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Fuller and Perdue - The Reliance Interest in Contract Damages

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The Reliance Interest in Contract Damages: 1 L. L. Fuller [†] and William R. Perdue, Jr. [‡] - The Purposes Pursued in Awarding Contract Damages - Why Should the Law ever Protect the Expectation Interest? - The Divergence of Measure and Motive and the Problem of Mixed Motives - The Relation between the Reliance Interest and the other Contract Interests - Should the Expectation Interest Set the Limit of Recovery? - The Problem of Overlapping Items of Damage - The Reliance Interest and Hadley v. Baxendale - The Reliance Interest in the Restatement of Contracts The proposition that legal rules can be understood only with reference to the purposes they serve would today scarcely be regarded as an exciting truth. The notion that law exists as a means to an end has been commonplace for at least half a century. There is, however, no justification for assuming, because this attitude has now achieved respectability, and even triteness, that it enjoys a pervasive application in practice. Certainly there are even today few legal treatises of which it may be said that the author has throughout clearly defined the purposes which his definitions and distinctions serve. We are still all too willing to embrace the conceit that it is possible to manipulate legal concepts without the orientation which comes from the simple inquiry: toward what end is this activity directed? Nietzsche's observation, that the most common stupidity consists in forgetting what one is trying to do, retains a discomforting relevance to legal science. In no field is this more true than in that of damages. In the assessment of damages the law tends to be conceived, not as a purposive ordering of human affairs, but as a kind of juristic mensuration. The language of the decisions sounds in terms not of command but of discovery. We measure the extent of the injury; we determine whether it was caused by the defendant's act; we ascertain whether the plaintiff has included the same item of damage twice in his complaint. One unfamiliar with the unstated premises which language of this sort conceals might almost be led to suppose that Rochester produces some ingenious instrument by which these calculations are accomplished. It is, as a matter of fact, clear that the things which the law of damages purports to "measure" and "determine" - the "injuries", "items of damage", "causal connections", etc. - are in considerable part its own creations, and that the process of "measuring" and "determining" them is really a part of the process of creating them. This is obvious when courts work on the periphery of existing doctrine, but it is no less true of fundamental and established principles. For example, one frequently finds the "normal" rule of contract damages (which awards to the promisee the value of the expectancy, "the lost profit") treated as a mere corollary of a more fundamental principle, that the purpose of
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The Reliance Interest in Contract Damages: 1L. L. Fuller [] and William R. Perdue, Jr. []- The Purposes Pursued in Awarding Contract Damages - Why Should the aw e!er Protect the "#pectation $nterest% - The Di!ergence o& 'easure and 'oti!e and the Pro(lem o& 'i#ed 'oti!es - The )elation (etween the )eliance $nterest and the other Contract $nterests - Should the "#pectation $nterest Set the imit o& )eco!ery% - The Pro(lem o& *!erlapping $tems o& Damage - The )eliance $nterest andHadley v. Baxendale - The )eliance $nterest in the )estatement o& ContractsThe proposition that legal rules can (e understood only with re&erence to the purposes they ser!e would today scarcely (e regarded as an e#citing truth+ The notion that law e#ists as a means to anend has (een commonplace &or at least hal& a century+ There is, howe!er, no -usti&ication &or assuming, (ecause this attitude has now achie!ed respecta(ility, and e!en triteness, that it en-oys a per!asi!e application in practice+ Certainly there are e!en today &ew legal treatises o& which it may (e said that the author has throughout clearly de&ined the purposes which his de&initions and distinctions ser!e+ We are still all too willing to em(race the conceit that it is possi(le to manipulatelegal concepts without the orientation which comes &rom the simple in.uiry/ toward what end is thisacti!ity directed% 0iet1sche2s o(ser!ation, that the most common stupidity consists in &orgetting what one is trying to do, retains a discom&orting rele!ance to legal science+ $n no &ield is this more true than in that o& damages+ $n the assessment o& damages the law tends to (e concei!ed, not as a purposi!e ordering o& human a&&airs, (ut as a 3ind o& -uristic mensuration+ The language o& the decisions sounds in terms not o& command (ut o& disco!ery+ Wemeasure the extent o& the in-ury4 we determine whether it was caused (y the de&endant2s act4 we ascertain whether the plainti&& has included the same item o& damage twice in his complaint+ *ne un&amiliar with the unstated premises which language o& this sort conceals might almost (e led to suppose that )ochester produces some ingenious instrument (y which these calculations are accomplished+$t is, as a matter o& &act, clear that the things which the law o& damages purports to 5measure5 and 5determine5 - the 5in-uries5, 5items o& damage5, 5causal connections5, etc+ - are in considera(le partits own creations, and that the process o& 5measuring5 and 5determining5 them is really a part o& the process o& creating them+ This is o(!ious when courts wor3 on the periphery o& e#isting doctrine, (ut it is no less true o& &undamental and esta(lished principles+ 6or e#ample, one &re.uently &inds the 5normal5 rule o& contract damages 7which awards to the promisee the !alue o& the e#pectancy, 5the lost pro&it58 treated as a mere corollary o& a more &undamental principle, that the purpose o& granting damages is to ma3e 5compensation5 &or in-ury+[9] [page 52] :et in this case we 5compensate5 the plainti&& (y gi!ing him something he ne!er had+ This seems on the &ace o& things a .ueer 3ind o& 5compensation5+ We can, to (e sure, ma3e the term 5compensation5 seem appropriate (y saying that the de&endant2s (reach 5depri!ed5 the plainti&& o& the e#pectancy+ ;ut this is in essence only a metaphorical statement o& the e&&ect o& the legal rule+ $n actuality the loss which the plainti&& su&&ers 7depri!ation o& the e#pectancy8 is not a datum o& nature (ut the re&lection o& a normati!e order+ $t appears as a 5loss5 only (y re&erence to an unstated ought. Conse.uently, when the law gauges damages (y the !alue o& the promised per&ormance it is not merely measuring a .uantum, (ut is see3ing an end, howe!er !aguely concei!ed this end may (e+$t is &or this reason that it is impossi(le to separate the law o& contract damages &rom the larger (ody o& moti!es and policies which constitutes the general law o& contracts+ $t is, un&ortunately &or the simplicity o& our su(-ect, impossi(le to assume that the purposi!e and policy-directed element o& contract law has (een e#hausted in the rules which de&ine contract and (reach+ $& this were possi(le the law o& contract damages would indeed (e simple, and we would ha!e (ut one measure o& reco!ery &or all contracts+ *& course, this is not the case+ What considerations in&luence the setting up o& di&&erent measures o& reco!ery &or di&&erent 3inds o& contracts% What &actors e#plain the rather numerous e#ceptions to the normal rule which measures damages (y the !alue o& the e#pectancy% $t is clear that these .uestions cannot (e answered without an in.uiryinto the reasons which underlie 7or may underlie8 the en&orcement o& promises generally+$n our own discussion we shall attempt &irst an analysis o& the purposes which may (e pursued in awarding contract damages or in 5en&orcing5 contracts generally4 then we shall attempt to in.uire to what e#tent, and under what circumstances, these purposes ha!e &ound e#pressions in the decisions and doctrinal discussions+ As the title suggests, the primary emphasis will (e on what wecall 5the reliance interest5 as a possi(le measure o& reco!ery in suits &or (reach o& contract+ The Purposes Pursued in Awarding Contract Damages $t is con!enient to distinguish three principal purposes which may (e pursued in awarding contract damages+ These purposes, and the situations in which they (ecome appropriate, may (e stated (rie&ly as &ollows/ First, the plainti&& has in reliance on the promise o& the de&endant con&erred some !alue on the de&endant+ The de&endant &ails to per&orm his promise+ The court may &orce the de&endant to disgorge the !alue he recei!ed &rom the plainti&&+ [page 5] The o(-ect here may (e termed the pre!ention o& gain (y the de&aulting promisor at the e#pense o& the promisee4 more (rie&ly, the pre!ention o& un-ust enrichment+ The interest protected may (e called the restitution interest. 6or our present purposes it is .uite immaterial how the suit in such a case (e classi&ied, whether as contractual or .uasi-contractual, whether as a suit to en&orce the contract or as a suit (ased upon a rescission o& the contract+ These .uestions relate to the superstructure o& the law, not to the (asic policies with which we are concerned+Secondly, the plainti&& has in reliance on the promise o& the de&endant changed his position+ 6or e#ample, the (uyer under a contract &or the sale o& land has incurred e#pense in the in!estigation o& the seller2s title, or has neglected the opportunity to enter other contracts+ We may award damages to the plainti&& &or the purpose o& undoing the harm which his reliance on the de&endant2s promise has caused him+ *ur o(-ect is to put him in as good a position as he was in (e&ore the promise was made+ The interest protected in this case may (e called the reliance interest.Thirdly, without insisting on reliance (y the promisee or enrichment o& the promisor, we may see3 to gi!e the promisee the !alue o& the e#pectancy which the promise created+ We may in a suit &or speci&ic per&ormance actually compel the de&endant to render the promised per&ormance to the plainti&&, or, in a suit &or damages, we may ma3e the de&endant pay the money !alue o& this per&ormance+ $)A)D, 'A0F" ""'"0TA$)" D" D)*$T )*'A$0 7Dth ed+ 9E=E8 @BC+ *& course (oth in "ngland and in )ome there was a gradual e#pansion o& the relie& granted, so that in time a direct (ene&it to the promisor ceased to (e essential+ 9E+ D$A'*0D, P)$'$T$H" AW 79E?A8 ?E9-@@A, Spea3ing o& ;a(ylonian and Assyrian law he writes, 5There are no transactions which are made (inding (y the mere &act o& agreement without the trans&er o& property+ That type o& commercial transaction has not yet (een reached4 law compensates &or loss, and until there are middlemen, and mar3et prices that &luctuate &rom day to day, there will (e no purely e#ecutory agreement to purchase and sell on a &uture date, nor can there (e pecuniary loss (y &ailure, to per&orm such an agreement+5 /d. at @GE+ =G+ A ardner, 4n /n#uiry into the rinciles o$ the La( o$ ,ontracts79E?=8 @B i!en, 99E Ala+ @@, =@ So+ C?E 79DED84 6ontaine !+ ;a#ley, EG >a+ @9B, 9C S+"+ 9G9A 79DE=84 0o(le !+ Ames '&g+ Co+, 99= 'ass+ @E= 79DC?84 'ount Pleasant Sta(le Co+ !+ Stein(erg, =?D 'ass+ ABC, 9?9 0+"+ =EA 79E=984 $rwin !+ Worcester Paper ;o# Co+, =@B 'ass+ @A?, 9@9 0+"+ =DB 79E=?84 *tis !+ Ooont1, CG 'o+ 9D? 79DCE84 "S 79E?A8 I 9@9+ A?+ 5Thus, in ray !+ Wa(ash )y+ Co+, ==G 'o+ App+ CC?, =CC S+W+ B@ 79E=A84 Security Sto!e R '&g+ Co+ !+ American )y+ "#press Co+, ==C 'o+ App+ 9CA, A9 S+W+ 7=d8 AC= 79E?=84 TDa!is R 'a-or !+ Cincinnati, a+ CDG+ 79DD=84 Crutcher R Co+ !+ "lliott, 9? Oy+ aw )ep+ AE= 79DE=84 'oorhead !+ 'inneapolis Seed Co+, 9?E 'inn+ 99, 9BA 0+W+ @D@ 79E9C84und.uist !+ Jennison, BB 'ont+ A9B, =9@ Pac+ BC 79E=?84 )eiger !+ Worth Co+, 9=C 0+C+ =?G, ?C S+"+ =9C 79EGG8+ The only re&erence to the seed warranty cases in the )"STAT"'"0T is in the &ourth illustration to I ??l, which indicates that the purchaser can reco!er the lost pro&it 5i& his e!idence gi!es a su&&icient (asis &or estimating5 it+ 0othing is said a(out what happens when the e!idence does not su&&ice &or this purpose+ BA+ Schnierow !+ ;outagy, ?? Cal+ App+ ??B, 9B@ Pac+ 99?= 79E9C84 Douglas !+ >uardian $A C*D" 79E??8 which reads, 5Any necessary e#pense which one o& the two contracting parties incurs in complying with the contract may (e reco!ered as damages+5 $n ;utler !+ 'oore, BD >a+ CDG, CD? 79DD=8, a case in which the plainti&& had (ought seed &or his own use, the court said, 5+++ i& the seed were worthless, the measure o& damages would (e the purchase money with interest and any exense incurred in comlying (ith the contract a&ter the same was entered into, such as the hauling o$ the seed, rearing the lands $or lanting, so(ing, and rolling said seed. +++5 7$talics ours+8 Surely here was an o(-ect lesson &or those who dra&ted I ???S $& courtse!er de!elop toward the )"STAT"'"0T the same treacherous de&erence they display toward codes, we may perhaps e#pect to see I ??? tortured in a similar manner+ Section ???, howe!er, presents an o(stacle to -udicial ingenuity which is lac3ing in the >eorgia Code, in the &orm o& a limitation o& reco!ery (y 5the &ull contract price5+ $t is di&&icult to imagine how the relie& granted in Butler v. 2oore would ha!e (een possi(le with such a limitation+ BC+ Comment a. See also the cases cited in note AB sura. BD+ Paola >as Co+ !+ Paola >lass Co+, AB Oan+ B9@, @@ Pac+ B=9 79DEB8, a case in which the de&endant (y &ailing to per&orm its contract to supply gas rendered !ain large e#penditures (y the plainti&& &or a glass &actory, ser!es twice as an illustration in the )"STAT"'"0T+ See I ?=E, the si#th illustration4 and I ??9, the si#th illustration to su(section 798+ $n (oth illustrations the discussion hinges entirely on the pro(lem o& pro!ing the pro&its e#pected to (e deri!ed &rom the operations o& the &actory, whereas in the actual case, e#pected pro&its were re-ected as too con-ectural and reim(ursement was granted &or the costs in!ol!ed in esta(lishing the &actory+ 0eedless to say, +as v. +lass does not reappear as an illustration to I ???+ BE+ 9EG F+S+ A@G 79EG?8, discussed sura p+ D?+ CG+ /d. at A@A+ C9+ T+ )aymond CC 79BB@8, discussed sura p+ CC+ C=+ BE 'd+ 9EE, 9@ Atl+ @B@ 79DDD8+ $t should (e noted that so &ar as restitution is concerned the )"STAT"'"0T ma3es e#press pro!ision &or cases o& this type+ I ?@C7987(8+ C?+ Title 5Damages5 in 9C C+ J. I 9=B, and D )+ C+ + I AB4 ? W$$ST*0, C*0T)ACTS 79E=G8 I 9?@94 B PA>", C*0T)ACTS 7=d ed+ 9E==8 I ?=GD+ Pace &aw %chool Institute o/ International Commercial &aw - ast updated July E, =GG? >o to Data(ase Directory UU >o to ;i(liography UU >o to Annotated Te#t o& Art+ C@ C$S> CommentsVContri(utions


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