ChaoProducer's bank of Phil v CAMarikina Autoline v People

ReylanBaliwag Transit v CAVilla Rey Transit v CADangwa Transportation v CA

NilsyPeople v QuilatonPeople v SiaEastern Shipping v CA

DanielPolicarpio v CACitibank v Cabamongan

SECOND DIVISION[G.R. No. 116110.May 15,1996]BALIWAG TRANSIT, INC., petitioner, vs.COURT OF APPEALS, SPOUSES ANTONIO GARCIA & LETICIA GARCIA, A & J TRADING, AND JULIO RECONTIQUE,respondents.SYLLABUS1. CIVIL LAW; CONTRACTS; SPECIAL CONTRACTS; COMMON CARRIERS; LIABILITY FOR DAMAGES; ESTABLISHED IN CASE AT BAR. As a common carrier, Baliwag breached its contract of carriage when it failed to deliver its passengers, Leticia and Allan Garcia to their destination safe and sound.A common carrier is bound to carry its passengers safely as far as human care and foresight can provide, using the utmost diligence of a very cautious person, with due regard for all the circumstances.In a contract of carriage, it is presumed that the common carrier was at fault or was negligent when a passenger dies or is injured.Unless the presumption is rebutted, the court need not even make an express finding of fault or negligence on the part of the common carrier.This statutory presumption may only be overcome by evidence that the carrier exercised extraordinary diligence as prescribed in Articles 1733 and 1755 of the Civil Code.The records are bereft of any proof to show that Baliwag exercised extraordinary diligence.On the contrary, the evidence demonstrates its driver's recklessness.Leticia Garcia testified that the bus was running at a very high speed despite the drizzle and the darkness of the highway.The passengers pleaded for its driver to slow down, but their plea was ignored.Leticia also revealed that the driver was smelling of liquor.She could smell him as she was seated right behind the driver.Another passenger, Felix Cruz testified that immediately before the collision, the bus driver was conversing with a co-employee.All these prove the bus driver's wanton disregard for the physical safety of his passengers, which make Baliwag as a common carrier liable for damages under Article 1759 of the Civil Code.2. ID.; ID.; ID.; ID.; LAND TRANSPORTATION AND TRAFFIC CODE; SECTION 34(g) THEREOF; SUBSTANTIALLY COMPLIED WITH IN CASE AT BAR. Baliwag cannot evade its liability by insisting that the accident was caused solely by the negligence of A & J Trading and Julio Recontique.It harps on their alleged non use of early warning device as testified to by Col. Demetrio dela Cruz, the station commander of Gapan, Nueva Ecija who investigated the incident, and Francisco Romano, the bus conductor.The records do not bear out Baliwag's contention.Col. dela Cruz and Romano testified that they did not see any early warning device at the scene of the accident.They were referring to the triangular reflectorized plates in red and yellow issued by the Land Transportation Office.However, the evidence shows that Recontique and Ecala placed a kerosene lamp or torch at the edge of the road, near the rear portion of the truck to serve as an early warning device.This substantially complies with Section 34 (g) of the Land Transportation and Traffic Code, to wit:"(g)lights and reflector when parked or disabled. Appropriate parking lights or flares visible one hundred meters away shall be displayed at the corner of the vehicle whenever such vehicle is parked on highways or in places that are not well-lighted or, is placed in such manner as to endanger passing traffic.Furthermore, every motor vehicle shall be provided at all times with built-in reflectors or other similar warning devices either pasted, painted or attached at its front and back which shall likewise be visible at night at least one hundred meters away.No vehicle not provided with any of the requirements mentioned in this subsection shall be registered." Baliwag's argument that the kerosene lamp or torch does not substantially comply with the law is untenable.The aforequoted law clearly allows the use not only of an early warning device of the triangular reflectorized plates variety but also parking lights or flares visible one hundred meters away.Indeed, Col. dela Cruz himself admitted that a kerosene lamp is an acceptable substitute for the reflectorized plates.No negligence, therefore, may be imputed to A & J Trading and its driver, Recontique.3. ID.; DAMAGES; To PROVE ACTUAL DAMAGES, THE BEST EVIDENCE AVAILABLE TO THE PARTIES MUST BE PRESENTED. The propriety of the amount awarded as hospitalization and medical fees.The award of P25,000.00 is not supported by the evidence on record.The Garcias presented receipts marked as Exhibits "B-1 " to "B-42" but their total amounted only to P5,017.74.To be sure, Leticia testified as to the extra amount spent for her medical needs but without more reliable evidence, her lone testimony cannot justify the award of P25,000.00. To prove actual damages, the best evidence available to the injured party must be presented.The court cannot rely on uncorroborated testimony whose truth is suspect, but must depend upon competent proof that damages have been actually suffered.Thus, we reduce the actual damages for medical and hospitalization expenses to P5,017.74.4. ID.; ID.; MORAL DAMAGES; RECOVERABLE IF THE CARRIER THROUGH ITS AGENT, ACTED FRAUDULENTLY OR IN BAD FAITH. The award of moral damages is in accord with law.In a breach of contract of carriage, moral damages are recoverable if the carrier, through its agent, acted fraudulently or in bad faith.The evidence shows the gross negligence of the driver of Baliwag bus which amounted to bad faith.Without doubt, Leticia and Allan experienced physical suffering, mental anguish and serious anxiety by reason of the accident.APPEARANCES OF COUNSELLeopoldo C. Sta. Maria for Baliwag Transit, Inc.Arturo D. Vallar for Sps. Antonio & Leticia Garcia.Allan A. Leynes for A & J Trading, and Julio Recontique.D E C I S I O NPUNO,J.:This is a petition forcertiorarito review the Decision[1]of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV-31246 awarding damages in favor of the spouses Antonio and Leticia Garcia for breach of contract of carriage.[2]filed by the spouses Garcia questioning the same Court of Appeals' Decision which reduced their award of damages.On November 13, 1995, we denied their petition for review.The records show that on July 31, 1980, Leticia Garcia, and her five-year old son, Allan Garcia, boarded Baliwag Transit Bus No. 2036 bound for Cabanatuan City driven by Jaime Santiago.They took the seat behind the driver.At about 7:30 in the evening, in Malimba, Gapan, Nueva Ecija, the bus passengers saw a cargo truck parked at the shoulder of the national highway.Its left rear portion jutted to the outer lane, the shoulder of the road was too narrow to accommodate the whole truck.A kerosene lamp appeared at the edge of the road obviously to serve as a warning device.The truck driver, Julio Recontique, and his helper, Arturo Escala, were then replacing a flat tire.The truck is owned by respondent A & J Trading.Bus driver Santiago was driving at an inordinately fast speed and failed to notice the truck and the kerosene lamp at the edge of the road.Santiago's passengers urged him to slow down but he paid them no heed.Santiago even carried animated conversations with his co-employees while driving.When the danger of collision became imminent, the bus passengers shouted "Babangga tayo!".Santiago stepped on the brake, but it was too late.His bus rammed into the stalled cargo truck.It caused the instant death of Santiago and Escala, and injury to several others.Leticia and Allan Garcia were among the injured passengers.Leticia suffered a fracture in her pelvis and right leg.They rushed her to the provincial hospital in Cabanatuan City where she was given emergency treatment.After three days, she was transferred to the National Orthopedic Hospital where she was confined for more than a month.[3]She underwent an operation for partial hip prosthesis.[4]Allan, on the other hand, broke a leg.He was also given emergency treatment at the provincial hospital.Spouses Antonio and Leticia Garcia sued Baliwag Transit, Inc., A & J Trading and Julio Recontique for damages in the Regional Trial Court of Bulacan.[5]Leticia sued as an injured passenger of Baliwag and as mother of Allan.At the time of the complaint, Allan was a minor, hence, the suit initiated by his parents in his favor.Baliwag, A & J Trading and Recontique disclaimed responsibility for the mishap.Baliwag alleged that the accident was caused solely by the fault and negligence of A & J Trading and its driver, Recontique.Baliwag charged that Recontigue failed to place an early warning device at the corner of the disabled cargo truck to warn oncoming vehicles.[6]On the other hand, A & J Trading and Recontique alleged that the accident was the result of the negligence and reckless driving of Santiago, bus driver of Baliwag.[7]After hearing, the trial court found all the defendants liable, thus:x x xx x xx x x"In view thereof, the Court holds that both defendants should be held liable; the defendant Baliwag Transit, Inc. for having failed to deliver the plaintiff and her son to their point of destination safely in violation of plaintiff's and defendant Baliwag Transit's contractual relation.The defendant A & J and Julio Recontique for failure to provide its cargo truck with an early warning device in violation of the Motor Vehicle Law."[8]The trial court ordered Baliwag, A & J Trading and Recontique to pay jointly and severally the Garcia spouses the following:(1) P25,000.00 hospitalization and medication fee, (2) P450,000.00 loss of earnings in eight (8) years, (3) P2,000.00 for the hospitalization of their son Allan Garcia, (4) P50,000.00 moral damages, and (5) P30,000.00 attorney's fee.[9]On appeal, the Court of Appeals modified the trial court's Decision by absolving A & J Trading from liability and by reducing the award of attorney's fees to P10,000.00 and loss of earnings to P300,000.00, respectively.[10]Baliwag filed the present petition for review raising the following issues:1.Did the Court of Appeals err in absolving A & J Trading from liability and holding Baliwag solely liable for the injuries suffered by Leticia and Allan Garcia in the accident?2.Is the amount of damages awarded by the Court of Appeals to the Garcia spouses correct?We affirm the factual findings of the Court of Appeals.IAs a common carrier, Baliwag breached its contract of carriage when it failed to deliver its passengers, Leticia and Allan Garcia to their destination safe and sound.A common carrier is bound to carry its passengers safely as far as human care and foresight can provide, using the utmost diligence of a very cautious person, with due regard for all the circumstances.[11]In a contract of carriage, it is presumed that the common carrier was at fault or was negligent when a passenger dies or is injured.Unless the presumption is rebutted, the court need not even make an express finding of fault or negligence on the part of the common carrier.This statutory presumption may only be overcome by evidence that the carrier exercised extraordinary diligence as prescribed in Articles 1733 and 1755 of the Civil Code.[12]The records are bereft of any proof to show that Baliwag exercised extraordinary diligence.On the contrary, the evidencedemonstrates its driver's recklessness.Leticia Garcia testified that the bus was running at a very high speed despite the drizzle and the darkness of the highway.The passengers pleaded for its driver to slow down, but their plea was ignored.[13]Leticia also revealed that the driver was smelling of liquor.[14]She could smell him as she was seated right behind the driver.Another passenger, Felix Cruz testified that immediately before the collision, the bus driver was conversing with a co-employee.[15]All these prove the bus driver's wanton disregard for the physical safety of his passengers, which makes Baliwag as a common carrier liable for damages under Article 1759 of the Civil Code:Art. 1759.Common carriers are liable for the death of or injuries to passengers through the negligence or willfull acts of the former's employees, although such employees may have acted beyond the scope of their authority or in violation of the orders of the common carriers.This liability of the common carriers do not cease upon proof that they exercised all the diligence of a good father of a family in the selection or supervision of their employees.Baliwag cannot evade its liability by insisting that the accident was caused solely by the negligence of A & J Trading and Julio Recontique.It harps on their alleged non use of an early warning device as testified to by Col. Demetrio dela Cruz, the station commander of Gapan, Nueva Ecija who investigated the incident, and Francisco Romano, the bus conductor.The records do not bear out Baliwag's contention.Col. dela Cruz and Romano testified that theydid not seeany early warning device at the scene of the accident.[16]They were referring to the triangular reflectorized plates in red and yellow issued by the Land Transportation Office.However, the evidence shows that Recontique and Ecala placed a kerosene lamp or torch at the edge of the road, near the rear portion of the truck to serve as an early warning device.[17]This substantially complies with Section 34 (g) of the Land Transportation and Traffic Code, to wit:(g)Lights and reflector when parked or disabled.Appropriateparking lights or flares visible one hundred meters awayshall be displayed at the corner of the vehicle whenever such vehicle is parked on highways or in places that are not well-lighted or, is placed in such manner as to endanger passing traffic.Furthermore, every motor vehicle shall be provided at all times with built-in reflectors or other similar warning devices either pasted, painted or attached at its front and back which shall likewise be visible at night at least one hundred meters away.No vehicle not provided with any of the requirements mentioned in this subsection shall be registered.(Italics supplied)Baliwag's argument that the kerosene lamp or torch does not substantially comply with the law is untenable.The aforequoted law clearly allows the use not only of an early warning device of the triangular reflectorized plates variety but also parking lights or flares visible one hundred meters away.Indeed, Col. dela Cruz himself admitted that a kerosene lamp is an acceptable substitute for the reflectorized plates.[18]No negligence, therefore, may be imputed to A & J Trading and its driver, Recontique.Anent this factual issue, the analysis of evidence made by the Court of Appeals deserves our concurrence,viz:xxxxxxxxxIn the case at bar, both the injured passengers of the Baliwag involved in the accident testified that they saw some sort of kerosene or a torch on the rear portion of the truck before the accident.Baliwag Transit's conductor attempted to defeat such testimony by declaring that he noticed no early warning device in front of the truck.Among the testimonies offered by the witnesses who were present at the scene of the accident, we rule to uphold the affirmative testimonies given by the two injured passengers and give less credence to the testimony of the bus conductor who solely testified that no such early warning device exists.The testimonies of injured passengers who may well be considered as disinterested witness appear to be natural and more probable than the testimony given by Francisco Romano who is undoubtedly interested in the outcome of the case, being the conductor of the defendant-appellant Baliwag Transit Inc.It must be borne in mind that the situation then prevailing at the time of the accident was admittedly drizzly and all dark.This being so, it would be improbable and perhaps impossible on the part of the truck helper without the torch nor the kerosene to remove the flat tires of the truck. Moreover, witness including the bits conductor himself admitted that the passengers shouted, that they are going to bump before the collision which consequently caused the bus driver to apply the brake 3 to 4 meters away from the truck.Again, without the kerosene nor the torch in front of the truck, it would be improbable for the driver, more so the passengers to notice the truck to be bumped by the bus considering the darkness of the place at the time of the accident.x x xx x xx x xWhile it is true that the investigating officer testified that he found no early warning device at the time of his investigation, We rule to give less credence to such testimony insofar as he himself admitted on cross examination that he did not notice the presence of any kerosene lamp at the back of the truck because when he arrived at the scene of the accident, there were already many people surrounding the place (TSN, Aug, 22, 1989, p. 13).He further admitted that there exists a probability that the lights of the truck may have been smashed by the bus at the time of the accident considering the location of the truck where its rear portion was connected with the front portion of the bus (TSN, March 29, 1985, pp. 11-13).Investigator's testimony therefore did not confirm nor deny the existence of such warning device, making his testimony of little probative value.[19]IIWe now review the amount of damages awarded to the Garcia spouses.First, the propriety of the amount awarded as hospitalization and medical fees.The award of P25,000.00 is not supported by the evidence on record.The Garcias presented receipts marked as Exhibits B-1 to B 42 but their total amounted only to P5,017.74.To be sure, Leticia testified as to the extra amount spent for her medical needs but without more reliable evidence, her lone testimony cannot justify the award of P25,000.00.To prove actual damages, the best evidence available to the injured party must be presented.The court cannot rely on uncorroborated testimony whose truth is suspect, but must depend upon competent proof that damages have been actually suffered[20]Thus, we reduce the actual damages for medical and hospitalization expenses to P5,017.74.Second, we find as reasonable the award of P300,000.00 representing Leticia's lost earnings.Before the accident, Leticia was engaged in embroidery, earning P5,000.00 per month.[21]Her injuries forced her to stop working.Considering the nature and extent of her injuries and the length of time it would take her to recover,[22]we find it proper that Baliwag should compensate her lost income for five (5) years.[23]Third, the award of moral damages is in accord with law.In a breach of contract of carriage, moral damages are recoverable if the carrier, through its agent, acted fraudulently or in bad faith.[24]The evidence shows the gross negligence of the driver of Baliwag bus which amounted to bad faith.Without doubt, Leticia and Allan experienced physical suffering, mental anguish and serious anxiety by reason of the accident.Leticia underwent an operation to replace her broken hip bone with a metal plate.She was confined at the National Orthopedic Hospital for 45 days.The young Allan was also confined in the hospital for his foot injury.Contrary to the contention of Baliwag, the decision of the trial court as affirmed by the Court of Appeals awarded moral damages to Antonio and Leticia Garcia not in their capacity as parents of Allan.Leticia was given moral damages as an injured party.Allan was also granted moral damages as an injured party but because of his minority, the award in his favor has to be given to his father who represented him in the suit.Finally, we find the award of attorney's fees justified.The complaint for damages was instituted by the Garcia spouses on December 15, 1982, following the unjustified refusal of Baliwag to settle their claim.The Decision was promulgated by the trial court only on January 29, 1991 or about nine years later.Numerous pleadings were filed before the trial court, the appellate court and to this Court.Given the complexity of the case and the amount of damages involved,[25]the award of attorney's fee for P10,000.00 is just and reasonable.IN VIEW WHEREOF, the Decision of the respondent Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV-31246 is AFFIRMED with the MODIFICATION reducing the actual damages for hospitalization and medical fees to P5,017.74.No costs.SO ORDERED.Regalado (Chairman), Romero, Mendoza,andTorres, Jr., JJ.,concur.

THIRD DIVISION[G.R. No. 111584.September 17, 2001]PRODUCERS BANK OF THE PHILIPPINES,petitioner, vs.COURT OF APPEALS and SPOUSES SALVADOR Y. CHUA and EMILIA U. CHUA,respondents.D E C I S I O NMELO,J.:The instant petition assails the decision of the Court of Appeals in its CA-G.R.CV No. 20220, dated October 31, 1991, affirming with modification the decision of Branch 48 of the Regional Trial Court of the 6thJudicial Region stationed in Bacolod City, as well as the resolution dated August 12, 1993 denying petitioners motion for partial consideration.Undersignedponentewas given this case in pursuance of A. M. No. 00-9-03-SC dated February 27, 2001 distributing the so-called back-log cases.The generative facts of the case may be chronicled as follows:Sometime in April, 1982, respondent Salvador Chua was offered by Mr. Jimmy Rojas, manager of petitioner bank, to transfer his account from Pacific Banking Corporation to herein petitioner Producers Bank of the Philippines.In view of Rojas' assurances of longer loan terms and lower rates of interest, respondent spouses opened and maintained substantial savings and current deposits with the Bacolod branch of petitioner bank. Likewise, private respondents obtained various loans from petitioner bank, one of which was a loan for P2,000,000.00 which was secured by a real estate mortgage and payable within a period of three (3) years or from 1982 to 1985. On January 20, 1984, private respondents deposited with petitioner bank the total sum of P960,000.00, which was duly entered in private respondents' savings account passbook.However, petitioner bank failed to credit this deposit in private respondents' savings account due to the fact that its Branch Manager, Sixto Castillo, absconded with the money of the bank's depositors.Also, petitioner bank dishonored the checks drawn out by private respondents in favor of their various creditors on the ground of insufficient funds, despite the fact that at that time, the balance of private respondents' deposit was in the amount of P1,051,051.19.These events prompted private respondents to request for copies of their ledgers covering their savings and current accounts, but petitioner bank refused. Due to petitioner bank's refusal to furnish private respondents copies of their ledgers, private respondents instituted on January 30, 1984 an action for damages against petitioner bank which was docketed as Civil Case No. 2718.On the other hand, petitioner bank filed with the City Sheriff of Bacolod a petition for extrajudicial foreclosure of the real estate mortgage during the pendency of Civil Case No.2718.As a result, private respondents filed a complaint for injunction and damages docketed as Civil Case No. 3276, alleging that the petition for extajudicial foreclosure was without basis and was instituted maliciously in order to harass private respondents.On April 26, 1988, the trial court rendered its decision on the latter case, the dispositive portion of which reads:WHEREFORE, from the evidence adduced, judgment is hereby rendered in favor of plaintiff ordering the defendant as follows:1) To pay plaintiff the sum of P2,000,000.00 as moral damages, with legal rate of interest; the sum of P90,000.00 per month and P18,000.00 per month representing plaintiff's unrealized profits from his cement and gasoline station business, respectively, to commence from October 16, 1984, with legal rate of interest until fully paid; the sum of P250,000.00 as exemplary damages;2) To off-set the sum of P960,000.00 deposited by plaintiff on January 20, 1984 and entered in his Passbook No. 38240, together with its incremental interests computed at banking rate and to commence from January 20, 1984 with his agricultural loan account in the sum of P1,300,000.00 with interest thereon computed at fourteen (14%) percent per annum, to commence from January 4, 1984, covered by a real estate mortgage, both of which shall have a cut-off time frame on the date of this decision;3) That should the said savings deposit and its interest be sufficient to cover the off-setting, compensation shall take place and to be taken from the amounts awarded to plaintiff in the form of moral, actual and compensatory damages;4) That the time loan in the sum of P175,000.00 and the clean loan of P400,000.00, both without interest, shall be off-settled by the moral, actual and compensatory damages herein awarded to plaintiff;5) That after compensation or set-off had taken place, to pay plaintiff the balance of the adjudged moral, actual and compensatory damages, with legal rate of interest until fully paid;6) To render an accounting to plaintiff with respect to his Account Nos. 0142-0014-0 and 042-0014-1 for the period covering January to December, 1982;7) That in order to make the bank's record complete, to reform the deed of real estate mortgage conformably with the agreement by stipulating in the said document that the maturity date of the agricultural loan is April 1 5, 1987 at the same rate of interest of fourteen (14%) percent per annum, deducting from the original amount of the loan the payments made on the principal and interests; this reformation shall take place simultaneously with the off-setting of accounts;8) To pay plaintiff the sum equivalent to fifteen (15%) percent of the amount representing the balance of the sums awarded as moral, actual and compensatory damages as attorney's fees;9) To pay plaintiff the cots of suit;10) The writ of preliminary injunction issued by this Court is rendered permanent; and11) The counterclaim is hereby dismissed.SO ORDERED.(Rollo, pp. 261-263.)On October 31, 1991, upon appeal by petitioner bank, the Court of Appeals modified the decision of the trial court as follows:WHEREFORE, from the evidence adduced, judgment is hereby rendered as follows:1. Ordering the defendant -a. To pay plaintiff the sum of P500,000.00 as moral and exemplary damages;b. To pay the sum of P18,000.00 per month representing plaintiffs' unrealized profits from his gasoline station business to commence from October 16, 1984, with legal rate of interest, until fully paid;c. To allow the plaintiffs to offset their financial obligation with the defendant bank by the moral, exemplary, actual and compensatory damages herein awarded in favor of the aforesaid plaintiffs;d. If, after the off-setting, a balance remains in favor of the plaintiffs, to pay the said plaintiffs such balance of the adjudged moral, exemplary, actual and compensatory damages, with legal rate of interest until fully paid, as of the time of off-setting;e. To render an accounting to plaintiffs with respect to their Account Nos. 0142-0014-0 and 042-0014-1 for the period covering January to December, 1982;f. To pay plaintiffs the sum of P100,000.00 as attorney's fees.g. To pay the costs of suit.2. Ordering the plaintiffs-a. To settle their loan obligation with the defendant bank within 90 days from the finality of this decision, subject to the resolution of this Court to the effect that they shall be relieved from the payment of penalties and surcharges on heir outstanding balance starting January 20, 1984;3. The plaintiffs' prayer for reformation of their mortgage contract or annulment thereof is hereby denied;4. The counterclaim of defendant-appellant are hereby dismissed.SO ORDERED.(Rollo, pp. 86-87.)Petitioner moved for a partial reconsideration of the above decision but the same was denied on August 12, 1993. Hence, the instant petition with the following submissions which allegedly warrant our review of the assailed decision,viz.:1. The Court of Appeals erred in not ruling that the application for extrajudicial foreclosure of real estate mortgage is legal and valid;2. The Court of Appeals erred in not granting petitioner bank its right to foreclose extrajudicially the real estate mortgage and to proceed with its application for extrajudicial foreclosure of real estate mortgage;3. The Court of Appeals erred in ruling that private respondents be relieved from the payment of penalties and surcharges on their outstanding balance starting January 20, 1984;4. The Court of Appeals erred in awarding moral and exemplary damages of P500,000.00, unrealized profit of P18,000.00 per month, and attorney's fees of P100,000.00 against petitioner bank;5. The Court of Appeals erred in ordering an accounting to private respondents with respect to their Account Nos. 0142-0014-0 and 042-0014-1 for the period covering January to December, 1982.It should at once be apparent that except for the first and second imputed errors which involve petitioner bank's right to foreclose extrajudicially the real estate mortgage, the resolution of the assigned errors entails a review of the factual conclusions of the appellate court and the evidentiary bases thereof.Such an assessment is not, as a rule, proper in appeals from the Court of Appeals which should be confined to a consideration and determination only of issues of law as its findings of fact are deemed conclusive(Villanueva vs. Court of Appeals,294 SCRA 90 [1998]) especially so in this case because the findings of fact of the appellate court concur with those of the trial court.To reiterate, this Court's jurisdiction is only limited to reviewing errors of law in the absence of any showing that the findings complained of are totally devoid of support in the record or they are glaringly erroneous as to constitute serious abuse of discretion.Nonetheless, considering the amount involved, as well as for the satisfaction of the parties who have vigorously pursued this case since 1984, the Court, in the exercise of its discretion, examined the factual bases, particularly with respect to the propriety of the damages awarded to private respondents.The first and second assignments of error, being interrelated, shall be jointly discussed.Petitioner contends that it has the right to foreclose the real estate mortgage executed by private respondents in its favor as the loan under the real estate mortgage contract had become due and demandable.This argument is not well-taken.Foreclosure is but a necessary consequence of non-payment of a mortgage indebtedness. As a rule, the mortgage can be foreclosed only when the debt remains unpaid at the time it is due (Gov't. of the P.I. vs. Espejo,57 Phil. 496 [1932]).As found by the trial court and the Court of Appeals, and as borne by the evidence on record, private respondents were constantly paying their loan obligations with petitioner bank.In fact the amount of P960,000.00 was properly deposited with petitioner bank as evidenced by the corresponding deposit slip and the entry made in private respondents' savings account passbook.It is, therefore, not the fault of private respondents that their payment amounting to P960,000.00 was not credited to their account.Thus, it is certain that the loan which was secured by a real estate mortgage cannot be considered as unpaid so as to warrant foreclosure on the mortgage.Clearly, private respondents have not yet defaulted on the payment of their loans.Moreover, the term of the loan, as agreed upon by the parties, is three years, or from 1982 to 1985. But petitioner filed its application for extrajudicial foreclosure on October 15, 1984. Indisputably, the application for foreclosure of the mortgage on October 15, 1984 was premature because by then, private respondents' loan was not yet due and demandable.Likewise, both the Court of Appeals and the trial court found that private respondents are entitled to moral and exemplary damages.We agree.Moral and exemplary damages may be awarded without proof of pecuniary loss.In awarding such damages, the court shall take into account the circumstances obtaining in the case and assess damages according to its discretion.As borne out by the record of this case, private respondents are engaged in several businesses, such as rice and corn trading, cement dealership, and gasoline proprietorship.The dishonor of private respondents' checks and the foreclosure initiated by petitioner adversely affected the credit standing as well as the business dealings of private respondents as their suppliers discontinued credit lines resulting in the collapse of their businesses.In the case ofLeopoldo Araneta vs. Bank of America(40 SCRA 144 [1971]), we held that:"The financial credit of a businessman is a prized and valuable asset, it being a significant part of the foundation of his business. Any adverse reflection thereon constitutes some financial loss to him."The damage to private respondents' reputation and social standing entitles them to moral damages. Article 2217, in relation to Article 2220, of the Civil Code explicitly provides that "moral damages include physical suffering, mental anguish, fright, serious anxiety, besmirched reputation, wounded feelings, moral shock, social humiliation, and similar injury."Obviously, petitioner bank's wrongful act caused serious anxiety, embarrassment, and humiliation to private respondents for which they are entitled to recover moral damages in the amount of P300,000.00 which we deem to be reasonable.The award of exemplary damages is in order in view of the malicious and unwarranted application for extrajudicial foreclosure by petitioner which was obviously done to harass, embarrass, annoy, or ridicule private respondents.Likewise, petitioner, in its application for extrajudicial foreclosure, included the other loans of private respondents which were not covered by the real estate mortgage agreement, such as the loan of P175,000.00 which was a time loan, and the amount of P400,000.00 which was a clean loan.Moreover, petitioner unjustifiably refused to give private respondents copies of their account ledgers which would show the deposits made by them.Also, petitioner bank's failure to credit the deposit in the account of private respondents constituted gross negligence in the performance of its contractual obligation which amounts to evident bad faith. Verily, all these acts of petitioner were accompanied by bad faith and done in wanton, fraudulent and malevolent manner warranting the award of exemplary damages in favor of private respondents, in accordance with Article 2232 of the Civil Code which provides:ART. 2232.In contracts and quasi-contracts, the court may award exemplary damages if the defendant acted in a wanton, fraudulent, reckless, oppressive, or malevolent manner.Of course, a plaintiff need not prove the actual extent of exemplary damages, for its determination is addressed to the sound discretion of the court upon proof of the plaintiff's entitlement to moral, temperate, or compensatory damages (Article 2234, Civil Code).In the instant case, exemplary damages in the amount of P150,000.00 are proper.Anent the award of actual damages, the Court of Appeals granted private respondents the amount of P18,000.00 per month representing private respondents' unrealized profits from his gasoline station business, to commence from October 16, 1984.Under Articles 2199 and 2200 of the Civil Code, actual or compensatory damages are those awarded in satisfaction of, or in recompense for, loss or injury sustained.They proceed from a sense of natural justice and are designed to repair the wrong that has been done.There are two kinds of actual or compensatory damages: one is the loss of what a person already possesses, and the other is the failure to receive as a benefit that which would have pertained to him (Tolentino,Civil Code of the Phil., Vol. V, 1992 ed., pp. 633-636).In the latter instance, the familiar rule is that damages consisting of unrealized profits, frequently referred as"ganacias frustradas"or"lucrum cessans,"are not to be granted on the basis of mere speculation, conjecture, or surmise, but rather by reference to some reasonably definite standard such as market value, established experienced, or direct inference from known circumstances(Talisay-Silay Milling Co., Inc. vs. Asociacion de Agricultores de Talisay-Silay, Inc.,247 SCRA 361 [1995]).In the case at bar, actual damages in the form of unrealized profits were awarded on the basis of the sole testimony of private respondent Salvador Chua, to wit:Atty. Chua:Q: You mentioned earlier during your direct testimony that you are engaged in gasoline business. Do you have a gasoline station.A: Yes, sir.Q: Where is that located?A: It is located at Corner Araneta-San Sebastian Sts.Q: Before the filing of the Extra Judicial Foreclosure, how much more or less, you earned from that gasoline station by way of conservative estimate?A: In my gasoline business, based on my record, I have an average of 114,000 liters.Q: Do you mean to say you can dispose 114,000 liters a month?A: Yes, sir.Q: How much is the mark up per liter?A: Before the publication of the Extra Judicial Foreclosure the markup is P0.27 per liter. So, it comes out that the profit is P30,78.00 (sic).Q: How much is your overhead for disposing that much liters of gasoline every month?A: The overhead is about 12,280.00.Q: That will give you an average of P18,000.00 a month?A: Yes; sir.Q: After the filing of the Extra Judicial Foreclosure, what happened to your gasoline business?A: Because of the publication of the Extra Judicial Foreclosure I did not have credit line anymore. Since I have no capital I was forced to sell my right to operate to my relatives.(tsn, March 25, 1986, pp. 9-12)However, other than the testimony of Salvador Chua, private respondents failed to present documentary evidence which is necessary to substantiate their claim for actual or compensatory damages.In order to recover this kind of damages, the injured party must prove his case, thus:When the existence of a loss is established, absolute certainty as to its amount is not required.The benefit to be derived from a contract which one of the parties has absolutely failed to perform is of necessity to some extent, a matter of speculation, but the injured party is not to be denied for that reason alone. He must produce the best evidence of which his case is susceptible and if that evidence warrants the inference that he has been damaged by the loss of profits which he might with reasonable certainty have anticipated but for the defendant's wrongful act, he is entitled to recover. (Cerreno vs. Tan Chuco,28 Phil. 312 [1914] quoted inCentral Bank of the Philippines vs. Court of Appeals,63 SCRA 431 [1975])Applying the foregoing test to the instant case, the Court finds the evidence of private respondents insufficient to be considered within the purview of "best evidence." The bare assertion of private respondent Salvador Chua that he lost an average of P18,000.00 per month is inadequate if not speculative and should be admitted with extreme caution especially because it is not supported by independent evidence.Private respondents could have presented such evidence as reports on the average actual profits earned by their gasoline business, their financial statements, and other evidence of profitability which could aid the court in arriving with reasonable certainty at the amount of profits which private respondents failed to earn.Private respondents did not even present any instrument or deed evidencing their claim that they have transferred their right to operate their gasoline station to their relatives.We cannot, therefore, sustain the award of P18,000.00 a month as unrealized profits commencing from October 16, 1984 because this amount is not amply justified by the evidence on record.Further, well-settled is the rule that even if the petition for extrajudicial foreclosure filed by petitioner against private respondents is clearly unfounded, this does not necessarily mean, in the absence of specific facts proving damages, that actual damage has been sustained.The Court cannot rely on speculations as to the fact and amount of damages.It must depend on actual proof of the damages alleged to have been suffered(Perfecto vs. Gonzales,128 SCRA 635 [1984]).Finally, the award of attorney's fees as part of damages is deemed just and equitable under the circumstances.Attorney's fees may be awarded when a party is compelled to litigate or to incur expenses to protect his interest by reason of an unjustified act of the other party(Ching Sen Ben vs. Court of Appeals,314 SCRA 762 [ 1999]).In this case, petitioner bank's act of not crediting private respondents' deposit of P960,000.00, as well as the premature filing of the extrajudicial foreclosure, have compelled private respondents to institute an action for injunction and damages primarily in order to protect their rights and interests.The award of attorney's fees is also justified under Article 2208 of the Civil Code which provides:ART. 2208.In the absence of stipulation, attorney's fees and expenses of litigation, other than judicial costs, cannot be recovered, except:(1) when exemplary damages are awarded;(2) when the defendant's act or omission has compelled the plaintiff to litigate with third persons or to incur expenses to protect his interest;WHEREFORE,the decision of the Court of Appeals in its CA-G.R. CV No. 20220 is affirmed with MODIFICATION only as to the award of damages in that petitioner bank is ordered to pay private respondents the following:1.Three Hundred Thousand Pesos (P300,000.00) as moral damages;2.One Hundred Fifty Thousand Pesos (P150,000.00) as exemplary damages; and3.One Hundred Thousand Pesos (P100,000.00) as attorneys fees and litigation expenses.In all other respects, the said judgment is affirmed.SO ORDERED.Vitug, Panganiban, Gonzaga-Reyes,andSandoval-Gutierrez, JJ.,concur.

FIRST DIVISIONMARIKINAAUTO LINEG.R. No. 152040TRANSPORT CORPORATIONand FREDDIE L. SUELTO,Present:Petitioners,PANGANIBAN,C.J.,Chairperson,YNARES-SANTIAGO,-versus-AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ,CALLEJO, SR., andCHICO-NAZARIO,JJ.PEOPLE OF THEPHILIPPINESPromulgated:and ERLINDA V. VALDELLON,Respondents.March 31, 2006x - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -- - - - - - - - - - - - - - xD E C I S I O NCALLEJO, SR.,J.:Before the Court is a Petition for Review onCertiorariof the Decision[1]of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. CR No. 16739 affirming the Joint Decision of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) in Criminal Case No.Q-93-42629 and Civil Case No. Q-93-16051, where Freddie Suelto was convicted of reckless imprudence resulting in damages to property.Erlinda V. Valdellon is the owner of a two-door commercial apartment located atNo. 31 Kamias Road,Quezon City.The Marikina Auto Line Transport Corporation (MALTC) is the owner-operator of a passenger bus with Plate Number NCV-849.Suelto, its employee, was assigned as the regular driver of the bus.[2]At around2:00 p.m.onOctober 3, 1992, Suelto was driving the aforementioned passenger bus alongKamias Road, Kamuning,Quezon City, going towards Epifanio de los Santos Avenue (EDSA).The bus suddenly swerved to the right and struck the terrace of the commercial apartment owned by Valdellon located alongKamuning Road.[3]Upon Valdellons request, the court ordered Sergio Pontiveros, the Senior Building Inspection Officer of the City Engineers Office, to inspect the damaged terrace.Pontiveros submitted a report enumerating and describing the damages:(1)The front exterior and the right side concrete columns of the covered terrace were vertically displaced from its original position causing exposure of the vertical reinforcement.(2)The beams supporting the roof and parapet walls are found with cracks on top of the displaced columns.(3)The 6 CHB walls at [the] right side of the covered terrace were found with cracks caused by this accident.(4)The front iron grills and concrete balusters were found totally damaged and the later [sic] beyond repair.[4]He recommended that sincethe structural members made of concrete had been displaced, the terrace would have to be demolished to keep its monolithicness, and to insure the safety and stability of the building.[5]Photographs[6]of the damaged terrace were taken.Valdellon commissioned Engr. Jesus R. Regal, Jr. to estimate the cost of repairs, inclusive of labor and painting, and the latter pegged the cost atP171,088.46.[7]In a letter datedOctober 19, 1992addressed to the bus company and Suelto, Valdellon demanded payment ofP148,440.00, within 10 days from receipt thereof, to cover the cost of the damage to the terrace.[8]The bus company and Suelto offered aP30,000.00 settlement which Valdellon refused.[9]Valdellon filed a criminal complaint for reckless imprudence resulting in damage to property against Suelto. After the requisite preliminary investigation, an Information was filed with the RTC of Quezon City.The accusatory portion of the Information reads:That on or about the 3rdday of October 1992, in Quezon City, Philippines, the said accused, being then the driver and/or person in charge of a Marikina Auto Line bus bearing Plate No. NVC-849, did then and there unlawfully, and feloniously drive, manage, and operate the same along Kamias Road, in said City, in a careless, reckless, negligent, and imprudentmanner, by then and there making the said vehicle run at a speed greater than was reasonable and proper without taking the necessary precaution to avoid accident to person/s and damage to property, and considering the condition of the traffic at said place at the time, causing as a consequence of his said carelessness, negligence, imprudence and lack of precaution, the said vehicle so driven, managed and operated by him to hit and bump, as in fact it hit and bump a commercial apartment belonging to ERLINDA V. VALDELLON located at No. 31 Kamias Road, this City, thereby causing damages to said apartment in the total amount ofP171,088.46, Philippine Currency, to her damage and prejudice in the total amount aforementioned.CONTRARY TO LAW.[10]Valdellon also filed a separate civil complaint against Suelto and the bus company for damages.She prayed that after due proceedings, judgment be rendered in her favor, thus:WHEREFORE, it is respectfully prayed of this Honorable Court to issue a writ of preliminary attachment against the defendants upon approval of plaintiffs bond, and after trial on the merits, to render a decision in favor of the plaintiff, ordering the defendants, jointly and severally, to paya)the total sum ofP171,088.46 constituting the expenses for the repair of the damaged apartment of plaintiff, with interests to be charged thereon at the legal rate from the date of the formal demand until the whole obligation is fully paid;b)the sum of not less thanP20,000.00 each as compensatory and exemplary damages;c) the sum ofP20,000.00 as attorneys fees and the sum ofP1,000.00 for each appearance of plaintiffs counsel; and costs of suit;PLAINTIFF further prays for such other reliefs as may be just and equitable in the premises.[11]A joint trial of the two cases was ordered by the trial court.[12]The trial court conducted an ocular inspection of the damaged terrace, where defendants offered to have it repaired and restored to its original state.Valdellon, however, disagreed because she wanted the building demolished to give way for the construction of a new one.[13]During the trial, Valdellon testified on the damage caused to the terrace of her apartment, and, in support thereof, adduced in evidence a receipt forP35,000.00, dated October 20, 1993, issued by the BB Construction and Steel Fabricator for carpentry, masonry, welding job and electrical [work].[14]Pontiveros of the Office of the City Engineer testified that there was a need to change the column of the terrace, but that the building should also be demolished because if concrete is destroyed, [one] cannot have it restored to its original position.[15]Engr. Jesus Regal, Jr., the proprietor of the SSP Construction, declared that he inspected the terrace and estimated the cost of repairs, including labor, atP171,088.46.

Sueltotestified that at2:00 p.m.onOctober 3, 1992, he was driving the bus on its way toAyala Avenue,Makati, Metro Manila.When he reached the corner ofK-H StreetatKamias Road,Quezon City, a passenger jeepney suddenly crossed from EDSA going to V. Luna and swerved to the lane occupied by the bus.Suelto had to swerve the bus to the right upon which it hit the side front of the terrace of Valdellons two-door apartment.[16]Based on his estimate, the cost to the damage on the terrace of the apartment amounted toP40,000.00.[17]On cross-examination, Suelto declared that he saw the passenger jeepney when it was a meter away from the bus.Before then, he had seen some passenger jeepneys on the right trying to overtake one another.[18]Architect Arnulfo Galapate testified that the cost of the repair of the damaged terrace amounted toP55,000.00.[19]OnApril 28, 1994, the trial court rendered judgment finding Suelto guilty beyond reasonable doubt of reckless imprudence resulting in damage to property, and ordered MALTC and Suelto to pay, jointly and severally,P150,000.00 to Valdellon, by way of actual and compensatory damages, as well as attorneys fees and costs of suit.Thefalloof the decision reads:WHEREFORE, finding the accused FREDDIE SUELTO Y LIWAG guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of Reckless Imprudence Resulting in Damage to Property, said accused is hereby sentenced to suffer imprisonment of ONE (1) YEAR.With respect to the civil liability, judgment is hereby rendered in favor of plaintiff Erlinda Valdellon and against defendant Marikina Auto Line Transport Corporation and accused Freddie Suelto, where both are ordered, jointly and severally, to pay plaintiff:a.the sum ofP150,000.00, as reasonable compensation sustained by plaintiff for her damaged apartment;b.the sum ofP20,000.00, as compensatory and exemplary damages;

c.the sum ofP20,000.00, as attorneys fees; and,d.the costs of suit.SO ORDERED.[20]MALTC and Suelto, now appellants, appealed the decision to the CA, alleging that the prosecution failed to prove Sueltos guilt beyond reasonable doubt.They averred that the prosecution merely relied on Valdellon, who testified only on the damage caused to the terrace of her apartment which appellants also alleged was excessive.Appellant Suelto further alleged that he should be acquitted in the criminal case for the prosecutions failure to prove his guilt beyond reasonable doubt.He maintained that, in an emergency case, he was not, in law, negligent.Even if the appellate court affirmed his conviction, the penalty of imprisonment imposed on him by the trial court is contrary to law.In its Brief for the People of thePhilippines, the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG) submitted that the appealed decision should be affirmed with modification.On Sueltos claim that the prosecution failed to prove his guilt for the crime of reckless imprudence resulting in damage to property, the OSG contended that, applying the principle ofres ipsa loquitur, the prosecution was able to prove that he drove the bus with negligence and recklessness.The OSG averred that the prosecution was able to prove that Sueltos act of swerving the bus to the right was the cause of damage to the terrace of Valdellons apartment, and in the absence of an explanation to the contrary, the accident was evidently due to appellants want of care.Consequently, the OSG posited, the burden was on the appellant to prove that, in swerving the bus to the right, he acted on an emergency, and failed to discharge this burden.However, the OSG averred that the trial court erred in sentencing appellant to a straight penalty of one year, and recommended a penalty of fine.OnJune 20, 2000, the CA rendered judgment affirming the decision of the trial court, but the award for actual damages was reduced toP100,000.00.Thefalloof the decision reads:WHEREFORE, premises considered, the decision dated April 28, 1994, rendered by the courta quois AFFIRMED with the modification that the sum ofP150,000.00 as compensation sustained by the plaintiff-appellee for her damaged apartment be reduced toP100,000.00 without pronouncement as to costs.SO ORDERED.[21]Appellants filed a Motion for Reconsideration, but the CA denied the same.[22]MALTC and Suelto, now petitioners, filed the instant petition reiterating its submissions in the CA: (a) the prosecution failed to prove the crime charged against petitioner Suelto; (b) the prosecution failed to adduce evidence to prove that respondent suffered actual damages in the amount ofP100,000.00; and (c) the trial court erred in sentencing petitioner Suelto to one (1) year prison term.On the first issue, petitioners aver that the prosecution was mandated to prove that petitioner Suelto acted with recklessness in swerving the bus to the right thereby hitting the terrace of private respondents apartment.However, the prosecution failed to discharge its burden.On the other hand, petitioner Suelto was able to prove that he acted in an emergency when a passenger jeepney coming from EDSA towards the direction of the bus overtook another vehicle and, in the process, intruded into the lane of the bus.On the second issue, petitioners insist that private respondent was able to prove only the amount ofP35,000.00 by way of actual damages; hence, the award ofP100,000.00 is barren of factual basis.On the third issue, petitioner Suelto posits that the straight penalty of imprisonment recommended by the trial court, and affirmed by the CA, is contrary to Article 365 of the Revised Penal Code.The petition is partially granted.On the first issue, we find and so resolve that respondent People of the Philippines was able to prove beyond reasonable doubt that petitioner Suelto swerved the bus to the right with recklessness, thereby causing damage to the terrace of private respondents apartment.Although she did not testify to seeing the incident as it happened, petitioner Suelto himself admitted this in his answer to the complaint in Civil Case No. Q-93-16051, and when he testified in the trial court.Suelto narrated that he suddenly swerved the bus to the right of the road causing it to hit the column of the terrace of private respondent.Petitioners were burdened to prove that the damage to the terrace of private respondent was not the fault of petitioner Suelto.We have reviewed the evidence on record and find that, as ruled by the trial court and the appellate court, petitioners failed to prove that petitioner acted on an emergency caused by the sudden intrusion of a passenger jeepney into the lane of the bus he was driving.It was the burden of petitioners herein to prove petitioner Sueltos defense that he acted on an emergency, that is, he had to swerve the bus to the right to avoid colliding with a passenger jeep coming from EDSA that had overtaken another vehicle and intruded into the lane of the bus.The sudden emergency rule was enunciated by this Court inGan v. Court of Appeals,[23]thus:[O]ne who suddenly finds himself in a place of danger, and is required to act without time to consider the best means that may be adopted to avoid the impending danger, is not guilty of negligence if he fails to adopt what subsequently and upon reflection may appear to have been a better method unless the emergency in which he finds himself is brought about by his own negligence.Under Section 37 of Republic Act No. 4136, as amended, otherwise known as the Land Transportation and Traffic Code, motorists are mandated to drive and operate vehicles on the right side of the road or highway:SEC. 37.Driving on right side of highway.Unless a different course of action is required in the interest of the safety and the security of life, person or property, or because of unreasonable difficulty of operation in compliance herewith, every person operating a motor vehicle or an animal-drawn vehicle on a highway shall pass to the right when meeting persons or vehicles coming toward him, and to the left when overtaking persons or vehicles going the same direction, and when turning to the left in going from one highway to another, every vehicle shall be conducted to the right of the center of the intersection of the highway.Section 35 of the law provides, thus:Sec. 35.Restriction as to speed.(a) Any person driving a motor vehicle on a highway shall drive the same at a careful and prudent speed, not greater nor less than is reasonable and proper, having due regard for the traffic, the width of the highway, and of any other condition then and there existing; andno person shall drive any motor vehicle upon a highwayat such a speed as to endanger the life, limb and property of any person, norat a speed greater than will permit him to bring the vehicle to a stop within the assured clear distance ahead(emphasis supplied).In relation thereto, Article 2185 of the New Civil Code provides that unless there is proof to the contrary, it is presumed that a person driving a motor vehicle has been negligent, if at the time of mishap, he was violating any traffic regulation.By his own admission, petitioner Suelto violated the Land Transportation and Traffic Code when he suddenly swerved the bus to the right, thereby causing damage to the property of private respondent.However, the trial court correctly rejected petitioner Sueltos defense, in light of his contradictory testimony vis--vis his Counter-Affidavit submitted during the preliminary investigation:It is clear from the photographs submitted by the prosecution (Exhs. C, D, G, H & I) that the commercial apartment of Dr. Valdellon sustained heavy damage caused by the bus being driven by Suelto.It seems highly improbable that the said damages were not caused by a strong impact.And, it is quite reasonable to conclude that, at the time of the impact, the bus was traveling at a high speed when Suelto tried to avoid the passenger jeepney.Such a conclusion finds support in the decision of the Supreme Court in People vs. Ison, 173 SCRA 118, where the Court stated that physical evidence is of the highest order.It speaks more eloquently than a hundred witnesses.The pictures submitted do not lie, having been taken immediately after the incident.The damages could not have been caused except by a speeding bus.Had the accused not been speeding, he could have easily reduced his speed and come to a full stop when he noticed the jeep.Were he more prudent in driving, he could have avoided the incident or even if he could not avoid the incident, the damages would have been less severe.In addition to this, the accused has made conflicting statements in his counter-affidavit and his testimony in court.In the former, he stated that the reason why he swerved to the right was because he wanted to avoid the passenger jeepney in front of him that made a sudden stop.But, in his testimony in court, he said that it was to avoid a passenger jeepney coming from EDSA that was overtaking by occupying his lane.Such glaring inconsistencies on material points render the testimony of the witness doubtful and shatter his credibility.Furthermore, the variance between testimony and prior statements renders the witness unreliable.Such inconsistency results in the loss in the credibility of the witness and his testimony as to his prudence and diligence.As already maintained and concluded, the severe damages sustained could not have resulted had the accused acted as a reasonable and prudent man would.The accused was not diligent as he claims to be.What is more probable is that the accused had to swerve to the right and hit the commercial apartment of the plaintiff because he could not make a full stop as he was driving too fast in a usually crowded street.[24]Moreover, if the claim of petitioners were true, they should have filed a third-party complaint against the driver of the offending passenger jeepney and the owner/operator thereof.Petitioner Sueltos reliance on the sudden emergency rule to escape conviction for the crime charged and his civil liabilities based thereon is, thus, futile.On the second issue, we agree with the contention of petitioners that respondents failed to prove that the damages to the terrace caused by theincident amounted toP100,000.00.The only evidence adduced by respondents to prove actual damages claimed by private respondent were the summary computation of damage made byEngr. Jesus R. Regal, Jr. amounting toP171,088.46 and the receipt issued by the BB Construction and Steel Fabricator to private respondent forP35,000.00 representing cost for carpentry works, masonry, welding, and electrical works.Respondents failed to present Regal to testify on his estimation.In its five-page decision, the trial court awardedP150,000.00 as actual damages to private respondent but failed to state the factual basis for such award.Indeed, the trial court merely declared in the decretal portion of its decision that the sum ofP150,000.00 as reasonable compensation sustained by plaintiff for her damaged apartment.The appellate court, for its part, failed to explain how it arrived at the amount ofP100,000.00 in its three-page decision.Thus, the appellate court merely declared:With respect to the civil liability of the appellants, they contend that there was no urgent necessity to completely demolish the apartment in question considering the nature of the damages sustained as a result of the accident.Consequently, appellants continue, the award ofP150,000.00 as compensation sustained by the plaintiff-appellee for her damaged apartment is an unconscionable amount.The damaged portions of the apartment in question are not disputed.Considering the aforesaid damages which are the direct result of the accident, the reasonable, and adequate compensation due is hereby fixed atP100,000.00.[25]Under Article 2199 of the New Civil Code, actual damages include all the natural and probable consequences of the act or omission complained of, classified as one for the loss of what a person already possesses (dao emergente) and the other, for the failure to receive, as a benefit, that which would have pertained to him (lucro cesante).As expostulated by the Court inPNOC Shipping and Transport Corporation v. Court of Appeals:[26]

Under Article 2199 of the Civil Code, actual or compensatory damages are those awarded in satisfaction of, or in recompense for, loss or injury sustained.They proceed from a sense of natural justice and are designed to repair the wrong that has been done, to compensate for the injury inflicted and not to impose a penalty.In actions based on torts or quasi-delicts, actual damages include all the natural and probable consequences of the act or omission complained of.There are two kinds of actual or compensatory damages: one is the loss of what a person already possesses (dao emergente), and the other is the failure to receive as a benefit that which would have pertained to him (lucro cesante).[27]The burden of proof is on the party who would be defeated if no evidence would be presented on either side.The burden is to establish ones case by a preponderance of evidence which means that the evidence, as a whole, adduced by one side, is superior to that of the other.Actual damages are not presumed.The claimant must prove the actual amount of loss with a reasonable degree of certainty premised upon competent proof and on the best evidence obtainable.Specific facts that could afford a basis for measuring whatever compensatory or actual damages are borne must be pointed out.Actual damages cannot be anchored on mere surmises, speculations or conjectures.As the Court declared:As stated at the outset, to enable an injured party to recover actual or compensatory damages, he is required to prove the actual amount of loss with reasonable degree of certainty premised upon competent proof and on the best evidence available.The burden of proof is on the party who would be defeated if no evidence would be presented on either side.He must establish his case by a preponderance of evidence which means that the evidence, as a whole, adduced by one side is superior to that of the other.In other words, damages cannot be presumed and courts, in making an award, must point out specific facts that could afford a basis for measuring whatever compensatory or actual damages are borne.[28]The Court further declared that where goods are destroyed by the wrongful act of defendant, the plaintiff is entitled to their value at the time of the destruction, that is, normally, the sum of money which he would have to pay in the market for identical or essentially similar goods, plus in a proper case, damages for the loss of the use during the period before replacement.[29]While claimants bare testimonial assertions in support of their claims for damages should not be discarded altogether, however, the same should be admitted with extreme caution.Their testimonies should be viewed in light of claimants self-interest, hence, should not be taken as gospel truth.Such assertion should be buttressed by independent evidence.In the language of the Court:For this reason, Del Rosarios claim that private respondent incurred losses in the total amount ofP6,438,048.00 should be admitted with extreme caution considering that, because it was a bare assertion, it should be supported by independent evidence.Moreover, because he was the owner of private respondent corporation whatever testimony he would give with regard to the value of the lost vessel, its equipment and cargoes should be viewed in the light of his self-interest therein.We agree with the Court of Appeals that his testimony as to the equipment installed and the cargoes loaded on the vessel should be given credence considering his familiarity thereto.However, we do not subscribe to the conclusion that his valuation of such equipment, cargo, and the vessel itself should be accepted as gospel truth.We must, therefore, examine the documentary evidence presented to support Del Rosarios claim as regards the amount of losses.[30]An estimate of the damage cost will not suffice:Private respondents failed to adduce adequate and competent proof of the pecuniary loss they actually incurred.It is not enough that the damage be capable of proof but must be actually proved with a reasonable degree of certainty, pointing out specific facts that afford a basis for measuring whatever compensatory damages are borne.Private respondents merely sustained anestimated amountneeded for the repair of the roof of their subject building.What is more, whether the necessary repairs were caused only by petitioners alleged negligence in the maintenance of its school building, or included the ordinary wear and tear of the house itself, is an essential question that remains indeterminable.[31]We note, however, that petitioners adduced evidence that, in their view, the cost of the damage to the terrace of private respondent would amount toP55,000.00.[32]Accordingly, private respondent is entitled toP55,000.00 actual damages.We also agree with petitioner Sueltos contention that the trial court erred in sentencing him to suffer a straight penalty of one (1) year.This is so because under the third paragraph of Article 365 of the Revised Penal Code, the offender must be sentenced to pay a fine when the execution of the act shall have only resulted in damage to property.The said provision reads in full:ART. 365.Imprudence and negligence.Any person who, by reckless imprudence, shall commit any act which, had it been intentional, would constitute a grave felony, shall suffer the penalty ofarresto mayorin its maximum period, toprision correccionalin its medium period; if it would have constituted a less grave felony, the penalty ofarresto mayorin its minimum and medium periods shall be imposed; if it would have constituted a light felony, the penalty ofarresto menorin its maximum period shall be imposed.Any person who, by simple imprudence or negligence, shall commit an act which would, otherwise, constitute a grave felony, shall suffer the penalty ofarresto mayorin its medium and maximum periods; if it would have constituted a less serious felony, the penalty ofarresto mayorin its minimum period shall be imposed.When the execution of the act covered by this article shall have only resulted in damage to the property of another, the offender shall be punished by a fine ranging from an amount equal to the value of said damages to three times such value, but which shall in no case be less than 25 pesos.A fine not exceeding two hundred pesos and censure shall be imposed upon any person who, by simple imprudence or negligence, shall cause some wrong which, if done maliciously, would have constituted a light felony.In the imposition of these penalties, the courts shall exercise their sound discretion, without regard to the rules prescribed in Article 64 (Emphasis supplied).In the present case, the only damage caused by petitioner Sueltos act was to the terrace of private respondents apartment, costingP55,000.00.Consequently, petitioners contention that the CA erred in awardingP100,000.00 by way of actual damages to private respondent is correct.We agree that private respondent is entitled to exemplary damages, and find that the award given by the trial court, as affirmed by the CA, is reasonable.Considering the attendant circumstances, we rule that private respondent Valdellon is entitled to onlyP20,000.00 by way of exemplary damages.IN LIGHT OF ALL THE FOREGOING,the petition isPARTIALLYGRANTED.The joint decision of the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City isAFFIRMED WITH THE MODIFICATIONthat petitioner Suelto is sentenced to pay a fine ofP55,000.00 with subsidiary imprisonment in case of insolvency.Petitioners areORDEREDto pay to Erlinda V. Valdellon, jointly and severally, the total amount ofP55,000.00 by way of actual damages, andP20,000.00 by way of exemplary damages.No pronouncement as to costs.G.R. No. L-25499 February 18, 1970VILLA REY TRANSIT, INC.,petitioner,vs.THE COURT OF APPEALS, TRINIDAD A. QUINTOS, PRIMA A. QUINTOS, AND JULITA A. QUINTOS,respondents.Laurea and Pison for petitioner.Bonifacio M. Abad, Jr. for respondents.CONCEPCION,C.J.:Petitioner, Villa Rey Transit, Inc., seeks the review bycertiorariof a decision of the Court of Appeals affirming that of the Court of First Instance of Pangasinan. The basic facts are set forth in said decision of the Court of Appeals, from which We quote:At about 1:30 in the morning of March 17, 1960, an Izuzu First Class passenger bus owned and operated by the defendant, bearing Plate No. TPU-14871-Bulacan and driven by Laureano Casim, left Lingayen, Pangasinan, for Manila. Among its paying passengers was the deceased, Policronio Quintos, Jr. who sat on the first seat, second row, right side of the bus. At about 4:55 o'clock a.m. when the vehicle was nearing the northern approach of the Sadsaran Bridge on the national highway in barrio Sto. Domingo, municipality of Minalin, Pampanga, it frontally hit the rear side of a bullcart filled with hay. As a result the end of a bamboo pole placed on top of the hayload and tied to the cart to hold it in place, hit the right side of the windshield of the bus. The protruding end of the bamboo pole, about 8 feet long from the rear of the bullcart, penetrated through the glass windshield and landed on the face of Policronio Quintos, Jr. who, because of the impact, fell from his seat and was sprawled on the floor. The pole landed on his left eye and the bone of the left side of his face was fractured. He suffered other multiple wounds and was rendered unconscious due, among other causes to severe cerebral concussion. A La Mallorca passenger bus going in the opposite direction towards San Fernando, Pampanga, reached the scene of the mishap and it was stopped by Patrolman Felino Bacani of the municipal police force of Minalin who, in the meantime, had gone to the scene to investigate. Patrolman Bacani placed Policronio Quintos, Jr. and three other injured men who rode on the bullcart aboard the La Mallorca bus and brought them to the provincial hospital of Pampanga at San Fernando for medical assistance. Notwithstanding such assistance, Policronio Quintos, Jr. died at 3:15 p.m. on the same day, March 17, 1960, due to traumatic shock due to cerebral injuries.The private respondents, Trinidad, Prima and Julita, all surnamed Quintos, are the sisters and only surviving heirs of Policronio Quintos Jr., who died single, leaving no descendants nor ascendants. Said respondents herein brought this action against herein petitioner, Villa Rey Transit, Inc., as owner and operator of said passenger bus, bearing Plate No. TPU-14871-Bulacan, for breach of the contract of carriage between said petitioner and the deceased Policronio Quintos, Jr., to recover the aggregate sum of P63,750.00 as damages, including attorney's fees. Said petitioner defendant in the court of first instance contended that the mishap was due to a fortuitous event, but this pretense was rejected by the trial court and the Court of Appeals, both of which found that the accident and the death of Policronio had been due to the negligence of the bus driver, for whom petitioner was liable under its contract of carriage with the deceased. In the language of His Honor, the trial Judge:The mishap was not the result of any unforeseeable fortuitous event or emergency but was the direct result of the negligence of the driver of the defendant. The defendant must, therefore, respond for damages resulting from its breach of contract for carriage. As the complaint alleged a total damage of only P63,750.00 although as elsewhere shown in this decision the damages for wake and burial expenses, loss of income, death of the victim, and attorneys fee reach the aggregate of P79,615.95, this Court finds it just that said damages be assessed at total of only P63,750.00 as prayed for in plaintiffs' amended complaint.The despositive part of the decision of the trial Court reads:WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered ordering the defendant to pay to the plaintiffs the amount of P63,750.00 as damages for breach of contract of carriage resulting from the death of Policronio Quintos, Jr.which, as above indicated, was affirmed by the Court of Appeals. Hence, the present petition for review oncertiorari, filed by Villa Rey Transit, Inc.The only issue raised in this appeal is the amount of damages recoverable by private respondents herein. The determination of such amount depends, mainly upon two (2) factors, namely: (1) the number of years on the basis of which the damages shall be computed and (2) the rate at which the losses sustained by said respondents should be fixed.The first factor was based by the trial court the view of which was concurred in by the Court of Appeals upon the life expectancy of Policronio Quintos, Jr., which was placed at 33-1/3 years he being over 29 years of age (or around 30 years for purposes of computation) at the time of his demise by applying the formula (2/3 x [80-301 = life expectancy) adopted in the American Expectancy Table of Mortality or the actuarial of Combined Experience Table of Mortality. Upon the other hand, petitioner maintains that the lower courts had erred in adopting said formula and in not acting in accordance withAlcantara v. Surro1in which the damages were computed on a four (4) year basis, despite the fact that the victim therein was 39 years old, at the time of his death, and had a life expectancy of 28.90 years.The case cited is not, however, controlling in the one at bar. In the Alcantara case,noneof the parties had questioned the propriety of the four-year basis adopted by the trial court in making its award of damages. Both parties appealed, but only as regards theamountthereof. The plaintiffs assailed the non-inclusion, in its computation, of the bonus that the corporation, which was the victim's employer, had awarded to deserving officers and employees, based upon the profits earned less than two (2) months before the accident that resulted in his death. The defendants, in turn, objected to the sum awarded for the fourth year, which was treble that of the previous years, based upon the increases given, in that fourth year, tootheremployees of the same corporation. Neither this objection nor said claim for inclusion of the bonus was sustained by this Court. Accordingly, the same had not thereby laid down any rule on the length of time to be used in the computation of damages. On the contrary, it declared:The determination of the indemnity to be awarded to the heirs of a deceased person has thereforeno fixed basis. Much is left to the discretion of the court considering the moral and material damages involved, and so it has been said that"(t)here can be no exact or uniform rule for measuring the value of a human life and the measure of damages cannot be arrived at by precise mathematical calculation, but the amount recoverable depends on the particular facts and circumstances of each case. The life expectancy of the deceased or of the beneficiary, whichever is shorter, is an important factor.' (25 C.J.S. 1241.) Other factors that are usually considered are: (1) pecuniary loss to plaintiff or beneficiary (25 C.J.S. 1243-1250) ; (2) loss of support (25 C.J.S., 1250-1251); (3) loss of service (25 C.J.S. 1251-1254); (4) loss of society (25 C.J.S. 1254-1255); (5) mental suffering of beneficiaries (25 C.J.S., 1258-1259) ; and (6) medical and funeral expenses (26 C.J.S., 1254-1260)."2Thus, life expectancy is, not only relevant, but, also, animportantelement in fixing the amount recoverable by private respondents herein. Although it is not thesoleelement determinative of said amount, no cogent reason has been given to warrant its disregard and the adoption, in the case at bar, of a purely arbitrary standard, such as a four-year rule. In short, the Court of Appeals has not erred in basing the computation of petitioner's liability upon the life expectancy of Policronio Quintos, Jr.With respect to the rate at which the damages shall be computed, petitioner impugns the decision appealed from upon the ground that the damages awarded therein will have to be paidnow, whereas most of those sought to be indemnified will be sufferedyears later. This argument is basically true, and this is, perhaps, one of the reasons why the Alcantara case points out the absence of a "fixed basis" for the ascertainment of the damages recoverable in litigations like the one at bar. Just the same, the force of the said argument of petitioner herein is offset by the fact that, although payment of the award in the case at bar will have to take place upon the finality of the decision therein, the liability of petitioner herein had been fixed at the rate only of P2,184.00 a year, which is the annual salary of Policronio Quintos, Jr. at the time of his death, as a young "training assistant" in the Bacnotan Cement Industries, Inc. In other words, unlike the Alcantara case, on which petitioner relies, the lower courts did not consider, in the present case, Policronio's potentiality and capacity toincreasehis future income. Indeed, upon the conclusion of histrainingperiod, he was supposed to have a better job and be promoted from time to time, and, hence, to earn more, if not considering the growing importance of trade, commerce and industry and the concomitant rise in the income level of officers and employeestherein much more.At this juncture, it should be noted, also, that We are mainly concerned with the determination of the losses or damages sustained by the private respondents, as dependents and intestate heirs of the deceased, and that said damages consist,notof the full amount of his earnings, but of the support, they received or would have received from him had he not died in consequence of the negligence of petitioner's agent. In fixing the amount of that support, We must reckon with the "necessary expenses of his own living", which should be deducted from his earnings. Thus, it has been consistently held that earning capacity, as an element of damages to one's estate for his death by wrongful act is necessarily his net earning capacity or his capacity to acquire money, "less the necessary expense for his own living.3Stated otherwise, the amount recoverable is not loss of the entire earning, but rather the loss of thatportionof the earnings which the beneficiary would have received.4In other words, only net earnings, not gross earning, are to be considered5that is, the total of the earningslessexpenses necessary in the creation of such earnings or income6and less living and other incidental expenses.7All things considered, We are of the opinion that it is fair and reasonable to fix the deductible living and other expenses of the deceased at the sum of P1,184.00 a year, or about P100.00 a month, and that, consequently, the loss sustained by his sisters may be roughly estimated at P1,000.00 a year or P33,333.33 for the 33-1/3 years of his life expectancy. To this sum of P33,333.33, the following should be added: (a) P12,000.00, pursuant to Arts. 104 and 107 of the Revised Penal Code, in relation to Article 2206 of our Civil Code, as construed and applied by this Court;8(b) P1,727.95, actually spent by private respondents for medical and burial expenses; and (c) attorney's fee, which was fixed by the trial court, at P500.00, but which, in view of the appeal taken by petitioner herein, first to the Court of Appeals and later to this Supreme Court, should be increased to P2,500.00. In other words, the amount adjudged in the decision appealed from should be reduced to the aggregate sum of P49,561.28, with interest thereon, at the legal rate, from December 29, 1961, date of the promulgation of the decision of the trial court.Thus modified, said decision and that of the Court of Appeals are hereby affirmed, in all other respects, with costs against petitioner, Villa Rey Transit, Inc. It is so ordered.Reyes, J.B.L., Dizon, Makalintal, Zaldivar, Sanchez, Castro, Fernando, Teehankee, Barredo and Villamor, JJ., concur.SECOND DIVISION

[G.R. No. 95582. October 7, 1991.]

DANGWA TRANSPORTATION CO., INC. and THEODORE LARDIZABAL y MALECDAN,Petitioners, v. COURT OF APPEALS, INOCENCIA CUDIAMAT, EMILIA CUDIAMAT BANDOY, FERNANDO CUDIAMAT, MARRIETA CUDIAMAT, NORMA CUDIAMAT, DANTE CUDIAMAT, SAMUEL CUDIAMAT and LIGAYA CUDIAMAT, all Heirs of the late Pedrito Cudiamat represented by Inocencia Cudiamat,Respondents.

Francisco S. Reyes Law Office, forPetitioners.

Antonio C. de Guzman for private-respondents.

SYLLABUS

1. REMEDIAL LAW; EVIDENCE; FACTUAL FINDINGS OF THE COURT OF APPEALS; RULE AND EXCEPTION. It is an established principle that the factual findings of the Court of Appeals as a rule are final and may not be reviewed by this Court on appeal. However, this is subject to settle exceptions, one which is when the findings of the appellate court are contrary to those of the trial court, in which case a reexamination of the facts and evidence may be undertaken.

2. CIVIL LAW; COMMON CARRIERS; LIABLE FOR INJURIES SUFFERED BY BOARDING PASSENGERS RESULTING FROM THE PREMATURE ACCELERATION OF THEIR CONVEYANCES. The contention of petitioners that the driver and the conductor had no knowledge that the victim would ride on the bus, since the latter had supposedly not manifested his intention to board the same, does not merit consideration. When the bus is not motion there is no necessity for a person who wants to ride the same to signal his intention to board. A public utility bus, once it stops, is in effect making a continuous offer to bus riders. Hence, it becomes the duty of the driver and the conductor, every time the bus stops, to do no act that would have the effect of increasing the peril to a passenger while he was attempting to board the same. The premature acceleration of the bus in this case was a breach of such duty. It is the duty of common carriers of passengers, including common carriers by railroad train, streetcar, or motorbus, to stop their conveyances a reasonable length of time in order to afford passengers an opportunity to board and enter, and they are liable for injuries suffered by boarding passengers resulting from the sudden starting up or jerking of their conveyances while they are doing so.

3. ID.; ID.; ID.; BOARDING AND ALIGHTING FROM A SLOWLY MOVING VEHICLE; NOT A NEGLIGENCE PER SE. It is not negligence per se, or as a matter of law, for one to attempt to board a train or streetcar which is moving slowly. An ordinarily prudent person would have made the attempt to board the moving conveyance under the same or similar circumstances. The fact that passengers board and alight from a slowly moving vehicle is a matter of common experience and both the driver and conductor in this case could not have been unaware of such an ordinary practice.

4. ID.; ID.; ID.; LIABILITY THEREOF; EXTENDS TO PERSONS BOARDING THE VEHICLE AS WELL AS THOSE ALIGHTING THEREFROM. The victim herein, by stepping and standing on the platform of the bus, is already considered a passenger and is entitled to all the rights and protection pertaining to such a contractual relation. Hence, it has been held that the duty which the carrier of passengers owes to its patrons extends to persons boarding the cars as well as to those alighting therefrom. (Del Prado v. Manila Electric Co., supra.)

5. ID.; ID.; ID.; BOUND TO OBSERVE EXTRAORDINARY DILIGENCE FOR THE SAFETY OF THE PASSENGERS TRANSPORTED BY THEM. Common carriers, from the nature of their business and for reasons of public policy, are bound to observe extraordinary diligence for the safety of the passengers transported by them, according to all the circumstances of each case. A common carrier is bound to carry the passengers safely as far as human care and foresight can provide, using the utmost diligence of very cautious persons, with a due regard for all the circumstances. (Art. 1755, Civil Code.)

6. ID.; DAMAGES; ACTION BASED ON A CONTRACT OF CARRIAGE; FINDING OF FAULT OR NEGLIGENCE ON THE PART OF CARRIER NEED NOT BE EXPRESS. It has also been repeatedly held that in an action based on a contract of carriage, the court need not make an express finding of fault or negligence on the part of the carrier in order to hold it responsible to pay the damages sought by the passenger. By the contract of carriage, the carrier assumes the express obligation to transport the passenger to destination safety and to observe extraordinary diligence with a cure regard for all the circumstances, and any injury that might be suffered by the passenger is right away attributable to the fault or negligence of the carrier. This is an exception to the general rule that negligence must be proved, and it is therefore incumbent upon the carrier to prove that it has exercised extraordinary diligence as prescribed in Articles 1733 and 1755 of the Civil Code.

7. ID.; ID.; ID.; ACTUAL OR COMPENSATORY DAMAGES; RULE IN DETERMINING THE AMOUNT THEREOF. With respect to the award of damages, an oversight was, however, committed by respondent Court of Appeals in computing the actual damages based on the gross income of the victim. The rule is that the amount recoverable by the heirs of a victim of a tort is not the loss of the entire earnings, but rather the loss of that portion of the earnings which the beneficiary would have received. In other words, only net earnings, not gross earnings, are to be considered, that is, the total of the earnings less expenses necessary in the creation of such earnings or income and minus living and other incidental expenses.

D E C I S I O N

REGALADO,J.:

On May 13, 1985, private respondents filed a complaint 1 for damages against petitioners for the death of Pedrito Cudiamat as a result of a vehicular accident which occurred on March 25, 1985 at Marivic, Sapid, Mankayan, Benguet. Among others, it was alleged that on said date, while petitioner Theodore M. Lardizabal was driving a passenger bus belonging to petitioner corporation in a reckless and imprudent manner and without due regard to traffic rules and regulations and safety to persons and property, it ran over its passenger, Pedrito Cudiamat. However, instead of bringing Pedrito immediately to the nearest hospital, the said driver, in utter bad faith and without regard to the welfare of the victim, first brought his other passengers and cargo to their respective destinations before bringing said victim to the Lepanto Hospital where he expired.

On the other hand, petitioners alleged that they had observed and continued to observe the extraordinary diligence required in the operation of the transportation company and the supervision of the employees, even as they add that they are not absolute insurers of the safety of the public at large. Further, it was alleged that it was the victims own carelessness and negligence which gave rise to the subject incident, hence they prayed for the dismissal of the complaint plus an award of damages in their favor by way of a counterclaim.chanrobles.com:cralaw:red

On July 29, 1988, the trial court rendered a decision, effectively in favor of petitioners, with this decretal portion:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph

"IN VIEW OF ALL THE FOREGOING, judgment is hereby pronounced that Pedrito Cudiamat was negligent, which negligence was the proximate cause of his death. Nonetheless, defendants in equit