+ All Categories
Home > Documents > frsbog_mim_v22_0257.pdf

frsbog_mim_v22_0257.pdf

Date post: 06-Jan-2016
Category:
Upload: fedfraser
View: 215 times
Download: 0 times
Share this document with a friend
Popular Tags:
7
7/17/2019 frsbog_mim_v22_0257.pdf http://slidepdf.com/reader/full/frsbogmimv220257pdf 1/7 TO: The  Federal Reserve Board X-4314 257 From: Divisions  of  Bank Operations  3;nd  Research  and  Statistics. THE  MCFAD3EN BILL  TO  REVISE  THE  FEEERAL RESERVE  ACT General purposes  of the  amendments The  amendments  to the  Federal Reserve  Act  proposed  by  Congressman McFadden immediately prior to the  adjournment  of the  last Congress apparently have  two purposes:  (1) To  reestablish  a  closer connection between  the  volume  of  Federal reserve notes  in  circulation  and the  currency requirements  of  business. With this  in  view  the  bill prohibits  the use by  teserve banks  of  gold  and of  accep- tances purchased in the  open market  as  collateral  for  Federal reserve notes, leaving discounted paper  as the  sole authorized collateral.  (2 ) To  reduce  the lending power  of the  reserve banks,  by  permitting member banks  to  withdraw from the  reserve banks,  and to  hold  in  their  own  vaults,  a  part  of  their required reserves.  # Both  of  these objects appear  to be  based largely  on  misconceptions aris- ing  from imperfect appreciation  of the  experience  of the  system.  The  first  of them assumes that  the  volume  of  Federal reserve notes  in  circulation currently depends upon  the  character  of the  paper  or  other collateral which  may be  used as  cover  for the  notes,  but  experience  has  demonstrated that this  is not the case. Notes  get  into general circulation only when customers  of  member  or nonraeiaber banks withdraw currency  to  meet their current needs. Member banks retain  in  their  own  vaults only such  an  amount  of  currency  as  they need  to meet daily requirements, because  it  does  not pay  then  to  keep more,  and it is only when these daily requirements increase,  by  reason  of the  demands  of the public, that member banks find  it  necessary  to  obtain more currency from  the reserve bank, using  any  acceptable collateral that they  nay  have.  The
Transcript
Page 1: frsbog_mim_v22_0257.pdf

7/17/2019 frsbog_mim_v22_0257.pdf

http://slidepdf.com/reader/full/frsbogmimv220257pdf 1/7

TO: The  Fed er al Res erv e Board X-431 4

257

F ro m: Di v i s i o ns

  o f

  Bank Ope rat ion s

  3;nd

  Res ea rch

  a n d

  S t a t i s t i c s .

THE

  MCFAD3EN BILL

  TO

  REVISE

  THE

  FEEERAL RESERVE

  ACT

Genera l purposes  o f t h e  amendments

T h e  amendments  t o t h e  F edera l Res erv e  A c t  pro po s ed  by  Congressman McFadden

i m m e d i a t e l y p r i o r  t o t h e  adjournment  o f t h e  l a s t Co ngres s a pp a re nt l y ha v e  two

p u r p o s e s :  ( 1 ) T o  r e e s t a b l i s h  a  c l o s e r c o n n e c t i o n b e t w e e n  t h e  volume  o f  F edera l

r e s e r v e n o t e s  i n  c i r c u l a t i o n  a n d t h e  currency requ i rements  o f  bu s i ne s s . Wi th

t h i s  i n  v i ew  t h e  b i l l p r o h i b i t s  t h e u s e b y  t e s e r v e b a n k s  o f  g o l d  a n d o f  a c c e p -

t a n c e s p u r c h a s e d  i n t h e  open market  a s  c o l l a t e r a l  f o r  F e d e r a l r e s e r v e n o t e s ,

l e a v i n g d i s c o u n t e d p a p e r  a s t h e  s o l e a u t h o r i z e d c o l l a t e r a l .  ( 2 ) T o  reduce  t h e

l end i ng po wer

  o f t h e

  res erv e ba nks ,

  b y

  permitt ing member banks

  t o

  withdraw from

t h e  res erv e ba nks ,  a n d t o  h o l d  i n  t h e i r  ow n  v a u l t s ,  a  p a r t  o f  t h e i r r e q u i r e d

r e s e r v e s .  #

Both

  o f

  t h e s e o b j e c t s a p p ea r

  t o b e

  b a s e d l a r g e l y

  o n

  m i s c o n c e p t i o ns a r i s -

i n g  f ro m i m p e r f e c t a p p r e c i a t i o n  o f t h e  e x p e r i e n c e  o f t h e  s y s t e m .  The  f i r s t  o f

them assume s t ha t  t h e  volume  o f  F e d e r a l r e s e r v e n o t e s  i n  c i r c u l a t i o n c u r r e n t l y

depends upon  t h e  c h a r a c t e r  o f t h e  pa per  o r  o t h e r c o l l a t e r a l w h i c h  m a y b e  us ed

a s  c o v e r  f o r t h e  n o t e s ,  b u t  e x p e r i e n c e  h a s  d e m o n s t r at e d t h a t t h i s  i s n o t t h e

c a s e . N o t e s

  g e t

  i n t o g e n e r a l c i r c u l a t i o n o n l y w he n c u s t o m e r s

  o f

  member

  o r

nonraeiaber banks withdraw currency  t o  meet t h e i r cu rr en t ne e ds . Member banks

r e t a i n  i n  t h e i r  o w n  v a u l t s o n l y su c h  a n  amount  o f  c u r r e n c y  a s  they need  t o

meet da i l y requ i rements , beca us e

  i t

  does

  n o t p a y

  t h e n

  t o

  keep more,

  a n d i t i s

o n l y when th es e da i l y requ i rement s i n cr ea s e ,  b y  reason  o f t h e  demands  o f t h e

pu b l i c , th at member banks f i n d  i t  n e c e s s a r y  t o  ob ta in more curr enc y from  t h e

r e s e r v e b a n k , u s i n g

  a n y

  a c c e p t a b l e c o l l a t e r a l t h a t t h e y

  n a y

  h a v e .

  The

Page 2: frsbog_mim_v22_0257.pdf

7/17/2019 frsbog_mim_v22_0257.pdf

http://slidepdf.com/reader/full/frsbogmimv220257pdf 2/7

258

- 2 -  X-4314

e l a s t i c i t y

  o f t h e

  Federal reserve note doas

  n o t

  depend

  o n t h e

  c h a r a c t e r

  o f

c o l l a t e r a l that- member banlcs

  u s e t o

  obt ain curr ency . Federa l res erv e no tes

i s su ed ag a in s t go ld cone  i n f o r  re t l i r cnent  a s  prompt ly  a s  r o t e s s e c u r c d  by

commercial paper.  I t i s  through  t h e  Fe de ra l r e s e r v e barics -  m e e t i n g  t h e c u r -

rency demand when  i t  a r i s e s t h a t  t h e  amount  o f  currency  i n  c i r c u l a t i o n  i s c o n -

s t a n t l y a d j u s t e d

  t o t h e

  requirements

  o f

  b u s i n e s s .

The

  provis ion author iz ing member banks

  t o

  hold par t

  o f

  t h e i r r e s e r v e s

  i n

t h e i r  ow n  v a u l t s , w h i c h  i s  apparent ly in t ended  t o  d i m i n i s h  t h e  lending power

o f t h e  re se rv e banks, through  a  r e d u c t i o n  o f  t h e i t r e s e r v e s , w o ul d h av e l i t t l e

e f f e c t , when t aken  i n  conj unc t i on w i t h  t h e  other proposed amendments, because

member banks would have  no  inducement  t o  e x e r c i s e t h e i r o p t i o n  t o a n y  e x t e n t .

That port ion

  o f

  t h e i r re so urce s which

  t h e l a w o r

  e x p e r i e n c e r e q u i r e s

  t h e

  member

banks  t o  h o l d  a s  re ser ve s would remain in ac t i ve  a n d  unproduc t ive  o f  earn ings ,

under  t h e  proposed amendment  a s i t i s  under ex i s t ing laws ,  a n d a  mere trans-

f e r o f  re se rv es from res er ve banks  t©  member banks would  n o t  i n c r e a s e  t h e

member banks

  1

  lending power

  o r

  e a r n i n g c a p a c i t y ,

  b u t

  wo uld mere ly reduce

  t h e

l ending power  o f t h e  reserve banks#

  %

Gold with

  t h e

  r e s e r v e a g e n t s

  n o t t o

  count

  a s

  r e s e r v e s

The  p r o v i s i o n  i n t h e  McFadden b i l l th at g ol d h e l d wi th  t h e  F edera l  r e -

serve agent sha l l  n o t  count  a s  p a r t  o f t h e  r e s e r v e s  o f t h e  reserve bank  i s a

repea l  o f a n  amendment adopted  i n 1 9 1 7 ,  p r i n c i p a l l y  f o r t h e  purpose  o f f a -

c i l i t a t i n g n ot e i s s u e s

  a n d

  p e r m i t t i n g

  t h e

  reserve banks

  t o

  count

  a l l t h e

  gold,

whether he ld  b y t h e  a g e n t  o r b y t h e  reserve bank,  a s  p a r t  o f  t h e i r r e s e r v e s #

Notes were exchanged  f o r  g o l d p r i o r  t o t h e  amendment butthis  w a s  accompl ished

i n a  roundabout  w a y , a n d i t w a s  thought best  t o  a u t h o r i z e  t h e  direct exchange#

Page 3: frsbog_mim_v22_0257.pdf

7/17/2019 frsbog_mim_v22_0257.pdf

http://slidepdf.com/reader/full/frsbogmimv220257pdf 3/7

- 3 -

  X-4314

The  e f f e c t  o f  this proposal  a t t h e  pr es en t time would be.that  o f t h e

$1,700,000,000

  of

  Federal reserve notes

  i n

  ci rc ul at io n, only about $400,000,000

could continue

  t o be a

  l i a b i l i t y

  of t he

  reserve banks because this

  i s t h e

total amount  of  disc ount ed paper hel d  b y t h e  twelve re se rv e ban ks. Against

t h e  remainder  o f t h e  no tes ,  t h e  Federal reserve agents  now  hold gold  a n d i n

order  t o  comply with  t h e  proposed amendment  t h e  re se rv e banks would have  t o

fo l low

  one of two

  courses ; e i t he r

  t o p a y

  this gold

  b u t

  i n t o c i r c u l a t i o n

  i n e x -

change  f o r a n  equivalent amount  o f  Federal reserve notes;  o r t o  impound  t h e

gold with  t h e  agent  to be  h e l d  by him  e x c l u s i v e l y  f o r t h e  redemption  of  notes.

The  reserve banks would probably adopt  t h e  procedure  of  l e t t i n g  t h e

$1,300,000,000

  o f

  gold held

  b y t h e

  agents

  a s

  cover

  f o r

  notes

  b e

  a p p l i e d

  to t he

r educ t ion

  o f t h e

  barks

1

  l i a b i l i t y

  on

  re se rve no te s. Thus

  t h e

  gold

  a s a n a s -

s e t a n d a n  equivalent amount  of  notes  a s a  l i a b i l i t y w o u l d  b e  taken  out of

t h e  reserve banks

1

  balance sheet  a n d  would appear only  i n t h e  account  of t h e

Federal res erv e ag en ts . Under pr es en t con dit ion s  t h e  reserve banks would

a f t e r t h i s t r a n s a c t i o n s t i l l h a v e

  a

  r e s e r v e

  of

  about

  6 0 p e r

  cent against

their combined note

  a n d

  de po si t l i a b i l i t y .

  I n

  some

  o f t h e

  reserve banks,

however,  t h e  resul t would  b e a  d e f i c i e n c y  of r e se rve s even  a t t h e  pr es en t t ime.

The  reserve banks could increase  t h e  volume  of  p a p e r e l i g i b l e  a s  note

cover  a t  t h e i r d i s p o s a l ;  i . e . ,  p a pe r e l i g i b l e  a s  cover under  t h e  amendments,

b y

  se l l ing accep tances

  a n d

  s e c u r i t i e s

  a n d

  thereby causing member banks

  t o

discount paper with  t h e  rese rv e banks. While te ch ni ca l l y th is would  be a

method  of  i n c r e a s i n g  t h e  volume  of  p a p e r e l i g i b l e  f o r  note cover,  i t  would

involve  a  complete withdrawing  of  Federal reserve banks from open-market

opera t ions .

Under

  t h e

  McFadden proposal

  t h e

  note- i ssuing power

  o f t h e

  reserve banks,

Page 4: frsbog_mim_v22_0257.pdf

7/17/2019 frsbog_mim_v22_0257.pdf

http://slidepdf.com/reader/full/frsbogmimv220257pdf 4/7

  k

- 4 -  X—'-JlU

which  is new  l i m i t e d  by  reser ve requirements , w i l l  oe  l i m i t e d  i n  adJ.i t ion

b y t h e  amount  of  el ig ib le paper avai la.be  a s  c o l l a t e r a l  f o r  note i s sue .  As

po in t ed  o u t  ea r l i e r , t h i s add i t i on a l l im i t a t i on does  n o t  i n c r e a s e  t h e e l -

a s t i c i t y  o f t h e  reserve no te  b u t  merely erects  a  cumbersome piece  of  mach-

inery that might under cer ta in condi t ions prevent  t h e  smooth performance

of

  t h e i r f u n c t i o n s

  by the

  reserve banks.

  A

  si tu at io n might even ar is e ,

under

  t h e

  proposed amendment, where reserve banks,

  by

  reason

  of l ow re -

se rves  - n d  shor tage  of  e l i g i b l e paper , cou ld  n o t  issue Federal reserve

n o t e s  to  memoir banks unless these banks borrowed  $ 3 . ~ 0  from  t h e  reserve

banks,  and  kept $2.00  of  t h i s  on  deposit with  t h e  reserve banks,  i n  order

t o  obtain  $ 1 .0 0 o f  Federal res erv e not es . Under cond i t ion s  of  unusual

c r e d i t

  and

  currency demand, therefore,

  t h e

  McFadden amendment would cause

u n n e c e s s a r y d i f f i c u l t i e s

  to our

  banking system,

  and

  since

  t h e

  t e s t

  of t he

soundness  of a  banking system  i s t he way i t  would stand  u p  under  a  s t r a i n  —

t h i s  i s a  serious argument against  the . propo sa l .

I n

  cons ide r ing

  t h e

  poss ib l e e f f ec t

  of

  these amendments

  i n

  decreasing

t h e

  gold re se rv es

  o f t h e

  reserve banks through fur ther increases

  of

  gold

  i n

c i r c u l a t i o n ,  t h e  fact should  n o t b e  overlooked that  th e  gold  now  he ld  by

t h e  reserve banks  f o r t h e  most part  was n o t  withdrawn from domestic ci r c u l -

a t i o n  but was  i mpo rted f rom abroad*  As th e  r e s u l t  o f  paying  o u t  gold cer t -

i f i c a t e s  t h e  volume  of  gold  i n  c i r c u l a t i o n  a t t h e  present t ime  i s  nea r ly  a s

l a r g e  a s  be fo re  t h e  system  was  e s t a b l i s h e d ,  a n d t h e  reserve banks  i n r e -

cent months have also

  met out of

  the i r r e se rves

  a

  considerable demand

  f o r

gold

  f o r

  export .

Page 5: frsbog_mim_v22_0257.pdf

7/17/2019 frsbog_mim_v22_0257.pdf

http://slidepdf.com/reader/full/frsbogmimv220257pdf 5/7

The

  c hi e f e f f e c t

  o f t h e

  pro po s ed

  :• man

 demerit r e l a t i n g

  t o

  &old cover

appears  to b e t J  lower  t h e  r e s e r v e r a t i o  o f t h e  re ser ve banks  b y i m -

pounding  a  p a r t  c f  the i r res erv es w i th  t h e  F e d e r a l r e s e r v e a g e n t s .  At

a  time when reserves  a r e  ample,  a s a t  p r e s e n t ,  t h e  impounding  o f t h e

gold would

  n o t

  b r i n g

  th e

  res erv e ra t i o nea r

  t h e

  l e

e

,al minimum,

  b u t

u n d e r c o n d i t i o n s  o f  except ional ly large demand  f o r  c r e d i t  and  currency

t h e

  amendment woulj interfere with

  t h e

  smooth operat ion

  o f t h e

  reserve

banks  and  might make ne ce ss ar y  a  s us pens i o n  o f  res erv e requi rements .

A c c e p t a n c e s i n e l i g i b l e

  a s

  c o l l a t e r a l a g a i n s t n o t e s

I n  p r o h i b i t i n g  t h e u s e o f  a c c e p t a n c e s  a s  c o v e r  f o r  Federal res erv e

n o t e s ,  t h e  amendment pl ac es a cc ep ta nc es  i n  regard  t o  i n e l i g i b i l i t y  s-s

c o v e r  f o r  n o t e s  o n t h e  s ame f o o t i n g w i t h U n i t e d S t a t e s s e c u r i t i e s ,  t he

o t h e r c l a s s  o f  open-market pu rc ha se s  Of the  re se rv e banks . Accep tance s ,

however ,  a r e a s  d i r e c t l y c o n n e c t ed w i t h  t h e  f i n a n c i n g  o f  c u r r e n t b u s i -

n e s s  a s a r e  pro mi s s o ry no tes ,  an d  r e f l e c t  t h e  underly ing commercia l

t r a n s a c t i o n s

  i n

  c o n t r a s t

  t o

  paper secu red

  b y

  U n i t e d S t a t e s o b l i g a t i o n s

whi ch  i s n o w  e l i g i b l e  and  would continue  t o be  e l i g i b l e u nd er  t h e

amendment,

  t o

  s e r v e

  a s

  cover

  f o r

  Federa l res erv e no tes .

  I t i s

  probable

t h a t  t h e  o b j e c t  o f  this amendment  i s n o t s o  much  t o  i n c r e a s e  t h e  e l a s t i c -

i t y o f t h e

  Federa l res erv e no te

  a s t o

  l i m i t

  t h e

  rese rv e oanks ' open-

market operat ions .

Page 6: frsbog_mim_v22_0257.pdf

7/17/2019 frsbog_mim_v22_0257.pdf

http://slidepdf.com/reader/full/frsbogmimv220257pdf 6/7

Autuc r i t y

  t o h o i J

  p a r t

  of

  r e se rves

  i n

  numbers

1

  vau l t s

The

  proposa l

  t o

  au th or iz e member banks

  t o

  hold par t

  of

  their required

r e s e r v e s

  i n

  t h e i r

  own

  vaults would

  i n i t s

  p r e s e n t form per n. it member banks

t o

  count

  a s

  p a r t

  of

  t- ie i r reserves

  t h e

  vault cash which they

  now

  ca r ry

  a s

t i l l money•  I f t h e  amendment were adopted without increasing  t h e  reserve

requirements

  o f

  member banks,

  i t

  would make a v a i l a b l e

  t o t h e

  member banks

about $5vC,vCv,CGv which they could

  u s e

  e i t h e r

  a s a

  b a s i s

  f o r

  add i t i ona l

l end ing

  o r to

  reduce indebtedness

  a t t h e

  r e s e r ve banks* When

  i n 1 9 1 7 r e -

serve requirements changed

  so as to

  make only balances

  a t t h e

  reserve

banks count

  a s

  lega l rese rves

  f o r

  member banks,

  a t t h e

  same time required

reserve percentages were reduced

  in

  recogni t ion

  of the

  f ac t t ha t

  t h e

  cash

which member banks would continue  t o  car ry  i n  their vaul ts would  x?0  longer

count

  a s

  r e s e r v e s .

  The

  prese nt proposal

  to

  permi t

  t h e

  vaul t , cash

  of

  member

banks

  to be

  counted

  a s

  reserves without correspondingly increasing

  t h e

legal reserve requirements would result

  i n

  reduced borrowing

  a t t h e r e - .

serve banks  and in  member banks see kin g in cr ea se d inve stm ent  f o r  the i r

re leased funds .

I f t h e

  proponents

  o f the

  b i l l would upon con sid era tio n de cide

  t o i n -

c lude  i n t h e  amendment  an  inc rea se  i n  reserve requirements equal  to the

amount

  of

  cash

  i n

  v a u l t ,

  t h e

  proposa l would have re la t i ve ly l i t t l e e f f ec t

on the

  c r e d i t s i t u a t i o n .

Page 7: frsbog_mim_v22_0257.pdf

7/17/2019 frsbog_mim_v22_0257.pdf

http://slidepdf.com/reader/full/frsbogmimv220257pdf 7/7

263

- 7 -  X-U^lU

E x ' l s t i n g p r o v i s i o n s  n o t  emergency measure s

The Mc Fad de n  proposa l  h a s  been genera l ly unders t ood  t o  have  t h e  obj ec t

o f  r e s t o r i n g  t h e  Federal Reserve  A c t t o i t s  o ri g in a l form through repea l

of war  time amendments. Exp eri enc e in di ca te s th at  t h e 1 ^ 1 ?  amendments,

though the ir passage  may  have been exped ite d  by th e war  emergency,  a r e n o t

i n t h e

  n a t u r e

  o f

  emergency pr ov i s io ns ,

  b u t a r e a

  l o g i c a l r o u n d i n g

  cut o f

t h e  reserve sys t em.  In  e f f e c t  t h e  McFadden p r o po s a l would hav e  t h e  system

r e t u r n

  t o t h e

  i d e a s

  and

  t h e o r i e s

  o f t h e

  framers

  o f t h e

  Federal Reserve

  A c t

p r i o r  t o t h e  s y s t e m ' s e s t a b l i s h m e n t ,  and  wo ul d t h u s s a c r i f i c e  t h e  l e s s e n s

o f  prac t i ca l exper ience acquired dur ing  t h e  decade  o f i t s  o p e r a t i o n ,


Recommended