Rupa Lake, Chairman of the cooperative, and chairman

of Environmental Protection and Community Development. These interviews were an

important part of data collection because they provided initial information given by

knowledgeable individuals. Additionally, a few of these individuals (particularly the

chairman of the cooperative) were able to provide names of additional cooperative

members to interview. Key informants were given the same list of interview questions as

the regular cooperative members, but also often provided additional comments outside of

the interview questions (see below for details on interview questions).

Household Survey

Forty-two members of the Rupa Lake Rehabilitation and Fishery Cooperative (including

the key informants) were surveyed regarding their opinions on the functionality of the

cooperative and the services and environmental quality of the lake. Households were

chosen using a snowball method—key leaders were interviewed first, and these initial

interviewees provided names of other members to interview. I, along with the interpreter,

personally visited each home in order to conduct interviews. In total, 19 of the

respondents were female and 23 were male. Groups interviewed were Brahmin and

Chhetri (69%); Gurung, Magar, and Tamang (26%); and Jalahari (a marginalized group

—5%). Ratios of ethnic groups interviewed are representative of their relative ratios in

the watershed.

The purpose of this interview was to determine the cooperative members’

perspectives on the environmental quality of the lake in the past compared to its condition

today, as well as their opinions on the effectiveness of the cooperative and its 28

management. This would provide insight on the way the cooperative works and its

perceived effectiveness. Questions were determined with the help of LI-BIRD in order to

ensure that they would be effective and ethical as well as yield thoughtful responses. The

result was a set of fourteen questions comprising four categories: benefits received from

the lake now and 20 years ago, the environmental condition of the lake now and 20 years

ago, management of the cooperative, and crops/rice varieties grown now and 20 years

ago.

Focus Group Discussion

Additionally, questions were created for facilitation of a focus group discussion. The

purpose of the focus group was to meet with leading members of the cooperative in order

to gain a deeper insight into the cooperative’s history and how it works. These questions

were designed to fit into two categories: information about the cooperative itself and

change in biodiversity over time. The final product was a set of nine questions intended

to gather basic information about the cooperative including number of members, ratio of

men to women as cooperative members and as leaders, term length for committee

members, and whether committee members are elected or selected. For a more thorough

understanding of its history and effectiveness, questions were also asked regarding events

which may have triggered a change in actions surrounding the lake or the community’s

involvement in watershed management and how biodiversity conditions are currently as

opposed to 20 years ago. The actual focus group was held in the community with the

cooperative’s president, vice president, and president of the women’s group among

attendees.29

Archival Data

The final method of data collection was visiting the cooperative’s office and looking

through archival records, which refer to preexisting information stored in files, usually

kept for research or legal purposes. The purpose of this was to uncover further fixed

information about the cooperative, such as growth in members over time, gender of

members, and meeting minutes. In this case, paper files in the office were studied for

relevant information.

IV. Results and Discussion

Local Impacts: Since 2008, a payment for ecosystem services (PES) program has

apportioned 25% of its revenue into projects that contribute to education and the health of

the lake at the watershed level. The PES program chooses projects to fund based on

proposals that focus on either generating income or conservation. Major PES projects

include: conservation awareness grants to 19 local schools, scholarships for 52 students

from marginalized groups, support for 17 community forestry user groups, funding for

income generating activities such as beekeeping and zero tillage agriculture for poor and

marginalized farmers (which 5000 households have benefited from thus far), and many

others (Regmi et al 2009). These will be outlined more thoroughly below.

In general, interviewees expressed that the condition of the lake has improved and

been made cleaner since the cooperative has been in place. A major accomplishment of

the work of the cooperative has been cleaning the water of invasive plant species and

increasing the fish population by breeding threatened local fish varieties and introducing

fingerlings. “20 years ago,” explained one local, “there was nowhere around the lake to 30

walk, it was very dirty, and people did not have any idea about fish culture and the

importance of the lake.” Others reported that it used to be full of unwanted weeds.

Manharka Adhikari, manager of the lake, feels that “the current environmental condition

of the lake is better than previously because there are no longer simalkada fruit, which

used to cover the lake…fish culture gives greater fish yield and profits, which help

communities keep Rupa Lake clean.”

However, others argued that the condition of the lake has decreased over time

even with the work of the cooperative, mainly citing the reduction of edible plants and

the decreasing surface area of the lake from sedimentation as culprits. One local lamented

the reduction of the medicinal plant white lotus, which “was used for jaundice. There is

less nowadays due to fish culture.” Many others, including those who felt that the lake’s

condition has been improving in other ways, expressed concern about the depth of the

lake, which was said to be “decreasing day by day due to soil in the lake.”

Interviewees were asked open-endedly about benefits they received from the lake

20 years ago as well as benefits they receive from the lake today. Figure 4 separates the

various responses given for 20 years ago and today side-by-side and tallies the number of

respondents who cited each of them. There are many noteworthy points there—many

respondents attributed the cooperative’s beautification of the lake with bringing in

tourists, who support their local economy. Indeed, 21 respondents noted that they receive

economic benefits from the lake either through tourism, business, or employment through

the cooperative; zero respondents cited that they received these perks from the lake 20

years ago. However, 9 respondents said that they made money from the lake 20 years

31

ago, compared to 37 who said they make money from the lake today. Interestingly,

despite the ban on individual fishing, a greater number of interviewees (37) said that they

eat fish from the lake today as opposed to 21 people citing that they ate fish from the lake

20 years ago. Five respondents noted that they have seen an increase in biodiversity such

as new bird species appearing, new fish species being introduced, a greater variety of

medicinal plants cultivated, and new rice varieties being used in the lake area.

On the other side, many interviewees remarked that numbers of certain vital

edible and medicinal plants have been dwindling due to increased fishing. A greater

number of respondents said that they consumed the medicinal white lotus and other

edible plants 20 years ago than consume it today. Subgroups, particularly the Mother

Groups (which will be discussed below) within the cooperative are working to conserve

these plants in order to turn this around.

These mixed responses indicate that the cooperative’s work on the lake and its

watershed has improved the livelihoods of community members in many ways, but also

has areas it should improve upon in order to maximize local benefits.

32

Swimming or RecreationBiodiversity

Food, Water, and Swimming for AnimalsFish to Eat

White LotusMake Money

Beauty or Fresh AirPlants to Eat

Bathing and Washing ClothesTourism/Business/Employment

BoatingFreedom

No Benefits

0 5 10 15 20 25 30 35 406

512

3711

377

39

215

00

30

1021

199

015

20

122

Benefits Received by the Lake

20 Years Ago Today

Number of Households

Figure 4: Benefits received from the lake 20 years ago vs today

Through the PES program, the cooperative is able to both empower members and

simultaneously contribute to the health of the lake and its watershed by supporting two

categories of groups. The first of these is the Mother Groups, which have two subgroups

comprised of 50 and 15 members. These are groups of local women who conserve

indigenous plants by cultivating them on the shore of the lake, including the medicinal

white lotus, nurcut, and local rice varieties. In addition to increasing availability of these

resources for human consumption, conservation of these species has greater impacts on

the ecosystem by providing food and breeding areas for local fish and bird populations.

The second set of groups funded through the PES program includes the 17

community forestry groups, with member counts of up to 200 people. Projects undertaken

33

by these groups include construction of dry latrines to keep feces out of the watershed,

construction of erosion prevention walls, implementation of a firewood collection period

of just seven days per year, and raising awareness about pollution and littering.

Rupa Cooperative’s PES program also supports community empowerment by

providing 50 scholarships each year to local children and supporting income-generating

activities. It helps to elevate the poor by providing funding for goats, beehives, or

materials for households to build a biogas digester (to convert cattle or human waste into

biogas for cooking). Thus far, the cooperative has helped to fund 300 biogas digesters.

The first female goat bred from a household that has received funding must be donated to

another local farmer. Additionally, when a PES-funded beehive splits, the household that

received it must donate the new swarm to another household. This helps to spread the

benefits of the program to other community members.

When asked open-endedly who made decisions regarding the management of the

lake, responses given by interviewees included “communities” (86%), “cooperative

leaders” (6%), “initial cooperative members” (2%), and the NGO “CARE Nepal” (2%)

(see Figure 2). The vast majority’s response of “communities” indicates that people

generally feel involved in decision-making. Additionally, when asked open-endedly

whether the current management of the lake works well for respondents and their

families, 95% responded “yes” (see Figure 5). It should be noted that nobody said that the

management did NOT work well—the other 5% of interviewees merely did not give a

straightforward yes or no response but instead mentioned the need of funding for a dam

for higher productivity and profits. Many of the “yes” responders also cited this need as

34

well as more economic support from the government. However, the overwhelming

majority of “yes” responses indicated that people are largely satisfied with how the

cooperative is managed.

The inclusiveness of communities in decision-making and perception that the

cooperative is well-managed show promise for the longevity of the cooperative and

continued support for the cooperative by community members, a critical component of a

successful institution.

Who Made Decisions Regarding the Management of

the Lake?  Percent of respondents

Communities 86%

Cooperative leaders 6%

CARE Nepal 2%

Original members 2%

Does the Current Management of the Lake Work

Well for You and Your Family?

Yes 95%

Uncertain 5%

Figure 5: Cooperative members’ responses about management of the lake

35

Despite the numerous benefits the cooperative provides to the community and

environment, some of its limitations and challenges should be noted. Individual fishing

has been banned by the cooperative, so the only way individuals can obtain fish from the

lake now is by purchasing them from the cooperative. Some community members

indicated that they feel this ban has encroached on their freedom. Additionally, the price

to join the cooperative has increased over time, creating an issue of equity for families

who have recently moved to the area and perhaps cannot afford to join at the more

expensive price. Another challenge faced by the cooperative is its ability to obtain

funding for projects from the government and NGOs and incorporate the land of private

owners into conservation projects. Finally, despite constant patrolling by cooperative

employees and even government police, illegal fishing is still encountered on a regular

basis. Rupa Cooperative now faces the challenge of effectively monitoring the lake and

properly enforcing its own rules.

Implications: Governance of the Commons

These results have multiple implications for what it means to successfully govern the

commons. As we have seen in the literature review, scholars will often attribute one type

of governance, such as exclusively top-down or bottom-up, as being the ideal way to

govern the commons. Based on the results of this research, this is not necessarily the

case.

Rupa Lake Rehabilitation and Fishery Cooperative could not have been formed

without the aforementioned supportive legislation of the government and resources of

36

local NGOs. Previously, government programs were not enough to keep the condition of

the lake from degrading initially. It was the synthesis of all of these entities that led to the

success of the cooperative. Therefore, this research supports a few key ideas. First, no

single form of governance is a panacea for solving commons problems—instead of ruling

out certain forms of governance, it may be better to instead assess in which ways each

form might be able to contribute to the success of the resource being examined. Second,

institutions should govern at multiple levels, which could potentially range from local to

national, and always should include local input.

Additionally, Rupa Cooperative did not follow a regimented program to find

success, and instead utilizes strategies tailored to the geography of the area and the

culture of locals. This leads to the third conclusion regarding governance: governing

strategies should be implemented on a case-by-case basis.

Eliciting Sustainable Outcomes

How can we determine whether outcomes elicited by the institutions managing Rupa

Lake are indeed sustainable? Before examining what makes an institution sustainable, it

is important to define what sustainability means in this context in order to determine:

what does “sustainability” entail in the case of governance and common pool resources?

There is no single universal definition—the term itself is vague and broad, and its

definition can change depending on scale and context (Lutz Newton 2005). For the

purposes of this paper, sustainability refers to fostering the ecological environment,

stakeholder interests, social equity, and economy both inter- and intra-generationally.

37

Each component is related to others, and a falter in one will jeopardize the sustainability

of the entire system.

First, the foundation for a sustainable system is the condition of the ecological

environment, including natural resources. Since we depend on the environment and

ecosystem services for our livelihoods, we must foster it in such a way that we do not

take away from its ability to support the needs of humans and other organisms today and

over time. Worldview plays a significant role here—the dominant view of nature is that it

is a commodity for humans to exploit as they please and views technology as a suitable

replacement for nature and ecosystem services (Vos 2007). This viewpoint creates a

slippery slope as it does not see nature as intrinsically valuable and therefore is less likely

to see value in sustaining the environment. In fact, there is a well-established correlation

between environmental degradation and technological advancement (Maragia 2006). On

the other hand, a viewpoint that considers nature complex, intrinsically valuable and

irreplaceable by technology is more likely to conserve it. In this paradigm, humans are an

integral part of nature rather than separate from it. A worldview that recognizes this

intricate relationship between humans and nature is essential in sustaining the

environment for present and future generations, and institutions responsible for the

governance of the commons should embody this ideology and consider environmental

stewardship of utmost priority.

Second, a key component for fostering sustainability is economy. The dominant

economic view is that “economic accumulation in the present can compensate the future

for any parts of nature that are destroyed in the process of economic growth” (Vos 2007:

38

336). This assumes that technology can eventually substitute “used-up” resources. Many

developed nations see a strong economy as being able to “spend” its way out of

environmental issues with technology. Proponents of the theory of the invisible hand

believe that a free market will solve such issues but critics of this theory, such as Hardin

(1968), argue that a free market may mean the destruction of the commons, including

pastures, fisheries, and air quality. With either perspective, it is important for institutions

to find ways to include natural resources in economic decisions. One such method assigns

monetary values to ecosystem services (Jenkins et al 2010; Sutton et al 2012). This

makes it easier for humans to govern and protect these systems since they are given a

concrete value that can be compared to other services, therefore enabling people to better

prioritize actions to take in order to ensure the sustainability of natural resources. Still,

despite the careful thought which goes into assigning such values, we must ask ourselves

whether it is truly wise to place a value on something that is essentially priceless (since

without ecosystem services human life could not exist). Therefore, since the environment

is extremely complex and it is unlikely humans will ever understand everything there is

to know about nature, in this definition a healthy economy works within the constraints

of the environment. Good governance should support economic sustainability without

compromising the sustainability of ecosystems. Rather than focusing on pure economic

growth, sustainable institutions instead focus on developments that increase quality of life

and harmony with nature. These could be measured based on surveys issued periodically

that identify and rate indicators such as access to basic needs such as adequate food and

39

shelter, subjective feelings of well-being, connection with the natural environment, and

confidence in local institutions to support these.

Third, sustainability necessitates supporting stakeholder interests by encouraging

participation (Norton 2005). Ensuring that all affected parties have a voice is important in

sustainability because it doesn’t leave out any particular group. Decision-making by only

a few parties risks the exclusion of certain affected groups and thus is inconsiderate of

their views and desires. In a case of whaling regulations, government officials and Inuit

people made great progress in preserving stakeholder interests when they agreed that

conserving the traditional relationship between Inuit and belugas in the southeast Baffin

region was the common goal, essentially switching the basic management unit from the

stock of belugas to the relationship between the resource (belugas) and its users (Inuits)

(Freeman et al 1998). Stakeholders should feel that they are benefiting from, not

sacrificing their livelihoods for, the governance strategies.

Therefore, sustainability-oriented institutions should emphasize local and

community involvement as directly as possible in order to protect locals’ interests and

also enlist support for decisions. This can be challenging when it comes to future

generations since, in democracies, “present generations are likely to pursue their own

interests at the expense of future generations” (Vos 2007: 338). A potential way to

mitigate this issue would be to include a council within institutions whose role is to

protect future generations’ interests (Vos 2007).

A vital component of sustainability is social equity, based on the idea that human

activity and nature are related and affect one another (Maragia 2006). It is impossible to

40

sustain people’s livelihoods or their environment when there are gaping economic

disparities between classes, communities are displaced, or land is destroyed. Sustainable

solutions should integrate social equity to ensure that efforts to reduce pollution and

improve environmental quality benefit the most vulnerable and disadvantaged members

of society as much as or more than other groups (Vos 2007). Gender is a critical

subcomponent here for multiple reasons, including that environmental issues and their

solutions usually affect men and women differently, and exclusion of women (as is often

the norm in the case of the rural poor) is a hindrance to achieving sustainability (Maragia

2006). Institutions may also include indigenous knowledge in their research and

governance through participatory methods, co-creation of knowledge, and place-based

solutions. Social equity is closely tied with the previously-discussed component

(stakeholder interests) since it necessitates inclusiveness. However, the major distinction

made by the equity component is that it takes things a step further by requiring justness of

decisions and ensuring that certain members of society are not unjustly burdened or

excluded in the name of “sustainability” or at the expense of others. Therefore,

sustainable institutions should ensure that poor and disadvantaged groups are properly

represented in all decisions by valuing their opinions and livelihoods.

Good governance of the commons does not simply promote environmental health

—it is a holistic concept encompassing the ecological environment, economy,

stakeholder interests, and social equity. Commons institutions must consider and elevate

each of these in order to elicit sustainable outcomes in society.

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Rupa Cooperative and Ostrom’s Design Principles

Another framework which can be used to assess the potential for sustainable outcomes is

to examine Rupa Cooperative in relation to Ostrom’s design principles for CBM (1990).

According to Ostrom (1990), these are the principles demonstrated by successful

commons institutions, so it is useful observe where Rupa Cooperative stands in relation

to these principles.

The first principle mandates that boundaries of the resource and community users

must be clearly defined. In this case, the resource boundary is strictly the watershed of

Rupa Lake and those living within the watershed constitute the users.

The second and third principles require congruence between rules and local

conditions and that individuals affected by rules should participate in creating them. The

democratic nature of Rupa Cooperative’s elections and complete involvement of local

community members support these principles and help ensure that rules created are

indeed backed by the community and cognizant of local conditions. Additionally,

resources are managed by community members for the purpose of supporting their own

local needs, such as Mother Groups’ conservation practices and forestry groups’ rules for

harvesting wood.

Ostrom’s fourth and fifth principles have to do with monitoring, stating that

monitors should be accountable to appropriators and that graduated sanctions progress

incrementally depending on severity of rule-breaking. Since monitors of Rupa Lake and

its watershed are community members employed by the cooperative, the fourth principle

is met. Enforcing graduated sanctions as punishments for breaking rules is one way that

42

Rupa Cooperative can improve its managing and more closely follow Ostrom’s design

principles.

Sixth, Ostrom calls for conflicts to be able to be resolved at low cost and in an

accessible manner. Spatial differences between communities (upstream, midstream, and

downstream) pose a challenge for conflict resolution, but recurring meetings for

cooperative members provide a forum in which locals can express concerns and solve

conflicts.

Bringing in higher and external authorities, Ostrom’s seventh and eighth

principles require that community’s self-governance be respected and, for larger CPRs,

governance should exist at multiple levels and scales. In this case, the national

government does respect the community’s self-governance due to forestry acts

encouraging local management of resources. Although Rupa Lake’s watershed may be

considered a small CPR, it also incorporates aspects of Ostrom’s eighth principle since

multiple entities at different levels (from cooperative subgroups to NGOs to government

support) contribute to the management of the resource.

Implications: Criteria for a Sustainable Institution

Equipped with a definition for sustainability, we can determine what a “sustainable

institution” entails. Institutions involved in the management of Rupa Lake show promise

for eliciting sustainable outcomes for the longevity of ecosystems and the institutions

themselves. Based on the results of this research, I have created a five-prong criteria for a

sustainable commons institution.

43

First, sustainable institutions should provide benefits to society that it can see. In

interviews, community members were able to cite tangible economic and social benefits

they receive from the lake as a result of the cooperative and NGO efforts. Their

perception that these efforts are benefiting stakeholder interests is key in our definition of

sustainability and elicits the continued support and willingness of stakeholders to

participate.

Second, sustainable institutions should function democratically and with

transparency in order to take locals’ opinions into account and increase equity.

Community members indicated that they feel involved in Rupa Cooperative’s decision-

making and that their input is acknowledged—this kind of community support is crucial

for the cooperative’s longevity.

Third, sustainable institutions should elevate the status of marginalized groups.

Rupa Cooperative and local NGOs make efforts to include and benefit those groups that

need it most, such as women in Mother Groups, youth, and financially/ethnically

marginalized groups through the PES program. Elevating these groups ensures that

benefits created by the institutions are distributed equitably and that one or a few groups

do not receive all benefits at the expense of other groups.

Fourth, sustainable institutions promote biologically diverse ecosystems.

Biodiverse ecosystems have been shown to be more functional and resilient to change;

thus, fostering biodiversity is critical for the health of the resource and subsequently the

livelihoods of those who depend on it. Rupa Cooperative fosters biodiversity through its

PES program’s support of educational efforts and conservation groups. For example, it

44

has published a conservation guide to water birds of Rupa Lake and also financially

supports Mother Groups’ plant conservation and stewardship of the wetland habitat for

local birds and other species.

Fifth, sustainable institutions are collaborative and willing to work with other

institutions. This is a crucial component in this case study—Rupa Lake Cooperative

would not have been possible without the help of local NGOs and support of the

government. The synthesis of these entities has been an important factor for the longevity

of Rupa Lake because it combines local knowledge with the expertise and resources of

external agencies, enabling the creation of more inclusive ideas and solutions that would

not have come to fruition with the work of just one agency.

Discussion

As explored in the cultural theory portion of the literature review, differing ideologies

feed into differing perspectives on how to best manage natural resources. No ideology is

necessarily “wrong,” but combining approaches as opposed to opting for one creates for

more inclusive strategies. It can seem more simple and elegant to advocate for a single

approach, but my own research indicates that a synthesis of multiple approaches could

yield more robust results. The institutions managing Rupa Lake are an example of how

differing perspectives can come together.

Rupa Cooperative demonstrates individualistic principles because it is run by the

individuals who participate in the local market and aims to create profits for communities

from the sale of fish. Locals can still consume as much fish as they would like since the

fish caught by the cooperative is sold at market prices. However, the individualistic 45

element is less pronounced than the hierarchical and egalitarian elements because it has

restricted certain individual freedoms such as the rights of individuals to fish on the lake

for their own personal gain and the ability of individuals to remove vegetation from the

watershed anytime they would like.

Rupa Cooperative embodies hierarchical elements due to NGO and PES

investments in infrastructure, knowledge and other long-term solutions. For example,

investments in dry latrines and soil erosion prevention walls provide long-term physical

improvements, and investments in education via scholarships and conservation awareness

grants support the education necessary for the continued stewardship of the resource. A

hierarchical element which Rupa Cooperative could improve upon is investments in

scientific research on the watershed—quantitative data on biodiversity and sustainable

fishing yields are important as indicators for current ecosystem health and planning for

sustainability into the future.

Rupa Cooperative strongly demonstrates egalitarianism because it elevates

marginalized members of society, particularly through income-generating and

empowerment activities funded by the PES program. This includes the scholarships for

marginalized children, support for women’s groups, and funding for beehives, goats, and

other income-supporting activities. Additionally, it prioritizes environmental stewardship

through conservation funding and activities, including the conservation by Mother

Groups and vegetation removal restrictions by forestry groups.

Although Rupa Cooperative has room for improvement in catering to all of the

ideologies, the synergy of these components working together and complementing one

46

another enable the cooperative to reach a deeper level of sustainability not possible with a

less holistic approach. Moving forward, Rupa Cooperative may work to emphasize

incorporating more individualistic principles by granting more rights to individual users

to utilize the resources of the lake and its watershed.

In addition to combining ideologies, cross-scale governance has also

demonstrated to be a successful approach to governance based on this research. Rupa

Lake’s watershed is managed by a collaboration of communities, NGOs, and the

government—therefore, it cannot fit into a single category such as top-down or bottom-

up solutions, but rather falls under what other literature has termed “clumsy” solutions.

Institutions managing Rupa Lake recognize that the complex interactions between the

different organizations create for robust and adaptive solutions. By combining the

resources of the government, expert knowledge and resources of NGOs, and local

knowledge and culture of communities, these institutions are able to govern Rupa Lake

and its watershed in an inclusive and diverse manner that embodies the principles of

sustainability.

Like any research, this study is not perfect and its limitations should be noted.

First, methods for determining interviewees were not completely random, and most of the

information gathered from interviews and otherwise is qualitative in nature. Due to these

reasons, it is difficult to perform any statistical or quantitative analyses or generalize

responses to say that they are representative of the entire population of the cooperative or

community members.

47

Second, language and cultural barriers may have caused discrepancies in the data.

The use of an interpreter helped to bridge these gaps, but even so it is possible that

responses were not always translated with complete accuracy.

A third limitation of this study is that all interviewees were members of Rupa

Cooperative. This was intentional since members best understand how the cooperative

works and can explain its benefits, but it does not recognize the opinions of locals who

have not opted into the cooperative membership. It would be interesting to see how

nonmembers feel about the management of Rupa Lake and how it affects their

livelihoods.

Fourth, the lack of available archival data prevented me from obtaining certain

statistical and hard data that would have been useful for this research. For example, the

proportions of men and women would shed light on Rupa Cooperative’s inclusiveness of

the latter marginalized group. Also, data regarding membership in Rupa Cooperative over

time would have helped to illustrate the growth of the cooperative over time.

V. Conclusion

This case study of Rupa Lake used interviews, a focus group discussion, and a literature

review to analyze governing institutions involved in the management of the watershed

and potential sustainability outcomes. Based on findings, conclusions were drawn

regarding principles for the successful governance of the commons and guidelines for

developing sustainability-oriented institutions. It was found that, in the case of Rupa

Lake, no single form of governance was solely responsible for improving conditions of

the lake and society, and that instead institutions at different scales enabled its successes. 48

Qualities of institutions that contribute to Rupa Lake’s watershed sustainability are their

abilities to: provide benefits to society that it can recognize, function democratically and

transparently, promote a biodiverse ecosystem, elevate marginalized groups, and

collaborate with other institutions. These results have wider implications for the

governance of common-pool resources and may be applied to other ecosystems and

communities seeking the sustainability of local commons.

The results of this research demonstrate the complexity of commons management

and emphasize the fact that there is no one-size-fits-all solution to commons problems.

The institutions involved in managing Rupa Lake are tailored to the specific needs of

Rupa Lake and its watershed and to meeting the needs of the community. Such a complex

solution cannot be cleanly applied to resources in other areas, but may assist other entities

in creating institutions to sustain their own natural and socioeconomic systems.

Other commons institutions may use the framework outlined in the previous

section as a guideline, but the exact solutions exerted will vary depending on the

resource, community, and stakeholders involved. When creating policies and executing

actions, governing institutions beyond the community itself should be mindful of

community interests while striving to provide financial and cognitive resources to assist

in resource management.

The case study of Rupa Lake examines a relatively small ecosystem, which begets

the issue of whether this framework could be scaled up to apply to larger ecosystems

such as larger watersheds or ocean fisheries. Larger ecosystems often have more users,

which pose challenges for user groups in “organizing, agreeing on rules, and enforcing

49

rules” (Ostrom et al 1999). In such cases, assistance from institutions at state or national

levels can help to create more cohesive solutions, but must be done without

compromising the needs of local users.

Future research on Rupa Lake should continue to monitor the health of the

ecosystem and benefits to society. Scientific research may be conducted to determine

more quantitative data on ecosystem health such as number of species of fish, birds, or

plants (a biodiversity indicator) and other data monitoring. Collecting such data

periodically can help to determine how ecosystem health, community involvement and

perceived benefits change over time.

Additionally, although the cooperative has been able to increase annual fish catch,

Rupa Cooperative may be squandering its full potential in achieving maximum

sustainable yield. Or, conversely, it may be unknowingly depleting fish stocks in a

gradual, unforeseeable manner as seen in the case of Pauly’s shifting baseline syndrome

(1995). Future research should observe harvest rates, fish stock trends, and repopulation

efforts in order to more concretely determine potential yield for Rupa Lake.

Future research should also gather more information from marginalized members

of society to ensure that they continue to feel empowered by and included in decisions

regarding management of the lake and its watershed.

Other case studies on commons governance should consider not only community-

based institutions, but also collaborating agencies and overarching government

regulations which impact the resource and local community. Governing institutions may

50

be assessed for their potential to elicit sustainable outcomes by utilizing the guidelines

outlined here. These guidelines may be challenged or amended based on the results.

This case study has challenged the widespread notion that there is one “ideal”

way to govern common-pool resources. As opposed to any one panacea, the complex

interactions between local communities, NGOs, and state and national authorities can

create sustainable solutions that are tailored to best suit the unique, equally complex

conditions of different ecosystems and communities. When institutions collaborate to

govern holistically and inclusively, their solutions may not be the elegant cure-alls sought

after by researchers and policymakers, but demonstrate promise for eliciting the robust

and adaptive solutions necessary to achieve sustainability in ever-changing systems.

51

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