Full Report African Futures 2050

8/7/2019 Full Report African Futures 2050

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Monograph 175

January 2011

African Futures 2050The next orty years

Jakkie Cilliers, Barry Hughes and Jonathan Moyer


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Monograph 175 i

Contents

List o f gures and tables . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . iii

List o abbreviations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . ivAcknowledgements . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . ix

Preace . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . x

Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . xii

Perspectives on the uture o Arica . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . xxii

The Arican Futures Project . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . xv

Content and structure o this report . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . xviii

Chapter 1

Arica in the world . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1

Economic shit to Asia . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3

Arican development like India? . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6

Arica intertwined with Europe . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8

Conclusion . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10

Chapter 2

Human development . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11

Arican population growth . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13

Human development . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 17

Conclusion . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 25

Chapter 3

Economic growth and transormation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 27

Arican economic growth . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 28


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List o f gures and tables

Figure 1 The major models o the IFs system . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . xvii

Map 1 Regions o the Arican Futures Project 2050 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . xix

Figure 1.1 Global material power index: Arica and major global powers . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2

Figure 1.2 GDP (at purchasing power parity) o Arica and major global powers . . . . . . 4

Figure 1.3 China-Arica trade in $ billions 19952008 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5

Figure 2.1 Arican population in global context . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12

Figure 2.2 Arican population in regional context . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13

Figure 2.3 Arican ertility rates . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14

Figure 2.4 Demographic dividends, Arica in global context . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 15

Figure 2.5 Urban population as share o the total, Arica in global context . . . . . . . . . . 16

Figure 2.6 Human development index (HDI), Arica in global context . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 18

Figure 2.7 Literacy, Arica in global context . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 19

Figure 2.8 Arican literacy . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 20Figure 2.9 Arican lie expectancy . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 21

Figure 2.10 Communicable disease mortality by subtype or Southern Arica:

2010 and 2030 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 22

Figure 2.11 Communicable disease mortality by subtype or Eastern Arica:

2010 and 2030 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 23

Figure 2.12 Years o lie lost in Arica through major death cause groupings . . . . . . . . . . 24

Figure 3. 1 Aricas economic growth, 1961-2008 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 28

Economic transormation: growth and diversity . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 33

Economic transormation: critical oundations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 46

Conclusion . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 61

Chapter 4

Sociopolitical change . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 63

Democratisation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 64

The rule o law and absence o corruption . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 70

Domestic stability and violent conf ict . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 73

Conclusion . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 79

Chapter 5Alternative Arican utures . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 81

The challenges o Arican development . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 85

Alternative paths o Arican development . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 87

Notes . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 91


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Figure 4.4 GDP per capita and transparency globally (UN subregions) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 71

Figure 4.5 Transparency (reduced corruption) in Arican regions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 72

Figure 4.6 Global trends in armed conf ict, 19462008 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 73

Figure 4.7 Global conf ict trends 19992008 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 74

Figure 4.8 GDP per capita and state ragility globally (UN subregions) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 75

Figure 5.1 The relative material power o the top our Arican (A4) countries . . . . . . . . 83

Figure 5.2 Aricas population and education pyramid, 2030 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 86

Figure 5.3 Alternative Arican utures . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 88

Figure 5.4 Arican GDP per capita (at market exchange rates) in alternative

scenarios . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 89

Figure 3.2 GDP per capita (MER) in Arican regions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 29

Figure 3.3 GDP per capita (PPP) in Arican regions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 30

Figure 3.4 GDP per capita (PPP) o leading Arican and comparable emerging

powers . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 31

Figure 3.5 Extreme poverty in Arican regions (millions below $1,25 per person

per day) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 32

Figure 3.6 Diversity in Arican economies and growth prospects . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 33

Figure 3.7 Economic transormations o Arican countries . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 35

Figure 3.8 Economic transormations o Arican regions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 36

Figure 3.9 Arican ood production in global context . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 38

Figure 3.10 Arican ood production by region . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 39

Figure 3.11 Precipitation change comparing end o 20th century with end o

21st century . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 42

Figure 3.12 Arican energy production by type . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 44

Figure 3.13 Required annual investment in Arican inrastructure in $ billion . . . . . . . . . 48

Figure 3.14 Arican vehicle ownership in global context . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 49

Figure 3.15 Current global rail systems . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 50

Figure 3.16 Percentage o people in Arica without access to sae water or

improved sanitation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 51

Figure 3.17 Annual electricity consumption in Arican regions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 52

Figure 3.18 Mobile telephone and broadband penetration in Arica . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 53

Figure 3.19 Intraregional trade f ows . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 57Figure 3.20 Composition o Arican trade by trading par tners, 19902008 . . . . . . . . . . . . 59

Figure 3.21 Arican share o global expor ts and FDI inf ows . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 60

Table 4.1 Freedom in Arica 2009 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 67

Figure 4.1 The history o democracy in Arican regions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 67

Figure 4.2 The relationship between democracy and education in Arica . . . . . . . . . . . 68

Figure 4.3 Democratic de cit in Arican regions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 69


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ECOWAS Economic Community o West Arican States

EIA US Energy Inormation Administration

EU European Union (includes 27 member countries)

FDI Foreign direct investment

GDP Gross domestic product

GMO Genetically modif ed organism

HDI Human development index

HDIs Human development indicators

IC Inormation and communication technology

IFs International Futures

IMF International Monetary Fund

IPCC Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change

ISS Institute or Security Studies

I Inormation technology

MER Market exchange rates

MDGs Millennium Development Goals

NEPAD New Partnership or Arican Development

NGO Non-governmental organisation

NOAA National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration

Northern Arica Algeria, Egypt , Libya, unisia, Islamic Republic o

Mauritania and Morocco

ODA O cial development assistance

OECD Organisation or Economic Cooperation and Development

PPP Purchasing power parity

SACU Southern Arica n Customs Union

SADC Southern Arica n Development Community

List o abbreviations

ACCES Arica, Climate Change, Environment and Security dialogue

orum

ADB Arican Development Bank

AFP Arican Futures Project

AGRA Alliance or a Green Revolution in Arica

APSA Arican Peace and Security Architecture

ASF Arican Standby Force

BRIC Brazil, Russia, India and China

CAADP Comprehensive Arica Agriculture Development Programme

CAR Central Arica n Republic

CD Compact disc

Central Arica Cameroon, Central Arica n Republic, Chad, Congo,

Democratic Republic o Congo, Equatorial Guinea, Gabon,

and So om and PrincipeCOMESA Common Market or Eastern and Southern Arica

DAC Development Assistance Committee

DRC Democratic Republic o Congo

EPAs European partnership arrangements

East Arica Burundi, Comoros, Djibouti, Eritrea, Ethiopia, Kenya,

Madagascar, Mauritius, Rwanda, Seychelles, Somalia, Sudan,

anzania and Uganda


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T is monograph is a collaborative e ort between teams rom t he Institute

or Security Studies (ISS) and the Frederick S Pardee Center or International

Futures (in the Jose Korbel School o International Studies at the University

o Denver). Our collaboration is part o the Arican Futures 2050 project that

intends to provide key Arican institutions with a common thinking tool

to help rame options or the uture. During the most recent training in

December 2010 in Cape own on the International Futures (IFs) so ware,

we received very useul commentary on the manuscript rom participants rom

the UN Economic Commission or Arica (UNECA), the Arican Development

Bank (ADB) and the AU Commission. T e errors and omissions that remain

are the responsibility o the authors.

T e authors would like to express t heir appreciation par ticularly or the

assistance received rom the ollowing sta o the ISS in specif c chapters and

their general comments on the manuscript as a whole: Nelson Alusala, Andrews

Atta-Asamoah, Annie Chikwana, Cheryl Frank, Collette Schulz-Herzenberg,

Lauren Hutton, Duke Kent-Brown, Donald Mwiturubani and Debay adesse.

Specif c acknowledgement is provided where appropriate.

Acknowledgements

SFI State ragi lity index

SIPRI Stockholm International Peace Research Institute

SMS Short-messaging service

Southern Arica Angola, Botswana, Lesotho, Malawi, Mozambique, Namibia,

South Arica, Swaziland, Zambia and Zimbabwe

FR otal ertilit y rate

UNDP United Nations Development Programme

UNDPKO UN Department o Peacekeeping Operations

UNECA United Nations Economic Commission or AricaUNHCR United Nations High Commissioner or Reugees

US United States o America

West Arica Benin, Burkina Faso, Cape Verde, Cte dIvoire, Gambia,

Ghana, Guinea, Guinea-Bissau, Liberia, Mali, Niger, Nigeria,

Senegal, Sierra Leone and ogo

WGI World governance indicators

$ US$


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economics, sociopolitical change, the environment and human development

itsel, including health and education. It explores urther into our uture than

perhaps any other extensive study o Arican utures has ever done. While not

pushing orward specif c policy init iatives, it provides a context within which

those who pursue sustainable human development can consider our policies.

While providing us with a broad set o insights concerning where we may be

going, clearly this study leaves room or much uture work. No one can predict

the uture and we do not pretend to do so. Instead this publication provides one

possible uture, shaped by recent and likely uture developments, but with the

clear statement that it is only one such vision. T e intention is to build, in the

near uture and in collaboration with other Arican institutions, other visions,

rooted heavily in alternative choices and actions across the continent. Clearly,

the story o Aricas uture has only begun.


Preace

Major transitions are rapidly reshaping Arica. Populations are growing sub-

stantial ly and urbanising. Economic growth has accelerated over the last decade.

New technologies, including mobile phones and solar cells, are sweeping across

the continent. Longsta nding con icts have been or a re being addressed. On

the broader stage, but with important regional implications, the rise o China,

India and other major emerging countries are changing our trading and

investment patterns.

Yet major uncertainties ace us. How rapidly will we bring communicable

diseases under control and advance the education o our citizens? Can Arica

diversiy its economies and employ its growing populations in manuacturing

and services, as well as successully managing the wealth generated by its raw

materials? Will climate change increase pressures on agriculture or will Arica

have its own green revolution? How will the continent build the extensive

inrastructures that it desperately needs? What will be the quality o our gov-

ernance? How will ex ternal actors, both governments and f rms, approach and

a ect Aric a?

Aricans share common goals. We seek extensive and sustainable human

development. We strive or con ict reduction and widespread acceptance oand even support or diversity. We wish to see human rights respected every-

where. As we pursue our goals in the contexts o both rapid change and great

uncertainty, we need insight into the path that we are on and where that path is

taking us, as well as into the leverage that our choices provide us.

With this monograph the Institute or Security Studies and the Pardee

Center or International Futures provide an extensive study o our current

course. Combining the deep and wide knowledge o Arica within the ISS with

extensive use o the IFs modelling system, t his discussion goes beyond past work

in a number o ways. It looks across most major issue arenas: demographics,


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o extreme poverty rates and achieving universal primary education. Yet the

progress towards most o them is clear, and o en strik ing and accelerating. 4

According to the World Bank:

alongside the acceleration in [economic] growth, progress on the

MDGs has been su ciently rapid that ma ny countries (such as Ma lawi,

Ghana and Ethiopia) are likely to reach most o the goals, i not by 2015

then soon therea er. Aricas poverty rate was al ling at one percentage

point a year, rom 59 per cent in 1995 to 50 per cent in 2005. Child mor-

tality rates are declining; HIV/AIDS is stabilising; and primary comple-

tion rates are rising aster in Arica than anywhere else. 5

Although the percentage o people living in poverty in Arica generally in-

creased rom 1981 to 1996, it declined therea er until the recent ood crises and

subsequent global f nancial crises interrupted progress . Although the actua l

numbers increased, progress is steady against the substantial increases in popu-

lation numbers during this period.6 Advances in education have been irregular

historically, but appear to be on track. Progress in meeting health challenges,

especially key communicable diseases such as HIV/AIDS and malaria, is in-

creasingly apparent, although the relative burden o non-communicable disease

will grow as the population ages. Algeria, Morocco, Ethiopia, Botswana, Benin

and Burkina Faso are all within the top 25 global best perormers with regard to

improvements in human development indicators (HDIs).7

T us the global conclusion o the 2010 edition o the Human Development

Reportpertains also to Arica:

T e past 20 years have seen substantial progress in many aspects o humandevelopment. Most people today are healthier, live longer, are more edu-

cated and have more access to goods and services. Even in countries acing

adverse economic conditions, peoples health and education have greatly

improved. And there has been progress not only in improving health and

education and raising income, but also in expanding peoples power to

select leaders, in uence public decisions and share knowledge.8

At the economic level, within and outside o the continent there has been a

degree o amazement at the extent to which the majority o Arican countries

Introduction

PERSPECTIVES ON THE FUTURE OF AFRICA

When one reads analyses and orecasts concerning g lobal change, it i s o en

as i the Arican continent were not part o the world, except as a source o

commodities, or humanitarian considerations, or as an object o international

intervention to halt the spread o instability.1

T e view rom Arica, and increasingly Asia, is quite di erent. Here there

is increasing recognition that things are rapidly changing across the continent.

T ere are many critical and interact ing transitions underway that help explain,

or example, the very positive global investment and economic growth trends

that preceded the 2008 global recession, as well as the relatively strong perorm-

ance o the continent during it. In 2009, when the global economy contracted

by 0,6 per cent, sub-Saharan Arican economies continued to expand, with

growth averaging 2,6 per cent, rebounding to an expected 5 per cent in 2010.

T e continents growing strengths range well beyond its t raditional dependence

on commodity exports, increasingly re ecting improvements in the quality o

governance as well as its burgeoning population.2

At the human level, the continent is roughly halway through a demographic

transition rom high to low death and birth rates, despite the impact o HIV/AIDS. T e youthul momentum o Aricas growing population means that, by

2050, almost one in our o the worlds people will live in Arica. Urbanisation

is proceeding apace. By 2025, the majority o Aricans will be living in towns

and cities and the continent will cease to be predominantly rural.3 Urbanisation

is bringing large numbers o people into cities, not just into tenuous and tu-

multuous lie conditions with associated social discontent, but into increasingly

productive economic environments.

Having started rom a very low base, Arica will ail to reach many o the

Millennium Development Goals (MDGs) on schedule, including halving


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Yet, when casting our eyes on events some 40 years into the uture, it serves

us well to consider how much has changed in the previous 40 years. In 1970,

Biara capitulated to Nigeria, ending a brutal civil war. Black Sabbath released

the f rst true heavy metal record on vinyl long beore the rise (and then al l)

o the compact disc (CD) and beore the era o digital music. Rhodesia severed

its last ties with the United Kingdom, declaring itsel a racially segregated re-

public, and t he Concorde made its f rst supersonic ight. Dur ing that year the

Beatles disbanded, while the US invaded Cambodia to hunt down the Vietcong

and later began the military withdrawals that would lead to the deeat o South

Vietnam at the hands o the north. Norway discovered oil in the North Sea, and

the voting age in the US was reduced to 18. France and China continued to test

nuclear weapons and the world had ewer than 3,7 billion people.13

We live in a time when human innovation and progress on many ronts contin-

ue to accelerate. I, by 2011, we have seen so many changes in the last our decades,

we should recognise that the world would, by 2050, be very di erent indeed.

THE AFRICAN FUTURES PROJECT

T is study is produced by t he Arica n Futures Project (AFP), a collaboration

between the ISS (www.issarica.org) and the Frederick S Pardee Center or

International Futures (www.is.du.edu). T e AFP promotes the ex ploration and

identif cation o t rends and policy interventions to promote human capabil-

ity development and sustainability. It does this by providing tools to Arican

institutions and leaders produced by both regional experts and quantitative

modellers. A number o key Arican institutions are engaged in similar or

complementary projects, most notably the NEPAD Planning and Coordination

Agency, the ADB, UNECA and the Arican Union Commission itsel. At somepoint over the last six months, members o all our have been involved in dis-

cussions on Arican utures at the ISS a nd training on the associated IFs so -

ware. We hope that our e orts wi ll serve to complement the work done by these

important actors as well as others.

T is monograph augments an earlier study by the ISS , Arica in the New

World, that sought to provide a glimpse o where change could take the con-

tinent by 2025. With the assistance o the Pardee Center modelling team, this

monograph looks much urther ahead, to 2050. T is init ial product o the

AFP largely presents the base case (or business as usual) development o the

have been able to withstand and weather the downturn, particularly when

compared to the devastating impact o the 1973 oil shock. Inrastructure is still

very inadequate, but it is being built, with especially dramatic progress in tele-

communications. Even while new commodities are discovered and exploited,

including signif cant expa nsions in energy production, transitions to more

diversif ed economies are underway.

At the sociopolitical level, with some major and glaring exceptions, govern-

ance is improving and the intensif ed ocus on and demand or urther improve-

ments bodes well or the continent. Democracy, or which there is widespread

public support, has been advancing since the 1990s, although recent setbacks

in Guinea, Madagascar, Cte dIvoire and elsewhere are a cause o concern.

Although there are signs o resurgence in military intervention in Arican

politics in certa in countries, intrastate con ict levels have allen signif cantly

since 1998.9

In spite o progress across these issue areas, the continent aces daunting

challenges such as poverty traps involving high ertility, reliance on sub-

sistence agriculture, lack o nutrition and inadequate education. Arica is

home to the only three countries globally that have a lower HDI today than

in 1970 (Zimbabwe, the Democratic Republic o Congo [DRC] and Zambia).10

Unemployment and underemployment are extraordinarily high across much o

the continent. T ere is stil l excessive dependence on primary ag ricultura l and

mineral commodities, and low levels o industrial manuacturing activities; the

balance o payments crisis o the late 1970s and early 1980s is widely blamed

on excessive vulnerability to external shocks. Rapid urbanisation and chang-

ing economic structures bring their own problems, such as social discontent

and sociopolitical disruption. Regional and continental leaders still o en ail to

label and disown disastrously poor perormances by ellow leaders.In addition, there are new and emerging problems. Not least o these is

climate change, and 2010 may prove to have been the warmest year in the world

since 1880, the earliest date or which global data are available. During the next

two decades, the global average temperature may rise by around 0,2 C a decade;

and a global temperature increase o 4 C rom the beginning to the end o the

century (the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change [IPCC] high warming

scenario) now appears increasingly likely.11 Water stress will increase, especially

across the already driest parts o Arica, and the impact o climate change may

stall or reverse much o the progress made towards achieving some MDGs.12


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Monograph 175 xvii


assistance as well as traditional evidence-based research and publicat ions. T e

head o ce o the Institute is in Pretoria, South Arica, and its publicat ions and

other products are available ree o charge at www.issarica.org.

T e Frederick S Pardee Center or International Futures is the home o

the international utures (IFs) model. Based at the Jose Korbel School o

International Studies at the University o Denver, this centre works with one o

the most comprehensive integrated assessment models in the world. T e model,

original ly created by Barry Hughes, combines impacts and e ects rom a wide

continent across the interact ion o key global systems. T is base case can also

be described as a continuation, roughly, o current trends, although the ore-

casting is o complex and interrelated dynamic systems, not extrapolative.

Arica, a continent with 53 countries a nd more than 2 000 langua ges,

presents a complex tapestry, and the analysis presented in these pages necessar-

ily glosses over this rich diversity. Although it is surely not the intention o the

AFP to ignore this nuance, the perspective in this publication takes a macro and

long-term view. T at approach has strengths and weak nesses. A key strength

is its consideration o interactions within and across key global systems and

countries, helping us see the big picture o change. One weakness o this type

o modelling is that it is not as attentive to trends at the micro-level (includ-

ing weak-signals) that can eventually have broad impact. Similarly, we cannot

orecast discrete events, although we can consider their implications.

All orecasts, including those presented in these pages, must be treated with a

great degree o caution; no one can predict the uture, and all members o the AFP

understand this well. Our orecasts are inormed extensions o current trends and

dynamics. T ey build on interpretations derived rom our current knowledge o

development patterns. T ey are the output o a complex modelling structure, 35

years o academic work and a team o dedicated scholars and students.

T roughout this paper, the use o will in tal king about the uture should

always be read as may be. We reer in that usage o will to the orecasts o the

IFs base case, unless noted otherwise.

While there are limits to orecasting, it is still a necessary human activity.

T inking s ystematically about the uture including doing so t hrough the

creation and use o quantitative models creates a platorm or people to plan

or their uture more e ectively. When orecasts a re explicit and transparent,

they help leaders think about tradeo s among choices in the ace o u ncertainty.While there will always be events that appear to be black swans (high impact,

unoreseen events), this should not, and historically has not, stopped people

rom doing their best to plan or what is likely to lie ahead.

T e ISS is one o Ar icas premier applied pol icy research institutes. T is pan-

Arican organisation has o ces in Ethiopia, Kenya, Senegal and South Arica, and

its work spans a broad range o issues that relate to sustainable human security.

T e Institute has a sta o around 150 persons rom 17 di erent Arican countries.

Di erent rom most o its peers , the Institute o ers a pan-Arican approach and

coverage to its work, which includes substantive teaching/training and technical

Links shown areexamples rom amuch larger set

Governmentexpenditure

Fertility Income

Conf ict /cooperati onStability/instability

Mortality

Labour

Fooddemand

Demand, supply,prices, investment

Land use,water

Resource use,carbon production

January 2010

E cienc ies

Figure 1 The major models o th e International Futures (IFs) system


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xviii Institute for Security Studies


Monograph 175 xix


range o key global systems. Figure 1 outlines the general structure o the model.

Each block represents a complex system o variables and interactions. For more

inormation about the model, or or orecasts through 2060 o many variables

rom it across global regions and 183 countries, see our annual volume series 14

or visit www.is.du.edu.15

For the purposes o this project, the AFP has created its own country group-

ings (see Map 1). T roughout this report we will present most orecasts in terms

o those f ve regions Central Arica, East Arica, West Arica, Southern Arica,

and Northern Arica. T is wil l help us summarise change or the continent,

while also showing the substantial di erences across it. T e reader should un-

derstand, however, that we do the data analysis and orecasting at the country

level (across 183 countries globally). We will sometimes drill down to the

country level, and the IFs tool is reely available or those who wish to do so.

CONTENT AND STRUCTURE OF THIS REPORT

T is monograph begins, in Chapter 1, to tell our core story (in orecasting terms,

that o the base case or reerence scenario) o Arican development through

2050. Both external orces and internal developments have shaped the history o

Arica and they both will continue to interact in shaping its uture. 16 Chapter 1

considers the t rade, f nance, development-model, and security implications or

Arica o cha nging global power and production patterns. T ese changing pat-

terns include the rise o the East and o Brazil, Russia, India and China (BRIC)

and other emerging countries more generally. T ere will be continuity as well

as change, however, including the extension o longstanding relationships with

European governments (which will almost certainly continue to support good

governance and a rules-based global system), and the inevitable playing out ointerest and in uence rom the United States.

T e ollowing three chapters ex plore key elements o development with in

Arica. Chapter 2 begins by identiying some undamental demographic transi-

tions (or example, changing population growth and age structure, urbanisa-

tion, and the growing dominance o East- and West Arican regions in conti-

nental population). Next, it turns to issues o advance in human capabilities,

ocusing on education and health.

Chapter 3 moves to the patterns o economic growth and transormation in

Arica. Agricultural development remains undamentally important; low and

Map 1 Regions o the Arican Futures Project 2050

Morocco

WesternSahara

CapeVerde

Algeria

Mauritania

Tunisia

Libya Egypt

Mali Niger

SudanChadSenegal

The Gambia

Guinea-Bissau Guinea

Sierra LeoneLiberia

CtedIvoire

BurkinaFaso

Ghana

Togo Benin

Nigeria

Camaroon

So Tom & PrncipeGabon

Central AricanRepublic

Equitorial Guinea

Congo Republic

DemocraticRepublic o

Congo

Ethiopia

Kenya

Eritrea

SomaliaUganda

RwandaBurundi

Tanzania

Seychelles

Comoros

Madagascar

Angola

NamibiaBotswana

Zambia

Zimbabwe Mozambique

Malawi

South AricaLesotho

Swaziland

Mauritius

West Africa 15 countries: Benin, Burkina Faso, Cape Verde, Cte dIvoire, Gambia, Ghana, Guinea, Guinea

Bissau, Liberia, Mali, Niger, Nigeria, Senegal, Sierra Leone and Togo.

East Africa 14 countries: Burundi, Comoros, Djibouti, Eritrea, Ethiopia, Kenya, Madagascar, Mauritius,Rwanda, Seychelles, Somalia, Sudan, Tanzania and Uganda.

Southern Africa 10 countries: Angola, Botswana, Lesotho, Malawi, Mozambique, Namibia, South Arica,

Swaziland, Zambia and Zimbabwe.

Central Africa 8 countries: Cameroon, Central Arican Republic, Chad, Congo, Democratic Republic o

Congo, Equatorial Guinea, Gabon and So Tom & Prncipe.

Northern Africa 6 countries: Algeria, Egypt, Libya, Tunisia, Islamic Republic o Mauritania and Morocco.

Note Regional member ship is similar to the ve regions used by the Arican Union or various administ rative

and elective purp oses; with two di erences: (1) Burundi is allocated to East and not to Central Ar ica

and (2) the Southern Arican region does not correspond with the Southern Arican Development

Community (SADC); instead we place Tanzania, Mauritius and Madagascar in East Arica and the

Democratic Republic o Congo in Central Arica. Morocco is not a member o the AU.


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Monograph 175 1

historically very slowly growing per-hectare yields suggest the possibility o an

Ar ican green revolution. T ere are, however, signif cant uncer tainties around

prospects or development o ragile Arican soils and strengthening o systems

or support o agricultural production. Moreover, environmental actors, espe-

cially the availability o water and the impact o climate change, add to uncer-

tainties or the prospects o agriculture. Because Arica has been relatively less

extensively explored, there are also great uncertainties around the total extent

o energy resources available or production, consumption and export.

Among the critical oundations or aster economic growth and accelerated

rapid transormation to less resource-dependent economies are investment

in inrastructure, regional integration and expanded global connections o

Arican economies. Overall, the key to e ective poverty reduction is ra ising the

productive capacity o the Arican countries in a sustainable manner; it cannot

depend on aid or charity.

Chapter 4 turns to sociopolitical elements o development. Democratisation is

clearly part o that, and it o ers a critica l oundation or the protection o human

rights . T ere is broad public support or plural istic governance on the continent,

and, with clear exceptions, democrac y has advanced signif cantly in recent years.

T e impact o democracy on economic development is contested, however,

and especially in the middle range o the democratisation process it appears

not to acilitate growth. Other aspects o sociopolitical change, especially the

promotion o the rule o law and the reduction o corruption, have clear re-

lationships with growth and thus also require improvement across Arica. So,

too, does domestic security, which is undamental to both democratisation and

broader sociopolitical development.

As a bridge to subsequent work o the AFP 2050 project, the f nal chapter

broadens the picture beyond the base case analysis. o help paint a landscapeas appropriately complicated as this rich continent deserves, we propose our

scenarios that will help rame the possible range o uncertainty around change

across the continent. It bears repeating that Arican utures will depend on the

interaction o orces rom the global context with developments within and

across Arican states. T e external orces may be riendly or hosti le to Arica,

and the internal ones may be strongly development-ocused or weak and para-

sitic. We elaborate in this monograph on one important story o Aricas uture,

but many stories are possible, and human choices will always remain critical.

Future studies and publications will explore those alternative stories.

T e world is experiencing a seismic shi in power rom the US predominance

that emerged at the end o the Cold War to a newly multipolar world that will

continue taking new shape across the f rst hal o t he 21st century. Aspects o

this transition that have received much attention include the sustained eco-

nomic growth o the BRIC countries , the insig nif cant impact o the global

recession on Chinese economic growth (at least through 2010) and the growing

importance o the G20 relative to the G7.

T is tra nsition is clear in Figure 1.1, which shows through 2050 a orecasto relative material power distribution across Arica and key global leaders.

T e relative decline o t he US and European Union (EU) are as striking as is

the sharp rise o China and India. Note also the strong and consistent rela-

tive growth o Arican material power, passing the EU by the end o the time

horizon.

From the perspective o Arica, the greatest impact o this shi is not the

decline o relat ive in uence o the US, but the relat ive rise o China and India.

T ese powers wi ll continue to increase their polit ical and economic in uence

on the region. T is wil l be both positive and negat ive: trade wi ll grow and

1Arica in the world17


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Monograph 175 3


ECONOMIC SHIFT TO ASIA

Much has been writ ten about the shi in relative material power and in uence

towards Asia and especially China.18 T is tra nsition wil l unda mentally in u-

ence Arican utures. T e signs o realignment are there to see, most promi-

nently in the growing importance attached to the G20. Whereas the original

G7 (Canada, Germany, France, United Kingdom, Italy, Japan and the US),

produced 67-70 per cent o global gross domestic product (GDP) during the 40

years between 1960 and 2000, this dropped to around 59 per cent by 2010 and is

likely to decline to about 30 per cent by 2050. 19 T e more inclusive G20, la rgely

through its inclusion o countries such as China, India and Brazil, has produced

about 80 per cent o global GDP since 1960 and still will do so in 2050.

We may be seeing the rise o what some describe as interpolarity (inter-

dependent multipolarity).20 Interpolarity re ects, on the one hand, a return

to multiple centres o power across the world with a number o competing

centres o power emerging globally. Part and parcel o this trend is an acceler-

ating shi away rom Western dominance and towards greater heterogeneity

and complexity. T is hot, at and crowded world (as depicted so graphica lly

by T omas Friedma n)21 will also see the rising in uence o non-state actors,

including crimina l networks, civil society and f nancial institutions.

At the same time the world will become more interdependent than ever beore

through its trade, f nancial systems, energy interdependence and global commu-

nication systems.22 T e extent to which globa lisation continues to deepen (as it

has or many decades) is evident when one considers that global GDP, in nominal

terms, increased rom $32,1 trillion in 2000 to $61,2 trillion in 2008, ie almost

doubling. World trade, also in nominal terms, increased rom $13,1 trillion to

$32,2 trillion over the same period an increase o 245 per cent. Clearly, tradegrowth has outstripped GDP growth by a substantial margin. 23 Global institu-

tions are also increasing ly called upon (with di erent levels o success) to respond

to global challenges such as climate change and organised crime.

Figure 1.2 shows, looking orward, China, not just overtaking the US and

European economies, but considerably outstripping them by mid-century. In act,

India will probably overtake Europe by then and be near to catching the economy

o the US. Moreover, the collective size o the Arican economies will exceed $13

trillion by 2050 (at purchasing power parity [PPP])24, making it larger than even

the US or EU economies in 2010 (more on Arican growth urther on).

technology will spill over, but over-reliance on primary resource exploitation

will remain a undamental hurdle or Arican development.

While the economic gaze o Arica will increasingly turn to the east, develop-

ment assistance or humanitarian crises and the promotion o good governance

wil l continue to ow rom Europe. T e EU has a strong materia l and ideological

interest in promoting Arican domestic security. Additionally, Europeans aremotivated by the desire to promote human rights, governance and develop-

ment, and will probably continue to und this through aid programmes.

T e US will a lso continue to play a major role in Aric a. Like t he Chinese

and increasingly the Indians, it will seek raw materials, including energy. Like

the Europeans, it will o er assistance, including help on health i ssues, and

it will push or improved governance. In addition, attention to its own and

broader global security issues will involve it heavily in regional security issues.

In summary, the external in uences on Arica will change, but are hardly li kely

to decline.

Figure 1.1 Global material power index: Arica and major global powers

Note Global material power is calculated rom various measures o GDP, population size, government spending and technologicalcapabilities. This index is on a 100 point scale, where, or example, the US begins with about 23% o global material power in2010 and ends with about 16% o global material power in 2050.

24

Index

22

12

14

16

18

20

10

8

6

Arica China India USA EU

Year

2008 2012 2016 2044 20482040202820242020 20362032

Source International futures (IFs) base case version 6.37.


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Monograph 175 5


trade, Arica-China trade has doubled in nominal terms every three years.

Most important, Chinas trade with Arica proved remarkably resilient during

the global recession, declining by only 14 per cent between 2008 and 2009,28

whereas Arican trade with Japan, US and France declined by between 45 and

22 per cent. Standard Bank expects China-Arica trade to reach $300 billion in

2012 three times the 2008 level. 29 Figure 1.3 indicates the remarkable momen-

tum o China-Arica trade in billion $ rom 1995 to 2008. 30 Although US trade

growth with Arica has also been strong, China outpaced the US to become the

continents largest trading partner in 2009.31

Chinese development is currently robust, but may experience turbulence inthe uture. Matters o environmental sustainability represent a possible con-

straint on large, sustained growth rates. In addition, economic liberalisation has

the potential to translate into political pressure and the Chinese Communist

Party will inevitably need to conront its democratic def cit. Final ly, social

inequalities could bring about f ssures that undermi ne Chinese unity moving

orward, also impacting development and trade.

While China is positioned to become the dominant uture trade partner

with Arica, India also plays a crucial role. Indian growth has been very strong

over the past ten years. Its population is growing aster and is younger, with the

T e US remains today the single global superpower and wi ll retain that position

or at least a decade to come, despite the many challenges that it will conront.

In military terms, US dominance is set to last much longer given the investment

in f ghting technology that it has made over the years. In 2010, it spent less than

5 per cent o GDP on deence, equivalent to roughly nine times that o China

and to the total military spending o the rest o the G20 countries.25

Apart rom its military dominance the relative economic decline o the US and

relative ascension o China (and others) have proound impacts on trade patternsthat are already evident. Since 2003, according to a recent report by Standard Bank,26

more than 21 per cent o Aricas additional cumulative trade has been conducted

with BRIC counterparts (especially China) and that trade is growing rapidly. For

instance, although in 2008 Aricas total external trade o $1 trillion accounted or

only 3,1 per cent o world trade, it has doubled since 2002. BRIC-Arica trade has

increased eight old, rom $22,3 billion in 2000 to $166 billion in 2008, and BRICs

share o Arica trade increased rom 4,6 per cent in 1993 to 19 percent in 2008.

Since 2000, China-Arica trade has grown ten times reaching $106,8 billion

in 2008.27 Although Arica accounts or only 4 per cent o Chinese oreign

Figure 1.2 GDP (at purchasing power parity) o Arica and major global powers

50 000

Billion$

45 000

20 000

25 000

30 000

35 000

40 000

15 000

10 0005 000


Year

2008 2012 2016 2044 20482040202820242020 20362032

Source IFs base case version 6.37.

Figure 1.3 China-Arica trade in $ billions 19952008

120

US$billion

100

80

40

60

19950

1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008

Year

20

Source Simon Freemantle and Jeremy Stevens, Confronting some of the major criticisms ofSino-Africa ties, Economics: BRIC and Africa, Standard Bank, 5 March 2010, 5.


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Monograph 175 7


exports are a major contributor to GDP in many countries in Arica, the

continent remains a net importer o ood. 36

T e importance o agriculture should be ev ident i one conciders that it is gen-

erally accepted that agriculture constitutes approximately 37 per cent o Aricas

GDP and contributes about 40 per cent o the total export value with 65 per

cent o the continents population dependent on the sector or their livelihood

although f gures di er slight ly between sources.

None o the Indian interventions listed in these pages are new to Arica.

Many are progressing, i not adequately advanced, such as the use o genetically

modif ed crops and enhanced use o ertilizer. Important continental initiatives

such as the Alliance or a Green Revolution in Arica (AGRA) and the Arican

Unions Comprehensive Arica Agriculture Development Programme (CAADP)

are both making impressive strides in reorming Arican agriculture.

T e second actor was Indias 1991 economic reorm programme, which

reversed the anaemic Hindu rate o growth by laying the oundation or rapid

increases in productivity, most evident in the rise o Indias services sector.

Indias developmental model has thus been unique in the manner in which it

has shi ed rom agriculture to services without major industrial expansion.

Indias inward-looking economic model has thus relied on domestic markets

more than exports, on consumption more than investment, on services more

than industry, and on high-tech more than low-skilled manuacturing. 37 Hence

Freemantle and Stevens argued that:

Arica needs to build economies o scale to provide the local supply-

side dynamics to support the emergence o a strong and globally com-

petitive private sector. For this to happen, markets must integrate on aregional basis. T ese developments will allow regional markets to ag-

gregate demand and unlock demographic dividends, thereby attracting

greater levels o oreign direct i nvestment. Crucially, local f rms must

produce goods relevant to local and regional demand, thereby shielding

themselves rom exogenous trade-related shocks.38

T e f nal ac tor is that India un leashed the potential o its demographics

through the private sector protecting the home market rom global competi-

tion where necessary, and relying on large and smal l domestic f rms to create an

result that its economically active population will continue to grow more ro-

bustly and usurp that o China. T is provides considerable scope or productiv-

ity-d riven grow th. T e worlds largest democ racy does not su er rom the same

democratic def cit as China, but has many other chal lenges su cient to derail

its growth rates over time. Its social inequalities are large and even growing.

Its heavy and ine cient bureaucracy is a persistent retardant o growth. Overly

strict labour laws that discourage employment and corruption are major chal-

lenges almost as huge as that o upgrading Indias decrepit inrastructure.32

T ese challenges should sound ami liar or they are also t hose acing much o

Arica.

AFRICAN DEVELOPMENT LIKE INDIA?

In Arica in the New World33, it was concluded that Arican development

would, in act, look much like that o India, and that it is towards Delhi that

Aricans should be looking i they wish to picture their most likely path(s) to

development. A recent economics report by Simon Freemantle and Jeremy

Stevens34 provided substantial support to this line o reasoning. Acknowledging

the complex con uence o domestic a nd global actors that underpin Indian

growth, t he authors identif ed three core elements, each with par ticular devel-

opmental relevance or Arica.

T e f rst is Indias green revolution (ollowed several years later by that in

Latin America), driven largely by genetically advanced grains and various

reorms that have allowed the country to become broadly ood secure rather

than using agricultu re as a means o generating oreign exchange. T at India

was able to achieve this while its population doubled since 1960 is particularly

remarkable and a challenge very simi lar to that which Arica now aces. Stapleoods must be elevated over cash crops. Investment must be channelled into

greater use o irrigation and ertilisers, and government subsidies or local pro-

ducers must support domestic production and output.35 T at external demand

is determining Arican economics is particularly evident in the agricultural

sector. According to a recent study:

Since independence, Arican governments and policymakers have largely

viewed agriculture as a key generator o oreign exchange, rather than

as a conduit or domestic ood security. As a result, while agricultural


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Monograph 175 9


primarily to European consumers. In addition, the Mediterranean Solar Plan

could go a long way to helping the EU meet its 2020 renewable energy pledge.

T e plan, launched in July 2008 and updated in November 2010, envisages gen-

erating 20 GW o renewable energy (solar in particular) in North Arica or

possible export to Europe, provided, o course, that Europe builds the proper

inrastructure to improve electrical transmission routes between the Iberian

Peninsula and the rest o Europe.41

Already, exports to the EU dominate the trade relations o Libya, unisia,

Morocco, Algeria and Mauritania.42 T e so-ca lled MED countries (Algeria,

Egypt, Israel, Jordan, Lebanon, Morocco, Syria, unisia and the Palestinian

Authority, as well as urkey) accounted or around 9,7 per cent o total EU

exports and 7,5 per cent o imports in 2007. T is ow o goods and services

could be urther strengthened i barriers to trade were reduced.43

Although the investment, trade and other opportunities on the Arican

continent are expanding, Europe is being squeezed out o much o the rest o

Arica, as its privi leged in uence stemming rom the colonial era is steadily

eroded, partic ularly by China, and as south-south t rade expands. T is develop-

ment must necessarily orce a rethink o the current modalities o economic

cooperation between Europe and Arica under the Economic Partnership

Agreements. Already south-south trade represents more than 50 per cent o

Aricas trade, although the low level o inter-Arican trade remains one o the

major constraints on development on the continent.

While the economic landscape is changing, the real symbiotic interaction

between Europe and Arica will take place in the promotion o stable and good

governance. Poor governance leads to deteriorating human development con-

ditions, which reduce productivity and urther weaken political institutions.

T is vicious cycle has the possibility o h ighlight ing tensions across groups andleading to con ict. Domestic instability i s not in the interest o eit her Arican

or European leaders, o citizens or the global community.

Europe is interested in Arican stability primarily or three reasons. First,

an improved security situation decreases the possibility o destabilising migra-

tion ows and terrorism. Second, Europeans correct ly def ne Arica as a swi ng

region in their endeavour to advance human rights, democracy, civil society

and the rights o women globally. T ird, there remain within Europe emotional

ties to Arica dating back to the colonial era (not least o which are eelings o

guilt or abuses on the continent).

entrepreneurial culture o hope and can do using the orces o globalisation to

galvanise domestic consumer consumption. It has been 20 years since Harvard

Business School proessor Michael Porter provided scholarly support to the

common sense notion that well-cra ed regulation actually promotes rather than

hampers economic growth and competitiveness, and the need to provide limited

protection and state support to Aricas own industries is equally sel-evident.

AFRICA INTERTWINED WITH EUROPE

T e war on terror and a ssociated stereotypi ng o non-Europeans and Muslims

in particular, have accentuated the sense o ortress Europe, a rich continent

with a low birth rate, nervous about allowing entry o oreign nationals rom

the wider world into its territory. In addition, most o the expansion o Arica-

China trade and o Arican south-south trade more generally has occurred at

the expense o Western Europe, which has seen its share o trade with Arica

decline rom 51 per cent in 1990 to 28 per cent in 2008. 39

Beyond aspects o a shared history between some European countries and

their ormer colonies, Arica will remain important or Europe or three reasons

physical proximity, as a source o commodities, and because o Aricas im-

portance in the development o norms or global governance. Similarly, Europe

will remain important or Arica despite all the hype about China, around 40

per cent o oreign direct investment into Arica originates rom the EU. 40 Both

regions will f nd that they need one another, and that they are better o with

sustained interaction.

Economically, North Arica and Europe will continue to rely especially

heavily on one another, though the rest o Arica will additionally extend its

economic interests to the East. Proximity and interdependence have pushed theArab-Arican states along the Mediterranean in North Arica to look towards

Europe or their economic and possibly eventually their political uture and

or Europe to look south in meeting it s energy, labour and market requirements,

as well as to secure its borders.

Europe needs cheap labour a need that will not dissipate as its population

continues to age and the employment opportunities in North Arica are less

than ideal. Backed up against the Sahara desert to their south, North Arican

countries see the Mediterranean as their natural market. Algeria and Egypt,

and to a lesser extent Libya, a re signif cant expor ters o liquef ed natural gas,


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Monograph 175 11

2Human development

A sustained population growth rate o 2,3 per cent, as recorded by Arica in

2010, would give rise to a doubling o t he population in 31 years.

Although its ertility and population growth rates are declining, Arica has a

very young and rapidly growing population. By 2050, roughly one in our people

in the world will live on the Arican continent. Populations o East and West

Arica will grow especially rapidly and become much larger than those o the

northern, central or southern regions. By 2050, East and West Arica will each

have populations that are nearly 2,5 times greater than those o any o the other

three regions. T is wil l probably lead to a transition in t he way that regionalinstitutions are organised and run, possibly also in political leadership and con-

testation on the continent, as well as in patterns o external engagement.

Ultimately, declining population growth in Arica rates will set the stage

or a growing demographic dividend (larger shares o the population in the

working years) and potentially aster economic growth. T is transition in the

ratio o working-aged population to total population will be accompanied by a

rapid increase in urbanisation, which will uel economic activity, but also place

extraordinar y demands on urban development. T e challenges such g rowth

rates pose or policymakers are obvious. Each year they must provide more

Without European assistance through the EUs Arican Peace Facility,

the Arican Unions much-vaunted Arican Peace and Security Architecture

(APSA) would not have been translated into the capabilities evident today in

the Arican Standby Force (ASF) and its three almost operational brigade-size

capabilities or con ict prevention and management in South, West a nd East

Arica.44 Since 2006, the EU has spent approximately 1 billion in its support

or APSA and f ve peace support missions in Arica. Spending by Orga nisation

or Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) Development Assistance

Committee (DAC) countries on strengthening governance has increased sub-

stantially in recent years.45

CONCLUSION

With global multipolarity or interpolarity, a multiple-tiered set o relationships

and hopeully partnerships is developing or Arica economically with the

countries o Asia (as both trade and investment partners and as development

models), on governance, peace and security with Europe, and across many

issues including security and health with the US. While Arican heads o state

may look with envy at the example o top-down state-led development exem-

plif ed by China a nd the Asian t igers such as Singapore and aiwan o some

decades earlier, Arican cit izenry who stand to su er the worst excesses o these

examples look towards the reedoms in Europe as more appropriate to alleviate

their stricken situation, even as they continue to desire the consumer culture

and technological dynamism o the US.


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Monograph 175 13


AFRICAN POPULATION GROWTH

T e demographic size o Arica i n the world has grown rom 9 per cent o the

total in 1960 to 15 per cent in 2010. By 2050, its share o global population will

reach 23 per cent and it will be considerably larger than either China or India

(see Figure 2.1). Moreover, its population will be still growing by more than 1per cent annual ly, well above the rate o other global regions. T is dramatic

growth will considerably increase Aricas importance in the world, regardless

o what happens to other aspects o its development.

T e population increases o Arica wi ll, however, not be uniorm. In ac t, the

demographic balance within Aric a will shi rather sharply towards Eastern

and Western Arica because o their higher total ertility rate (FR). Figure 2.2

shows that the two subregions will each have nearly 700 million people and be

more than 2,5 times as large as Central, Southern or Northern Arica. In ad-

dition, ertility is high and is likely to remain high (see Figure 2.3) in Central

classrooms, more teachers, more health acilities and more services o all types

to simply maintain current standards. Urban areas will mushroom and become

the key drivers o Arican utures.

In terms o human development, Arica continues to improve access to

primary education, giving rise to increases in levels o literacy and HDI.

Regionally, while Northern Arica has the highest HDI because o its income,

Southern Arica has the highest levels o literacy. In the global context, Arican

literacy is at about the same level as in India and is expected to improve at

roughly the same rate.

T e HIV/AIDS epidemic appears to have reached a turning point and the

orecasts show a decreasing burden o communicable disease more generally

across the continent. Much still needs to be invested to sustain this reduction

in levels o malaria, diarrheal and other preventable and treatable diseases. T at

said, with development comes new kinds o liestyle-related diseases, such as

diabetes and heart d isease. T ese will bec ome growing problems or Arica as it

approaches mid-century.

Figure 2.1 Arican population in global context

Millionpeople

2 200

2 000

1 600

1 400

1 200

1 000

0

800

400

1967

Year

1975 1983 1991 1999 2007 2015 2023 2031 2039 2047

600

200


1 800


Figure 2.2 Arican population in regional context

700

Millionpeople

600

300

400

500

0

100

200

1960 2005 2050

Year

Central Arica Eastern Arica Northern Arica

S ou thern Ari ca We ster n Ari ca



19/63



Monograph 175 15


rates decline and reduce the relative size o the population below 15 years o

age, beore the populat ion signif cantly ages and t hereore rapidly increases the

share o the elderly). Figure 2.4 shows that, currently, the share o the Arican

population o working age (those between 15 and 65 years o age) is much lower

than that o the US, the EU, India, or China. T at share is growing or Arica,

however, and will continue to do so through 2050, in sharp contrast to most othe rest o the world. Only India (and South Asia more generally) is also likely

to have a continued demographic dividend through most o the f rst hal o

the century. T e working population share o China is just now reaching its

peak and is pois ed or rapid decline. T e total size o t he Arica n workorce will

exceed that o China beore 2030 and India beore 2035 and continue to grow

therea er. Arica a lready has more middle-class households (with an income o

more than $20 000) than does India.46

T e share o population in the working-age category is currently highest in

Southern Arica (about 65 per cent) and considerably lower elsewhere in the

Arica. Whereas that region is currently considerably less populated than the

other regions o the continent, it will be comparable in size to Northern and

Southern Arica by 2050.

Unless current pat terns change signif cantly (and there is considerable so-

ciopolitical leverage in this area in the longer run), ertility rates in 2050 will

have declined to replacement levels only in Northern Arica. T is means that

population growth across almost the entire continent, and especially in CentralArica, is likely to still have considerable momentum even in 2050, shortly

beore the size o the global population will peak. In act, the Arican popula-

tion may not approach stability until near or even shortly a er the end o the

century, by which time it could be about 3 billion people, or 32 per cent o the

global total.

T is continued growth i n the Ar ican population wi ll pose many prob-

lems. At the same time, however, at least two demographic opportunities will

appear. T e f rst is the demographic dividend, the phenomenon o the rising

share o those o working age in the total population (it occurs when ertility

Figure 2.3 Arican ertility rates

Birthsperwoman

7

5

4

3

2

11967

Year

1975 1983 1991 1999 2007 2015 2023 2031 2039 2047

6

8


Southern Arica Western Arica


Figure 2.4 Demographic dividends, Arica in a global context

Percentopopulationbetween1565yearsoage 74

72

70

68

66

64

56

54

62

60

58


2008

Year

2012 2016 2020 2024 2028 2032 2036 2040 2044 2048



20/63



Monograph 175 17


T e urbanisat ion process is very important to the continent. A recent analy-

sis by the McKinsey Global Institute ound that the shi rom rural to urban

employment accounts or 20 to 50 per cent o productivity growth.48 In 1980,

McKinsey noted, a mere 28 per cent o Aricans lived in cit ies. T e proportion

in 2010 was closer to 40 per cent and rising rapidly. By 2030, the continents top

18 cities could have a combined spending power o $1,3 trillion.49 Industries

related to consumers (such as retail, telecommunications and banking), inra-

structure development, agriculture and resources would be worth $2,6 trillion

in annual revenues by 2020.50

HUMAN DEVELOPMENTT e HDI o the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) provides the

most widely used index through which to track human development and the

living conditions o populations across the world. It captures progress in three

basic capabilities: living a long and healthy lie, being educated and knowledge-

able, and enjoying a decent st andard o living. T e most recent report, released

in 2010, f nds that [t]he past 20 years have seen substantia l progress in many

aspects o human development. Most people today are healthier, live longer,

are more educated and have more access to goods and services.51 T e world s

average HDI (which combines inormation on lie expectancy, schooling and

income) has increased by 18 per cent since 1990 and, overall, poor countries are

catching up with r ich countries in the HDI. Al most all countries have benef ted

rom this progress, with only three all in Arica, namely the DRC, Zambia,

and Zimbabwe having a lower HDI today than in 1970.52 T is convergence,

the 2010 report notes, paints a ar more optimistic picture than a perspective

limited to trends in income, where divergence has continued.53

Figure 2.6 shows that on the HDI measure India pulled away rom Arica

over the last two decades, largely because o the HIV/AIDS epidemic and the

associated decline in lie expectancy in Arica.54 Yet, Arican HDI values have

begun to turn upward again, and the IFs base case orecast suggests that the

continent will roughly track the rates o rise in India and even China going

orward. o be sure, poverty as measured in health, education and income is

currently particularly prevalent in sub-Saharan Arica, especially in countries

such as Niger, Gabon, Lesotho and Swaziland. As noted by the UNDP, a quarter

o the worlds multidimensional poor (458 million people) live in Arica.55

continent. Even in Southern Arica, the demographic dividend will grow some-

what until about 2040, as the other regions o the continent gradually converge

with its higher levels by 2050.

While potentially a blessing, growing demographic dividends can also be

very problematic with respec t to unemployment rates when inadequate numbers

o jobs are available. Especially in the early stages o growth in demographic

dividends, those newly avai lable or work tend to be the young. T us a youthbulge o en accompanies that sta ge o the demographic div idend and can be

socially destabi lising, especially when unemployed (unemployed young men are

notoriously disruptive and global ly the major source o crime and violence).

Second and similarly, urbanisation poses both opportunity and challenge.

Figure 2.5 shows that urbanisation rates in Arica have advanced rapidly over

the last 50 years. Although urbanisation rates are now especially rapid in China,

and that country is likely to urbanise considerably more rapidly than Arica,

more than 50 per cent o the continents population is likely to be in c ities beore

2025.47 T is growth will occur across Arican regions.

Figure 2.5 Urban population as share o the total, Arica in a global context

Urbanpopulationaspercentototal 80

60

50

40

30

10

20

1967

Year

1975 1983 1991 1999 2007 2015 2023 2031 2039 2047


70

90



21/63



Monograph 175 19


tend to have greater inequality in health, education and income. Low human

development countries also tend to experience high gender inequality, evident

in the CAR and Mozambique.58

Literacy and education

Education and literacy are key components o the HDI (as are lie expectancy

and income, which are urther explored later). Education is an important driver

o countries economic perormance and potential. Adequate primary education

is essential, but the quality and accessibility o secondary and higher education

will be even more important or determining whether these societies success-

ully graduate up the value-added production ladder.59

With respect to literacy, o en roughly associated with a completed primary

education, Figure 2.7 shows that Arica is currently very close to the same level

as India and is likely to track the advance o that country airly closely. More

generally, as indic ated earlier, India n development patterns o er an a nalogue

or those o Arica in many ways, including human development.

An analysis o HDI movers provides some interesting f ndings. Apart rom the

stellar perormance o countries such as China, Indonesia and South Korea, the

list o top 25 improvers includes a number o Arican countries, namely Algeria

(9th), Morocco (10th), Ethiopia (11th), Botswana (14th), Benin (18th) and Burkina

Faso (25th

). T e largest drag on improvements in HDI in Arica in recent yearsis the impact o the HIV epidemic, and lie expectancy has allen below 1970

levels in six sub-Saharan Arican countries. 56

Within the continent, Northern Arica currently has the highest HDI level

(at about 0,7, well above India and close to the current level o China). Central

Arica has the lowest level, near 0,45. Globally, sub-Saharan Arica is typically

considered the region acing the greatest challenges in human development.

Across all dimensions, it has the lowest HDI indicators o any region.57

T e 2010 HDI report also indicates the extent to which countries (such as

Namibia and the Central Aric an Republic [CAR]) with less human development

Figure 2.6 Human development index (HDI), Arica in a global context

Index

1,05

0,85

0,75

0,70

0,65

0,60

0,35

0,55

0,45

1980

Year

1987 1994 2001 2008 2015 2022 2029 2036 2043 2050

0,50

0,40

0,80

0,90

0,95

1,00



Figure 2.7 Literacy, Arica in a global context

P

ercent

100

95

90

85

80

75

60

70

65


2008

Year

2012 2016 2020 2024 2028 2032 2036 2040 2044 2048



22/63



Monograph 175 21


Communicable diseases have long been the ocus o development assistance

in Arica, and much progress is expected in these areas. Figures 2.10 and 2.11

shows our mortality pyramids or communicable disease subtypes or Eastern

Arica and Southern Arica in the years 2010 and 2030.

T e burden o AIDS-related deaths in Eas tern and Southern Arica is no-

ticeable (the red bulges in the middle o the graphs), with much greater impact

in Southern Arica. Both o these regions show decreasing rates o mortality asorecasts approach 2030. T e orecasts also anticipate declines in rates o inant

mortality, currently very high or both regions, with about 60 out o every 1 000

babies dying in the f rst year o lie. Declines may be anticipated i n these rates

partly through improvements in incomes and in access to water and sanitation.

More generally, the patterns o deaths rom communicable diseases vary

widely across the continent and some countries and regions will benef t greatly

rom reduced burdens. In the case o malaria, the DRC, Ethiopia, Kenya, Nigeria,

Southern Sudan, anzania and Uganda account or two-thirds o all cases, and in

the case o AIDS, Southern and Central Arica account or about one-third.

T e patterns o literacy wit hin A rica are di erent rom those or the HDI

overall, in which Northern Arica stands as the clear regional leader. In the case

o literacy (see Figure 2.8), it is Southern Arica that leads, with rates o almost

80 per cent. All regions are likely to advance steadily through mid-century,

although Central Arica may well have the slowest rate (related in part to the

exceptionally high ertility and population growth rates seen above).

Health

It is the dramatic loss o lie expectancy due to HIV/AIDS that cut back the upward

movement o human development overall in Southern and Central Arica, espe-

cially, and to lesser but still signif cant degrees in East Arica and West Ar ica.

T e AIDS plague has def nitively characterised perceptions around the world

o Arican development. Although there is increasingly clear evidence that the

corner has been turned, it is also the uture course o the scourge that creates the

greatest uncertainty around human development across much o the continent.

Figure 2.8 Arican literacy

Percent

100

95

90

85

80

75

50

70

60

2007

Year

2011 2015 2019 2023 2027 2031 2035 2039 2043 2047

Central Arica Eas tern Arica Northern Arica

S ou thern Ari ca We ste rn Ar ica

65

55


Figure 2.9 Arican lie expectancy

Years

65

55

50

45

40

351967

Year

1975 1983 1991 1999 2007 2015 2023 2031 2039 2047

60

80


Southern Arica Western Arica

70

75



23/63



Monograph 175 23


Figure 2.10 Communicable disease mortality by subtype or Southern Arica: 2010 and 2030

(a) 2010

959990948589808475797074656960645559

404435393034

2529202415191014

5914

Inants

45495054

Number o deaths per 1 000 people13 26 39 52 6501326395265

Age

Males: 69,59 (Max) Females: 60,22 (Max)

D iar rhoe a O ther co mmunicabl e di seas es

AIDSRespiratory inections Malaria

(b) 2030

959990948589808475797074656960645559

404435393034

2529202415191014

5914

Inants

45495054


Age


Note Scale o each mortality pyramid standardised (ranges out to 65 deaths per 1 000).


Figure 2.11 Communicable disease mortality by subtype or Eastern Arica: 2010 and 2030

(a) 2010

959990948589808475797074656960645559

404435393034

2529202415191014

5914

Inants

45495054


Age


(b) 2030

959990948589808475797074656960645559

404435393034

2529202415191014

5914

Inants

45495054


Age


Diarrhoea Other communicable diseases

AIDSRespiratory inections Malaria


Note Scale o each mortality pyramid standardised (ranges out to 65 deaths per 1 000).


24/63



Monograph 175 25


Figure 2.12. Specif cally, in 2010, 7,2 million died in A rica rom communic able

diseases and 3,5 million died rom chronic diseases. T e trends in deaths rom

the two cause categories will cross in about 2025, much earlier than the trends

in years o lie lost. Soon, increasing attention will be paid to chronic diseases

across the continent.

Obviously, such orecasts should in no way suggest that the rate o growth

in health e orts devoted to communicable disease should slow, but they do

point to the increasing double burden o disease that the continent will ace as

progress in combating communicable diseases is made and Arican populations

age. And they suggest the changing pattern o health risk actors. By 2050, the

obesity rate in Arica (orecast at about 10 per cent) will be only 2-3 percentage

points lower than the under-nutrition rate and both could be well below the

smoking rate (at more than 20 per cent).

CONCLUSION

On the whole, and in spite o the HIV/AIDS epidemic, the human condition in

Arica is improving quite steadily. T ere are major, broad-sweeping transorma-

tions well underway. Fertility rates and population growth rates are declining,

although they remain high in East, West and Central Arica and the popula-

tions o East and West Arica in particular will grow dramatically by 2050.

Education is advancing steadily, with the big pushes made towards the MDG o

universal prima ry completion while the goal is e ectively unattainable at this

point accelerating progress. Deaths rom communicable diseases remain ar

too high, but the rates o mortality are decreasing, and the burden o disease is

shi ing inexorably towards chronic ones.

T e orecasts are mostly positive in terms o human development. Oneclear exception is that numbers in extreme poverty (which the next chapter

discusses) will remain high even as rates continue to decline. Overall, the ad-

vances in human development will spill over in important ways to accelerated

economic advance.

In the ace o (appropriately) signif cant attent ion to the problems o com-

municable diseases in Arica, including HIV/AIDS and malaria, a major transi-

tion will probably occur beore 2050. By mid-century, the annual years o lie

lost to communicable disease (that is, the continent-wide sum o all years lost

to individuals who die prior to the worlds longest lie expectancies60) will all

below the rising trend in the years o lie lost to chronic or non-communicabledisease (see f gures 2.10 and 2.11).

T ese patterns re ect the decreasing rates o death rom communicable

disease, although the orecasts rom IFs still anticipate more than 500 000

annual deaths rom malaria in 2050 and 150 000 rom AIDS (hopeully and

quite possibly ar less will be actually recorded). 61

T ose who die o commu nicable diseases tend to do so young, o en as

inants or children, while those who die o non-communicable diseases more

o en die older. T us the actual current di erence in annual deaths rom the two

cause groups is much smaller than the di erence in years o lie lost as shown in

Figure 2.12 Years o lie lost in Arica through major death cause groupings

Millionyears

260

240

200

180

160

140

60

120

100

Communicable disease Injuries and accidentsNon-communicable disease

2008

Year

2012 2016 2020 2024 2028 2032 2036 2040 2044 2048

80

40

20

0

Source: IFs base case version 6.37.


25/63

Monograph 175 27

3 Economic growthand transormation62

T e Arican ec onomy is beginning to take o . Strong growth in working-

age populations and the movement o those peo

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