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r 915 X-202U (COPY) CHAMBER OF COi^/tEHCE OF THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA WASHINGTON, D. C. October 9> 1920 Honorable William P. G. Harding, Governor, Federal Reserve Board, Washington, D. C. My.dear Governor: Desiring to measure the effect of the declared policy of the Federal Reserve Board to restrict the undue use of the rediscount privilege by advancing the discount rate, we have had under consideration an analysis of the effect of the rate changes in the increase of the general bank rate, the changes in the loan account indicating a decrease Of loans on government war obligations and other bonds and stocks, and the increase of the volume of loans to discounts of member banks and of all state and national banks during a period from October, l$ig, to September 1, 1920. We have also had under consideration the decrease in market values of securities arising from an advance in interest rate, the purpose being not to under-vaiue the beneficial effects that may have resulted from the policy but rather to ascertain the cost to the public of this country in the interest bill on the one hand and the decreased market value of securities on the other as representing the offset to the safeguards that may have been included in carrying out the Board's policy. The analysis studied by our Board of Directors was not prepared in a spirit of criti- cism but rather of open and friendly inquiry and the figures compiled have, with very few exceptions, been taken from the statistical records of the Federal Reserve Board as published in the monthly bulletins from l a s t November to date. If we may venture to suggest anything to the consideration of the Federal Reserve Board it would be to express the conviction that a second definite instrument should be provided by law to be used in controlling the volume of rediscounts when the logical and usual instrument, the increase in the discount rate, fails in its effectiveness. We have a feeling that the Phelan act, passed in April of this year, provides this other instrument to limit rediscounts, but the exercise of this power on the part of the Federal Reserve bariks being optional it does not at present provide positive limitations vAiich indicate the basic volume of rediscount operations subject to increase upon application with valid reasons therefor. We c o r d i a l l y commend to your consideration the expression of our Digitized for FRASER http://fraser.stlouisfed.org/ Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis
Transcript

r 9 1 5

X-202U

( C O P Y ) CHAMBER OF COi /tEHCE

OF THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA WASHINGTON, D. C.

October 9> 1920

Honorable William P. G. Harding, Governor, Federal Reserve Board, Washington, D. C.

My.dear Governor:

Desi r ing to measure the e f f e c t of the declared pol icy of the Federal Reserve Board to r e s t r i c t the undue use of the rediscount p r i v i l e g e by advancing the discount r a t e , we have had under considerat ion an ana lys i s of the e f f e c t of the r a t e changes in the increase of the general bank r a t e , the changes i n the loan account ind ica t ing a decrease Of loans on government war ob l iga t ions and other bonds and stocks, and the increase of the volume of loans to discounts of member banks and of a l l s t a t e and na t iona l banks during a per iod from October, l $ ig , to September 1, 1920.

We have a l so had under considerat ion the decrease in market values of s e c u r i t i e s a r i s i n g from an advance in i n t e r e s t r a t e , the purpose being not to under-vaiue the b e n e f i c i a l e f f e c t s tha t may have r e su l t ed from the p o l i c y but r a t h e r to a s c e r t a i n the cost to the publ ic of t h i s country in the i n t e r e s t b i l l on the one hand and the decreased market value of s e c u r i t i e s on the other as represent ing the o f f s e t t o the safeguards t h a t may have been included in carrying out the Board's pol icy . The ana lys i s s tudied by our Board of Directors was not prepared in a s p i r i t of c r i t i -cism but r a the r of open and f r i e n d l y inquiry and the f igu res compiled have, with very few exceptions, been taken from the s t a t i s t i c a l records of the Federal Reserve Board as published in the monthly b u l l e t i n s from l a s t November to date .

If we may venture t o suggest anything to the considera t ion of the Federal Reserve Board i t would be to express the convict ion tha t a second d e f i n i t e instrument should be provided by law to be used in con t ro l l i ng the volume of red iscounts when the log ica l and usual instrument, the increase in the discount r a t e , f a i l s in i t s e f f e c t i v e n e s s .

We have a f e e l i n g tha t the Phelan ac t , passed in April of t h i s year, provides t h i s other instrument t o l i m i t rediscounts , but the exerc i se of t h i s power on the p a r t of the Federal Reserve bariks being opt ional i t does not a t present provide p o s i t i v e l i m i t a t i o n s vAiich ind ica te the bas ic volume of rediscount operat ions sub jec t to increase upon app l i ca t ion with v a l i d reasons t h e r e f o r .

We co rd i a l l y commend to your considerat ion the expression of our

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Board t h a t the rediscount r a t e may be placed upon a lower l eve l in the 'near f u t u r e , f e e l i n g conf ident t ha t t h i s ac t on the p a r t of the Federal Reserve Board w i l l immediately lower the general i n t e r e s t f a t e in the same r a t i o t h a t the advancing rediscount r a t e has served to s tep up the general bark r a t e .

We are not unmindful of the danger or d i f f i c u l t y tha t may a t tend a reduct ion of the rediscount r a t e in i t s e f f e c t upon the s e c u r i t i e s market and we a r e no t urging ac t ion in t h i s d i r ec t ion u n t i l such time as the safeguards have been extended uniformly throughout a l l of the Federal Beserve banks to make impossible a per iod of speculat ion, as the market values of s e c u r i t i e s move upward in keeping with the lower p r i c e of money. We a re desi rous of continuing our analys is of the e f f e c t s of t h i s po l i cy upon commerce and wi l l gladly tender to the Board any ass i s tance which the Chamber of Commerce may be able t o o f f e r in solving what we f e e l to be an i n t r i c a t e and d i f f i c u l t problem. We should a l so g rea t l y appreciate your c r i t i c i s m of our pos i t ion i f we have mis in te rpre ted the Board 's po l i cy in i t s r e s u l t s . w@ are a t t ach ing here to a copy of the memorandum which has had the a t t e n t i o n of the Directors and upon which the d iscuss ion of the subject has been pred ica ted .

Very t r u l y yours,

(Signed) JOSEPH H. DEPRESS

Pres iden t .

Inc losure :

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" ( C O * Y) X^2024a

TO THE BOARD OF DIRECTORS OF THE CHAMBER OF COMMERCE OF THE UNITED SPATES:

For eleven months the declared po l icy of the Federal Reserve Board

to cont ro l c r e d i t expansion, discourage speculat ive operat ion in s e c u r i t i e s

and commodities,bring about de f l a t i on , and r e t u r n to normal p r i c e l eve l s

has been in e f f e c t *

The extent t o which the po l i cy has been successful i s not ye t c l e a r . •

The instrument chosen, an increase in the rediscount r a t e operat ing i n

normal times, would surely have brought about the con t ro l s sought, but

normal times are no t wi th us ye t and adjustments have been p a r t i c u l a r l y

d i f f i c u l t because world complexities inf luence them. Channels of com-

munication are not a l l open arid running smoothly. Transportat ion on land

and sea i s s t i l l s u f f e r i n g from the s t r a i n of war condi t ions . In t e rna t iona l

c r e d i t i s s t i l l chaot ic ahd the exhausted surpluses of the n e c e s s i t i e s of

l i f e have not yet been regained. Perhaps experimentation with t h i s ins t i l l*

ment was des i rab le i f only to ingufe tke Maintenance of the lawful reserves

of gold agains t the deposi t and note c i r c u l a t i o n l i a b i l i t y of the Federal

Reserve system, but whether the r e s u l t s hoped f o r have or have not bean

r e a l i z e d the value of these r e s u l t s must be measured by the disadvantages

su f fe red to secure them, and the po l i cy of the Federal Reserve Board has

had such a marked e f f e c t upon the i n t e r e s t r a t e f o r cur ren t and time c r e d i t

operat ions , and upon the values of outstanding s e c u r i t i e s , and even in

some measure upon the general p r i ce l e v e l , t h a t I have been l e d to make

an ana lys i s f o r your considera t ion t o permit you t o determine whether a

change of nol icy i s advisable or necessary, or whether a f u r t h e r amend-

ment t o the Federal Reserve law should be made to provide other i n s t r u -

ments of control than the one used in t h i s ins tance .

In p r e sen t i ng t h i s ana lys i s I wish i t d i s t i n c t l y understood t h a t I

am not c r i t i c i s i n g the Federal Reserve Board nor the boards of the Federal Digitized for FRASER http://fraser.stlouisfed.org/ Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis

— 2 - X-20?4a

Reserve banks. I am simply asking a cons idera t ion of the apparent r e s u l t s

of the Board's p o l i c y to determine, perchance, whether the Chamber of

Commerce of the United S t a t e s has a duty i n connect ion wi th the f a r t h e r

continuance of t h i s p o l i c y .

We may assume t h a t the c o n s i s t e n t operat ion of the p o l i c y has develop-

ed c e r t a i n r e s t r a i n i n g i n f l u e n c e s . Hie e x t e n t t o which d i s a s t e r has been

averted i s d i f f i c u l t t o measure. The unknown q u a n t i t i e s may compensate

f o r a l l c o s t s . I s h a l l not t r y t o speculate regarding them, but only to

s e t f o r t h such comparative f a c t s as are a v a i l a b l e from the records of the

Federal Reserve system.

1 . We must admit t h a t the r e s t r a i n t s of an increased red i scount rate

he lped t o maintain t h e m e t a l l i c reserve a g a i n s t d e p o s i t s and note c i r c u l a -

t i o n . Hie va lue of t h i s as ho ld ing the p u b l i c conf idence i n the Federal

Reserve system i s very grea t . The same r e s u l t might have been obtained by

a broader i n t e r p r e t a t i o n of the power of the Board to l i m i t r ed i s count s ,

but the law i s not mandatory or even s p e c i f i c on t h i s quest ion of l i m i t a -

t i o n and, t h e r e f o r e , the instrument chosen was the natura l and l o g i c a l on6*

2 . Hie investment account of e i g h t hundred report ing member banks

has been reduced from November, 1919» t o Ju ly , 1920, by something over

$450,000, OCX).

3 . The l o a n s on Uni ted S t a t e s bonds and c e r t i f i c a t e s f l u c t u a t e d

from $1 ,061 ,000 ,000 on October 4 to a high of $1 ,189 ,000 ,000 i n March to

a low of $1 ,000 ,000 ,000 i n Ju ly , a n e t decrease f o r the per iod of

$61 ,000 ,000 .

4 . Loans on s tocks and bonds other than United S t a t e s s e c u r i t i e s

l i k e w i s e f l u c t u a t e d from $3 ,200 ,000 ,000 i n October to a h igh of $3 ,350-

000 ,000 i n January to a low o f $3 ,046 ,000 ,000 i n J u l y , a n e t decrease f o r

the p e r i o d of $156 ,000 ,000 . Undoubtedly the h i g h i n t e r e s t r a t e de ferred

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- 3 -X-2064a

some capital investnients where the earning power of s u c h investments

was low, and bond and stock operations and commodity purchases were

curtai led. Operations of a highly prof i table or speculative nature,

however, probably proceeded, notwithstanding the rate; for speculation,

e spec ia l ly in abnormal titii68* playti fbr a stake and the pride of money

becomes a secondary consideration.

I wish to d i scuss in t h e i r order the changes s ince the Federal Re-

serve po l i cy was announced in

The p r i ce of money; The general s tock of money; The index f i g u r e s f o r wholesale 'pr ices; The loans and discounts of r epor t ing banks and

a l l s t a t e and na t iona l banks; The p r i c e of war obl igat ions of the United

Sta tes Government; The p r i c e of a l l other bonds; The volume of s e c u r i t i e s issued.

The ftrice of Money:

The Federal Reserve Board i n i t s Bu l l e t in dated October 1, 1919,said:

"The disappearance of the Treasury from the long term loan market and the rapid reduct ion of i t s requirements f o r short term accommodation foreshadow the approach of the time when the f i n a n c i a l operat ions of the Government wi l l cease t o be the important f a c t o r in shaping Reserve bark p o l i c i e s which they have been, and Federal Reserve bark r a t e s once more w i l l be f ixed sole ly with a view of a id ing commerce and b u s i n e s s . "

In the November Bu l l e t i n the Board sa id :

"A review of a l l the condi t ions in the banking s i t u a t i o n has confirmed the Board i n the view tha t in the app l i ca t ion of i t s discount po l i cy an advance of r a t e s should no longer be d e f e r r e d . "

Also, in the December B u l l e t i n the Board sa id :

"The usua l method of r e s t r i c t i n g the undue use of the rediscount p r i v i l e g e i s t o advance r a t e s . This po l i cy would have been put i n t o operat ion several months ago except f o r i t s bear ing upon government f inanc ing . The f a c t tha t the Treasury had sold more than twenty b i l l i o n s

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X.2024a - 4 -

i n bonds and Victory notes , magp of which had been taken by persons who had been unable to pay f o r them in f u l l but were obliged to car ry them a t banks, l i q u i d a t i n g t h e i r ob l iga t ions from time to time, ma te r i a l ly a l t e r e d the po l icy which would otherwise have been adopted by the Board. That a r e l a t i v e l y low r a t e was maintained f o r the purpose of accom-modating bona f i d e subscr ibers to government ob l iga t ions opened an opportuni ty f o r other borrowers t o obta in funds f o r t h e i r own purposes a t comparatively low c o s t . "

For more than twelve months preceding these e d i t o r i a l announcements

rediscount r a t e s had been maintained a t from 4-1/4$ to 4-3/4$, and t h i s

r a t e served to anchor the r a t e charged by member banks to customers, and

in the open market a t 5 -1 /4$ to 5 - l / 2$ , a d i f f e r e n t i a l of from 3/4$ to

1$ above the rediscount r a t e .

Quoting from the Board1 s March B u l l e t i n :

" I t was the Board's view a l so tha t as a r u l e the discount r a t e s of the Federal Reserve Banks should be higher than cu r -ren t market r a t e s , thus o f f e r i n g no incent ive to member banks to rediscount f o r the sake of making a p r o f i t in the t r a n s a c t i o n . "

However proper t h i s view may be, the operat ion does not seem to

proceed tha t way, and the argument most f r equen t ly advanced when the

Federal Reserve law was under d iscuss ion was t h a t the power of the Federal

Reserve Board t o meke a rediscount r a t e would serve t o s t a b i l i z e bank r a t e s

upon a reasonable and favorable l e v e l .

From September t o November 29, 1$19, the rediscount r a t e was f r a c t i o n -

a l l y advanced and the general bank discount r a t e moved up f r a c t i o n a l l y to

a maximum of 6$. Under normal condi t ions t h i s f r a c t i o n a l advance would

have re ta rded loan expansion but the contrary was the r e s u l t and up to

January 16, 1920, the loans and discounts of some e igh t hundred r epo r t ing

banks increased $500,000,000. On January 21, 1920, the f i r s t consequential

rediscount increase was made, t o a maximum of 6$. Hie r e s u l t to May 14

was an increase in loans and discounts of $1,500,000,000. Subdivided, the

loans changed as fo l l ows :

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- 5 -X-20"Ua

On U. S. s e c u r i t i e s , increase $87,000,000; On stocks and bonds other than U. S. s e c u r i t i e s ,

decrease $250,000,000; Other loans , p r i n c i p a l l y commercial paper and d i s -

counts, increase $1,600,000,000.

Comment e d i t o r i a l l y in the March and April Bu l l e t i n s of the

Federal Reserve Board was as fo l lowst

"The normal and t r a d i t i o n a l method of c r e d i t control has been the discount r a t e . I t s e f f i c i e n c y , however, p r e -supposes normal condi t ions. The advance in r a t e operates in normal condi t ions not only to diminish the demand f o r c r e d i t by making ce r t a in a c t i v i t i e s unp ro f i t ab l e but as well i t increases the supply of c r e d i t by a t t r a c t i n g i t from other cen te r s or count r ies . The condi t ions t h a t make t h i s t r a d i t i o n a l control e f f e c t i v e do not a l l e x i s t a t the present time. The expansion of c red i t s e t in motion by the war mast be checked. Credit must be brought under e f f e c t i v e control and i t s f low must be regulated and governed with ca re fu l regard f o r the economic welfare of the country and the needs of the producing i ndus t r i e s . Def la t ion , however, merely f o r the sake of d e f l a t i o n and the speedy r e tu rn to normal, d e f l a t i o n merely fo r the sake of r e s to r ing s e c u r i t i e s and commodities to t h e i r prewar l e v e l s without regard to other a f f a i r s ,wou ld be an insensate proceeding in the ex i s t i ng posture of na t iona l and world a f f a i r s .

"The influencesof the discount r a t e po l i cy of the Federal Reserve banks upon the investment market has i f anything been l e s s obvious than in the commercial banking f i e l d . As money r a t e s have increased the inf luence tending to maintain c a p i t a l operat ions a t comparatively low leve l have been correspondingly l e s sened . "

On May 29 a f u r t h e r subs tan t i a l increase was made in the rediscount r a t e , t o a maximum of 7%, Comment e d i t o r i a l l y in the June, Ju ly and August Bu l l e t i n s was as fo l lows:

"In view of the steady pressure f o r funds and by way of emphasizing the necess i ty f o r continued moderation in rediscount app l i ca t ions , advances not exceeding f i f t e e n days, secured by e l i g i b l e commercial paper, are f i xed a t the r a t e of 7 per cent , May 29th.

"Seven pef cent r a t e f o r commercial paper, which has j u s t been e s t ab l i shed , s u b s t a n t i a l l y r e f l e c t s condi t ions in the com-mercial loan market of t h i s country, where during the pas t month there has been a decided upward tendency, due to the increased pressure f o r commercial banking operat ions. The new r a t e s , t h e r e -f o r e , b r i ng the rediscount charge p r a c t i c a l l y into l i n e with the movements of commercial r a t e s .

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X-202Ua 9 2 2 - o -

"The ques t ion c o n s t a n t l y asked w i t h i n the l a s t few months has been the r e l a t i o n s h i p noted between the contro l of c r e d i t , the a p p l i c a t i o n of h igher d i scount r a t e s , and the a c t u a l ex -pans ion of opera t ions . On t h i s subjec t the ev idence i s s t i l l c o n f l i c t i n g and l a c k i n g i n c e r t a i n t y as to d e t a i l s . Die gen-e r a l c o n c l u s i o n to be drawn i s unmistakably t o the e f f e c t t h a t the o p e r a t i o n of c r e d i t contro l through h igher d iscount r a t e s has had a marked s u c c e s s . I t i s true that during the e a r l i e r per iod of i t s a p p l i c a t i o n , November, December, January, and February, an abso lu te check to the growth of r e d i s c o u n t i n g was n o t e f f e c t e d . This f a c t , however, should not be i n t e r p r e t e d i n the l i g h t of abso lu te f i g u r e s but rather i n the l i g h t o f r e l a -t i v e c o n d i t i o n s . "

"Summarizing the outcome, Governor Harding expres se s the op in i on:

•Further expansion of bank c r e d i t s has apparent ly been checked, though the volume of l oans and d i s c o u n t s of n e i t h e r member batiks nor Federal Beserve Banks has been m a t e r i a l l y reduced. 1

"The r e s u l t i n quest ion i s be ing a t t a i n e d on ly i n p a r t through the d i r e c t i n f l u e n c e of h igher r a t e s of i n t e r e s t and d i scount and i n part through the a p p l i c a t i o n cf j u d i c i o u s methods of l i m i t i n g u n e s s e n t i a l and unnecessary c r e d i t s . "

The e f f e c t of t h e s e i n c r e a s e s on the general bank r a t e was t o s t e p up customers' r a t e s to 7$ and open-market purchases to 8$ . The r e s u l t to J u l y 16 of the e f f o r t to c u r t a i l d i s count s and r e d i s c o u n t s was a s f o l l o w s :

Total l o a n s of e i g h t hundred report ing banks i n c r e a s e d $1,950,OTO,OOO.

The changes i n the loan account were as f o l l o w s :

Loans secured by U.S. o b l i g a t i o n s decreased $61 ,000 ,000 . Loans secured by s tocks and bonds decreased $156 ,000 ,000 . A l l o ther loans increased $2 ,195 ,000 ,000 .

and the f i g u r e s f o r September 17 show but a s l i g h t v a r i a t i o n from these

t o t a l s .

The r e s u l t on r e d i s c o u n t s h e l d by the Federal Reserve Batiks was t o

i n c r e a s e the t o t a l r e d i s c o u n t s to $350,000,000> but the d i s t r i b u t i o n was

markedly d i f f e r e n t i n that l o a n s on U.S. s e c u r i t i e s decreased $444,000,000,.

wh i l e other r e d i s c o u n t s , p r i n c i p a l l y commercial paper, i n c r e a s e d $79 5»000,000-

I t must be borne i n mind t h a t the t r a n s a c t i o n s here r e f e r r e d to represent

only the o p e r a t i o n s of about e i g h t hundred r e p o r t i n g member banks. On

February 28 ,1920 , the l o a n s and d i s c o u n t s of a l l Nat ional and State banks

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9 2 . 3

_7- - x-aosit a

were $26 ,685 ,000 ,000 . On February 13th the l o a n s and d i scounts of the r e p o r t i n g

banks whose f i g u r e s make up our comparison were $13 ,931 ,000 ,000 .

I t would appear from the forego ing that the p o l i c y adopted by the Federal

Beserve Board d id not decrease loans and d i scounts nor r e d i s c o u n t s , although

had no r e s t r a i n t been imposed we do not know how f a r the gold reserve might have

been impaired nor can we e s t i m a t e the ex tent to which d i s c o u n t s might have been

increased. We do know that the operat ion of the Board's p o l i c y served to i n -

crease the average i n t e r e s t ra te on current short time borrowings by at l e a s t

l - l / 2 % on $26 ,000 ,000 ,000 of c r e d i t , or an annual c o s t , i f the p o l i c y i s pursued,

of $400,000,000 more than would have been the case had the general bank ra te

and the red i scount remained a t or about the f i g u r e s of October, 1919* Perhaps

we may r a i s e the quest ion whether the choice of another instrument of contro l than

the r a i s i n g of the red i scount r a t e would n o t have been qui te a s e f f e c t i v e

and l e s s c o s t l y .

Stock of Money :

I f the p o l i c y of the Federal Re serve Board did not decrease r e d i s c o u n t s

i t must l i k e w i s e have f a i l e d t o reduce the general stock of money i n the

United S t a t e s and the amount i n c i r c u l a t i o n . The general s tock of money in

the United S t a t e s increased $430,000,000 from September 1 , 1919, to September '

1 , 1920, and the money i n c i r c u l a t i o n increased in t h e same per iod $464,000,000.

The per c a p i t a c i r c u l a t i o n , which was $54.03 on September 1 , 1919, increased

to $57*88, al though an e s t i m a t e of the i n c r e a s e in populat ion was a p p l i e d

in t h i s l a s t computation#

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X-2024 a

: 924

Index Figures of Wholesale P r i c e s :

I should not care to a t t r i b u t e to the p o l i c y of the Federal Reserve

Board the r e s p o n s i b i l i t y f o r the p r i c e advances of t h i s per iod , although

increased i n t e r e s t r a t e s would hardly br ing about p r i c e d e f l a t i o n . The

Bureau of Labor S t a t i s t i c s submits index f i g u r e s f o r a l l commodities show-

ing a steady advance from 220 i n October to 272 in May wi th a r e c e s s i o n

s ince May t o 262 f o r the month of July , whi le the index numbers of a l l

commodities provided by the S t a t i s t i c a l Department of the Federal Reserve

Board range from 212 i n October to 264 i n May with a r e c e s s i o n to 251 i n

Ju ly , 1920.

I t seems p e r f e c t l y obvious that n e i t h e r the money i n c i r c u l a t i o n nor

the l oans and d i s c o u n t s could be reduced i n the f a c e of such p r i c e advances,

which would demand l a r g e r c a p i t a l and c r e d i t to f inance the same number

of u n i t s produced and d i s t r i b u t e d ; n e i t h e r could i t be l o g i c a l l y argued

that the general stock of money or the volume of loans and d i scounts was

out of range wi th the increase in p r i c e s . Taking the n a t i o n a l banks as a

f a i r guide, the l o a n s and d i s c o u n t s doubled between December 31, 1914, and

May, 1920, whi l e commodity p r i c e s increased from 100 to the maximum of 272

during the same per iod .

jiflaps and, Discounts of Reporting Batiks and of a l l Banks :

I think I have r e f e r r e d s u f f i c i e n t l y to t h i s i tem i n the paragraph

an the p r i c e of money. Loans on Government War o b l i g a t i o n s and on other

stodks and bonds were decreased $217,000,000, but other l oans were increased

$2 ,195 ,000 ,000 to cover the requirements of commerce owing t o p r i c e advances,

and i f a l l Nat ional and S t a t e banks are cons idered, i n s t e a d of only .the

eight hundred banks Used i n the comparisons, the t o t a l s would be g rea t ly

increased.

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Pr ice of U. 8. T7ar Obligat ions; .

The if f ee t of an increased rediscount r a t e upon the outstanding

war ob l iga t ions of the Government was f irmly in the mind of the Federal Res-

erve Board, and a s long as the Government was a l a rge borrower r a t e s were

anchored down to low l e v e l s . Perhaps other inf luences beside the discount

r a t e a f f e c t e d the market value of .these s e c u r i t i e s , but the g rea tes t de-

c l ines followed the r a t e changes under the Federal Reserve Board po l i cy .

On October 10, 1919/ the market value of a l l outstanding war ob-

l i g a t i o n s was $19, *+75,000,000. Af ter the f r a c t i o n a l r a t e advances of Nov-

ember and December the market value declined to $19,251,000,000. Af ter the

l a r g e r increases in the rediscount r a t e in January and in May, the market

value was reduced to $17,641,000,000, while on September 1 of t h i s year

the market value was $17,308,000,000, a t o t a l l o s s in market value from

October, 1919* t o September,. 1920, of approximately $2,166,000,000.

Other Bonds: z

At the beginning of 1920 the par value of r a i l road bonds out-

standing was subs t an t i a l l y $12,$00,000,000. The market value was $9# 079/

000,000. On May 31 the market value approximated $8,484,000,000, a l o s s

of $595>000,000, while on September 1 a gain was r eg i s t e r ed , probably due

to favorable l e g i s l a t i o n , making the market value $8,631#000,000, a l o s s

for the f u l l period of $448,000,000.

On publ ic u t i l i t i e s s e c u r i t i e s the f i n a l f i g u r e s a r e not compiled

but the l o s s from October, 1919, t o September, 1$20, w i l l surely exceed

$500,000,000.

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• " 9 2 6 I n d u s t r i a l bonds have l ikewise been se r ious ly a f f e c t e d . The t o t a l s

of t he se and the l o s s i n market value can be obtained. Su f f i ce i t t o say

t h a t , a s an i n d i c a t i o n i n market value , four of the most s t ap le i n d u s t r i a l

bond i s s u e s l o s t from October 10, 1919# t o September, 1920, 5-1 /2 p o i n t s .

No e f f o r t has been na.de t o compute the l o s s i n market value of the

great volume of municipal boiids outs tanding, but t h i s w i l l probably closely

p a r a l l e l the l o s s sus ta ined i n the Government's war ob l iga t ions and produce

a t o t a l shrinkage i n market values i n excess of $5* 000>000,000. Of course,

t h i s i s not a l l a l o s s , f o r t he market values w i l l be r e s to r ed wi th im-

proved condi t ions and a s the prospect f o r lower r a t e s becomes assured , but

the l o s s t o i nd iv idua l s and corpora t ions can be measured by the t r ansac t ions

i n these i s s u e s and w i l l , i f computed, show s u r p r i s i n g f i g u r e s . Here agpiin

I r a i s e the ques t ion whether the choice of some o ther instrument than the

l a r g e increase i n the rediscount r a t e might not have been a s e f f e c t i v e in

r e s t r a i n i n g and much l e s s cos t ly .

S e c u r i t i e s Issued;

Bond, stock and note i s sues during the per iod under cons idera t ion

must a l s o be considered i n c a l c u l a t i n g the r e s u l t s of t he Federal Reserve

Beard ' s p o l i c y . From January t o August inc lus ive , 1919, new i s s u e s amounted

t o $1,850,000.000. From January t o August i nc lu s ive , 1920, new i s sues

amounted to $2,444,000,000, These f i g u r e s would not i n d i c a t e t h a t the

po l icy of t h e Federal Reserve Board had grea t ly r e s t r a i n e d the issuance of

s e c u r i t i e s , but the a d d i t i o n to the overhead cos t s a r i s i n g from a g rea t ly

increased i n t e r e s t r a t e w i l l be presen t f o r some years and c o n s t i t u t e a

tax upon t h e pub l i c which, i n the l a s t ana ly s i s , must assume the burden,

We have been cons ider ing up to t h i s poin t only s e c u r i t i e s bought and

sold on the exchanges, bu t re fe rence must be made t o t h a t grea t mass of

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other loans , including r ea l e s t a t e loans, the market value of which has

been a f f e c t e d and t o the cost of new or refunding f inancing grea t ly i n -

creased by the general i n t e r e s t l e v e l . Cotild another instrument than,

a r ad i ca l increase i n the rediscount r a t e have been chosen?

Section 5202 of the Revised S ta tu tes provides t h a t

"No na t iona l banking as soc ia t ion shal l a t any time be indebted, or i n any way l i a b l e , t o an amount exceeding the amount of i t s c ap i t a l stock a t such time ac tua l ly paid i n and remaining undiminished by l o s s e s or otherwise, except on account of demands of the nature fol lowing:

Notes of c i r c u l a t i o n .

Moneys deposited with or col lected by the a s soc i a t ion .

B i l l s of exchange or d r a f t s drawn aga ins t money ac tua l ly on deposit to the c red i t of the assoc ia t ion , or due there to .

L i a b i l i t i e s to the stockholders of the a s s o c i a t i o n or dividends and reserve p r o f i t s . "

In September, 1916, t h i s sect ion was amended t o make poss ib le

f u r t h e r expansion of l i a b i l i t i e s incurred under the provis ions of the

Federal Reserve Act.

In the March Bu l l e t in the Governor of the Federal Reserve Bank i s

reported a s follows:.

"Although there a re no s p e c i f i c l i m i t a t i o n s imposed upon the

amount of borrowings by member banks a t the Federal Reserve banks,

the re i s a p o t e n t i a l l i m i t a t i o n provided f o r i n the Act. In tha t

pa r t of sec t ion 4 which r e l a t e s t o the du t i e s of the board of

d i r e c t o r s of a Federal Reserve Bank there i s the fol lowing:

'Said board sha l l adminis ter the a f f a i r s of said bank f a i r l y and impar t i a l ly and without d iscr iminat ion i n favor of or aga ins t any member bank or banks and s h a l l , subject to the p rov is ions of law and the orders of the Federal Reserve Board, extend t o each member bank such discounts , advancements,and accomodat ions a s may be sa fe ly and reasonably 'made with due regard f o r the claims of other member banks ' . Digitized for FRASER

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"Therefore, i t i s p o s s i b l e t o determine t h e o r e t i c a l l y what

a f a i r l i n e of accommodation f o r any member bank would be; that i s ,

what amount of accommodation can be granted 1 s a f e l y and reasonably

wi th due regard f o r the claims of other member banks 1 .

"Any attempt, however, t o contro l cred i t by t h e a p p l i c a t i o n

of t h i s ru l e i s subject t o s e r i o u s admin i s t ra t ive d i f f i c u l t i e s .

If t h e paper o f f e r e d i s e l i g i b l e arid good, i t would be b e t t e r f o r

a r e s e r v e bank t o grant accommodation a t a p r i c e rather than t o

r e f u s e i t e n t i r e l y , but t h e a c t , subd iv i s ion (d) , s e c t i o n 14, pro-

v i d e s t h a t a Federal Reserve Bank s h a l l have power t o e s t a b l i s h

from time t o t ime, subjec t t o review and determinat ion of the

Federal Reserve Board, r a t e s of discount t o be charged by the

Federal Reserve Bank f o r each c l a s s of paper, which s h a l l be f i x e d

wi th a view of accommodating commerce and b u s i n e s s . There i s no

a u t h o r i t y , however, f o r e s t a b l i s h i n g graduated r a t e s based upon

the t o t a l borrowings of a member bank, and consequently when i t

becomes necessary t o advance the d iscount rate i n order t o curb

demands of those banks red i scount ing wi th the Federal Reserve Banks

i n very l a r g e amounts the same rate would have t o apply t o t h e

moderate requirements of other member banks who nay rediscount wi th

the Federal Reserve Banks in frequent ly and rover e x c e s s i v e l y . Thus

a p p l i c a t i o n of r a t e advances a s a c o r r e c t i v e or de terrent t o c e r t a i n

banks tends t o r a i s e the l e v e l of current r a t e s t o a l l .

"The Board, t h e r e f o r e , recommends t o Congress t h a t an a d d i t i o n a l

power be granted i t , by adding t o subd iv i s ion ( d ) , s e c t i o n 14,

a p r o v i s o that each Federal Reserve Bank may, w i t h the approval of

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the Federal Reserve Board, determine by uniform r u l e , a p p l i c a b l e

t o a l l i t s member banks a l i k e , the normal maximum rediscount

l i n e of each member bank and that i t may submit f o r the review

and determinat ion of the Federal Reserve Beard graduated r a t e s

on an ascend ing s c a l e t o apply equal ly and ra tab ly to a l l i t s

member banks r e d i s c o u n t i n g amounts i n e x c e s s of t h e normal l i n e

so determined. In t h i s way, i n the opinion of the Board, i t would

be p o s s i b l e t o reduce e x c e s s i v e borrowings of member banks and t o

induce them t o hold t h e i r own l a r g e borrowers i n check without

r a i s i n g the b a s i c r a t e . The Federal Reserve Banks would thus be

provided wi th an e f f e c t i v e method of d e a l i n g w i th c r e d i t expansion

more near ly a t t h e source than i s now p r a c t i c a b l e and without

unnecessary hardship to banks and borrowers who are conducting

t h e i r a f f a i r s w i t h i n the bounds of moderation.

"Congress on Apri l 3 f i n a l l y completed i t s work upon the

Phslan b i l l which had been recommended by the Board, and the

Pres ident on Apri l 13 s igned the measure, thus making i t law.

The Act a s now on the s t a t u t e books fur ther extends the Beard's

power i n connect ion wi th the approving of discount r a t e s by pro-

v i d i n g t h a t these rates *subject t o the approval , review, and

determinat ion of the Federal Reserve Board, may be graduated or

progressed on the b a s i s of the amount of the advances and d i s -

count accommodations extended by the Federal Reserve Bank t o the

borrowing bank' . The new p r o v i s i o n i s thus permiss ive and not

mandatory, i t s purpose being t h a t of au thor i z ing Federal Reserve

Banks w i t h the approval of the Board t o e s t a b l i s h a ' l i n e of c r e d i t 1

or d iscount accommodation f o r each member bank, s u b j e c t i n g those

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which p a s s beyond t h i s l i m i t i n t h e i r a p p l i c a t i o n s t o a pro-

g r e s s i v e l y growihg rate designed t o r e p r e s s the undue e n l a r g e -

ment of such a p p l i c a t i o n s . "

From the August B u l l e t i n we take the f o l l o w i n g :

"Under the terms of t h e Phelan Act adopted by Congress

on Apri l 13, 1920, p r o v i s i o n was made f o r the a p p l i c a t i o n of

graduated r a t e s of red iscount , r i s i n g from a base ra te t o be

e s t a b l i s h e d a t the opt ion of the board of d i r e c t o r s of the

Federal Reserve Bank, according a s the a p p l i c a t i o n s f o r r e -

d iscount f i l e d by member banks exceeded a s p e c i f i e d or base

l i n e t o which the normal or b a s i c discount ra te was a p p l i c a b l e .

S ince the adopt ion of t h e Phelan Act the new plan has been put

i n t o e f f e c t by four Federal Reserve Banks. The b a s i c l i n e which

has been adopted by the At lanta , S t . Louis , and Kansas City banks

i s two and one-half t imes a sum equal t o 65 per cent of the

member bank's average reserve balance p l u s i t s p a i d - i n s u b s c r i p -

t i o n t o the c a p i t a l s tock of the Federal Reserve Bank, both c a l -

cu lated over a f i x e d per iod e i t h e r preceding or i d e n t i c a l wi th

the per iod t o which the b a s i c l i n e a p p l i e s . For the D a l l a s

d i s t r i c t , however, a b a s i c discount l i n e was adopted equal t o

the p a i d - i n c a p i t a l and surplus of the member bank. At lanta

and S t . Louis apply the normal ra te , i , e . , the general e f f e c t i v e

ra te t o a l l o f f e r i n g s f o r rediscount and apply a p r o g r e s s i v e

• s u p e r - r a t e ' a t the end of the reserve computation per iod t o the

average borrowings i n e x c e s s of the b a s i c l i n e , wh i l e Kansas City

and D a l l a s impose the ' s u p e r - r a t e ' upon such part of the current

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o f f e r i n g s a s may, t o g e t h e r wi th outs tanding borrowings, be

i n e x c e s s of the b a s i c l i n e . As a s c a l e o i r a t e s , a l l four

banks have adopted an increase of one-half of 1 p s r cent

f o r anyth ing up t o 25 per cant i n exces s of the b a s i c

l i n e , w i t h 1 per cent f o r the second 25 per cent e x c e s s ,

and so on upward. Exceptions to t h i s progres s ive rate

p l a n were genera l ly made i n case of member bank c o l l a t e r a l

n o t e s secured by Government o b l i g a t i o n s , a l though some

v a r i a t i o n i n method of making except ions has been

introduced i n the four banks where the p lan has been

i n e f f e c t . As i l l u s t r a t i v e of the working of the p lan

a concrete example nay be c i t e d . A bank with a normal

l i n e of $100,000 and borrowings of $200,000 would be

charged an excess , or super-rate of one-half of 1 per

cent on $25,000, 1 psr cent on an equal amount, a 1 - 1 / 2

per cent on a l i k e amount, and 2 per cent on the f i n a l

$25 ,000 . A l l paper under discount on the date the

p r o g r e s s i v e r a t e s became e f f e c t i v e was exempted from

the a p p l i c a t i o n of the super-rate , a l though counted a s

part of the general c r e d i t s tructure i n determining the

s c a l e of s u p e r - r a t e s a p p l i c a b l e t o new l o a n s or to

renewals . The working of the p l a n i s of cons iderable

i n t e r e s t because of • the f a c t t h a t i t has not been app l i ed

to a l l d i s t r i c t s , w h i l e there has been d i f f e r e n c e of op in ion

a s t o the t h e o r e t i c a l advantages of i t . "

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This r e c i t a l i s not made f o r the purpose of fau l t—f ind ing . Water once over

the dam cannot be brought back. Disadvantages s u f f e r e d or l o s s e s sus ta ined

through the p o l i c y adopted by the Board cannot be recovered.

The cpiestion would appear to be whether another instrument than a r a d i c a l

increase of the rediscount r a t e could have been chosen that would, have e f f e c t -

i v e l y appl ied needed r e s t r a i n t s and proved l e s s c o s t l y t o the commerce of the

country.

I t i s ev ident that the Governor of the Federal Beserve Board b e l i e v e d that

the boards of the Federal Reserve banks had the power t o l i m i t r e d i s c o u n t s , but

they did not see f i t t o e x e r c i s e i t , probably because the power was permiss ive

only and un i formi ty of a c t i o n was d i f f i c u l t to secure .

When the r a i s e i n the discount r a t e i n November and December d id not produce

the des i red r e s u l t s , some other expedient could have been t r i e d , but again the

prov i s ions of the law were not mandatory and even the p r o v i s i o n s of the Phelan

Act l e f t i t t o the d i s c r e t i o n of the boards of the Federal Reserve banks to adopt

a b a s i c l i m i t of red i scounts and a progress ive ra te f o r the e x c e s s of such l i m i t s .

So long as the power to s e t l i m i t a t i o n s and t o impose e i t h e r the maximum

r a t e approved by the Federal Reserve Board or the p r o g r e s s i v e r a t e of the Phelan

Act i s o p t i o n a l , there w i l l cont inue to be a measure of u n c e r t a i n t y and lack of

cohes ive and uniform a c t i o n among the Federal Reserve banks.

A c e r t a i n measure of f l e x i b i l i t y must be r e t a i n e d , f o r the demands upon the

Regional Banks d i f f e r m a t e r i a l l y , but more uni formity can be had without des troy-

ing the f l e x i b i l i t y .

( l ) The Chamber of Commerce of the United S t a t e s could suggest to the Federal

Reserve Board a r e s t o r a t i o n of the red i scount r a t e to a l e v e l which a l l of the

Regional Banks could adopt wi thout impairing the f l e x i b i l i t y of t h e i r own a c t i o n

or make f o r d i s c r i m i n a t i o n as between the member banks.

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Acting under the p r o v i s i o n s of the Phelan A c t a b a s i c l i m i t a t i o n of

red i scounts could be s e t f o r a l l member banks.

Rediscount p r i v i l e g e s required i n e x c e s s of t h i s l i m i t a t i o n could be

granted by the boards of the Regional Banks upon a p p l i c a t i o n and a t a r a t e

i n keeping with the e s s e n t i a l character of the e x c e s s requirements and the

need to maintain the l e g i t i m a t e commercial operat ions of the Region.

(2 ) When next opportunity o f f e r s , there could be proposed an

amendment to the law that the b a s i c l i m i t a t i o n be f i x e d as a mandatory p r o v i s i o n .

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