Full CPD report

The Department in Review Cincinna2 Police Department

January 2012

Strategic Policy Partnership

Box 577 West Tisbury, MassachuseGs 02575

1

Table of Contents (1 out of 2)

•  Execu2ve Summary •  Introduc2on and Overview

–  The Audit Team and Introductory Remarks (7-‐8)

–  The Cincinna< Police Department (9) –  Linder Report Ac<on

Recommenda<ons (10-‐15) –  The Historical Environment (16) –  The Vision for Policing Cincinna<

(17-‐23) •  Community Policing

–  Current Ini<a<ves (25-‐26) –  Recommenda<ons (26-‐30)

•  Patrol Services –  Organiza<on (32-‐34) –  District-‐by-‐District Recommenda<ons

(35-‐46) –  Administra<on (47-‐48) –  Special Services (49-‐53) –  Resource Alloca<on (54-‐56) –  Demand Management (57-‐58)

•  The Inves2ga2ve Func2on

–  Organiza<on (60) –  Case Management (61-‐64) –  Integra<on with Patrol (65-‐66) –  Specializa<on (67-‐68) –  Homicide (69-‐70) –  Officer-‐involved Shoo<ngs (71) –  Felonious Assaults (72-‐74) –  Criminalis<cs (75) –  Records Management (76-‐77) –  Task Forces (78)

•  The Intelligence Func2on –  Structure (80) –  Informa<on Dissemina<on (81) –  U<liza<on (82) –  Special Events (83) –  Departmental Coordina<on (84) –  Phone Surveillance (85)

2 Strategic Policy Partnership

Table of Contents (2 out of 2)

•  Administra2ve and Support Services –  Internal Inves<ga<ons Sec<on (87) –  Planning Sec<on (87) –  Inspec<ons Sec<on (88) –  Court Control Unit (88) –  Detail Coordina<on Unit (88) –  Training Sec<on (89) –  Organiza<on (91) –  Technology (92-‐97) –  Financial Management and Personnel

(97-‐98) –  Over<me and Court Time (99-‐102)

•  Addressing Crime and Disorder –  The History (104-‐105) –  Strategy/Implementa<on (106-‐107) –  Law Enforcement Team (108) –  Services Team (109) –  Community Team (109) –  Systems Team (109) –  Team Recommenda<ons (111)

•  Managing Performance –  General Background (113) –  General Recommenda<ons (114-‐115) –  Accredita<on (116-‐117) –  Personnel Evalua<on (118-‐119)

•  Restructuring and Resourcing the Department

–  Staffing Levels (121-‐128) –  Departmental Organiza<on (129-‐133)

•  Summary of Recommenda2ons


Execu2ve Summary

•  This report presents the results of a review or “audit” of the Cincinna< Police Department, undertaken at the request of Chief James Craig. The objec<ve of this review was to assess current structure, opera<ons, and systems within the Cincinna< Police Department against na<onal standards, iden<fying strategies that were notable for their effec<veness and needed to be protected, areas that needed strengthening and areas that needed major reform.

•  Overall, the department is a police agency that has made significant strides toward excellence in a number of areas over the last five years. A number of notable ini<a<ves have been undertaken, such as the Cincinna< Ini<a<ve to Reduce Violence (CIRV), which has won several na<onal awards.

•  The quality of the police officers with whom the review staff interacted was notable, having a strong commitment to Cincinna< and its future. Since the riots that occurred some years ago, the department has worked hard to build trust with the Cincinna< community experiencing substan<al success.

•  Key recommenda<ons resul<ng from the review are the following: –  The organiza<on is somewhat top heavy, overly specialized and in need of more robust

performance management processes. –  A greater percentage of police officers need to be assigned to the Police Districts as

opposed to specialized assignments, with District Commanders held accountable for how those officers are used to address the major concerns of District neighborhoods


Execu2ve Summary

–  The rela<onship between inves<ga<ons of felonious assault cases and homicides needs to be strengthened. Presently, Districts inves<gate the assaults and Inves<ga<ons inves<gate homicides. They are in reality ogen the same event – except that in a homicide the vic<m has died.

–  The department needs to strengthen its commitment to vic<ms of crime, who ogen are trauma<zed from the crime event and need regular informa<on from the inves<ga<ng officer.

–  The successful CIRV strategy against violent crime needs to be re-‐vitalized and focused. Having had excellent success in its ini<al years, it has become a bit disorganized in the last year but has the poten<al to drama<cally further reduce violent crime in the community.

–  The department needs to be restructured, merging related units and ac<vi<es, reducing staffing in some so that addi<onal personnel can be moved to patrol assignments.

–  There is a strong need for the department to move forward at a fast pace with its technology ini<a<ves, since they can drama<cally increase the informa<on flow in the department and that made available to field personnel.

–  Performance management through the CompStat process and the related Problem-‐Oriented Policing process needs to become a cornerstone of strategic thinking about how crime preven<on should occur.

–  The community must be brought into the department processes of policy development, strategy and tac<cs.


Introduc2on and Overview

The Audit Team and Introductory Remarks ― The Cincinna< Police Department ― The Linder Ac<on

Report ― Vision for Cincinna< Policing



•  This report presents the findings of an audit of the Cincinna< Police Department aimed at providing the Chief of Police with a picture of how current prac<ces in the department match what are considered best prac<ces across the country.

•  The audit, conducted by staff of the Strategic Policy Partnership (SPP), was headed by Robert Wasserman. Team members were Robert Stewart, Louis K. Dekmar and Patrick Oliver. Each team member reviewed specific aspects of the department, joining together for discussions regarding observa<ons and findings. Zachary Ginsburg provided research on various comparable agencies across the country.

•  This audit review period was between October and December, 2011. SPP staff conducted numerous visits, interviewing command staff and unit heads, riding with officers in various districts, and reviewing departmental data.

•  SPP held extensive discussions with James Craig, Police Chief, regarding his vision for policing Cincinna<. We informed the Chief of our recommenda<ons as they began to crystalize, and in many cases he acted to begin implementa<on when they fit with his overall vision for the department.

•  We were impressed with the willingness of employees of the department – at all levels – to share informa<on, insights and sugges<ons for ways the department could improve its effec<veness. The police union President shared her observa<ons and sugges<ons, as did the City Manager. However, the content of this work is en<rely that of the Strategic Policy Partnership and its staff, reflec<ng our opinion of how the department can improve.



•  It is important to note that the Cincinna< Police Department – when compared with other police agencies its size and service popula<on – is a good police agency. Over the years, it has improved how it addresses the policing challenges of Cincinna<, and has learned from its mistakes. Since the riots of some years ago and the Collabora<ve Agreement, the Department seems to have adopted a posi<ve stance in its rela<onship with the minority community that is reflected in how many officers address their work.

•  Over the last few years, the Department has adopted a number of state-‐of-‐the-‐art ini<a<ves – most notably the Cincinna< Ini<a<ve for Reduc<on of Violence (CIRV), the an<-‐violence ini<a<ve that in its early stages has produced very posi<ve results. While there have been substan<al issues surrounding management styles in the department, there appears to be a serious commitment to addressing those issues under the new Chief, James Craig.

•  The amtude expressed by numerous officers with whom we interacted regarding Cincinna<’s quality as a city is most impressive. Officers like policing in this city; they like the city and desire that the Department be noted as a place where excellence prevails.

•  The recommenda<ons contained in this audit report provide a framework from which that commitment and desire can be achieved.


The Cincinna2 Police Department

•  The City of Cincinna< Police Department currently employs approximately 1027 sworn law enforcement officers and 119 civilian employees. It is a full-‐service law enforcement agency, providing a wide range of services to the residents and visitors to the city.

•  Under the Police Chief, the department has been divided into five Bureaus, each headed by an Assistant Chief of Police. Recently, with the arrival of Chief James Craig, the department has begun a process of restructuring, and currently the five Bureaus have been collapsed into four: Patrol Services, Inves<ga<ons, Administra<on and Resources.

•  The department has five Districts, each of which provides police services to a group of neighborhoods throughout the city. Cincinna< has a wide variety of neighborhoods, each with its own characteris<cs and iden<ty.

•  The city is a financial center for Southern Ohio and has several na<onal corpora<ons headquartered there. It is also a substan<al conven<on center, has several major sports teams and draws many visitors daily.

•  While the popula<on of the city is about 300,000, the metropolitan area has a popula<on of approximately 2,600,000 and there is a substan<al increase in popula<on within the city boundaries daily as people come into the city to work, shop or visit entertainment and ea<ng establishments.

•  A large number of police employees grew up in Cincinna< and have a par<cular affinity for the community.

•  Over the years, the department has undertaken a number of notable ini<a<ves, including an innova<ve violent crime reduc<on ini<a<ve (CIRV) and an evolving commitment to community policing, among many others.


Linder Report Ac2on Recommenda2ons

A major review of the Cincinna< Police Department was conducted by an outside consultant in 2005. The review was funded by the private sector for the Mayor. A number of specific recommenda<ons were made; many of which have been implemented and some which have not. The status of those recommenda<ons and our comment on each is listed below. Ac2on 1 – Launch STORM (Strategic and Tac4cal Opera4ons and Risk Management). •  This recommenda<on suggested a model of CompStat as the basis of crime reduc<on efforts. The

CompStat process has now been implemented and the CIRV process has approached the issue of violence in a different, and more effec<ve way, than had been recommended.

Ac2on 2 – Hold commanders accountable for outcomes, not ac4vi4es. •  The implementa<on of CompStat has been a move in this direc<on but the performance measures

are s<ll too focused on ac<vi<es. Beper outcome measures will need to be iden<fied. Ac2on 3 – Invest in sophis4cated crime-‐mapping analysis. •  The department has obtained crime analysis sogware and each District has a crime analyst (a

police officer assigned to that func<on). •  The sogware in use does geographical profiling and spa<al analysis for density crime mapping. •  Numerous other sogware products also available to the crime analysts. Ac2on 4 – Ini4ate Quality Assurance Unit audit systems for repor4ng and coding crime incidents and police responses. •  The department has not assigned personnel the specific task of audi<ng crime report coding. •  Processes for ensuring the accuracy of such repor<ng are under considera<on. •  The process for repor<ng and entering crime report data will move to field repor<ng rather than

having data clerks entering data from handwripen reports.



Ac2on 5 – Ini4ate task force to explore prospect of criminal intelligence sharing with other jurisdic4ons. •  Some informa<on sharing was in place during supervisors’ mee<ngs but generally

informa<on sharing remains an issue within the Department. •  One of the most important issues remains sharing intelligence informa<on with officers in

the field. The existence of perceived silos in the Department restricts such informa<on sharing.

•  The Fusion Center (intelligence) now provides a base for informa<on sharing with other jurisdic<ons.

Ac2on 6 – Count arrests by “bodies” instead of charges for each arrested person. •  This has been implemented Ac2on 7 – Combine SCU and VICE to more effec4vely target mid-‐level narco4c dealers. •  These two func<ons have been integrated into a single vice unit . It has been doing

inves<ga<ons at all levels. •  There is some duplica<on of effort by the Vice Squad and regional task forces focusing on

narco<cs enforcement. Ac2on 8 – Seek stronger inspec4on ini4a4ves by City agencies working with police targe4ng vice loca4ons. Also seek more civil penal4es for viola4ons. •  The Vice Unit and police districts now iden<fy loca<ons requiring such ac<on and both

criminal and civil penal<es are now issued. •  Nuisance abatement viola<ons are now issued under the quality of life code. •  CERT team ac<vi<es now address these issues as well.



Ac2on 9 – Priori4ze on arres4ng “worst of the worst” felons. •  The Cincinna< Ini<a<ve to Reduce Violence (CIRV) has focused enforcement and preven<on

ac<vi<es on gang and group members who engage in the most violent ac<vi<es. •  District personnel and the Vice Unit target repeat violent offenders as well. •  There is a need for the Department to be involved in decisions concerning the release of

prisoners who have had a serious propensity to reoffend. Ac2on 10 – Assign one VCS officer to Major Offenders Unit for 60-‐day rota4ons. •  This has not been implemented. The reason is not clear. •  There appears to be agreement that a rota<on plan for the department would be beneficial

for officer development. Ac2on 11 – Track warrants and document inves4ga4ve ac4ons to record progress. •  This has been completed and is done by SOFAST and District inves<ga<ve units. Ac2on 12 – Implement program to have inves4gators interview and debrief subjects arrested for guns, drugs, and violent crime charges. •  This prac<ce is rou<nely done by the arres<ng officers and inves<gators on significant

arrests. •  The na<onal best prac<ce – an inves<gator separate from the arres<ng or case inves<gator

interviewing arrestees – will be considered in the future. •  The prac<ce can be greatly increased in the future.



Ac2on 13 – Ini4ate pawn shop database input by district inves4gators. •  This ac<on has not been implemented. •  District inves<gators have been using Leads on-‐Line to complete these ac<ons. Ac2on 14 – Transfer district inves4gators from Patrol Bureau to Inves4ga4ons Bureau. •  This recommenda<on has been widely discussed in the Department over the years. •  There are both poten<al benefits and complica<ons rela<ng to such a merger and

centraliza<on of inves<ga<ons, par<cularly rela<ng to informa<on sharing between inves<gators and districts.

•  Current best-‐prac<ce is decentraliza<on of inves<gators except for Homicide and Aggravated Assault Firearm as well as some special crimes, such as sex crimes.

Ac2on 15 – Review case clearances at STORM mee4ngs -‐-‐ especially ones cleared by excep4on -‐-‐ to increase cases cleared by arrest. •  Some of this has occurred at the weekly CompStat mee<ng but overall it has not been

implemented. Ac2on 16 – Assign local inves4gators and proba4on/parole officers to ini4al office interviews when violent or career property criminals are released to parole or proba4on. •  There has been no procedure developed for this ac<on, although District Neighborhood

Liaison Officers rou<nely visit career criminals with Parole and Proba<on Officers. •  CIRV has taken some ac<ons with regard to this recommenda<on. •  Current best-‐prac<ce has evolved into a far more targeted and comprehensive interview

with released offenders, aimed at preven<ng reoffending.



Ac2on 17 – Work with Coroner to establish electronic no4fica4on system for CODIS and NIBIN hits. •  Inves<gators now receive facsimile transmissions from the Coroner’s Office. Ac2on 18 – Code and track CODIS and NIBIN hits. •  This ac<on is completed by the Criminalis<cs and the Coroner’s Office. Ac2on 19 – Chief and Coroner to arrange for in-‐service training for supervisors on subjects of importance to both agencies. •  Not implemented for unknown reasons. Ac2on 20 – Clarify policy to dictate when li\ing a fingerprint is required. •  The ac<on is now standardized in the Department’s Inves<ga<ons Manual, but there is s<ll

some degree of interpreta<on in its implementa<on. •  The process starts with the ini<al inves<ga<on by the patrol officer; a beper standardized

criteria needs to be iden<fied and implemented to make the process work as recommended. Ac2on 21 – Secure funds to purchase palm -‐-‐print reader. •  The CIS has made such a purchase. Ac2on 22 – Develop tracking system for processed crime scenes to track fingerprint and palm print outcomes. •  This ac<on has been completed. CIS tracks all crime scenes they process. Finger and palm

prints are tracked through the Automated Fingerprint Iden<fica<on System (AFIS)



Ac2on 23 – “Full Court Press Ini4a4ve:” “Every non-‐patrol officer, with few excep4ons, both in districts and at headquarters, will be required to spend one tour each week on patrol under district supervision.” •  This has not been implemented as it was considered more “show” and “go.” •  As the department moves to reduce specialized units by moving officers to patrol, it becomes

more difficult to implement this recommenda<on as the remaining units would have less staffing and thus poten<ally greater workload.

Summary •  Many managers in the Department felt they were not consulted when the Linder Report was

being prepared. It appears that this lack of involvement made many in the Department unwilling to take the recommenda<ons seriously. Addi<onally, the report was apparently never released publically, although some in the Department had access to the recommenda<ons.

•  It is important that the Department ensure that the results of departmental analyses be publically available. This is par<cularly important because of the Chief’s commitment to full transparency of Department ac<ons and opera<ons.

•  The Department must also analyze recommenda<ons that may improve performance and, for those that are accepted, track progress toward implementa<on with regular reviews and assignment of responsibility to accountable managers. Use of the CompStat forum is one good way of monitoring progress.


The Historical Environment

•  The Cincinna< Police Department has long been viewed as a model for the professional police agency, an organiza<onal strategy that developed following the work of O.W. Wilson and other reformers in the mid-‐part of the last century. That model focused on policing ac<vi<es for a new era, moving police officers into vehicles, providing them with radios, and making response to ci<zen calls for service the primary priority.

•  There was a high priority on ensuring that new officers met basic qualifica<ons, were adequately trained and followed rules and regula<ons. These were the cornerstones of the new professionalism.

•  Management styles during this period were absolute and fairly authoritarian. Higher ranks in police agencies ogen managed by fear and in<mida<on. There was liple communica<on between management and lower-‐level officers; these officers were expected to do what they were told.

•  The result of this managerial style was the forma<on of police associa<ons and unions to protect officer rights. But even with the forma<on of employee organiza<ons, the core management style that developed over the years remained in place.

•  In Cincinna<, the Chief of Police was viewed as a powerful leader of a complex organiza<on. Internally, over the years, the authoritarian management style became somewhat less aggressive but remained as the model that each chief embodied.

•  In many ways, the mantra was “do what I say” with limited collabora<on in decision-‐making from the top down. This style produced results, some na<onally notable. But over many years, it created a sense within the department that cri<cism and collabora<on were not postures that were accepted.

Strategic Policy Partnership 16

The Vision for Policing Cincinna2

•  The Cincinna< Police Department is well-‐placed to achieve a level of excellence, community engagement and effec<veness built upon the many posi<ve ini<a<ves undertaken over the last ten years. The Collabora<ve Agreement, while distasteful to many in the Department, put in place new systems that raised ci<zen confidence in the organiza<on. Police outreach to community leadership flowing from the Collabora<ve Agreement has resulted in drama<cally improved legi<macy of the Department in the eyes of the community.

•  The current Chief of Police, James Craig, is commiped to reinforcing the strengths of the department and moving the agency to new levels of excellence. The key characteris<cs of the Department that will develop in the coming years are the following:

–  Strong community collabora<on with the Department in areas of policy development, strategic and tac<cal development, transparency and the sharing of responsibility between police and community for effec<ve crime reduc<on and safety throughout the city.

–  A strengthened commitment to problem-‐solving as a key means for reducing repeat situa<ons of concern for the community and situa<ons requiring police apen<on.

–  Internal police management prac<ces that show respect for employees and value the work they do, pushing down authority within the organiza<on to be crea<ve problem-‐solvers within policy guidelines.

–  A leaner police organiza<on that provides value for money spent by the ci<zens of Cincinna< for policing services.



–  Strong performance management ini<a<ves – including a problem-‐solving CompStat – that will ensure all employees are accountable for outcomes resul<ng from their ac<vi<es.

–  A community that truly shares responsibility for semng the standard for safety and security in every neighborhood; community members are vocal that they will not tolerate aberrant criminal and deviant behavior that damages their neighborhoods’ quality of life.

–  An effec<ve crime preven<on strategy with robust implementa<on of the Community Ini<a<ve to Reduce Violence (CIRV) process that has been so successful in years past.

–  Stronger integra<on between police and other city agencies in providing services to those who have problems that may result in violent or destruc<ve behavior.

–  High levels of sa<sfac<on with police performance in mee<ng community needs, resul<ng in higher levels of police legi<macy in the community and increased confidence that the police are trea<ng everyone with respect, regardless of the circumstances.

–  Maximizing police officers assigned to neighborhood policing through reducing specializa<on of certain func<ons.

–  Widespread acknowledgement in the community that “cops count” in maintaining Cincinna< as a great place to live and work.



–  A strong commitment to assis<ng vic<ms of crime, to lessen the impact of criminal events on their lives and well-‐being.

–  Powerful ethics within the police organiza<on focused on truthfulness at all <mes and a commitment to excellence in community service through the organiza<on’s ac<vi<es.


Accountabili2es •  The members of the department should have a clearly defined set of accountabili<es;

quali<es of performance by which they are judged. Drawn from the Strategic Policy Partnership’s work with the Cambridge Police Department, the Cincinna< Police Department’s accountabili<es ought to include the following:

•  All police officers are accountable for…

–  Addressing with skill and competency a wide range of public safety situa<ons affec<ng

the quality of life within the community. –  The quality of their problem-‐solving, decision-‐making and judicial use of discre<onary

authority. –  The quality and professionalism of their communica<on and interac<ons with the

community. –  Exercising judgment in a manner that is reassuring and responsive to the community. –  The treatment of vic<ms and those in need of assistance in a manner that reflects the

Department’s values. –  The type of rela<onship the department has with the community. –  The level of communica<on, coopera<on, and coordina<on with their fellow officers. –  Conduc<ng themselves in a way that leads ci<zens to perceive their ac<ons as

legi<mate.



•  Sergeants are also accountable for… –  Consistency in officers’ delivery of services. –  The quality of work of their subordinates, and communica<ng their strengths and

weaknesses to them. –  The level of communica<on between officers and their colleagues, clients and the

community. –  Officers’ understanding of and adherence to the Department’s mission and values. –  Ensuring their subordinates are informed about situa<ons or circumstances that may

impact their assignments. •  Lieutenants are also accountable for…

–  General overall oversight and management of the units for which they have opera<onal control.

–  Ensure the effec<ve coordina<on effec<veness among the various opera<onal components of the department.

–  Ensuring clear and open lines of communica<on between the units that report to them. –  The accuracy and <meliness of informa<on provided to others in the department. –  The management of accurate, <mely, and important informa<on that is brought to the

apen<on of the Police Chief. –  The iden<fica<on of crime paperns and trends, and the development of interven<on

strategies to be carried out by their subordinates. –  Thinking strategically in the development of problem solving strategies that meet

certain criteria. •  Captains are also accountable for…

–  Providing construc<ve guidance to unit commanders. –  Consistency in the delivery of services of the shig commanders, unit commanders and

sector lieutenants (everyone playing on the same team).



–  Ensuring vic<ms and persons in of assistance are treated in accordance with the values of the Department.

–  Maintenance of staffing levels (Ensure the proper staffing levels in order to maintain a safety and adequate delivery of police services).

–  Defining and distribu<ng informa<ve and ac<onable intelligence and analysis. –  Balancing the expenditures associated with the areas of responsibili<es are consistent

with the overall mission and needs of the department •  Assistant Chiefs are also accountable for…

–  Ins<lling a sense of overall public trust, con<nually building upon the professional reputa<on of the Department.

–  Ins<lling and building upon the overall sense of professionalism among all members of the department, as well as establishing and maintaining a desired level of professional services.

–  Build upon and facilitate the collabora<on and partnerships that exist among city departments, service providers, other external agencies, as well as the various boards and commissions.

–  Maintaining a high level of coordina<on of services with other agencies. –  Addressing percep<ons of fear and other concerns in the community. –  Transparency of opera<ons and decisions in the eyes of the public. –  Con<nually assessing alloca<on of resources and making adjustments to always strike at

maintaining an adequate level of police services. –  Mee<ng officers’ need for guidance, training, professional development, and resources. –  Keeping the Chief informed of pending problems or issues, and managing other

informa<on (ensuring its importance and accuracy) that is brought to his apen<on.



•  The Chief of Police is also responsible for… –  Maintaining trust between the Department and the community and among the

Department. –  Craging and implemen<ng effec<ve strategies for maintaining order and deterring

crime. –  Overseeing policy implementa<on in all opera<ons and divisions. –  Responding to community concerns and ensuring compliance with all governmental and

legal direc<ves. –  Promo<ng a culture of proper and judicious resource expenditure through the financial

management process. –  Op<mizing managerial efficiency in all Departmental branches. –  Communica<ng Departmental needs to proper city, county, state, and federal

authori<es. –  Managing rela<ons between the Department and all external cons<tuencies.

Recommenda2ons •  The Chief should ensure that each person holding these ranks understand these

accountabili<es and how their performance will be judged. When issues arise related to mee<ng these accountabili<es, discussions should be held with the impacted employee to develop a strategy for improving performance.

•  A crucial benefit of clearly defined accountabili<es is that every officer knows how their performance will be judged. These accountabili<es in no way impact the contract between the union and and the department.

•  Over <me, the Department should develop comparable accountabili<es for civilian posi<ons as well.



Community Policing

Current Ini<a<ves ― Recommenda<ons


Community Policing

•  Community policing has been a cornerstone for police agencies throughout the country. In Cincinna<, this important ini<a<ve has evolved to adopt several separate components grouped into two units: A community policing unit which coordinates specialized ac<vi<es with various community groups and a problem-‐solving unit which works to develop guidance on addressing on-‐going problem solving ac<vi<es that can address localized issues of concern to the community.

•  Upon appointment, Chief Craig moved these units into the Office of the Chief of Police under a police Captain. The Chief believed that having them in the Chief’s Office would show his support for these ac<vi<es while their eventual placement in the organiza<on was determined.

•  Since being assigned to the Chief’s Office, the units have undertaken a number of ini<a<ves, many of which will be beneficial to the Department when they come to frui<on. These include:

–  Chief’s Police Advisory Board –  Faith Based Ini<a<ve with D3 –  La<no Project –  Urban League/CPPC Programming –  Fraternal Order of Police Associates Coordinator –  Fine Arts Youth Ini<a<ve –  Community Summit


Community Policing

•  Personnel assigned to these units are commiped to the basic principles of community policing and problem-‐oriented policing; policing strategies that reflect the most common thread of policing substance in forward looking police agencies:

–  Strong involvement of diverse community representa<ves in localized policing priority semng and strategy.

–  Recogni<on of the importance of trea<ng all persons with whom the police come in contact with dignity and respect, regardless of their ac<vi<es.

–  Consistency in law enforcement (ensuring that all neighborhoods receive the same level and type of service) but also responding to each neighborhoods’ unique problems and priori<es.

•  The Cincinna< Police Department has made significant strides in its rela<onship with the community and adop<on of these principles. Police officers, the police union, and the management staff have come to recognize the importance of building strong rela<onships of trust with the community. While the efforts have not been equal in all parts of the organiza<on, it appears that substan<al progress has been made and a founda<on upon which further efforts can be based has been set.

Recommenda2ons •  The Chief of Police should form a Ci<zen’s Advisory Council represen<ng the breadth of the

Cincinna< community. Mee<ng monthly, they should discuss policy, strategy and police effec<veness.


Community Policing

Recommenda2ons (Con2nued) •  Each police District should have a Ci<zen’s Advisory Council consis<ng of a diverse group of

residents and business representa<ves from district neighborhoods. These Councils should meet monthly with the District Captain to discuss policing issues, public percep<ons, crime trends and ways in which the community and police can jointly address the problem areas of crime and disorder.

•  The posi<on of Community Liaison, staffed by a Lieutenant, should be established in the Chief’s Office with the following du<es:

–  Monitoring the state of the rela<onship with the community in each of the Districts and offering assistance in building rela<onships of trust

–  Overseeing the Department’s strong Volunteer Program, working to see it expanded to all districts

–  Coordina<ng the School Resource Officers with the School Department and districts to see that all schools requiring SRO presence receive that assignment, even if part-‐<me. Even though the SROs will be assigned to the Districts and report through supervisors to the District Commander, the Community Liaison Lieutenant will review their ac<vi<es and ensure they meet required standards for effec<ve police-‐youth-‐school rela<ons

–  Providing training to SROs in interac<ng with youth so that the SROs are skilled interveners when youth issues arise


Community Policing

Recommenda2ons (Con2nued) –  Liaising with key community groups for the Chief of Police and serving as a key point of

contact for those community leaders who want to contact the Chief about issues of concern

–  Monitor community policing ini<a<ves in other communi<es so that Cincinna< can take advantage of best-‐prac<ces as they develop.

•  Most community policing func<ons now performed in the Office of the Chief of Police should be decentralized to Neighborhood Policing Services.

•  The remainder of the community policing func<ons should be combined with the problem-‐solving ac<vi<es and assigned to the Patrol Bureau (which we recommend be renamed the Neighborhood Policing Bureau). In that posi<on, the staff assigned to these func<ons can assist District Captains in implemen<ng problem-‐solving strategies. Coordina<on of the crime analysis func<on should also be assigned to this group, and it should also support and func<onally supervise the district crime analyst work (with the analysts s<ll repor<ng to the District Captain) while feeding the rejuvenated CompStat (Performance Management) process.

•  The department should strengthen problem-‐solving training for recruits and consider an award at gradua<on for the recruit who did best in this part of the curricula.

•  Problem-‐solving needs to be a central part of the commitment to community policing. The Department should examine the nature of occurrences in neighborhoods with substan<al problems of crime and disorder. The Problem-‐solving staff of the Department has developed


Community Policing

Recommenda2ons (Con2nued) a proposal for a Ci<Stat process that fully integrates CompStat (described later in this report), the Cincinna< Ini<a<ve to Reduce Violence (CIRV), and problem-‐solving ini<a<ves to iden<fy how loca<ons impact crime and what strategies can change that environment and thus reduce crime.

•  The Problem-‐solving staff, which will be expanded under the recommenda<ons above, should be strongly supported by the Department’s management team to ensure that they have a voice in decision-‐making for all the elements of the process. They should arrange to have UC students work as interns in their unit.

•  The ac<vi<es to be simultaneously undertaken should include the following: –  Analysis on loca<ons complements and benefits the CompStat and CIRV/offender

focused strategies –  CIRV data to include addi<onal elements of shoo<ngs and homicide incidents –  Problem loca<ons are iden<fied by the following tools but are rarely used in conjunc<on

with CompStat and CIRV: •  Chronic nuisance •  Liquor permit premises •  Code Enforcement Response Team (CERT) ac<ons •  Search warrant loca<ons •  Iden<fied open-‐air drug markets


Community Policing

Recommenda2ons (Con2nued) •  Loca<ons with the highest calls for service •  Gun recovery loca<ons and gun arrest loca<ons •  Drug arrest loca<ons

–  Problem solving with a place-‐based focus forces analysis of the condi<ons that enable crimes to occur chronically at a small number of loca<ons.

•  To ensure that the process is sustainable and effec<ve, the following specific ac<vi<es must be undertaken:

–  Daily mee<ngs within CPD districts/units/sec<ons to review 24 hour crime incidents –  Weekly mee<ngs (i.e. CompStat mee<ngs) to address short-‐term analysis –  Monthly mee<ngs to review the effec<veness of prior responses –  A semi-‐annual mee<ng to address seasonal crime trends and ensure strategic problem-‐

solving •  The faculty and staff of the Department of Criminal Jus<ce at the University of Cincinna<

should be brought into this process, with student interns joining the analysis teams. •  Any commander who does not fully and ac<vely support this problem-‐solving orienta<on of

the Department should be counseled and then, if necessary, disciplined.


Patrol Services

Patrol Services Organiza<on ― District-‐by-‐District Recommenda<ons ― Night Chief ― Community-‐Oriented Policing Coordinator ― Special Services

Sec<on ― Patrol Resource Alloca<on


Patrol Services Organiza2on

•  The Patrol Bureau, commanded by an assistant chief, performs all primary police func<ons. Bureau personnel respond to ci<zen requests for police assistance, enforce criminal and traffic laws, inves<gate criminal ac<vity, take offense reports, and regulate non-‐criminal conduct. Components of the Patrol Bureau include the five police districts, the Night Chief, Patrol Administra<on, (un<l recently) the Community Oriented Policing (COP) Coordinator, Special Services Sec<on, and the Special Weapons And Tac<cs (SWAT) Coordinator.

•  DISTRICTS: The City of Cincinna< is divided into five police districts, each commanded by a Captain who is responsible for opera<ons and personnel deployment. Police officers assigned to the districts for uniform patrol ac<vity are generally divided into three fixed shigs.

•  Each shig is commanded by a lieutenant. The first shig’s star<ng <mes are 0600 and 0700 hours. The second shig’s star<ng <mes are 1300, 1400, or 1500 hours, depending upon the service demands of each individual district. The third shig’s star<ng <mes are 2200 or 2300 hours. Third shig is supplemented by a late power shig and has a star<ng <me between 1900 and 2100 hours. This increases field strength when the demand for police service is higher.

•  The districts provide uniformed patrols in a variety of ways. In addi<on to marked vehicle and foot patrols, each district contains a Mountain Bike Squad. These officers provide a full range of police services. The district efforts are supplemented by mounted and canine patrols as needed.



•  Each district has an inves<ga<ve unit commanded by a lieutenant. This unit inves<gates crimes occurring within the district. When necessary, the unit coordinates these inves<ga<ons with the Criminal Inves<ga<on Sec<on (CIS) of the Inves<ga<ons Bureau.

•  Each district has iden<fied a Community Problem Oriented Policing (CPOP) liaison supervisor and an officer on each shig as a contact for the community to address recurring problems. Ci<zens can contact these officers via e-‐mail or the 24-‐hour CPOP cell phone. The goal is for all officers to adopt and apply the components of problem-‐solving and community policing to address community concerns.

•  Each district fields a Violent Crimes Squad (VCS) supervised by a sergeant. VCS officers concentrate on responding to and inves<ga<ng reports of violent crimes. They also serve outstanding warrants to arrest and incarcerate the subjects commimng these violent crimes.

•  Each district assigns officers to perform specialized law enforcement tasks that include crime preven<on, community rela<ons, vice enforcement ac<vi<es, traffic control, crime analysis, and warrant service.



General Recommenda2ons •  Re-‐name the Patrol Services Bureau the Neighborhood Policing Bureau, as that beper

describes the ac<vi<es that are undertaken. Policing is about places, the neighborhoods of the city.

•  This <tle more accurately reflects the manner in which the Department delivers service, focusing on the well-‐established neighborhoods that exist in the city. The <tle also reflects the con<nuing effort to decentralize policing services to the District Command, strengthening the neighborhood and community focus of the manner in which the department delivers products and services.

•  The name change is congruent with several other recommenda<ons that aim to bolster the outreach to community resources and strengthen police-‐community rela<ons at the opera<onal level.

•  The five Districts will remain in the Neighborhood Policing Bureau, all repor<ng to the Assistant Chief of the Bureau. There should be a Special Opera<ons Unit which coordinates key aspects of the Cincinna< Ini<a<ve for the Reduc<on of Violence (CIRV) as well as specialized func<ons, such as SWAT, traffic, canine and related ac<vi<es.

•  While the Special Opera<ons Unit has important traffic responsibili<es, this should not diminish the responsibility of District officers to enforce traffic laws in a robust manner, since many who commit crimes violate traffic laws regularly.


Patrol Services 1st District

-‐ Neighborhoods CBD-‐Riverfront * Mt. Adams Over-‐the-‐Rhine Queensgate Pendleton -‐ Resources 1 Captain 7 Lieutenants 21 Sergeants 13 Specialists 96 Police Officers 5 Clerk Typists 1 Hostler 144 Total


*Central Business District -‐ Riverfront •  The downtown area is an important center of Cincinna<’s conference and tourist ac<vity, as

well as a business center. •  The casino being built in this area will require substan<al police planning and a highly visible,

ac<ve policing presence in the area. •  Conven<ons that come to the area require a substan<al policing presence, both for crowd

control security enhancement and traffic movement. In policing parlance, the area requires substan<al police planning and management of major events which regularly occur.

•  Recognizing the importance of this area, many agree that a separate policing group needs to be assigned to address these issues.

Recommenda2ons •  A Downtown Area be created, commanded by a Police Captain, who would be accountable

for the quality of service provided and the sophis<ca<on of planning developed for policing the influx of thousands to the new casino.

•  This area should operate as a separate sec<on, with officers and some specialists assigned repor<ng to the Captain, who should report to the Assistant Chief of the Neighborhood Policing Bureau.

•  The Area staff should operate from the District 1 sta<on in Police Headquarters and support services should be shared with the District. But the command should be totally separate from the remainder of District 1.

•  The event planning and related units should be a part of this new Area. Personnel should be allocated from the exis<ng District 1 complement, with addi<onal officers (and two inves<gators) assigned from the officers being moved to Neighborhood Policing Services from specialist units.


Patrol Services: Central Business District

Patrol Services: 2nd District

-‐ Neighborhoods California East End East Walnut Hills Evanston Hyde Park Kennedy Heights Linwood Madisonville Mt. Lookout Columbia / Tusculum Kennedy Heights Mount Washington Oakley O’Bryonville


Patrol Services: 2nd District

Second District -‐ Resources 1 Captain 4 Lieutenants 19 Sergeants 7 Specialists 79 Police Officers 4 Clerk Typists 114 Total

•  Geographically, this is an extremely large district. •  It’s size makes it difficult and <me-‐consuming to travel from one end to the other. •  This may be significant to enabling supervisors to monitor the performance of subordinates

or to get onto a scene when their presence is needed in a cri<cal situa<on.

Recommenda2on. •  In the long term planning for the organiza<on, we recommend that a realignment of the

districts be reviewed, as such a realignment may lessen travel and response <mes based on distance travelled. We discuss realignment in a later sec<on of this report.


Patrol Services 3rd District

-‐ Neighborhoods Saylor Park Riverside Sedamsville North Fairmount English Woods East Westwood Milllvale Fay Apartments S. Cumminsville East Price Hill Westwood Lower Price Hill – Queensgate South Fairmount


Patrol Services 3rd District -‐ Resources 1 Captain 4 Lieutenants 18 Sergeants 24 Specialists 111 Police Officers 4 Clerk Typists 162 Total

•  The Third District is pilo<ng a “sector” system which assigns a geographic subdivision of the district to a lieutenant.

•  That lieutenant is responsible for crime reduc<on efforts in that area. •  This is a major departure from the typical “watch commander” model of the lieutenant’s role

which is akin to being a shig manager. •  Forward thinking departments are moving to some varia<on of this “new” model and it

deserves our apen<on and focus. Recommenda2ons •  More cri<cal analysis needs to be made of the efforts being employed by this district.

A structured evalua<on of expected outcomes should be coordinated with the planning unit

•  Another varia<on of the “sector” model should be studied in another district, to determine which varia<on is best suited to the Cincinna< structure. Criteria for analysis should be established for both trial districts



Recommenda2ons •  The study should focus on issues related to crime reduc<on, community outreach, crime

preven<on and employee management. •  In the current model being tested, beside the crime reduc<on efforts, the lieutenant is also

accountable for the performance and behavior of the approximately 25-‐30 subordinates who regularly patrol the sector area.

•  This is a substan<al change to the historic role of the patrol lieutenant. It’s an important ingredient in the decentraliza<on of the community policing effort; the provision of services at a neighborhood level; closer and improved management of the officer and sergeants assigned to the sector; and responsibility for a more engaging rela<onship with the residents and business within the district.

•  There needs to be a strong linkage between this pilot and the concepts being developed by the Problem-‐Oriented Policing Unit, as addressing community problems in an effec<ve manner is a key objec<ve of the Lieutenant’s role.

•  The Third District is also par<cipa<ng in a pilot project evalua<ng a “4-‐10” work schedule. Both patrol officers and inves<gators have been included in the evalua<on of this schedule.

•  This is the only district where inves<gators were included in the new work schedule. Typically, in many police agencies, the adop<on of this work plan is restricted to patrol resources. One of the key objec<ves for a department in adop<ng this work schedule is crea<ng incen<ves to retain more experienced officers in patrol.



•  We have recommended elsewhere in the report that a careful evalua<on be undertaken of the impact of such a change in the work schedule. Issues to be evaluated, beyond officer morale, include use of costs, officer deployment, beat coverage, vaca<on and sick <me and impact on the community. Given the current economic climate, the implementa<on of the 4-‐10 work schedule must be a cost neutral undertaking or, if there are costs associated with it, givebacks equivalent to those costs be considered.

•  As we noted in the Second District , the Third District also has a unique geographic configura<on that makes travel difficult.

•  We would suggest that any future beat/district re-‐configura<on take these issues into account.


Patrol Services 4th District

-‐ Neighborhoods Mount Auburn Corryville Avondale North Avondale Paddock Hills Hartwell Carthage Roselawn Bondhill Walnut Hills -‐ Resources 1 Captain 3 Lieutenants 19 Sergeants 6 Specialists 1 Technician 3 Clerk Typists 138 Total


Patrol Services 4th District Recommenda2ons •  Our observa<ons alongside our call response and crime data analyses led us to conclude that

the Fourth District needs addi<onal resources. •  For the call load and crime problems in this district, more patrol staffing is needed. •  The priority of staffing specialized units throughout the Department has leg patrol services

depleted in a number of areas, acutely so in the Fourth District. •  There are a significant number of calls for service legover for succeeding shigs on a regular

basis. •  As personnel are recommiped to the patrol districts as a result of recommenda<ons

accompanying this report, special apen<on should be given to ensuring that the Fourth District has priority for addi<onal staffing.


Patrol Services: 5th District

-‐ Neighborhoods College Hill University Heights Fairview Northside Cligon Mounty Airy Winton Hills Winton Place Camp Washington -‐ Resources 1 Captain 4 Lieutenants 19 Sergeants 13 Specialists 89 Police Officers 4 Clerk Typists 130 Total


Patrol Services: 5th District

Recommenda2ons •  The Figh District is also par<cipa<ng in an evalua<on of the “4-‐10” work schedule. The same

type of evalua<on must be completed for this ini<a<ve, as in District Three. •  The patrol shigs are the only units involved in this pilot of the 10-‐4 work schedule. The same

criteria listed for the Third District evalua<on should also apply here.


Patrol Services: Administra2on

Night Chief •  A Police Captain (some<mes two Captains) have been responsible for providing a command

presence for the Department during the evening and overnight hours. This captain posi<on carries Department-‐wide responsibili<es. The Captain goes to major events and keeps a record of significant events during the work shig, which forms the basis of a daily report to the Command Staff.

•  As the number of Captains on the department declines, this posi<on appears to be unnecessary and can be accomplished by lieutenants in any of a variety of assignments or rota<onal schemes.

Patrol Administra2on •  Commanded by a Captain, the incumbent coordinates and reviews reports and other

informa<on submiped by the Districts and the Night Chief. •  This Captain serves as the deputy commander/administra<ve liaison for the Patrol Bureau

and reports to the Patrol Bureau Commander. Community Oriented Policing (COP) Coordinator •  A lieutenant responsible for the progression of the COP philosophy in the Department. •  The COP Coordinator guides the districts’ Community Problem Oriented Policing (CPOP)

liaison supervisors and CPOP liaison officers as they work to develop neighborhood-‐based collabora<ons with ci<zens. This posi<on was recently moved to the Chief’s Office.

•  The COP Coordinator serves as the clearinghouse for informa<on on community policing.


Patrol Services: Administra2on

Recommenda2ons •  Abolish the posi<on of Night Chief and re-‐assign the du<es to lieutenants either by

assignment or rota<on. If Lieutenants are available, two of them could be assigned to the Office of the Assistant Chief of the Neighborhood Policing Bureau.

•  As an op<on, the department could establish a rota<onal system in which all lieutenants share these du<es on an equal basis.

•  With this op<on, this duty would be performed in addi<on to the lieutenants’ regular assignment.

•  The Patrol Administra<on Captain posi<on should be eliminated and assigned to a Lieutenant, who can perform the du<es formerly performed by the Captain.

•  The Community-‐Oriented Policing Captain posi<on should be re-‐designated as “Community Liaison” and assigned to the Office of the Chief of Police. The responsibili<es of this posi<on are covered under the sec<on on Community Policing.


Patrol Services: Special Services Sec2on

•  This sec<on is commanded by a Captain, responsible for providing specialized police func<ons to enhance Department patrol opera<ons.

•  These specialized supplemental services are provided through the Park/Canine Unit, Traffic Unit and un<l recently, the Vortex Unit.

•  Park/Canine Unit, commanded by a lieutenant, is responsible for all law enforcement ac<vi<es within the Cincinna< Park System and oversight of all police canine opera<ons.

•  These tasks are carried out through the Park Squad, Patrol Canine Squad and Detec<on Canine Squad.

•  Park Squad, supervised by shig sergeants, has responsibility for patrol of the City’s 141 park areas, which encompass 4,765 acres of land.

•  This squad is commiped to providing a more visible police presence and improving safety in City parks.

•  Other responsibili<es include: response to ci<zen requests for assistance, enforcement of criminal and traffic laws, regula<on of non-‐criminal conduct, repor<ng incidents and offenses, inves<ga<on of criminal ac<vity, and enforcement of park rules.

•  The Park Squad also represents the Department on mapers concerning the planning and coordina<on of events within the City’s parks.


Patrol Services: Special Services

•  Patrol Canine Squad, supervised by a sergeant, is responsible for assis<ng district officers in high-‐risk search situa<ons. On a coopera<ve basis, in conjunc<on with the mutual aid agreements, and with the approval of a command officer, the patrol canine teams can be used by other police agencies within Hamilton County.

•  Detec2on Canine Squad, supervised by a sergeant, is responsible for the comple<on of two dis<nct missions:

–  The narco<c detec<on teams are responsible for assis<ng officers in detec<ng and loca<ng illegal narco<cs.

–  The explosive device teams are responsible for assis<ng officers in loca<ng explosive devices.

•  The Detec<on Squad will respond to calls for service, be available for planned events, and conduct proac<ve searches.

•  On a coopera<ve basis, in conjunc<on with the mutual aid agreements, and with the approval of a command officer, the detec<on canine teams can be u<lized by other law enforcement agencies within Hamilton County.

•  Traffic Unit, commanded by a lieutenant, is responsible for coordina<ng the Department’s traffic enforcement efforts.

•  It has staff supervision over the Department’s selec<ve enforcement program and other specialized traffic-‐related programs.



•  This unit’s responsibili<es include: radar and intoxilyzer training and cer<fica<on, fatal accident inves<ga<on, assis<ng the Federal Avia<on Administra<on (FAA) and the Ohio State Highway Patrol (OSHP) in aircrag crash inves<ga<ons, and assis<ng the Ohio Department of Natural Resources (ODNR), Division of Watercrag, in boat crashes.

•  The unit also acts as a liaison and an implementa<on site for state programs such as the seat belt and holiday drunk driving programs. The unit supervises and coordinates private police officers, school crossing guards, and the Public Vehicles/Private Police Squad.

•  Vortex Unit, commanded by a lieutenant, is a highly visible, proac<ve unit that has a zero-‐tolerance approach to street crimes, drug trafficking, and quality of life issues.

•  The focus of this unit is to seek out and physically arrest both minor and major criminal offenders by enforcing every law and employing every tool available to inconvenience criminals.

•  By u<lizing uniform patrols, mountain bike officers, plainclothes officers, and confiden<al informants, the Vortex Unit makes a posi<ve impact in the City.

•  The Vortex Unit assists the districts by targe<ng hot spots and providing addi<onal uniform presence during high profile events



•  Special Weapons and Tac2cs (SWAT) Unit, commanded by a lieutenant responsible for supervising all SWAT officers and SWAT ac<vi<es.

•  All SWAT officers have full-‐<me responsibili<es in the various districts, sec<ons, and units. SWAT trains as a unit on a regular basis and responds to hostage, barricaded person, and other high-‐risk situa<ons as needed. SWAT is composed of two elements: Tac<cal and Nego<a<ons.

•  These elements complement each other and both report to the SWAT Coordinator.

Recommenda2ons •  The Sec<on should be renamed the Special Opera2ons Sec2on •  This will make the func<ons of the unit more recognizable to other agencies. •  Unify the command of the Parks and Canine Squads under one lieutenant. •  K-‐9 study. While canine units will be placed under the overall command of a lieutenant,

there should be an examina<on of the general tac<cs u<lized by the Patrol Canine unit. May similarly situated departments have re-‐oriented their training to a “Stop and Bark” policy. A similar discussion should take place in Cincinna<.

•  Rename the Vortex Unit the Safe Streets Unit, which is more understandable to the public and reflec<ve of its orienta<on.

•  Transfer the motorcycle officers currently assigned to the First District to the Traffic Unit and replace them with officers currently in units that are being decentralized or disbanded.



•  Since SWAT par<cipa<on is a collateral duty, the sugges<on has been made that with addi<onal resources being assigned to patrol, it is possible to have SWAT resources on both the day and evening tours of duty.

•  Overall, SWAT requires very high level management oversight given the impact of its ac<ons. It should have a very close liaison, at least, with the Training Sec<on in the proposed Professional Standards Bureau.


•  The Department allocates patrol resources between the Districts and beats within Districts using a formula that is primarily based on call for workload, the number of calls, the minutes of ac<vity these calls represent, and area being covered (to figure response <me and a number of other factors).

•  Police agencies have used this method for years despite numerous issues having arisen over the formula’s desirability.

•  Recently, the planning staff updated the formula and is preparing an alternate alloca<on formula. Either way, it seems clear that there are insufficient officers available in patrol to meet these formulas’ demands.

•  In a review of work demands for District 1, it was shown that under the current system and officers assigned to the District, there were over 6,000 calls for service held in dispatch pending assignment beyond the recommended holding <me (which is 3 minutes for emergencies, 5 minutes for “immediate priority calls,” 5 minutes for “immediate traffic calls,” and 55 minutes for other rou<ne calls.)

•  These calls held beyond recommended <mes were fairly evenly distributed by day or week. •  The required staffing levels will in many ways drama<cally change under the piloted 10-‐4

work schedule with overlap shigs coupled with fewer officer work days per week. There are both posi<ve and nega<ve implica<ons of this change, which will hopefully become clear from the evalua<on of the pilots.


Patrol Services: Resource Alloca2on

Recommenda2ons •  The Department needs to undertake a redistric<ng study to match patrol assignment areas

with the natural neighborhoods of the city. •  The analysis should include the following key concepts:

–  Neighborhoods or “par<cular service areas” should not be divided. For example, the University of Cincinna< appears to be spread over three Districts. It could be considered a “neighborhood unto itself.”

–  Major streets should not be used as district or beat boundaries (except for expressways) as every street must be in an iden<fied district. You cannot have one side of the street in one District and the other in a different district. Back property lines need to be the boundaries for Districts (and beats as well).

–  Patrol beat areas should be larger than they are now, so at the least busy <me, only a single unit would be assigned to the area and during busier <mes, two or more units would be assigned. During slower <mes of the day, “cover units” may have to be assigned to serve as back-‐up for several beat areas.

–  The analysis undertaken to develop the redistric<ng should involve overlaying maps of neighborhoods, poli<cal boundaries, natural barriers (such as rivers and streams, expressways, etc.), and various other factors. An overlay should show the “affinity” between neighborhoods (either strong, medium or non-‐existent), laying the founda<on for merging neighborhoods into District and beat boundaries.



Recommenda2ons •  Using this methodology, new district lines can be created. Not every district or beat must

have equal work demands; the number of officers assigned will reflect the work demand, not the number of beats.

•  Underlying this approach to police service area boundaries are several key concepts: –  Reducing “out of beat” <me for officers assigned to a geographic area. Now, many

officers spend as much <me out of their assigned area as they do in the beat. The community wants consistent policing presence.

–  Officers should have 25 minutes of unobligated <me on patrol per each hour on duty, ager call service <me and administra<ve <me. In Cincinna<, 30% of officer <me in District 1 is claimed to be administra<ve <me, a very high figure. That needs to be reduced through beper use of technology for reports, less sta<on <me and related changes.

–  The concept of “in-‐service – when not answering a call” and out of service “when answering a call” needs to be reversed.

–  Use of alterna<ve responses are cri<cal if officer <me is to be moved from racing from call to call to engaging in proac<ve policing ac<vity. As noted in a previous sec<on of this report, police should only de dispatched when having an officer on the scene will make a difference in resolving the situa<on.

–  The difference between “problem-‐solving <me” and “self-‐ini<ated patrol <me” needs to be collapsed into a single category of “problem-‐oriented policing” <me.



•  As we have noted, the department cannot immediately send an officer to every call for service. Far more police personnel would be required to fully meet that demand.

•  That demand has been created because police have tried to meet the goal of “you call for an officer and an officer will come,” regardless of the nature of the call.

•  No other service business, except for Fire and Emergency Medical services, has been able to meet the demands created under this scenario. Most Fire Departments have far fewer calls for service than some years ago, as fires have been drama<cally reduced over the years. This is not so for police agencies.

•  Police officers should respond quickly only when having a police officer on the scene will impact a problem that cannot be handled in a different manner.

Recommenda2ons •  An analysis of the call for service workload indicates that the Department should engage in a

vigorous examina<on of alterna<ve methods of responding to calls for service. The call for service work demand is quite high on many days of the week. The Department cannot afford to have a police officer respond to every call in a prompt <me frame. Only in circumstances where ci<zens would benefit from having a police officer come to the scene should an officer be dispatched.

•  Many police departments have adopted aggressive call management ini<a<ves designed to reduce the number of mobile responses required. This reduc<on provides patrol officers more <me to undertake dedicated assignments designed to target crime “hotspots,” target known offenders, amplify police presence, and prevent future crime occurrences.


Patrol Services: Resource Demand Management

•  The Milwaukee Police Department has ini<ated a successful ini<a<ve where light duty officers (officers unable to work patrol assignments) are assigned as “call interveners” when a person calls with a complaint or situa<on for which having a police officer respond to the scene is unnecessary. For example, for noise complaints, the officer calls the noisy party, advising them that they need to turn down the noise or a cita<on will be issued. In most cases, the problem is resolved and the complainant calls back for confirma<on of the resolu<on.

•  There are numerous categories of lower-‐priority calls for service which can be handled in this manner. While the Communica<ons Center is separate from the Police Department, those calls can be transferred to a police center for officer call-‐back by these specially-‐designated officers.

•  The Department needs to explore op<ons such as the above to reduce the call response requirements.

•  Note that when your cable goes out and you call the Cable Company, you are given a <me and date that a repair person will come to your house. Everyone accepts that. The same is necessary for some types of calls for service that come to the police.

•  Obviously, such an ini<a<ve must involve the public and must be thoroughly discussed by the ci<zen advisory commipees we recommend in this report.


Patrol Services: Resource Demand Management

The Inves2ga2ve Func2on

Organiza<on― Case Management ― Inves<gator Assignment Prac<ces ― Centralized Inves<ga<ons

and District Opera<ons ― Inves<ga<ve Assignment Specializa<on ― Homicide Unit ―

Task Forces


•  The current organiza<on of the Inves<ga<ve Func<on is located within the Inves<ga<ons Bureau and consists of the Central Vice Control Sec<on, with the Regional Narco<cs Unit (RENU), Mid-‐Level Drug Unit, and Regulatory Enforcement Unit assigned; the Criminal Inves<ga<on Sec<on, consis<ng of the Homicide Unit, Personal Crimes Unit, and Major Offense Unit; and the Intelligence Sec<on is responsible for SOFAST and Project Disarm.

Recommenda2ons •  The Inves<ga<ons Bureau should con<nue to house all elements presently assigned. The

Fusion Center and Real Time Crime Units should be transferred from the Strategic Development Bureau to the Inves<ga<ons Bureau and placed with within the intelligence func<on.

The Inves2ga2ve Func2on: Organiza2on


Inves2ga2ve Case Management Process •  The current case management system is described as a manual system augmented by a

Records Management System with no provision for monitoring case status or flagging delinquent cases. For the most part, the day-‐to-‐day case management is a combina<on of using the query func<on with memory prompts on posted notes. The system does not link to other case-‐related records, and separate inquiries have to be ini<ated in each database with the reques<ng officer knowing which databases to explore based on their personally-‐developed knowledge of the system. The present system training is limited and no sogware opera<ons manual has been to provided to any employee interviewed.

•  The agency does not have a computer-‐based report system presently; rather, police officers generate a hand-‐wripen report, which is entered into a “Report Management System” (RMS) by a clerk – a process which can take as long as seven days. Addi<onally, with the secondary entry there is an increased opportunity for inaccuracies or data transposi<on.

•  Agency personnel regardless of assignment are unable to check a name and through one source gather informa<on regarding previous agency contacts as a suspect, vic<m, witness, field interroga<on, traffic cita<on, or traffic accident – mul<ple inquiries must be generated to retrieve data.

61

The Inves2ga2ve Func2on: Case Management


Recommenda2ons •  The agency should ensure there is a contemporary and dynamic Records Management

System that integrates the en<re agency’s record-‐genera<ng components. Officers should access the RMS in the field and enter reports, subject to a supervisor approval, the incident reports are then forwarded to the Case Management System, which should include:

–  All case reports that require follow-‐up are uploaded into the Case Management System.

–  Case informa<on that can be reviewed by the supervisor and assigned to the appropriate detec<ve for follow-‐up.

–  During case assignment, case tasks can be assigned to the assigned detec<ve as well.

–  Deadlines can be assigned on specific case tasks and the case will flag when a task has not been completed as assigned by a <me certain, ensuring a supervisor can follow up with the person assigned the case.

62



Recommenda2ons (con2nued) –  All department members with access to Case Management can view the ini<al

incident report. Suppor<ng documents can be viewed by anyone with the authorized security password. Any and all members may add supplemental reports to the system. The system should print informa<on in different formats depending on what is required (detec<ve report format, case file reports, supplemental reports etc.).

–  Deadlines can be assigned by supervisors through Case Management and supervisors can review the cases independently of the assigned detec<ve to ensure that deadlines are met. Supplemental reports should be capable of being viewed wirelessly so detec<ves with laptops can access the system from the field.

–  The system should have the capability to track persons, suspects, vic<ms, stolen property etc.

–  The system should have the means to track the <me a detec<ve spends inves<ga<ng a case.

–  The system should track property recovery, arrest stats, clearance stats per detec<ve. –  There should be numerous search engines for the system to include searching narra<ves

for specific informa<on. –  The system should track ac<ve/suspended/cleared cases for each detec<ve.

63



Inves2gator Assignment Prac2ces •  District Commanders have the la<tude of assigning district detec<ves either by crime type,

geographical area, or both. Generally, assignments are made with the skill sets and competencies as an influence but not the domina<ng determina<on. The number of detec<ves assigned to Inves<ga<ons in the districts is constantly reviewed and assessed based on outcomes and patrol requirement for staffing beats. On occasion, detec<ve strength may be reduced to augment the patrol func<on if there is a reduc<on in personnel.

•  A review of a random sampling of reports from detec<ves assigned to the various districts reflected an inconsistent standard within the agency regarding the type and nature of documenta<on accepted by supervisors in a detec<ve report. In some cases, the narra<ves were fully developed, case facts and witnesses iden<fied, and their informa<on captured. In others, there was a dearth of documenta<on and almost no narra<ve. The reports completed by detec<ves ranged from very good to poor.

Recommenda2ons •  District Commanders should be free to allocate their detec<ve resources with flexibility and

in a manner that allows them to address crime rates and detec<ve skill sets to their unique semng. However, a universal standard of case documenta<on, case development and case presenta<on should be developed, trained and supervised to ensure sound and consistent quality. The use of check sheets should be ins<tu<onalized as a resource to aid the detec<ve in producing a professional case file.

64

The Inves2ga2ve Func2on: Assignments


•  There is a Criminal Inves<ga<ons Sec<on (CIS) in the Inves<ga<ons Bureau; District Detec<ves are accountable to the Patrol Bureau. Tradi<onally, the District Detec<ves are assigned to work robberies, burglaries, auto theg, domes<c violence, felonious assault, and other misdemeanors.

•  The linkage between the Criminal Inves<ga<on Sec<on and the District Detec<ves is driven by the development of personal rela<onships. A lack of technology and the absence of a consistently scheduled mee<ng between the interested par<es (district detec<ve, CIS detec<ves, crime analysis, and intelligence) inhibits informa<on dissemina<on that could assist inves<ga<ons. In specific cases and on request, crime analysis will look for links, but the free exchange of informa<on to iden<fy poten<al inves<ga<ve links rela<ng cases worked in another district or CIS is missing.

•  The district and CIS supervisors meet two <mes per month for a formal face-‐to-‐face exchange of informa<on. These are not in-‐depth reviews and thus there is a risk that important informa<on may not be exchanged.

•  Un<l recently, certain personnel did not consider Black-‐on-‐Black crime a priority; consequently, informa<on pursuit rela<ve to it was not a main concern. Addi<onally, some ranking district members believe that most specialized units in the agency, including CIS, do not view themselves as supporters of districts but rather that the districts are there to support them.

65

The Inves2ga2ve Func2on: Integra2on With Patrol


•  It has been commonplace for district detec<ve unit commanders not to receive any informa<on or briefings on homicides that occur in their districts aside from general flyers; they ogen receive more informa<on about pending homicides from the news media than from the informa<on disseminated to the district detec<ves absent a personal rela<onship that has been developed between the homicide detec<ve and the district detec<ve supervisor.

•  District detec<ve unit commanders do not have access to the “Homicide Folder” with updated and preliminary informa<on regarding homicides; only the district captains have access.

•  There is a general percep<on and frustra<on in some district detec<ve units that require coopera<on from CIS or any of its units that undue effort must be expended to track down informa<on. If an interested district detec<ve looks hard enough and leverages enough rela<onships the informa<on can be obtained, but it is a difficult and frustra<ng process that undermines service efforts to the community and its ci<zen.

Recommenda2ons •  The agency relies on informal and unstructured processes for informa<on exchange. The

need to establish a formal protocol using technology is clearly evident. A formal liaison between CIS and the District Detec<ves and weekly mee<ngs where informa<on can be exchanged and brought back to the district creates enhanced opportuni<es to strengthen communica<on and linkage.

66

The Inves2ga2ve Func2on: Integra2on with Patrol


•  The support role of CIS must be detailed in policy and its responsibility to work closely and support the district efforts though developing and sharing inves<ga<ve informa<on emphasized. Technology should be employed to facilitate the exchange of informa<on between the various disciplines.

•  In the 1980’s, Vice Control Sec<on (VCS) had approximately ten to twelve officers, two sergeants and one lieutenant. The day shig consisted of the lieutenant, one sergeant and two officers, while the night shig had the remaining sergeant and officers. VCS had overall inves<ga<ve authority over vice func<ons city-‐wide and focused on liquor, pros<tu<on, gambling, pornography, and drugs. During this <me, each of the five district commanders had “Mini-‐Tacs” consis<ng of six to eight officers and a sergeant to work vice problem areas within their respec<ve district boundaries.

•  When not assigned to a specific problem, the Mini-‐Tacs focused their efforts on the drug problem. Around 1988, the Patrol Bureau Commander created the Street Corner Unit (SCU) to combat growing drug problems, especially crack cocaine. All district Mini-‐Tacs were combined into one large off-‐site unit with mul<ple sergeants and one lieutenant to combat “street corner” level drug dealers. Soon ager SCU was created, district commanders created new Mini-‐Tacs u<lizing district personnel to fill the void, thus taking away from uniform street personnel.

67

The Inves2ga2ve Func2on: Specializa2on


Recommenda2ons (Con2nued) •  In 2006, these units were combined into one sec<on inves<ga<ng all vice ac<vi<es. A “mid-‐level”

drug unit was formed in CVCS at this <me and addi<onal personnel were also added, ul<mately crea<ng a sec<on of approximately figy officers, eight sergeants, two lieutenants, and one captain. In 2009, the Vortex Unit was created in the Patrol Bureau to combat city-‐wide problems. Personnel were once again absorbed from the district Violent Crime Units (previously known as Mini-‐Tacs), crea<ng another void in the districts. Once again, district Captains back-‐filled from their uniform patrol personnel to fill the void of their district level problem-‐solvers.

•  Reduce significantly the number of personnel assigned to Vice Control Sec<on and re-‐assign a complement of officers to each district for street level vice enforcement.

•  A Centralized Vice Sec<on should remain in place but there should be clear guidelines and protocols established and enforced regarding what cons<tutes a threshold case that is referred to the Vice Control Sec<on for inves<ga<on. Likewise, the Centralized Vice Sec<on should refer cases that do not comprise the elements mee<ng their inves<ga<ve threshold back to the districts.

•  District Commanders use their violent crimes unit at least 70% of the <me as opposed to using VICE Unit officers.

68

The Inves2ga2ve Func2on: Specializa2on


•  The Homicide Unit is responsible for inves<ga<ng all homicides and suspicious deaths occurring within the City of Cincinna< and is part of the Inves<ga<ons Bureau. The Homicide Unit venue is known throughout the city. Informants, witnesses, and concerned ci<zens with informa<on regarding homicides can always speak with homicide detec<ves, who are scheduled to work staggered shigs seven days a week, 8AM – 2AM. Detec<ves from other departmental units and inves<gators from outlying agencies frequently request the Homicide Unit’s assistance owing to its exper<se.

•  Homicide detec<ves work in a centralized open bay area that facilitates communica<on among all unit detec<ves, enhancing its effec<veness. Inves<gators frequently and con<nually discuss vic<mology, suspects’ methods of opera<on, weapons of choice commonali<es, offender/vic<m associates/associa<ons, commonali<es in offender/vic<m habits, similari<es case fact paperns, case law, current inves<ga<ve trends and best prac<ces. The Homicide Unit had a 64% clearance rate for the last three year period (2008-‐2010).

•  Case responsibility for imminent death cases involving felonious assault is an issue in some districts; the current protocol is too subjec<ve and too much discre<on lies with individual homicide inves<gators.

69

The Inves2ga2ve Func2on: Homicide


Recommenda2ons •  The Homicide Unit is extremely specialized, works very well as presently organized, and

should not be de-‐centralized. There is some exchange of informa<on between the districts and the unit, but it is more rela<onship driven, as opposed to being a formal func<on of the unit. An expressed protocol, captured in policy, detailing the dissemina<on of homicide informa<on to the district detec<ves and commander should be developed. A formal liaison between the Homicide Unit and each District Commander should also be created. The Homicide Unit must recognize their support role in the districts.

70

The Inves2ga2ve Func2on: Homicide


•  The Homicide Unit is also responsible for officer involved shoo<ngs, which average three or four per year. However, in calendar year 2011, the unit inves<gated nine officer involved shoo<ngs, three within a two week period. Less than half of the unit is trained to conduct officer involved shoo<ngs inves<ga<ons, placing an occasional strain on the unit’s ability to work those cases in an effec<ve and <mely fashion.

•  The officer involved shoo<ng teams work all cases where an officer shoots a subject, or in cases where an officer is shot. The unit does not work those cases where an officer is subject to gunfire, but does not receive a gunshot wound.

Recommenda2ons •  The department should form a “shoo<ng team” to inves<gate all officer-‐involved shoo<ngs,

coordinated by Internal Affairs. If this is not done, the agency should expand the number of teams trained to conduct officer involved shoo<ngs. Though 2011 was an anomaly, the Homicide Unit’s ability to inves<gate officer-‐involved shoo<ngs was not op<mal. These cases must be inves<gated by experienced and trained personnel. As part of the assignment to the homicide unit, consider manda<ng that all homicide teams be trained to conduct officer-‐involved shoo<ng inves<ga<ons.

71

The Inves2ga2ve Func2on: Officer-‐Involved Shoo2ngs


•  Presently, felonious assaults are assigned to the individual district detec<ves for follow-‐up inves<ga<on. The differing quality of the inves<ga<ons completed by the district detec<ves and the Homicide Unit is stark. In instances where a vic<m dies months ager a felonious assault and the suspect has not been charged, the district inves<ga<on that is turned over to the Homicide Unit for follow-‐up can be seriously flawed. The result is problema<c for the homicide detec<ve and the outcome of that inves<ga<on can be compromised because of the lacking resources and skill sets at the district level.

•  Crime scene processing is a considerable challenge for district inves<gators. It appears very liple crime scene processing occurs at the district level for a variety of reasons, including a lack of training and exper<se. The differing quality in the homicide crime scenes worked by the Criminalis<cs Unit compared to those worked in the districts cannot be overstated.

•  A review of 15 felonious assaults (shoo<ngs) at randomly selected crime scene cases worked at the district level revealed that 7/15 were not photographed; 11/15 did not have close-‐up photographs; 7/15 did not have overall photographs; 14/15 did use placards to mark or “showcase” evidence; none of the 15 cases had measurements documen<ng the loca<on of any evidence recovered; 14/15 did not contain a diagram as part of the case file; and 6/15 had no evidence collected.

•  The following chart illustrates the deficiencies inherent in the reviewed shoo<ng crime scenes processed by district detec<ves:

72

The Inves2ga2ve Func2on: Felonious Assaults


Review of 15 Felonious Assault (shoo2ngs) Crime Scenes Processed at the District Level

73

Recommenda2ons •  The Homicide Unit should work all cases where an officer is the vic<m of a felonious

assault – whether a gunshot wound is sustained or not – to ensure a proper case is presented for prosecu<on and all of the agency resources are available to develop that case.

•  The Homicide Unit should receive an increase in personnel and be tasked with working all felonious assaults and unapended deaths, including infant deaths, suicides, and imminent deaths. The wripen direc<ve governing the Homicide Unit should mandate that the appropriate district commanders receive current and con<nual informa<on from the Homicide Unit as a maper of policy on all cases assigned.

•  The close rela<onship between the Homicide Unit and the Prosecutor’s Office may facilitate an increase in prosecu<on of felonious assault cases if they are “worked up” like homicide cases. There is valid and substan<al poten<al for an increase in clearance rates for felonious assaults if these cases are assigned to the Homicide Unit, with a corresponding reduc<on of “grudge” felonious assaults and homicides if the shooters are iden<fied, arrested, prosecuted, and convicted.

74

The Inves2ga2ve Func2on: Felonious Assaults


Homicide Unit and Criminalis2cs Unit – Recommenda2ons •  The Criminalis<cs Unit should receive a sufficient increase in personnel to ensure

adequate support for the corresponding increase in cases that will be assigned to the Homicide Unit.

•  We recommend a three month training rota<on process for district inves<gators selected by their immediate supervisors through the Criminalis<cs’ Unit where they can receive training in crime scene processing, u<lizing the equipment available to them at their District of assignment. The training objec<ve would be to enhance the districts crime scene processing and improve case presenta<on in court to increase the convic<on rate.

•  Conduct a needs assessment of districts’ crime scene processing equipment and tools to determine if all district crime scene technicians have adequate resources.

75

The Inves2ga2ve Func2on: Criminalis2cs


•  The lack of technology available to the Homicide Unit is substan<al. Current homicide cases are maintained in metal file cabinets in paper form, but the Unit also stores electronic versions that consist of several folders and document files. Criminalis<cs apaches photographs and property/evidence receipts; an audio folder that is populated with all audio recordings, including witness and suspect interviews, 911 calls, and police radio transmissions; the computer document file will contain the ini<al report of inves<ga<on, officer’s log, other photographs, media releases, and case summary. The paper file contains the bulk of the inves<ga<on such as laboratory reports, all interview notes, photographic line-‐ups, consent search forms, and Miranda waiver.

•  In the Homicide Unit, supervision of cases occur through a combina<on of oral communica<on and a review of the officers log – no computer based sogware case management system is part of the unit. Consequently, ac<ve review of cases by supervisors is haphazard, and due to the dynamic nature of the on-‐going cases, creates numerous opportuni<es for missed deadlines or case oversight. The lack of a computer-‐based sogware system results in the Homicide Unit Commander having to physically inspect as many as 60 cases to insure that proper supervision is occurring in these ac<ve homicide inves<ga<ons.

•  The system does not allow for two-‐way communica<on between Case Management and the Record Management System (RMS). Informa<on transfers from the RMS at the first download but does not update informa<on. Informa<on that is added to the Case Management System does not move into the RMS. Dual entries are required on all arrests, all persons, all clearances, and all property.

76

The Inves2ga2ve Func2on: Records Management


Recommenda2ons (Con2nued) •  The RMS should be developed in a manner that facilitates all aspects of case management,

from the ini<al report taken by the responding officer to the inves<ga<ng detec<ve accessing and augmen<ng the report. The RMS should provide for a robust exchange of informa<on with the Chief of Police, District Commanders, and other interested Sec<ons or Units regarding the ongoing status of criminal inves<ga<ons.

•  Since 1969 CPD has had 426 unsolved homicide cases. In 2011, seven homicides were solved; three addi<onal were re-‐opened, and two are awai<ng grand jury presenta<on.

•  Based on an assessment of the remaining cases by the Homicide Unit, approximately one third, or about 140 cases, should be re-‐opened as they have workable leads. The unavailability of those for access has made it very difficult to navigate through those cases. Presently, cases more than two years old are physically stored off-‐site with “Fortress,” a contracted vendor. “Fortress” is responsible for case file transporta<on, storage, retrieval, and return to the Homicide Unit when a new lead is discovered. The facility and its personnel have not been veped to ensure reliability and case file integrity.

•  All homicide cases should either be reduced to electronic files or housed in a storage facility directly controlled by the police department.

77

The Inves2ga2ve Func2on: Records Management


Task Forces •  The department is engaged with other law enforcement agencies in a number of Task Forces

that focus on special problems, mostly on a regional basis. These Task Forces generally have officers from a number of different police agencies par<cipa<ng in the task force efforts.

•  Some of these Task Forces are run by federal government law enforcement agencies while others are run by the County.

•  The Department has had a long-‐standing involvement with a County Drug Task Force called RENU. A substan<al number of departmental police officers are assigned to the task force, addressing vice problems in Cincinna< and the surrounding area. Some of the ac<vity is within Cincinna< and thus leads to conflicts between the Cincinna< Police Department’s Vice Unit and the opera<ons of RENU, as those opera<ons are not always coordinated.

•  There have also been indica<ons that members of the RENU team have acted out of state without clear authority.

Recommenda2ons •  As the Vice Unit is being restructured under the Interim reorganiza<on, and numerous

officers are being moved to Districts, it is wise for the Department to consolidate drug inves<ga<ons that remain centralized with those of the task force. Thus, we suggest that the Department no longer par<cipate in the task force, allowing some of those officers to be reassigned to the recons<tuted Vice Unit. The Unit should seek federal standing, partnering with ATF and/or DEA, permimng them to legally follow leads across the state border.

78

The Inves2ga2ve Func2on: Task Forces


The Intelligence Func2on

Structure ― Informa<on Dissemina<on ― Effec<ve U<liza<on ― Special Events ―

Departmental Coordina<on ― Phone Surveillance


•  The current organiza<on of the Inves<ga<ve Func<on is located within the Inves<ga<ons Bureau and consists of the Central Vice Control Sec<on, with the Regional Narco<cs Unit (RENU), Mid-‐Level Drug Unit, and Regulatory Enforcement Unit assigned; the Criminal Inves<ga<on Sec<on, consis<ng of the Homicide Unit, Personal Crimes Unit, and Major Offense Unit; and the Intelligence Sec<on which is responsible for SOFAST and Project Disarm.

•  The Strategic Development Bureau houses the Fusion Center and Real Time Crime Center. •  Real Time Crime Center is accessed by the districts for license plate informa<on and social

networking, which has an important intelligence rela<onship. •  The organiza<onal structure of placing complemen<ng resources and Intelligence Sec<on

under one bureau and Real Time Crime and the Fusion Center within another bureau inhibits the ability to leverage intelligence and informa<on exchange .

Recommenda2ons •  Transfer the Fusion and Real Time Crime Centers from the Strategic Development Bureau to

the Inves<ga<ons Bureau. •  Create a Special Inves<ga<ons Sec<on, with a Captain assigned as Sec<on Commander. •  Assign the Intelligence Unit and the Fusion Center and Real Time Crime to that Sec<on. •  Provide comprehensive guidance to the Intelligence Unit and audit compliance to ensure

that intelligence ac<vi<es are always within Cons<tu<onal requirements.

The Intelligence Func2on: Structure


•  Many in the department are uncertain as to the exact nature and func<on of the Intelligence Unit. Upon request, districts receive support or services, but it has only been in the last couple of months that there has been outreach to the districts with an assigned liaison in each district that allowed it to iden<fy and assist with gang ac<vity.

•  There is a broad view at the district level that the Intelligence Unit is in possession of informa<on that is seldom disseminated to the field. Some in the districts believe that the Intelligence Unit has an abundance of equipment and personnel but does not serve the districts; rather, the unit seems focused on the wrong priori<es and provide liple ac<ve or useful intelligence. District personnel acknowledge they do not always share informa<on with the Intelligence Unit because it is a “black hole” and no informa<on is ever returned to the districts.

Recommenda2ons •  The Intelligence unit should remain a centralized func<on but an intelligence liaison officer

designated by each district and accountable to the district commander should be a part of the intelligence process. This will ensure the Intelligence Unit is receiving informa<on from the districts and the districts are receiving informa<on in return for analysis or ac<on.

•  The agency should develop an effec<ve policy for gathering, recording, submimng, and dissemina<ng intelligence informa<on throughout the police department. The Intelligence Unit should be charged with crea<ng an effec<ve “customer service” model that facilitates that important func<on for those authorized to receive informa<on relevant to their responsibili<es and du<es.

The Intelligence Func2on: Informa2on Dissemina2on


The Intelligence Func2on: U2liza2on

•  The Intelligence Unit is not a relevant resource as it relates to current threats and problems experienced at the district level. Emphasis in the Intelligence Unit seems to be on motorcycle gangs as opposed to the street gang ac<vity responsible for the majority of serious crime in the districts – despite that the Intelligence Unit is the agency’s gang experts. There is shared sen<ment in the districts that there is liple pro-‐ac<ve measures taken by the Intelligence Unit connec<ng or iden<fying the receivers of stolen property and informa<on surrounding “fences” and similar facilitators of property crimes. There is universal agreement that in the recent past, the Intelligence Unit has become more responsive.

Recommenda2ons •  The Intelligence Unit must market themselves throughout the agency as a support func<on

and con<nually demonstrate a responsive and proac<ve posture, with an emphasis on crime types, such as felonious assaults, robberies, burglaries, and stolen property, along with other linking elements. Ul<mately, providing informa<on to the districts for follow-‐up and ac<on plans.

•  The gang exper<se in the Intelligence Unit, as a resource mul<plier, should be shared and expanded into the districts through the training of district personnel. This would increase the “eyes and ears” on the street at the district level and complement the informa<on gathering city-‐wide.


The Intelligence Func2on: Special Events

•  In the planning of special events, the Intelligence Unit has failed to provide thorough informa<on to agency members responsible for planning and coordina<ng unique occurrences.

•  Events involving the tea party protest, concerts or circuses (where PETA-‐like interest ac<vity may occur) have historically not been a focus of the Intelligence Unit. Frequently, the Intelligence Unit will provide liple beyond a web search of related ac<vi<es reported in other jurisdic<ons, unless specifically requested or directed by the personnel responsible for planning or coordina<ng special event .

Recommenda2ons •  The Intelligence Unit must understand its func<on in the planning of special events, and

obtain training if needed to ensure the unit fully develops their role and responsibili<es. •  A needs assessment should be conducted with all agency personnel charged with the

responsibility of planning special events and the role of the Intelligence Unit in these events described and defined in policy.


•  There is an absence of clear policy and considerable confusion at the district level as to which func<on should drive intelligence, the Intelligence Unit, Fusion Center, Real Time Crime, or district crime analysis. Consequently, there is no formal protocol that enables the district to share informa<on with one another or with the intelligence Unit, resul<ng in informa<on vemng and dissemina<on based on individual custom developed by the districts.

•  Presently, informa<on is shared primarily through informal rela<onships established by detec<ves with their colleagues in other districts or sec<ons, as opposed to a formally developed intelligence and informa<on sharing process. They have had an effec<ve informa<on sharing role in ac<ve city-‐wide inves<ga<ons, but rou<ne intelligence at the district level appears challenging.

Recommenda2ons •  The Intelligence Unit, Fusion Center , and Real Time Crime should be under the same

command. Real Time Crime and the Fusion Center should be developing and sharing the data with the Intelligence Unit, who can act on the hard informa<on by conduc<ng surveillance and developing that informa<on then ensuring it is passed to the proper districts, units and sec<ons throughout the agency.

•  A policy should be developed describing the role of each intelligence discipline and the role and responsibility of agency members receiving or repor<ng intelligence.

The Intelligence Func2on: Coordina2on


•  The Intelligence Unit is very effec<ve in obtaining cell phone and telephone records, but is only available on weekdays. There is a sense that the unit is overwhelmed by cell phone informa<on requests, consequently the response is not always <mely.

•  If the Intelligence Unit is not able to process a request for cell phone records promptly, a district detec<ve will ini<ate the necessary documents, obtain the phone records, and submit them later to the Intelligence Unit.

Recommenda2ons •  The phone subpoena task should be handled by the appropriate districts or inves<ga<ve

sec<ons to expedite the process. •  A detailed policy should be developed and inves<gators properly train and sufficiently

supervised to ensure safeguards are in place to maintain the integrity of the process. •  The Intelligence Unit should act as the clearing house for all phone records obtained by the

agency, with a copy of all those records and suppor<ng documents being forwarded to them to ensure the correct processes and procedures were followed.

The Intelligence Func2on: Phone Surveillance


Administra2ve and Support Services

Internal Inves<ga<ons Sec<on ― Planning Sec<on ― Inspec<ons Sec<on ― Court Control Unit ― Detail Coordina<on Unit ― Accredita<on Unit ― Training Sec<on ― Organiza<on ― Technology ― Court and

Other Over<me Compensa<on ― Financial Management and Personnel



•  This bureau, commanded by an assistant chief, is responsible for coordina<ng and performing inter-‐bureau planning tasks and special research evalua<on studies.

•  Administra<on Bureau consists of the Internal Inves<ga<ons Sec<on, Planning Sec<on, and Inspec<ons Sec<on.

•  The Planning Sec<on, with the excep<on of the policy development process, is not in the most func<onally sound loca<on in the department.

•  Internal Inves2ga2on Sec2on, commanded by a captain, is responsible for inves<ga<ng ci<zen complaints of a serious nature: complaints of alleged police misconduct, alleged misconduct of Department civilian employees and use of force incidents that result in serious injury or death.

•  This sec<on coordinates pre-‐disciplinary hearings in conjunc<on with the Department hearing officer(s) and coordinates the inves<ga<on of complaints referred by the Ci<zen Complaint Authority

•  Planning Sec2on, commanded by a captain, is responsible for planning, research, and the development of programs that maximize the effec<ve use of Department personnel and resources.

•  This sec<on is responsible for long-‐range planning, developing and maintaining forms and procedures, conduc<ng legal research and tracking civil li<ga<on involving the Department and its members.

•  This sec<on serves as the Department’s liaison with the City Solicitor’s Office.



•  Inspec2ons Sec2on, commanded by a captain, monitors the ac<vity of the Department through staff inspec<ons and unannounced inspec<ons conducted on a random basis, including the Department’s random drug-‐tes<ng program. At the annual uniform inspec<on, this sec<on monitors the condi<on of issued equipment and ensures compliance with Department dress and grooming standards. Inspec<ons Sec<on conducts cri<cal reviews of all use of force incidents and serves as the Department’s central record repository for all use of force incidents. This sec<on is also responsible for ensuring the Department meets CALEA standards.

•  Court Control Unit, supervised by a sergeant, is the police liaison with the local judiciary and manages police officer apendance in court by monitoring officers’ court appearances. This unit verifies apendance, <me spent in court by officers, as well as ensuring the Police Department dress and grooming standards are met. The Court Control supervisor randomly visits courtrooms to monitor officers’ tes<mony and case prepara<on.

•  Detail Coordina2on Unit, supervised by a sergeant, coordinates all outside employment extension of police service details. This unit also maintains the Police Department’s outside employment ac<vity records for all officers. These records are reviewed monthly to ensure compliance with Department policy. The Detail Coordina<on Unit supervisor also conducts audits and random inspec<ons of outside employment details.



•  The Training Sec2on, commanded by a Captain, develops and conducts training programs for the Police Department. This includes recruit, in-‐service, and firearms training in both live fire and the firearms training simulator (FATS).

•  The Training Sec<on conducts training in the areas of supervision, management, physical fitness, self-‐defense, officer survival, interpersonal skills, legal issues, and current topics. It also coordinates numerous outside training requests, FBI training programs, and computer training programs.

•  The training staff produces training bulle<ns, memos, and video programs for Department use at department roll calls.

•  The Training Sec<on also conducts the Ci<zen Police Academy and the Student Police Academy.

•  The Firearms Training Unit of the Training Sec<on, supervised by a Sergeant, is responsible for the Department’s live firearms training. The unit conducts annual firearms qualifica<ons for all sworn personnel and firearms instruc<on for police recruits. It inspects, repairs, and evaluates Department firearms and makes recommenda<ons on appropriate ammuni<on for Department use.

•  Overall, the training ac<vi<es of the department are comprehensive and an important element in officer development. Many officers at various ranks have the ability to apend specialized training related to their assignment. But there is a percep<on among some officers that apendance at specialized training is provided mostly to those who have prior rela<onships with senior managers.



Recommenda2ons •  Every effort should be made to ensure that the selec<on of officers for special schools is

transparent to avoid percep<ons of favori<sm. •  The Department should explore training trainers in modern prac<ces of officer-‐to-‐youth

contact, since those rela<onships can have a long term impact on the future legi<macy of the Department as youth grow up. There is a knowledge base developing about how police interac<ons with youth can be drama<cally improved by understanding how the youth brain sees the world.

•  In the future, when recruit classes are hired, a number of new training and orienta<on prac<ces should be explored:

–  Following the academy, before officers are assigned to a neighborhood for field training, they should spend a few days to a week with a selected neighborhood organiza<on that will assume responsibility for introducing them to the neighborhood, its environment, leadership and issues. Experience shows that such orienta<on increases not only the new officer’s knowledge but the community’s willingness to share responsibility for the success of the new officer.

–  Recruits should spend some <me as observers in marked police units at various stages of their training to see what the “real world” of policing is like. This permits them to ask ques<ons about what they have seen in the academy semng ager these ride-‐alongs.


Recommenda2ons •  Rename the Administra<ve Services Bureau to Professional Standards Bureau. •  This is a beper reflec<on of the industry standard for this grouping of departmental

responsibili<es. •  Planning and Development should be relocated in the Resource Management Bureau. •  The policy and procedure func<on should be absorbed into the Inspec<ons Unit. •  The Training Sec<on should be relocated to the Professional Standards Bureau. •  This is a coloca<on of func<ons that seems to be gathering adop<on by the more forward

thinking agencies. •  The idea of having policy and training curricula wripen in closely aligned units should ensure

more uniformity and consistency in both efforts.


Administra2ve and Support Services: Organiza2on

Technology •  The Department has many technology systems which greatly affect the quality of opera<ons,

safely of field personnel and <me consumed with documen<ng ac<vi<es and informa<on received.

•  The development of systems in the Department appears have had a near-‐term focus rather than a longer-‐term strategic focus. Technology has not been integrated into the core func<ons of the Department, but a significant number of posi<ve steps have been taken over the years.

•  There has not been training nor pressure on employees to fully use the technological capabili<es available to them today. For example, though mandated by police, there are con<nually a substan<al number of police reports from the field that have not been electronically submiped, reviewed or acknowledged by officers or supervisors. Management has ogen not been willing to ensure that the required standard is met, thus directly impeding the real <me informa<on flow that is so cri<cal to effec<ve response to crime and preven<on of future occurrences.

•  In this sense, technology u<liza<on has, to some degree, become an outlier in the basic opera<ons of the Department when it must become an integrated system used by all.

•  There have also been a number of issues related to knowledge of systems and technology at the management level of the Department. The managers assigned appear to have done a good job within the limita<ons of their knowledge of this science.

•  Personnel staffing to support the technology area has ogen been limited and far below what is required for successful implementa<on.

•  For the department as a whole, there is no Strategic Plan for Technology Development.



Technology •  The Department currently has a number of important technology systems that are in the

process of development or upda<ng or needing replacement. These include… –  Records Management System: deployed in 2004, moves from under warranty in 2012.

The vendor has been Motorola, which has developed the more advanced versions of this important sogware in collabora<on with the Department. There has been an absence of field tes<ng and audi<ng of system sogware.

–  Field Repor<ng and Processing: a process cri<cal to the Department’s crime management ini<a<ves (such as CIRV and CompStat). As previously noted, current system opera<on ogen involves delays in processing dates from 24 to 48 hours.

–  License Plate Reader: a Homeland Security Project for the Southern Ohio, Indiana and Northern Kentucky region. The Department is a pilot leader in the US for use of this new technology.

–  Community Crime Cameras: A comprehensive effort between the 52 neighborhoods of the city and the Central Riverfront. While implementa<on has occurred, apparently there has been inadequate planning for addressing a variety of issues, such as data access, public records requests, etc.

–  Computer/SAN Replacement: Funding has been encumbered to replace the 550 exis<ng computer worksta<ons in the Department because of the age of the equipment. The poten<al use of the Smart Client plaworm needs to be explored rather than just purchasing networked computers.



Technology –  Mobile Data Computer (MDC) replacement: This project seeks to replace in-‐car

computers in 211 CPD vehicles as a part of this County project. The equipment purchased needs to meet CPD needs, but it appears that there has been only limited involvement in system specifica<ons.

These are just a sampling of issues currently exis<ng in the technology area. A lis<ng of current projects and the staff assigned is listed on the following page.



Technology Projects

PROJECT DESCRIPTION LEAD BACKUP START DATE

END DATE COMMENTS

Desktop Refresh Replace computers/upgrade opera<ng system to Windows 7/upgrade Office package to 2010 Tom Lind 01/01/12 04/31/12

SAN Upgrade Upgrade the SAN Tom Lind 06/01/11 03/15/12 RMS Servers Replace outdated RMS servers Tom Lind 01/01/12 06/01/12 AD Migra<on Move Ac<ve Directory to RCCAD Tom Lind/Mike Arnold 04/01/10 06/01/12 Academy Training Lab/Mobile Training Lab

Implement mobile and permanent training lab in conjunc<on with the Academy staff

Tom Lind/Academy Staff 09/01/10 06/30/12 Pending upgrade of Training Lab

RMS Support Development, report wri<ng, support Lt. Ogilvie/Lt. Carmichael Gerry Geisel 10 BC Ongoing

LPR Support Development of custom applica<ons, assist in project management, troubleshoot problems Heather Whipon Tony Schlegel 11/01/09 Ongoing

CNPS Camera Project Installa<on, troubleshoo<ng, support, etc. Barry Whipon Tony Schlegel 01/01/08 Ongoing

i2 Sogware Installa<on Finish the i2 installa<on that will allow connec<on to diverse databases Jim Olthaus 01/01/10 03/31/12

Upgrade of Payroll to SQL database Upgrade the current payroll database from Access to SQL Jim Olthaus 02/01/12 02/29/12

SCPA Hiring Fill SCPA posi<on Jim Olthaus Tom Lind 12/01/12 03/31/12 CPA Hiring Fill CPA posi<on Jim Olthaus Tom Lind 01/01/12 03/31/12 CPS Hiring (Grant) Fill CPA posi<on (Grant) Heather Whipon Jim Olthaus 01/01/12 03/31/12

Command Van-‐SWAT Nego<ator Van Technology Update

Install updated technology in the command a SWAT nego<a<ons vans (computers, wireless, etc.) Lt. Wolf

Jim Olthaus/Tom Lind

MVR Wireless Project Sgt. Tom Snith Field Tes<ng 1 sta<on Mobile RMS Project

Update DEMM Servers

The servers in the districts to upload video are in need of replacement and upgrade; look into networking

Upgrade Criminalis<cs computers

Upgrade computer to Windows 7 (64 bit) and add memory to see if the problems with locking up are fixed Tony Schlegel Jim Olthaus 12/15/11 01/15/12

Review Omega Products Review the Omega groups products of Crimeview Dashboard, Crimeview Mobile, etc.

Review Telestaff Product

Review and request another demo of the Telestaff product to replace <me books, court management, lineups, etc.



Technology -‐ Recommenda2ons •  The Department should hire a Technology and Systems Manager to oversee the en<re

informa<on technology area. This posi<on requires specialized educa<on and experience in technology-‐related fields. It should be a trained, qualified civilian.

•  The first task for the new Manager should be a review of current systems projects, then the development of a Strategic Plan for Technology that presents objec<ves, systems proposed and costs associated with their development.

•  The Department should aggressively require that employees at all levels use the current technology systems as required by exis<ng policy, within the <meframes that have been established. Employees who con<nually fail to meet the required deadlines for submission of field reports, for example, or approve those submiped should be disciplined ager being no<fied of this deficiency should it con<nue.

•  Many police personnel assigned to technology should be replaced with qualified civilians over <me. Some police officer liaison must always be maintained within the technology units but not in management posi<ons or for highly technical ac<vi<es. Police officer roles should focus on ensuring that systems developers understand the needs and requirements of those who will use the technology.



Financial Management and Personnel •  The Financial Management and Personnel func<ons are combined under a single manager,

repor<ng to the Assistant Chief, Resources Bureau. •  The Personnel Sec<on manages all the Department’s personnel mapers, except for

recrui<ng, which operates under Training. The variety of func<ons is expansive, and the small staff assigned operates under the direct supervision of a Police Sergeant.

•  In coming months, the Department may be scheduling a recruit class, which will put pressure on this sec<on to recruit and screen candidates. The Lieutenant assigned to Personnel should assume responsibility for coordina<ng and managing these ac<vi<es. While in the future this posi<on might be civilianized, in the near term it should remain a police manager posi<on.

•  The Fiscal Sec<on oversees the Department budget process and expenditures. Recommenda2ons •  The Fiscal Sec<on should be moved to the Office of the Chief of Police, where fiscal decisions

and oversight of expenditures can get to the Chief of Police without filtering. Personnel should remain under the Resource Management Bureau.

•  The alloca<on and expenditure of funds received by the Department from asset forfeiture also requires direct repor<ng to the Chief. The current prac<ce of having fiscal under an Assistant Chief means that fiscal decisions go through one extra organiza<onal layer.

•  While financial oversight is now very strong, opera<onally the Department should think strategically about how asset forfeiture funds are allocated, ensuring that they carefully reflect thought-‐out priori<es.


Administra2ve and Support Services: Fiscal & Personnel

Financial Management and Personnel – Recommenda2ons (Con2nued) •  The Department needs to invest in technology that will bring the employee apendance

process online. Apendance informa<on is currently entered manually in each unit of the Department. In the near term, Timekeepers should be organized centrally but an automa<c system will save a tremendous amount of clerical staff <me, which can then be allocated to other pressing mapers.


Administra2ve and Support Services: Fiscal and Personnel

•  Current court pay is cos<ng the city approximately $3 million annually. •  Court over<me is awarded three different ways:

-‐ Court (minimum of 3 hours over<me for a solitary appearance), the current year to date is 331,515.65. -‐ Dead Time/Off Days (defined as less than 8 hours between shig and court appearance, and off days is defined as those days commencing with the last hour worked on a normal tour of duty the employee is not required to return to work within the next 24hr period including preplanned vaca<on and compensatory <me), the current year to date total is 873,471.54. -‐ Fair Labor Standards Act -‐ federal law requiring workers to be paid over<me in excess of 480 hours worked compensatory <me. Year to date total is 1,559,121.71

Recommenda2ons •  Ensure that only essen<al personnel are indicated on arrest slips. •  Meet with key judicial officials to improve u<liza<on of officers schedules to subpoena

officers on their working days. •  Work with courts to not schedule officers on first call cita<ons, traffic offenses, and specific

misdemeanors. •  Review schedules in top Districts and hours of ac<ve units to reduce dead <me.


Administra2ve and Support Services: Court Over2me

Recommenda2ons (Con2nued) •  Consider flat rate for court appearance. •  Eliminate Dead Time/Off Day provision. •  Acquire administra<ve court technology to lessen burden on court personnel to determine

officer working schedules. •  Designate regular personnel to present reports on first call cases and preliminary hearings. •  If adopted, u<lize the overlapping schedule from the 4/10 plan to schedule officers for later

court start.


Administra2ve and Support Services: Court Over2me

Over2me •  The department currently spends about $5,465,000 on over<me:

OVERTIME BUDGET FOR 2010

2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 BUDGET

COUNCIL MANDATED PVO $1,866,217.67 $704,071.20

CONTINGENCY $1,228,932.80 $1,278,890.59 $1,496,070.92 $2,596,207.79 $2,481,601.49 $1,587,930.49 $1,204,463.89 $994,532.10 $711,453.10 $265,720.00

INCREMENT $1,869,537.04 $2,073,108.53 $2,110,437.00 $1,670,836.84 $2,027,741.59 $1,753,772.12 $2,069,405.26 $1,920,966.23 $1,507,028.19 $1,850,000.00

COURT $601,690.86 $695,263.78 $779,434.60 $695,865.86 $819,938.87 $752,785.91 $559,157.38 $493,631.47 $418,491.55 $450,000.00

FLSA $670,514.31 $730,879.80 $899,991.88 $991,740.45 $1,295,113.96 $1,147,491.68 $1,404,512.63 $1,564,321.49 $1,726,026.08 $1,800,000.00

OFF $742,222.94 $860,900.64 $1,016,174.95 $1,032,153.99 $1,279,120.99 $1,118,482.23 $1,082,526.18 $1,111,889.07 $1,080,285.87 $1,100,000.00

COMMUNICATIONS

TOTAL $5,112,897.95 $5,639,043.34 $6,302,109.35 $6,986,804.93 $7,903,516.90 $6,360,462.43 $8,186,283.01 $6,789,411.56 $5,443,284.79 $5,465,720.00

ADJ FOR TAKE BACK OUR STREETS / CMPVO -‐$500,000.00 -‐$1,200,000.00 -‐$1,200,000.00 -‐$1,500,000.00 -‐$1,866,217.67 -‐$704,071.20

LESS COMMUNICATIONS -‐$397,988.14 -‐$350,000.00

ADJ TOTAL $5,112,897.95 $5,639,043.34 $5,802,109.35 $5,786,804.93 $6,703,516.90 $4,860,462.43 $6,320,065.34 $6,085,340.36 $5,045,296.65 $5,115,720.00

INC/DEC FROM PRIOR YEAR 10.29% 2.89% -‐0.26% 15.84% -‐27.49% 30.03% -‐3.71% -‐17.09% 1.40%


Administra2ve and Support Services: Over2me

•  Many of the over<me expenditures are mandated by contract or federal regula<on (FLSA). Por<ons of over<me are reimbursed by federal and state grants or other agencies.

•  However, the Department does not allocate other over<me to individual units, requiring that Commanders of those units live within the allocated amounts.

•  Police agencies that provide adequate control over their over<me do such alloca<ons, reserving up to 20% or more of over<me budge<ng for a “con<ngency fund.”

Recommenda2ons •  The Department should develop an over<me alloca<on strategy, providing each District and

each specialized unit with an alloca<on of the over<me provided in the budget. •  Commanders of each unit should be held accountable for staying within the allocated

amounts unless given explicit approval by the Chief of Police. •  Commanders must allocate their over<me in a manner that recognizes that over<me needed

during the summer months may be far greater than that needed during late fall or late winter months.

•  Commanders must ensure that over<me is not used for duplicate work, such as when two Captains are drawn to a scene of an incident when one Captain would be sufficient.


Administra2ve and Support Services: Over2me

Addressing Crime and Disorder

The History ― Strategy/Implementa<on ― Law Enforcement Team ― Services Team ―

Community Team ― Systems Team ― Team Recommenda<ons



The History •  In a bold step a few years ago, the City agreed to be a pilot organiza<on for a new crime

preven<on and reduc<on strategy developed by staff at the John Jay College of Criminal Jus<ce in New York City. This strategy had been tested in a series of communi<es, including Boston (where its impact became well-‐known as the “Boston Miracle“) and High Point, North Carolina (where street-‐level drug markets were eliminated throughout the city).

•  The Cincinna< strategy was en<tled “Cincinna< Ini<a<ve to Reduce Violence” (CIRV) and began in 2007. There was a strong commitment to the strategy by the Mayor, City Manager and Chief of Police at the <me. The strategy had substan<al results in the first few years, drama<cally lowering the level of violent crime in the Districts where it was implemented.

•  The department received substan<al assistance from faculty at the University of Cincinna<, and the efforts became an exemplary collabora<ve of efforts by many stakeholders, including the Cincinna< community, police, proba<on and parole and many of the community’s social service agencies.

•  In the last year, the ini<a<ve has languished in the background of department change, most importantly the former Chief of Police’s re<rement. The opportunity is now present to revitalize the ini<a<ve in a way that will not only drama<cally reduce violent crime in Cincinna< but place the city among the few across the country who have been able to address violent crime in a strategic manner focused on preven<ng occurrences, not just arres<ng offenders ager the fact.


The ac<vi<es that need to be undertaken for re-‐vitalizing CIRV are detailed below, drawn from discussions with program staff, Dr. Robin Engel of the University of Cincinna< and David Kennedy (and staff) of the John Jay College of Criminal Jus<ce in New York, who created the concept that CIRV embodies as its base opera<ng philosophy. STRATEGY/IMPLEMENTATION •  Personnel with prior CIRV experience should be placed in leadership posi<ons to guide the

ini<a<ve –  Key leadership posi<ons include:

•  Co-‐chair •  Project Manager •  LE Team Chair (and opera<onal leader) •  Services Team Chair •  Community Team Chair •  Systems Team Chair

•  Establish recommitment of the Mayor, City Manager, City Council, and Chief to the core ideologies of focused deterrence

–  Realignment and agreement on goals of ini<a<ve –  Clear agreement on defini<ons and targets of ini<a<ve (e.g., defining gang) –  Reestablish quarterly Governing Board mee<ngs –  Reestablish rou<ne presenta<ons to City Council by CIRV Strategy/Implementa<on

Team



•  Determine financial commitment from City for costs associated with CIRV –  Costs include:

•  Street Advocates •  Provision of social services (e.g., Talbert House) •  Community Engagement (e.g., Partnering Center) •  Data collec<on, analysis, evalua<on, and report wri<ng (University of Cincinna<) •  CPD over<me expenditures associated with CIRV Opera<ons

–  Seek addi<onal funding sources (e.g., federal and state grant opportuni<es, private funding sources)

•  Once leadership personnel are selected, conduct a strategic planning sessions for all CIRV partners

–  Recommitment to CIRV, including OGSM process (Objec<ves, Goals, Strategies, Measures)

–  Update OGSM and strive for balanced scorecards –  Establish short-‐term and long-‐term goals for each team

•  Develop new communica<on strategy –  Determine if offender no<fica<on mee<ngs (i.e., call-‐in sessions) remain effec<ve and

feasible –  Iden<fy and implement addi<onal tac<cs for offender no<fica<on –  Pilot test and evaluate effec<veness of new tac<cs



•  Long-‐term goal: Develop a comprehensive violence reduc<on strategy that includes domes<c violence and violence associated with open-‐air drug markets

–  Conduct analyses to determine the rela<onship between group-‐related violence, domes<c violence, and violence associated with open-‐air drug markets

–  Iden<fy common offenders, vic<ms, and loca<ons –  Determine the feasibility of using focused deterrence strategies to address other

violence categories –  Establish coordina<on across CPD units (personal crimes, vice, homicide, patrol districts,

real-‐<me crime, etc.) •  Embed focused deterrence / problem solving approach within CPD

–  Reestablish in-‐service training that explains CIRV and underlying principles of focused deterrence

–  Establish CompStat process that clearly iden<fies violence reduc<on goals and holds commanders responsible

–  Establish reward structure that encourages innova<on and adherence to focused deterrence /problem solving principles



LAW ENFORCEMENT TEAM •  Increase coopera<on and coordina<on across LE Team members

–  In par<cular, seek reengagement of Hamilton Co. Proba<on Department, Ohio Department of Rehabilita<on and Correc<ons, Hamilton Co. Prosecutors Office, and U.S. Aporney’s Office

•  Increase coordina<on between Real Time Crime Center, Intelligence Sec<on, Patrol Districts,

and CIRV Team –  Conduct coordinated and systema<c intelligence updates –  Coordinate data collec<on and analysis

•  Direct involvement of UC team for assistance •  Reestablish CPD Opera<onal units dedicated to CIRV group/gang opera<ons, coordinated by

Commanders with CIRV knowledge/experience –  Includes opera<onal units at department and individual district levels (e.g., Vortex, ATF

Task Force, and Patrol District VCS) •  Coordinate direct involvement of Intelligence Sec<on in CIRV Opera<ons

–  Increase informa<on sharing across units (e.g., homicide, vice, patrol districts)



SERVICES TEAM •  Needs to be recreated •  Iden<fy new partners •  Secure funding sources •  Recommitment to evidence-‐based prac<ces COMMUNITY TEAM

•  Iden<fy new tac<cs for successful community engagement •  Secure funding sources •  Recommitment to evidence-‐based prac<ces •  Establish commitment to data collec<on and evalua<on process



SYSTEMS TEAM

•  Iden<fy one CPD unit specifically tasked with data collec<on, analysis, and other associated documenta<on tasks

•  Unit should have ready access to all data needed to complete their tasks, including: –  Arrest Informa<on –  Suspect Informa<on –  Vic<miza<on Informa<on –  Group Enforcement Informa<on –  Call-‐in Informa<on –  FIR Database

•  CPD analysts charged with CIRV-‐related documenta<on must have all necessary sogware to complete tasks

•  CPD unit charged with CIRV documenta<on must work directly with UC research team –  Develop and use common defini<ons for all measures –  Develop data sharing plan –  Develop clear expecta<ons for task responsibili<es

Strategic Policy Partnership 110


Recommenda2ons •  We strongly support the ac<on steps detailed on the previous pages. It is impera<ve that all

levels of city government, agencies throughout the community and the community itself re-‐engage in the CIRV process, with a commitment to showing the small percentage of persons in Cincinna< who engage in violence that such ac<vity will not be tolerated.

•  Within the department, the CIRV effort must be an effort that involves all Bureaus, and in which informa<on rela<ve to the CIRV process is widely shared, without silos evolving which prevent such communica<on.

•  For city government, it is cri<cal that the community and agency efforts that are an integral part of the CIRV strategy be resourced. A source of funding for cri<cal component costs must be found. It is an incredibly important investment in Cincinna<’s future and the economic viability of the community.

•  It is also important that the performance measures for the CIRV ini<a<ve be incorporated into the department’s performance management process (CompStat).

•  The en<re effort can have increased if the problem-‐solving strategy being developed by the Problem-‐Solving Unit gets incorporated in an integral manner with CIRV. Focusing apen<on on the nature of the environmental loca<ons (places) where a majority of violent crime occurs can create ac<ons that bring the community and the city into building neighborhood safeguards that will prevent future occurrences of violent criminal acts. It can become a model for the country.



Managing Performance

General Background ― General Recommenda<ons ― Status of Accredita<on ―

Strengthening Personnel Competencies



•  The Department has had a CompStat process that has been neither very effec<ve nor very robust in its opera<on. Mee<ngs have been held around a conference table, making it difficult for par<cipants to observe data on screens in the room. It has generally been expected that senior managers would ques<on District Captains about the status of crime in their areas but ogen the discussions randomly roamed off to other topics, with the session losing its focus. Chief Craig, upon appointment implemented what he termed “CompStat Lite” as a star<ng point for strengthening the process.

•  Generally, the District Captains appear to have a reasonable degree of knowledge regarding crime in their district. The Department has been fairly robust in responding to crime events and the CIRV ini<a<ve has had drama<c impacts in several past years. But the CompStat process has been a useful mechanism for staying on top of crime paperns and status.

•  One of the most important underpinnings for an effec<ve CompStat process is the availability of real-‐<me crime data on a daily basis. Cincinna< has not had this capability for a series of complicated reasons but plans are underway to improve data repor<ng in a manner that will provide a founda<on for effec<ve performance management.

•  Effec<ve CompStat processes generally move toward group discussions about how department resources can best be used to intervene in paperns of crime. The New York City Police Department, the pioneer of these processes, developed the concept of “cops on the dots:” Gemng a picture of crime occurrences daily permiped each NYPD precinct to move officers to those areas where crime was occurring, all aimed at preven<ng the next occurrence.

•  In the earliest NYPD Compstat, the ques<oning of precinct commanders was very aggressive and ogen rude and demeaning. Experience has shown that this is not the best model.



Recommenda2ons •  Building on “CompStat Lite,” the Department must develop a robust real-‐<me system for

collec<ng the type of performance data that serves as the basis for performance management. That data need to be available to the impacted managers prior to any performance management review.

•  The involvement of the Crime Analysis staff and Problem-‐oriented staff is cri<cal to a successful performance management process. This staff can provide analysis of the data produced by the Department’s technology staff.

•  For crime sta<s<cs, the Department should hold a morning mee<ng of District Commanders, Inves<ga<ve Commanders, unit heads, and the Assistant Chiefs of Neighborhood Policing and Inves<ga<ons to review crime status for the previous 24 hours. The District Captains (or their designated representa<ve if they are absent from duty) can join the mee<ngs via video conference from their office. A review for each District should occur, describing the major crime events from 12:00 AM to 11:59 PM the previous day and any significant events which have occurred between midnight and the the morning mee<ng.

•  These morning reviews, which should not last more than 30 minutes, should briefly review major crimes, discuss linkages between events and the deployment plans for that day. The Lieutenant of the Problem-‐Solving and Crime Analysis Group should be included on the call.

•  In support of this daily review (Monday through Friday but not weekends), a daily crime report should be produced by the Informa<on Technology Unit modeled ager the repor<ng developed by the Milwaukee, Wisconsin Police Department.



Recommenda2ons (Con2nued) •  A CompStat room should be created in which performance management mee<ngs are held.

We have provided the department with an outline of how the room should be structured, so that adequate video presenta<ons of crime data can be seen by all.

•  The CompStat sessions, which should occur once a week in that room, should be chaired by the Assistant Chief of Neighborhood Policing Services. The other Assistant Chiefs should apend as well, simng at a “ques<oner table.” Each District Captain should be called to describe the state of crime and disorder in their District, evolving problems and their strategy to address apparent paperns. With the responsible inves<ga<ve commander’s par<cipa<on, they should also review case status of serious crime cases.

•  With all District Commanders in apendance along with representa<ves of special units, such as Special Opera<ons, others in the room should offer sugges<ons and resource assignments that will assist the District Captain address the problems iden<fied as strategies are discussed.

•  The objec<ve of the session is collabora<ve problem-‐solving. It is not to embarrass an individual commander but bring together Department capabili<es to immediately address evolving paperns of crime and disorder.

•  Once every six weeks, following the CompStat update for all Districts, one District should be scheduled for a more intensive review, looking at issues such as sick leave use, over<me expenditures, community par<cipa<on, and related mapers.

•  Eventually other units in the Department should be subject to the same type of review, but on a less frequent schedule.


•  The Cincinna< Police Department has been accredited by the Commission on Accredita<on for Law Enforcement Agencies (CALEA) since 1997. Ranking agency members tend to characterize CALEA Accredita<on as having developed bench marks for the agency, no<ng it is a very posi<ve process that ensures sound business prac<ces and reassures the public that the business model is a posi<ve one. However, a number of mid-‐level and line personnel are frustrated that CALEA was not more helpful during the federal review of the agency ager the “riots.” But those tasked with sa<sfying DOJ compliance requirements indicated that the agency fulfilled those requirements more rapidly and easier because of the plaworm the agency had created through the CALEA process. Those familiar with evidence and property mapers support accredita<on because of the quality control of evidence, which ensures the integrity of the evidence process.

•  The agency members affiliated with the Accredita<on Unit have developed an effec<ve paper process of gathering proofs of compliance throughout the various bureaus.

Recommenda2ons •  The agency has been accredited since 1997 and should consider con<nuing its affilia<on with

CALEA. The process of peer review is invaluable, par<cularly as it relates to cri<cal tasks, i.e. evidence processing and handling, use of force and pursuit analysis.

•  If con<nuing with CALEA, the agency should emphasize the role of CALEA as a management tool for con<nuous improvement, not a process that is a subs<tute for robust leadership.

•  Likewise, the agency should develop an electronic method of gathering documents necessary to demonstrate proofs of compliance with the standards.


Managing Performance: Accredita2on

Recommenda2ons (Con2nued) •  Some agency personnel believe unnecessary reports are required that do not serve any

effec<ve purpose, specifically the quarterly report to the police chief regarding ci<zen concerns. Addi<onally, there is a percep<on that a specific number of training hours are required by CALEA Accredita<on, for example, 8 hours of training is mandatory when 4 hours would do.

•  The agency should complete a comprehensive review of all reports, analyses, and documented reviews to ascertain if they properly serve the agency and add value. In those instances where reports or documents are generated merely to sa<sfy a standard, those reports should be discon<nued and replaced with a document that is useful and valuable to the agency mission. Agency members should be challenged if they claim that a CALEA standard dictates how an agency achieves compliance: CALEA describes the task that must be addressed, it does not mandate the manner.

•  A review of specific training hours characterized as mandatory to ensure compliance with a CALEA standard should be scru<nized; no CALEA standard requires an explicit number of training hours to demonstrate compliance.

•  Even given the above, the department should carefully review the return from remaining an accredited agency. A number of the deficiencies found in this review were not iden<fied by the accredita<on process, and probably would not be. That raises important issues regarding the value of the accredita<on process for Cincinna<.


Managing Performance: Accredita2on

Performance Evalua2on •  From the conversa<ons held with personnel and our review of the Performance Evalua<on

Manual, we find the appraisal system lacking in a number of substan<al ways. •  We were told that the evalua<on system is not taken very seriously and that it has no

connec<on to job assignment, transfer, advanced training or promo<on. •  The appraisal is conducted once a year, less than the standard employed by forward thinking

departments of comparable size. •  The 436A, which is used by patrol resources to capture ac<vity, seems to have no direct

connec<on to the evalua<on process. •  There appears to be no career development component of the evalua<on system. •  By policy, only the extreme ra<ngs require documenta<on.

Recommenda2ons •  At a minimum, conduct appraisals twice a year. •  Ini<ate a review of the performance evalua<on system by researching the approaches of

similarly situated police departments and current innova<ons in the industry by HR experts.


Managing Performance: Performance Evalua2on

Recommenda2ons (Con2nued) •  Encourage supervisors to have quarterly discussions with each of their subordinates about

performance. •  Make career development a formal part of performance evalua<on. •  Have the reviewer play a more significant role in the evalua<on of the employee. •  Provide documenta<on substan<a<ng all ra<ngs.


Managing Performance: Performance Evalua2on

Restructuring and Resourcing the Department

Staffing Levels ― Departmental Organiza<on


Restructuring and Resourcing the Department Staffing Levels -‐ How many Officers Does a City Require?

•  There is a debate regarding the number of police officers a city requires to adequately provide service and meet the policing challenges of the community.

•  The number of police officers in American ci<es varies greatly from region to region. The Western United States generally has far fewer police officers per popula<on than Mid-‐west and East Coast communi<es. Some of this owes to the evolu<on of West Coast police agencies ager the development of certain East Coast public sector prac<ces; the Western ci<es ogen had far lower density and their ci<es had more modern city management organiza<ons. Thus, these newer ci<es commonly had less officers.

•  Addi<onally, the popula<on density of most Eastern ci<es is far greater than those in Western parts of the country, mostly because the land available for newer ci<es to expand with growth was more common in the West.

•  It has been common to view the number of officers required as a ra<o of officers per 1000 popula<on. Largest East Coast/Midwest ci<es have ogen had a ra<o of 3 to 4 police officers per thousand, with a few ci<es approaching 6 officers per thousand. On the West Coast, it is common to have 2 officers per thousand or less. In many cases, the number of civilian employees to police officers is also far greater than Eastern/Midwest communi<es.

•  In <mes of fiscal austerity, many communi<es – both on the East Coast/Midwest and West Coast – are finding that they can not afford the numbers of police officers they have supported during past <mes. The common view is that ci<es must trim the number of officers in the future if city financial health is to remain viable.


Staffing Levels -‐ Impact within the Current Environment •  Almost all ci<es are financially stressed within the current economic environment. Few have

the capacity to increase police strength; many have had to reduce the number of police officers.

•  It has become common for thoughwul administrators to address the percentage of police agency strength that is allocated to sworn officers and that which is allocated to civilian employees. It has been shown that many posi<ons in a police organiza<on currently filled by sworn officers could be performed equally well or even beper by civilians, ogen at less cost.

•  When financial <mes are difficult, governments are ogen reluctant to reduce police officer staffing when there are civilians in the department. Thus, many ci<es reduce civilian posi<ons first, ogen resul<ng in police officer reassignment from field police du<es to jobs that do not require police officers training and skill. This is an unwise ac<on for a government to take.

•  It now appears obvious that policing must be performed with fewer police officers than in the past. New policing strategies, a focus on predic<ve policing, community policing ingrained as an organiza<onal culture, crime preven<on and targeted enforcement against repeat or serial offenders can reduce the number of officers required, providing civilian staff assumes du<es for which civilians are trained and can effec<vely perform.

•  The table on the following page shows how ci<es comparable to Cincinna< compare with regards to staffing levels. The comparable ci<es are mostly “rust belt” Midwestern ci<es.



Cincinna< and CPD -‐ Comparable Ci<es and Departments

City Popula<on (City)

Popula<on (Metro)

Square Miles (Land)

Density (/mi2) PD Size -‐ Sworn

PD Size -‐ Civilian

PD Size (Total)

% Civilian

Cincinna< 296,943 2,130,151 78.0 4,273.5 1,059 119 1,178 10.10% Buffalo 261,310 1,135,509 40.6 6,656.2 768 150 918 16.34% Cleveland 396,815 2,250,871 77.6 5,113.0 1,559 246 1,805 13.63% Milwaukee 594,833 1,555,908 96.1 6,296.3 1,936 727 2,663 27.30% Pipsburgh 305,704 2,356,285 55.5 5,636.0 887 67 954 7.02% St. Louis 319,294 2,845,298 61.9 5,158.2 1,363 557 1,920 29.01% Toledo 287,208 651,409 80.6 3,767.7 566 111 677 16.40%

City

"Part I" Crimes (2010)

Crime Rate (per 100,000 pop)

Officers per 1000 pop

Officer per Square Mile

Employees per 1000

Cincinna< 24,121 8123 3.6 13.6 3.98 Buffalo 18,352 7023 2.9 18.9 3.52 Cleveland 28,961 7298 3.9 20.1 4.56 Milwaukee 38,049 6396 2.9 20.1 4.48 Pipsburgh 14,094 4610 4.3 16.0 3.13 St. Louis 33,529 10500 4.3 22.0 6.02 Toledo 11,830* 4118 2.0 7.0 2.36

*Excludes larceny Sources: 2010 Census, 2010 FBI Crime in the United States (UCR) Report



Staffing Levels -‐ Where Cincinna2 Stands •  Compared with the comparable ci<es, Cincinna< does not stand out at the top or bopom of

any of the comparisons, except that it has the second lowest number of civilians as a percentage of total police department staffing out of all the listed departments.

•  Our review of the level of civiliza<on in the Department noted that there are a substan<al number of posi<ons currently staffed by police officers that most other police agencies have converted to civilian posi<ons, many at lower cost. Only 10% of the Department’s staffing is civilian, compared to Milwaukee’s 27%, St. Louis’ 29%, and Toledo and Buffalo’s 16%.

•  There are also some posi<ons where technical skill is required, beyond that found among police personnel. The police personnel assigned to those posi<ons, such as Director of Informa<on Technology, have done a good job learning the field and trying to move the Department forward, but having civilian managers in some of these areas would be far more effec<ve, a fact with which a number of current posi<on incumbents agree.

•  Civilianiza<on will take <me, and officers replaced can then move to field posi<ons now filled with officers who are re<ring or otherwise leaving the Department.

•  But if civilianiza<on occurs, it is important that the civilian strength be maintained over the longer term, so a situa<on is created that forces the Department to fill vacant civilian posi<ons with sworn officers, something that will occur if the func<on is cri<cal and must be staffed.



Staffing Levels -‐ Where Cincinna2 Stands •  Cincinna< also has a low ra<o of officers to supervisors, and supervisors to managers. The

current ra<os are as follows: –  Captains to Assistant Chiefs: 3.2 –  Lieutenants to Captains: 3.0 –  Sergeants to Lieutenants: 3.48 –  Police Officers to Sergeants: 4.77

•  The norm for urban police agencies is a ra<o of 6-‐7 police officers per Sergeant. It appears that over the years, the department has promoted individuals to supervisory posi<ons that did not have meaningful supervisory responsibili<es; that is, the work of the posi<ons could have been accomplished by lower-‐level personnel.

•  The department has recently taken steps to reduce the number of Assistant Chiefs, Captains and Lieutenants, which will help restructure assignments and responsibili<es, pushing down these responsibili<es to lower levels of the organiza<on where higher-‐level authori<es are not required. This is a posi<ve step, not only in <mes of fiscal pressure but in crea<ng a beper func<oning organiza<on.

Staffing Levels – Recommenda2ons •  Ensure that each supervisory and management posi<ons have responsibili<es and authori<es

commensurate with that rank.



Staffing Levels -‐ Recommenda2ons •  The Department should move to civilianize the following posi<ons in a structured, organized

manner, with officers being moved out of them back into the field as police vacancies occur. Bureau Sworn Non-sworn

Position Rank Salary Classification Salary Difference1 IT Section Commander Information Mgmt Captain $99,480.11 IT Manager $106,438.34 ($6,958.23)2 Police Academy Commander Resource Mgmt Captain $99,480.11 Police Acad. Manager $99,662.58 ($182.47)3 Records Unit Commander Information Mgmt Lieutenant $85,758.72 Supv Management Analyst $87,921.14 ($2,162.42)4 Personnel Unit Commander Resource Mgmt Lieutenant $85,758.72 Supv HR Analyst $87,921.14 ($2,162.42)5 CALEA Unit - Administrative Support Administration PO $63,383.00 Adm Tech $48,720.49 $14,662.516 Crime Analyst - Information Analysis Unit Information Mgmt PO $63,383.00 Crime Analyst $48,719.49 $14,663.517 Crime Analyst - Information Analysis Unit Information Mgmt PO $63,383.00 Crime Analyst $48,719.49 $14,663.518 Crime Analyst - Information Analysis Unit Information Mgmt PO $63,383.00 Crime Analyst $48,719.49 $14,663.519 Crime Analyst - Information Analysis Unit Information Mgmt PO $63,383.00 Crime Analyst $48,719.49 $14,663.51

10 TCRU positions Information Mgmt PO $63,383.00 Clerk Typist 3 $38,070.45 $25,312.5511 TCRU positions Information Mgmt PO $63,383.00 Clerk Typist 3 $38,070.45 $25,312.5512 TCRU positions Information Mgmt PO $63,383.00 Clerk Typist 3 $38,070.45 $25,312.5513 Crime Analyst - CIS Investigation PO $63,383.00 Crime Analyst $48,719.49 $14,663.5114 Crime Analyst - Intelligence Investigation PO $63,383.00 Crime Analyst $48,719.49 $14,663.5115 Crime Analyst - Vice Investigation PO $63,383.00 Crime Analyst $48,719.49 $14,663.5116 Criminalist Investigation PO $63,383.00 Police Criminalist $54,287.52 $9,095.4817 Criminalist Investigation PO $63,383.00 Police Criminalist $54,287.52 $9,095.4818 Crime Analyst - D1 Patrol PO $63,383.00 Crime Analyst $48,719.49 $14,663.5119 Crime Analyst - D2 Patrol PO $63,383.00 Crime Analyst $48,719.49 $14,663.5120 Crime Analyst - D3 Patrol PO $63,383.00 Crime Analyst $48,719.49 $14,663.5121 Crime Analyst - D4 Patrol PO $63,383.00 Crime Analyst $48,719.49 $14,663.5122 Crime Analyst - D5 Patrol PO $63,383.00 Crime Analyst $48,719.49 $14,663.5123 Crime Analyst - Traffic Patrol PO $63,383.00 Crime Analyst $48,719.49 $14,663.5124 PFMS - Grant Writer Resource Mgmt PO $63,383.00 Adm Tech $48,720.49 $14,662.5125 Supply - Storekeeper Resource Mgmt PO $63,383.00 Laborer $36,404.34 $26,978.6626 District Desk or Clerical positions D1 Patrol PO $63,383.00 Clerk Typist 2 $34,898.37 $28,484.6327 District Desk or Clerical positions D1 Patrol PO $63,383.00 Clerk Typist 2 $34,898.37 $28,484.6328 District Desk or Clerical positions D2 Patrol PO $63,383.00 Clerk Typist 2 $34,898.37 $28,484.6329 District Desk or Clerical positions D2 Patrol PO $63,383.00 Clerk Typist 2 $34,898.37 $28,484.6330 District Desk or Clerical positions D3 Patrol PO $63,383.00 Clerk Typist 2 $34,898.37 $28,484.6331 District Desk or Clerical positions D3 Patrol PO $63,383.00 Clerk Typist 2 $34,898.37 $28,484.6332 District Desk or Clerical positions D4 Patrol PO $63,383.00 Clerk Typist 2 $34,898.37 $28,484.6333 District Desk or Clerical positions D4 Patrol PO $63,383.00 Clerk Typist 2 $34,898.37 $28,484.6334 District Desk or Clerical positions D5 Patrol PO $63,383.00 Clerk Typist 2 $34,898.37 $28,484.6335 District Desk or Clerical positions D5 Patrol PO $63,383.00 Clerk Typist 2 $34,898.37 $28,484.6336 Sr. Criminalists Investigation PS $68,453.64 Sr. Criminalist $61,312.64 $7,141.0037 Sr. Criminalists Investigation PS $68,453.64 Sr. Criminalist $61,312.64 $7,141.0038 Patrol Adm - Crossing Guard Coordinator Patrol PS $68,453.64 Adm Specialist $63,083.59 $5,370.0539 PIO Commander Chief's Office Sergeant $73,929.93 Sr. Adm Specialist $74,835.74 ($905.81)40 Court Control Unit Commander Administration Sergeant $73,929.93 Adm Specialist $63,083.59 $10,846.3441 Detail Coordination Unit Commander Administration Sergeant $73,929.93 Adm Specialist $63,083.59 $10,846.3442 Planning Researcher Administration Sergeant $73,929.93 Adm Specialist $63,083.59 $10,846.3443 Information Analysis Unit Supervisor Information Mgmt Sergeant $73,929.93 Sr. Crime Analyst $64,326.48 $9,603.4544 IT Unit Commander Information Mgmt Sergeant $73,929.93 Comp Oper Support Supv $64,326.59 $9,603.3445 Administrative Sergeant D1 Patrol Sergeant $73,929.93 Adm Specialist $63,083.59 $10,846.3446 Administrative Sergeant D2 Patrol Sergeant $73,929.93 Adm Specialist $63,083.59 $10,846.3447 Administrative Sergeant D3 Patrol Sergeant $73,929.93 Adm Specialist $63,083.59 $10,846.3448 Administrative Sergeant D4 Patrol Sergeant $73,929.93 Adm Specialist $63,083.59 $10,846.3449 Administrative Sergeant D5 Patrol Sergeant $73,929.93 Adm Specialist $63,083.59 $10,846.3450 Administrative Sergeant CIS Investigation Sergeant $73,929.93 Adm Specialist $63,083.59 $10,846.3451 Employee Relations Squad Commander Resource Mgmt Sergeant $73,929.93 Human Resource Analyst $63,083.59 $10,846.34

$760,855.11

Potential Sworn Positions to be Civilianized



Staffing Levels – Recommenda2ons (Con2nued) •  The Department should also transfer a number of officers assigned to specialist posi<ons to

patrol, filling shortages of patrol officers in the Districts. While some believe that the specialist posi<ons need to be protected, given the movement of the Department to making District assignments the priority, reinforcing the authori<es District Commanders have over how they use their personnel, and holding these Commanders accountable for the outcomes they achieve makes redeployment impera<ve.

•  Based on our analysis, we recommend the following transfers to field patrol du<es: Sgts POs

–  Elimina<on of the Dare Program 1 6 –  Civilianiza<on of Court 4 –  Civilianiza<on of Supply 1 1 –  Civilianiza<on of Financial Management 1 –  Intelligence Reduc<on 2 8 –  Vice Unit Reduc<on 6 25

•  RENU 2 –  TOTALS 1st Itera2on 10 47



Staffing Levels – Recommenda2ons (Con2nued) •  The Dare program’s elimina<on reflects growing na<onal concern over evalua<ons that show

liple if any impact on the children receiving the courses. The Department should instead invest in improving School Resource Officers’ and neighborhood police officers’ interac<ons with youth.

•  The movement of these officers from the listed assignments is part of the decentraliza<on of personnel that the Department needs to undertake. Many of the officers will move to patrol assignments in their designated Districts of assignment. Overall, when completed, there will be almost a 9.5% increase in police officers available in District assignments.

•  A few of the assignments cannot be completed un<l civilian replacements are provided, but these are only 7 of the listed 57 posi<ons. The remainder can be transferred at once.

•  Moving these police officers from the listed assignments will thus allow an increase of District staffing at minimal cost. It will provide District Commanders with assignment flexibility, allowing them to beper fulfill call for service work demands and strengthen District narco<cs interven<ons and related ac<vi<es.

•  It is important that an alloca<on plan be developed quickly indica<ng how many of these officers will go to which District. But given the fact that District 4 appears to have a substan<al shortage of personnel, a number of these officers should be assigned to that District.

•  We believe there are other such assignments that can be made and would suggest working toward a second set of transfers of up to 25 addi<onal personnel from inside assignments.




Departmental Organiza2on •  The Department has been organized in a tradi<onal hierarchical structure, with five major

Bureaus repor<ng to the Chief of Police. Each Bureau was commanded by an Assistant Chief. When Chief Craig assumed the office of Chief he moved some units – basically those focused on community policing – into the Chief’s Office. He also iden<fied a number of police senior management posi<ons that should be eliminated, reflec<ng his sense that the Department was too top-‐heavy.

•  The Department’s underlying focus must be policing “where the rubber hits the road” in the city’s neighborhoods. Police officers assigned to the police District handle the calls for assistance from the community, intervene in a wide variety of neighborhood situa<ons, are the first to inves<gate reported crime and largely develop the rela<onship of trust with the community that results in the Department’s legi<macy as perceived by the community.

•  “Silos,” with limited communica<on between the personnel assigned to each, have ogen featured in the Department’s history.

•  There has also been a large degree of specializa<on in the Department. Units formed with a valid purpose grew over <me into larger units, reducing the number of personnel available for staffing in the neighborhood police Districts.

•  The trend in American policing has been to reduce specializa<on, to ensure that units created are reviewed every few years to see if the original purpose remains valid, and to ensure that there is a rota<on policy that prevents officers from remaining in specialized func<ons for many years and thus losing touch with neighborhood policing.

•  The following was the table of organiza<on under the former Chief:




Departmental Organiza2on – Recommenda2ons •  The Department should be restructured to reflect the following elements:

–  Reduce specializa<on so that the number of personnel assigned to neighborhood policing in the police Districts can be increased.

–  Merge like func<ons so that each Bureau has a clear, substan<ve area of responsibility. –  Increase available staffing to the police Districts so that the District Commanders will

have sufficient resources to achieve their objec<ves, thus allowing them to be held accountable for the quality of police service in the neighborhoods.

–  Reduce the number of Bureaus from five to four. •  The ini<al reorganiza<on should be an “Interim” organiza<onal structure. That structure

should stay in place un<l the following occur: –  A Bureau Chief re<res, thus permimng one of the Bureaus to be headed by a civilian

manager who would oversee the technical and administra<ve sec<ons of the Department.

–  Up to four Captains re<re, thus permimng technical posi<ons now filled by Captains to be filled by highly-‐trained civilians.

–  Up to five Lieutenants re<re, thus permimng a series of other administra<ve management posi<ons to be filled by qualified civilians.



Recommenda2ons-‐ (Con<nued) •  The Fiscal Sec<on should be separated from the Personnel func<on and moved to the Office

of the Chief, providing the Chief with unfepered knowledge of the status of fiscal affairs. The sec<on is well run, but needs to report to the Chief.

•  Personnel should remain assigned under the Resource Management Bureau. •  The Chief of Police should appoint a Chief of Staff, at Captains rank, to manage func<ons in

the Office of the Chief, monitor the status of the improvement strategies set forth in this review, follow-‐up on direc<ves issues by the Chief to subordinates and maintain oversight of department and community outreach efforts ini<ated by the Chief. Most highly effec<ve police organiza<ons have used such a posi<on with great success to ensure that progress toward the department’s goals in maintained.


Chief of StaffCaptain Paul H. Humphries

Executive AssistantMs. Sabrina Burton-Simonson

Chief's AdjutantLieutenant Maurice Robinson

Public Information OfficeSgt.

Community LiaisonLieutenant Lisa A. Davis

Payroll & PurchasingMs. R. Smith

Special FundsMs. A. Napier

GrantsMs. N. Wagner

Fiscal AffairsDirector Ella Topham

Downtown Services Unit (1st Rel.)Lieutenant

Downtown Services Unit (2nd Rel.)Lieutenant

Marine PatrolSgt.

Mounted PatrolSgt.

Special Events UnitLieutenant

Central BusinessCaptain Kimberly A. Frey

District OneCaptain Gary W. Lee

District TwoCaptain Paul F. Broxterman

District ThreeCaptain Russell A. Neville

District FourCaptain Eliot K. Isaac

District FiveCaptain Paul W. Neudigate

SWAT & Tactical PlanningLieutenant

Safe StreetsLieutenant

Parks SquadSgt.

Patrol Canine SquadSgt.

Detection Canine SquadSgt.

Parks & Canine UnitLieutenant

Traffic UnitLieutenant

Special OperationsCaptain Daniel W. Gerard

Crime Analysis & Problem SolvingLieutenant

School Resource OfficersSgt.

Patrol AdministrationLieutenant

Night Inspectors2 - Lieutenants

Neighborhood Policing BureauAssistant Chief James L. Whalen

Regional Narcotics Unit (RENU)Sgt.

Regulatory EnforcementSgt.

Vice ControlLieutenant

Central Vice InvestigationsCaptain Stephen G. Luebbe

Personal CrimesLieutenant

Major OffendersLieutenant

HomicideLieutenant

Criminal InvestigationsCaptain Thomas A. Johns

Fusion CenterSgt.

S.O.F.A.S.T.Sgt.

Project DISARMSgt.

Intelligence & FusionLieutenant

Special InvestigationsCaptain Michael U. Neville

Investigations BureauAssistant Chief Vincent L. Demasi

Assistant CommanderLieutenant

Internal InvestigationsCaptain Teresa A. Theege

Court ControlSgt.

Detail CoordinationSgt.

InspectionsLieutenant

AccreditationSgt.

Policy & ProcedureLieutenant

Inspections, Policy & ProcedureCaptain Andrew G. Raabe

Target Range & Firearms TrainingSgt.


TrainingCaptain Douglas M. Wiesman

Professional Standards BureauAssistant Chief Richard L. Janke

Special ProjectsLieutenant

Technology & SystemsCaptain Jeffrey L. Butler, Jr.


Planning & DevelopmentCaptain David J. Bailey

Court PropertySgt.

ImpoundSgt.

SupplySgt.

Fleet ManagementMr. D. Diersing

Evidence & Property ManagementLieutenant

Employee RelationsSgt.

Personnel, Recruitment & BackgroundLieutenant

Police RecordsLieutenant

Resource Management BureauAssistant Chief Cindy M. Combs

Police ChiefJames E. Craig


Summary of Recommenda2ons



Accountabili2es •  All sworn personnel understand their accountabili<es, and develop strategies for improving

performance when issues arise pertaining to them. •  Over <me, the Department should develop comparable accountabili<es for civilian posi<ons

as well.

Community Policing •  The Chief of Police should form a Ci<zen’s Advisory Council, mee<ng with it monthly to

discuss policy, strategy, and police effec<veness. •  Form a Ci<zens’ Advisory Commipee in each district that will meet monthly with the District

Captain to discuss policing issues, public percep<ons, crime trends, and joint strategies to combat crime and disorder.

•  The Chief’s Office should establish a Community Liaison, staffed by a Lieutenant, that will monitor and assist police-‐community rela<onships in each district, oversee the Department’s Volunteer Program, coordinate and train the School Resource Officers, liaise with community leaders, and monitor community policing ini<a<ves in other locales and to find best-‐prac<ces as they develop.

•  Move most community policing func<ons now performed in the Office of the Chief of Police to Neighborhood Policing Services (except those that will operate under the Community Liaison).



Community Policing (Con2nued) •  Combine community policing func<ons with the problem-‐solving ac<vi<es assigned to the

Neighborhood Policing Bureau and also assign it coordina<on of the crime analysis func<on. •  Make problem-‐solving a central part of the commitment to community policing. •  Give the problem-‐solving staff a strong voice in decision-‐making for all elements of the

community policing process. •  Simultaneously ins<tute loca<ons analyzing that complements and coordinates with the

CompStat and Cincinna< Ini<a<ve to Reduce Violence (CIRV)/offender-‐focused strategies along with including addi<onal elements of shoo<ngs and homicides in CIRV data.

•  Schedule daily mee<ngs within CPD districts/units/sec<ons to review 24-‐hour crime incidents, weekly mee<ngs to address short-‐term analysis, monthly mee<ngs to review prior responses effec<veness, and a semi-‐annual mee<ng to address seasonal crime trends and ensure strategic problem-‐solving.

•  Coordinate community policing processes with the University of Cincinna<’s Department of Criminal Jus<ce.

•  Counsel and, if necessary, discipline commanders who do not fully and ac<vely support the Department’s problem-‐solving orienta<on.



Patrol Services Organiza2on •  Re-‐name the Patrol Services Bureau the “Neighborhood Policing Bureau.” •  Keep all five districts in the Neighborhood Policing Bureau, repor<ng to the Assistant Chief of

the Bureau, and create a Special Opera<ons Unit that coordinates key aspects of the CIRV as well as specialized func<ons such as SWAT, traffic, and canine ac<vi<es.

•  Create a “Downtown Area,” commanded by a Captain under the Assistant Chief of the Neighborhood Policing Bureau, to accommodate Cincinna<’s conference and tourist ac<vity as well as the new casino.

–  It should operate as a separate sec<on with officers and specialists repor<ng to the Captain.

–  Staff should operate from the District 1 sta<on in Police Headquarters and the Area should share support services, but command should be totally separate from the remainder of District 1.

–  The event planning and related units should be part of this new Area, and personnel should be allocated from the exis<ng District 1 complement alongside officers moved to Neighborhood Policing from specialist units.

•  Ini<ate a structured evalua<on of expected outcomes in the 3rd District coordinated with the Planning Unit.

•  Study the “sector model” currently piloted in the 3rd District in another District to determine whether it outperforms standard models, ensure strong linkage with concepts under development by the Problem-‐Oriented Policing Unit.



Patrol Services Organiza2on (Con2nued) •  Monitor “4-‐10” work schedule pilots in the 3rd and 5th Districts, ensure cost neutrality. •  Consider unique geographic circumstances and travel <me into future beat/district re-‐

configura<ons. •  Allocate addi<onal patrol resources to the 4th District. •  Eliminate the Night Chief posi<on, reassign its du<es to lieutenants by assignment or

rota<on. •  Eliminate the Patrol Administra<ve Captain and assign its du<es to a Lieutenant. •  Re-‐designate the Community-‐Oriented Policing Captain the “Community Liaison,” assign it to

the Office of the Chief of Police. •  Rename the Special Services Sec<on the “Special Opera<ons Sec<on.” •  Ini<ate a study of K-‐9 Unit tac<cs. •  Rename the Vortex Unit the “Safe Street Unit.” •  Transfer the motorcycle officers currently assigned to the 1st District to the Traffic Unit and

replace them with officers currently in units that are being decentralized or disbanded. •  Examine whether it is possible to have SWAT resources available on both day and evening

tours of duty. •  Ensure close SWAT liaison with the Training Sec<on in the proposed Professional Standards

Bureau.



Patrol Services Organiza2on (Con2nued) •  Ini<ate a redistric<ng study to match patrol assignment areas with the natural

neighborhoods of the city and ensure that officers in each district are alloped sufficient <me for problem-‐oriented policing.

•  Examine alterna<ve response methods to calls for service to ensure that officers are dispatched only when their presence will benefit ci<zens.

The Inves2ga2ve Func2on •  Transfer the Fusion Center and Real Time Crime Units from the Strategic Development

Bureau to the Inves<ga<ons Bureau and place it within The Intelligence Func<on. •  Ensure that Record Management and Case Management Systems are dynamic and fully up-‐

to-‐date. •  Create a universal standard of case documenta<on, development, and presenta<on. •  Establish weekly informa<onal mee<ngs between the Criminal Inves<ga<ons Sec<on (CIS)

and the District Detec<ves alongside a formal protocol for using technology to disseminate informa<on.

•  Detail in policy CIS’ support responsibility to work closely with Districts through developing and sharing informa<on.

•  Reduce personnel assigned to the Vice Control Sec<on (VCU) and re-‐assign a complement of officers to each district for street level vice enforcement.

•  Establish clear guidelines detailing which cases are referred to the VCU.



The Inves2ga2ve Func2on (Con2nued) •  Create policy protocols requiring informa<onal exchange between the Homicide Unit and

Districts, including a formal liaison with District Commanders. •  Form a “shoo<ng team,” coordinated by Internal Affairs, to inves<gate all officer-‐involved

shoo<ngs. •  Assign the Homicide Unit to work all cases in which an officer is the vic<m of a felonious

assault – whether a gunshot wound is sustained or not. •  Increase Homicide Unit personnel and assign it to all felonious assaults and unapended

deaths, also formally ensuring that the appropriate district commander receives current and con<nual informa<on from the Unit.

•  Increase Criminalis<cs Unit personnel to ensure adequate support for the corresponding increase in cases assigned to the Homicide Unit

•  Enhance district crime scene processing and improve case presenta<on by introducing a 3-‐month training rota<on.

•  Conduct a needs assessment of district crime scene processing equipment and tools to ensure that district crime scene technicians are adequately resourced.

•  Develop the Records Management System to facilitate all aspects of case management. •  Reduce all homicide cases to electronic files or house them in Departmental (not vendor)

storage facili<es. •  Terminate VCU par<cipa<on in the Regional Narco<cs Unit (RENU) and seek VCU federal

standing with ATF/DEA to permit legal lead pursuit across state borders.



The Intelligence Func2on •  Transfer the Fusion and Real Time Crime Centers from the Strategic Development Bureau to

the Inves<ga<ons Bureau. •  Create a Special Inves<ga<ons Sec<on, with a Captain assigned as Sec<on Commander. •  Assign the Intelligence Unit and the Fusion Center and Real Time Crime to that Sec<on. •  Provide comprehensive guidance to the Intelligence Unit and audit compliance to ensure

that intelligence ac<vi<es are always within Cons<tu<onal requirements. •  Designate intelligence liaison officers, accountable to District Commanders, from each

district to liaise with the Intelligence Unit. •  Develop a policy to effec<vely gather, record, submit, and disseminate intelligence

throughout the Department based on a “customer service” model. •  Market the Intelligence Unit throughout the agency as a responsive and proac<ve Unit with

an emphasis on crime types and providing informa<on to districts for follow-‐up. •  Share Intelligence Unit gang exper<se as a resource mul<plier, expanding it into districts

through the training of district personnel. •  Ensure that the Intelligence Unit understands its role in special events. •  Conduct a needs assessment with all agency personnel assigned to planning special events

to ensure that the Intelligence Unit is capable of mee<ng all guidelines as set by policy. •  Develop a policy describing the roles and responsibili<es of the Intelligence Unit, Fusion

Center, and Real Time Crime Centers. •  Re-‐assign the phone subpoena task to appropriate districts or inves<ga<ve sec<ons.



The Intelligence Func2on (Con2nued) •  Develop policy to ensure that inves<gators are properly trained and supervised to ensure

adequate telephonic surveillance safeguards. •  Forward a copy of all phone records and suppor<ng documents to the Intelligence Unit to

ensure correct procedures are followed. Administra2ve and Support Services •  Ensure that the selec<on of officers for special schools is transparent to avoid percep<ons of

favori<sm. •  Consider training trainers in modern prac<ces of officer-‐to-‐youth contact. •  Consider requiring recruits to spend <me with neighborhood organiza<ons and in ride-‐alongs

with marked police units when new recruit classes are hired. •  Hire a civilian Technology and Systems Manager to oversee the en<re informa<on

technology area, assigning her/him to first review current systems projects and develop a Strategic Plan for Technology. Eliminate the Captain’s posi<on now having this func<on.

•  Enforce employee compliance with technological systems usage guidelines, especially those over punctuality.

•  Replace sworn personnel assigned to technology with qualified civilians over <me and where appropriate.

•  Move the Fiscal Sec<on to the Office of the Chief of Police. •  Con<nue to ensure that funds from asset forfeiture are used prudently, strategically, and in

compliance with federal requirements.



Administra2ve and Support Services (Con2nued) •  Acquire technology to move employee apendance process online. •  Ensure that only essen<al personnel are indicated on arrest slips. •  Meet with key judicial officials to improve u<liza<on of officers schedules to subpoena

officers on their working days. •  Work with courts to not schedule officers on first call cita<ons, traffic offenses, and specific

misdemeanors. •  Review schedules in top Districts and hours of ac<ve units to reduce dead <me. •  Consider flat rate for court appearance. •  Eliminate Dead Time/Off Day provision. •  Acquire administra<ve court technology to lessen burden on court personnel to determine

officer working schedules. •  Designate regular personnel to present reports on first call cases and preliminary hearings. •  If adopted, u<lize the overlapping schedule from the 4/10 plan to schedule officers for later

court start. •  Develop an over<me alloca<on strategy, providing each District and each specialized unit

with an alloca<on of the over<me provided in the budget. •  Hold commanders of each unit accountable for staying within the allocated amounts unless

given explicit approval by the Chief of Police. •  Instruct commanders to consider seasonal demands in over<me alloca<on. •  Instruct commanders to ensure that over<me is not used for duplicate work.



Addressing Crime and Disorder •  Assign personnel with prior CIRV experience in leadership posi<ons. •  Establish recommitment of the Mayor, City Manager, City Council, and Chief to the core

ideologies of focused deterrence. •  Determine financial commitment from City for costs associated with CIRV. •  Conduct a strategic planning sessions for all CIRV partners once leadership personnel are

selected. •  Develop a new communica<on strategy. •  Develop a comprehensive violence reduc<on strategy that includes domes<c violence and

violence associated with open-‐air drug markets as a long-‐term goal. •  Embed focused deterrence / problem solving approach within CPD •  Increase coopera<on and coordina<on across LE Team members •  Increase coordina<on between Real Time Crime Center, Intelligence Sec<on, Patrol Districts,

and CIRV Team •  Reestablish CPD Opera<onal units dedicated to CIRV group/gang opera<ons, coordinated by

Commanders with CIRV knowledge/experience •  Coordinate direct involvement of Intelligence Sec<on in CIRV Opera<ons •  Re-‐create a Services Team with new partners, secure funding sources, and a commitment to

evidence-‐based prac<ces.



Addressing Crime and Disorder (Con2nued) •  Iden<fy new community engagement tac<cs, secure funding sources, commitment to

evidence-‐based prac<ces, and established commitments to data collec<on and evalua<on processes among the Community Team.

•  Task one unit with data collec<on, analysis, and other associated documenta<on tasks; ensure that it possesses all necessary data and resources and works alongside the University of Cincinna< research team.

Managing Performance •  Develop a robust, real-‐<me system for collec<ng the type of data that serves as the basis for

performance management and is available to impacted managers. •  Involve Crime Analysis and Problem-‐oriented staff in the performance management process. •  Ini<ate morning crime sta<s<cs mee<ngs with District Commanders, Inves<ga<ve

Commanders, unit heads, and the Assistant Chiefs of Neighborhood Policing and Inves<ga<ons to review crime status for the previous 24 hours.

•  Assign the Informa<on Technology Unit to issue a daily crime report in support of morning crime sta<s<cs mee<ngs.

•  Create a CompStat room to hold performance management mee<ngs. •  Reform the lay-‐out and order of CompState sessions in the manner described on 113. •  Schedule districts for intensive CompStat reviews on a rota<ng basis. •  Schedule other units for such reviews on a less frequent basis. •  Rename the Administra<ve Services Bureau to the “Professional Standards Bureau.”



Managing Performance (Con2nued) •  Relocate Planning and Development to the Resource Management Bureau. •  Transfer the policy and procedure func<on into the Inspec<ons Unit. •  Relocate the Professional Standards Bureau into the Training Sec<on. •  Con<nue affilia<on with the Commission on Accredita<on for Law Enforcement Agencies

(CALEA). •  Emphasize CALEA’s role as a management tool for con<nuous improvement, not a process

that is a subs<tute for robust leadership. •  Develop an electronic method of document gathering to demonstrate proofs of compliance

with standards. •  Ini<ate a comprehensive review of all reports, analyses, and documented reviews to

ascertain whether they properly serve the agency and add value. •  Examine the review of specific training hours characterized as mandatory to ensure

compliance with CALEA standards (no CALEA standard requires an explicit number of training hours to demonstrate compliance).

•  The department should carefully review the return from remaining an accredited agency. A number of the deficiencies found in this review were not iden<fied by the accredita<on process, and probably would not be. That raises important issues regarding the value of the accredita<on process for Cincinna<.

•  Conduct performance evalua<on appraisals at least twice per year. •  Ini<ate a review of the performance evalua<on system by researching the approaches of

similarly situated police departments and current innova<ons in the industry by HR experts.



Managing Performance (Con2nued) •  Encourage supervisors to have quarterly discussions with each of their subordinates about

performance. •  Make career development a formal part of performance evalua<on. •  Have the reviewer play a more significant role in the evalua<on of the employee. •  Provide documenta<on substan<a<ng all ra<ngs. Restructuring and Resourcing the Department •  Civilianize some sworn posi<ons and move officers back into the field as police vacancies

occur (See Table on 124 for a proposed list of posi<ons to civilianize). •  Transfer some officers assigned to specialist posi<ons to patrol (See Table on 125 for a list of

proposed specialist transfers). •  Restructure the Department to reflect reduc<ons in specializa<on, merged like-‐func<ons,

increased staffing available to District commanders, reduc<on in Bureaus from five to four. •  Maintain new structure as “interim” un<l a Bureau Chief re<res, up to four Captains re<re, or

up to five Lieutenants re<re. •  Appoint a Chief of Staff at Captain’s rank for the Chief of Police (the Captain will be selected

by the Chief of Police). •  For a proposed reorganiza<onal chart, see 131.


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