Fukushima & Three Mile Island Reactor Accidents: Recovery, Cleanup, Lessons, & Future
Foundation For Nuclear Studies
Congressional BriefingMay 18, 2012
Lake H. [email protected]
Disclaimer: Fukushima Information is preliminary especially regarding interpretation of events; opinions expressed are mine and mine alone. Most
Photos Courtesy of TEPCO1L. Barrett Consulting LLC
Energy & Human Societal Evolution• Mankind
– Huts to Modern Cities
• Energy– Simple Fire to Fossil Electricity to Nuclear Electricity
• Energy Density– Diffuse/Intermittent to Concentrated/Continuous
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Constant Evolutionary Societal Benefit/Risk Tradeoffs
• No Energy Source is Free From Risk or Cost
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Oil Rig Fire Gas Pipeline Explosion Wind Mill Collapse
Coal Mine Accident
Solar Panel Roof FallsCoal Ash Dam Break
Hydro Power Floods2000 Killed 1963
Nuclear Power PlantHigh Density Energy Reactor Core Boils Water
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Three Mile Island Units 1 &2March 28, 1979
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Three Mile Island Unit‐2 AccidentMarch 28, 1979
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Relief Valve fails to close
650,000 gallons of highly radioactive water collects
Core is uncovered Fuel overheats/fails/~50% Melt
Operators Believe Reactor
Overfilled and Turn Off Injection Pumps
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PORV
TMI Core Damage Sequence
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Three Mile IslandMarch 28, 1979
Hydrogen Deflagration28psig 13:00
~3M deep water1000R/hr
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Offsite Releases Variable & Confused Readings 3/28‐30
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Public Confusion Due To Lackof Information & Distrust
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Company Not BelievedGovernment DistrustedBut NRC Single SpokesmanDenton Made Progress
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TMI Precautionary Evacuation• Minimal Releases‐But Great Uncertainty Then
– Mostly Noble Gases, Minor Iodine (<15Ci),
– No detectable Cs release
– Maximum Dose <<1msv, ave ~10 μsv (<1mr) over 2M
• Advisory Evacuation for Pregnant Women & Children on 3/30/79
• ~140,000 People Left for Less than a Week– Cost $71M Paid by Owner Insurance
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PA Evacuation Sites
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President Carter ArrivesApril 1
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Carter, Denton & PA Governor ThornburgPresident Carter In Control Room
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Initial Plant Stabilization• Core Cooling Established: 6 Hours
• Cold (<100C) Passive Shutdown:1 Month
• All Accident Water Retained
• Pre‐accident Water Processed and Released to Make Room For Accident Water
• Accident Water Never Released to River
• Airborne Iodine Releases From Auxiliary Building Mitigated
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Recovery Cleanup Actions
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Building Remediation to Gain Core Access (Barrett Entry)
Phased Unique Air and Water Cleanup Systems Created Based on Best Available
Technology
TMI Damaged Core Removal~1985‐1990
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TMI Defueling Sequence
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Core Bore Machine Defuel Can Loading Can Transfers
Core Debris StorageTransportShipping Cask
TMI Unit 1 Restarted• Restarted September 18, 1985
– Six and Half Year Process
– Extensive Operator Training
– Plant Modifications
– Extensive Public Regulatory Hearing Process
• One of Best Operating Reactors Today in US
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Three Mile Island History• Reactor Scram: 04:00 3/28/79• Core melt and relocation: ~ 05:00 – 07:30 3/28/79• Hydrogen Deflagration: 13:00 3/28/79 • Recirculation Cooling: Late 3/28/79• Phased Water Processing: 1979‐1993:Removed ~1.2MCi Cs137• Containment Venting 43KCi Kr‐85: July 1980• Containment Entry: July 1980• Reactor Head removed and core melt found: July 1984• Start Defuel: October 1985• Shipping Spent Fuel: 1988‐1990• Finish Defuel: Jan 1990• Evaporate ~10 M Liters Processed Water: 1991‐93• Cost: ~$1 Billion (YOE)
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Peace On The RiverMost Painful Experiences Are the Most Teachable
We Learned & We Changed
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20081978
Most Stress is Gone- All are WiserNuclear Power is SaferNuclear Power is More Productive
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Fukushima Daiichi Nuclear Power Station
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Units 5 &6
Dry SNF Storage
CommonSpent Fuel Pool
Units 1‐4
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Event Initiation
March 11, 2011•About 14:46, a 9.0 magnitude earthquake struck (Plant design basis earthquake: 8.2)‐ Plant safety systems reportedly function satisfactorily.
•Units 1,2 & 3 Scram & Unit 4 has 100 day old core offloaded into Unit 4 Spent Fuel Pool
•~ 15:45, Seven tsunami waves up to 14 meters high inundated the site, whose design basis was 5.7 meters – the reactors and backup diesel power sit roughly 10 to 13 meters above sea level
•The tsunami & earthquake impacts up and down the northeast coast resulted in tragic loss of 20,000+ lives, damage, and destruction of infrastructure.
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Subduction Fault
No Known Seismic Safety DamageDespite Huge Earthquake, Seismic Loads Close to Design
Safety Systems Appeared Functional
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Tsunami Waves
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Incoming Wave Behind Reactor Building 15:42
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Wave Behind Reactor Building 15:43:26
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Wave Behind Reactor Building 15:43:54
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Wave Behind Reactor Building 15:44:58
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Wave Behind Reactor Building 15:47
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Tank Top 15M
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Tsunami Size: Main Safety Factor 3/11 15:45
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GE Mark I Reactor Building
Spent Fuel Pool
Reactor Vessel
Suppression Pool (Torus)
Primary Containment
Steel Containment Vessel
Secondary Containment
Boiling Water Reactor DesignAt Fukushima Daiichi
Refueling Floor
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Browns Ferry Primary Containment
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Post Tsunami U 1‐4 Conditions (~15:45)
• No AC Power
• No Unit 1 & 2 DC & Partial Unit 3 DC Power
• No Control room Lighting (flashlights)
• Salt Water Flooded EDGs & Switchgear
• Salt Water Destroyed Service Water Pumps & Switchgear
• Unit 1 Isolation Condenser Valve Problems
• Spotty Instrumentation ReadingsL. Barrett Numark Assoc 34
Battery Power Control of Steam‐Driven Reactor Core Isolation Cooling System In Units 2 &3 (Unit 1 Had
Isolation Condenser which Operators Stopped)
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3/11 15:45 to ~ 3/11 24:00 JST
CST?
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Unit 1 Isolation Condenser
Actions to Extend DC Power For Control
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Scavenged Truck Batteries To Maintain Reactor Instrumentation
Control Room Operator During Black Out
Battery Power Exhausted
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Suppression pool (wet well) becomes saturated
3/12 ~02:00 JST
Core Uncovers and starts to overheat
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Venting Primary Containment Filter Refueling
Bay
3/12 ~05:30 U1 3/13 ~ 00:00 U23/13 ~ 08:40 U3
Primary Containment Pressure~ ~90psia @02:00 3/12
Uncertain Command & Control Actions & Unit 1 Vent Valve Operability
Core Overheated
H2 & Steam
H2 & Steam
H2 & Steam ?
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Hydrogen Leakage Paths
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Electrical Penetrations
Hatch Seals
Dry Head Seals
Unit 1 Reactor Building Explosion 3/12 15:31
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Unit 3 Reactor Building Explosion3/14 11:15
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Unit 1 Reactor Building
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Unit 3 Reactor Building
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Before After
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Fukushima: Reactor Vessel‐Primary‐Secondary Containment Sequence
Core Over Heats‐Clad Burst ~900C‐Clad Oxidize ~1200C‐H2 Release‐Partial Melt~1800C‐2700C‐Primary Coolant System Overpressure
Vent from Primary Coolant Sys to Primary Containment‐ H2, Steam, & Fission Products (Xe, Kr, I, Cs etc)
No Primary Containment Cooling therefore Primary Containment Overpressure‐Vent to Secondary Containment
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Primary Coolant System Primary Containment Secondary Containment
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Cores Melted, Slumped Into Lower Head& Likely Failed Some CRD Penetrations
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Melted Core dropped
Original Core
RPV ThermalFailures
Unit 1 Melt: 3/11~19:00 RPV Fails ~3/12 ~15:00Unit 2 Melt: 3/14 ~20:00Unit 3 Melt: 3/13 ~09:00
Unit 1 RPV Failed Grossly and Units 2&3 Partially
Core on Floor
Unit 2 & 3 Core MeltMostly Retained In Vessel?
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Minor Concrete Penetration (if any) due to low Melted Core Mass and Flooded Drywell Floor
Longer Core Cooling With Turbine Driven Pumps Resulted in Less Aggressive Core Melting
Projected Vessel Breach with some Melted core on the floor
U 2 Water Level is 60cm deep with Very High Gamma Levels (~7000R/hr or 70Sv/hr) Likely exposed Melted Fuel 3/12
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Unit 1 Core Melt to the FloorLoss of Isolation Condenser Cooling: Early Core Melt & Significant Vessel Penetration & Likely Core Drop
Unit 1 Corium Penetrated ~70cm (30%) of the 260cm thick floor concrete Above the 4cm steel liner plate.
There is 7M of base mat concrete belowthe liner plate
7M Thick
Core Cooling Established With Fire Truck Sea Water Injection
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Bleed & Feed Core Cooling Established Seawater Injection Started Using Fire Engine Pump
Shift to Fresh Water Injection: To Dissolve Possible Salt Cakes
Tank
Vapor Venting
Boric Acid
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Water Core InjectionSeawater Fresh Rate Rate (1/12)
(gpm) (gpm‐tpd)
U1 3/12 20:20 3/25 20 36‐156U3 3/13 13:10 3/25 50 87‐240U2 3/14 16:30 3/26 30 78‐216
Leakage to Reactor Building‐Turbine Bldg‐Intake Structure
Condensation/WaterL. Barrett Consulting LLC
Immediately After Unit 3 Explosion 3/14/11 ~10:00AM JST
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Spent Fuel Pool in Reactor Building
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~350,000 Gal U4:1331 Assemblies SF ~100 day oldU3:514 Assy SF~ 200 Days oldU2: 587 Assy SF ~120 Days Old
Unit 4 Pool
Unit 4 Reactor Building
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Unit 4 Spent Fuel Pool Water Sampling
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Boom Inserting Probe~11‐04‐11
400ml Sample Probe~11‐04‐11L. Barrett Consulting LLC
Unit 4 Spent Fuel Pool
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Sampling Indicates Little If Any Fuel DamageLow Cesium Levels in 90Bq/mlWater Level Lowered For Seismic Safety
Unit 4 Explosion: H2 From Unit 3
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Unit 4
Unit 3
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Dry Storage Cask Facility
air inlet
overhead travelling crane
storage cask
transport vehicle
cask trolley
RelativeLow Elevation
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Body: γ-ray shield (carbon steel)
outer shellprimary lid
secondary lid
basket(borated-aluminum alloy)
cask frame
neutron shield(boron-added resin)
bottom plate
Main featuresCylindrical forged carbon-steel casksSimilarity with transport casks5-115T 52 Assy Casks & 4-96T 37 Assy CasksHelium filledSteel for γ-ray shield/ resin for neutron shieldBorated-aluminum alloy basket for sub-criticality
Storage Only Metal Cask
Dry Storage Facility Was Flooded But All 9 Casks Intact
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Fukushima Stabilized
• Established Recirculation Core Cooling– Damaged Pressure Vessel(s) & Containments
• Mitigating Airborne Releases
• Mitigating Water Releases
• Gaining Building Access to Start Recovery Activities
• Managing Solid Wastes
• Maintain Personnel Safety: High Rad Areas
• Addressing Evacuation Zone Situation L. Barrett Consulting LLC 59
Units 1‐4 After U4 Building Explosion 3/16
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Unit 4 Fuel Pool‐Side
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Unit 3 & Unit 4
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Water Spray to Unit 3 Pool Area
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Unit 4 Reactor Building Water Injection Boom To Spent Fuel Pool
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Release Periods Based On Site Gamma Levels
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U2 Internal Explosion?
U3 Gray Smoke?
U3 White Smoke?
uSv/h @Gate @ 1Km
U1 Explosion?
U4 Building Explosion?