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Toward the understanding of partial-monitoring games ICML Workshop on Exploration & Exploitation Andr ´ as Antos abor Bart´ ok avid P ´ al Csaba Szepesv ´ ari University of Alberta E-mail: [email protected] Seattle, July 2, 2011 Szepesv ´ ari (UofA) Partial monitoring July 2, 2011 1 / 39
Transcript

Toward the understanding of partial-monitoringgames

ICML Workshop on Exploration & Exploitation

Andras Antos Gabor Bartok David Pal Csaba Szepesvari

University of AlbertaE-mail: [email protected]

Seattle, July 2, 2011

Szepesvari (UofA) Partial monitoring July 2, 2011 1 / 39

Contributions! !"# !"$ %&'()*+

!

%, -.*/0/)1)(2

34+5)(2

67+'()*+5

80.94(

:*1)'2;<)(=;

.4'*9+)>4.

?4=0@)*.;:*1)'2

80.94(;

:*1)'2;<A*

;.4'*9+)>4.

Off-policy learning with options and recognizersDoina Precup, Richard S. Sutton, Cosmin Paduraru, Anna J. Koop, Satinder Singh

McGill University, University of Alberta, University of Michigan

Options

Distinguished

region

Ideas and Motivation Background Recognizers Off-policy algorithm for options Learning w/o the Behavior Policy

Wall

Options• A way of behaving for a period of time

Models of options• A predictive model of the outcome of following the option• What state will you be in?• Will you still control the ball?• What will be the value of some feature?• Will your teammate receive the pass?• What will be the expected total reward along the way?• How long can you keep control of the ball?

Dribble Keepaway Pass

Options for soccer players could be

Options in a 2D world

The red and blue options

are mostly executed.

Surely we should be able

to learn about them from

this experience!

Experienced

trajectory

Off-policy learning• Learning about one policy while behaving according to another• Needed for RL w/exploration (as in Q-learning)• Needed for learning abstract models of dynamical systems

(representing world knowledge)• Enables efficient exploration• Enables learning about many ways of behaving at the same time

(learning models of options)

! a policy! a stopping condition

Non-sequential example

Problem formulation w/o recognizers

Problem formulation with recognizers

• One state

• Continuous action a ! [0, 1]

• Outcomes zi = ai

• Given samples from policy b : [0, 1] " #+

• Would like to estimate the mean outcome for a sub-region of the

action space, here a ! [0.7, 0.9]

Target policy ! : [0, 1] ! "+ is uniform within the region of interest

(see dashed line in figure below). The estimator is:

m! =1n

nX

i=1

!(ai)

b(ai)zi.

Theorem 1 Let A = a1, . . . ak ! A be a subset of all the

possible actions. Consider a fixed behavior policy b and let !A be

the class of policies that only choose actions from A, i.e., if!(a) > 0 then a " A. Then the policy induced by b and the binaryrecognizer cA is the policy with minimum-variance one-step

importance sampling corrections, among those in !A:

! as given by (1) = arg minp!!A

Eb

"

!(ai)

b(ai)

«2#

(2)

Proof: Using Lagrange multipliers

Theorem 2 Consider two binary recognizers c1 and c2, such that

µ1 > µ2. Then the importance sampling corrections for c1 have

lower variance than the importance sampling corrections for c2.

Off-policy learning

Let the importance sampling ratio at time step t be:

!t ="(st, at)

b(st, at)

The truncated n-step return, R(n)t , satisfies:

R(n)t = !t[rt+1 + (1 ! #t+1)R

(n!1)t+1 ].

The update to the parameter vector is proportional to:

!$t =h

R!t ! yt

i

""yt!0(1 ! #1) · · · !t!1(1 ! #t).

Theorem 3 For every time step t ! 0 and any initial state s,

Eb[!!t|s] = E![!!t|s].

Proof: By induction on n we show that

EbR(n)t |s = E!R

(n)t |s

which implies that EbR"t |s = E!(R"

t |s. The rest of the proof isalgebraic manipulations (see paper).

Implementation of off-policy learning for options

In order to avoid!! ! 0, we use a restart function g : S ! [0, 1](like in the PSD algorithm). The forward algorithm becomes:

!!t = (R!t " yt)#"yt

tX

i=0

gi"i..."t!1(1 " #i+1)...(1 " #t),

where gt is the extent of restarting in state st.

The incremental learning algorithm is the following:

• Initialize !0 = g0, e0 = !0!!y0

• At every time step t:

"t = #t (rt+1 + (1 " $t+1)yt+1) " yt

%t+1 = %t + &"tet

!t+1 = #t!t(1 " $t+1) + gt+1

et+1 = '#t(1 " $t+1)et + !t+1!!yt+1

References

Off-policy learning is tricky

• The Bermuda triangle

! Temporal-difference learning! Function approximation (e.g., linear)! Off-policy

• Leads to divergence of iterative algorithms! Q-learning diverges with linear FA! Dynamic programming diverges with linear FA

Baird's Counterexample

Vk(s) =

!(7)+2!(1)

terminal

state99%

1%

100%

Vk(s) =

!(7)+2!(2)

Vk(s) =

!(7)+2!(3)

Vk(s) =

!(7)+2!(4)

Vk(s) =

!(7)+2!(5)

Vk(s) =

2!(7)+!(6)

0

5

10

0 1000 2000 3000 4000 5000

10

10

/ -10

Iterations (k)

510

1010

010

-

-

Parametervalues, !k(i)

(log scale,

broken at !1)

!k(7)

!k(1) – !k(5)

!k(6)

Precup, Sutton & Dasgupta (PSD) algorithm

• Uses importance sampling to convert off-policy case to on-policy case• Convergence assured by theorem of Tsitsiklis & Van Roy (1997)• Survives the Bermuda triangle!

BUT!

• Variance can be high, even infinite (slow learning)• Difficult to use with continuous or large action spaces• Requires explicit representation of behavior policy (probability distribution)

Option formalism

An option is defined as a triple o = !I,!, ""

• I # S is the set of states in which the option can be initiated

• ! is the internal policy of the option

• " : S $ [0, 1] is a stochastic termination condition

We want to compute the reward model of option o:

EoR(s) = Er1 + r2 + . . . + rT |s0 = s, !, "

We assume that linear function approximation is used to represent

the model:

EoR(s) % #T $s = y

Baird, L. C. (1995). Residual algorithms: Reinforcement learning with function

approximation. In Proceedings of ICML.

Precup, D., Sutton, R. S. and Dasgupta, S. (2001). Off-policy temporal-difference

learning with function approximation. In Proceedings of ICML.

Sutton, R.S., Precup D. and Singh, S (1999). Between MDPs and semi-MDPs: A

framework for temporal abstraction in reinforcement learning. Artificial

Intelligence, vol . 112, pp. 181–211.

Sutton,, R.S. and Tanner, B. (2005). Temporal-difference networks. In Proceedings

of NIPS-17.

Sutton R.S., Rafols E. and Koop, A. (2006). Temporal abstraction in

temporal-difference networks”. In Proceedings of NIPS-18.

Tadic, V. (2001). On the convergence of temporal-difference learning with linear

function approximation. In Machine learning vol. 42.

Tsitsiklis, J. N., and Van Roy, B. (1997). An analysis of temporal-difference learning

with function approximation. IEEE Transactions on Automatic Control 42.

Acknowledgements

Theorem 4 If the following assumptions hold:

• The function approximator used to represent the model is a

state aggregrator

• The recognizer behaves consistently with the function

approximator, i.e., c(s, a) = c(p, a), !s " p

• The recognition probability for each partition, µ(p) is estimatedusing maximum likelihood:

µ(p) =N(p, c = 1)

N(p)

Then there exists a policy ! such that the off-policy learning

algorithm converges to the same model as the on-policy algorithm

using !.

Proof: In the limit, w.p.1, µ converges toP

s db(s|p)P

a c(p, a)b(s, a) where db(s|p) is the probability ofvisiting state s from partition p under the stationary distribution of b.

Let ! be defined to be the same for all states in a partition p:

!(p, a) = "(p, a)X

s

db(s|p)b(s, a)

! is well-defined, in the sense thatP

a !(s, a) = 1. Using Theorem3, off-policy updates using importance sampling corrections " willhave the same expected value as on-policy updates using !.

The authors gratefully acknowledge the ideas and encouragement

they have received in this work from Eddie Rafols, Mark Ring,

Lihong Li and other members of the rlai.net group. We thank Csaba

Szepesvari and the reviewers of the paper for constructive

comments. This research was supported in part by iCore, NSERC,

Alberta Ingenuity, and CFI.

The target policy ! is induced by a recognizer function

c : [0, 1] !" #+:

!(a) =c(a)b(a)

P

x c(x)b(x)=

c(a)b(a)µ

(1)

(see blue line below). The estimator is:

m! =1n

nX

i=1

zi!(ai)b(ai)

=1n

nX

i=1

zic(ai)b(ai)

µ

1b(ai)

=1n

nX

i=1

zic(ai)

µ

!" !"" #"" $"" %"" &"""

'&

!

!'& ()*+,+-./01.,+.2-345.13,.630780#""04.)*/301.,+.2-349

:+;<7=;0,3-762+>3,

:+;<0,3-762+>3,

?=)@3,07804.)*/30.-;+724

McGill

The importance sampling corrections are:

!(s, a) ="(s, a)b(s, a)

=c(s, a)µ(s)

where µ(s) depends on the behavior policy b. If b is unknown,instead of µ we will use a maximum likelihood estimate

µ : S ! [0, 1], and importance sampling corrections will be definedas:

!(s, a) =c(s, a)

µ(s)

On-policy learning

If ! is used to generate behavior, then the reward model of anoption can be learned using TD-learning.

The n-step truncated return is:

R(n)t = rt+1 + (1 ! "t+1)R

(n!1)t+1 .

The #-return is defined as usual:

R!t = (1 ! #)

"X

n=1

#n!1R(n)t .

The parameters of the function approximator are updated on every

step proportionally to:

!$t =h

R!t ! yt

i

""yt(1 ! "1) · · · (1 ! "t).

• Recognizers reduce variance

• First off-policy learning algorithm for option models

• Off-policy learning without knowledge of the behavior

distribution

• Observations

– Options are a natural way to reduce the variance of

importance sampling algorithms (because of the termination

condition)

– Recognizers are a natural way to define options, especially

for large or continuous action spaces.

Contributions! !"# !"$ %&'()*+

!

%, -.*/0/)1)(2

34+5)(2

67+'()*+5

80.94(

:*1)'2;<)(=;

.4'*9+)>4.

?4=0@)*.;:*1)'2

80.94(;

:*1)'2;<A*

;.4'*9+)>4.

Off-policy learning with options and recognizersDoina Precup, Richard S. Sutton, Cosmin Paduraru, Anna J. Koop, Satinder Singh

McGill University, University of Alberta, University of Michigan

Options

Distinguished

region

Ideas and Motivation Background Recognizers Off-policy algorithm for options Learning w/o the Behavior Policy

Wall

Options• A way of behaving for a period of time

Models of options• A predictive model of the outcome of following the option• What state will you be in?• Will you still control the ball?• What will be the value of some feature?• Will your teammate receive the pass?• What will be the expected total reward along the way?• How long can you keep control of the ball?

Dribble Keepaway Pass

Options for soccer players could be

Options in a 2D world

The red and blue options

are mostly executed.

Surely we should be able

to learn about them from

this experience!

Experienced

trajectory

Off-policy learning• Learning about one policy while behaving according to another• Needed for RL w/exploration (as in Q-learning)• Needed for learning abstract models of dynamical systems

(representing world knowledge)• Enables efficient exploration• Enables learning about many ways of behaving at the same time

(learning models of options)

! a policy! a stopping condition

Non-sequential example

Problem formulation w/o recognizers

Problem formulation with recognizers

• One state

• Continuous action a ! [0, 1]

• Outcomes zi = ai

• Given samples from policy b : [0, 1] " #+

• Would like to estimate the mean outcome for a sub-region of the

action space, here a ! [0.7, 0.9]

Target policy ! : [0, 1] ! "+ is uniform within the region of interest

(see dashed line in figure below). The estimator is:

m! =1n

nX

i=1

!(ai)

b(ai)zi.

Theorem 1 Let A = a1, . . . ak ! A be a subset of all the

possible actions. Consider a fixed behavior policy b and let !A be

the class of policies that only choose actions from A, i.e., if!(a) > 0 then a " A. Then the policy induced by b and the binaryrecognizer cA is the policy with minimum-variance one-step

importance sampling corrections, among those in !A:

! as given by (1) = arg minp!!A

Eb

"

!(ai)

b(ai)

«2#

(2)

Proof: Using Lagrange multipliers

Theorem 2 Consider two binary recognizers c1 and c2, such that

µ1 > µ2. Then the importance sampling corrections for c1 have

lower variance than the importance sampling corrections for c2.

Off-policy learning

Let the importance sampling ratio at time step t be:

!t ="(st, at)

b(st, at)

The truncated n-step return, R(n)t , satisfies:

R(n)t = !t[rt+1 + (1 ! #t+1)R

(n!1)t+1 ].

The update to the parameter vector is proportional to:

!$t =h

R!t ! yt

i

""yt!0(1 ! #1) · · · !t!1(1 ! #t).

Theorem 3 For every time step t ! 0 and any initial state s,

Eb[!!t|s] = E![!!t|s].

Proof: By induction on n we show that

EbR(n)t |s = E!R

(n)t |s

which implies that EbR"t |s = E!(R"

t |s. The rest of the proof isalgebraic manipulations (see paper).

Implementation of off-policy learning for options

In order to avoid!! ! 0, we use a restart function g : S ! [0, 1](like in the PSD algorithm). The forward algorithm becomes:

!!t = (R!t " yt)#"yt

tX

i=0

gi"i..."t!1(1 " #i+1)...(1 " #t),

where gt is the extent of restarting in state st.

The incremental learning algorithm is the following:

• Initialize !0 = g0, e0 = !0!!y0

• At every time step t:

"t = #t (rt+1 + (1 " $t+1)yt+1) " yt

%t+1 = %t + &"tet

!t+1 = #t!t(1 " $t+1) + gt+1

et+1 = '#t(1 " $t+1)et + !t+1!!yt+1

References

Off-policy learning is tricky

• The Bermuda triangle

! Temporal-difference learning! Function approximation (e.g., linear)! Off-policy

• Leads to divergence of iterative algorithms! Q-learning diverges with linear FA! Dynamic programming diverges with linear FA

Baird's Counterexample

Vk(s) =

!(7)+2!(1)

terminal

state99%

1%

100%

Vk(s) =

!(7)+2!(2)

Vk(s) =

!(7)+2!(3)

Vk(s) =

!(7)+2!(4)

Vk(s) =

!(7)+2!(5)

Vk(s) =

2!(7)+!(6)

0

5

10

0 1000 2000 3000 4000 5000

10

10

/ -10

Iterations (k)

510

1010

010

-

-

Parametervalues, !k(i)

(log scale,

broken at !1)

!k(7)

!k(1) – !k(5)

!k(6)

Precup, Sutton & Dasgupta (PSD) algorithm

• Uses importance sampling to convert off-policy case to on-policy case• Convergence assured by theorem of Tsitsiklis & Van Roy (1997)• Survives the Bermuda triangle!

BUT!

• Variance can be high, even infinite (slow learning)• Difficult to use with continuous or large action spaces• Requires explicit representation of behavior policy (probability distribution)

Option formalism

An option is defined as a triple o = !I,!, ""

• I # S is the set of states in which the option can be initiated

• ! is the internal policy of the option

• " : S $ [0, 1] is a stochastic termination condition

We want to compute the reward model of option o:

EoR(s) = Er1 + r2 + . . . + rT |s0 = s, !, "

We assume that linear function approximation is used to represent

the model:

EoR(s) % #T $s = y

Baird, L. C. (1995). Residual algorithms: Reinforcement learning with function

approximation. In Proceedings of ICML.

Precup, D., Sutton, R. S. and Dasgupta, S. (2001). Off-policy temporal-difference

learning with function approximation. In Proceedings of ICML.

Sutton, R.S., Precup D. and Singh, S (1999). Between MDPs and semi-MDPs: A

framework for temporal abstraction in reinforcement learning. Artificial

Intelligence, vol . 112, pp. 181–211.

Sutton,, R.S. and Tanner, B. (2005). Temporal-difference networks. In Proceedings

of NIPS-17.

Sutton R.S., Rafols E. and Koop, A. (2006). Temporal abstraction in

temporal-difference networks”. In Proceedings of NIPS-18.

Tadic, V. (2001). On the convergence of temporal-difference learning with linear

function approximation. In Machine learning vol. 42.

Tsitsiklis, J. N., and Van Roy, B. (1997). An analysis of temporal-difference learning

with function approximation. IEEE Transactions on Automatic Control 42.

Acknowledgements

Theorem 4 If the following assumptions hold:

• The function approximator used to represent the model is a

state aggregrator

• The recognizer behaves consistently with the function

approximator, i.e., c(s, a) = c(p, a), !s " p

• The recognition probability for each partition, µ(p) is estimatedusing maximum likelihood:

µ(p) =N(p, c = 1)

N(p)

Then there exists a policy ! such that the off-policy learning

algorithm converges to the same model as the on-policy algorithm

using !.

Proof: In the limit, w.p.1, µ converges toP

s db(s|p)P

a c(p, a)b(s, a) where db(s|p) is the probability ofvisiting state s from partition p under the stationary distribution of b.

Let ! be defined to be the same for all states in a partition p:

!(p, a) = "(p, a)X

s

db(s|p)b(s, a)

! is well-defined, in the sense thatP

a !(s, a) = 1. Using Theorem3, off-policy updates using importance sampling corrections " willhave the same expected value as on-policy updates using !.

The authors gratefully acknowledge the ideas and encouragement

they have received in this work from Eddie Rafols, Mark Ring,

Lihong Li and other members of the rlai.net group. We thank Csaba

Szepesvari and the reviewers of the paper for constructive

comments. This research was supported in part by iCore, NSERC,

Alberta Ingenuity, and CFI.

The target policy ! is induced by a recognizer function

c : [0, 1] !" #+:

!(a) =c(a)b(a)

P

x c(x)b(x)=

c(a)b(a)µ

(1)

(see blue line below). The estimator is:

m! =1n

nX

i=1

zi!(ai)b(ai)

=1n

nX

i=1

zic(ai)b(ai)

µ

1b(ai)

=1n

nX

i=1

zic(ai)

µ

!" !"" #"" $"" %"" &"""

'&

!

!'& ()*+,+-./01.,+.2-345.13,.630780#""04.)*/301.,+.2-349

:+;<7=;0,3-762+>3,

:+;<0,3-762+>3,

?=)@3,07804.)*/30.-;+724

McGill

The importance sampling corrections are:

!(s, a) ="(s, a)b(s, a)

=c(s, a)µ(s)

where µ(s) depends on the behavior policy b. If b is unknown,instead of µ we will use a maximum likelihood estimate

µ : S ! [0, 1], and importance sampling corrections will be definedas:

!(s, a) =c(s, a)

µ(s)

On-policy learning

If ! is used to generate behavior, then the reward model of anoption can be learned using TD-learning.

The n-step truncated return is:

R(n)t = rt+1 + (1 ! "t+1)R

(n!1)t+1 .

The #-return is defined as usual:

R!t = (1 ! #)

"X

n=1

#n!1R(n)t .

The parameters of the function approximator are updated on every

step proportionally to:

!$t =h

R!t ! yt

i

""yt(1 ! "1) · · · (1 ! "t).

• Recognizers reduce variance

• First off-policy learning algorithm for option models

• Off-policy learning without knowledge of the behavior

distribution

• Observations

– Options are a natural way to reduce the variance of

importance sampling algorithms (because of the termination

condition)

– Recognizers are a natural way to define options, especially

for large or continuous action spaces.

Outline

1 Partial Monitoring (what and why?)Prediction games (“full information setting”)Partial-monitoring

2 ResultsInformation, loss-estimationThe fundamental lemmaLower boundUpper bound

3 Conclusions and Open Problems

4 Bibliography

Szepesvari (UofA) Partial monitoring July 2, 2011 2 / 39

Outline

1 Partial Monitoring (what and why?)Prediction games (“full information setting”)Partial-monitoring

2 ResultsInformation, loss-estimationThe fundamental lemmaLower boundUpper bound

3 Conclusions and Open Problems

4 Bibliography

Szepesvari (UofA) Partial monitoring July 2, 2011 3 / 39

Prediction Games

learner environment

referee

Szepesvari (UofA) Partial monitoring July 2, 2011 4 / 39

Prediction Games

learner environment

referee

action It outcome Jt

Szepesvari (UofA) Partial monitoring July 2, 2011 4 / 39

Prediction Games

learner environment

referee

action It outcome Jt

loss `t = L(It, Jt)

L is publicly known

Szepesvari (UofA) Partial monitoring July 2, 2011 4 / 39

Prediction Games

learner environment

referee

action It outcome Jt

loss `t = L(It, Jt)

feedback Jt

Szepesvari (UofA) Partial monitoring July 2, 2011 4 / 39

A Mathematical Framework

In each round t = 1, 2, . . . ,T

learner chooses action It ∈ Xenvironment chooses outcome Jt ∈ Yreferee computes loss `t = L(It, Jt)

learner receives feedback Jt – “full information”

Learner’s goal: Keep∑T

t=1 `t as low as possible

The game is governed by the function

L : X × Y → R

known a priori to everyone.

Szepesvari (UofA) Partial monitoring July 2, 2011 5 / 39

A Mathematical Framework

In each round t = 1, 2, . . . ,T

learner chooses action It ∈ Xenvironment chooses outcome Jt ∈ Yreferee computes loss `t = L(It, Jt)

learner receives feedback Jt – “full information”

Learner’s goal: Keep∑T

t=1 `t as low as possible

The game is governed by the function

L : X × Y → R

known a priori to everyone.

Szepesvari (UofA) Partial monitoring July 2, 2011 5 / 39

A Mathematical Framework

In each round t = 1, 2, . . . ,T

learner chooses action It ∈ Xenvironment chooses outcome Jt ∈ Yreferee computes loss `t = L(It, Jt)

learner receives feedback Jt – “full information”

Learner’s goal: Keep∑T

t=1 `t as low as possible

The game is governed by the function

L : X × Y → R

known a priori to everyone.

Szepesvari (UofA) Partial monitoring July 2, 2011 5 / 39

A Mathematical Framework

In each round t = 1, 2, . . . ,T

learner chooses action It ∈ Xenvironment chooses outcome Jt ∈ Yreferee computes loss `t = L(It, Jt)

learner receives feedback Jt – “full information”

Learner’s goal: Keep∑T

t=1 `t as low as possible

The game is governed by the function

L : X × Y → R

known a priori to everyone.

Szepesvari (UofA) Partial monitoring July 2, 2011 5 / 39

A Mathematical Framework

In each round t = 1, 2, . . . ,T

learner chooses action It ∈ Xenvironment chooses outcome Jt ∈ Yreferee computes loss `t = L(It, Jt)

learner receives feedback Jt – “full information”

Learner’s goal: Keep∑T

t=1 `t as low as possible

The game is governed by the function

L : X × Y → R

known a priori to everyone.

Szepesvari (UofA) Partial monitoring July 2, 2011 5 / 39

A Mathematical Framework

In each round t = 1, 2, . . . ,T

learner chooses action It ∈ Xenvironment chooses outcome Jt ∈ Yreferee computes loss `t = L(It, Jt)

learner receives feedback Jt – “full information”

Learner’s goal: Keep∑T

t=1 `t as low as possible

The game is governed by the function

L : X × Y → R

known a priori to everyone.

Szepesvari (UofA) Partial monitoring July 2, 2011 5 / 39

Measure of Performance of the Learner

How fast does the average cost converge to the optimal averagecost?

Compare the total losses⇒ Regret:

RT =

T∑

t=1

L(It, Jt) − infi∈X

T∑

t=1

L(i, Jt) .

Hannan consistency:

RT

T→ 0 as T →∞

Typical result:RT = O(Tγ)

for some γ ∈ (0, 1)

Szepesvari (UofA) Partial monitoring July 2, 2011 6 / 39

Measure of Performance of the Learner

How fast does the average cost converge to the optimal averagecost?

Compare the total losses⇒ Regret:

RT =

T∑

t=1

L(It, Jt) − infi∈X

T∑

t=1

L(i, Jt) .

Hannan consistency:

RT

T→ 0 as T →∞

Typical result:RT = O(Tγ)

for some γ ∈ (0, 1)

Szepesvari (UofA) Partial monitoring July 2, 2011 6 / 39

Measure of Performance of the Learner

How fast does the average cost converge to the optimal averagecost?

Compare the total losses⇒ Regret:

RT =

T∑

t=1

L(It, Jt) − infi∈X

T∑

t=1

L(i, Jt) .

Hannan consistency:

RT

T→ 0 as T →∞

Typical result:RT = O(Tγ)

for some γ ∈ (0, 1)

Szepesvari (UofA) Partial monitoring July 2, 2011 6 / 39

Measure of Performance of the Learner

How fast does the average cost converge to the optimal averagecost?

Compare the total losses⇒ Regret:

RT =

T∑

t=1

L(It, Jt) − infi∈X

T∑

t=1

L(i, Jt) .

Hannan consistency:

RT

T→ 0 as T →∞

Typical result:RT = O(Tγ)

for some γ ∈ (0, 1)

Szepesvari (UofA) Partial monitoring July 2, 2011 6 / 39

Measure of Performance of the Learner

How fast does the average cost converge to the optimal averagecost?

Compare the total losses⇒ Regret:

RT =

T∑

t=1

L(It, Jt) − infi∈X

T∑

t=1

L(i, Jt) .

Hannan consistency:

RT

T→ 0 as T →∞

Typical result:RT = O(Tγ)

for some γ ∈ (0, 1)

Szepesvari (UofA) Partial monitoring July 2, 2011 6 / 39

Outline

1 Partial Monitoring (what and why?)Prediction games (“full information setting”)Partial-monitoring

2 ResultsInformation, loss-estimationThe fundamental lemmaLower boundUpper bound

3 Conclusions and Open Problems

4 Bibliography

Szepesvari (UofA) Partial monitoring July 2, 2011 7 / 39

What is Missing?

In some games, the learner cannot see the environment’s action⇒ “partial information”Examples:

I Dynamic pricingI Bandwidth allocationI Apple tastingI Online advertising (bandits)

Tradeoff:I ExploreI Exploit

Yet another variation of bandit problems!?!?

Szepesvari (UofA) Partial monitoring July 2, 2011 8 / 39

What is Missing?

In some games, the learner cannot see the environment’s action⇒ “partial information”Examples:

I Dynamic pricingI Bandwidth allocationI Apple tastingI Online advertising (bandits)

Tradeoff:I ExploreI Exploit

Yet another variation of bandit problems!?!?

Szepesvari (UofA) Partial monitoring July 2, 2011 8 / 39

What is Missing?

In some games, the learner cannot see the environment’s action⇒ “partial information”Examples:

I Dynamic pricingI Bandwidth allocationI Apple tastingI Online advertising (bandits)

Tradeoff:I ExploreI Exploit

Yet another variation of bandit problems!?!?

Szepesvari (UofA) Partial monitoring July 2, 2011 8 / 39

What is Missing?

In some games, the learner cannot see the environment’s action⇒ “partial information”Examples:

I Dynamic pricingI Bandwidth allocationI Apple tastingI Online advertising (bandits)

Tradeoff:I ExploreI Exploit

Yet another variation of bandit problems!?!?

Szepesvari (UofA) Partial monitoring July 2, 2011 8 / 39

What is Missing?

In some games, the learner cannot see the environment’s action⇒ “partial information”Examples:

I Dynamic pricingI Bandwidth allocationI Apple tastingI Online advertising (bandits)

Tradeoff:I ExploreI Exploit

Yet another variation of bandit problems!?!?

Szepesvari (UofA) Partial monitoring July 2, 2011 8 / 39

What is Missing?

In some games, the learner cannot see the environment’s action⇒ “partial information”Examples:

I Dynamic pricingI Bandwidth allocationI Apple tastingI Online advertising (bandits)

Tradeoff:I ExploreI Exploit

Yet another variation of bandit problems!?!?

Szepesvari (UofA) Partial monitoring July 2, 2011 8 / 39

What is Missing?

In some games, the learner cannot see the environment’s action⇒ “partial information”Examples:

I Dynamic pricingI Bandwidth allocationI Apple tastingI Online advertising (bandits)

Tradeoff:I ExploreI Exploit

Yet another variation of bandit problems!?!?

Szepesvari (UofA) Partial monitoring July 2, 2011 8 / 39

What is Missing?

In some games, the learner cannot see the environment’s action⇒ “partial information”Examples:

I Dynamic pricingI Bandwidth allocationI Apple tastingI Online advertising (bandits)

Tradeoff:I ExploreI Exploit

Yet another variation of bandit problems!?!?

Szepesvari (UofA) Partial monitoring July 2, 2011 8 / 39

What is Missing?

In some games, the learner cannot see the environment’s action⇒ “partial information”Examples:

I Dynamic pricingI Bandwidth allocationI Apple tastingI Online advertising (bandits)

Tradeoff:I ExploreI Exploit

Yet another variation of bandit problems!?!?

Szepesvari (UofA) Partial monitoring July 2, 2011 8 / 39

What is Missing?

In some games, the learner cannot see the environment’s action⇒ “partial information”Examples:

I Dynamic pricingI Bandwidth allocationI Apple tastingI Online advertising (bandits)

Tradeoff:I ExploreI Exploit

Yet another variation of bandit problems!?!?

Szepesvari (UofA) Partial monitoring July 2, 2011 8 / 39

What is Missing?

In some games, the learner cannot see the environment’s action⇒ “partial information”Examples:

I Dynamic pricingI Bandwidth allocationI Apple tastingI Online advertising (bandits)

Tradeoff:I ExploreI Exploit

Yet another variation of bandit problems!?!?

Szepesvari (UofA) Partial monitoring July 2, 2011 8 / 39

Partial-Monitoring Games

learner environment

referee

Szepesvari (UofA) Partial monitoring July 2, 2011 9 / 39

Partial-Monitoring Games

learner environment

referee

action It outcome Jt

Szepesvari (UofA) Partial monitoring July 2, 2011 9 / 39

Partial-Monitoring Games

learner environment

referee

action It outcome Jt

loss `t = L(It, Jt)feedback ht = H(It, Jt)

L, H are publicly known

Szepesvari (UofA) Partial monitoring July 2, 2011 9 / 39

Partial-Monitoring Games

learner environment

referee

action It outcome Jt

loss `t = L(It, Jt)feedback ht = H(It, Jt)

feedback ht

Szepesvari (UofA) Partial monitoring July 2, 2011 9 / 39

Mathematical Framework

In each round t = 1, 2, . . . ,T

learner chooses action It ∈ Xenvironment chooses outcome Jt ∈ Y (unobserved)referee computes loss `t = L(It, Jt) and ht = H(It, Jt)

learner receives feedback ht ∈ H

Learner’s goal: Keep∑T

t=1 `t as low as possible

The game is governed by two functions

L : X × Y → R and H : X × Y → H

known a priori to everybody.

Szepesvari (UofA) Partial monitoring July 2, 2011 10 / 39

Mathematical Framework

In each round t = 1, 2, . . . ,T

learner chooses action It ∈ Xenvironment chooses outcome Jt ∈ Y (unobserved)referee computes loss `t = L(It, Jt) and ht = H(It, Jt)

learner receives feedback ht ∈ H

Learner’s goal: Keep∑T

t=1 `t as low as possible

The game is governed by two functions

L : X × Y → R and H : X × Y → H

known a priori to everybody.

Szepesvari (UofA) Partial monitoring July 2, 2011 10 / 39

Mathematical Framework

In each round t = 1, 2, . . . ,T

learner chooses action It ∈ Xenvironment chooses outcome Jt ∈ Y (unobserved)referee computes loss `t = L(It, Jt) and ht = H(It, Jt)

learner receives feedback ht ∈ H

Learner’s goal: Keep∑T

t=1 `t as low as possible

The game is governed by two functions

L : X × Y → R and H : X × Y → H

known a priori to everybody.

Szepesvari (UofA) Partial monitoring July 2, 2011 10 / 39

Mathematical Framework

In each round t = 1, 2, . . . ,T

learner chooses action It ∈ Xenvironment chooses outcome Jt ∈ Y (unobserved)referee computes loss `t = L(It, Jt) and ht = H(It, Jt)

learner receives feedback ht ∈ H

Learner’s goal: Keep∑T

t=1 `t as low as possible

The game is governed by two functions

L : X × Y → R and H : X × Y → H

known a priori to everybody.

Szepesvari (UofA) Partial monitoring July 2, 2011 10 / 39

Mathematical Framework

In each round t = 1, 2, . . . ,T

learner chooses action It ∈ Xenvironment chooses outcome Jt ∈ Y (unobserved)referee computes loss `t = L(It, Jt) and ht = H(It, Jt)

learner receives feedback ht ∈ H

Learner’s goal: Keep∑T

t=1 `t as low as possible

The game is governed by two functions

L : X × Y → R and H : X × Y → H

known a priori to everybody.

Szepesvari (UofA) Partial monitoring July 2, 2011 10 / 39

Mathematical Framework

In each round t = 1, 2, . . . ,T

learner chooses action It ∈ Xenvironment chooses outcome Jt ∈ Y (unobserved)referee computes loss `t = L(It, Jt) and ht = H(It, Jt)

learner receives feedback ht ∈ H

Learner’s goal: Keep∑T

t=1 `t as low as possible

The game is governed by two functions

L : X × Y → R and H : X × Y → H

known a priori to everybody.

Szepesvari (UofA) Partial monitoring July 2, 2011 10 / 39

Examples I

Rock-Paper-Scissors

L =

0 1 −1−1 0 11 −1 0

H =

R P SR P SR P S

One-Arm Bandit Game

L = H =

(0 0−1 1

)

Row player: learner, column player: environment

Szepesvari (UofA) Partial monitoring July 2, 2011 11 / 39

Examples II

Revealing Action Game/Label Efficient Prediction

L =

1 00 11 1

H =

a ab bc d

Row player: learner, column player: environment

Szepesvari (UofA) Partial monitoring July 2, 2011 12 / 39

Example III: Online Convex Optimization

action I from a convex set Xoutcome J is a convex function from a class Yfeedback H(I, J) = J

loss L(I, J) = J(I)

online regression, online SVMs, online LASSO, online PCA, learningwith expert advice, portfolio optimization, online shortest path,compression & universal coding etc.

Full-information feedback: H(I, J) = J

Szepesvari (UofA) Partial monitoring July 2, 2011 13 / 39

Example IV: Multi-Armed Bandits

action I ∈ X = 1, 2, . . . ,Koutcome J ∈ Y = [0, 1]K

loss = feedback: L(I, J) = H(I, J) = JI

Bandit feedback: H(I, J) = L(I, J)

extensions: bandit linear & convex optimization, bandit shortest path

applications: web advertisement, content optimization, routing innetworks, control theory & reinforcement learning

Szepesvari (UofA) Partial monitoring July 2, 2011 14 / 39

Example V: Dynamic Pricing

We’re selling a stream of identical items(e.g. air-tickets, books, mp3s)

asking price I ∈ X = [0, 1]

maximum price J ∈ Y = [0, 1]

feedback H(I, J) = II ≤ Jloss

L(I, J) =

J − I if J ≥ I (sell),c if J < I (no sell).

for some c > 0

Szepesvari (UofA) Partial monitoring July 2, 2011 15 / 39

Previous Results about Finite Games

0 1

1

1/2

O(1) Θ(T 1/2) Θ(T )

Full informa-tion games

Banditgames

2/3

︷ ︸︸ ︷

No gameshere

Revealing action game

No informa-

tion!

Opponent

does not

matter! ︷ ︸︸ ︷

No gameshere

WM – Vovk(1990);Littlestone andWarmuth (1994)Exp3 – Aueret al. (2002)FeedExp3 –Piccolboni andSchindelhauer(2001)Cesa-Bianchiet al. (2006)

Where isdynamicpricing?Where shouldwe putG = (L,H)??How to play agame G?

Szepesvari (UofA) Partial monitoring July 2, 2011 16 / 39

Previous Results about Finite Games

0 1

1

1/2

O(1) Θ(T 1/2) Θ(T )

Full informa-tion games

Banditgames

2/3

︷ ︸︸ ︷

No gameshere

Revealing action game

No informa-

tion!

Opponent

does not

matter! ︷ ︸︸ ︷

No gameshere

WM – Vovk(1990);Littlestone andWarmuth (1994)

Exp3 – Aueret al. (2002)FeedExp3 –Piccolboni andSchindelhauer(2001)Cesa-Bianchiet al. (2006)

Where isdynamicpricing?Where shouldwe putG = (L,H)??How to play agame G?

Szepesvari (UofA) Partial monitoring July 2, 2011 16 / 39

Previous Results about Finite Games

0 1

1

1/2

O(1) Θ(T 1/2) Θ(T )

Full informa-tion games

Banditgames

2/3

︷ ︸︸ ︷

No gameshere

Revealing action game

No informa-

tion!

Opponent

does not

matter! ︷ ︸︸ ︷

No gameshere

WM – Vovk(1990);Littlestone andWarmuth (1994)Exp3 – Aueret al. (2002)

FeedExp3 –Piccolboni andSchindelhauer(2001)Cesa-Bianchiet al. (2006)

Where isdynamicpricing?Where shouldwe putG = (L,H)??How to play agame G?

Szepesvari (UofA) Partial monitoring July 2, 2011 16 / 39

Previous Results about Finite Games

0 1

1

1/2

O(1) Θ(T 1/2) Θ(T )

Full informa-tion games

Banditgames

2/3

︷ ︸︸ ︷

No gameshere

Revealing action game

No informa-

tion!

Opponent

does not

matter! ︷ ︸︸ ︷

No gameshere

WM – Vovk(1990);Littlestone andWarmuth (1994)Exp3 – Aueret al. (2002)

FeedExp3 –Piccolboni andSchindelhauer(2001)Cesa-Bianchiet al. (2006)

Where isdynamicpricing?Where shouldwe putG = (L,H)??How to play agame G?

Szepesvari (UofA) Partial monitoring July 2, 2011 16 / 39

Previous Results about Finite Games

0 1

1

1/2

O(1) Θ(T 1/2) Θ(T )

Full informa-tion games

Banditgames

2/3

︷ ︸︸ ︷

No gameshere

Revealing action game

No informa-

tion!

Opponent

does not

matter!︷ ︸︸ ︷

No gameshere

WM – Vovk(1990);Littlestone andWarmuth (1994)Exp3 – Aueret al. (2002)FeedExp3 –Piccolboni andSchindelhauer(2001)Cesa-Bianchiet al. (2006)

Where isdynamicpricing?Where shouldwe putG = (L,H)??How to play agame G?

Szepesvari (UofA) Partial monitoring July 2, 2011 16 / 39

Previous Results about Finite Games

0 1

1

1/2

O(1) Θ(T 1/2) Θ(T )

Full informa-tion games

Banditgames

2/3

︷ ︸︸ ︷

No gameshere

Revealing action game

No informa-

tion!

Opponent

does not

matter!︷ ︸︸ ︷

No gameshere

WM – Vovk(1990);Littlestone andWarmuth (1994)Exp3 – Aueret al. (2002)FeedExp3 –Piccolboni andSchindelhauer(2001)Cesa-Bianchiet al. (2006)

Where isdynamicpricing?Where shouldwe putG = (L,H)??How to play agame G?

Szepesvari (UofA) Partial monitoring July 2, 2011 16 / 39

Previous Results about Finite Games

0 1

1

1/2

O(1) Θ(T 1/2) Θ(T )

Full informa-tion games

Banditgames

2/3

︷ ︸︸ ︷

No gameshere

Revealing action game

No informa-

tion!

Opponent

does not

matter!︷ ︸︸ ︷

No gameshere

WM – Vovk(1990);Littlestone andWarmuth (1994)Exp3 – Aueret al. (2002)FeedExp3 –Piccolboni andSchindelhauer(2001)Cesa-Bianchiet al. (2006)

Where isdynamicpricing?Where shouldwe putG = (L,H)??How to play agame G?

Szepesvari (UofA) Partial monitoring July 2, 2011 16 / 39

Previous Results about Finite Games

0 1

1

1/2

O(1) Θ(T 1/2) Θ(T )

Full informa-tion games

Banditgames

2/3

︷ ︸︸ ︷

No gameshere

Revealing action game

No informa-

tion!

Opponent

does not

matter!︷ ︸︸ ︷

No gameshere

WM – Vovk(1990);Littlestone andWarmuth (1994)Exp3 – Aueret al. (2002)FeedExp3 –Piccolboni andSchindelhauer(2001)Cesa-Bianchiet al. (2006)

Where isdynamicpricing?

Where shouldwe putG = (L,H)??How to play agame G?

Szepesvari (UofA) Partial monitoring July 2, 2011 16 / 39

Previous Results about Finite Games

0 1

1

1/2

O(1) Θ(T 1/2) Θ(T )

Full informa-tion games

Banditgames

2/3

︷ ︸︸ ︷

No gameshere

Revealing action game

No informa-

tion!

Opponent

does not

matter!︷ ︸︸ ︷

No gameshere

WM – Vovk(1990);Littlestone andWarmuth (1994)Exp3 – Aueret al. (2002)FeedExp3 –Piccolboni andSchindelhauer(2001)Cesa-Bianchiet al. (2006)

Where isdynamicpricing?Where shouldwe putG = (L,H)??

How to play agame G?

Szepesvari (UofA) Partial monitoring July 2, 2011 16 / 39

Previous Results about Finite Games

0 1

1

1/2

O(1) Θ(T 1/2) Θ(T )

Full informa-tion games

Banditgames

2/3

︷ ︸︸ ︷

No gameshere

Revealing action game

No informa-

tion!

Opponent

does not

matter!︷ ︸︸ ︷

No gameshere

WM – Vovk(1990);Littlestone andWarmuth (1994)Exp3 – Aueret al. (2002)FeedExp3 –Piccolboni andSchindelhauer(2001)Cesa-Bianchiet al. (2006)

Where isdynamicpricing?Where shouldwe putG = (L,H)??How to play agame G?

Szepesvari (UofA) Partial monitoring July 2, 2011 16 / 39

Previous Results about Finite Games

0 1

1

1/2

O(1) Θ(T 1/2) Θ(T )

Full informa-tion games

Banditgames

2/3

︷ ︸︸ ︷

No gameshere

Revealing action game

No informa-

tion!

Opponent

does not

matter!︷ ︸︸ ︷

No gameshere

?

WM – Vovk(1990);Littlestone andWarmuth (1994)Exp3 – Aueret al. (2002)FeedExp3 –Piccolboni andSchindelhauer(2001)Cesa-Bianchiet al. (2006)

Where isdynamicpricing?Where shouldwe putG = (L,H)??How to play agame G?

Szepesvari (UofA) Partial monitoring July 2, 2011 16 / 39

Our Contributions

Characterization of 2×M and N × 2 games for adversarialenvironmentsCharacterization of all N ×M games for environments thatgenerate outcomes i.i.d.(stochastic environments)Any N ×M game falls into one of the four categories:

trivial RT = 0easy RT = Θ(

√T)

hard RT = Θ(T2/3)hopeless RT = Θ(T)

Szepesvari (UofA) Partial monitoring July 2, 2011 17 / 39

Outline

1 Partial Monitoring (what and why?)Prediction games (“full information setting”)Partial-monitoring

2 ResultsInformation, loss-estimationThe fundamental lemmaLower boundUpper bound

3 Conclusions and Open Problems

4 Bibliography

Szepesvari (UofA) Partial monitoring July 2, 2011 18 / 39

What Information Can We Collect?

Game G = (L,H), L,H ∈ RN×M

Opponent playing p ∈ ∆M: P (Jt = j) = pj.What information does the player gain when playing action i?If i is played for a long time, one can learn the distribution of thesymbols in the ith row of H!

0.1 0.6 0.2 0.1P(ht = ) = 0.3P(ht = ) = 0.6P(ht = ) = 0.6

P (ht = σk) =∑M

j=1 IHi,j=σk pj =∑M

j=1 S(i)kj pj = (S(i)p)k

S(i): Signal matrix underlying action i

Szepesvari (UofA) Partial monitoring July 2, 2011 19 / 39

What Information Can We Collect?

Game G = (L,H), L,H ∈ RN×M

Opponent playing p ∈ ∆M: P (Jt = j) = pj.What information does the player gain when playing action i?If i is played for a long time, one can learn the distribution of thesymbols in the ith row of H!

0.1 0.6 0.2 0.1P(ht = ) = 0.3P(ht = ) = 0.6P(ht = ) = 0.6

P (ht = σk) =∑M

j=1 IHi,j=σk pj =∑M

j=1 S(i)kj pj = (S(i)p)k

S(i): Signal matrix underlying action i

Szepesvari (UofA) Partial monitoring July 2, 2011 19 / 39

What Information Can We Collect?

Game G = (L,H), L,H ∈ RN×M

Opponent playing p ∈ ∆M: P (Jt = j) = pj.What information does the player gain when playing action i?If i is played for a long time, one can learn the distribution of thesymbols in the ith row of H!

0.1 0.6 0.2 0.1P(ht = ) = 0.3P(ht = ) = 0.6P(ht = ) = 0.6

P (ht = σk) =∑M

j=1 IHi,j=σk pj =∑M

j=1 S(i)kj pj = (S(i)p)k

S(i): Signal matrix underlying action i

Szepesvari (UofA) Partial monitoring July 2, 2011 19 / 39

What Information Can We Collect?

Game G = (L,H), L,H ∈ RN×M

Opponent playing p ∈ ∆M: P (Jt = j) = pj.What information does the player gain when playing action i?If i is played for a long time, one can learn the distribution of thesymbols in the ith row of H!

0.1 0.6 0.2 0.1 P(ht = ) = 0.3

P(ht = ) = 0.6

P(ht = ) = 0.6

P (ht = σk) =∑M

j=1 IHi,j=σk pj =∑M

j=1 S(i)kj pj = (S(i)p)k

S(i): Signal matrix underlying action i

Szepesvari (UofA) Partial monitoring July 2, 2011 19 / 39

What Information Can We Collect?

Game G = (L,H), L,H ∈ RN×M

Opponent playing p ∈ ∆M: P (Jt = j) = pj.What information does the player gain when playing action i?If i is played for a long time, one can learn the distribution of thesymbols in the ith row of H!

0.1 0.6 0.2 0.1 P(ht = ) = 0.3

P(ht = ) = 0.6

P(ht = ) = 0.6

P (ht = σk) =∑M

j=1 IHi,j=σk pj =∑M

j=1 S(i)kj pj = (S(i)p)k

S(i): Signal matrix underlying action i

Szepesvari (UofA) Partial monitoring July 2, 2011 19 / 39

What Information Can We Collect?

Game G = (L,H), L,H ∈ RN×M

Opponent playing p ∈ ∆M: P (Jt = j) = pj.What information does the player gain when playing action i?If i is played for a long time, one can learn the distribution of thesymbols in the ith row of H!

0.1 0.6 0.2 0.1 P(ht = ) = 0.3

P(ht = ) = 0.6

P(ht = ) = 0.6

P (ht = σk) =∑M

j=1 IHi,j=σk pj =∑M

j=1 S(i)kj pj = (S(i)p)k

S(i): Signal matrix underlying action i

Szepesvari (UofA) Partial monitoring July 2, 2011 19 / 39

What Information Can We Collect?

Game G = (L,H), L,H ∈ RN×M

Opponent playing p ∈ ∆M: P (Jt = j) = pj.What information does the player gain when playing action i?If i is played for a long time, one can learn the distribution of thesymbols in the ith row of H!

0.1 0.6 0.2 0.1 P(ht = ) = 0.3

P(ht = ) = 0.6

P(ht = ) = 0.6

P (ht = σk) =∑M

j=1 IHi,j=σk pj =∑M

j=1 S(i)kj pj = (S(i)p)k

S(i): Signal matrix underlying action i

Szepesvari (UofA) Partial monitoring July 2, 2011 19 / 39

What Information Can We Collect?

Game G = (L,H), L,H ∈ RN×M

Opponent playing p ∈ ∆M: P (Jt = j) = pj.What information does the player gain when playing action i?If i is played for a long time, one can learn the distribution of thesymbols in the ith row of H!

0.1 0.6 0.2 0.1 P(ht = ) = 0.3

P(ht = ) = 0.6

P(ht = ) = 0.6

P (ht = σk) =∑M

j=1 IHi,j=σk pj =∑M

j=1 S(i)kj pj = (S(i)p)k

S(i): Signal matrix underlying action i

Szepesvari (UofA) Partial monitoring July 2, 2011 19 / 39

What is the Information Good For?

Decision ProblemLet i, i′ be two actions. Can we decide which of them is better?

Notation: `i ∈ RM: ith row of L

We want to figure out sgn((`i − `i′)>p), no matter how p is chosen.

The information we receive is S(i)p, S(i′)p, or S(i,i′)p, where

S(i,i′) =

(S(i)S(i′)

)∈ R(si+si′ )×M .

The bad case (BC)∃ p1, p2 ∈ ∆M such that S(i,i′)(p1 − p2) = 0and sgn((`i − `i′)

>p1) 6= sgn((`i − `i′)>p2)

Szepesvari (UofA) Partial monitoring July 2, 2011 20 / 39

What is the Information Good For?

Decision ProblemLet i, i′ be two actions. Can we decide which of them is better?

Notation: `i ∈ RM: ith row of L

We want to figure out sgn((`i − `i′)>p), no matter how p is chosen.

The information we receive is S(i)p, S(i′)p, or S(i,i′)p, where

S(i,i′) =

(S(i)S(i′)

)∈ R(si+si′ )×M .

The bad case (BC)∃ p1, p2 ∈ ∆M such that S(i,i′)(p1 − p2) = 0and sgn((`i − `i′)

>p1) 6= sgn((`i − `i′)>p2)

Szepesvari (UofA) Partial monitoring July 2, 2011 20 / 39

What is the Information Good For?

Decision ProblemLet i, i′ be two actions. Can we decide which of them is better?

Notation: `i ∈ RM: ith row of L

We want to figure out sgn((`i − `i′)>p), no matter how p is chosen.

The information we receive is S(i)p, S(i′)p, or S(i,i′)p, where

S(i,i′) =

(S(i)S(i′)

)∈ R(si+si′ )×M .

The bad case (BC)∃ p1, p2 ∈ ∆M such that S(i,i′)(p1 − p2) = 0and sgn((`i − `i′)

>p1) 6= sgn((`i − `i′)>p2)

Szepesvari (UofA) Partial monitoring July 2, 2011 20 / 39

What is the Information Good For?

Decision ProblemLet i, i′ be two actions. Can we decide which of them is better?

Notation: `i ∈ RM: ith row of L

We want to figure out sgn((`i − `i′)>p), no matter how p is chosen.

The information we receive is S(i)p, S(i′)p, or S(i,i′)p, where

S(i,i′) =

(S(i)S(i′)

)∈ R(si+si′ )×M .

The bad case (BC)∃ p1, p2 ∈ ∆M such that S(i,i′)(p1 − p2) = 0and sgn((`i − `i′)

>p1) 6= sgn((`i − `i′)>p2)

Szepesvari (UofA) Partial monitoring July 2, 2011 20 / 39

What is the Information Good For?

Decision ProblemLet i, i′ be two actions. Can we decide which of them is better?

Notation: `i ∈ RM: ith row of L

We want to figure out sgn((`i − `i′)>p), no matter how p is chosen.

The information we receive is S(i)p, S(i′)p, or S(i,i′)p, where

S(i,i′) =

(S(i)S(i′)

)∈ R(si+si′ )×M .

The bad case (BC)∃ p1, p2 ∈ ∆M such that S(i,i′)(p1 − p2) = 0and sgn((`i − `i′)

>p1) 6= sgn((`i − `i′)>p2)

Szepesvari (UofA) Partial monitoring July 2, 2011 20 / 39

Outline

1 Partial Monitoring (what and why?)Prediction games (“full information setting”)Partial-monitoring

2 ResultsInformation, loss-estimationThe fundamental lemmaLower boundUpper bound

3 Conclusions and Open Problems

4 Bibliography

Szepesvari (UofA) Partial monitoring July 2, 2011 21 / 39

The Fundamental Lemma

The bad case (BC)∃ p1, p2 ∈ ∆M such that S(i,i′)(p1 − p2) = 0and sgn((`i − `i′)

>p1) 6= sgn((`i − `i′)>p2)

Lemma(BC)⇔ `i − `i′ 6∈ Im(S>(i,i′))

Szepesvari (UofA) Partial monitoring July 2, 2011 22 / 39

The Fundamental Lemma

The bad case (BC)∃ p1, p2 ∈ ∆M such that S(i,i′)(p1 − p2) = 0and sgn((`i − `i′)

>p1) 6= sgn((`i − `i′)>p2)

Lemma(BC)⇔ `i − `i′ 6∈ Im(S>(i,i′))

Szepesvari (UofA) Partial monitoring July 2, 2011 22 / 39

Proof of the Fundamental Lemma(BC)

∃ p1, p2 ∈ ∆M such that S(i,i′)(p1 − p2) = 0and sgn((`i − `i′)

>p1) 6= sgn((`i − `i′)>p2)

Lemma(BC)⇔ `i − `i′ 6∈ Im(S>(i,i′))

Proof: ⇒.We prove that `i − `i′ ∈ Im(S>(i,i′)) implies that for any p, (`i − `i′)

>p canbe figured out from S(i,i′)p.

Assume `i − `i′ ∈ Im(S>(i,i′)).

Then `i − `j = (S(i,i′))>v for some v ∈ Rsi+si′ .

Hence, for any p ∈ ∆M, (`i − `i′)>p = v>S(i,i′)p.

Note: Basis of the algorithm!

Szepesvari (UofA) Partial monitoring July 2, 2011 23 / 39

Proof of the Fundamental Lemma(BC)

∃ p1, p2 ∈ ∆M such that S(i,i′)(p1 − p2) = 0and sgn((`i − `i′)

>p1) 6= sgn((`i − `i′)>p2)

Lemma(BC)⇔ `i − `i′ 6∈ Im(S>(i,i′))

Proof: ⇒.We prove that `i − `i′ ∈ Im(S>(i,i′)) implies that for any p, (`i − `i′)

>p canbe figured out from S(i,i′)p.

Assume `i − `i′ ∈ Im(S>(i,i′)).

Then `i − `j = (S(i,i′))>v for some v ∈ Rsi+si′ .

Hence, for any p ∈ ∆M, (`i − `i′)>p = v>S(i,i′)p.

Note: Basis of the algorithm!

Szepesvari (UofA) Partial monitoring July 2, 2011 23 / 39

Proof of the Fundamental Lemma(BC)

∃ p1, p2 ∈ ∆M such that S(i,i′)(p1 − p2) = 0and sgn((`i − `i′)

>p1) 6= sgn((`i − `i′)>p2)

Lemma(BC)⇔ `i − `i′ 6∈ Im(S>(i,i′))

Proof: ⇒.We prove that `i − `i′ ∈ Im(S>(i,i′)) implies that for any p, (`i − `i′)

>p canbe figured out from S(i,i′)p.

Assume `i − `i′ ∈ Im(S>(i,i′)).

Then `i − `j = (S(i,i′))>v for some v ∈ Rsi+si′ .

Hence, for any p ∈ ∆M, (`i − `i′)>p = v>S(i,i′)p.

Note: Basis of the algorithm!

Szepesvari (UofA) Partial monitoring July 2, 2011 23 / 39

Proof of the Fundamental Lemma(BC)

∃ p1, p2 ∈ ∆M such that S(i,i′)(p1 − p2) = 0and sgn((`i − `i′)

>p1) 6= sgn((`i − `i′)>p2)

Lemma(BC)⇔ `i − `i′ 6∈ Im(S>(i,i′))

Proof: ⇒.We prove that `i − `i′ ∈ Im(S>(i,i′)) implies that for any p, (`i − `i′)

>p canbe figured out from S(i,i′)p.

Assume `i − `i′ ∈ Im(S>(i,i′)).

Then `i − `j = (S(i,i′))>v for some v ∈ Rsi+si′ .

Hence, for any p ∈ ∆M, (`i − `i′)>p = v>S(i,i′)p.

Note: Basis of the algorithm!

Szepesvari (UofA) Partial monitoring July 2, 2011 23 / 39

Proof of the Fundamental Lemma(BC)

∃ p1, p2 ∈ ∆M such that S(i,i′)(p1 − p2) = 0and sgn((`i − `i′)

>p1) 6= sgn((`i − `i′)>p2)

Lemma(BC)⇔ `i − `i′ 6∈ Im(S>(i,i′))

Proof: ⇒.We prove that `i − `i′ ∈ Im(S>(i,i′)) implies that for any p, (`i − `i′)

>p canbe figured out from S(i,i′)p.

Assume `i − `i′ ∈ Im(S>(i,i′)).

Then `i − `j = (S(i,i′))>v for some v ∈ Rsi+si′ .

Hence, for any p ∈ ∆M, (`i − `i′)>p = v>S(i,i′)p.

Note: Basis of the algorithm!

Szepesvari (UofA) Partial monitoring July 2, 2011 23 / 39

Proof of the Fundamental Lemma(BC)

∃ p1, p2 ∈ ∆M such that S(i,i′)(p1 − p2) = 0and sgn((`i − `i′)

>p1) 6= sgn((`i − `i′)>p2)

Lemma(BC)⇔ `i − `i′ 6∈ Im(S>(i,i′))

Proof: ⇒.We prove that `i − `i′ ∈ Im(S>(i,i′)) implies that for any p, (`i − `i′)

>p canbe figured out from S(i,i′)p.

Assume `i − `i′ ∈ Im(S>(i,i′)).

Then `i − `j = (S(i,i′))>v for some v ∈ Rsi+si′ .

Hence, for any p ∈ ∆M, (`i − `i′)>p = v>S(i,i′)p.

Note: Basis of the algorithm!

Szepesvari (UofA) Partial monitoring July 2, 2011 23 / 39

Proof of the Fundamental Lemma(BC)

∃ p1, p2 ∈ ∆M such that S(i,i′)(p1 − p2) = 0and sgn((`i − `i′)

>p1) 6= sgn((`i − `i′)>p2)

Lemma(BC)⇔ `i − `i′ 6∈ Im(S>(i,i′))

Proof: ⇒.We prove that `i − `i′ ∈ Im(S>(i,i′)) implies that for any p, (`i − `i′)

>p canbe figured out from S(i,i′)p.

Assume `i − `i′ ∈ Im(S>(i,i′)).

Then `i − `j = (S(i,i′))>v for some v ∈ Rsi+si′ .

Hence, for any p ∈ ∆M, (`i − `i′)>p = v>S(i,i′)p.

Note: Basis of the algorithm!

Szepesvari (UofA) Partial monitoring July 2, 2011 23 / 39

Proof of the Fundamental Lemma(BC)

∃ p1, p2 ∈ ∆M such that S(i,i′)(p1 − p2) = 0and sgn((`i − `i′)

>p1) 6= sgn((`i − `i′)>p2)

Lemma(BC)⇔ `i − `i′ 6∈ Im(S>(i,i′))

Proof: ⇒.We prove that `i − `i′ ∈ Im(S>(i,i′)) implies that for any p, (`i − `i′)

>p canbe figured out from S(i,i′)p.

Assume `i − `i′ ∈ Im(S>(i,i′)).

Then `i − `j = (S(i,i′))>v for some v ∈ Rsi+si′ .

Hence, for any p ∈ ∆M, (`i − `i′)>p = v>S(i,i′)p.

Note: Basis of the algorithm!

Szepesvari (UofA) Partial monitoring July 2, 2011 23 / 39

Proof of the Fundamental Lemma(BC)

∃ p1, p2 ∈ ∆M such that S(i,i′)(p1 − p2) = 0and sgn((`i − `i′)

>p1) 6= sgn((`i − `i′)>p2)

Lemma(BC)⇔ `i − `i′ 6∈ Im(S>(i,i′))

Proof: ⇒.We prove that `i − `i′ ∈ Im(S>(i,i′)) implies that for any p, (`i − `i′)

>p canbe figured out from S(i,i′)p.

Assume `i − `i′ ∈ Im(S>(i,i′)).

Then `i − `j = (S(i,i′))>v for some v ∈ Rsi+si′ .

Hence, for any p ∈ ∆M, (`i − `i′)>p = v>S(i,i′)p.

Note: Basis of the algorithm!

Szepesvari (UofA) Partial monitoring July 2, 2011 23 / 39

Proof⇐ (BC)∃ p1, p2 ∈ ∆M such that S(i,i′)(p1 − p2) = 0and sgn((`i − `i′)

>p1) 6= sgn((`i − `i′)>p2)

Lemma(BC)⇔ `i − `i′ 6∈ Im(S>(i,i′))

Proof: ⇐.Assume `i − `i′ 6∈ Im(S>(i,i′))

⇒ (`i − `i′) 6⊂ Im(S>(i,i′))

⇒ Ker(S(i,i′)) 6⊂ (`i − `i′)⊥ (because Im(M)⊥ = Ker(M>))

⇒ ∃v ∈ Ker(S(i,i′)) s.t. (`i − `i′)>v = 1

Since 1> = 1>S(i,i′), 0 = 1>0 = 1>(S(i,i′)v) = 1>v

∃p0 ∈ ∆M, ε > 0 s.t. p1 = p0 + εv ∈ ∆M, p2 = p0 − εv ∈ ∆M, andsgn((`i − `i′)

>p1) 6= sgn((`i − `i′)>p2), while

S(i,i′)(p1 − p2) = 2εS(i,i′)v = 0.

Szepesvari (UofA) Partial monitoring July 2, 2011 24 / 39

Proof⇐ (BC)∃ p1, p2 ∈ ∆M such that S(i,i′)(p1 − p2) = 0and sgn((`i − `i′)

>p1) 6= sgn((`i − `i′)>p2)

Lemma(BC)⇔ `i − `i′ 6∈ Im(S>(i,i′))

Proof: ⇐.Assume `i − `i′ 6∈ Im(S>(i,i′))

⇒ (`i − `i′) 6⊂ Im(S>(i,i′))

⇒ Ker(S(i,i′)) 6⊂ (`i − `i′)⊥ (because Im(M)⊥ = Ker(M>))

⇒ ∃v ∈ Ker(S(i,i′)) s.t. (`i − `i′)>v = 1

Since 1> = 1>S(i,i′), 0 = 1>0 = 1>(S(i,i′)v) = 1>v

∃p0 ∈ ∆M, ε > 0 s.t. p1 = p0 + εv ∈ ∆M, p2 = p0 − εv ∈ ∆M, andsgn((`i − `i′)

>p1) 6= sgn((`i − `i′)>p2), while

S(i,i′)(p1 − p2) = 2εS(i,i′)v = 0.

Szepesvari (UofA) Partial monitoring July 2, 2011 24 / 39

Proof⇐ (BC)∃ p1, p2 ∈ ∆M such that S(i,i′)(p1 − p2) = 0and sgn((`i − `i′)

>p1) 6= sgn((`i − `i′)>p2)

Lemma(BC)⇔ `i − `i′ 6∈ Im(S>(i,i′))

Proof: ⇐.Assume `i − `i′ 6∈ Im(S>(i,i′))

⇒ (`i − `i′) 6⊂ Im(S>(i,i′))

⇒ Ker(S(i,i′)) 6⊂ (`i − `i′)⊥ (because Im(M)⊥ = Ker(M>))

⇒ ∃v ∈ Ker(S(i,i′)) s.t. (`i − `i′)>v = 1

Since 1> = 1>S(i,i′), 0 = 1>0 = 1>(S(i,i′)v) = 1>v

∃p0 ∈ ∆M, ε > 0 s.t. p1 = p0 + εv ∈ ∆M, p2 = p0 − εv ∈ ∆M, andsgn((`i − `i′)

>p1) 6= sgn((`i − `i′)>p2), while

S(i,i′)(p1 − p2) = 2εS(i,i′)v = 0.

Szepesvari (UofA) Partial monitoring July 2, 2011 24 / 39

Proof⇐ (BC)∃ p1, p2 ∈ ∆M such that S(i,i′)(p1 − p2) = 0and sgn((`i − `i′)

>p1) 6= sgn((`i − `i′)>p2)

Lemma(BC)⇔ `i − `i′ 6∈ Im(S>(i,i′))

Proof: ⇐.Assume `i − `i′ 6∈ Im(S>(i,i′))

⇒ (`i − `i′) 6⊂ Im(S>(i,i′))

⇒ Ker(S(i,i′)) 6⊂ (`i − `i′)⊥ (because Im(M)⊥ = Ker(M>))

⇒ ∃v ∈ Ker(S(i,i′)) s.t. (`i − `i′)>v = 1

Since 1> = 1>S(i,i′), 0 = 1>0 = 1>(S(i,i′)v) = 1>v

∃p0 ∈ ∆M, ε > 0 s.t. p1 = p0 + εv ∈ ∆M, p2 = p0 − εv ∈ ∆M, andsgn((`i − `i′)

>p1) 6= sgn((`i − `i′)>p2), while

S(i,i′)(p1 − p2) = 2εS(i,i′)v = 0.

Szepesvari (UofA) Partial monitoring July 2, 2011 24 / 39

Proof⇐ (BC)∃ p1, p2 ∈ ∆M such that S(i,i′)(p1 − p2) = 0and sgn((`i − `i′)

>p1) 6= sgn((`i − `i′)>p2)

Lemma(BC)⇔ `i − `i′ 6∈ Im(S>(i,i′))

Proof: ⇐.Assume `i − `i′ 6∈ Im(S>(i,i′))

⇒ (`i − `i′) 6⊂ Im(S>(i,i′))

⇒ Ker(S(i,i′)) 6⊂ (`i − `i′)⊥ (because Im(M)⊥ = Ker(M>))

⇒ ∃v ∈ Ker(S(i,i′)) s.t. (`i − `i′)>v = 1

Since 1> = 1>S(i,i′), 0 = 1>0 = 1>(S(i,i′)v) = 1>v

∃p0 ∈ ∆M, ε > 0 s.t. p1 = p0 + εv ∈ ∆M, p2 = p0 − εv ∈ ∆M, andsgn((`i − `i′)

>p1) 6= sgn((`i − `i′)>p2), while

S(i,i′)(p1 − p2) = 2εS(i,i′)v = 0.

Szepesvari (UofA) Partial monitoring July 2, 2011 24 / 39

Proof⇐ (BC)∃ p1, p2 ∈ ∆M such that S(i,i′)(p1 − p2) = 0and sgn((`i − `i′)

>p1) 6= sgn((`i − `i′)>p2)

Lemma(BC)⇔ `i − `i′ 6∈ Im(S>(i,i′))

Proof: ⇐.Assume `i − `i′ 6∈ Im(S>(i,i′))

⇒ (`i − `i′) 6⊂ Im(S>(i,i′))

⇒ Ker(S(i,i′)) 6⊂ (`i − `i′)⊥ (because Im(M)⊥ = Ker(M>))

⇒ ∃v ∈ Ker(S(i,i′)) s.t. (`i − `i′)>v = 1

Since 1> = 1>S(i,i′), 0 = 1>0 = 1>(S(i,i′)v) = 1>v

∃p0 ∈ ∆M, ε > 0 s.t. p1 = p0 + εv ∈ ∆M, p2 = p0 − εv ∈ ∆M, andsgn((`i − `i′)

>p1) 6= sgn((`i − `i′)>p2), while

S(i,i′)(p1 − p2) = 2εS(i,i′)v = 0.

Szepesvari (UofA) Partial monitoring July 2, 2011 24 / 39

Proof⇐ (BC)∃ p1, p2 ∈ ∆M such that S(i,i′)(p1 − p2) = 0and sgn((`i − `i′)

>p1) 6= sgn((`i − `i′)>p2)

Lemma(BC)⇔ `i − `i′ 6∈ Im(S>(i,i′))

Proof: ⇐.Assume `i − `i′ 6∈ Im(S>(i,i′))

⇒ (`i − `i′) 6⊂ Im(S>(i,i′))

⇒ Ker(S(i,i′)) 6⊂ (`i − `i′)⊥ (because Im(M)⊥ = Ker(M>))

⇒ ∃v ∈ Ker(S(i,i′)) s.t. (`i − `i′)>v = 1

Since 1> = 1>S(i,i′), 0 = 1>0 = 1>(S(i,i′)v) = 1>v

∃p0 ∈ ∆M, ε > 0 s.t. p1 = p0 + εv ∈ ∆M, p2 = p0 − εv ∈ ∆M, andsgn((`i − `i′)

>p1) 6= sgn((`i − `i′)>p2), while

S(i,i′)(p1 − p2) = 2εS(i,i′)v = 0.

Szepesvari (UofA) Partial monitoring July 2, 2011 24 / 39

Proof⇐ (BC)∃ p1, p2 ∈ ∆M such that S(i,i′)(p1 − p2) = 0and sgn((`i − `i′)

>p1) 6= sgn((`i − `i′)>p2)

Lemma(BC)⇔ `i − `i′ 6∈ Im(S>(i,i′))

Proof: ⇐.Assume `i − `i′ 6∈ Im(S>(i,i′))

⇒ (`i − `i′) 6⊂ Im(S>(i,i′))

⇒ Ker(S(i,i′)) 6⊂ (`i − `i′)⊥ (because Im(M)⊥ = Ker(M>))

⇒ ∃v ∈ Ker(S(i,i′)) s.t. (`i − `i′)>v = 1

Since 1> = 1>S(i,i′), 0 = 1>0 = 1>(S(i,i′)v) = 1>v

∃p0 ∈ ∆M, ε > 0 s.t. p1 = p0 + εv ∈ ∆M, p2 = p0 − εv ∈ ∆M, andsgn((`i − `i′)

>p1) 6= sgn((`i − `i′)>p2), while

S(i,i′)(p1 − p2) = 2εS(i,i′)v = 0.

Szepesvari (UofA) Partial monitoring July 2, 2011 24 / 39

Proof⇐ (BC)∃ p1, p2 ∈ ∆M such that S(i,i′)(p1 − p2) = 0and sgn((`i − `i′)

>p1) 6= sgn((`i − `i′)>p2)

Lemma(BC)⇔ `i − `i′ 6∈ Im(S>(i,i′))

Proof: ⇐.Assume `i − `i′ 6∈ Im(S>(i,i′))

⇒ (`i − `i′) 6⊂ Im(S>(i,i′))

⇒ Ker(S(i,i′)) 6⊂ (`i − `i′)⊥ (because Im(M)⊥ = Ker(M>))

⇒ ∃v ∈ Ker(S(i,i′)) s.t. (`i − `i′)>v = 1

Since 1> = 1>S(i,i′), 0 = 1>0 = 1>(S(i,i′)v) = 1>v

∃p0 ∈ ∆M, ε > 0 s.t. p1 = p0 + εv ∈ ∆M, p2 = p0 − εv ∈ ∆M, andsgn((`i − `i′)

>p1) 6= sgn((`i − `i′)>p2), while

S(i,i′)(p1 − p2) = 2εS(i,i′)v = 0.

Szepesvari (UofA) Partial monitoring July 2, 2011 24 / 39

Proof⇐ (BC)∃ p1, p2 ∈ ∆M such that S(i,i′)(p1 − p2) = 0and sgn((`i − `i′)

>p1) 6= sgn((`i − `i′)>p2)

Lemma(BC)⇔ `i − `i′ 6∈ Im(S>(i,i′))

Proof: ⇐.Assume `i − `i′ 6∈ Im(S>(i,i′))

⇒ (`i − `i′) 6⊂ Im(S>(i,i′))

⇒ Ker(S(i,i′)) 6⊂ (`i − `i′)⊥ (because Im(M)⊥ = Ker(M>))

⇒ ∃v ∈ Ker(S(i,i′)) s.t. (`i − `i′)>v = 1

Since 1> = 1>S(i,i′), 0 = 1>0 = 1>(S(i,i′)v) = 1>v

∃p0 ∈ ∆M, ε > 0 s.t. p1 = p0 + εv ∈ ∆M, p2 = p0 − εv ∈ ∆M, andsgn((`i − `i′)

>p1) 6= sgn((`i − `i′)>p2), while

S(i,i′)(p1 − p2) = 2εS(i,i′)v = 0.

Szepesvari (UofA) Partial monitoring July 2, 2011 24 / 39

Proof⇐ (BC)∃ p1, p2 ∈ ∆M such that S(i,i′)(p1 − p2) = 0and sgn((`i − `i′)

>p1) 6= sgn((`i − `i′)>p2)

Lemma(BC)⇔ `i − `i′ 6∈ Im(S>(i,i′))

Proof: ⇐.Assume `i − `i′ 6∈ Im(S>(i,i′))

⇒ (`i − `i′) 6⊂ Im(S>(i,i′))

⇒ Ker(S(i,i′)) 6⊂ (`i − `i′)⊥ (because Im(M)⊥ = Ker(M>))

⇒ ∃v ∈ Ker(S(i,i′)) s.t. (`i − `i′)>v = 1

Since 1> = 1>S(i,i′), 0 = 1>0 = 1>(S(i,i′)v) = 1>v

∃p0 ∈ ∆M, ε > 0 s.t. p1 = p0 + εv ∈ ∆M, p2 = p0 − εv ∈ ∆M, andsgn((`i − `i′)

>p1) 6= sgn((`i − `i′)>p2), while

S(i,i′)(p1 − p2) = 2εS(i,i′)v = 0.

Szepesvari (UofA) Partial monitoring July 2, 2011 24 / 39

Illustration

When `i − `i′ 6∈ Im(S>(i,i′)) then (BC) holds.

(1, 0, 0)

(0, 1, 0)

(0, 0, 1)

i

i′(`i − `i′)>p < 0

(`i − `i′)>p > 0

p0

p1 = p0 + εv

p2 = p0 − εv

v is s.t. v ∈ Ker(S(i,i′)) and (`i − `i′)>v = 1.

Szepesvari (UofA) Partial monitoring July 2, 2011 25 / 39

Cell decomposition

(1, 0, 0)

(0, 1, 0)

(0, 0, 1)p

i

i′

i and i′ are “neighboring actions”

Szepesvari (UofA) Partial monitoring July 2, 2011 26 / 39

Outline

1 Partial Monitoring (what and why?)Prediction games (“full information setting”)Partial-monitoring

2 ResultsInformation, loss-estimationThe fundamental lemmaLower boundUpper bound

3 Conclusions and Open Problems

4 Bibliography

Szepesvari (UofA) Partial monitoring July 2, 2011 27 / 39

Lower Bound

TheoremIf there exists i, i′ actions which are neighbors and `i − `i′ 6∈ Im(S>(i,i′))

then the RT = Ω(T2/3).

Proof.Follows from the Fundamental Lemma:∃p1, p2 ∈ ∆M s.t. p1 makes i optimal, p2 makes i′ optimal and thereis no way to distinguish between p1 and p2 based on theobservations.If there is no third action, the game is hopelessIf there is a third action that can help distinguishing p1 and p2 thenit will be costly to use it whenever p is either p1 or p2.

Szepesvari (UofA) Partial monitoring July 2, 2011 28 / 39

Lower Bound

TheoremIf there exists i, i′ actions which are neighbors and `i − `i′ 6∈ Im(S>(i,i′))

then the RT = Ω(T2/3).

Proof.Follows from the Fundamental Lemma:∃p1, p2 ∈ ∆M s.t. p1 makes i optimal, p2 makes i′ optimal and thereis no way to distinguish between p1 and p2 based on theobservations.If there is no third action, the game is hopelessIf there is a third action that can help distinguishing p1 and p2 thenit will be costly to use it whenever p is either p1 or p2.

Szepesvari (UofA) Partial monitoring July 2, 2011 28 / 39

Lower Bound

TheoremIf there exists i, i′ actions which are neighbors and `i − `i′ 6∈ Im(S>(i,i′))

then the RT = Ω(T2/3).

Proof.Follows from the Fundamental Lemma:∃p1, p2 ∈ ∆M s.t. p1 makes i optimal, p2 makes i′ optimal and thereis no way to distinguish between p1 and p2 based on theobservations.If there is no third action, the game is hopelessIf there is a third action that can help distinguishing p1 and p2 thenit will be costly to use it whenever p is either p1 or p2.

Szepesvari (UofA) Partial monitoring July 2, 2011 28 / 39

Lower Bound

TheoremIf there exists i, i′ actions which are neighbors and `i − `i′ 6∈ Im(S>(i,i′))

then the RT = Ω(T2/3).

Proof.Follows from the Fundamental Lemma:∃p1, p2 ∈ ∆M s.t. p1 makes i optimal, p2 makes i′ optimal and thereis no way to distinguish between p1 and p2 based on theobservations.If there is no third action, the game is hopelessIf there is a third action that can help distinguishing p1 and p2 thenit will be costly to use it whenever p is either p1 or p2.

Szepesvari (UofA) Partial monitoring July 2, 2011 28 / 39

Lower Bound

TheoremIf there exists i, i′ actions which are neighbors and `i − `i′ 6∈ Im(S>(i,i′))

then the RT = Ω(T2/3).

Proof.Follows from the Fundamental Lemma:∃p1, p2 ∈ ∆M s.t. p1 makes i optimal, p2 makes i′ optimal and thereis no way to distinguish between p1 and p2 based on theobservations.If there is no third action, the game is hopelessIf there is a third action that can help distinguishing p1 and p2 thenit will be costly to use it whenever p is either p1 or p2.

Szepesvari (UofA) Partial monitoring July 2, 2011 28 / 39

Illustration

When `i − `i′ 6∈ Im(S>(i,i′)) then (BC) holds.

(1, 0, 0)

(0, 1, 0)

(0, 0, 1)

i

i′

(`i − `i′)>p < 0

(`i − `i′)>p > 0

p0

p1 = p0 + εv

p2 = p0 − εv

v is s.t. v ∈ Ker(S(i,i′)) and (`i − `i′)>v = 1.

Szepesvari (UofA) Partial monitoring July 2, 2011 29 / 39

Outline

1 Partial Monitoring (what and why?)Prediction games (“full information setting”)Partial-monitoring

2 ResultsInformation, loss-estimationThe fundamental lemmaLower boundUpper bound

3 Conclusions and Open Problems

4 Bibliography

Szepesvari (UofA) Partial monitoring July 2, 2011 30 / 39

Toward the Upper Bound

Let p ∈ ∆M be the distribution chosen by the environment i∗ be anoptimal action under p.

Regret⇒ expected regret:

RT = E

[T∑

t=1

L(It, Jt)

]− min

1≤i≤NE

[T∑

t=1

L(i, Jt)

]

Regret decomposition:

RT =

N∑

i=1

E [τi]αi,i∗ ,

whereI αi,i′ = (`i − `i′)

>p is the difference of losses underlying i, i′,I τi is the number of times action i is played.

How can we keep τi small?Estimate αi,i′ and when sgn(αi,i′) becomes obvious, eliminate thesuboptimal action!Szepesvari (UofA) Partial monitoring July 2, 2011 31 / 39

Toward the Upper Bound

Let p ∈ ∆M be the distribution chosen by the environment i∗ be anoptimal action under p.

Regret⇒ expected regret:

RT = E

[T∑

t=1

L(It, Jt)

]− min

1≤i≤NE

[T∑

t=1

L(i, Jt)

]

Regret decomposition:

RT =

N∑

i=1

E [τi]αi,i∗ ,

whereI αi,i′ = (`i − `i′)

>p is the difference of losses underlying i, i′,I τi is the number of times action i is played.

How can we keep τi small?Estimate αi,i′ and when sgn(αi,i′) becomes obvious, eliminate thesuboptimal action!Szepesvari (UofA) Partial monitoring July 2, 2011 31 / 39

Toward the Upper Bound

Let p ∈ ∆M be the distribution chosen by the environment i∗ be anoptimal action under p.

Regret⇒ expected regret:

RT = E

[T∑

t=1

L(It, Jt)

]− min

1≤i≤NE

[T∑

t=1

L(i, Jt)

]

Regret decomposition:

RT =

N∑

i=1

E [τi]αi,i∗ ,

whereI αi,i′ = (`i − `i′)

>p is the difference of losses underlying i, i′,I τi is the number of times action i is played.

How can we keep τi small?Estimate αi,i′ and when sgn(αi,i′) becomes obvious, eliminate thesuboptimal action!Szepesvari (UofA) Partial monitoring July 2, 2011 31 / 39

Toward the Upper Bound

Let p ∈ ∆M be the distribution chosen by the environment i∗ be anoptimal action under p.

Regret⇒ expected regret:

RT = E

[T∑

t=1

L(It, Jt)

]− min

1≤i≤NE

[T∑

t=1

L(i, Jt)

]

Regret decomposition:

RT =

N∑

i=1

E [τi]αi,i∗ ,

whereI αi,i′ = (`i − `i′)

>p is the difference of losses underlying i, i′,I τi is the number of times action i is played.

How can we keep τi small?Estimate αi,i′ and when sgn(αi,i′) becomes obvious, eliminate thesuboptimal action!Szepesvari (UofA) Partial monitoring July 2, 2011 31 / 39

Toward the Upper Bound

Let p ∈ ∆M be the distribution chosen by the environment i∗ be anoptimal action under p.

Regret⇒ expected regret:

RT = E

[T∑

t=1

L(It, Jt)

]− min

1≤i≤NE

[T∑

t=1

L(i, Jt)

]

Regret decomposition:

RT =

N∑

i=1

E [τi]αi,i∗ ,

whereI αi,i′ = (`i − `i′)

>p is the difference of losses underlying i, i′,I τi is the number of times action i is played.

How can we keep τi small?Estimate αi,i′ and when sgn(αi,i′) becomes obvious, eliminate thesuboptimal action!Szepesvari (UofA) Partial monitoring July 2, 2011 31 / 39

Toward the Upper Bound

Let p ∈ ∆M be the distribution chosen by the environment i∗ be anoptimal action under p.

Regret⇒ expected regret:

RT = E

[T∑

t=1

L(It, Jt)

]− min

1≤i≤NE

[T∑

t=1

L(i, Jt)

]

Regret decomposition:

RT =

N∑

i=1

E [τi]αi,i∗ ,

whereI αi,i′ = (`i − `i′)

>p is the difference of losses underlying i, i′,I τi is the number of times action i is played.

How can we keep τi small?Estimate αi,i′ and when sgn(αi,i′) becomes obvious, eliminate thesuboptimal action!Szepesvari (UofA) Partial monitoring July 2, 2011 31 / 39

Toward the Upper Bound

Let p ∈ ∆M be the distribution chosen by the environment i∗ be anoptimal action under p.

Regret⇒ expected regret:

RT = E

[T∑

t=1

L(It, Jt)

]− min

1≤i≤NE

[T∑

t=1

L(i, Jt)

]

Regret decomposition:

RT =

N∑

i=1

E [τi]αi,i∗ ,

whereI αi,i′ = (`i − `i′)

>p is the difference of losses underlying i, i′,I τi is the number of times action i is played.

How can we keep τi small?Estimate αi,i′ and when sgn(αi,i′) becomes obvious, eliminate thesuboptimal action!Szepesvari (UofA) Partial monitoring July 2, 2011 31 / 39

Constructing Good Estimates

Assume that for every neighboring action i, i′, `i − `i′ ∈ Im(S>(i,i′))How to exploit this?If i, i′ are neighbors, ∃v(i,i′) ∈ Rsi+si′ s.t.

`i − `i′ = S>(i,i′)v(i,i′)

Estimate:I Assume the learner tried i, i′ n-times, let q(i,i′) be the corresponding

empirical distribution over the observations.I Estimate αi,i′ using

αi,i′ = v>(i,i′)q(i,i′)

I This works because q(i,i′) ≈ S(i,i′)p and soαi,i′ = v>(i,i′)q(i,i′) ≈ v>(i,i′)S(i,i′)p = (`i − `i′)

>pWhen i, i′ are not neighbors, form a chain i = i0, i1, . . . , iK = i′ ofneighbors and use αi,i′ =

∑K−1k=0 αik,ik+1 .

Szepesvari (UofA) Partial monitoring July 2, 2011 32 / 39

Constructing Good Estimates

Assume that for every neighboring action i, i′, `i − `i′ ∈ Im(S>(i,i′))How to exploit this?If i, i′ are neighbors, ∃v(i,i′) ∈ Rsi+si′ s.t.

`i − `i′ = S>(i,i′)v(i,i′)

Estimate:I Assume the learner tried i, i′ n-times, let q(i,i′) be the corresponding

empirical distribution over the observations.I Estimate αi,i′ using

αi,i′ = v>(i,i′)q(i,i′)

I This works because q(i,i′) ≈ S(i,i′)p and soαi,i′ = v>(i,i′)q(i,i′) ≈ v>(i,i′)S(i,i′)p = (`i − `i′)

>pWhen i, i′ are not neighbors, form a chain i = i0, i1, . . . , iK = i′ ofneighbors and use αi,i′ =

∑K−1k=0 αik,ik+1 .

Szepesvari (UofA) Partial monitoring July 2, 2011 32 / 39

Constructing Good Estimates

Assume that for every neighboring action i, i′, `i − `i′ ∈ Im(S>(i,i′))How to exploit this?If i, i′ are neighbors, ∃v(i,i′) ∈ Rsi+si′ s.t.

`i − `i′ = S>(i,i′)v(i,i′)

Estimate:I Assume the learner tried i, i′ n-times, let q(i,i′) be the corresponding

empirical distribution over the observations.I Estimate αi,i′ using

αi,i′ = v>(i,i′)q(i,i′)

I This works because q(i,i′) ≈ S(i,i′)p and soαi,i′ = v>(i,i′)q(i,i′) ≈ v>(i,i′)S(i,i′)p = (`i − `i′)

>pWhen i, i′ are not neighbors, form a chain i = i0, i1, . . . , iK = i′ ofneighbors and use αi,i′ =

∑K−1k=0 αik,ik+1 .

Szepesvari (UofA) Partial monitoring July 2, 2011 32 / 39

Constructing Good Estimates

Assume that for every neighboring action i, i′, `i − `i′ ∈ Im(S>(i,i′))How to exploit this?If i, i′ are neighbors, ∃v(i,i′) ∈ Rsi+si′ s.t.

`i − `i′ = S>(i,i′)v(i,i′)

Estimate:I Assume the learner tried i, i′ n-times, let q(i,i′) be the corresponding

empirical distribution over the observations.I Estimate αi,i′ using

αi,i′ = v>(i,i′)q(i,i′)

I This works because q(i,i′) ≈ S(i,i′)p and soαi,i′ = v>(i,i′)q(i,i′) ≈ v>(i,i′)S(i,i′)p = (`i − `i′)

>pWhen i, i′ are not neighbors, form a chain i = i0, i1, . . . , iK = i′ ofneighbors and use αi,i′ =

∑K−1k=0 αik,ik+1 .

Szepesvari (UofA) Partial monitoring July 2, 2011 32 / 39

Constructing Good Estimates

Assume that for every neighboring action i, i′, `i − `i′ ∈ Im(S>(i,i′))How to exploit this?If i, i′ are neighbors, ∃v(i,i′) ∈ Rsi+si′ s.t.

`i − `i′ = S>(i,i′)v(i,i′)

Estimate:I Assume the learner tried i, i′ n-times, let q(i,i′) be the corresponding

empirical distribution over the observations.I Estimate αi,i′ using

αi,i′ = v>(i,i′)q(i,i′)

I This works because q(i,i′) ≈ S(i,i′)p and soαi,i′ = v>(i,i′)q(i,i′) ≈ v>(i,i′)S(i,i′)p = (`i − `i′)

>pWhen i, i′ are not neighbors, form a chain i = i0, i1, . . . , iK = i′ ofneighbors and use αi,i′ =

∑K−1k=0 αik,ik+1 .

Szepesvari (UofA) Partial monitoring July 2, 2011 32 / 39

Constructing Good Estimates

Assume that for every neighboring action i, i′, `i − `i′ ∈ Im(S>(i,i′))How to exploit this?If i, i′ are neighbors, ∃v(i,i′) ∈ Rsi+si′ s.t.

`i − `i′ = S>(i,i′)v(i,i′)

Estimate:I Assume the learner tried i, i′ n-times, let q(i,i′) be the corresponding

empirical distribution over the observations.I Estimate αi,i′ using

αi,i′ = v>(i,i′)q(i,i′)

I This works because q(i,i′) ≈ S(i,i′)p and soαi,i′ = v>(i,i′)q(i,i′) ≈ v>(i,i′)S(i,i′)p = (`i − `i′)

>pWhen i, i′ are not neighbors, form a chain i = i0, i1, . . . , iK = i′ ofneighbors and use αi,i′ =

∑K−1k=0 αik,ik+1 .

Szepesvari (UofA) Partial monitoring July 2, 2011 32 / 39

Constructing Good Estimates

Assume that for every neighboring action i, i′, `i − `i′ ∈ Im(S>(i,i′))How to exploit this?If i, i′ are neighbors, ∃v(i,i′) ∈ Rsi+si′ s.t.

`i − `i′ = S>(i,i′)v(i,i′)

Estimate:I Assume the learner tried i, i′ n-times, let q(i,i′) be the corresponding

empirical distribution over the observations.I Estimate αi,i′ using

αi,i′ = v>(i,i′)q(i,i′)

I This works because q(i,i′) ≈ S(i,i′)p and soαi,i′ = v>(i,i′)q(i,i′) ≈ v>(i,i′)S(i,i′)p = (`i − `i′)

>pWhen i, i′ are not neighbors, form a chain i = i0, i1, . . . , iK = i′ ofneighbors and use αi,i′ =

∑K−1k=0 αik,ik+1 .

Szepesvari (UofA) Partial monitoring July 2, 2011 32 / 39

Constructing Good Estimates

Assume that for every neighboring action i, i′, `i − `i′ ∈ Im(S>(i,i′))How to exploit this?If i, i′ are neighbors, ∃v(i,i′) ∈ Rsi+si′ s.t.

`i − `i′ = S>(i,i′)v(i,i′)

Estimate:I Assume the learner tried i, i′ n-times, let q(i,i′) be the corresponding

empirical distribution over the observations.I Estimate αi,i′ using

αi,i′ = v>(i,i′)q(i,i′)

I This works because q(i,i′) ≈ S(i,i′)p and soαi,i′ = v>(i,i′)q(i,i′) ≈ v>(i,i′)S(i,i′)p = (`i − `i′)

>pWhen i, i′ are not neighbors, form a chain i = i0, i1, . . . , iK = i′ ofneighbors and use αi,i′ =

∑K−1k=0 αik,ik+1 .

Szepesvari (UofA) Partial monitoring July 2, 2011 32 / 39

When Should the Learner Stop Using an Action?

Stop using i, when 0 < αi,i′(≈ (`i − `i′)>p) for some action i′

Construct confidence intervals based on Bernstein’s inequalityand when the relative error is below 1/2, stop“Bernstein Stopping” (Mnih et al., 2008)C. variance, range of αi,i′ will depend on

∑(i,i′) neighbors ‖vi,i′‖s

s,s = 1, 2

Assuming αi,i′ , w.p. 1− δ, this rule stops after

C1 log(C2/(δαi,i′))

α2i,i′

samples, for appropriate C1,C2 > 0 (game-specific) constants.

Szepesvari (UofA) Partial monitoring July 2, 2011 33 / 39

When Should the Learner Stop Using an Action?

Stop using i, when 0 < αi,i′(≈ (`i − `i′)>p) for some action i′

Construct confidence intervals based on Bernstein’s inequalityand when the relative error is below 1/2, stop“Bernstein Stopping” (Mnih et al., 2008)C. variance, range of αi,i′ will depend on

∑(i,i′) neighbors ‖vi,i′‖s

s,s = 1, 2

Assuming αi,i′ , w.p. 1− δ, this rule stops after

C1 log(C2/(δαi,i′))

α2i,i′

samples, for appropriate C1,C2 > 0 (game-specific) constants.

Szepesvari (UofA) Partial monitoring July 2, 2011 33 / 39

When Should the Learner Stop Using an Action?

Stop using i, when 0 < αi,i′(≈ (`i − `i′)>p) for some action i′

Construct confidence intervals based on Bernstein’s inequalityand when the relative error is below 1/2, stop“Bernstein Stopping” (Mnih et al., 2008)C. variance, range of αi,i′ will depend on

∑(i,i′) neighbors ‖vi,i′‖s

s,s = 1, 2

Assuming αi,i′ , w.p. 1− δ, this rule stops after

C1 log(C2/(δαi,i′))

α2i,i′

samples, for appropriate C1,C2 > 0 (game-specific) constants.

Szepesvari (UofA) Partial monitoring July 2, 2011 33 / 39

When Should the Learner Stop Using an Action?

Stop using i, when 0 < αi,i′(≈ (`i − `i′)>p) for some action i′

Construct confidence intervals based on Bernstein’s inequalityand when the relative error is below 1/2, stop“Bernstein Stopping” (Mnih et al., 2008)C. variance, range of αi,i′ will depend on

∑(i,i′) neighbors ‖vi,i′‖s

s,s = 1, 2

Assuming αi,i′ , w.p. 1− δ, this rule stops after

C1 log(C2/(δαi,i′))

α2i,i′

samples, for appropriate C1,C2 > 0 (game-specific) constants.

Szepesvari (UofA) Partial monitoring July 2, 2011 33 / 39

When Should the Learner Stop Using an Action?

Stop using i, when 0 < αi,i′(≈ (`i − `i′)>p) for some action i′

Construct confidence intervals based on Bernstein’s inequalityand when the relative error is below 1/2, stop“Bernstein Stopping” (Mnih et al., 2008)C. variance, range of αi,i′ will depend on

∑(i,i′) neighbors ‖vi,i′‖s

s,s = 1, 2

Assuming αi,i′ , w.p. 1− δ, this rule stops after

C1 log(C2/(δαi,i′))

α2i,i′

samples, for appropriate C1,C2 > 0 (game-specific) constants.

Szepesvari (UofA) Partial monitoring July 2, 2011 33 / 39

Finishing the Upper Bound

RT =∑N

i=1 E [τi]αi,i∗

Further, when the stopping rules do not fail..

N∑

i=1

τiαi,i∗ ≤∑

i:αi,i∗≥α0

C1 log(C2/(δαi,i∗))

α2i,i∗

αi,i∗ + α0

i:αi,i∗<α0

τi

≤ C1Nlog(C2/(δα0))

α0+ α0T

Choose α0 =√

C1N/T to get

N∑

i=1

τiαi,i∗ ≤√

C1NT(1 + log(C2/(δα0))) .

Szepesvari (UofA) Partial monitoring July 2, 2011 34 / 39

Algorithm – BALATON

BALATON ≡ Bandit based loss annihilation

1 Repeat while there is more than one “alive” action:2 Estimate loss differences between alive actions3 When some estimate substantially differs from zero, kill the

suboptimal action4 Play the remaining action until the end

Szepesvari (UofA) Partial monitoring July 2, 2011 35 / 39

Algorithm – BALATON

BALATON ≡ Bandit based loss annihilation

1 Repeat while there is more than one “alive” action:2 Estimate loss differences between alive actions3 When some estimate substantially differs from zero, kill the

suboptimal action4 Play the remaining action until the end

Szepesvari (UofA) Partial monitoring July 2, 2011 35 / 39

Algorithm – BALATON

BALATON ≡ Bandit based loss annihilation

1 Repeat while there is more than one “alive” action:2 Estimate loss differences between alive actions3 When some estimate substantially differs from zero, kill the

suboptimal action4 Play the remaining action until the end

Szepesvari (UofA) Partial monitoring July 2, 2011 35 / 39

Algorithm – BALATON

BALATON ≡ Bandit based loss annihilation

1 Repeat while there is more than one “alive” action:2 Estimate loss differences between alive actions3 When some estimate substantially differs from zero, kill the

suboptimal action4 Play the remaining action until the end

Szepesvari (UofA) Partial monitoring July 2, 2011 35 / 39

The Main Result

TheoremAny N ×M game falls into one of the four categories:

trivial RT = 0easy RT = Θ(

√T)

hard RT = Θ(T2/3)hopeless RT = Θ(T)

Szepesvari (UofA) Partial monitoring July 2, 2011 36 / 39

Summary for Finite, Stochastic Games

0 1

1

1/2

O(1) Θ(T 1/2) Θ(T )

Full informa-tion games

Banditgames

2/3

︷ ︸︸ ︷

No gameshere

Revealing action game

No informa-

tion!

Opponent

does not

matter!︷ ︸︸ ︷︷ ︸︸ ︷

Any game is at 0, 1/2, 2/3 or 1

There is a computationally efficient way of determining where agiven game fallsExample: Dynamic pricing is at 2/3 (new!)If the game is “easy” (at 1/2), one should use BALATON

If the game is “hard” (at 2/3), one should use FEEDEXP3

Szepesvari (UofA) Partial monitoring July 2, 2011 37 / 39

Summary for Finite, Stochastic Games

0 1

1

1/2

O(1) Θ(T 1/2) Θ(T )

Full informa-tion games

Banditgames

2/3

︷ ︸︸ ︷

No gameshere

Revealing action game

No informa-

tion!

Opponent

does not

matter!︷ ︸︸ ︷︷ ︸︸ ︷

Any game is at 0, 1/2, 2/3 or 1

There is a computationally efficient way of determining where agiven game fallsExample: Dynamic pricing is at 2/3 (new!)If the game is “easy” (at 1/2), one should use BALATON

If the game is “hard” (at 2/3), one should use FEEDEXP3

Szepesvari (UofA) Partial monitoring July 2, 2011 37 / 39

Summary for Finite, Stochastic Games

0 1

1

1/2

O(1) Θ(T 1/2) Θ(T )

Full informa-tion games

Banditgames

2/3

︷ ︸︸ ︷

No gameshere

Revealing action game

No informa-

tion!

Opponent

does not

matter!︷ ︸︸ ︷︷ ︸︸ ︷

Any game is at 0, 1/2, 2/3 or 1

There is a computationally efficient way of determining where agiven game fallsExample: Dynamic pricing is at 2/3 (new!)If the game is “easy” (at 1/2), one should use BALATON

If the game is “hard” (at 2/3), one should use FEEDEXP3

Szepesvari (UofA) Partial monitoring July 2, 2011 37 / 39

Summary for Finite, Stochastic Games

0 1

1

1/2

O(1) Θ(T 1/2) Θ(T )

Full informa-tion games

Banditgames

2/3

︷ ︸︸ ︷

No gameshere

Revealing action game

No informa-

tion!

Opponent

does not

matter!︷ ︸︸ ︷︷ ︸︸ ︷

Any game is at 0, 1/2, 2/3 or 1

There is a computationally efficient way of determining where agiven game fallsExample: Dynamic pricing is at 2/3 (new!)If the game is “easy” (at 1/2), one should use BALATON

If the game is “hard” (at 2/3), one should use FEEDEXP3

Szepesvari (UofA) Partial monitoring July 2, 2011 37 / 39

Summary for Finite, Stochastic Games

0 1

1

1/2

O(1) Θ(T 1/2) Θ(T )

Full informa-tion games

Banditgames

2/3

︷ ︸︸ ︷

No gameshere

Revealing action game

No informa-

tion!

Opponent

does not

matter!︷ ︸︸ ︷︷ ︸︸ ︷

Any game is at 0, 1/2, 2/3 or 1

There is a computationally efficient way of determining where agiven game fallsExample: Dynamic pricing is at 2/3 (new!)If the game is “easy” (at 1/2), one should use BALATON

If the game is “hard” (at 2/3), one should use FEEDEXP3

Szepesvari (UofA) Partial monitoring July 2, 2011 37 / 39

Summary for Finite, Stochastic Games

0 1

1

1/2

O(1) Θ(T 1/2) Θ(T )

Full informa-tion games

Banditgames

2/3

︷ ︸︸ ︷

No gameshere

Revealing action game

No informa-

tion!

Opponent

does not

matter!︷ ︸︸ ︷︷ ︸︸ ︷

Any game is at 0, 1/2, 2/3 or 1

There is a computationally efficient way of determining where agiven game fallsExample: Dynamic pricing is at 2/3 (new!)If the game is “easy” (at 1/2), one should use BALATON

If the game is “hard” (at 2/3), one should use FEEDEXP3

Szepesvari (UofA) Partial monitoring July 2, 2011 37 / 39

Conclusions

Full characterization of stochastic partial monitoring gamesHardness depends on whether there exist neighboring actionswhose loss difference cannot be estimated locallyOpen question: Does this extend to the adversarial case?Conjecture: YesWANTED: Good algorithm, with O(

√T) regret when local

observability holdsOther questions:

I Dependence on other parameters: Number of actions, number ofoutcomes, the algebraic properties of (L,H)

I Infinite action spaces, infinite outcome spacesI Between bandit and full information: See Ohad Samir’s talk! ,I . . .

Szepesvari (UofA) Partial monitoring July 2, 2011 38 / 39

Conclusions

Full characterization of stochastic partial monitoring gamesHardness depends on whether there exist neighboring actionswhose loss difference cannot be estimated locallyOpen question: Does this extend to the adversarial case?Conjecture: YesWANTED: Good algorithm, with O(

√T) regret when local

observability holdsOther questions:

I Dependence on other parameters: Number of actions, number ofoutcomes, the algebraic properties of (L,H)

I Infinite action spaces, infinite outcome spacesI Between bandit and full information: See Ohad Samir’s talk! ,I . . .

Szepesvari (UofA) Partial monitoring July 2, 2011 38 / 39

Conclusions

Full characterization of stochastic partial monitoring gamesHardness depends on whether there exist neighboring actionswhose loss difference cannot be estimated locallyOpen question: Does this extend to the adversarial case?Conjecture: YesWANTED: Good algorithm, with O(

√T) regret when local

observability holdsOther questions:

I Dependence on other parameters: Number of actions, number ofoutcomes, the algebraic properties of (L,H)

I Infinite action spaces, infinite outcome spacesI Between bandit and full information: See Ohad Samir’s talk! ,I . . .

Szepesvari (UofA) Partial monitoring July 2, 2011 38 / 39

Conclusions

Full characterization of stochastic partial monitoring gamesHardness depends on whether there exist neighboring actionswhose loss difference cannot be estimated locallyOpen question: Does this extend to the adversarial case?Conjecture: YesWANTED: Good algorithm, with O(

√T) regret when local

observability holdsOther questions:

I Dependence on other parameters: Number of actions, number ofoutcomes, the algebraic properties of (L,H)

I Infinite action spaces, infinite outcome spacesI Between bandit and full information: See Ohad Samir’s talk! ,I . . .

Szepesvari (UofA) Partial monitoring July 2, 2011 38 / 39

Conclusions

Full characterization of stochastic partial monitoring gamesHardness depends on whether there exist neighboring actionswhose loss difference cannot be estimated locallyOpen question: Does this extend to the adversarial case?Conjecture: YesWANTED: Good algorithm, with O(

√T) regret when local

observability holdsOther questions:

I Dependence on other parameters: Number of actions, number ofoutcomes, the algebraic properties of (L,H)

I Infinite action spaces, infinite outcome spacesI Between bandit and full information: See Ohad Samir’s talk! ,I . . .

Szepesvari (UofA) Partial monitoring July 2, 2011 38 / 39

Conclusions

Full characterization of stochastic partial monitoring gamesHardness depends on whether there exist neighboring actionswhose loss difference cannot be estimated locallyOpen question: Does this extend to the adversarial case?Conjecture: YesWANTED: Good algorithm, with O(

√T) regret when local

observability holdsOther questions:

I Dependence on other parameters: Number of actions, number ofoutcomes, the algebraic properties of (L,H)

I Infinite action spaces, infinite outcome spacesI Between bandit and full information: See Ohad Samir’s talk! ,I . . .

Szepesvari (UofA) Partial monitoring July 2, 2011 38 / 39

Conclusions

Full characterization of stochastic partial monitoring gamesHardness depends on whether there exist neighboring actionswhose loss difference cannot be estimated locallyOpen question: Does this extend to the adversarial case?Conjecture: YesWANTED: Good algorithm, with O(

√T) regret when local

observability holdsOther questions:

I Dependence on other parameters: Number of actions, number ofoutcomes, the algebraic properties of (L,H)

I Infinite action spaces, infinite outcome spacesI Between bandit and full information: See Ohad Samir’s talk! ,I . . .

Szepesvari (UofA) Partial monitoring July 2, 2011 38 / 39

Conclusions

Full characterization of stochastic partial monitoring gamesHardness depends on whether there exist neighboring actionswhose loss difference cannot be estimated locallyOpen question: Does this extend to the adversarial case?Conjecture: YesWANTED: Good algorithm, with O(

√T) regret when local

observability holdsOther questions:

I Dependence on other parameters: Number of actions, number ofoutcomes, the algebraic properties of (L,H)

I Infinite action spaces, infinite outcome spacesI Between bandit and full information: See Ohad Samir’s talk! ,I . . .

Szepesvari (UofA) Partial monitoring July 2, 2011 38 / 39

Conclusions

Full characterization of stochastic partial monitoring gamesHardness depends on whether there exist neighboring actionswhose loss difference cannot be estimated locallyOpen question: Does this extend to the adversarial case?Conjecture: YesWANTED: Good algorithm, with O(

√T) regret when local

observability holdsOther questions:

I Dependence on other parameters: Number of actions, number ofoutcomes, the algebraic properties of (L,H)

I Infinite action spaces, infinite outcome spacesI Between bandit and full information: See Ohad Samir’s talk! ,I . . .

Szepesvari (UofA) Partial monitoring July 2, 2011 38 / 39

Conclusions

Full characterization of stochastic partial monitoring gamesHardness depends on whether there exist neighboring actionswhose loss difference cannot be estimated locallyOpen question: Does this extend to the adversarial case?Conjecture: YesWANTED: Good algorithm, with O(

√T) regret when local

observability holdsOther questions:

I Dependence on other parameters: Number of actions, number ofoutcomes, the algebraic properties of (L,H)

I Infinite action spaces, infinite outcome spacesI Between bandit and full information: See Ohad Samir’s talk! ,I . . .

Szepesvari (UofA) Partial monitoring July 2, 2011 38 / 39

For Further Reading

Auer, P., Cesa-Bianchi, N., Freund, Y., andSchapire, R. (2002). The nonstochasticmultiarmed bandit problem. SIAM Journalon Computing, 32:48–77.

Cesa-Bianchi, N., Lugosi, G., and Stoltz, G.(2006). Regret minimization under partialmonitoring. Mathematics of OperationsResearch, 31:562–580.

Littlestone, N. and Warmuth, M. (1994). Theweighted majority algorithm. Informationand Computation, 108:212–261.

Mnih, V., Szepesvari, C., and Audibert, J.-Y.(2008). Empirical Bernstein stopping. In

Cohen, W. W., McCallum, A., and Roweis,S. T., editors, ICML 2008, pages 672–679.ACM.

Piccolboni, A. and Schindelhauer, C. (2001).Discrete prediction games with arbitraryfeedback and loss. In Helmbold, D. andWilliamson, B., editors, COLT2001/EuroCOLT 2001, volume 2111 ofLecture Notes in Computer Science, pages208–223. Springer.

Vovk, V. (1990). Aggregating strategies. InCOLT 1990, pages 371—383.

Szepesvari (UofA) Partial monitoring July 2, 2011 39 / 39


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