FIRST DIVISION[G.R. No. 133778. March 14, 2000]ENGRACE NIAL for Herself and as Guardian ad Litem of the minors BABYLINE NIAL, INGRID NIAL, ARCHIE NIAL & PEPITO NIAL, JR.,petitioners, vs. NORMA BAYADOG,respondent.NcmmisD E C I S I O NYNARES_SANTIAGO,J.:May the heirs of a deceased person file a petition for the declaration of nullity of his marriage after his death?Pepito Nial was married to Teodulfa Bellones on September 26, 1974. Out of their marriage were born herein petitioners. Teodulfa was shot by Pepito resulting in her death on April 24, 1985. One year and 8 months thereafter or on December 11, 1986, Pepito and respondent Norma Badayog got married without any marriage license. In lieu thereof, Pepito and Norma executed an affidavit dated December 11, 1986 stating that they had lived together as husband and wife for at least five years and were thus exempt from securing a marriage license. On February 19, 1997, Pepito died in a car accident. After their fathers death, petitioners filed a petition for declaration of nullity of the marriage of Pepito to Norma alleging that the said marriage was void for lack of a marriage license. The case was filed under the assumption that the validity or invalidity of the second marriage would affect petitioners successional rights. Norma filed a motion to dismiss on the ground that petitioners have no cause of action since they are not among the persons who could file an action for "annulment of marriage" under Article 47 of the Family Code.Judge Ferdinand J. Marcos of the Regional Trial Court of Toledo City, Cebu, Branch 59, dismissed the petition after finding that the Family Code is "rather silent, obscure, insufficient" to resolve the following issues:(1) Whether or not plaintiffs have a cause of action against defendant in asking for the declaration of the nullity of marriage of their deceased father, Pepito G. Nial, with her specially so when at the time of the filing of this instant suit, their father Pepito G. Nial is already dead;(2) Whether or not the second marriage of plaintiffs deceased father with defendant is null and void ab initio;(3) Whether or not plaintiffs are estopped from assailing the validity of the second marriage after it was dissolved due to their fathers death.[1]Thus, the lower court ruled that petitioners should have filed the action to declare null and void their fathers marriage to respondent before his death, applying by analogy Article 47 of the Family Code which enumerates the time and the persons who could initiate an action for annulment of marriage.[2]Hence, this petition for review with this Court grounded on a pure question of law.Scnc mThis petition was originally dismissed for non-compliance with Section 11, Rule 13 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, and because "the verification failed to state the basis of petitioners averment that the allegations in the petition are true and correct." It was thus treated as an unsigned pleading which produces no legal effect under Section 3, Rule 7, of the 1997 Rules.[3]However, upon motion of petitioners, this Court reconsidered the dismissal and reinstated the petition for review.[4]The two marriages involved herein having been solemnized prior to the effectivity of the Family Code (FC), the applicable law to determine their validity is the Civil Code which was the law in effect at the time of their celebration.[5]A valid marriage license is a requisite of marriage under Article 53 of the Civil Code,[6]the absence of which renders the marriagevoid ab initiopursuant to Article 80(3)[7]in relation to Article 58.[8]The requirement and issuance of marriage license is the States demonstration of its involvement and participation in every marriage, in the maintenance of which the general public is interested.[9]This interest proceeds from the constitutional mandate that the State recognizes the sanctity of family life and of affording protection to the family as a basic "autonomous social institution."[10]Specifically, the Constitution considers marriage as an "inviolable social institution," and is the foundation of family life which shall be protected by the State.[11]This is why the Family Code considers marriage as "a special contract of permanent union"[12]and case law considers it "not just an adventure but a lifetime commitment."[13]However, there are several instances recognized by the Civil Code wherein a marriage license is dispensed with, one of which is that provided in Article 76,[14]referring to the marriage of a man and a woman who have lived together and exclusively with each other as husband and wife for a continuous and unbroken period of at least five years before the marriage. The rationale why no license is required in such case is to avoid exposing the parties to humiliation, shame and embarrassment concomitant with the scandalous cohabitation of persons outside a valid marriage due to the publication of every applicants name for a marriage license. The publicity attending the marriage license may discourage such persons from legitimizing their status.[15]To preserve peace in the family, avoid the peeping and suspicious eye of public exposure and contain the source of gossip arising from the publication of their names, the law deemed it wise to preserve their privacy and exempt them from that requirement.Sdaa misoThere is no dispute that the marriage of petitioners father to respondent Norma was celebrated without any marriage license. In lieu thereof, they executed an affidavit stating that "they have attained the age of majority, and, being unmarried, have lived together as husband and wife for at least five years, and that we now desire to marry each other."[16]The only issue that needs to be resolved pertains to what nature of cohabitation is contemplated under Article 76 of the Civil Code to warrant the counting of the five year period in order to exempt the future spouses from securing a marriage license. Should it be a cohabitation wherein both parties are capacitated to marry each other during the entire five-year continuous period or should it be a cohabitation wherein both parties have lived together and exclusively with each other as husband and wife during the entire five-year continuous period regardless of whether there is a legal impediment to their being lawfully married, which impediment may have either disappeared or intervened sometime during the cohabitation period?Working on the assumption that Pepito and Norma have lived together as husband and wife for five years without the benefit of marriage, that five-year period should be computed on the basis of a cohabitation as "husband and wife" where the only missing factor is the special contract of marriage to validate the union. In other words, the five-year common-law cohabitation period, which is counted back from the date of celebration of marriage, should be a period of legal union had it not been for the absence of the marriage. This 5-year period should be the years immediately before the day of the marriage and it should be a period of cohabitation characterized by exclusivity meaning no third party was involved at any time within the 5 years and continuity that is unbroken. Otherwise, if that continuous 5-year cohabitation is computed without any distinction as to whether the parties were capacitated to marry each other during the entire five years, then the law would be sanctioning immorality and encouraging parties to have common law relationships and placing them on the same footing with those who lived faithfully with their spouse. Marriage being a special relationship must be respected as such and its requirements must be strictly observed. The presumption that a man and a woman deporting themselves as husband and wife is based on the approximation of the requirements of the law. The parties should not be afforded any excuse to not comply with every single requirement and later use the same missing element as a pre-conceived escape ground to nullify their marriage. There should be no exemption from securing a marriage license unless the circumstances clearly fall within the ambit of the exception. It should be noted that a license is required in order to notify the public that two persons are about to be united in matrimony and that anyone who is aware or has knowledge of any impediment to the union of the two shall make it known to the local civil registrar.[17]The Civil Code provides:Article 63: "x x x. This notice shall request all persons having knowledge of any impediment to the marriage to advice the local civil registrar thereof. x x x."Article 64: "Upon being advised of any alleged impediment to the marriage, the local civil registrar shall forthwith make an investigation, examining persons under oath. x x x"SdaadThis is reiterated in the Family Code thus:Article 17provides in part: "x x x. This notice shall request all persons having knowledge of any impediment to the marriage to advise the local civil registrar thereof. x x x."Article 18reads in part: "x x x. In case of any impediment known to the local civil registrar or brought to his attention, he shall note down the particulars thereof and his findings thereon in the application for a marriage license. x x x."This is the same reason why our civil laws, past or present, absolutely prohibited the concurrence of multiple marriages by the same person during the same period. Thus, any marriage subsequently contracted during the lifetime of the first spouse shall be illegal and void,[18]subject only to the exception in cases of absence or where the prior marriage was dissolved or annulled. The Revised Penal Code complements the civil law in that the contracting of two or more marriages and the having of extramarital affairs are considered felonies,i.e., bigamy and concubinage and adultery.[19]The law sanctions monogamy.In this case, at the time of Pepito and respondents marriage, it cannot be said that they have lived with each other as husband and wife for at least five years prior to their wedding day. From the time Pepitos first marriage was dissolved to the time of his marriage with respondent, only about twenty months had elapsed. Even assuming that Pepito and his first wife had separated in fact, and thereafter both Pepito and respondent had started living with each other that has already lasted for five years, the fact remains that their five-year period cohabitation was not the cohabitation contemplated by law. It should be in the nature of a perfect union that is valid under the law but rendered imperfect only by the absence of the marriage contract. Pepito had a subsisting marriage at the time when he started cohabiting with respondent. It is immaterial that when they lived with each other, Pepito had already been separated in fact from his lawful spouse. The subsistence of the marriage even where there was actual severance of the filial companionship between the spouses cannot make any cohabitation by either spouse with any third party as being one as "husband and wife".Scs daadHaving determined that the second marriage involved in this case is not covered by the exception to the requirement of a marriage license, it is voidab initiobecause of the absence of such element.The next issue to be resolved is: do petitioners have the personality to file a petition to declare their fathers marriage void after his death?Contrary to respondent judges ruling, Article 47 of the Family Code[20]cannot be applied even by analogy to petitions for declaration of nullity of marriage. The second ground for annulment of marriage relied upon by the trial court, which allows "the sane spouse" to file an annulment suit "at any time before the death of either party" is inapplicable. Article 47 pertains to the grounds, periods and persons who can file an annulment suit, not a suit for declaration of nullity of marriage. The Code is silent as to who can file a petition to declare the nullity of a marriage. Voidable and void marriages are not identical. A marriage that is annulable is valid until otherwise declared by the court; whereas a marriage that is voidab initiois considered as having never to have taken place[21]and cannot be the source of rights. The first can be generally ratified or confirmed by free cohabitation or prescription while the other can never be ratified. A voidable marriage cannot be assailed collaterally except in a direct proceeding while a void marriage can be attacked collaterally. Consequently, void marriages can be questioned even after the death of either party but voidable marriages can be assailed only during the lifetime of the parties and not after death of either, in which case the parties and their offspring will be left as if the marriage had been perfectly valid.[22]That is why the action or defense for nullity is imprescriptible, unlike voidable marriages where the action prescribes. Only the parties to a voidable marriage can assail it but any proper interested party may attack a void marriage. Void marriages have no legal effects except those declared by law concerning the properties of the alleged spouses, regarding co-ownership or ownership through actual joint contribution,[23]and its effect on the children born to such void marriages as provided in Article 50 in relation to Article 43 and 44 as well as Article 51, 53 and 54 of the Family Code. On the contrary, the property regime governing voidable marriages is generally conjugal partnership and the children conceived before its annulment are legitimate.Sup remaContrary to the trial courts ruling, the death of petitioners father extinguished the alleged marital bond between him and respondent. The conclusion is erroneous and proceeds from a wrong premise that there was a marriage bond that was dissolved between the two. It should be noted that their marriage was void hence it is deemed as if it never existed at all and the death of either extinguished nothing.Jurisprudence under the Civil Code states that no judicial decree is necessary in order to establish the nullity of a marriage.[24]"A void marriage does not require a judicial decree to restore the parties to their original rights or to make the marriage void but though no sentence of avoidance be absolutely necessary, yet as well for the sake of good order of society as for the peace of mind of all concerned, it is expedient that the nullity of the marriage should be ascertained and declared by the decree of a court of competent jurisdiction."[25]"Under ordinary circumstances, the effect of a void marriage, so far as concerns the conferring of legal rights upon the parties, is as though no marriage had ever taken place. And therefore, being good for no legal purpose, its invalidity can be maintained in any proceeding in which the fact of marriage may be material, either direct or collateral, in any civil court between any parties at any time, whether before or after the death of either or both the husband and the wife, and upon mere proof of the facts rendering such marriage void, it will be disregarded or treated as non-existent by the courts." It is not like a voidable marriage which cannot be collaterally attacked except in direct proceeding instituted during the lifetime of the parties so that on the death of either, the marriage cannot be impeached, and is made goodab initio.[26]But Article 40 of the Family Code expressly provides that there must be a judicial declaration of the nullity of a previous marriage, though void, before a party can enter into a second marriage[27]and such absolute nullity can be based only on a final judgment to that effect.[28]For the same reason, the law makes either the action or defense for the declaration of absolute nullity of marriage imprescriptible.[29]Corollarily, if the death of either party would extinguish the cause of action or the ground for defense, then the same cannot be considered imprescriptible.JurisHowever, other than for purposes of remarriage, no judicial action is necessary to declare a marriage an absolute nullity. For other purposes, such as but not limited to determination of heirship, legitimacy or illegitimacy of a child, settlement of estate, dissolution of property regime, or a criminal case for that matter, the court may pass upon the validity of marriage even in a suit not directly instituted to question the same so long as it is essential to the determination of the case. This is without prejudice to any issue that may arise in the case. When such need arises, a final judgment of declaration of nullity is necessary even if the purpose is other than to remarry. The clause "on the basis of a final judgment declaring such previous marriage void" in Article 40 of the Family Code connotes that such final judgment need not be obtained only for purpose of remarriage.WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The assailed Order of the Regional Trial Court, Toledo City, Cebu, Branch 59, dismissing Civil Case No. T-639, is REVERSED and SET ASIDE. The said case is ordered REINSTATED.SO ORDERED.Davide, Jr., (Chairman), Puno,andKapunan, JJ.,concur.Sc jurisPardo, J.,on official business abroad.

[1]The dispositive portion of the Order dated March 27, 1998 issued by Judge Ferdinand J. Marcos of Regional Trial Court (RTC) - Branch 59, Toledo City, reads: "WHEREFORE, premises considered, defendants motion to dismiss is hereby granted and this instant case is hereby ordered dismissed without costs." (p. 6;Rollo,p. 21).[2]Order, p. 4;Rollo,p. 19.[3]Minute Resolution dated July 13, 1998;Rollo,p. 39.[4]Minute Resolution dated October 7, 1998;Rollo,p. 50.[5]Tamano v. Ortiz, 291 SCRA 584 (1998).[6]Now Article 3, Family Code. Art. 53. No marriage shall be solemnized unless all the requisites are complied with:(1) Legal capacity of the contracting parties; their consent, freely given;(2) Authority of the person performing the marriage; and(3) A marriage license, except in a marriage of exceptional character.[7]Now Article 4, Family Code. Art. 80. The following marriages shall be void from the beginning:x x xx x xx x x(3) Those solemnized without a marriage license, save marriages of exceptional character.x x xx x xx x x[8]Art. 58. Save marriages of an exceptional character authorized in Chapter 2 of this Title, but not those under article 75, no marriage shall be solemnized without a license first being issued by the local civil registrar of the municipality where either contracting party habitually resides.[9]Peridov.Perido, 63 SCRA 97 (1975).[10]Section 12, Article II, 1987 Constitution; Hernandez v. CA, G. R. No. 126010, December 8, 1999; See also Tuason v. CA, 256 SCRA 158 (1996).[11]Section 2, Article XV (The Family), 1987 Constitution.[12]Article 1, FamilyCodeprovides: "Marriage is a special contract of permanent union between a man and a woman entered into in accordance with law for the establishment of conjugal or family life. x x x.[13]Santosv.CA, 58 SCAD 17 (1995); 310 Phil. 21, 41 (1995).[14]Now Article 34, Family Code. Art. 76. No marriage license shall be necessary when a man and a woman who have attained the age of majority and who, being unmarried, have lived together as husband and wife for at least five years, desire to marry each other. The contracting parties shall state the foregoing facts in an affidavit before any person authorized by law to administer oaths. The official, priest or minister who solemnized the marriage shall also state in an affidavit that he took steps to ascertain the ages and other qualifications of the contracting parties and that he found no legal impediment to the marriage.[15]Report of the Code Commission, p. 80.[16]Rollo,p. 29.[17]Articles 63 and 64, Civil Code; Article 17 and 18, FamilyCode.[18]Article83,CivilCode provides "Any marriage subsequently contracted by any person during the lifetime of the first spouse of such person with any person other than such first spouse shall be illegal and void from its performance, unless:(1) the first marriage was annulled or dissolved; or(2) the first spouse had been absent for seven consecutive years."Article41oftheFamilyCode reads: "A marriage contracted by any person during the subsistence of a previous marriage shall be null and void, unless before the celebration of the subsequent marriage, the prior spouse had been absent for four consecutive years"[19]Arts. 333 and 334, Revised Penal Code.[20]Art. 47. The action for annulment of marriage must be filed by the following persons and within the periods indicated herein:(1)For causes mentioned in number 1 of Article 45 by the party whose parent or guardian did not give his or her consent, within five years after attaining the age of twenty-one; or by the parent or guardian or person having legal charge of the minor, at any time before such party has reached the age of twenty-one;(2)For causes mentioned in number 2 of Article 45, by the sane spouse, who had no knowledge of the others insanity; or by any relative or guardian or person having legal charge of the insane, at any time before the death of either party, or by the insane spouse during a lucid interval or after regaining sanity;(3)For causes mentioned in number 3 of Article 45, by the injured party, within five years after the discovery of the fraud;(4)For causes mentioned in number 4 of Article 45, by the injured party, within five years from the time the force, intimidation or undue influence disappeared or ceased;For causes mentioned in numbers 5 and 6 of Article 45, by the injured party, within five years after the marriage.[21]Suntay v. Cojuanco-Suntay,300 SCRA 760 (1998); Peoplev.RetirementBoard, 272 Ill. App. 59 cited in I Tolentino, Civil Code, 1990 ed. p. 271.[22]InreConzasEstate, 176 Ill. 192; Millerv.Miller, 175 Cal. 797, 167 Pac. 394 cited in I Tolentino, Civil Code, 1990 ed., p. 271.[23]Article 148-149, FamilyCode; Article 144, CivilCode.[24]Odayatv.Amante, 77 SCRA 338 (1977); Weigel v. Sempio-Dy, 143 SCRA 499 (1986); Peoplev.Mendoza, 95 Phil. 845 (1954); 50 O.G. (10) 4767 cited in Peoplev.Aragon, 100 Phil. 1033 (1957); 53 O.G. 3749.[25]35 Am. Jur. 219-220.[26]18 RCL 446-7; 35 Am Jur. 221.[27]Apiag v. Cantero,335 Phil. 511 (1997); 268 SCRA 47 (1997); Atienza v. Judge Brillantes, Jr., 60 SCAD 119; 312 Phil. 939 (1995).[28]Domingo v. CA, 226 SCRA 572 (1993).[29]Article 39, FamilyCode as amended by E.O. 209 and 227 s. 1987 and further amended by R.A. No. 8533 dated February 23, 1998.

THIRD DIVISIONEDGAR SAN LUIS,G.R. No. 133743Petitioner,Present:- versus -Ynares-Santiago,J.(Chairperson),Austria-Martinez,Callejo, Sr., andChico-Nazario,JJ.FELICIDAD SAN LUIS,Respondent.x ---------------------------------------------------- xRODOLFO SAN LUIS,G.R. No. 134029Petitioner,- versus -Promulgated:FELICIDAD SAGALONGOSalias FELICIDAD SAN LUIS,Respondent.February 6, 2007x ---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- xDECISIONYNARES-SANTIAGO,J.:Before us are consolidated petitions for review assailing the February 4, 1998 Decision[1]of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 52647, which reversed and set aside the September 12, 1995[2]and January 31, 1996[3]Resolutions of the Regional Trial Court of Makati City, Branch 134 in SP. Proc. No. M-3708; and itsMay 15, 1998Resolution[4]denying petitioners motion for reconsideration.The instant case involves the settlement of the estate of Felicisimo T. San Luis (Felicisimo), who was the former governor of theProvinceofLaguna.During his lifetime, Felicisimo contracted three marriages.His first marriage was with Virginia Sulit onMarch 17, 1942out of which were born six children, namely: Rodolfo, Mila, Edgar, Linda, Emilita and Manuel. OnAugust 11, 1963,Virginiapredeceased Felicisimo.Five years later, onMay 1, 1968, Felicisimo married Merry Lee Corwin, with whom he had a son, Tobias.However, onOctober 15, 1971, Merry Lee, an American citizen, filed a Complaint for Divorce[5]before the Family Court of the First Circuit,State of Hawaii,United States of America(U.S.A.), which issued a Decree Granting Absolute Divorce and Awarding Child Custody onDecember 14, 1973.[6]OnJune 20, 1974, Felicisimo married respondent Felicidad San Luis, then surnamed Sagalongos, before Rev. Fr. William Meyer, Minister of the United Presbyterian atWilshire Boulevard,Los Angeles,California,U.S.A.[7]He had no children with respondent but lived with her for 18 years from the time of their marriage up to his death onDecember 18, 1992.Thereafter, respondent sought the dissolution of their conjugal partnership assets and the settlement of Felicisimos estate.OnDecember 17, 1993, she filed a petition for letters of administration[8]before theRegionalTrialCourtofMakatiCity, docketed as SP. Proc. No. M-3708 which was raffled to Branch 146 thereof.Respondent alleged that she is the widow of Felicisimo; that, at the time of his death, the decedent was residing at 100 San Juanico Street, New Alabang Village, Alabang, Metro Manila; that the decedents surviving heirs are respondent as legal spouse, his six children by his first marriage, and son by his second marriage; that the decedent left real properties, both conjugal and exclusive, valued atP30,304,178.00 more or less; that the decedent does not have any unpaid debts.Respondent prayed that the conjugal partnership assets be liquidated and that letters of administration be issued to her.OnFebruary 4, 1994, petitioner Rodolfo San Luis, one of the children of Felicisimo by his first marriage, filed a motion to dismiss[9]on the grounds of improper venue and failure to state a cause of action.Rodolfo claimed that the petition for letters of administration should have been filed in theProvinceofLagunabecause this was Felicisimos place of residence prior to his death.He further claimed that respondent has no legal personality to file the petition because she was only a mistress of Felicisimo since the latter, at the time of his death, was still legally married to Merry Lee.OnFebruary 15, 1994, Linda invoked the same grounds and joined her brother Rodolfo in seeking the dismissal[10]of the petition.OnFebruary 28, 1994, the trial court issued an Order[11]denying the two motions to dismiss.Unaware of the denial of the motions to dismiss, respondent filed onMarch 5, 1994her opposition[12]thereto.She submitted documentary evidence showing that while Felicisimo exercised the powers of his public office in Laguna, he regularly went home to their house inNewAlabangVillage, Alabang, Metro Manila which they bought sometime in 1982. Further, she presented the decree of absolute divorce issued by the Family Court of the First Circuit, State ofHawaiito prove that the marriage of Felicisimo to Merry Lee had already been dissolved.Thus, she claimed that Felicisimo had the legal capacity to marry her by virtue of paragraph 2,[13]Article 26 of the Family Code and the doctrine laid down inVan Dorn v. Romillo, Jr.[14]Thereafter, Linda, Rodolfo and herein petitioner Edgar San Luis, separately filed motions for reconsideration from the Order denying their motions to dismiss.[15]They asserted that paragraph 2, Article 26 of the Family Code cannot be given retroactive effect to validate respondents bigamous marriage with Felicisimo because this would impair vested rights in derogation of Article 256[16]of the Family Code.OnApril 21, 1994, Mila, another daughter of Felicisimo from his first marriage, filed a motion to disqualify Acting Presiding Judge Anthony E. Santos from hearing the case.OnOctober 24, 1994, the trial court issued an Order[17]denying the motions for reconsideration.It ruled that respondent, as widow of the decedent, possessed the legal standing to file the petition and that venue was properly laid.Meanwhile, the motion for disqualification was deemed moot and academic[18]because then Acting Presiding Judge Santos was substituted by Judge Salvador S. Tensuan pending the resolution of said motion.Mila filed a motion for inhibition[19]against Judge Tensuan onNovember 16, 1994. On even date, Edgar also filed a motion for reconsideration[20]from the Order denying their motion for reconsideration arguing that it does not state the facts and law on which it was based.OnNovember 25, 1994, Judge Tensuan issued an Order[21]granting the motion for inhibition. The case was re-raffled to Branch 134 presided by Judge Paul T. Arcangel.OnApril 24, 1995,[22]the trial court required the parties to submit their respective position papers on the twin issues of venue and legal capacity of respondent to file the petition.OnMay 5, 1995, Edgar manifested[23]that he is adopting the arguments and evidence set forth in his previous motion for reconsideration as his position paper.Respondent and Rodolfo filed their position papers on June 14,[24]andJune 20,[25]1995, respectively.OnSeptember 12, 1995, the trial court dismissed the petition for letters of administration.It held that, at the time of his death, Felicisimo was the duly elected governor and a resident of theProvinceofLaguna.Hence, the petition should have been filed in Sta. Cruz, Laguna and not inMakatiCity.It also ruled that respondent was without legal capacity to file the petition for letters of administration because her marriage with Felicisimo was bigamous, thus, voidab initio.It found that the decree of absolute divorce dissolving Felicisimos marriage to Merry Lee was not valid in thePhilippinesand did not bind Felicisimo who was a Filipino citizen.It also ruled that paragraph 2, Article 26 of the Family Code cannot be retroactively applied because it would impair the vested rights of Felicisimos legitimate children.Respondent moved for reconsideration[26]and for the disqualification[27]of Judge Arcangel but said motions were denied.[28]Respondent appealed to the Court of Appeals which reversed and set aside the orders of the trial court in its assailed Decision datedFebruary 4, 1998, the dispositive portion of which states:WHEREFORE, the Orders dated September 12, 1995 and January 31, 1996 are hereby REVERSED and SET ASIDE; the Orders dated February 28 and October 24, 1994 are REINSTATED; and the records of the case is REMANDED to the trial court for further proceedings.[29]The appellante court ruled that under Section 1, Rule 73 of the Rules of Court, the term place of residence of the decedent, for purposes of fixing the venue of the settlement of his estate, refers to the personal, actual or physical habitation, or actual residence or place of abode of a person as distinguished from legal residence or domicile.It noted that although Felicisimo discharged his functions as governor in Laguna, he actually resided in Alabang, Muntinlupa.Thus, the petition for letters of administration was properly filed inMakatiCity.The Court of Appeals also held that Felicisimo had legal capacity to marry respondent by virtue of paragraph 2, Article 26 of the Family Code and the rulings inVan Dorn v. Romillo, Jr.[30]andPilapil v. Ibay-Somera.[31]It found that the marriage between Felicisimo and Merry Lee was validly dissolved by virtue of the decree of absolute divorce issued by the Family Court of the First Circuit, State ofHawaii.As a result, under paragraph 2, Article 26, Felicisimo was capacitated to contract a subsequent marriage with respondent.Thus With the well-known rule express mandate of paragraph 2, Article 26, of the Family Code of the Philippines, the doctrines in Van Dorn, Pilapil, and the reason and philosophy behind the enactment of E.O. No. 227, there is no justiciable reason to sustain the individual view sweeping statement of Judge Arc[h]angel, that Article 26, par. 2 of the Family Code, contravenes the basic policy of our state against divorce in any form whatsoever.Indeed, courts cannot deny what the law grants. All that the courts should do is to give force and effect to the express mandate of the law.The foreign divorce having beenobtained by the ForeigneronDecember 14, 1992,[32]the Filipino divorcee, shallx x x have capacity to remarry under Philippine laws.For this reason, the marriage between the deceased and petitioner should not be denominated as a bigamous marriage.Therefore, under Article 130 of the Family Code, the petitioner as the surviving spouse can institute the judicial proceeding for the settlement of the estate of the deceased. x x x[33]Edgar, Linda, and Rodolfo filed separate motions for reconsideration[34]which were denied by the Court of Appeals.OnJuly 2, 1998, Edgar appealed to this Courtviathe instant petition for review oncertiorari.[35]Rodolfo later filed a manifestation and motion to adopt the said petition which was granted.[36]In the instant consolidated petitions, Edgar and Rodolfo insist that the venue of the subject petition for letters of administration was improperly laid because at the time of his death, Felicisimo was a resident of Sta. Cruz, Laguna.They contend that pursuant to our rulings inNuval v. Guray[37]andRomualdez v. RTC,Br.7,TaclobanCity,[38]residence is synonymous with domicile which denotes a fixed permanent residence to which when absent, one intends to return.They claim that a person can only have one domicile at any given time.Since Felicisimo never changed his domicile, the petition for letters of administration should have been filed in Sta. Cruz, Laguna.Petitioners also contend that respondents marriage to Felicisimo was void and bigamous because it was performed during the subsistence of the latters marriage to Merry Lee.They argue that paragraph 2, Article 26 cannot be retroactively applied because it would impair vested rights and ratify the void bigamous marriage.As such, respondent cannot be considered the surviving wife of Felicisimo; hence, she has no legal capacity to file the petition for letters of administration.The issues for resolution: (1) whether venue was properly laid, and (2) whether respondent has legal capacity to file the subject petition for letters of administration.The petition lacks merit.Under Section 1,[39]Rule 73 of the Rules of Court, the petition for letters of administration of the estate of Felicisimo should be filed in the Regional Trial Court of the province in which heresidesat the time of his death.In the case ofGarcia Fule v. Court of Appeals,[40]we laid down the doctrinal rule for determining the residence as contradistinguished from domicile of the decedent for purposes of fixing the venue of the settlement of his estate:[T]he term resides connotesex vi terminiactual residence as distinguished from legal residence or domicile.This term resides, like the terms residing and residence, is elastic and should be interpreted in the light of the object or purpose of the statuteor rulein which it is employed.In the application of venue statutes and rules Section 1, Rule 73 of the Revised Rules of Court is of such nature residencerather thandomicile is the significant factor.Even where the statute uses the word domicile still it is construed as meaning residence and not domicile in the technical sense.Some cases make a distinction between the terms residence and domicile but as generally used in statutes fixing venue, the terms are synonymous, and convey the same meaning as the term inhabitant.In other words, resides should be viewed or understood in its popular sense, meaning,the personal, actual or physical habitation of a person, actual residence or place of abode.It signifies physical presence in a place and actual stay thereat.In this popular sense, the term means merely residence, that is, personal residence,not legal residence or domicile.Residence simply requires bodily presence as aninhabitantin a given place, while domicile requires bodily presence in that place and also an intention to make it ones domicile. No particular length of time of residence is required though; however, the residence must be more than temporary.[41](Emphasis supplied)It is incorrect for petitioners to argue that residence, for purposes of fixing the venue of the settlement of the estate of Felicisimo, is synonymous with domicile.The rulings inNuvalandRomualdezare inapplicable to the instant case because they involve election cases.Needless to say, there is a distinction between residence for purposes of election laws and residence for purposes of fixing the venue of actions.In election cases, residence and domicile are treated as synonymous terms, that is, the fixed permanent residence to which when absent, one has the intention of returning.[42]However, for purposes of fixing venue under the Rules of Court, the residence of a person is his personal, actual or physical habitation, or actual residence or place of abode, which may not necessarily be his legal residence or domicile provided he resides therein with continuity and consistency.[43]Hence, it is possible that a person may have his residence in one place and domicile in another.In the instant case, while petitioners established that Felicisimo was domiciled in Sta. Cruz, Laguna, respondent proved that he also maintained a residence in Alabang, Muntinlupa from 1982 up to the time of his death.Respondent submitted in evidence the Deed of Absolute Sale[44]dated January 5, 1983 showing that the deceased purchased the aforesaid property.She also presented billing statements[45]from the Philippine Heart Center and Chinese General Hospital for the period August to December 1992 indicating the address of Felicisimo at 100 San Juanico, Ayala Alabang, Muntinlupa.Respondent also presented proof of membership of the deceased in the Ayala Alabang Village Association[46]and Ayala Country Club, Inc.,[47]letter-envelopes[48]from 1988 to 1990 sent by the deceaseds children to him at his Alabang address, and the deceaseds calling cards[49]stating that his home/city address is at 100 San Juanico, Ayala Alabang Village, Muntinlupa while his office/provincial address is in Provincial Capitol, Sta. Cruz, Laguna.From the foregoing, we find that Felicisimo was a resident of Alabang, Muntinlupa for purposes of fixing the venue of the settlement of his estate.Consequently, the subject petition for letters of administration was validly filed in the Regional Trial Court[50]which has territorial jurisdiction over Alabang, Muntinlupa.The subject petition was filed on December 17, 1993.At that time, Muntinlupa was still a municipality and the branches of the Regional Trial Court of the National Capital Judicial Region which had territorial jurisdiction over Muntinlupa were then seated inMakatiCityas per Supreme Court Administrative Order No. 3.[51]Thus, the subject petition was validly filed before theRegionalTrialCourtofMakatiCity.Anent the issue of respondent Felicidads legal personality to file the petition for letters of administration, we must first resolve the issue of whether a Filipino who is divorced by his alien spouse abroad may validly remarry under the Civil Code, considering that Felicidads marriage to Felicisimo was solemnized on June 20, 1974, or before the Family Code took effect on August 3, 1988.In resolving this issue, we need not retroactively apply the provisions of the Family Code, particularly Art. 26, par. (2) considering that there is sufficient jurisprudential basis allowing us to rule in the affirmative.The case ofVan Dorn v. Romillo, Jr.[52]involved a marriage between a foreigner and his Filipino wife, which marriage was subsequently dissolved through a divorce obtained abroad by the latter.Claiming that the divorce was not valid under Philippine law, the alien spouse alleged that his interest in the properties from their conjugal partnership should be protected.The Court, however, recognized the validity of the divorce and held that the alien spouse had no interest in the properties acquired by the Filipino wife after the divorce.Thus:In this case, the divorce inNevadareleased private respondent from the marriage from the standards of American law, under whichdivorce dissolves the marriage.As stated by the Federal Supreme Court of the United States in Atherton vs. Atherton, 45 L. Ed. 794, 799:The purpose and effect of a decree of divorce from the bond of matrimony by a competent jurisdiction are to change the existing status or domestic relation of husband and wife, and to free them both from the bond.The marriage tie, when thus severed as to one party, ceases to bind either.A husband without a wife, or a wife without a husband, is unknown to the law.When the law provides, in the nature of a penalty, that the guilty party shall not marry again, that party, as well as the other, is still absolutely freed from the bond of the former marriage.Thus, pursuant to his national law, private respondent is no longer the husband of petitioner.He would have no standing to sue in the case below as petitioners husband entitled to exercise control over conjugal assets.As he is bound by the Decision of his own countrys Court, which validly exercised jurisdiction over him, and whose decision he does not repudiate, he is estopped by his own representation before said Court from asserting his right over the alleged conjugal property.[53]As to the effect of the divorce on the Filipino wife, the Court ruled that she should no longer be considered married to the alien spouse.Further, she should not be required to perform her marital duties and obligations.It held:To maintain, as private respondent does, that, under our laws, petitioner has to be consideredstill marriedto private respondentand still subject to a wife's obligationsunder Article 109,et. seq.of the Civil Codecannot be just.Petitioner should not be obliged to live together with, observe respect and fidelity, and render support to private respondent. The latter should not continue to be one of her heirs with possible rights to conjugal property.She should not be discriminated against in her own country if the ends of justice are to be served.[54](Emphasis added)This principle was thereafter applied inPilapil v. Ibay-Somera[55]where the Court recognized the validity of a divorce obtained abroad.In the said case, it was held that the alien spouse is not a proper party in filing the adultery suit against his Filipino wife.The Court stated that the severance of the marital bond had the effect of dissociating the former spouses from each other,hence the actuations of one would not affect or cast obloquy on the other.[56]Likewise, inQuita v. Court of Appeals,[57]the Court stated that where a Filipino is divorced by his naturalized foreign spouse, the ruling inVan Dornapplies.[58]Although decided onDecember 22, 1998, the divorce in the said case was obtained in 1954 when the Civil Code provisions were still in effect.The significance of theVan Dorncase to the development of limited recognition of divorce in thePhilippinescannot be denied.The ruling has long been interpreted as severing marital ties between parties in a mixed marriage and capacitating the Filipino spouse to remarry as a necessary consequence of upholding the validity of a divorce obtained abroad by the alien spouse.In his treatise, Dr. Arturo M. Tolentino citedVan Dornstating that if the foreigner obtains a valid foreign divorce, the Filipino spouse shall have capacity to remarry under Philippine law.[59]InGarcia v. Recio,[60]the Court likewise cited the aforementioned case in relation to Article 26.[61]In the recent case ofRepublic v. Orbecido III,[62]the historical background and legislative intent behind paragraph 2, Article 26 of the Family Code were discussed, to wit:BriefHistorical BackgroundOnJuly 6, 1987, then President Corazon Aquino signed into law Executive Order No. 209, otherwise known as the Family Code,which took effect onAugust 3, 1988. Article 26 thereof states:All marriages solemnized outside the Philippines in accordance with the laws in force in the country where they were solemnized, and valid there as such, shall also be valid in this country, except those prohibited under Articles 35, 37, and 38.On July 17, 1987, shortly after the signing of the original Family Code, Executive Order No. 227 was likewise signed into law, amending Articles 26, 36, and 39 of the Family Code. A second paragraph was added to Article 26. As so amended, it now provides:ART. 26. All marriages solemnized outside thePhilippinesin accordance with the laws in force in the country where they were solemnized, and valid there as such, shall also be valid in this country, except those prohibited under Articles 35(1), (4), (5) and (6), 36, 37 and 38.Where a marriage between a Filipino citizen and a foreigner is validly celebrated and a divorce is thereafter validly obtained abroad by the alien spouse capacitating him or her to remarry, the Filipino spouse shall have capacity to remarry under Philippine law.(Emphasis supplied)x x x xLegislative IntentRecords of the proceedings of the Family Code deliberations showed that the intent of Paragraph 2 of Article 26, according to Judge Alicia Sempio-Diy, a member of theCivil Code Revision Committee, is to avoid the absurd situation where the Filipino spouse remains married to the alien spouse who, after obtaining a divorce, is no longer married to the Filipino spouse.Interestingly, Paragraph 2 of Article 26 traces its origin to the 1985 case ofVan Dorn v. Romillo, Jr.TheVan Dorncase involved a marriage between a Filipino citizen and a foreigner. The Court held therein that a divorce decree validly obtained by the alien spouse is valid in thePhilippines, and consequently, the Filipino spouse is capacitated to remarry under Philippine law.[63](Emphasis added)As such, theVan Dorncase is sufficient basis in resolving a situation where a divorce is validly obtained abroad by the alien spouse.With the enactment of the Family Code and paragraph 2, Article 26 thereof, our lawmakers codified the law already established through judicial precedent.Indeed, when the object of a marriage is defeated by rendering its continuance intolerable to one of the parties and productive of no possible good to the community, relief in some way should be obtainable.[64]Marriage, being a mutual and shared commitment between two parties, cannot possibly be productive of any good to the society where one is considered released from the marital bond while the other remains bound to it.Such is the state of affairs where the alien spouse obtains a valid divorce abroad against the Filipino spouse, as in this case.Petitioners cite Articles 15[65]and 17[66]of the Civil Code in stating that the divorce is void under Philippine law insofar as Filipinos are concerned.However, in light of this Courts rulings in the cases discussed above, the Filipino spouse should not be discriminated against in his own country if the ends of justice are to be served.[67]InAlonzo v. Intermediate Appellate Court,[68]the Court stated:But as has also been aptly observed, we test a law by its results; and likewise, we may add, by its purposes. It is a cardinal rule that, in seeking the meaning of the law, the first concern of the judge should be to discover in its provisions the intent of the lawmaker. Unquestionably, the law should never be interpreted in such a way as to cause injustice as this is never within the legislative intent. An indispensable part of that intent, in fact, for we presume the good motives of the legislature, is torender justice.Thus, we interpret and apply the law not independently of but in consonance with justice. Law and justice are inseparable, and we must keep them so. To be sure, there are some laws that, while generally valid, may seem arbitrary when applied in a particular case because of its peculiar circumstances. In such a situation, we are not bound, because only of our nature and functions, to apply them just the same, in slavish obedience to their language. What we do instead is find a balance between the word and the will, that justice may be done even as the law is obeyed.As judges, we are not automatons.We do not and must not unfeelingly apply the law as it is worded, yielding like robots to the literal command without regard to its cause and consequence.Courts are apt to err by sticking too closely to the words of a law, so we are warned, by Justice Holmes again, where these words import a policy that goes beyond them.x x x xMore than twenty centuries ago, Justinian defined justice as the constant and perpetual wish to render every one his due.That wish continues to motivate this Court when it assesses the facts and the law in every case brought to it for decision.Justice is always an essential ingredient of its decisions. Thus when the facts warrants, we interpret the law in a way that will render justice, presuming that it was the intention of the lawmaker, to begin with, that the law be dispensed with justice.[69]Applying the above doctrine in the instant case, the divorce decree allegedly obtained by Merry Lee which absolutely allowed Felicisimo to remarry, would have vested Felicidad with the legal personality to file the present petition as Felicisimos surviving spouse.However, the records show that there is insufficient evidence to prove the validity of the divorce obtained by Merry Lee as well as the marriage of respondent and Felicisimo under the laws of the U.S.A.InGarcia v. Recio,[70]the Courtlaid down the specific guidelines for pleading and proving foreign law and divorce judgments. It held that presentation solely of the divorce decree is insufficient and that proof of its authenticity and due execution must be presented.Under Sections 24 and 25 of Rule 132, a writing or document may be proven as a public or official record of a foreign country by either (1) an official publication or (2) a copy thereof attested by the officer having legal custody of the document.If the record is not kept in thePhilippines, such copy must be (a) accompanied by a certificate issued by the proper diplomatic or consular officer in the Philippine foreign service stationed in the foreign country in which the record is kept and (b) authenticated by the seal of his office.[71]With regard to respondents marriage to Felicisimo allegedly solemnized inCalifornia,U.S.A., she submitted photocopies of the Marriage Certificate and the annotated text[72]of the Family Law Act of California which purportedly show that their marriage was done in accordance with the said law.As stated inGarcia,however, the Court cannot take judicial notice of foreign laws as they must be alleged and proved.[73]Therefore, this case should be remanded to the trial court for further reception of evidence on the divorce decree obtained by Merry Lee and the marriage of respondent and Felicisimo.Even assuming that Felicisimo was not capacitated to marry respondent in 1974, nevertheless, we find that the latter has the legal personality to file the subject petition for letters of administration, as she may be considered the co-owner of Felicisimo as regards the properties that were acquired through their joint efforts during their cohabitation.Section 6,[74]Rule 78 of the Rules of Court states that letters of administration may be granted to the surviving spouse of the decedent.However, Section 2, Rule 79 thereof also provides in part:SEC. 2.Contents of petition for letters of administration. A petition for letters of administration must be filed by aninterested personand must show, as far as known to the petitioner: x x x.An interested person has been defined as one who would be benefited by the estate, such as an heir, or one who has a claim against the estate, such as a creditor. The interest must be material and direct, and not merely indirect or contingent.[75]In the instant case, respondent would qualify as an interested person who has a direct interest in the estate of Felicisimo by virtue of their cohabitation, the existence of which was not denied by petitioners.If she proves the validity of the divorce and Felicisimos capacity to remarry, but fails to prove that her marriage with him was validly performed under the laws of theU.S.A., then she may be considered as a co-owner under Article 144[76]of the Civil Code.This provision governs the property relations between parties who live together as husband and wife without the benefit of marriage, or their marriage is void from the beginning.It provides that the property acquired by either or both of them through their work or industry or their wages and salaries shall be governed by the rules on co-ownership.In a co-ownership, it is not necessary that the property be acquired through their joint labor, efforts and industry.Any property acquired during the union isprima faciepresumed to have been obtained through their joint efforts.Hence, the portions belonging to the co-owners shall be presumed equal, unless the contrary is proven.[77]Meanwhile, if respondent fails to prove the validity of both the divorce and the marriage, the applicable provision would be Article 148 of the Family Code which has filled the hiatus in Article 144 of the Civil Code by expressly regulating the property relations of couples living together as husband and wife but are incapacitated to marry.[78]InSaguid v. Court of Appeals,[79]we held that even if the cohabitation or the acquisition of property occurred before the Family Code took effect, Article 148 governs.[80]The Court described the property regime under this provision as follows:The regime of limited co-ownership of property governing the union of parties who are not legally capacitated to marry each other, but who nonetheless live together as husband and wife, applies to properties acquired during said cohabitation in proportion to their respective contributions. Co-ownership will only be up to the extent of the proven actual contribution of money, property or industry.Absent proof of the extent thereof, their contributions and corresponding shares shall be presumed to be equal.x x x xIn the cases ofAgapay v. Palang, andTumlos v. Fernandez, which involved the issue of co-ownership of properties acquired by the parties to a bigamous marriage and an adulterous relationship, respectively, we ruled that proof of actual contribution in the acquisition of the property is essential.x x xAs in other civil cases, the burden of proof rests upon the party who, as determined by the pleadings or the nature of the case, asserts an affirmative issue.Contentions must be proved by competent evidence and reliance must be had on the strength of the partys own evidence and not upon the weakness of the opponents defense. x x x[81]In view of the foregoing, we find that respondents legal capacity to file the subject petition for letters of administration may arise from her status as the surviving wife of Felicisimo or as his co-owner under Article 144 of the Civil Code or Article 148 of the Family Code.WHEREFORE,the petition isDENIED.The Decision of the Court of Appeals reinstating and affirming theFebruary 28, 1994Order of the Regional Trial Court which denied petitioners motion to dismiss and itsOctober 24, 1994Order which dismissed petitioners motion for reconsideration isAFFIRMED.Let this case beREMANDEDto the trial courtfor further proceedings.SO ORDERED.CONSUELO YNARES-SANTIAGOAssociate JusticeWE CONCUR:MA. ALICIA AUSTRIA-MARTINEZROMEO J. CALLEJO, SR.Associate JusticeAssociate JusticeMINITA V. CHICO-NAZARIOAssociate JusticeATTESTATIONI attest that the conclusions in the above decision were reached in consultation before the case was assigned to the writer of the opinion of the Courts Division.CONSUELO YNARES-SANTIAGOAssociate JusticeChairperson, Third DivisionCERTIFICATIONPursuant to Section 13, Article VIII of the Constitution and the Division Chairpersons Attestation, it is hereby certified that the conclusions in the above Decision were reached in consultation before the case was assigned to the writer of the opinion of the Courts Division.REYNATO S. PUNOChief Justice

[1]Rolloof G.R. No. 133743, pp. 45-66. Penned by Associate Justice Artemon D. Luna and concurred in by Associate Justices Godardo A. Jacinto and Roberto A. Barrios.[2]Records, pp. 335-338.Penned by Judge Paul T. Arcangel.[3]Id.at 391-393.[4]Rolloof G.R. No. 133743, p.68.Penned by Associate Justice Artemon D. Luna and concurred in by Associate Justices Demetrio G. Demetria and Roberto A. Barrios.[5]Records, p. 125.[6]Id.at 137.[7]Id.at 116.[8]Id.at 1-5.[9]Id.at 10-24.[10]Id.at 30-35.[11]Id.at 38.[12]Id.at 39-138.[13]When a marriage between a Filipino citizen and a foreigner is validly celebrated and a divorce is thereafter validly obtained abroad by the alien spouse capacitating him or her to remarry, the Filipino spouse shall have capacity to remarry under Philippine law.[14]G.R. No. L-68470,October 8, 1985, 139 SCRA 139.[15]See Records, pp. 155-158, 160-170 and 181-192.[16]This Code shall have retroactive effect insofar as it does not prejudice or impair vested rights or acquired rights in accordance with the Civil Code or other laws.[17]Records, p. 259.[18]Id.at 260.[19]Id.at 262-267.[20]Id.at 270-272.[21]Id.at 288.[22]Id.at 301.[23]Id.at 302-303.[24]Id.at 306-311.[25]Id.at 318-320.[26]Id.at 339-349.[27]Id.at 350-354.[28]Id.at 391-393.[29]Rolloof G.R.No. 133743,p. 66.[30]Supranote 14.[31]G.R. No. 80116,June 30, 1989, 174 SCRA 653.[32]Parenthetically, it appears that the Court of Appeals proceeded from a mistaken finding of fact because the records clearly show that the divorce was obtained onDecember 14, 1973(notDecember 14, 1992) and that the marriage of Gov. San Luis with respondent was celebrated onJune 20, 1974. These events both occurred before the effectivity of the Family Code onAugust 3, 1988.[33]Rolloof G.R. No. 133743, p. 65.[34]See CArollo, pp. 309-322, 335-340, and 362-369.[35]Rolloof G.R. No. 133743, pp. 8-42.[36]Id.at 75.[37]52 Phil. 645 (1928).[38]G.R. No. 104960,September 14, 1993, 226 SCRA 408.[39]SECTION 1.Where estate of deceased persons be settled. If the decedent is an inhabitant of the Philippines at the time of his death, whether a citizen or an alien, his will shall be proved, or letters of administration granted, and his estate settled,in the Court of First Instance in the province in which he resides at the time of his death, x x x. (Underscoring supplied)[40]G.R. Nos. L-40502 & L-42670,November 29, 1976, 74 SCRA 189.[41]Id.at 199-200.[42]Romualdez v. RTC, Br. 7, Tacloban City, supranote 38 at 415.[43]SeeBoleyley v. Villanueva,373 Phil. 141, 146 (1999);Dangwa Transportation Co. Inc. v. Sarmiento,G.R. No. L-22795,January 31, 1977, 75 SCRA 124, 128-129.[44]Records, pp. 76-78.[45]Id.at 60-75.[46]Id.at 79.[47]Id.at 80.[48]Id.at 81-83.[49]Id.at 84.[50]The Regional Trial Court and not the Municipal Trial Court had jurisdiction over this case because the value of Gov. San Luis estate exceededP200,000.00 as provided for under B.P. Blg 129, Section 19(4).[51]SC Administrative Order No. 3 datedJanuary 19, 1983states in part:Pursuant to the provisions of Section 18 of B.P. Blg. 129, and Section 4 of the Executive Order issued by the President of the Philippines on January 17, 1983, declaring the reorganization of the Judiciary, the territorial jurisdiction of the Regional Trial Courts in the National Capital Judicial Region are hereby defined as follows:x x x x5.Branches CXXXII to CL, inclusive, with seats atMakati over the municipalities of Las Pinas,Makati, Muntinlupa and Paraaque. x x x[52]Supranote 14.[53]Id.at 139, 143-144.[54]Id.at 144.[55]Supranote 31.[56]Id.at 664.[57]G.R. No. 124862,December 22, 1998, 300 SCRA 406.[58]Id.at 414; See alsoRepublic v. Orbecido III,G.R. No. 154380, October 5, 2005, 472 SCRA 114, 121.[59]Tolentino, Arturo M.,Commentaries and Jurisprudence on the Civil Code of thePhilippines,Vol. I, 1990 ed., p. 263.[60]G.R. No. 138322,October 2, 2001, 366 SCRA 437.[61]Id.at 447.[62]Supranote 58.[63]Id.at 119-121.[64]Goitia v. Campos Rueda, 35 Phil. 252, 254-255 (1916).[65]ART. 15.Laws relating to family rights and duties, or to the status, condition and legal capacity of persons are binding upon citizens of thePhilippines, even though living abroad.[66]Art. 17. x x xProhibitive laws concerning persons, their acts or property, and those which have for their object public order, public policy and good customs shall not be rendered ineffective by laws or judgments promulgated, or by determinations or conventions agreed upon in a foreign country.[67]Supranote 14 at 144.[68]G.R. No. L-72873,May 28, 1987, 150 SCRA 259.[69]Id.at 264-265, 268.[70]Supranote 60.[71]Id.at 448-449.[72]Records, pp. 118-124.[73]Supranote 60 at 451.[74]SEC. 6.When and to whom letters of administration granted. Ifx x x a person dies intestate, administration shall be granted:(a)To the surviving husband or wife, as the case may be, or next of kin, or both, in the discretion of the court, or to such person as such surviving husband or wife, or next of kin, requests to have appointed, if competent and willing to serve; x x x.[75]Saguinsin v. Lindayag,116 Phil. 1193, 1195 (1962).[76]Article 144 of the Civil Code reads in full:When a man and a woman live together as husband and wife, but they are not married, or their marriage is void from the beginning, the property acquired by either or both of them through their work or industry or their wages and salaries shall be governed by the rules on co-ownership.[77]Valdes v. RTC,Br.102,Quezon City,328 Phil. 1289, 1297 (1996).[78]Francisco v. Master Iron Works & Construction Corporation, G.R. No. 151967, February 16, 2005, 451 SCRA 494, 506.[79]G.R. No. 150611,June 10, 2003, 403 SCRA 678.[80]Id.at 686.[81]Id.at 679, 686-687.

SECOND DIVISIONREPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, P e t i t i o n e r , -versus-CRASUS L. IYOY, R e s p o n d e n t.G.R. No. 152577Present: PUNO, Chairman, AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ, CALLEJO, SR., TINGA, and CHICO-NAZARIO,JJ.Promulgated:September 21, 2005

x- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -xD E C I S I O NCHICO-NAZARIO,J.:In this Petition for Review onCertiorariunder Rule 45 of the Rules of Court, petitioner Republic of the Philippines, represented by the Office of the Solicitor General, prays for the reversal of the Decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 62539, dated 30 July 2001,[1]affirming the Judgment of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Cebu City, Branch 22, in Civil Case No. CEB-20077, dated 30 October 1998,[2]declaring the marriage between respondent Crasus L. Iyoy and Fely Ada Rosal-Iyoy null and void on the basis of Article 36 of the Family Code of the Philippines. The proceedings before the RTC commenced with the filing of a Complaint[3]for declaration of nullity of marriage by respondent Crasus on 25 March 1997. According to the said Complaint, respondent Crasus married Fely on 16 December 1961 at Bradford Memorial Church, Jones Avenue, Cebu City. As a result of their union, they had five children Crasus, Jr., Daphne, Debbie, Calvert, and Carlos who are now all of legal ages. After the celebration of their marriage, respondent Crasus discovered that Fely was hot-tempered, a nagger and extravagant. In 1984, Fely left the Philippines for the United States of America (U.S.A.), leaving all of their five children, the youngest then being only six years old, to the care of respondent Crasus. Barely a year after Fely left for the U.S.A., respondent Crasus received a letter from her requesting that he sign the enclosed divorce papers; he disregarded the said request. Sometime in 1985, respondent Crasus learned, through the letters sent by Fely to their children, that Fely got married to an American, with whom she eventually had a child. In 1987, Fely came back to the Philippines with her American family, staying at Cebu Plaza Hotel in Cebu City. Respondent Crasus did not bother to talk to Fely because he was afraid he might not be able to bear the sorrow and the pain she had caused him. Fely returned to the Philippines several times more: in 1990, for the wedding of their eldest child, Crasus, Jr.; in 1992, for the brain operation of their fourth child, Calvert; and in 1995, for unknown reasons. Fely continued to live with her American family in New Jersey, U.S.A. She had been openly using the surname of her American husband in the Philippines and in the U.S.A. For the wedding of Crasus, Jr., Fely herself had invitations made in which she was named as Mrs. Fely Ada Micklus. At the time the Complaint was filed, it had been 13 years since Fely left and abandoned respondent Crasus, and there was no more possibility of reconciliation between them. Respondent Crasus finally alleged in his Complaint that Felys acts brought danger and dishonor to the family, and clearly demonstrated her psychological incapacity to perform the essential obligations of marriage. Such incapacity, being incurable and continuing, constitutes a ground for declaration of nullity of marriage under Article 36, in relation to Articles 68, 70, and 72, of the Family Code of the Philippines.Fely filed her Answer and Counterclaim[4]with the RTC on 05 June 1997. She asserted therein that she was already an American citizen since 1988 and was now married to Stephen Micklus. While she admitted being previously married to respondent Crasus and having five children with him, Fely refuted the other allegations made by respondent Crasus in his Complaint. She explained that she was no more hot-tempered than any normal person, and she may had been indignant at respondent Crasus on certain occasions but it was because of the latters drunkenness, womanizing, and lack of sincere effort to find employment and to contribute to the maintenance of their household. She could not have been extravagant since the family hardly had enough money for basic needs. Indeed, Fely left for abroad for financial reasons as respondent Crasus had no job and what she was then earning as the sole breadwinner in the Philippines was insufficient to support their family. Although she left all of her children with respondent Crasus, she continued to provide financial support to them, as well as, to respondent Crasus. Subsequently, Fely was able to bring her children to the U.S.A., except for one, Calvert, who had to stay behind for medical reasons. While she did file for divorce from respondent Crasus, she denied having herself sent a letter to respondent Crasus requesting him to sign the enclosed divorce papers. After securing a divorce from respondent Crasus, Fely married her American husband and acquired American citizenship. She argued that her marriage to her American husband was legal because now being an American citizen, her status shall be governed by the law of her present nationality. Fely also pointed out that respondent Crasus himself was presently living with another woman who bore him a child. She also accused respondent Crasus of misusing the amount ofP90,000.00 which she advanced to him to finance the brain operation of their son, Calvert. On the basis of the foregoing, Fely also prayed that the RTC declare her marriage to respondent Crasus null and void; and that respondent Crasus be ordered to pay to Fely theP90,000.00 she advanced to him, with interest, plus, moral and exemplary damages, attorneys fees, and litigation expenses. After respondent Crasus and Fely had filed their respective Pre-Trial Briefs,[5]the RTC afforded both parties the opportunity to present their evidence. Petitioner Republic participated in the trial through the Provincial Prosecutor of Cebu.[6] Respondent Crasus submitted the following pieces of evidence in support of his Complaint: (1) his own testimony on 08 September 1997, in which he essentially reiterated the allegations in his Complaint;[7](2) the Certification, dated 13 April 1989, by the Health Department of Cebu City, on the recording of the Marriage Contract between respondent Crasus and Fely in the Register of Deeds, such marriage celebration taking place on 16 December 1961;[8]and (3) the invitation to the wedding of Crasus, Jr., their eldest son, wherein Fely openly used her American husbands surname, Micklus.[9] Felys counsel filed a Notice,[10]and, later on, a Motion,[11]to take the deposition of witnesses, namely, Fely and her children, Crasus, Jr. and Daphne, upon written interrogatories, before the consular officers of the Philippines in New York and California, U.S.A, where the said witnesses reside. Despite the Orders[12]and Commissions[13]issued by the RTC to the Philippine Consuls of New York and California, U.S.A., to take the depositions of the witnesses upon written interrogatories, not a single deposition was ever submitted to the RTC. Taking into account that it had been over a year since respondent Crasus had presented his evidence and that Fely failed to exert effort to have the case progress, the RTC issued an Order, dated 05 October 1998,[14]considering Fely to have waived her right to present her evidence. The case was thus deemed submitted for decision. Not long after, on 30 October 1998, the RTC promulgated its Judgment declaring the marriage of respondent Crasus and Fely null and voidab initio, on the basis of the following findings The ground bearing defendants psychological incapacity deserves a reasonable consideration. As observed, plaintiffs testimony is decidedly credible. The Court finds that defendant had indeed exhibited unmistakable signs of psychological incapacity to comply with her marital duties such as striving for family unity, observing fidelity, mutual love, respect, help and support. From the evidence presented, plaintiff adequately established that the defendant practically abandoned him. She obtained a divorce decree in the United States of America and married another man and has establish [sic] another family of her own. Plaintiff is in an anomalous situation, wherein he is married to a wife who is already married to another man in another country.Defendants intolerable traits may not have been apparent or manifest before the marriage, the FAMILY CODE nonetheless allows the annulment of the marriage provided that these were eventually manifested after the wedding. It appears to be the case in this instance.Certainly defendants posture being an irresponsible wife erringly reveals her very low regard for that sacred and inviolable institution of marriage which is the foundation of human society throughout the civilized world. It is quite evident that the defendant is bereft of the mind, will and heart to comply with her marital obligations, such incapacity was already there at the time of the marriage in question is shown by defendants own attitude towards her marriage to plaintiff.In sum, the ground invoked by plaintiff which is defendants psychological incapacity to comply with the essential marital obligations which already existed at the time of the marriage in question has been satisfactorily proven. The evidence in herein case establishes the irresponsibility of defendant Fely Ada Rosal Iyoy, firmly.Going over plaintiffs testimony which is decidedly credible, the Court finds that the defendant had indeed exhibited unmistakable signs of such psychological incapacity to comply with her marital obligations. These are her excessive disposition to material things over and above the marital stability. That such incapacity was already there at the time of the marriage in question is shown by defendants own attitude towards her marriage to plaintiff. And for these reasons there is a legal ground to declare the marriage of plaintiff Crasus L. Iyoy and defendant Fely Ada Rosal Iyoy null and voidab initio.[15] Petitioner Republic, believing that the afore-quoted Judgment of the RTC was contrary to law and evidence, filed an appeal with the Court of Appeals. The appellate court, though, in its Decision, dated 30 July 2001, affirmed the appealed Judgment of the RTC, finding no reversible error therein. It even offered additional ratiocination for declaring the marriage between respondent Crasus and Fely null and void, to wit Defendant secured a divorce from plaintiff-appellee abroad, has remarried, and is now permanently residing in the United States. Plaintiff-appellee categorically stated this as one of his reasons for seeking the declaration of nullity of their marriageArticle 26 of the Family Code provides:Art. 26. All marriages solemnized outside the Philippines in accordance with the laws in force in the country where they were solemnized, and valid there as such, shall also be valid in this country, except those prohibited under Articles 35(1), (4), (5) and (6), 36, 37 and 38.WHERE A MARRIAGE BETWEEN A FILIPINO CITIZEN AND A FOREIGNER IS VALIDLY CELEBRATED AND A DIVORCE IS THEREAFTER VALIDLY OBTAINED ABROAD BY THE ALIEN SPOUSE CAPACITATING HIM OR HER TO REMARRY, THE FILIPINO SPOUSE SHALL LIKEWISE HAVE CAPACITY TO REMARRY UNDER PHILIPPINE LAW.The rationale behind the second paragraph of the above-quoted provision is to avoid the absurd and unjust situation of a Filipino citizen still being married to his or her alien spouse, although the latter is no longer married to the Filipino spouse because he or she has obtained a divorce abroad. In the case at bench, the defendant has undoubtedly acquired her American husbands citizenship and thus has become an alien as well. This Court cannot see why the benefits of Art. 26 aforequoted can not be extended to a Filipino citizen whose spouse eventually embraces another citizenship and thus becomes herself an alien.It would be the height of unfairness if, under these circumstances, plaintiff would still be considered as married to defendant, given her total incapacity to honor her marital covenants to the former. To condemn plaintiff to remain shackled in a marriage that in truth and in fact does not exist and to remain married to a spouse who is incapacitated to discharge essential marital covenants, is verily to condemn him to a perpetual disadvantage which this Court finds abhorrent and will not countenance. Justice dictates that plaintiff be given relief by affirming the trial courts declaration of the nullity of the marriage of the parties.[16]After the Court of Appeals, in a Resolution, dated 08 March 2002,[17]denied its Motion for Reconsideration, petitioner Republic filed the instant Petition before this Court, based on the following arguments/grounds I. Abandonment by and sexual infidelity of respondents wife do notper seconstitute psychological incapacity.II. The Court of Appeals has decided questions of substance not in accord with law and jurisprudence considering that the Court of Appeals committed serious errors of law in ruling that Article 26, paragraph 2 of the Family Code is inapplicable to the case at bar.[18] In his Comment[19]to the Petition, respondent Crasus maintained that Felys psychological incapacity was clearly established after a full-blown trial, and that paragraph 2 of Article 26 of the Family Code of the Philippines was indeed applicable to the marriage of respondent Crasus and Fely, because the latter had already become an American citizen. He further questioned the personality of petitioner Republic, represented by the Office of the Solicitor General, to institute the instant Petition, because Article 48 of the Family Code of the Philippines authorizes the prosecuting attorney or fiscal assigned to the trial court, not the Solicitor General, to intervene on behalf of the State, in proceedings for annulment and declaration of nullity of marriages. After having reviewed the records of this case and the applicable laws and jurisprudence, this Court finds the instant Petition to be meritorious.IThe totality of evidence presented during trial is insufficient to support the finding of psychological incapacity of Fely.Article 36, concededly one of the more controversial provisions of the Family Code of the Philippines, reads ART. 36. A marriage contracted by any party who, at the time of the celebration, was psychologically incapacitated to comply with the essential marital obligations of marriage, shall likewise be void even if such incapacity becomes manifest only after its solemnization.Issues most commonly arise as to what constitutes psychological incapacity. In a series of cases, this Court laid down guidelines for determining its existence. InSantos v. Court of Appeals,[20]the term psychological incapacity was defined, thus . . . [P]sychological incapacity should refer to no less than a mental (not physical) incapacity that causes a party to be truly cognitive of the basic marital covenants that concomitantly must be assumed and discharged by the parties to the marriage which, as so expressed by Article 68 of the Family Code, include their mutual obligations to live together, observe love, respect and fidelity and render help and support. There is hardly any doubt that the intendment of the law has been to confine the meaning of psychological incapacity to the most serious cases of personality disorders clearly demonstrative of an utter insensitivity or inability to give meaning and significance to the marriage. This psychological condition must exist at the time the marriage is celebrated[21]The psychological incapacity must be characterized by (a)Gravity It must be grave or serious such that the party would be incapable of carrying out the ordinary duties required in a marriage;(b)Juridical Antecedence It must be rooted in the history of the party antedating the marriage, although the overt manifestations may emerge only after the marriage; and(c)Incurability It must be incurable or, even if it were otherwise, the cure would be beyond the means of the party involved.[22]More definitive guidelines in the interpretation and application of Article 36 of the Family Code of the Philippines were handed down by this Court inRepublic v. Court of Appeals and Molina,[23]which, although quite lengthy, by its significance, deserves to be reproduced below (1) The burden of proof to show the nullity of the marriage belongs to the plaintiff. Any doubt should be resolved in favor of the existence and continuation of the marriage and against its dissolution and nullity. This is rooted in the fact that both our Constitution and our laws cherish the validity of marriage and unity of the family. Thus, our Constitution devotes an entire Article on the Family, recognizing it as the foundation of the nation. It decrees marriage as legally inviolable, thereby protecting it from dissolution at the whim of the parties. Both the family and marriage are to be protected by the state.The Family Code echoes this constitutional edict on marriage and the family and emphasizes their permanence, inviolability and solidarity.(2) The root cause of the psychological incapacity must be (a) medically or clinically identified, (b) alleged in the complaint, (c) sufficiently proven by experts and (d) clearly explained in the decision. Article 36 of the Family Code requires that the incapacity must be psychological - not physical, although its manifestations and/or symptoms may be physical. The evidence must convince the court that the parties, or one of them, was mentally or psychically ill to such an extent that the person could not have known the obligations he was assuming, or knowing them, could not have given valid assumption thereof. Although no example of such incapacity need be given here so as not to limit the application of the provision under the principle ofejusdem generis, nevertheless such root cause must be identified as a psychological illness and its incapacitating nature fully explained. Expert evidence may be given by qualified psychiatrists and clinical psychologists.(3) The incapacity must be proven to be existing at the time of the celebration of the marriage. The evidence must show that the illness was existing when the parties exchanged their I do's. The manifestation of the illness need not be perceivable at such time, but the illness itself must have attached at such moment, or prior thereto.(4) Such incapacity must also be shown to be medically or clinically permanent or incurable. Such incurability may be absolute or even relative only in regard to the other spouse, not necessarily absolutely against everyone of the same sex. Furthermore, such incapacity must be relevant to the assumption of marriage obligations, not necessarily to those not related to marriage, like the exercise of a profession or employment in a job(5) Such illness must be grave enough to bring about the disability of the party to assume the essential obligations of marriage. Thus, mild characteriological peculiarities, mood changes, occasional emotional outbursts cannot be accepted as root causes. The illness must be shown as downright incapacity or inability, not a refusal, neglect or difficulty, much less ill will. In other words, there is a natal or supervening disabling factor in the person, an adverse integral element in the personality structure that effectively incapacitates the person from really accepting and thereby complying with the obligations essential to marriage.(6) The essential marital obligations must be those embraced by Articles 68 up to 71 of the Family Code as regards the husband and wife as well as Articles 220, 221 and 225 of the same Code in regard to parents and their children. Such non-complied marital obligation(s) must also be stated in the petition, proven by evidence and included in the text of the decision.(7) Interpretations given by the National Appellate Matrimonial Tribunal of the Catholic Church in the Philippines, while not controlling or decisive, should be given great respect by our courts(8) The trial court must order the prosecuting attorney or fiscal and the Solicitor General to appear as counsel for the state. No decision shall be handed down unless the Solicitor General issues a certification, which will be quoted in the decision, briefly stating therein his reasons for his agreement or opposition, as the case may be, to the petition. The Solicitor General, along with the prosecuting attorney, shall submit to the court such certification within fifteen (15) days from the date the case is deemed submitted for resolution of the court. The Solicitor General shall discharge the equivalent function of thedefensor vinculicontemplated under Canon 1095.[24]A later case,Marcos v. Marcos,[25]further clarified that there is no requirement that the defendant/respondent spouse should be personally examined by a physician or psychologist as a conditionsine qua nonfor the declaration of nullity of marriage based on psychological incapacity. Such psychological incapacity, however, must be established by the totality of the evidence presented during the trial.Using the guidelines established by the afore-mentioned jurisprudence, this Court finds that the totality of evidence presented by respondent Crasus failed miserably to establish the alleged psychological incapacity of his wife Fely; therefore, there is no basis for declaring their marriage null and void under Article 36 of the Family Code of the Philippines.The only substantial evidence presented by respondent Crasus before the RTC was his testimony, which can be easily put into question for being self-serving, in the absence of any other corroborating evidence. He submitted only two other pieces of evidence: (1) the Certification on the recording with the Register of Deeds of the Marriage Contract between respondent Crasus and Fely, such marriage being celebrated on 16 December 1961; and (2) the invitation to the wedding of Crasus, Jr., their eldest son, in which Fely used her American husbands surname. Even considering the admissions made by Fely herself in her Answer to respondent Crasuss Complaint filed with the RTC, the evidence is not enough to convince this Court that Fely had such a grave mental illness that prevented her from assuming the essential obligations of marriage. It is worthy to emphasize that Article 36 of the Family Code of the Philippines contemplates downright incapacity or inability to take cognizance of and to assume the basic marital obligations; not a mere refusal, neglect or difficulty, much less, ill will, on the part of the errant spouse.[26] Irreconcilable differences, conflicting personalities, emotional immaturity and irresponsibility, physical abuse, habitual alcoholism, sexual infidelity or perversion, and abandonment, by themselves, also do not warrant a finding of psychological incapacity under the said Article.[27] As has already been stressed by this Court in previous cases, Article 36 is not to be confused with a divorce law that cuts the marital bond at the time the causes therefore manifest themselves. It refers to a serious psychological illness afflicting a party even before the celebration of marriage. It is a malady so grave and so permanent as to deprive one of awareness of the duties and responsibilities of the matrimonial bond one is about to assume.[28] The evidence may have proven that Fely committed acts that hurt and embarrassed respondent Crasus and the rest of the family. Her hot-temper, nagging, and extravagance; her abandonment of respondent Crasus; her marriage to an American; and even her flaunting of her American family and her American surname, may indeed be manifestations of her alleged incapacity to comply with her marital obligations; nonetheless, the root cause for such was not identified. If the root cause of the incapacity was not identified, then it cannot be satisfactorily established as a psychological or mental defect that is serious or grave; neither could it be proven to be in existence at the time of celebration of the marriage; nor that it is incurable. While the personal examination of Fely by a psychiatrist or psychologist is no longer mandatory for the declaration of nullity of their marriage under Article 36 of the Family Code of the Philippines, by virtue of this Courts ruling inMarcos v. Marcos,[29]respondent Crasus must still have complied with the requirement laid down inRepublic v. Court of Appeals and Molina[30]that the root cause of the incapacity be identified as a psychological illness and that its incapacitating nature be fully explained. In any case, any doubt shall be resolved in favor of the validity of the marriage.[31] No less than the Constitution of 1987 sets the policy to protect and strengthen the family as the basic social institution and marriage as the foundation of the family.[32]IIArticle 26, paragraph 2 of the Family Code of the Philippines is not applicable to the case at bar.According to Article 26, paragraph 2 of the Family Code of the Philippines Where a marriage between a Filipino citizen and a foreigner is validly celebrated and a divorce is thereafter validly obtained abroad by the alien spouse capacitating him or her to remarry, the Filipino spouse shall likewise have capacity to remarry under Philippine law.As it is worded, Article 26, paragraph 2, refers to a special situation wherein one of the couple getting married is a Filipino citizen and the other a foreigner at the time the marriage was celebrated.By its plain and literal interpretation, the said provision cannot be applied to the case of respondent Crasus and his wife Fely because at the time Fely obtained her divorce, she was still a Filipino citizen. Although the exact date was not established, Fely herself admitted in her Answer filed before the RTC that she obtained a divorce from respondent Crasus sometime after she left for the United Statesin 1984, after which she married her American husband in 1985. In the same Answer, she alleged that she had been an American citizensince 1988. At the time she filed for divorce, Fely wasstill a Filipino citizen, and pursuant to the nationality principle embodied in Article 15 of the Civil Code of the Philippines, she was still bound by Philippine laws on family rights and duties, status, condition, and legal capacity, even when she was already living abroad. Philippine laws, then and even until now, do not allow and recognize divorce between Filipino spouses. Thus, Fely could not have validly obtained a divorce from respondent Crasus.IIIThe Solicitor General is authorized to intervene, on behalf of the Republic, in proceedings for annulment and declaration of nullity of marriages.Invoking Article 48 of the Family Code of the Philippines, respondent Crasus argued that only the prosecuting attorney or fiscal assigned to the RTC may intervene on behalf of the State in proceedings for annulment or declaration of nullity of marriages; hence, the Office of the Solicitor General had no personality to file the instant Petition on behalf of the State. Article 48 provides ART. 48. In all cases of annulment or declaration of absolute nullity of marriage, the Court shall order the prosecuting attorney or fiscal assigned to it to appear on behalf of the State to take steps to prevent collusion between the parties and to take care that the evidence is not fabricated or suppressed. That Article 48 does not expressly mention the Solicitor General does not bar him or his Office from intervening in proceedings for annulment or declaration of nullity of marriages. Executive Order No. 292, otherwise known as the Administrative Code of 1987, appoints the Solicitor General as the principal law officer and legal defender of the Government.[33] His Office is tasked to represent the Government of the Philippines, its agencies and instrumentalities and its officials and agents in any litigation, proceeding, investigation or matter requiring the services of lawyers. The Office of the Solicitor General shall constitute the law office of the Government and, as such, shall discharge duties requiring the services of lawyers.[34] The intent of Article 48 of the Family Code of the Philippines is to ensure that the interest of the State is represented and protected in proceedings for annulment and declaration of nullity of marriages