g: pp ex ookskeyword5406-dovidio5406-dovidio-ch05schaller/SchallerConwayPeavy2010.pdf · [16:03...

[16:03 21/1/2010 5406-dovidio-ch05.tex] Job No: 5406 Dovidio: The Sage Handbook of Prejudice, Stereotyping and Discrimination Page: 81 81–96

5Evolutionary Processes

Mark Schal ler , Lucian Gideon Conway I I I , andK. Michel le Peavy

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ABSTRACT

Two kinds of evolutionary processes inform psychological research on stereotypes and prejudices. Oneis a process through which genetic variants are selectively transmitted from individuals to their offspringthrough sexual reproduction; this process has shaped psychological mechanisms that characterizecontemporary human populations. The other is a process through which knowledge structures areselectively transmitted between individuals through interpersonal communication; this process shapes thebelief systems that characterize human cultures. Inquiry into the first kind of process (genetic evolution)produces novel discoveries about contemporary human prejudices and the cues that trigger them. Inquiryinto the second kind of process (cultural evolution) produces novel discoveries about the contents ofpopular stereotypes. This chapter reviews these bodies of research, and their implications.

EVOLUTIONARY PROCESSES

Two distinct types of evolutionary process arerelevant to the psychology of stereotypes andprejudices. One is articulated within the vastscientific literature on human evolutionarybiology. This is a process through whichsome genetic variants, rather than others, areselectively transmitted from individuals totheir offspring through sexual reproduction,with resulting consequences for the pheno-typic characteristics of human populations.The human brain is a product of this evolu-tionary process. Consequently, understandinghow the brain evolved in response to selectionpressures in ancestral environments leadsto novel discoveries about psychologicalphenomena in contemporary environments.

The other kind of evolutionary processfocuses not on genes, but on memes –a word coined by the biologist RichardDawkins (1976) to refer to the vast arrayof cognitive structures (such as stereotypes)and behavioral tendencies that may, or maynot, become widespread within a popula-tion. Some memes, rather than others, areespecially likely to be transmitted fromone individual to another (through ordinaryinterpersonal communication processes), andthis selective interpersonal transmission hasimplications for the shared belief systemsthat define human cultures. This process –conceptually distinct from but analogousto genetic evolution (Mesoudi, Whiten, &Laland, 2006) – has been referred tovariously as ‘social evolution,‘ ‘socio-cultural


82 BASIC PROCESSES AND CAUSES OF PREJUDICE, STEREOTYPING, AND DISCRIMINATION

evolution,‘ and ‘cultural evolution.‘ For theremainder of this chapter we use the latterterm.

Both processes are ‘evolutionary‘ in thesense that, over a period of time, some variantsof information (either genes or memes) aremore likely than others to be selectivelytransmitted and selectively retained withina population. But the mechanistic details ofeach process are very different, and theyhave very different kinds of implicationswhen applied to the psychology of preju-dices and stereotypes. Genetic evolutionaryprocesses operate across vast time scales,and are not themselves the subject of directempirical inquiry within the psychologicalsciences. Rather, rigorous theorizing aboutthe consequences of human genetic evolutionprovides a logical framework within whichit is possible to deduce novel hypothesesabout the contemporary human prejudices andthe variables that influence these prejudices(e.g., the hypothesis, and consequent empir-ical discovery, that women are especiallyxenophobic and ethnocentric during the fewweeks of pregnancy; Navarrete, Fessler, &Eng, 2007). In contrast, cultural evolutionaryprocesses often occur within relatively shortperiods of time, and so can be empiricallyobserved with psychological research meth-ods. Among these empirical observationsare novel findings pertaining to variablesthat influence the emergence, persistence,and change of widespread stereotypes (e.g.,the finding that interpersonal communicationnorms predict changes in the specific contentsof African-American stereotypes over thecourse of the twentieth century; Schaller,Conway, & Tanchuck, 2002). Conceptuallydistinct bodies of psychological researchreveal the implications of each kind ofevolutionary process. This chapter reviewsthese bodies of research.

We begin with a brief historical overview.Then, in the second section we reviewmany different ways in which conceptualspeculations about human genetic evolutionhave led to novel discoveries about contem-porary human prejudices. In the third section,we review research on cultural evolutionary

processes and their consequences on thecontents of popular stereotypes. In the fourthand final section, we discuss integrativethemes and directions for future research.

HISTORICAL BACKGROUND

Evolutionary approaches to human behaviorhave scholarly roots that are both longand deep. Darwin’s (1859) original treatiseon evolution by natural selection focusedon non-human species, but several of hissubsequent books attended more explicitly tohuman evolution and implications for specifickinds of psychological phenomena, such asemotions (Darwin, 1871, 1872). Since then,enormous bodies of research have articulatedthe evolutionary origins of human cognitionand behavior. Inquiries into evolutionary ori-gins focus mainly on processes that operatedon ancestral populations over long periodsof time. In contrast, psychological inquiriestypically focus on processes operating at anindividual level of analysis, usually withinvery short periods of time. Given thesedifferent levels of analysis, insights aboutthe evolutionary origins of human behaviordo not translate easily into sophisticatedhypotheses about contemporary psychologi-cal processes. Only in the last few decadeshave psychological scientists begun to employevolutionary principles to develop and testsuch hypotheses (for reviews, see Buss, 2005;Crawford & Krebs, 2008; Dunbar & Barrett,2007; Gangestad & Simpson, 2007; Schaller,Simpson, & Kenrick, 2006).

Donald Campbell was among the firstpsychological scientists to seriously considerthe implications of human genetic evolu-tion for the psychology of prejudice. In achapter titled ‘Ethnocentric and Other Altru-istic Motives,’ Campbell (1965a) discussedthe psychological connections between twosuperficially distinct phenomena – altruismand ethnocentrism – suggesting that theevolutionary bases of altruism may haveadditional implications for intergroup preju-dices as well. The influence of Campbell’swork on this topic is apparent in many


EVOLUTIONARY PROCESSES 83

contemporary programs of prejudice research(e.g., Brewer, 1999; Brewer & Caporael,2006), and is discussed more extensivelybelow.

Campbell was also instrumental in intro-ducing the study of cultural evolutionary pro-cesses to the psychological sciences. Inquiryinto cultural evolution has an even longerhistory than theories of genetic evolutionaryprocesses (Hull, 1988). But, again, becausethe consequences of cultural evolution man-ifest at the level of whole populations, andnot just individuals, these processes areeasily viewed as lying largely outside thedomain of psychological inquiry. Campbell(1965b, 1974, 1975) published a series ofimportant articles in which he articulatedthe implications of cultural evolutionaryprocesses for exactly the kinds of things –knowledge structures and social behaviors –that psychologists care about.

Stereotypes are, of course, also among thethings that psychologists care about. Thereis a venerable tradition of psychologicalresearch devoted to assessing and docu-menting changes in widespread stereotypes(e.g., Katz & Braly, 1933; Madon et al.,2001), as well as on how stereotypes arecommunicated from one person to another(e.g., Clark & Kashima, 2007; Lyons &Kashima, 2003; Ruscher, 1998, 2001). Thelogic of cultural evolution provides a setof conceptual tools through which thesetwo research traditions can be connected,such that stereotype communication affectsthe contents of widely shared stereotypes.Thus, just as cultural evolutionary processesinfluence the myths, legends, and othernarratives that define popular culture (e.g.,Heath, Bell, & Sternberg, 2001; Norenzayan,Atran, Faulkner, & Schaller, 2006), theseprocesses also influence the extent to whichsome stereotypes, rather than others, haveenduring social consequences.

We elaborate below on the implications ofcultural evolution for the study of stereotypes.But first, we review the more substantial bodyof research that focuses on human geneticevolution and its implications for the studyof human prejudices.

GENETIC EVOLUTION AND THEPSYCHOLOGY OF PREJUDICE(S)

Evolutionary inquiry into human psychol-ogy assumes that if (a) some specificpsychological tendency has some geneticbasis, and (b) that psychological tendency,relative to alternative tendencies, promotesreproductive fitness (i.e., the perpetuationof genes into subsequent generations), then(c) that specific psychological tendency(along with its genetic basis) will becomeincreasingly widespread within a popula-tion. Within that meta-theoretical framework,specific hypotheses can be deduced byidentifying ecological circumstances that,over long stretches of human evolution-ary history, were likely to have imposedenduring selection pressures on psycholog-ical tendencies that conferred higher levelsof reproductive fitness. In the absence ofany countervailing selection pressure, theseadaptive psychological tendencies are pre-sumed to have become widespread withinthe population, influencing human affect,cognition, and behavior in contemporaryenvironments.

These psychological adaptations may takemany forms, including attentional biases(Maner, Gailliot, Rouby, & Miller, 2007),cognitive shortcuts in information processing(Gigerenzer et al., 1999), competencies in log-ical reasoning (Cosmides & Tooby, 2005), andmeans of learning and knowledge acquisition(Öhman & Mineka, 2001). When applied tothe psychology of prejudice, this adaptationistlogic typically focuses on specific stimulus–response associations, such as the tendencyfor a specific superficial characteristic (a facialscar, for example) to trigger a particularset of affective, cognitive, and/or behavioralresponses. Many lines of research haveidentified prejudices (i.e., specific stimulus–response associations) that are likely to havebeen adaptive over the course of humanhistory. Importantly, this body of work doesmuch more than merely speculate about theevolutionary origins of these prejudices; italso has produced many novel hypothesesspecifying particular circumstances under



which these prejudices are either more, or less,likely to emerge.

Obligatory interdependenceand ingroup favoritism

One line of research emerges from the factthat, compared to many other species, homosapiens is an unimposing physical specimen.Humans are relatively weak, and lack thephysical weaponry (sharp fangs, claws, ortalons) and protective armor (thick hides,hard shells) that characterize many otherspecies. Human offspring also mature slowly.These limitations are likely to have imposedsevere fitness costs on individuals who livedsolitary lifestyles. These limitations are ame-liorated, however, for individuals who livewithin the protective milieu of a coalitionalgroup. Humans also are characterized byextraordinary psychological proficiencies –including capacities for language, planning,and perspective-taking. These psychologicalassets would be valuable under any circum-stance, but are especially powerful aids toreproductive fitness when employed within agroup context where knowledge (e.g., whereto find food, how to construct a weapon) can bepassed on to others. Thus, compared to thosewho pursued solitary lifestyles, significantfitness benefits accrued to our ancestors wholived in highly interdependent, cooperativegroups. Thus, it has been speculated that thereevolved psychological mechanisms disposinghumans toward a lifestyle characterized byobligatory interdependence with other people(Brewer, 1997; Brewer & Caporael, 2006).

Interdependence is not without its perils.In any population characterized by obligationsto others, there is the risk of exploitationby individuals who reap benefits from oth-ers’ largesse while neglecting to contributeto the common good. Many psychologicaladaptations have been identified that mayhelp resolve this dilemma (e.g., Cosmides &Tooby, 2005). One set of adaptations isspecifically relevant to intergroup prejudice:Psychological mechanisms that allow individ-uals to identify the boundaries of a coalitionalingroup so as to behave altruistically toward

individuals within the ingroup, but not toindividuals outside this boundary (Brewer,1999; Brewer & Caporael, 2006; Campbell,1965a).

An important implication of this analysis isthat the resulting prejudice (favoring membersof coalitional ingroups, relative to others) rep-resents ingroup favoritism (preference for theingroup) rather than outgroup derogation (dis-like of outgroups). Thus, ingroup favoritismneed not be associated with any aversiveresponse toward outgroups (Brewer, 2007).This implication is consistent with the resultsof experiments conducted within the ‘minimalgroups paradigm’(which assesses evaluationsof, and rewards allocated to, ad-hoc groupscreated in laboratory environments) that showgreater evidence of ingroup favoritism thanoutgroup derogration (Brewer, 1999). Indeed,ingroup favoritism can be shown even inthe absence of an outgroup (Brewer, 1979;Gaertner, Iuzzini, Witt, & Orina, 2006).

The evolution of coalitionalpsychology and its implications

Theoretical inquiry into the evolutionaryimportance of coalitional groups has yieldedadditional implications. One is that manycontemporary social categorizations (e.g.,categorizations based on race or ethnicity) –and the prejudices associated with them –are context-specific manifestations of deeper,universal psychological mechanisms thatevolved to distinguish between coalitionalingroups and outgroups.Although individualsmay be hyper-vigilant to markers of raceor ethnicity in some contemporary culturalcontexts, this tendency exists not becausethere is anything evolutionarily fundamentalabout race or ethnicity, but because race andethnicity happen to be superficial markersfor the evolutionarily fundamental distinctionbetween coalitional groups. As a conse-quence, the perceptual and mnemonic potencyof racial cues (e.g., skin color) may disappearunder circumstances in which other, evenmore powerful indicators of coalitional groupmembership exist. One set of studies foundthat any tendency to categorize individuals



according to race entirely disappeared whenthose individuals wore clothing (sports teamuniforms) that served as more meaning-ful signal of coalitional group membership(Kurzban, Tooby, & Cosmides, 2001).

The emphasis on coalitional groups stemsfrom the assumption that strong fitnessbenefits accrue to individuals who live withincoalitional groups. These benefits are greatestwhen within-group interaction is efficient,cooperative, and coordinated by normativerules. Any breakdown in social coordinationimposes fitness costs. Thus, prejudices againstindividuals who threatened social coordina-tion may have evolved (Neuberg, Smith, &Asher, 2000; Schaller & Neuberg, 2008).Coalitional outgroup members may representone such threat, because they likely adhereto rules and norms that deviate from thoseobserved within an ingroup. This impliesone evolutionary basis for xenophobia. Butingroup members may also undermine socialcoordination if they exhibit attitudes or behav-iors that deviate from important group norms,implying an evolutionary basis for prejudicesdirected against ingroup members who violategroup norms. Such deviant ingroup membersare especially likely to be targets of prejudiceunder conditions in which their counter-normative attitudes appear especially likelyto undermine effective group coordination,such as when those individuals are in positionsof influence over others. Consistent withthis implication, employment discriminationagainst homosexuals is especially strongwhen they are being considered for positionsthat connote considerable social influence(e.g., schoolteachers), compared to positions(e.g., jobs in the retail industry) that pro-vide less opportunity for far-reaching socialinfluence (Neuberg et al., 2000).

Different fitness-relevant threatsand different prejudice syndromes

A deficit in social coordination is just one kindof fitness-relevant cost that may result fromthe actions (or mere presence) of other people.Fitness costs may also be implied by specificattitudes, actions, or characteristics. People

who fail to reciprocate acts of generositycan impose fitness costs. So can people whothreaten one’s physical safety (e.g., throughacts of aggression) or health (e.g., becausethey have an infectious disease). Kurzbanand Leary (2001) argued that specific psy-chological mechanisms evolved to stigmatize,discriminate against, and socially excludeindividuals who represent these threats.

Importantly, this line of reasoning hasimplications that extend far beyond themere observation that people do not muchlike folks who pose threats to their fitness.Neuberg and his colleagues (Cottrell &Neuberg, 2005; Neuberg & Cottrell, 2006;Schaller & Neuberg, 2008) have suggestedthat qualitatively different kinds of fitnessthreats are associated with psychologicallydistinct prejudices. Thus, just as different non-social threats (predators, poisons) inspire verydifferent emotional responses (fear, disgust),different social threats inspire very differentprejudice syndromes – defined by distinctaffective experiences, cognitive associations,and behavioral consequences (Neuberg &Cottrell, 2006). Each prejudice syndromerepresents a functionally adaptive responseto a particular form of threat. Consistentwith this evolutionary analysis, empiricalevidence reveals that different social groupsare associated with functionally distinct kindsof threat and, correspondingly, distinct emo-tional responses (Cottrell & Neuberg, 2005).This evolutionary analysis implies that thepsychology of prejudice is more accuratelycharacterized as the psychology of prejudices(plural).

An additional implication (with importantpractical applications) is that each distinctprejudice syndrome may vary across contexts,depending on the extent to which perceiversfeel vulnerable to different types of threats.According to Neuberg and Cottrell (2006,p. 174), if prejudice syndromes are indeedresponses to specific threats … they oughtto be triggered more easily, and experiencedmore intensely, in some (specific) situations(i.e., those that suggest a vulnerability to thetarget-relevant threat) and for some (specific)individuals (i.e., those who have a low

Mark Schaller

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The remainder of this paragraph -- everything from "if prejudice syndromes..." to "...the target-relevant threat)" -- is actually a quote. (In the original manuscript it was a block quote; maybe the indents got lost in the typesetting.) Please do something to indicate that it's a quote: Either (a) make it a block quote or (b) put open quotes immediately before "if prejudice syndromes..." and close quotes after "...target-relevant threat)."



threshold for perceiving – accurately or not –the target-relevant threat).

Supporting evidence emerges mainly fromtwo distinct research programs, one of whichfocuses on the threat of interpersonal aggres-sion, and the other on the threat of disease. Webriefly review each.

Implied threat of interpersonalaggression and its implications

Throughout much of human evolutionary his-tory, intergroup contact was often associatedwith an increased likelihood of interpersonalaggression and physical injury (Schaller &Neuberg, 2008). As a consequence, psycho-logical mechanisms (and their underlyinggenetic bases) may have evolved to disposeindividuals to implicitly associate outgroupmembers with traits connoting aggression,violence, and danger. But, while there maybe fitness benefits associated with such preju-dicial beliefs (e.g., hypervigilant avoidance ofpotentially-dangerous intergroup encounters),there may be costs as well (e.g., caloric costsassociated with the fearful avoidance behav-iors). Therefore, these prejudice processesare expected to be sensitive to additionalinformation indicating the extent to whichtheir benefits outweigh their costs. The upshotis that prejudicial responses are especiallylikely to be triggered under conditions inwhich perceivers sense that they may beespecially vulnerable to danger, but maybe muted when perceivers feel relativelyinvulnerable.

This line of reasoning has resulted in noveldiscoveries about when specific prejudicialbeliefs (but not others) emerge. For instance,people typically feel more vulnerable todanger when they are in the dark (Grillon,Pellowski, Merikangas, & Davis, 1997). Con-sequently, ambient darkness disposes peopleto perceive ethnic outgroups to be moreaggressive and hostile – and this effect is espe-cially pronounced among individuals whoare chronically concerned with interpersonalthreat (Schaller, Park, & Faulkner, 2003a,2003b). Importantly, this effect is specificto prejudicial beliefs along danger-connoting

traits (e.g., hostility); no such effect isobserved on equally negative but danger-irrelevant traits (e.g., ignorance).

In fact, while increased vulnerabilitypromotes evaluatively negative stereotypicbeliefs on traits connoting aggression anduntrustworthiness, it can actually promoteostensibly positive stereotypic beliefs alongother trait dimensions (such as competenceor agency). For example, in an experimentconducted within the context of the ongoingethnic conflict in Sri Lanka, a temporarilyincreased sense of vulnerability caused Sin-halese Sri Lankans to perceive an ethnicoutgroup (Sri Lankan Tamils) as especiallyaggressive, but also as especially skillful andcompetent (Schaller & Abeysinghe, 2006) –presumably because, in the context of malev-olent intentions, a high level of competenceconnotes an especially high level of danger.

This perspective implies gender differencesas well. Historically, violent intergroup con-tact was especially likely to occur betweenmales. This implies that men (compared towomen) are especially likely to perceiveoutgroup members as stereotypically dan-gerous, and are especially prone to havethese prejudicial perceptions triggered bycontextual cues (such as darkness) connotingvulnerability to harm. Several studies showsuch gender differences (see Schaller &Neuberg, 2008). In addition, given theirgreater physical strength and aggressiveness,men have typically posed a greater fitness-relevant threat to others. This implies that(compared to female outgroup members)male outgroup members are especially likelyto trigger danger-connoting cognitive andaffective associations and this has been shownto be so (Maner et al., 2005; Navarrete,Olsson, Ho, Mendes, Thomsen, & Sidanius,2009).

Finally, this line of theorizing has importantimplications in the domain of person memory.There is a well documented cross-raceface recognition bias, such that perceiversare very accurate at distinguishing betweenindividual ingroup members, but not soaccurate at distinguishing between outgroupmembers (Anthony, Copper, & Mullen, 1992).

Mark Schaller

Sticky Note

These citations are presented in a misleading manner, wrongly implying two separate articles by Schaller, Park, & Faulkner. In fact, only the first citation is to Schaller, Park, & Faulkner, 2003. The second citation should be to Schaller, Park, & Mueller, 2003. I'd recommend revising the citations to read, more accurately, as follows: "Schaller, Park, & Faulkner, 2003; Schaller, Park, & Mueller, 2003".



The bias is commonly presumed to resultfrom constraints on perceivers’ perceptualprocessing capacities and from perceivers’tendency to pragmatically allocate perceptualresources (e.g., Sporer, 2001). The evolu-tionary framework yields new explanatoryand predictive insights. Limited cognitiveresources (necessary for the encoding andmemory for individuating facial features) arelikely to be selectively allocated to thoseindividuals who are presumed to have themost immediate implications for reproductivefitness: members of coalitional ingroups.However, any potentially aggressive indi-vidual (as indicated by an obviously angryfacial expression) is highly fitness-relevant,whether a member of an ingroup or outgroup.It follows that recognition memory for angryfaces is likely to be highly accurate even foroutgroup members and this has been shownto be the case (Ackerman et al., 2006). Infact, historically, angry outgroup membersmay have posed especially profound threatsto reproductive fitness (compared to angryingroup members, whose actual aggressionmay be muted by norms prescribing within-group cooperation). Thus, perceivers mayactually be especially accurate in recognizingangry outgroup faces – a reversal of theface-recognition bias. Exactly such a reversaldoes emerge in studies assessing recognitionmemory for angry faces (Ackerman et al.,2006).

Implied threat of diseasetransmission and its implications

Even well-meaning individuals pose a threatto reproductive fitness if they carry infectiouspathogens. Given the powerful fitness costsassociated with pathogenic diseases, therelikely evolved a suite of psychological mech-anisms that sensitize perceivers to others whoappear to pose an infection risk, and that facil-itate aversive responses to those individuals.Moreover, consistent with the evolutionarycost–benefit logic discussed above, theseprejudicial responses are especially likelyto be triggered under conditions in whichperceivers feel especially vulnerable to the

transmission of disease, but may be mutedwhen perceivers feel relatively invulnerableto disease transmission (Schaller & Duncan,2007).

Because pathogenic diseases are associatedwith a wide range of morphological andbehavioral anomalies, anomalous appearanceof just about any kind may trigger prejudicialresponses – even if these anomalies are notactually symptomatic of disease (Kurzban &Leary, 2001; Schaller & Duncan, 2007).Indeed, under circumstances in whichindividuals feel especially vulnerable toinfectious diseases, they show especiallystrong implicit prejudices against peoplecharacterized by many different kinds of non-normative physical characteristics, includingpeople who are physically disabled, obese,or elderly (Duncan & Schaller, 2009; Park,2003; Park, Schaller, & Crandall, 2007). Infact, physical unattractiveness of any kindmight serve as a sort of crude heuristic cue forill-health, and may thus lead to aversive traitinferences (Zebrowitz, Fellous, Mignault, &Andreoletti, 2003).

This particular prejudice syndrome mayalso contribute to xenophobia and ethnocen-trism. Historically, intergroup contact led toincreased exposure to pathogenic diseases.Also, given that many cultural norms (e.g.,pertaining to hygiene practices and foodpreparation) serve as buffers against infection,contact with subjectively foreign peoples(those who ascribe to different culturalnorms) may have posed an especially highrisk of disease transmission. Consequently,people are likely to heuristically associatesubjectively foreign outgroups with the threatof disease. This analysis suggests a disease-avoidance basis for xenophobia and eth-nocentrism, with the additional implicationthat xenophobia and ethnocentrism may beexaggerated when perceivers feel especiallyvulnerable to infection. This appears tobe the case (Faulkner, Schaller, Park, &Duncan, 2004): When Canadians perceivethemselves to be especially vulnerable todisease, they show especially strong preju-dices against subjectively foreign immigrantgroups (e.g., immigrants from Peru and

Mark Schaller

Sticky Note

This citation ("Park, 2003") is wrong; it's missing some names. Please correct the citation as follows: "Park, Faulkner, & Schaller, 2003".



Mongolia), but no such increase in prejudiceagainst immigrants from subjectively famil-iar countries (such as Poland or Taiwan).Furthermore, ethnocentrism and xenophobiaare also exaggerated among individuals whoare temporarily immunosuppressed (womenin the first trimester of pregnancy), and soactually are more vulnerable to infection(Navarrete et al., 2007).

Other cue-based interpersonalprejudices

Two important evolutionary psychologicalprinciples are exemplified by the precedingline of research. First, people are percep-tually sensitive to specific sets of physicalcharacteristics that serve as heuristic cuesconnoting specific kinds of fitness-relevantcategories (e.g., morphological anomalies areheuristic cues connoting potential infectionrisk). And second, given the signal-detectionproblem inherent in any such cue-basedinference process, people often respond to anover-general set of cues (any morphologicalanomaly may serve as a cue connotingpotential infection risk).

These principles also underlie a line ofresearch documenting prejudicial perceptionsof adults who happen to have childlike fea-tures. Because newborn infants are helplessand dependent on adults for survival, andbecause an adult’s own reproductive fitnessdepends on the survival of one’s infant off-spring, the perception of babyish features inothers may heuristically trigger functionallycorrespondent inferences (e.g., helplessness).This may happen even when rational analysisreveals that the target person is not at all infan-tile. The implication is a set of predictablestereotypes and prejudices: Compared to otheradults, baby-faced adults are pre-judged tobe relatively more ignorant, incapable, andguileless (e.g., Zebrowitz & Montepare, 1992,2006; Zebrowitz & McDonald, 1991).

Other kinds of superficial physical fea-tures may trigger other kinds of prejudicialresponses. For example, drawing on evolu-tionary biological research on kin selectionand kin recognition, an extensive body of

psychological research shows that perceivedself-other similarity inclines people to implic-itly judge others – even total strangers –to be more kin-like (Park & Schaller, 2005;Park, Schaller, & Van Vugt, 2008). This setsthe stage for many predictable prejudices ina variety of behavioral domains includingsexual behavior, altruistic behavior, andeven political outcomes (Bailenson, Iyengar,Yee, & Collins, in press; DeBruine, 2005;Krupp, DeBruine, & Barclay, 2008)

Social dominance and itsimplications

Finally, there is an important line of research(associated with social dominance theory;Sidanius & Pratto, 1999) informed by theobservation that fitness benefits are likelyto have been associated with hierarchicalgroup structures, and that most contem-porary human societies are organized asgroup-based social hierarchies – with somegroups of people exercising a disproportionateamount of power. Social dominance theoryis not deduced strictly from evolutionaryprinciples. Rather, it is a hybrid conceptualframework that integrates conceptual insightsfrom different levels of analysis (e.g., evo-lutionary, psychological, sociological). Theintegrative framework produces hypothesesbearing on individuals’ motivations to main-tain existing group-based hierarchies and thesocial inequities implied by these hierarchies(Pratto, Sidanius, & Levin, 2006; Sidanius &Kurzban, 2003).

One implication is that many differentprejudices may result, in part, from the ten-dency to justify and maintain the inequitableoutcomes associated with dominant versussubordinate social categories. Consistent withthis implication, individuals who score highon measures of social dominance orientation(i.e., people who are especially favorabletoward the maintenance of dominance hierar-chies) are especially prejudiced against a vari-ety of different groups, and these prejudicesare especially likely to emerge when inter-group context and other dominance-relevantconsiderations are temporarily paramount

Mark Schaller

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"in press" should be changed to "2008" .



(Pratto & Shih, 2000; Pratto et al., 2006,1994).

Social dominance theory also has impor-tant implications for understanding ‘modernracism’ – the phenomenon in which overtlynon-prejudiced attitudes mask more subtleexpressions of racism. One set of studiesfound that overtly race-neutral objections toAmerican affirmative action policies werepredicted by dominance-related concerns, andthat this relationship was especially strongamong well-educated White people – who,presumably, stood to benefit the most fromexisting employment inequities (Frederico &Sidanius, 2002). Thus, ‘principled’ objectionsto affirmative action are not quite as principledas they appear, but may instead be based onlatent desires to maintain the existing socialhierarchy.

Social dominance theory, however, pertainsnot just to racial prejudice. The theory impliesthat the specific targets of dominance-basedprejudices are likely to vary predictably,depending on the specific sociological contextof inequality (Sidanius & Pratto, 1999). Forinstance, in societies described by salientrace-based inequalities (e.g., North America,South Africa), social dominance orientationis especially like to predict racial prejudice.But, in societies in which social stratificationis defined more saliently by social class orcaste or religion (as in much of southernAsia),social dominance orientation is more likely topredict prejudices based on those particularcategorical distinctions instead.

The theory also makes many uniquepredictions pertaining to sexism and genderstereotypes. In most human societies, menhave historically exercised a disproportion-ate amount of societal power relative towomen. It follows that men (comparedto women) are especially disposed towardthe maintenance of dominance hierarchies,and to show especially strong prejudicestoward those who threaten their status inan existing dominance hierarchy (Prattoet al., 1994; Sidanius & Kurzban, 2003;Sidanius, Pratto, & Brief, 1995). In addi-tion, social dominance orientation predictsgender-stereotypical attitudes. Among men,

higher levels of social dominance orientationare associated with lower levels of commit-ment to marriage and to offspring care; amongwomen, higher levels of social dominanceorientation are associated with a greater desireto marry a wealthy, high-status man (Pratto &Hegarty, 2000).

CULTURAL EVOLUTION ANDPOPULAR STEREOTYPES

To this point, we have discussed how ancientevolutionary pressures, by operating on genesover many generations, may have shaped thepsychology of prejudice. In addition, manyscholars have observed that variation-and-selective-retention processes – which underliegenetic evolution – operate on other kindsof information too (e.g., Campbell, 1965b;Dawkins, 1976; Hull, 1988; Mesoudi et al.,2006). Specifically, selection mechanismsguide the evolution of cultural memes.Stereotypes are one such meme.

Many meaningful consequences of stereo-types exist only because those stereotypes arepopular. Consider the phenomenon wherebyAfrican Americans perform poorly on aca-demic tests under conditions that make salientothers’ stereotypic beliefs about their ethnicgroup (Steele, 1997). This effect emergesonly because the academic underachieve-ment stereotype is widely shared across theAmerican population, and has been for sometime. The implication is hardly limited to thisparticular phenomenon. Stereotypes that aremore popular are more likely to be activatedin working memory, and these stereotypesin turn have more powerful consequenceson individual behavior (Sechrist & Stangor,2001; Stangor, Sechrist, & Jost, 2001). Tothe extent that stereotypes matter at all, theymatter more whenever they are more popular(Schaller & Conway, 2001).

Why are some stereotypes popular, whileothers are not? Why do some stereotypesremain popular, while others disappear fromthe cultural landscape? Cultural evolution-ary processes provide an answer to thosequestions.



Four key elements underlie a culturalevolutionary approach to stereotypes. First,there is a dualistic nature to the representationof stereotypes. At one level of analysis,stereotypes are individual-level cognitiverepresentations; but at a second level of anal-ysis, stereotypes are cultural representationsshared by many members of a population(Stangor & Schaller, 1996). Second, thecultural representation of a stereotype – theextent to which it is popular – is driven largelyby interpersonal communication processes.Third, interpersonal communication is aselective process: people are more likelyto communicate about some things ratherthan others. The consequence is that certainkinds of stereotypes become, and remain,popular across the social landscape, butothers do not. Fourth, the selective pressuresimposed by communication are far fromrandom. Individual-level psychological pro-cesses (motives, goals, etc.) predictably influ-ence the extent to which people communicateabout specific stereotypes. Consequently,these psychological processes influence theextent to which some stereotypes, ratherthan others, become enduring features of thepopular landscape.

Trait communicability predictsstereotype popularity

A fundamental implication of this conceptualanalysis is that, to the extent that anidiosyncratic bit of stereotypic knowledge ismore likely to be talked about, it is not likelyto remain idiosyncratic. If it is communicable,it is likely to become popular.

In one test of this hypothesis, Schaller,Conway, and Tanchuk (2002) obtained ratingsfor dozens of stereotypic traits indicating theextent to which information bearing on thesetraits is likely to be talked about. A separatesample of participants indicated the extent towhich each trait was stereotypical of particularethnic groups within the local geographicalregion. For prominent ethnic groups – thosethat people actually do talk about – morehighly communicable traits were more likelyto be central to the popular stereotype.

An additional study examined the effects ofa trait’s communicability on its persistencein the popular stereotype of American ethnicgroups across 60 years. The communicabilityof a trait predicted the extent to which itremained central to the cultural stereotypeof the most populous and prominent ethnicgroups (e.g., Jews,African-Americans). Traitsthat people are especially likely to talk about(e.g., lazy) persisted in the popular stereotype,decade after decade, while less communicabletraits (e.g., superstitious) did not.

It is notable that the predictive effectof trait communicability occurred only forconversationally prominent groups. This fur-ther implicates the importance of actualinterpersonal communication. It is throughacts of communication – individuals’ choicesabout what to talk about and what not to talkabout – that selection occurs, and this selectionprocess predicts the evolving contents ofpopular stereotypes.

Influences on communicabilityand their implications

Why are some stereotypic traits more com-municable than others? An answer lies inthe analogy between genes and memes. Thecommunicability of a gene (the extent towhich it is transmitted to future generations)depends fundamentally on the ecologicalcontext. The communicability of a meme(such as a stereotypic trait) depends funda-mentally on the psychological context – on thepsychological state of the people who might,or might not, introduce that information intotheir conversations with others.

People generally communicate informationthey judge to be useful to their conversationalpartners. Information bearing on physicalhealth and safety represents one of the mostuseful types to know about others. Forexample, people judge news stories to bemore important, and to be more worthy ofbroadcast, if they arouse more fear (Young,2003). Urban legends are more communi-cable to the extent that they arouse disgust(Heath et al., 2001). And in the contextof impression formation, people prioritize



trait information bearing on interpersonaltrust or distrust (Cottrell, Neuberg, & Li,2007). Similarly, the communicability of astereotypic trait positively correlates with theextent to which it connotes interpersonaldanger or safety, and these same traits havebeen more persistent in the cultural stereotypeof African-Americans (Schaller, Faulkner,Park, Neuberg, & Kenrick, 2004).

In addition to selectively crafting theircommunications to serve the needs of others,people also selectively craft their communi-cations to serve self-interested goals, suchas the desire to make a positive impressionon others. Among other things, this accountsfor individuals’ reluctance to be the bearer ofbad news (Rosen & Tesser, 1972). Impressionmanagement goals also influence the com-municability of specific stereotypic traits. Forexample, if people believe that others willthink more highly of them if they talk aboutpositive traits, then they selectively talk aboutthe positive characteristics of a group (e.g.,intelligence); but if they believe that otherswill think more highly of them if they talkabout negative traits, then they selectivelytalk about the negative characteristics ofa group (e.g., aggressiveness). This directimpact of impression management goalson trait communicability has a consequentindirect effect – entirely unintended – onthe emerging contents of socially sharedstereotypes (Schaller & Conway, 1999).

Impression management goals may influ-ence the communication of stereotypes inmore subtle ways as well – favoring certainvariations of the same trait over other, slightlydifferent variations. In terms of functionalimplications, the blatantly sexist belief that‘women are not capable of taking care ofthemselves’is not very different from the morebenevolent belief that ‘women are sensitiveand need protection.’ But among people whoworry about being perceived as prejudiced,these two beliefs may vary considerablyin their communicability. The same is trueof stereotypic information describing manyethnic minority groups. This may help toexplain why, in the wake of the civil rightsmovements, blatant forms of racism are

replaced in the population by more discreetvariations of the same essential prejudice(Gaertner & Dovidio, 1986; Swim, Aikin,Hall, & Hunter, 1995).

INTEGRATIVE THEMES, BROADERIMPLICATIONS, AND FUTUREDIRECTIONS

We have reviewed many different lines oftheory and research, each focusing on aspecific set of phenomena relevant to thepsychology of stereotypes and prejudices.While conceptually distinct, these lines ofresearch are united by their emphasis onthe variation-and-selective-retention mecha-nisms that define both genetic and culturalevolutionary processes.

Additional commonalities underlie thedifferent lines of research that considerhuman evolutionary origins of contemporaryprejudices. Whether the primary focus ison some specific kind of fitness-relevantdanger (the threat of aggression, disease, etc.)or opportunity (the benefits of coalitionalgroups, hierarchical structures, etc.), theseresearch programs all imply that contempo-rary prejudices emerge from psychologicalmechanisms that were adaptive in ancestralsocial ecologies, and that these mechanismsevolved because they help to solve fitness-relevant ‘problems’ (prospects to be attained,perils to be avoided) inherent to thoseecologies.

Importantly, however, this does not meanthat these prejudices are functionally adaptivein contemporary environments. Nor does itmean that these prejudices are inevitable orunchangeable. Quite the contrary. Evolution-ary cost–benefit analyses imply the evolutionof psychological mechanisms that are flexibleand sensitive to contextual cues (Schaller,Park, & Kenrick, 2007). Evolutionary mod-els that employ cost–benefit analyses oftenproduce novel hypotheses about the specificcontexts that are likely to either amplify orinhibit prejudicial responses. This not onlyyields novel scientific discoveries (e.g., theeffects of immunosuppression on xenophobia



and ethnocentrism; Navarrete et al., 2007),it also provides a basis for the developmentof interventions that might help to moderateprejudices in contemporary environments(Neuberg & Cottrell, 2006; Schaller &Neuberg, 2008). Xenophobic responses toimmigrant populations, for example, mightbe diminished by progressive public healthpolicies and other interventions that reduceindividuals’ perceived vulnerability to infec-tious disease.

The psychological products of geneticevolution can influence cultural evolutionaryprocesses too. Fitness-relevant information(e.g., traits connoting malevolence) may beespecially communicable, especially withincontexts (e.g., warfare, threat of terrorism)that enhance the salience of specific fitness-relevant prospects or perils. This has conse-quences on the evolving contents of popularstereotypes. Thus, just as evolutionarilyinformed interventions may inhibit the activa-tion of pernicious prejudices (at an individuallevel of analysis), these interventions may alsohave additional consequences on the spreadof stereotypes across a cultural landscape.Currently there is very little research thatrigorously addresses this intersection of thetwo levels (individual and cultural) at whichevolutionary processes operate. This remainsan important topic for future research, whichwill not only contribute to the psychologicalunderstanding of stereotypes and prejudices,but also to a growing body of interdis-ciplinary attempts to integrate processesoperating at evolutionary, cognitive, andcultural levels of analysis (Mesoudi et al.,2006).

Evolutionary insights can be useful notonly in predicting stereotypes and prejudicialbeliefs within a culture, but also in explainingthe differences between cultures. There aresubstantial cross-cultural differences in theexpression of specific kinds of prejudices(Inglehart, Basenez, & Moreno, 1998), butthe origins of these cross-cultural differ-ences remain largely unexplained. Recentresearch has employed evolutionary cost–benefit analyses to predict and explain rela-tions between specific ecological variables

(e.g., pathogen prevalence) and specificcross-cultural differences (e.g., individualisticversus collectivistic value systems; Fincher,Thornhill, Murray, & Schaller, 2008). Similaranalyses may help explain cross-culturaldifferences in specific kinds of prejudicesas well.

Of course, to fully articulate the relationsbetween evolution processes and contem-porary prejudices, it will be necessary notmerely to predict prejudices at a psychologicallevel. Researchers will need to show howselection pressures influenced the frequenciesof specific genetic variants within human(and pre-human) populations, and to identifyrelations between specific genes and preju-dices. It will be useful to show how andwhy and under what circumstances thosegenes are (or are not) expressed duringdevelopment. Additionally, research shouldattempt to trace the expression of those genesto the social and psychological processesthrough which individuals acquire prejudicialbeliefs in the first place (e.g., associativelearning mechanisms; e.g., Navarrete et al.,2009). And it will be useful to link theexpression of those genes to the specificphysiological mechanisms (neurotransmittersystems, neuroendocrine systems) that actu-ally govern the experience, expression, andcommunication of prejudice at any particularmoment in time.

SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS

We have reviewed two distinct ways in whichinquiry into evolutionary processes informsthe psychological study of stereotypes andprejudices.

One approach draws upon foundationalresearch in genetics and evolutionary biology,and applies these insights toward conceptualspeculations about psychological adaptationsthat contribute to prejudices in contemporarysocial environments. Many of these deduc-tions yield novel hypotheses, and novel empir-ical discoveries, about specific circumstancesunder which specific prejudices are likely tobe either exaggerated or inhibited.



The second approach focuses not on geneticevolutionary processes, but instead on culturalevolutionary processes – the selective meansthrough which some knowledge structures(rather than others) become, and remain,popular within any human society. Focusedinquiry into cultural evolutionary processesyields novel hypotheses, and novel empiricaldiscoveries, about specific circumstancesunder which specific stereotypes are likely tobe social problems.

Both bodies of psychological research areinformed by inquiries in other domains ofbiological and social science. The challengeassociated with any evolutionary approachto human stereotypes and prejudices is thatscientists must forge connections betweenphenomena operating at different levels ofanalysis. The benefit, ultimately, is a morecomplete understanding of human stereotypesand prejudices and what can be done toeliminate them.

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Mark Schaller

Sticky Note

If you make the change I've recommend on page 86, then "2003a" can be changed to "2003".

Mark Schaller

Sticky Note

And also, if you make that change on page 86, then you can change "2003b" to "2003".



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