GA - 2012-03-12 - POWELL v OBAMA (Appeal SCOGA) - Application for Discretionary Appeal

8/2/2019 GA - 2012-03-12 - POWELL v OBAMA (Appeal SCOGA) - Application for Discretionary Appeal

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IN THE SUPREME COURTSTATE OF GEORGIA

KEVIN RICHARD POWELl.,Applicant

V.BARACK OBAMA,

Respondent

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CASE NO.

APPLICATION FOR DISCRETIONARY APPEAL

J. MARK HATFIELDHATFIELD & HATFIELD, P.C.Attorney for Applicant

201 Albany AvenueP.O. Box 1361Waycross, Georgia 31502

(912) 283-3820Georgia Bar No. [email protected]


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KEVIN RICHARD POWELJi.,Applicant

IN THE SUPREME COURTSTATE OF GEORGIA

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V.BARACK OBAMA,

Respondent

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CASE NO.

APPLICATION FOR DISCRETIONARY APPEALNow comes Appl:_cant Kevin Richard Powell, by and through

undersigned counsel., and respectfully applies to this Courtpursuant to O.C.G.A. 5-6-35(a) (1) and 21-2-5(e) for leave tofile a discretionar~T appeal from the Superior Court of FultonCounty's "Order GraIlting Respondent Barack Obama's Motion toDismiss," which was entered and filed on March 2, 2012, inApplicant's Fulton ~;uperior Court action appealing a FinalDecision of Georgia Secretary of State Brian P. Kemp denyingApplicant's challencJe to the qualifications of Respondent BarackObama, a presidentiill candidate, to seek and hold the Office ofthe President of the~ United States, and finding Respondent Obamaeligible as a candiejate for the presidential primary election.

Applicant respectfully shows to the Court that he isattaching hereto: a'3Exhibit nAn a copy of the aforesaid "OrderGranting Respondent Barack Obama's Motion to Dismiss"; as ExhibitnBn a copy of the "::>etitionFor Judicial Review" filed by

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Applicant in the Superior Court of Fulton County on February 15,2012; as Exhibit "C'I a copy of Applicant's "Motion For ExpeditedReview or, Alternat~_vely, For Stay of Decision of Secretary ofState and For Postpc)nement of Presidential Preference PrimaryElection" filed on ~~ebruary 22, 2012; as Exhibit "0" a copy ofRespondent Barack Obama's "Motion to Dismiss" and Brief inSupport thereof served on February 27, 2012; as Exhibit "E" acopy of Applicant's "Response to Respondent's Motion to Dismiss"submitted to and acc:epted by the Superior Court of Fulton County,as per the Court's I)ermission and instructions, by email on March2, 2012 and thereaf-~er stamped as filed on March 5, 2012; and asExhibit "F" a copy of a letter dated January 25, 2012 fromRespondent's attorn(~y to Secretary of State Brian P. Kemp.

PART ONESTATEMENT OF THE CASE

1. TYPE OF Q~SE. This case is an Application ForDiscretionary Appea. pursuant to O.C.G.A. 5-6-35 (a)(1) and 21-2-5(e) for leave to appeal from the Order of the Superior Courtof Fulton County di:3missing Applicant's "Petition For JudicialReview" of a Final :)ecision of Georgia Secretary of State BrianP. Kemp denying Applicant's challenge to the qualifications ofRespondent Obama, a presidential candidate, to seek and hold theOffice of the Presi(lent of the United States, and findingRespondent Obama el.Lgible as a candidate for the presidentialprimary election.

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2. SUPREME COURT JURISDICTION. The Supreme Court hasjurisdiction to entErtain this Application pursuant to O.C.G.A. 5-6-35(a) (1) and 21-2-5(e), as well as pursuant to the 1983Constitution of the State of Georgia, Article VI, Section VI,Paragraph II, as this case draws into question theconstitutionality of O.C.G.A. 21-2-5 as applied to PresidentialPreference Primarie~:, and as this case involves the constructionof the ~natural borr Citizen" presidential eligibilityrequirement of Article II, Section I, Clause 5 of the UnitedStates Constitution, and this case thus falls within this Court'sexclusive appellate jurisdiction.

3. JUDGMENT 1l,PPEALEDAND DATE OF ENTRY. The SuperiorCourt of Fulton County's ~Order Granting Respondent BarackObama's Motion to Dismiss" was entered and filed on March 2,2012.

4. STATEMENT OF FACTS. On or before October 31, 2011,Respondent Barack Obama submitted a letter to the ExecutiveCommittee of the Dem0cratic Party of Georgia seeking to be listedon the Georgia Democratic Presidential Preference Primary Ballot.Consequently, on Nov2mber 1, 2011, Georgia Democratic PartyChairman Mike Berlon submitted, pursuant to O.C.G.A. 21-2-193,the name of Respondent Obama to the Georgia Secretary of State'sOffice as a candidat2 to be listed on the Georgia DemocraticPresidential Prefere~ce Primary Ballot.

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Thereafter, pursuant to O.C.G.A. 21-2-5(b), ApplicantPowell, a residentJf Gwinnett County, Georgia and a registeredvoter in the State ()f Georgia and an elector eligible to vote forcandidates for the IJresidency of the United States, timely filedwith the Georgia Sec:retary of State a written challenge to thequalifications of REspondent to seek and hold the Office of thePresidency of the U~ited States. Applicant contended thatRespondent does not meet the "natural born Citizen" eligibilityrequirement of Article II, Section I, Clause 5 of the UnitedStates Constitution.

As prescribed b'{ O.C.G.A. 21-2-5(b), the Office of theSecretary of State referred Applicant's challenge to anadministrative law judge (hereinafter "ALJ") of the Office ofState Administrative Hearings (hereinafter "OSAH"). Thereafter,pursuant to proper notice to all parties, the ALJ conducted ahearing on January 26, 2012.

Applicant was pr"esent at trial and submitted into therecord, through coun~el, evidence and testimony pertaining to theissues raised by his challenge. However, despite being timelyserved with a Notice to Produce by Applicant's counsel requiringRespondent to personally appear for trial and to bring with himcertain documents for use as evidence by Applicant at trial,Respondent failed to appear for trial on January 26, 2012.Likewise, Respondent's attorney also failed to appear for trial.

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No evidence or testimony whatsoever was introduced into therecord by or on beh~lf of Respondent at trial. The failure ofRespondent and his attorney to appear for trial on January 26,2012 was knowing and intentional, as demonstrated by a January25, 2012 letter written by Respondent's attorney to GeorgiaSecretary of State Erian P. Kemp (Exhibit "F").

Applicant's evidence at trial established that Respondent'sfather, Barack Hussein Obama, was born in Kenya and was a subjectof Great Britain. Additionally, Applicant established thatRespondent's aforesaid father, Barack Hussein Obama, was not acitizen of the United States as of the date of birth ofRespondent in 1961 or at any other time whatsoever.

Nevertheless, 00 February 3, 2012, the ALJ issued an initialDecision finding Res?ondent eligible as a candidate for thepresidential primary election. Pursuant to O.C.G.A. 21-2-5(b),the ALJ's Decision was reported to the Secretary of State.Subsequently on FebrJary 7, 2012, pursuant to O.C.G.A. 21-25(c), Georgia Secretary of State Brian P. Kemp issued a FinalDecision adopting th,~ initial Decision of the ALJ and denyingApplicant' s challengl~.

On February 15, 2012, pursuant to O.C.G.A. 21-2-5(e),Applicant timely fil(:;din the Superior Court of Fulton County a"Peti tion For Judicia.l Review" appealing and seeking judicialreview of the Secretilry of State's Final Decision (Exhibit "B")

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Applicant's Petition also requested that the Court grant anexpedited hearing ani review of the case due to the fact that theGeorgia Presidential Preference Primary Election was scheduled totake place less than three (3) weeks later, on March 6, 2012. Ina further effort to Jbtain some action by the Court in advance ofthe election date, AJplicant then filed, on February 22, 2012, a"Motion For Expedite,j Review or, Alternatively, For Stay ofDecision of Secretary of State and For Postponement ofPresidential Prefere~ce Primary Election" (Exhibit "C")

On February 27, 2012, counsel for Respondent served a"Motion to Dismiss" .3ndBrief in Support thereof in whichRespondent argued th.3t the Court lacked jurisdiction over thesubject matter; that there was a failure of service of process;and that Applicant's Petition failed to state a claim upon whichrelief could be granted (Exhibit "0").

On March 1, 201.2, the Court notified counsel for Applicantby email that, if ApJlicant wished to respond to Respondent's"Motion to Dismiss," counsel would have until the followingmornlng, March 2, 2012 at 9:30 a.m., to do so (Exhibit "E," pp.16-17). Counsel for Applicant thereafter submitted to the Court,by the aforesaid dea,iline, Applicant's "Response to Respondent'sMotion to Dismiss" (~xhibit "E," p. 14), and the Courtacknowledged receipt of same in an email sent at 8:30 a.m. on themorning of March 2, 2012 (Exhibit "E," p. 15). Just over two and

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one-half (2~) hours later, the Court emailed its file-stamped"Order Granting Respondent Barack Obama's Motion to Dismiss"(Exhibit "A," pp. 1-2).

PART TWOENUMERATION OF ERRORS

1. The Superior Court erred in holding that O.C.G.A. 21-2-5 does not apply in the context of a challenge to thequalifications of a candidate in the Presidential PreferencePrimary.

2. The Superior Court erred in holding O.C.G.A. 21-2-5unconstitutional as applied to a challenge to the qualificationsof a candidate in the Presidential Preference Primary.

3. The Superior Court erred in holding that Applicantfailed to perfect sErvice and in dismissing Applicant's actionbased upon a finding of failure to perfect service.

4. The Superior Court erred in failing to reverse theFinal Decision of the Secretary of State on the basis of theALJ's and the Secretary of State's errors in failing to determinethe proper placement of the burden of proof and in failing toapply such determin2tion in ruling upon Applicant's challenge.

5. The Superior Court erred in failing to reverse theFinal Decision of tte Secretary of State on the basis of theALJ's and the Secretary of State's errors in finding as "fact"that Respondent was born in the United States and that

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Respondent's mother was a citizen of the United States at thetime of Respondent's birth.

6. The Superior Court erred in failing to reverse theFinal Decision of tte Secretary of State on the basis of theALJ's and the Secretary of State's error in finding thatRespondent qualifies as a "natural born Citizen" pursuant toArticle II of the United States Constitution, despite the factthat Respondent's father was not a United States citizen at thetime of Respondent's birth.

PART THREEARGm!IENT AND CITATION OF AUTHORITY

Applicant would note at the outset that this Court's Rule34, concerning the standard for granting discretionary appeals,provides in pertinent part that "[a]n application for leave toappeal a final judgment [pursuant to] O.C.G.A. 5-6-35 shall begranted," among other instances, when " [r]eversible error appearsto exist" or when "[t]he establishment of a precedent isdesirable."

In the instant case, as set forth hereinbelow, the SuperiorCourt, as well as the ALJ and the Secretary of State, made anumber of reversible errors. Additionally, as this case raises

significant issues regarding the State of Georgia's authority toscreen the qualifications of presidential contenders, and asthese issues are certainly capable of being raised with regard to

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future presidential candidacies, the establishment of a precedentIS both necessary and desirable.

1. The Superior Court erred in holding that O.C.G.A. 21-2-5 does not apply in the context of a challenge to thequalifications of a candidate in the Presidential PreferencePrimary.

The Superior Court held that a.C.G.A. 21-2-5, the Georgiaqualifications chal~_enge statute, does not apply to thePresidential PreferE:nce Primary, as the Presidential PreferencePrimary apportions delegates, but does not result in thenomination or election of a presidential candidate. The Courtalso found that Res:pondent is not yet a "candidate" for thePresidential Electic1n, and that the Presidential PreferencePrimary is not an "E!lection" within the meaning of the GeorgiaElection Code. In this connection, Respondent contended beforethe Superior Court t.hat the definition of "election" found ina.C.G.A. 21-2-2(5) includes general or special elections, butnot a primary or special primary unless the context in which"election" is used ~clearly requires" the inclusion of a primaryor special primary.

The Superior Court and Respondent overlooked, however, theprovisions of a.C.G.A. 21-2-15 inasmuch as

This chapter shall apply to any general orspecial el.ection in this state to fill anyfederal, ~tate, county, or municipal office,

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to any general or special primary to nominatecandidate,) for any such office, and to anyfederal, state, county, or municipal electionor primar; for any other purpose whatsoever,unless otherwise provided.

Also, the qual:Lfications challenge statute, O.C.G.A. 21-2-5, grants a right t()challenge the qualifications of "anycandidate," regardl(~ss of the specific type of election. Despitethe Superior Court'~3 finding to the contrary, contestants in aPresidential Preference Primary are specifically designated bystatute as "candidates." O.C.G.A. 21-2-193.

Respondent alscl argued in the Court below that a "candidate"must be "certified by the state executive committee of apolitical party" or must submit "a notice of candidacy," seeO.C.G.A. 2l-2-5(a), and that neither of such conditions havetaken place as to Respondent. O.C.G.A. 21-2-5 (b) provides,however, that a challenge of the qualifications of any candidatemay be made "at any time prior to the election of suchcandidate," and Resrondent's political party would presumably befiling a certification of his nomination prior to the generalelection. Addition~lly, Applicant submits that "certified" and"notice of candidacy" are not specifically defined terms in theGeorgia Election Code, and one could argue that the list ofPresidential Preference Primary candidates submitted byRespondent's political party pursuant to O.C.G.A. 21-2-193constituted a "certification" or a "notice of candidacy."

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Accordingly, it is apparent that the Georgia qualificationschallenge statute dces, in fact, apply to the PresidentialPreference Primary; that the Superior Court did properly havesubject-matter juri~:diction of Applicant's Petition; and that theSuperior Court committed reversible error in holding otherwise.

2. The Superior Court erred in holding O.C.G.A. 21-2-5unconstitutional as applied to a challenge to the qualificationsof a candidate in tbe Presidential Preference Primary.

The Superior Ccurt also granted dismissal for lack ofsubject~matter jurisdiction based upon Respondent's argument thatFirst (and Fourteenth) Amendment associational rights of apolitical party give the party the exclusive right to determinewhom to include on its Presidential Preference Primary ballot.

While Respondert contended that First Amendmentassociational rights of a party are "most often litigated" in thesituation in which a party refuses to permit a name on a primaryballot (citing Democratic Part V of u.S. v. Wisconsin, 50 U.S.107, 101 S. Ct. 101C, 67 L. Ed. 2d 82 (1981); Duke v. Cleland,954 F. 2d 1526 (lltt Cir. 1992)), he also claimed that "thereverse is also true" in that the party has the unchecked rightto require certain rames on its primary ballot. Respondent,however, cited no a~thority for the latter proposition.

The Superior Court essentially adopted Respondent'sargument, as the Co~rt held that the Secretary of State may not

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interfere with a political party's determination of itscandidates, and the Secretary's authority is limited to examiningpresidential elector"s. However, none of the cases or statutescited by the Superic1r Court or by Respondent are authority forthe conclusion that a political party's constitutionalassociational right~ deprive a state government of its ability torequire that candidates meet constitutional or statutoryeligibility requiren~nts for office in order to be placed on thestate ballot.

In point of fac:t, O.C.G.A. 21-2-5(b) and (c) authorizethe Georgia Secretary of State, or an eligible Georgia elector,to challenge a candidate's qualifications, and the Secretary ofState is thereafter empowered to determine whether the candidateis qualified to see~: and hold office. O.C.G.A. 21-2-5(e) givesan elector unsucces~fully challenging a candidate'squalifications the r"ight to appeal the Secretary of State'sdecision by filing 2" petition in the Superior Court of FultonCounty. Given the ~tate's right to run its own elections,nothing pertaining to the associational rights of theRespondent's politic:al party deprived the Superior Court ofsubject-matter juriE:diction over Applicant's case, and theSuperior Court comm~ptted error in holding otherwise.

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3. The Superior Court erred in holding that Applicantfailed to perfect service and in dismissing Applicant's actionbased upon a finding- of failure to perfect service.

The Superior Court also ruled that, even if the Courtproperly had jurisdiction pursuant to O.C.G.A. 21-2-5,Applicant "failed entirely to perfect personal serVlce uponRespondent(s) as required by O.C.G.A. 21-2-5(e) and O.C.G.A. 9-11-4. The Superior Court apparently believed Applicant's caseto be subject to dismissal for the reason argued by Respondentthat "service of the summons and complaint was made by mailing to[R]espondent's attorney." Respondent claimed that personalservice or a waiver thereof was required for a viable suit.

However, the case of Douqlas Asphalt Co. v. Georqia PublicService Commission, 263 Ga. App. 711, 589 S.E. 2d 292 (2003) lScontrolling. In Douqlas Asphalt, the Court held that in anappeal of an administrative decision of a state agency or othertribunal, personal ~;ervice of the petition for judicial reviewupon the agency was not required, and service by mail was properto preserve the jurisdiction of the court. The Courtspecifically noted that service of appeals from an agencydecision is governec. by O.C.G.A. 5-3-21, which provides Inpertinent part that "[a] copy of the notice of appeal shall beserved on all partiE~s in the same manner prescribed by Code

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Section 5-6-32." O.C.G.A. 5-6-32(a), in turn, provides Inpertinent part that

Whenever under this article service or thegiving of any notice is required or permittedto be made upon a party and the party isrepresented by an attorney, the service shallbe made upon the attorney unless service uponthe party himself is ordered by the court.Service of all notices and other papershereunder and service of motions for newtrial, motions in arrest, motions forjudgment notwithstanding the verdict, and allother similar motions, orders, andproceedings may be made by the attorney orparty filing the notice or paper, in personor by mail, and proof thereof shown byacknowledgment of the attorney or partyserved, or by certificate of the attorney,party, or other person perfecting service.

Therefore, in the instant case, service of the Petition uponRespondent Obama by mailing same to his attorney was inaccordance with Georgia law.

Applicant further notes, however, that even if the serviceby mail were for any reason not considered valid, O.C.G.A. 5-3-2l(b) states in pertinent part that "[f]ailure to perfect serviceon any party shall rot work dismissal, but the superior courtshall grant continuances and enter such other orders as may benecessary to permit a just and expeditious determination of theappeal." Dismissal based upon the issue of service was thereforeinappropriate, and the Superior Court erred to the extent thatits dismissal was bcsed upon failure to perfect service.

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4. The Superior Court erred in failing to reverse theFinal Decision of the Secretary of State on the basis of theALJ's and the Secret,ary of State's errors in failing to determinethe proper placement, of the burden of proof and in failing toapply such determina,tion in ruling uponApplicant's challenge.

In dismissing Applicant's Petition For Judicial Review, theSuperior Court failed to address the ALJ's complete failure tomake a determinatior, as to the proper placement of the burden ofproof as between the parties, as well as the ALJ's failure toapply the burden of proof to his factual and legal conclusions.

On January 19, 2012, Applicant filed a "Motion ForDetermination of Placement of Burden of Proof" in which he soughtan order, pursuant to Havnes v. Wells, 273 Ga. 106, 108-109, 538S.E. 2d 430, 433 (2C:00), requiring Respondent to affirmativelyestablish his eligibility for office. Not only did the ALJ notrule on Applicant's motion in advance of trial, as was requestedby Applicant, but tt.e judge never even addressed or resolved themotion in his final ruling.

OSAH Rule 616-~-2-.07(1) provides that, with certainexceptions not appl~_cable herein, "[t]he agency shall bear theburden of proof in 2111 matters." Further, OSAH Rule 616-1-2.07(2) states that, "[p]rior to the commencement of the hearing,the Administrative Law Judge may determine that law or justicerequires a different placement of the burden of proof."

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The challenge to Respondent's qualifications herein was notinitiated by the applicable agency, the Office of the Secretaryof State. Rather, the challenge was commenced by Applicant,pursuant to O.C.G.A. 21-2-5(b), "by filing a written complaintwith the Secretary of State .... " Upon the filing of Applicant'schallenge, the Secretary of State was required as a matter ofprocedure, also pursuant to O.C.G.A. 21-2-5(b), to refer thechallenge to the OSAH for a hearing.

Prior to the trial before the ALJ, the "agency," i.e. theOffice of the Secretary of State, made no determination ofcandidate qualifications; issued no decision; and was not a partyto the challenge, and it would have therefore been inappropriatefor the agency to bear the burden of proof as initially suggestedby OSAH Rule 616-1-2-.07(1). The burden of proof therefore musthave been placed either with Applicant (i.e., to prove Respondentineligible) or with Respondent (i.e., to prove himself eligible)However, under HavnE~, 273 Ga. at 108-109, Applicant was notrequired, and should not be required, "to disprove anythingregarding [Respondent Obama's] eligibility to run for office .... "rd.

The significance of the ALJ's failure to rule on the burdenof proof is immediately apparent. Respondent and his lawyerfailed to attend trj.al and failed to offer any evidence, and suchfailures were intent:ional, as shown by Respondent's counsel's

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letter of January 25, 2012 (Exhibit ~F"). If Respondent did, asApplicant contends, bear the burden of proof at trial, thenRespondent can in no way be said to have satisfied his burden,and Applicant was entitled to judgment. Thus, the failure of theSuperior Court to reverse the Secretary of State, and the ALJ, onthe basis of their failure to address the burden of proof isreversible error.

5. The Superior Court erred in failing to reverse theFinal Decision of the Secretary of State on the basis of theALJ's and the Secre1:~ary of State's errors in finding as "fact"that Respondent was born in the United States and thatRespondent's mother was a citizen of the United States at thetime of Respondent' ~:~irth.

The ALJ's rulirlg, and consequently the Secretary of State'sruling, on Applicant's challenge to Respondent's qualificationsrelied upon certain alleged ~facts" which the ALJ said he~considered." Spec:Lfically, the ALJ found as ~fact": 1) thatRespondent Obama was born in the United States; and 2) thatRespondent Obama's rnother was a citizen of the United States atthe time of Respond':;nt' birth.

However, as se: forth hereinabove, Respondent carried theburden of proving his eligibility for office. Inasmuch asRespondent and his ~ttorney did not appear for trial and did notoffer any evidence whatsoever, and inasmuch as the ~natural born

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Citizen" requirement for presidential eligibility mandates anexamination of Respondent's place of birth and the citizenship ofboth of Respondent's parents at the time of Respondent's birth(as is explained hereinbelow), Respondent failed to carry hisburden of proof as to his eligibility, and the above ~facts"found by the ALJ were legally unsupported. The Superior Court'sfailure to reverse the Secretary of State, and the ALJ, withregard to these findings of ~fact" is reversible error.

6. The Superi.or Court erred in failing to reverse theFinal Decision of tb.e Secretary of State on the basis of theALJ's and the Secret:.aryof State's error in finding thatRespondent qualifies: as a "natural born Citizen" pursuant toArticle II of the United States Constitution, despite the factthat Respondent's fc:Ltherwas not a United States citizen at thetime of Respondent'B birth.

The ALJ's (and subsequently the Secretary of State's) rulingwas grounded in the ALJ's adoption of the non-binding reasonlngof the Indiana Court of Appeals in Ankenv v. Governor of Indiana,916 N.E. 2d 678 (20()9), with regard to the ALJ's finding that aperson qualifies as a natural born citizen if he was born in theUnited States becau~3e he became a United States citizen at birth.

Although, as p()inted out hereinabove, there was absolutelyno evidence whatsOe"ler submitted by Respondent at trial to carryhis burden of proof and establish Respondent's place of birth,

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the ALJ's ruling that a person's birth in the United Statesautomatically confers the status of "natural born Citizen"pursuant to Article II of the United States Constitution isunfounded; is an incorrect statement of the applicable law; andis contrary to the ruling of the United States Supreme Court inMinor v. Happersett, 88 U.S. 162, 167, 22 L. Ed. 627, 21 Wall.162 (1875).

Minor is bindirg authority for the proposition that theArticle II phrase "ratural born Citizen" refers to a person bornin the United State~: to two (2) parents who were then (at thetime of the child's birth) themselves United States citizens.Because, as Applicant's undisputed evidence at trialdemonstrated, Respordent Obama's father was not a United Statescitizen at the time of Respondent's birth, Respondent does notmeet the Article II "natural born Citizen" requirement for thepresidency, and the ALJ and the Secretary of State committederror in finding ottlerwise. The Superior Court thus likewisecommitted reversible error in failing to reverse the ALJ and theSecretary of State on this issue.1

CONCLUSION

For the above ~lnd foregoing reasons, Applicant respectfullyrequests that the Supreme Court grant this Application For

lThis issue will be more fully briefed by Applicant upon the granting ofthis ApplicationFor Discretionary Appeal.

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Discretionary Appeal and review and reverse the decision of theSuperior Court in this case.

Respectfully submitted, this 12th day of March, 2012.HATFIELD & HATFIELD, P.C.

201 Albany AvenueP.O. Box 1361Waycross, Georgia 31502(912) 283-3820

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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

I, J. Mark Hatfield, Attorney for Applicant, do herebycertify that I have this day served the foregoing Application ForDiscretionary Appeal upon:

Mr. Michael K. JablonskiAttorney at Law2221-0 Peachtree Road NEAtlanta, Georgia 30309Honorable Brian P. KempSecretary of StateState of Georgia214 State CapitolAtlanta, Georgia 30334

by placing a copy of same in the United States Mail in a properlyaddressed envelope ~rith sufficient postage affixed thereto inorder to insure proper delivery, and by emailing same to Mr.Jablonski at [email protected], and by emailing sameto Secretary Kemp at v:[email protected]. crO'I.

This 12th day of March, 2012.HATFIELD & HATFIELD, P.C.



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Mark HatfieldFrom:Sent:To:

Subject:

Attachments:

~~.;, ,~,,~DOC006.pdf (563

KB)

White, Connie [[email protected]]Friday, March 02,2012 11:04 AMdavid. [email protected]; codyj [email protected]; [email protected];van@liberty,egalfoundation.org; [email protected]; [email protected];[email protected]; [email protected] Granting Respondent Barack Obama's Motion(s) to Dismiss-2012cv211398,2012cv211~:27, 2012cv211528, 2012cv211537DOC006.pdf

Hello,Please find attached a stamp filed copy of the Order Granting Respondent Barack Obama'sMotion(s) to Dismiss 2012cv211398, 2012cv211527, 2012cv211528, 2012cv211537 from JudgeWright's office.Thank you,Connie White

PLAINTIFF'SEXHIBIT,/J \l11

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*CODY

*** * *CIVIL ACTION* FILE NO. 2012 ** **A IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF FULTON COUNTYSTATE OF GEORGIA @~y(\

FILED IN OFFICE

[ Ie"AR 2.1011 _ +EPUTY CLERK SUPERIOR COURTN COUNTY. GA ~~CARL SWENSSON

*** * *CIVIL ACTION

*FILE NO. 2012CV211527** **

KEVIN RICHARD POWELL,

*

** *CIVIL ACTION

*FILE NO. 2012CV211528** **

Farrar; et aI. v. Obama, et al: Civil Action No. 2012CV211398Swensson v. Obama: CivilAction No. 2012CV211527Powell v. Obama: Civil Action No. 2012CV211528Welden v. Obama: Civil Action No. 2012CV211537ORDER GRANTING MOTION{S) TO DISMISS Page 1


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DAVID P. WELDEN**

* **CIVIL ACTION*

FILE NO. 2012CV211537** **

ORDER GRANTING l:tESPONDENT BARACK OBAMA'S MOTION(S) TO DISM1SSThe above-captiolli:.ldactions are before the Court on the Petition(s) for Judicial Review

of Petitioners David Farral', et aI., Carl Swensson, Kevin Richard Powell, and David P. Welden,which were filed in this Court on February 13, 2012 and February 15, 2012, respectively.Although initially a.ssigned to four (4) different Superior Court Judges, the matters weretransferred to the Honorable Chief Judge Cynthia D. Wright, to whom the flIst-filed case wasassigned (Farrar, et al. v, Obama, et al., Civil Action File No. 2012CV211398), because each isan appeal of the same deci1;ionissued on February 3,2012 by Administrative Law Judge MichaelM. Malihi in the Office of State Administrative Hearings and thereafter adopted by the Secretaryof State.

Presently before the Court is the Motion to Dismiss of Respondent Barack Obama, filedin each of the above-refenmced actions on February 27, 2012. The Motion(s) to Dismiss areidentical in form and substance and will, therefore, be addressed by the Court in oneconsolidated Order to be applied in each case. Now, having considered the Motion(s) toDismiss, the other pleading!;of record, and applicable Georgia law, the Court fmds as follows:

Petitioners filed their AppeallPetition for Judicial Review of the Secretary of State'sdecision in this Court pursu.mt to O.C.G.A. 21-2-5(e), which provides as follows:Farrar, et al. v. Ohama, et al: CivilAction No. 2012CV211398Swensson V. Obama: CivilActlon No. 2012CV211527Powell v. Obama: CivilAction No. 2012CV211528Welden v. Oboma: CivilAction No. 2012CV211537ORDER GRANTING MOTION(S) TO DISMISS Page 2


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Page3

The elector filing the challenge or the candidate challenged shallhave the ri ght to appeal the decision of the Secretary of State byfiling a petition in the Superior Court of Fulton County within tendays after the entry of the final decision by the Secretary of State.The filing Df the petition shall not itself stay the decision of theSecretary of State; however, the reviewing court may order a stayupon appropriate terms for good cause shown. As soon as possibleafter service of the petition, the Secretary of State shall transmit theoriginal or a certified copy of the entire record of the proceedingsunder revi,;w to the reviewing court. The review shall beconducted by the court without a jury and shall be confined to therecord.

Petitioners allege that Respondent Barack Obama is not a "natural born citizen"l and,thus, is not qualified for candidacy in Georgia's 2012 Presidential Primary. Despite itsapplication in the court beilow, this Court does not believe that O.c.G.A. 21-2-5 applies in thiscase because the challenge at issue involves the Presidential Preference Primary, which by itsterms, is an opportunity for electors "to express their preference for one person to be a candidatefor nomination." O.C.G.l~. 21-2-191. The Presidential Preference Primary apportionsdelegates, but neither elec ts nor nominates candidates for the Presidency. Therefore, becauseRespondent Barack Obama is not yet a "candidate" for the Presidential election in question and

because the Presidential Preference Primary is not an "election" within the meaning of a.C.G.A. 21-2-1, et seq., O.C.G.A. 21-2-5 does not apply. See O.c.G.A. 21-2-2(5) and 21-2-5.

Moreover, it is weB established in Georgia as elsewhere in the United States that votersvote on "presidential electors," rather than voting directly for a candidate, when voting for theOffice of President of the United States. O.C.G.A. 21-2-172. The political parties' candidatesfor President are determined by convention of the political party. See O.C.G.A. 21-2-191 to

IPetitioners claim is based, in pa:i, on a contention that at the time of his birth, Respondent's father was not acitizen ofthe United States.Farrar, et al. v. Ohama, et al: CivilAction No. 2012CV211398Swensson v. Ohama: Civil Action No. 2012CV211527Powell v. abama: CivilAction No. 2012CV211528Welden v. Ohama: CivilAction No. 2012CV211537ORDER GRANTING MOTIONI:S) TO DISMISS


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21-2-200. In the case of a democratic candidate for President, the Democratic Party of Georgiahas the sale discretion to detennine the qualifications of potential candidates and the name( s) tobe included on its Presidential Preference Primary ballot. O.C.G.A. 21-2-193; see Duke v.Cleland, 954 F.2d 1523 (] lth Cir. 1992); Duke v. Cleland, 884 F. Supp. 511, 515-16 (N.D. Ga.1995).

The Secretary of State is prohibited by the Fourteenth Amendment of the United StatesConstitution and Georgi;;1 statutory law from infringing on the associationa1 rights of theDemocratic Party of Georgia and is limited in its authority to examining presidential electors.O.c.G.A. 21-2-172 to 21-2-200; Duke v. Cleland, 884 F. Supp. at 515-16 (N.D. Ga. 1995).Even if the Secretary of State believes that a challenger's claims are valid, the Secretary of Statemay not interfere with a po litical party's internal decision-making. Id.

Based upon Georgi a law and governing precedent, the Court finds it has no authority toexercise jurisdiction over the Democratic Party of Georgia's selection of the names(s) to beincluded in the Presidental Preference Primary or to examine the qualifications of thoseindividuals. Therefore, thei::e actions should be DISMISSED in accordance with O.C.G.A. 9-11-12(b).

Additionally, even iif the Court had determined that O.C.G.A. 21-2-5 applied to thesematters and provided the Court with appellate jurisdiction over same, the Court finds thatPetitioners have failed entirely to perfect personal service upon Respondent(s) as required byO.c.G.A. 21-2-5(e) and O.C.G.A 9-11-4. See Bible v. Bible, 259 Ga. 418, 418 (1989).

Therefore, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED AND ADJUDGED that Respondent BarackObama's Motion(s) to Dismiss in the above matters are GRANTED, and the above actions arehereby DISMISSED.

Farrar, et al. v. Ohama, et al: Civil Action No. 2012CV211398Swensson v.Ohama: Civil Action No. 2012CV211527Powell v.Obama: Civil Action No. 2012CV211528Welden v.Obama: Civil Action No. 2012CV211537ORDER GRANTING MOTION(S) TO DISMISS Page 4


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SO ORDERED this the 2nd day of March, 2012.c--~~\~YNTHIA D. WRIGHT, ChIef Judg~Fulton County Superior CourtAtlanta Judicial Circuit

Copies to:Via Email and U.S. Mail::David Farrar, Pro Se2059 Cavesprong RoadCedartown, Georgia 30125david. [email protected] Robert Judy, Pro Se3031 Ogden Avenue, Suite #2Ogden, Utah [email protected]. Mark Hatfield, Esq.Hatfield & Hatfield, P.c.201 Albany AvenueP.O. Box 1361Waycross, Georgia [email protected] R. Irion, Esq.Liberty Legal Foundation9040 Executive Park Drive: Suite 200Knoxville, TN 37923van(@'libertvlegalfoundatioll.orgMichael K. Jablonski, Esq.2221-D Peachtree Road, NEAtlanta, Georgia 30309michael. iablonski@comca~::t.net

Farrar, et al. v. abama, et al: ':::ivilAction No. 2012CV211398Swensson v. Ohama: CivilAction No. 2012CV211527Powell v. ahama: Civil Action No. 2012CV211528Welden v. ahoma: Civil Actio 11 No. 2012CV211537ORDER GRANTING MOTION(S) TO DISMISS Page 5


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Cam-Anh Le, Esq.Vincent Robert Russo, Jr., Esq.Office ofthe Georgia Secretary of StateExecutive Office214 State CapitolAtlanta, Georgia [email protected](aJ,sos. ga.gov

David P. Welden, Pro Se5530 Wright RoadPowder Springs, Georgia 30127dpwelden(W,grnail.com

Farrar, etal. v. Ohama, et al: Civil Action No. 2012CV211398Swensson v. Ohama: Civil Action No. 2012CV211527Powell v. Ohama: Civil Action No. 2012CV211528Welden v. Ohama: Civil Action No. 2012CV211537ORDER GRANTING MOTIONC::) TO DISMISS Page 6


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Court/ill' Su periorD StatePlaintiff(s)POWELL, KEVIN RICHARD Defendant(s)OBAMA, BARACKLast Firstiddle I. Suffix Prefixaidenastirstiddle I. Suffix Prefixaidenirstiddle I. Suffix Prefixaidenastirstiddle I. Suffix Prefixaidenirstiddle I. Suffix Prefixaidenastirstiddle I. Suffix Prefixaidenirstiddle I. Suffix Prefixaidenastirstiddle I. Suffix Prefixaiden No. of Defendants 1Pro Se

Last

Bar # 337509First Middle I. Suffix

Check Primary Type (Che


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IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF FULTON COUNTY, GEORGIA136 PRYOR STREET, ROOM C-I03, ATLANT A, GEORGIA 30303

SUMMONS . I . 'DEVIN RICHARD POWELL ; C No" 201) C~'1)I :52.~Plaintiff,

VS.BARACK OBAMA

Defendant

TO THE ABOVE NAMED DEFENDANT(S):Your are hereby summoned alld required to file with the Clerk of said Court and serve upon plaintiffsattorney, whose name and addl"ess is: J. MARK HATFIELD

HATFIELD & HATFIELD, P.C.201 ALBANY AVENUEP.O. BOX 1361WAYCROSS, GEORGIA 31502(912) 283-3820

An answer to the complaint ,,vhich is herewith served upon you, within 30 days after service of thissummons upon you, exclusivl: of the day of service. IF YOU FAIL TO DO SO, JUDGMENT BYDEFAULT WILL BE TAKEN AGAINST YOU FOR THE RELIEF DEMANDED IN THE

COMPLAINTdhis --)_,=.2_----.--

To defendant upon whom this petition is served:This copy of complaint and summons was served upon you , 20 _

Deputy Sherriff

Ins truct ions : At tach addendum shee t for addit ional part ie s i fneeded, make notat ion on this shee t i f addendum isused


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IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF FULTON COUNTYSTATE OF GEORGIA

KEVIN RICHARD POWELl:.,Petitioner

v.

BARACK OBAMA,Respondent

*

*

*

*

*

CIVIL ACTIOr: ~ I.. J '1)ILE No.2 )/2C/Y21 );32 ~

P]~TITION FOR .JUDICIAL REVIEWNow comes Petitioner Kevin Richard Powell, by and through

undersigned counsel, and files this Petition For Judicial Reviewagainst Respondent Barack Obama as follows:

1.This action is an appeal of a Final Decision of Georgia

Secretary of State Brian P. Kemp denying Petitioner Kevin RichardPowell's challenge to the qualifications of Respondent BarackObama, a presidential candidate, to seek and hold the Office ofthe President of the United States, and finding ~espondent Obamaeligible as a candidate for the presidential primary election.

2.This Court has jurisdiction of this appeal pursuant to

O.C.G.A. 21-2-5(e).3.

Petitioner Kevin Richard Powell is a natural person residingin Gwinnett County, Georgia. He is a registered voter in the

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State of Georgia, and he is an elector eligible to vote forcandidates for the i?residency of the United States, includingpresidential candida.te Barack Obama, the Respondent herein.

4

Respondent Obaln.a,on or before October 31, 2011, submitted aletter to the Executive Committee of the Democratic Party ofGeorgia seeking to be listed on the Georgia DemocraticPresidential Preference Primary Ballot. Consequently, onNovember 1, 2011, Georgia Democratic Party Chairman Mike Berlonsubmitted, pursuant to O.C.G.A. 21-2-193, the name ofRespondent to the GE:~orgiaSecretary of State's Office as acandidate to be list,ed on the Georgia Democratic PresidentialPreference Primary Ballot.

5 .Pursuant to O.C.G.A. 21-2-5(b), Petitioner timely filed

with the Georgia Secretary of State a written challenge to thequalifications of Respondent to seek and hold the Office of thePresidency of the United States. Petitioner's challengecontended that Respondent does not meet the "natural bornCitizen" eligibility requirement of Article II, Section I, Clause5 of the United States Constitution.

6 .Also pursuant to O.C.G.A. 21-2-5(b), the Office of the

Secretary of State thereafter referred Petitioner's challenge for

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a hearing before an administrative law judge of the Office ofState Administrative Hearings.

7 Pursuant to proper notice to the parties, a hearing was

conducted on January 26, 2012 before Administrative Law JudgeMichael M. Malihi. Petitioner was present at trial and submittedinto the record, through counsel, evidence and testimonypertaining to the iE:sues raised by his challenge. Respondent andhis attorney, however, did not appear for trial and failed tosubmit any evidence or testimony whatsoever.

8.On February 3, 2012, the administrative law judge issued an

initial Decision, a copy of which is attached hereto as Exhibit"A," finding Respondent eligible as a candidate for thepresidential primary election. Pursuant to O.C.G.A. 21-2-5(b),the administrative law judge's Decision was reported to theSecretary of State.

9.On February 7, 2012, pursuant to O.C.G.A. 21-2-5(c),

Georgia Secretary of State Brian P. Kemp issued a Final Decision,a copy of which is attached hereto as Exhibit "B," adopting the

initial Decision of the administrative law judge and denyingPetitioner's challen'je.

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10.

Pursuant to O.C.G.A. 21-2-5(e), Petitioner now appeals andseeks judicial revil~w of the Secretary of State's Final Decisionin this case, and fllrther seeks a reversal of that FinalDecision, for the rE!aSOn that substantial rights of thePetitioner have beerl prejudiced because the findings, inferences,conclusions, and decisions of the Secretary of State are:

(a) In violati.on of the Constitution and laws of thisstate;

(b) In excess of the statutory authority of the Secretaryof State;

(c) Made upon unlawful procedures;(d) Affected by other errors of law;(e) Clearly erroneous in view of the reliable, probative,

and substantial evidence on the whole record; and(f) Arbitrary ~nd capricious and characterized by an abuse

of discretion and a:learly unwarranted exercise of discretion.11.

In particular, Petitioner would enumerate the followingspecific grounds for review of the Secretary of State's FinalDecision in this case:

(a) The admini:5trative law judge, and consequently theSecretary of State aciopting the initial Decision of said judge,erred in issuing a s::_ngleruling applicable to the cases of

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erred in failing to make a determination as to the properplacement of the bu~den of proof and in failing to apply theburden of proof in~eaching factual and legal conclusions inPetitioner's case, despite the fact that Petitioner specificallyfiled a pre-trial "l1otion For Determination of Placement ofBurden of Proof";

(e) The admin:_strative law judge, and consequently theSecretary of State adopting the initial Decision of said judge,erred in failing to find Respondent's deliberate failure toappear for trial an event of default and in failing to sustainPetitioner's challerlge to Respondent's qualifications on thatindependent basis;

(f) The administrative law judge, and consequently theSecretary of State adopting the initial Decision of said jud~e,erred in adopting the reasoning of the Indiana Court of Appealsin Ankenv v. Governor of Indiana and in finding that a personautomatically qualii:ies as a "natural born Citizen," pursuant toArticle II of the United States Constitution, by merely beingborn in the United States, without regard to the citizenship ofhis parents;

(g) The administrative law judge, and consequently theSecretary of State adopting the initial Decision of said judge,erred in failing to properly construe the ruling of the UnitedStates Supreme Court in Minor v. Hapoersett;

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(h) The administrative law judge, and consequently theSecretary of State adopting the initial Decision of said judge,erred in finding that Respondent qualifies as a "natural bornCitizen" pursuant to Article II of the United StatesConsti tution, despi':e the fact that Respondent's father was not aUnited States citizen at the time of Respondent's birth; and

(i) The admin:,-stratie law judge, and consequently theSecretary of State ildopting the initial Decision of said judge,erred in failing at Petitioner's request to certify to thisCourt, for a determination of appropriate action including afinding of contempt,. the facts of the contemptuous behavior ofRespondent (and Respondent's counsel) in knowingly,intentionally, and deliberately failing to comply withPetitioner's Notice to Produce served upon Respondent.

12.

Petitioner resfectfully requests that this Court grant anexpedited hearing and review of this Petition due to the factthat the Georgia Presidential Preference Primary Election isscheduled to take place on March 6, 2012, less than three (3)weeks hence.

13.

Pursuant to O.C.G.A. 21-2-5(e)~ Petitioner furtherrespectfully requests that this Court order a stay of the FinalDecision of the Secretary of State finding Respondent eligible to

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deliberate failure to comply with Petitioner's Notice to Producein the administrative proceedings; and

(4) Grant such other and further relief as the Court maydeem just and prope.r.

This 15th day of February, 2012.HATFIELD & HATFIELD, P.C.

201 Albany AvenueP.O. Box 1361Waycross, Georgia 3J.502(912) 283-3820

Page -9-


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OFFICE OF STATE ADMINISTRATIVE HEARINGSSTATE OF GEORGIA

DA VID FARRAR, LEAH LAX, CODY JUDY,THOMAS MALAREN, LAURIE ROTH,

Plaintiffs,v.BARACK OBAMA,

Defendant.

DAVID P. WELDEN,Plaintiff,

v.BARACK OBAMA,

Defendant.

CARL SWENSSON,Plaintiff,

v.

BARACK OBAMA,Defendant.

KEVIN RICHARD POWELL,Plaintiff,

v.BARACK OBAMA,

Defendant.

Docket Number: OSAH-SECST ATE-CE1215136-60-MALIHICounsel for Plaintiffs: Orly TaitzCounsel for Defendant: Michael Jablonski

Docket Number: OSAH-SECST ATE-CE1215137-60-MALIHICounsel for Plaintiff: Van R. IrionCounsel for Defendant: Michael Jablonski

Docket Number: OSAH-SECSTATE-CE1216218-60-MALIHICounsel for Plaintiff: J. Mark HatfieldCounsel for Defendant: Michael Jablonski

Docket Number: OSAH-SECST ATE-CE1216823-60-MALIHI

Counsel for Plaintiff: J. Mark HatfieldCounsel for Defendant: Michael Jablonski

'.,PLAINTIFF'Sj,',~~~!BIT "


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DECISION IPlaintiffs allege that Defendant President Barack Obama does not meet Georgia's

eligibility requirements Dr candidacy in Georgia's 2012 presidential primary election.Georgia law mandates thd candidates meet constitutional and statutory requirements forthe office that they seek. O.C.G.A. 21-2-5(a). Mr. Obama is a candidate for federaloffice who has been certified by the state executive committee of a political party, andtherefore must, under Georgia Code Section 21-2-5, meet the constitutional and statutoryqualifications for holding the Office of the President of the United States. ld. The UnitedStates Constitution requin;:s that a President be a "natural bom [c]itizen." U.S. Const. art.II, 1, d. 5.

As required by GeDrgia Law, Secretary of State Brian Kemp referred Plaintiffs'challenges to this Court fi)r a hearing. O.c.G.A. 21-2-5(b). A hearing was held onJanuary 26, 2012 .. The record closed on February 1,2012. Plaintiffs Farrar, Lax, Judy,Ma1aren, and Roth and their counsel Orly Taitz, Plaintiffs Carl Swensson and KevinRichard Powell and their counsel J. Mark Hatfield, and Plaintiff David P. Welden and hiscounsel Van R. Irion, all appeared and answered the call of the case. However, neitherDefendant nor his counsel, Michael Jablonski, appeared or answered. Ordinarily, theCourt would enter a defaul t order against a party that fails to participate in any stage of aproceeding. Ga. Compo R. & Regs. 616-1-2-.30(1) and (5). Nonetheless, despite the

I This Decision has been consolidated to include the four challenges to President Obama's candidacy filedby Plaintiffs David farrar , et at., David P. Welden, Carl Swensson, and Kevin Richard Powell. Section I ofthis Decision applies only to the case presented by Ms. Tailz on behalf ofMr. Farrar and his co-plaintiffs,Leah Lax., Cody Judy, Thomas Malaren, and Laurie Roth, and does not pertain, in any way, to the cases ofMr. Welden, Mr. Swensson, and Mr. PowelL Section II applies to all Plaintiffs.

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Defendant's failure to appear, Plaintiffs asked this Court to decide the case on the meritsof their arguments and evi dence. The Court granted Plaintiffs' request.

By deciding this matter on the merits, the Court in no way condones the conductor legal scholarship of Defendant's attorney, Mr. Jablonski. This Decision is entirelybased on the law, as well as the evidence and legal arguments presented at the hearing.

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I. Evidentiary Arguments of Plaintiffs Farrar, et al.Plaintiffs Farrar, Lax, Judy, Malaren, and Roth contend that President Barack

Obama is not a natural born citizen. To support this contention, Plaintiffs assert that Mr.Obama maintains a fraudulently obtained social security number, a Hawaiian birthcertificate that is a computer-generated forgery, and that he does not otherwise possessvalid U.S. identification papers. Further, Plaintiffs submit that Mr. Obama has previouslyheld Indonesian citizenship, and he did not use his legal name on his notice of candidacy,which is either Barry Soetoro or Barack Obama Soebarkah. (Pl.s' Am. Compl. 3.)

At the hearing, Plaintiffs presented the testimony of eight witnesses2 and sevenexhibits in support of the:ir position. (Exs. P-I through P-7.) When considering thetestimony and exhibits, this Court applies the same rules of evidence that apply to civilnonjury cases in superior court. Ga. Compo R. & Regs. 616-1-2-.18(1)-(9). The weightto be given to any evidence shall be determined by the Court based upon its reliabilityand probative value. Ga. Compo R. & Regs. 616-1-2-.18(10).

The Court finds the testimony of the witnesses, as well as the exhibits tendered, tobe of little, if any, probative value, and thus wholly insufficient to support Plaintiffs'allegations.3 Ms. Taitz attempted to solicit expert testimony from several of thewitnesses without qualifyirlg or tendering the witnesses as experts. See Stephens v. State,219 Ga. App. 881 (1996) [the unqualified testimony of the witness was not competentevidence). For example, two of Plaintiffs' witnesses testified that Mr. Obama's birth

2 Originally, Ms. Taitz indicat~:d to the Court that she would offer the testimony of seven witnesses.However, during her closing argllment, Ms. Taitz requested to testify. Ms. Taitz was sworn and began hertestimony, but shortly thereafte1'., the Court requested that Ms. Tatiz step-down and submit any furthertestimony in writing.) The credibility of witnesses i!; within the sole discretion of the trier of fact. In non-jury cases thatdiscretion lies with the judge. See Mustang Tramp.. Inc. l'. fr. fV Lowe & Sons, Inc., 123 Ga. App. 350,352 (1971).

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certificate was forged, but neither witness was properly qualified or tendered as an expertin birth records, forged documents or document manipulation. Another witness testifiedthat she has concluded that the social security number Mr. Obama uses is fraudulent;however, her investigatory methods and her sources of information were not properlypresented, and she was never qualified or tendered as an expert in social security fraud, orfraud investigations in gl~neral. Accordingly, the Court cannot make an objectivethreshold determination oCthese witnesses' testimony without adequate knowledge oftheir qualifications. See Rnudsen l'. Dl~Uee-Freeman. Inc., 95 Ga. App. 872 (1957) (forthe testimony of an expert witness to be received, his or her qualifications as such mustbe first proved).

None of the testifying witnesses provided persuasive testimony. Moreover, theCourt finds that none of tile written submissions tendered by Plaintiffs have probativevalue. Given the unsatisfaGtoryevidence presented by the Plaintiffs, the Court concludesthat Plaintiffs' claims are not persuasive.

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II, Application of tht:~"Natural Born Citizen" RequirementPlaintiffs allege th,1tPresident Barack Obama is not a natural born citizen of the

United States and, therefDre, is not eligible to run in Georgia's presidential primaryelection. As indicated supra, the United States Constitution states that ,,[n]o personexcept a natural born Citizen ... shall be eligible for the Office of the President ... :4U.S. Canst. art. II, I, d. 5.

For the purpose of this section's analysis, the following facts are considered: I)Mr. Obama was born in the United States; 2) Mr. Obama's mother was a citizen of theUnited States at the time of his birth; and 3) Mr. Obama's father was never a UnitedStates citizen. Plaintiffs c{mtendthat, because his father was not aU .S. citizen at the timeof his birth, Mr. Obama is constitutionally ineligible for the Office of the President of theUnited States. The Court does not agree.

In 2009, the Indiana Court of Appeals ("Indiana Court") addressed facts andissues similar to those befi)re this Court. Arkeny v. Governor, 916 N.E.2d 678 (Ind. Ct.App. 2009). In Arkeny, thl~plaintiffs sought to prevent certification of Mr. Obama as aneligible candidate for president because he is not a natural born citizen. fd. at 681. Theplaintiffs argued, as the Plaintiffs argue before this Court, that "there's a very cleardistinction between a 'citizen of the United States' and a 'natural born Citizen,' and thedifference involves having [two] parents of U.S. citizenship, owing no foreignallegiance." ld. at 685. The Indiana Court rejected the arb'llmentthat Mr. Obama was

4 The definition of this clause Ilas been the source of much debate. See, e.g., Gordon, Who Can BePresident of the United States: nIl' Unresolved Enigma, 28 Md. L. Rev. 1 (1968); Jill A. Pryor, Note, TheNatural-Born Citizen Clause and Presidential Eligibility: An Approach for Resoh-ing Two Hundred YearsorUncertainty, 97 Yale L.J. 881 (1988); Christina S. Lohman, Presidential Eligibility: The Meaning of theNatural-Born Citizen Clause. .16 GOIlL L. Rev. 349 (2000); William T. Han, Bl~yond PresidentialEligibility: The Natural Born ClrizenClause as a Source (if Birthright Citizenship,58 Drake L. Rev. 457(2010).

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ineligible, stating that children born within the United States are natural born citizens,regardless of the citizenship of their parents. Id. at 688. This Court finds the decision

and analysis ofArkeny persuasive.The Indiana Court began its analysis by attempting to ascertain the definition of

"natural born citizen" because the Constitution does not define the term. ld. at 685-86;See Minor v. Happersett, 88 U.S. 162, 167 (1875) ("The Constitution does not, in words,say who shall be natural born citizens. Resort must be had elsewhere to ascertain that:');see also United States v. Wong Kim Ark, 169 U.S. 649 (1898) (noting that the only

mention of the term "natural born citizen" in the Constitution is in Article II, and the termis not defined in the Constitution).

The Indiana Coulil first explained that the U.S. Supreme Court has read theFourteenth Amendment and Article II (natural born citizen provision) in tandem and heldthat "new citizens may be born or they may be created by naturalization." ld. at 685(citing Minor, 88 U.S. at 167); See U.S. Const. amend. XIV, 1. ("All persons born ornaturalized in the United States and subject to the jurisdiction thereof, are citizens of theUnited States .... "). In Minor, the Court observed that:

At common-law, with the nomenclature of which the framers of theConstitution were f::uniliar, it was never doubted that all children born in acountry of parents who were its citizens became themselves, upon theirbirth, citizens also. These were natives, or natural-born citizens, asdistinguished from aliens or foreigners. Some authorities go further andinclude as citizens I~hildren born within the jurisdiction without referenceto the citizenship of their parents. As to this class there have been doubts,but never as to the first. For the purposes of this case it is not necessary tosolve these doubts.

!d. at 167-68. Plaintiffs ask this Court to read the Supreme Court's decision in Minor asdefining natural born citizens as only "children born in a country of parents who were its

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citizens:' 88 U.S. at 167. However, the Indiana Court explains thatMinor did not definethe term natural born citiizen. In deciding whether a woman was eligible to vote, theMinor Court merely conduded that children born in a country of parents who were itscitizens would qualifYas natural born, and this Court agrees. The Minor Court left openthe issue of whether a child born within the United States of alien parent(s) is a naturalborn citizen.

Next, the Indiana Court looked to United States v. Wong Kim Ark, in which theSupreme Court analyzed tile meaning of the words "citizen of the United States" in theFourteenth Amendment and "natural born citizen of the United States" in Article II todetermine whether a ehild born in the United States to parents who, at the time of thechild's birth, were subject~;of China "becomes at the time of his birth a citizen of theUnited States, by virtue of the first clause of the fourteenth amendment .... " !d. at 686(citing rVong Kim Ark, 169 U.S. at 653). The Indiana Court determined that the twoprovisions "must be interprl~tedin the light ofthe common law, the principles and historyof which were familiarly known to the framers of the constitution." Id. (citing Wong KimArk, 169 U.S. at 654). The Indiana Court agreed that [t]he interpretation of theconstitution of the United States is necessarily influenced by the fact that its provisionsare framed in the language 'Jf the English common law, and are to be read in the light ofits history." !d. (citing Wong Kim Ark, 169U.S. at 655) (internal citation omitted). TheWong Kim Ark Court extensively examined the common law of England in its decision

and concluded that Wong J.;;jmArk, who was born in the United States to alien parents,

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became a citizen of the United States at the time of his birth.5 Wong Kim Ark, 169 U.S. at705.

5 The Wong Kim Ark Court explained:The fundamental principle of the common law with regard to English nationality was birthwithin the allegiance. also c:aUed "ligealty," "obedience," "faith" or "power," of the King. Theprinciple embraced all persons born within the King's allegiance and subject to his protection.Such allegiance and protection were mutual ... and were not restricted to natural-bornsubject') and naturalized sul:Uects, or to those who had taken an oath of allegiance; but werepredicable of aliens in ami':y, so long as they were within the kingdom. Children, born inEngland, of such aliens, were therefore natural-born subjects. But the children, born withinthe realm, of foreign amba~;sadors, or the children of alien enemies, born during and withintheir hostile occupation of part of the King's dominions, were not natural-born subjects,because not born within thf~ allegiance, the obedience, or the power, or, as would be said atthis day, within the jurisdiction of the King.

169 U.S. at 655.It thus clearly appears that by the law of England it)r the last three centuries, beginning betl1rethe settlement of this country, and continuing to the present day, aliens, while residing in thedominions possessed by the Crown of England. were within the allegiance, the obedience. thefaith or loyalty, the protection, the power, the jurisdiction, of the English Sovereign; andtherefore every child born in England of alien parents was a natural-born subject, unless thechild of an ambassador or other diplomatic agent of a foreign State. or of an alien enemy inhostile occupation of the plai:e where the child was born.

[d. at 658. Further:Nothing is better settled at tLe common law than the doctrine that the children, even of aliens,born in a country, while the :Jarents are resident there under tlle protection of the government,and owing a temporary allegiance thereto, are subjects by birth.

11.at 660 (quoting Inglis v. Trwtees o./Sailors Snug Harbor, 28 U.S. (3 Pet.) 99,164 (1830) (Story, J .concurring. And:

The first section of the seccnd article of the constitution uses the language, 'a natural-borncitizen.' It thus assumes that ,:itizenship may be acquired by birth. Undoubtedly, this languageof the constitution was used in reference to that principle of public law. well understood inthis country at the time of the adoption of the constitution, which referred citizenship to theplace of birth.

11.at 662 (quoting Dred Scot! v. Sanford, 60 U.S. (19 How.) 393, 576 (1856) (Curtis, J., dissenting.Finally:

All persons born in the allegimce of the king are natural-born subjects, and all persons born intlle al legiance of the United~;tates are natural-born citizens. Birth and allegiance go together.Such is the rule of the common law, and it is the common law of this country, as well as ofEngland.

Id. at 662-63 (quoting United States 1'. Rhodes, (1866) (Mr. Justice Swayne.

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ft .__ ___

Relying on the language of the Constitution and the historical reviews andanalyses of Minor and Wong Kim Ark, the indiana Court concluded that

persons born with in the borders of the United States are "natural borncitizens" for Artide II, Section 1 purposes, regardless of the citizenship oftheir parents. Just as a person "born within the British dominions [was) anatural-born Briti~:h subject" at the time of the framing of the U.S.Constitution, so too were those "born in the allegiance of the United States[] natural-born citizens."

916 N.E.2d at 688. The Indiana Court determined that a person qualifies as a natural borncitizen if he was born in the United States because he became a United States citizen atbirth.6

For the purposes (If this analysis, this Court considered that President BarackObama was born in the United States. Therefore, as discussed in Arkcny, he became acitizen at birth and is a natural born citizen. Accordingly,

CONCLUSIONPresident Barack Obama is eligible as a candidate for the presidential primary

election under a.C.G.A. ::.1-2-5(b).

SO ORDERED, February ::;rd, 2012.

;\~J~J~.,V~MICHAEL M. MALIHI, Judge6 This Court recognizes that the U'ong Kim Ark case was not deciding the meaning or"natural born citizen"for the purposes of detennining rresidential qualifications; however, this Court finds the Indiana Court'sanalysis and reliance on these cas~:sto be persuasive.

10


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IN THE OFFICE OF THE SECRETARY OF STATESTATE OF GEORGIADAVID FARRAR, LEAH LAX, CODY .JUDY,THOMAS MALAREN, I,AIJRI.E:ROTH, Docket Number: OSAH-SECSTAT.E:CE-1215136-60- MALUIIPetitioners,

Counsel for Petitioners: Orly Taitzv.

Counsel for Respondent: Michael.JablonskiBARACK OBAMA,ResJlondent.

DAVID P. WELDON,Petitioner,

v.

BARACK OBAMA,Respondent.

CARL SWENSSON,Petitioner,

v.

BARACK OBAMA,Respondent.

KEVIN RICHARD POWEU ..,Petitioner,

v.

BARACK OBA~fA.Respondent.

Docket Number: OSAH-SECSTATECE-1215137-60- MAUHICounsel for Petitioners: Van R. IrionCounsel for Respolldent: Michael Jablonski

Docket Number: OSAH-SECSTATECE-1216218-60- MAUHICounsel for Petitioners: J. Mark HatfieldCounsel for Respondent: Michael Jablonski

Docket Number: OSAH-SECST ATECE-1216823-60- MAUHICounsel for Petitioners: J. Mark HatfieldCounsel for Respondent: Mich~lelJablonski

PLAINTIFF'S""', .EXHIBIT11'8" ,,'


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FINAL DECISION1

Petitioners filed candidate challenges pursuant to O.C.G.A. 21-2-5(b) contending thatRespondent docs not meet be State of Georgiats eligibility requirements for his name to be listedon the 2012 Presidential Preference Primary ballot. Judge Michael Malihi, Administrative LawJudge ("AU") for the Officl~ of State Administrative Hearings, held a hearing on each candidatechallenge on January 26, 2012 and entered an initial decision for the above-captioned eases onFebruary 3,2012. The Secretary of State formally adopts the initial decision of the ALJ into thisfinal decision.

Thel'efore, IT IS HEREBY DECIDED THAT the above-captioned challenges areDENIED.

SO DECIDED this ~;~ day of Fcbmary, 2012.

~ '~L-~ . ~'-fP. KEMPGeorgia Secretary of State

I Judge Michae1Malihi previously C Dnsolidatcd the above-captioned candidate challenges for the purpose of issuinghis initial decision. Those candidatl:' challenges remain consolidated for the purpose of issuing this Final Decision.


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I, J. Mark Hatfield, Attorney for Petitioner, do herebycertify that I have this day served the foregoing Summons andPetition For Judicial Review and attachments thereto upon:

Mr. Michael K. JablonskiAttorney at Law260 Brighton Road NEAtlanta, Georgia 30309-1523Honorable Brian P. KempSecretary of StateState of Georgia214 State CapitolAtlanta, Georgia 30334Honorable Michael M. MalihiAdministrative Law JudgeOffice of State Administrative Hearings230 Peachtree Street NWSuite 850Atlanta, Georgia 30303

by placing a copy of same in the United States Mail in a properlyaddressed envelope with sufficient postage affixed thereto in

order to insure proper d~livery, and by emailing same to Mr.Jablonski at [email protected], by emailing same toSecretary Kemp at [email protected], and by emailing same toJudge Malihi at [email protected].

This 15th day of February, 2012.

201 Albany AvenueP.O. Box 1361Waycross, Georgia 31:102(912) 283-3820


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IN THEi,:UPERIOR COURT OF FULTON COUNTY

KEVIN RICHARD POWELl.,Petitioner

V.BARACK OBAMA,

Respondent

STATE OF GEORGIA** CIVIL ACTION* FILE NO. 2012CV211528**

~~DEPUTY CLERK SUPERIOL_ Fl(LTON COUNTY,MOTION FOR,EXPEDITED REVIEW OR, ALTERNATIVELY,FOR STAY OF :DECISION OF SECRETARY OF STATE AND FOR

POSTPONEMENT OF, PRESIDENTIAL PREFERENCE PRIMARY ELECTIONNow comes Petitioner Kevin Richard Powell, by and through

undersigned counsel, and moves the Court for an expedited reviewof the above-captioned appellate proceeding or, in thealternative, for a stay of the Final Decision of the GeorgiaSecretary of State herein and for a postponement of the GeorgiaPresidential Preference Primary Election, and in support of thisMotion, Petitioner shows to the Court the following:

1.This action is ~n appeal of a Final Decision of Georgia

Secretary of State Brian P. Kemp denying Petitioner Kevin RichardPowell's challenge to the qualifications of Respondent BarackObama, a presidential candidate, to seek and hold the Office ofthe President of the United States, and finding Respondent Obamaeligible as a candidate for the presidential primary election.

PLAINTIFF'SEXHIBITI/c.~

Page -1-


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2 .

The Georgia Presidential Preference Primary Election isscheduled to take place on March 6, 2012, only two (2) weeks fromthe date of this Motion.

3.O.C.G.A. 21-2-5(e) guarantees Petitioner the right to

appellate review of the adverse decision of the Secretary ofState in this matte:[.

4.Petitioner's aI~eal involves, among other issues, a

s~gnificant issue of constitutional law, i.e. whether or notRespondent, whose fa.ther was a foreign national and never aUnited States citizen, meets the "natural born Citizen"eligibility requirerr~nt of Article II, Section I, Clause 5 of theUnited States Constitution.

5.Unless this Court grants expedited review, or unless this

Court orders a stay of the Final Decision of the Secretary ofState and a postponement of the Georgia Presidential PreferencePrimary Election pending a final judgment of this Court,Respondent will likely claim that Petitioner's action is moot

after the holding of the Georgia Presidential Preference PrimaryElection. Although ~etitioner would disagree, and does disagree,with any such claim by Respondent, nevertheless Petitioner

Page -2-


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anticipates that Respondent would probably make such an argumentin an effort to avoid a decision on the merits of this appeal.

6.With regard to Petitioner's request for an expedited review

of this appeal, Petitioner shows that Uniform Superior Court Rule6.7 ("Motions in em(~rgencies.") provides that

Upon written nc)tice and good cause shown, the assigned judgemay shorten or waive the time requirement applicable toemergency motions, except motions for summary judgment, orgrant an immediate hearing on any matter requiring suchexpedited procE!dure. The motion shall set forth in detailthe necessity i"or such expedited procedure.

7 .In connection with Petitioner's alternative request for a

stay of the Final Decision of the Georgia Secretary of Stateherein and for a postponement of the Georgia PresidentialPreference Primary Election, Petitioner shows that pursuant toO.C.G.A. 21-2-5(e), while "[t]he filing of the petition shallnot itself stay the jecision of the Secretary of Stater,] ...thereviewing court may Jrder a stay upon appropriate terms for goodcause shown." Furth


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Petitioner is entitled by Georgia law, and in order that thesignificant issue of constitutional interpretation raised byPetitioner's action may be finally and decisively adjudicated,this Court should g.rant expedited review of the instant appealor, in the alternative, the Court should grant a stay of theFinal Decision of the Georgia Secretary of State herein and apostponement of the Georgia Presidential Preference PrimaryElection currently ~;cheduled for March 6, 2012.

WHEREFORE, Petitioner Kevin Richard Powell respectfullyrequests that this Court grant the relief requested by Petitionerherein.

This 21st day of February, 2012.HATFIELD & HATFIELD, P.C.

rk HatfierdAtbdrney for Pet1t\onerGeorgia Bar No. 3~7\09


Page -4-


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I, J. Mark Hatfield, Attorney for Petitioner, do herebycertify that I have this day served the foregoing Motion ForExpedited Review or( Alternatively, For Stay of Decision ofSecretary of State and For Postponement of PresidentialPreference Primary Election upon:

Mr. Michael K. JablonskiAttorney at Law260 Brighton Road NEAtlanta, Georgia 30309-1523Honorable Brian P. KempSecretary of StateState of Georgia214 State CapitolAtlanta, Georgia 30334

by placing a copy of same in the United States Mail in a properlyaddressed envelope with sufficient postage affixed thereto inorder to insure prop~r delivery, and by emailing same to Mr.Jablonski at [email protected] and by emailing sameto Secretary Kemp at [email protected].

This 21st day o~ February, 2012.HATFIELD & HATFIELD, P.C.



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IN THE: SUPERIOR COURT OF FULTON COUNTYSTATE OF GEORGIA

KEVIN RICHARD POWELL,Petitioner,vs.BARACKOBAMA,Respondent

Civil Action File Number2012 CV211528

MOTION TO DISMISSRespondent moves t his Court for an order dismissing the petition as follows:

1.This Court :Iacks jurisdiction over the subject matter. O.C.G.A. 9-11-12(b)(1).

2. Failure of service of process. O.C.G.A. 9-11-12(b)(5).3. Failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted. O.C.G.A. 9-

11-12(b)(6).Argument in favor of the motion to dismiss is set forth in the accompanying brief.Respectfully submitted,This 27th day of February, 2012.

MICHAEL JABLONSKIGeorgia State Bar Number 3858502221-D Peachtree Road NEAtlanta, Georgia [email protected] PLAINTIFF'SEXHIBIT'I ,\

=--r2


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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICEI hereby certify that I have this day served the foregoing pleading upon

Mr, Mark HatfieldAttorney at Law201 Albany AvenueP.O. Box 1361Waycross, Georgia 31502by statutory electronic service pursuant to O.C.G.A. 9-11-5(e) using the email [email protected],This 27th day of February, ::2.012.

MICHAEL JABLONSKIGeorgia State Bar Number ~:\858502221-D Peachtree Road NEAtlanta, Georgia 30309404 -290-2977michael.jablo nskifcDcomcast.net


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IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF FULTON COUNTYSTATE OF GEORGIA

KEVIN RICHARD POWELL,Petitioner,vs.BARACKOBAMARespondent

Civil Action File Number2012 CV211528

Brief in ~:~upportof Respondent's Motion to Dismiss

The appeal from the Secretary of State's decision finding that President Obama isqualified to appear on the Presidential Preference Primary ballot is one in a long line ofpersistent challenges filed across the country since 2008. Not a single challenge has everbeen upheld.!

1.. See, Georgia cases: RhodeB v. MacDonald, 670 F. Supp.2d 1363 (M.D. Ga. 2009), affd,2010 WL 892848 (11th Cir. March 15, 2010) cert. denied, 129 S. Ct. 2830 (2009); Terryv. Handel, 08CV158774S(Superior Court Fulton County, 2008), appeal dismissed, No.S09D0284 (Ga. Supreme Court), reconsideration denied, No. S09A1373; Cook v. Goodet aI, 4:2009cvoo082, 2009 WL 2163535 (M.D.Ga. July 16, 2008).Federal cases: Allen v. Soetoro, 4:09-cv-00373, 2011 WL 2130589, (D. Ariz. May, 2010);In re: American Grand Jur!/, 3:09mc00215(USDC Tenn., 2009); Keyes v. Obama,8:09-cv-00082, 2009 WL 3861788, (U.S.D.C.D. Cal. Oct. 29, 2009), appeal pending,No. 10-55084 (9thCir., 2011); Berg v. Obama et aI, 574 F.Supp.2d 509 (E.D.Pa. 2008),affd, 586 F.3rd 234 (3rd Cir. 2009), Cert. denied, 129 S. Ct. 1030 (2009); Berg v.Obama, 656 F. Supp.2d. 10'7CD.D.C.Cir. 2009); Beverly v. Federal ElectionsCommission, 09-15562 (KD. Cal., 2008), affdo9-15562 (9th Cir., 2009), cert. denied,130 S. Ct. 1732 (2010); Bowhall v. Obama, 2:10cvo0609, 2010 WL 4932747, (M.D. Ala.November 30,2010); The Church of Jesus Christ Christian/Aryan Nations of Missouriet al v. Obama et aI, 6:08cv03405, 2011WL 4916569 (W.D. Mo. Oct. 17, 2011); Cohen v.Obama, 1:08cv02150, 2008 WL 5191864 (D.D.C., Dec. 11,2008), aff'd, 2009 WL


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2870668 (D.C. Cir. 2008); Cook v. Good et aI, 4:2009cvoo082, 2009 WL 2163535,(M.D. Ga. July 16,2008); Cook v. Simtechn 8:2009cV01382 (M.D. Fla., 2009); Craig v.U.s., 5:09-cv-00343 (W.D. Okla., 2009), cert. denied, 130 S. Ct. 141 (2009); Craig v.U.S., 5:09-CV-01345-C (W.D. Okla., 2010); Dawson v. Obama, 2:08cv02754, 2009 WL532617 (E.n. Cal. March 2,2009); Ealey v. Sarah Obama, 4:08-mc-00504 (S.D.Tex.,2008); Essek v. Obama, OS-379-GFVT (E.D. Ky., 2008); Hamblin v. Obama,2:09cV00410, 2009 WL 2513986 (D. Ariz. Aug. 14,2009); Hamrick v. Fukino, 1:08-cv00544, 2009 WL 1404535 (Haw., May 20, 2009); Herbert v. Obama, 3:08-cv-01164HES-TEM (M.D. Fla., 2008), cert. denied, 130 S. Ct. 562 (2009); Herbert v. US, 3:08cv-00634-TJC-MCR (M.D,Fla., 2008); Herbert v. US, 3:08cv01201, 2009 WL 129585,(S.D.Cal., Jan. 15, 2009); Hollander v. McCain, 566 F. Supp.2d 63 (D.N.H. 2008);Hollister v. Soetoro, 601 F, Supp.2d 179 (D.D.C. Cir. 2009), cert. denied, 131S. Ct. 1017(2011); Hunter v. U.S. Supreme Court, 2:08cv00232, 2009 WL 111683, (N.D.Tex., Jan.16,2009), appeal dismissed, No. 09-10246, No. 10-10009, No. 10-100064 (5th Cir.,2009); Jones v. Obama, 2:10-CV-01075 (C.D. Cal., 2010); Judy v. McCain, 2:08cV01162(USDC Nev., 2008); Kerchner v. Obama, 612 F.3d 204 (D.N.J. 2010), cert. denied, 131S. Ct. 663 (2010); Liberty I,egal Foundation v. DNC, CH-11-1757 (D Ariz., 2011);Mackay v. Obama, 2:11-CV"05458-JP (E.D. Pa., 2011), voluntarily dismissed, No. 113862 (USDC Pa., 2011);McLanahan v. Obama, 2:11-CV-00374-EFS (D.Was., 2011);Morrow v. Barak Humane Obama, 1:08-cv-22345 (S.D. Fla., 200B); Neely v. Obama,2:oB-cV-15243 (E.D.MI., 200B); Patriot's Heart Network v. Soetoro, 1:09-mc-00442RCL (D.D.C., 2009); In Re Paul Andrew Mitchell, 2:oB-cv-04083 (E.D. PA, 200B),affd304 Fed. Appx 113, 200B vVL53B1436 (3rd Cir., 200B), mandamus denied, No. oB4443 (3d Cir., 2008); Purpura v. Sebelius, 3:1O-CV-04B14,2011WL 154776B, (D.N.J.Apr. 21, 2011); Rhodes v. Gates, 5:09-,cv-00703-XR (W.D.Tex., 2009); Rhodes v.MacDonald, 670 F. Supp.2d 1363 (M.D. Ga. 2009), affd, 2010 WL 892848 ( 11thCir.March 15, 2010) cert. denied, 129 S. Ct. 2B30 (2009); Robinson v. Bowen, 567F.SUpp.2d 1144 (N.D.Cal. 2008); Roy v. Fed. Election, 2:08cvOI519, 2008 WL 4921263,(W.D. Wa. Nov. 14, 200B); Stamper v. US, l:oB CV2593, 2008 WL 4838073 (N.D.OH.2008); Strunk v. Patterson, 1:oBcv042B9 (E.D.N.Y., 200B), appeal dismissed No. oB5422 (2d Cir. Nov. 14, 2008); Strunk v. U.S. Dept. of State, 693 F.SUpp.2d 112 (D.D.C.Cir. 2010), mandamus den l'ed, No. 09-5322 (D.D.C., 2009), appeal dismissed, No. 105092, (DC Cir., 2010); Super American Grand Jury, 1:09-mc-00346-RCL (D.D.C.,2009) ; Taitz v. Obama, 70? F.SUpp.2d 1 (D.D.C. Cir. 2010), appeal pending, No. 115304 (DCCir., Oct. 31,2011); Taitz v. Astrue, 1:11-CV-00402,2011WL 3B05741, (D.D.C.Aug. 30,2011); Taitz v. Astl'ue, 1:1l-mC-0015B (D.Haw., 2011); Taitz v. Ruemmier, 1:11CV-01421(D.D.C., 2011); Thomas v. Hosemann, 1:oBmco02Bo (D. Haw., 200B);Thomas v. Hosemann, 2:oB-cv-00241-KS-MTP (SD Miss., 2008).State cases: Ankeny v. Daniels, 916 N.E.2d 678 (Ind. Ct. App. 2009) Affd, No. 49A020904-CV-353 (Ind. App. Court); Brockhausen v. Andrade, No. 08-1001-C365 (Tex.State Court); Broe v. Reed, 82473-B (Was. State Supreme Court); Connerat v.Browning, 999 So. 2d 644 O~la.Dist. Ct. App. 2008); Connerat v. Obama, No.09003103SC (Fla. State Court); Connerat v. Obama, No. 09005522SC (Fla. StateCourt); Constitution Party v. Lingle, No. 29743, 200B WL 51259B4 (Haw. Dec. 5,200B); Corbett v. Bowen, No. 30-2008-00114112-CU-FR_CJC, (Cal. Superior Court,


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An effort to harass the President continues with qualification challenges filedacross the country and in (}eorgia. Challengers ignore procedural and evidentiaryrequirements because thei r claims are without merit, based on fantasy, and offered inpursuit of a political agenda. See, for example, Rhodes v. MacDonald, 670 F. Supp.2d1363,1364 (M.D. Ga. 2009), affd, 2010 WL 892848 (11th Cir. March 15, 2010) cert.denied, 129 S. Ct. 2830 (2009)("When a lawyer uses the courts as a platform for

2008); Craig v. Oklahoma: MA-109808 (Okla. Supreme Court); Donofrio v. Wells, No.AN-I053-08T2 (NJ. Nov. 03, 2008), Cert. denied, 129 S. Ct. 752 (2008); Fitzpatrick v.Obama, no docket number (NC State Court); Greenberg v. Brunner, No. 2008cVI024(Ohio State Court, 2008); In re John McCain's Ineligibility to be on PresidentialPrimary Ballot in Pa, 944 .A..2d 75 (Pa. 2008); Justice v. Fuddy, 253 P.3d 665 (Haw.2011); Keyes v. Bowen, 189 Cal. App. 4th 647 (Cal. Ct. App. 2010) Cert. denied, 132 S. Ct.99 (2011); US v. LTC Terrence L. Lakin, MCAT-JA-SC; Liberty Legal Foundation v.DNC, CH-11-1757 (Tenn. State Court); Lightfoot v. Bowen, No. 168690 (Cal. SupremeCourt, 2008), Cert. denied, 555 U.S. 1151(2009); Marquis v. Reed, No. 08-2-34955-1(Was. State Court, 2008); lI,fartin v. Lingle, No. 29414, 2008 WL 4684786, (Haw. Oct.22,2008); Martin v. LinglE!,No. ICC08-1-002147, 2009 WL 1669050, (Haw. Jun. 9,2009), Appeal Dismissed, :;W09 WL 2372096 (Haw. Aug. 3, 2009); Martin v. Bennett,No. lCClO-l-000969 (Haw. State Court); Meroni et al v. McHenry County Grand JuryForeman et al, No. 09mr399 (Ill. State Court, 2009); Neal v. Brunner, No.2008cv72726 (Ohio State Court, 2008); Patriot's Heart Media Network v. IllinoisBoard of Elections, No. loHoo0605 (Ill. State Court); Schneller v. Cortes, 199 MM2008 (Pa. Supreme Court, :;W09), cert. denied, 129 S. Ct. 2830 (2009); Sorsensen v.Riley, cv-2008-1906 (Ala. S:ate Court, 2008); Spuck v. Sec. of State, 2008 CVI116(OhioState Court, 2008); Stumpo v. Granholm, No. 08-140-MM (Mich. Dist. Ct. (30th) Mar.31,2009), appeal dismissed:, No. 291681, (Mich. App. Ct., Jun. 3, 2009); Stunk v.Patterson, 029641/2008 (N.Y. State Court, 2008); Strunk v. Patterson, 029642/2008(N.Y. State Court, 2008); Sv1livan v. Sec. of State, 08CV1076(N.C. State Court, 2008);Sullivan v. Marshall, 08cvs, 021393 (N.C. State Court, 2008); Taitz v. Fuddy, lCCll-l001731 (Haw. State Court); 'Terry v. Handel, 08cv158774S (Superior Court FultonCounty, 2008), appeal dismissed, No. S09D0284 (Ga. Supreme Court), reconsiderationdenied, No. S09A1373; Wroilnowski v. Bysiewicz, SC 18264 (Conn. Supreme Court,2008).


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political agenda disconnected from any legitimate legal cause of action, that lawyerabuses her privilege to pradice law.")

President Obama was a United States citizen from the moment of his birth inHawaii. Since he held citizli~nshipfrom birth, all Constitutional qualifications have beenmet. Ankeny v. Governor of State of Indiana, 916 N.E.2d 678 (Ind. App., 2009);

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GA - 2012-03-12 - POWELL v OBAMA (Appeal SCOGA) - Application for Discretionary Appeal

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