Gandhi, Ramchandra -- On Meriting Death

8/12/2019 Gandhi, Ramchandra -- On Meriting Death

1/18

On Meriting DeathAuthor(s): Ramchandra Gandhi

Source: Philosophy East and West, Vol. 31, No. 3 (Jul., 1981), pp. 337-353Published by: University of Hawai'i PressStable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/1398578.

Accessed: 31/08/2013 15:00

Your use of the JSTOR archive indicates your acceptance of the Terms & Conditions of Use, available at.http://www.jstor.org/page/info/about/policies/terms.jsp

.JSTOR is a not-for-profit service that helps scholars, researchers, and students discover, use, and build upon a wide range of

content in a trusted digital archive. We use information technology and tools to increase productivity and facilitate new forms

of scholarship. For more information about JSTOR, please contact [email protected].

.

University of Hawai'i Pressis collaborating with JSTOR to digitize, preserve and extend access to Philosophy

East and West.

http://www.jstor.org

This content downloaded from 134.129.115.40 on Sat, 31 Aug 2013 15:00:10 PMAll use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions
http://www.jstor.org/action/showPublisher?publisherCode=uhphttp://www.jstor.org/stable/1398578?origin=JSTOR-pdfhttp://www.jstor.org/page/info/about/policies/terms.jsphttp://www.jstor.org/page/info/about/policies/terms.jsphttp://www.jstor.org/page/info/about/policies/terms.jsphttp://www.jstor.org/page/info/about/policies/terms.jsphttp://www.jstor.org/page/info/about/policies/terms.jsphttp://www.jstor.org/stable/1398578?origin=JSTOR-pdfhttp://www.jstor.org/action/showPublisher?publisherCode=uhp


2/18

Ramchandra andhi On meritingeath

In thinking urder hroughweencounter t itsheart he dea of the nnocenceof the victim fmurder, humanbeingkilledwithoutmeritingeathat thehands of hiskiller. he idea of nnocence ointsbeyond tselfothe anctityfhuman ife, nd the dea of thesanctityf human ifehas an insistence hichmakes thedifficultyf sayingpreciselywhat it comes to less embarrassingphilosophically han it mightbe otherwise.This articleis based on theconviction hatthe dea of thesanctityfhuman ife s nourishment ithoutwhich he dea ofthehumanright o lifeperishes.Does anyhumanbeingever have theright o killanyotherhumanbeing?Of course so, one mightwant to say, givingthe following epresentativeexample. Suppose a humanbeing,X, was tryingr intended o kill anotherhumanbeing,Y, suchthattheonlywayY could preventX fromkilling imwas by killing . Or letus supposethatX was tryingr intended o killnotYbutsomeotherhumanbeing, , such thatX could be preventedrom illingonly fY killedX. (We have now theclassiccontext f defensive illing,whichincludes, ut is not restrictedo, self-defensiveilling.) f in thissituationtwere lso thecase thatneither norZ merited eathat thehandsofX, somewould wantto say thatY had theright o kill X. Indeed,even f t were thecase thatonlyZ, and notalso Y, did not merit eath at thehandsofX, somewould stillwanttosaythatY had theright o killX.The extra features hat have been brought n to describethe generalsituation f defensive illingreimportanto bear nmind,but for he ake ofpreliminaryrgumentet us restricturselves o thesituation f self-defensivekilling,hat s,the sortof case whereX is tryingr intends o killY, theonlywayY can preventX fromkilling im s bykillingX, and Y does notmeritdeath t thehands ofX. Is one in this ituation eally bliged osaythatY hasthe rightto kill X? Let us consider some difficultieshichthis questioncreates.In order ounderstand hat t s forY, in this ortofsituation,o have theright okillX, wehave had tobringn the dea of Y notmeritingeath at thehands ofX, an idea evenmore difficulto understand han the idea of onehuman being havingthe rightto kill another.To be able to answerthequestion et us takea quick look at the dea of Y notmeritingeath at thehandsof X. We can see a few hingsmmediately.f Y does not merit eath atthehandsofX, thismeansat leastthatX does nothave therightokillY. Butit meansmore than this. Even ifX had the right o kill Y, it would notneccessarilyollow thatY merited eath at thehandsof X (Y maybe old,perhaps lreadydying, emayhave an ailingwife nd small hildren,tcetera.It is importantn any discussionof the humanright o life, think, ointroduce s earlyas possible the idea of human beings meriting r notRamchandra andhi sHead, DepartmentfPhilosophyt theUniversityfHyderbadPhilosophyast and West 1,no. 3 (July, 981).? byTheUniversityressof Hawaii.All rightseserved.

http://www.jstor.org/page/info/about/policies/terms.jsphttp://www.jstor.org/page/info/about/policies/terms.jsphttp://www.jstor.org/page/info/about/policies/terms.jsp


3/18

338 Gandhi

meritingeath at one another'shands,becauseeven f an argumentucceedsinestablishinghatvery ften umanbeingshavetherightokillotherhumanbeings, twould not automatically ollowthat n all thesecases anyhumanbeingmerited eath at the hands of another human being. Some of theconsiderations lluded to earlier n parenthesesmaybecomedecisive, r, inadditionto or even independentlyf these,the thought f the sanctity fhuman ifemayobligeus to say thatsome humanbeingor beingsdid notmerit eathat the handsofsomeotherhumanbeingor beings, venthoughthe atter ad therightokilltheformer.The introductionf the dea ofY notmeritingeath at the hands ofX intheexampleunderconsideration, hen,oughtnot to be objectedto on thegroundof thecomplexityr difficultyf this dea, inasmuch s the idea iscentralto any understandingf the humanright o life.But it could beobjectedto on anotherground. f Y does notmerit eath at thehands ofX,thismeans, s hasbeenpointed ut,thatX doesnothave therighto killY; atleast thismuch is meant,and we have written his into our attempt ounderstandwhat it is for Y to have the rightto kill X. Is it logicallypermissibleo do this?Can we, nlogic,hopetounderstand hat t s foronehumanbeingto have theright o killanother n terms f what t is for onehumanbeingnotto have theright o killanother, onsideringhatthese wothingsremerely pposites feachother? erhaps he deas of a humanbeinghaving nd not havingtheright o kill anotherhumanbeing require o beunderstood n essentialcontrastwith each otherin some immediate ndintuitive ay. do not know. On theface of t,this uppositioneemshard tosubstantiate.What sthewayout then?Let us, experimentally,o awaywiththepostulate hatY does notmeritdeath at thehandsofX, retainingll the other lements f thesituation,hatis (1) X is tryingr intends o killY, and (2) theonlywayY can preventfromkillinghimis by killingX. Are our difficultiest an end now? Thesituation llowsfor hepossibilityhatY maymerit eathat the hands ofX,that s,thatX mayhave theright o killY. Let us imagine hat his s infactthecase. Let us also, to avoidcomplications hichwillnot assistcomprehen-sion at this tage, upposethatX and Y bothknowthatX has theright okillY. We will in thatcase have to redescribehe situation s follows.We willhave to saythat 1) in theexercise f hisright o killY, X is tryingr intendsto killY, and that 2) theonlywayY can preventX fromkilling im s bykillingX. Does itfollowfrom1) and (2) above thatY has theright okillX?Ifnot,whynot?Can one saythat n viewof X's right o killhim,Y has losthisself-defensiveight o kill?Can a humanbeingever ose his self-defensiverightokill?Let us for a momentbringback the humanbeingZ from our earliestdescriptionfthesituation,nd supposethat lthoughX has theright o killY, and is exercisinghisright, e has no right o killZ, although n act he is



4/18

339

tryingr intends o killZ. Would not we wantto saythat n this ituationhas theright o killX, if theonlywayX can be prevented romkilling is byY killingX? And let us notforget hatX has theright o kill Y and bothXand Y know this f, n spiteof the factthatX has theright o killY, and isexercisinghisright, has theright o kill X in defense fZ, why annotYhavethesamerightn relation ohimself,hat s,theright,n order o defendhimself,o killX? IfY retains hegeneraldefensiveight o kill,howcan helose whatcan be subsumedunder hisright,hat s,theself-defensiveight okill?Does one wantto saythat ven fY retains is self-defensiveight okill,thisright f his, n relation o X, is weaker han X's right o kill Y? Whatwould be thebasisfor aying his?The idea of a self-defensiveight o killstemsfrom onsiderationswhichhave to do with he absolute ntegrityfa living ody-in thepresent ase alivinghumanbody-and there s nothing bout this dea which uggests hattheabsolute ntegrityfa livinghumanbodycan become underminedytherighthat omeotherhumanbeingmayhavetodestroyt. f this s sound, ndif, nourexample, ne can saythatY retains is self-defensiveight o killXdespitethefact thatX has the right o killY, the situationyields strangeconsequences.n order o see this, et us supposethatX is an executionerulyauthorized o kill Y who, let us suppose, s a murderer ondemnedby dueprocessof aw todeath, nd let us furtherupposethatX has commenced heexercise f hisright o kill Y. Then, fthepreceding easoning egardingelf-defensive illings sound,Y, thecondemnedman,would have theright elf-defensivelyo killX, theexecutioner,fthat s theonlywayhe can preventfromkilling im.Of courseY is unlikelyo havethe resources o do this, utwe areexamining otthe ikelihood f such a thing appening ut thetheory,the moraltheory fself-defense,hether he"self" happensto be a murdereror a saint. And whyshould moral or legal theoristswish to denythat acondemnedmurderer as theself-defensiveight o kill hisexecutioner t thepointwhere his s theonlypossible elf-defense? ould not t bemore orrectto saythat ll thatmoralitynd law and social policyrequire,fthey equirethis, s that the condemnedman oughtnot to succeed in thisenterprise?Summarizingndgeneralizingheargumento farwecan saythis:No humanbeingX can have theright o killanotherhumanbeingY and exercise hisrightwithout too acquiring right o kill,theright o killX, at thepointwhere heonlywayY can prevent from illing im sby killingX.In the ight fthe earlier iscussion etus return o thesimplestituation fhumankilling nvolving wo humanbeings,X and Y, which s describablethus: 1) X is tryingr intends okillY, and (2) theonlywayY canpreventfrom illing is by killingX. One might aythat he situation ieldsY's self-defensiveight o killX. Butone also would be forced osaythat ven fX didnot initially ave a right o killY, he would now, if the onlyway X canprevent fromkilling im s bykilling . So X andY havenow theright o



5/18

340 Gandhi

killeach other Could one saythat nviewofthefact hatX started hewholething, has a greater elf-defensiveight o killX thanX has to killY? Whatwould be the basic of such an assessment? uppose both X and Y areexercising heir self-defensiveight o kill each other,and as the combatdevelops t becomesclear thatY (perhapsa skilledAmitabhBachchan) ismore ikely o kill X thanvice versa. n addition o noticing his,wouldonewanttosaythatX's self-defensiveight okillY remainsweaker hanY's self-defensive ight o killX? Would one instead aytough-mindedlyhatX hadasked for t and leave it at that? As the combatdevelops t could also ofcoursebecomeclear thatX was on thepointofkilling . Let us supposethatX is a hardenedmurdererndY his unfortunatearget f attack.PerhapsX'smotive at firstwas simplyto rob Y or terrorizehim. Y, desperately rcourageously, as resistedX, weaklyat first nd thenforcefully. 's self-defensiveapacities re also stirred ow. Even if nitially e had notthoughtthathe had anyright o killY, nowhe does. Does notthis hainof reactionsthrow ighton thepsychology f hardenedmurderers ho are led compul-sively o kill xpeciallyhoseoftheir ictimswho offer esistance?The conviction hatself-defensiveillingmayalwaysbe in orderhas deeproots in human nature.This conviction an weaken,in saintsas well asmurderers,ut it cannotbe undermined y objective rgument.t is worthnoting hat one's conviction egardinghe egitimacyf self-defensiveillingmay remain ntactthroughout ne's life. n comparison,how weak is theconviction egardingheright o killto defend thers.Perhapsthis s not auniversallyccurringweakness.Thinkof escalationsof local warfarewitheverybodynvokingheright okill ndefense f their llies.)Does theprecedingrgumenttrengthenhe view thathumanbeingsoftendo have therightokillotherhumanbeings?nsofar s itdoes, tdoes so in anapparentlyverypuzzling way, because of its exposureof the theoreticalimpossibilityfcontainingelf-defensiveilling,nd oftheerror fsupposingthat the self-defensiveight o kill, f this s indeeda right,s lost by first-strikersn the ritualof humankilling, venby condemnedmurderers. neneed not be alarmedat thepuzzlingcharacter f theseresults.n fact, heyweakenonlytheself-righteousness,nd frustratenlythearrogance, f theexpectation hat a bit of argument nd a bit of accuratedescription fsituations f humankillingwill sufficeuitably o anchorin thenatureofthings heallegedhumanright o kill humanbeings. shall arguehere thatthey annotbecause there s no such thing s the humanright verto killhuman beings.How can this be shown?Has not much of the precedingargumentnd discussionpointed n thedirection f an affirmation,lbeitasomewhat aradoxical ffirmation,f thehumanright o killhumanbeings?Have I not madea distinctionetween he dea of a humanbeinghaving heright o killanotherhumanbeing, nd the idea of a humanbeingmeritingdeathat the handsof anotherhumanbeing?But inmaking hisdistinctionwas pointing utthatthe dea ofthe humanright o killhumanbeings acks



6/18

341

thepower ts advocateshave alwayswantedto invest t with, hepowertogenerate nd ustifyhe dea of humanbeingsmeritingeath at thehands ofotherhumanbeings. shallnow saymorepositivelywhy think here s nosuchthing s thehumanright okillhumanbeings.Whenever humanbeing,X, has a rightwhichhas essentiallyo do withanother human being,Y, a right nconceivablewithoutthe basis of X'srelationshipoY, itshouldbepossibleforX inprinciple ationallyo convinceY thatX has thegivenrightn relation oY. (I use theword"right" ndwillshortly se theword"duty"in this article n senses that can be, butdo nothave to be, as broad as the richunitaryegal-moral-political-spiritualensewhich heword"human"suggestswhenwe talk of humanrightsnd duties).Letas consider omeexamples.(1) X has theright o expectutter andor fromhis friend in all mattersthathave to do with hebasis of their riendship.o expect uch candor fromcasual acquaintances r enemies s irrational.I am not sureabout enemies,though.Perhapsenemies oo, at anyratethosewhoseenmitys not withouthonor, we oneanother carefulackofambiguityntheir ssessments f andcommunications ithone another.But itmaybe inaccurate o call such ackofambiguitycandor"). If Y is at some timeor other ignificantlynable tobe spontaneousnrelation o his friend , indomains hey ohabit n virtue ftheir riendship,nd ifX and Y arefriends,his an hardly ailto be noticedbyX. In such a caseX would have an indisputable ight o ask Y to talk boutthewholething.fY refuses,twoulda legitimatexpectation n X's parttobe able to convinceY thatY owesX an explanation. hisexpectationpringsfromX's right,nrelation oY, toexpect rom candor n their riendship.(2) A humancommunity as theright o expectfrom verymember f it aminimumacrifice f self-interestor thesake of thesurvival nd growth fthecommunity.An exploitativeociety oes notpossessthisright,nasmuchas it s nota humanommunity).etX be an elder fsuch communityndY arebelliousmemberwhothinks hat ven minimum acrificefself-interestnhispart nrelation o thecommunity ould be unjustified,rwho thinks heminimum oo exacting, omethingikethat. n this situationX could legiti-matelyhope to convinceY that thecommunity'slaimover Y was notun-justifiable, t any rate he could, with the aid of Y, redefine he minimumsacrifice laimedbythecommunityromts memberswithoutbandoning heprinciple f suchsacrifice. ere againX's expectationwouldspring romhisperceptionf thecommunity's ightn itsrelationship ithY. An analogousargumentwould show that n individual oo couldhopeto convince lders fhis communityf the egitimacyf those of his rightswhichthecommunityhas nothonored. upposenowthat humanbeing,X, thinks ehas therighttokill nother umanbeing,Y. If thereasoningmbodied nthe xamples ustconsidered s sound, it should be possibleforX to convinceY in rationalargumenthatX had theright o killY.Let us not think f those cases where heverypossibilityf talk, et alone



7/18

342 Gandhi

rational rgument,an be ruledout,for xample,whereX is on thepointofhurling mortalblowupon Y in exercise f whathe takes to be hisright okillY, and analogoussituations fmilitarynd civilianviolence,ocalizedorescalatory.Ifrational rgument erepossible n these ituations, ould therebe any mpendingmortalviolence oworry bout? WouldX stand nneed ofproving is right o kill Y? Yes, in an academicsense,one might rgue.Butcan there e an academicright o kill?Tornfrom context fpassion, here sn't ven a would-be ightokill).(3) Letus think f situations fprejudice nd self-deceptionndpresumptu-ous superiorityhereX notonly hinks hathehas theright o killY, heevenperverselymagines hathecan talkY intoaccepting he status fa deservingvictimparedonlybyX's mercy. oullessfanatics,Nazis, deluded deologues,and fantasy-inspiredemiliteratesometo mind.X in ourexample s one such.Can he hope in rational rgumento convinceY thathe (X) has theright okillY? It is a mootpointwhether personofthis ort an engage nrationalargument t all, especiallywithsomeone,Y, who is theveryobject of hisperverse lindness.However, et us attribute nexpected apabilities o thehuman mindand picture situationwhereX does initiate n argumentwithY. Y maywelltremble eforeX, and it is not beyondthecapacitiesof thehuman oul indesparateperil oyield hroughurvivalistelf-deceptiono themost mplausibleuggestionsnd sophistries.n thiswayY maywellyield oX in argument,ut this s no triumph freason. Less dramatically,ulturalconditioningan also often xtract rom, or nstance, condemnedmurderertheacknowledgmentf society's ight o kill him.But let us notforget hatnoneofthese ituations fallegedrational rgumentave theopenendedness-which quality ndfreedomlone canguarantee-which sthe oul of rationalargumentetween umanbeings. n an allegeddialoguebetween elf-confessedtormentor nd defensivevictim there s no place for fundamentalmoralinquiry,whichpresupposes n environment f patienceand rational con-sideration.Am I really lso saying, pparentlyo counterintuitively,hat ven fX weretryingr intended o kill Y unprovoked y anything mayhave done, andevenif theonly wayY could stopX fromkillinghimwas by killingX, Ywould nothavetherighto killX? I am indeed aying hat.But shallalso saythat nthat ortof situationtmaywell be Y's duty o defendhimselfnd, ifthiscan be done only bykillingX, itmaybe Y's duty o kill X. Is notthisstrange osition?How canY nothave therighto killX if tcanbe hisduty odo so? Is notduty trongerhanright?n self-defenseet mepointout that t sbyno means unusual forY to be under n obligation o do something, ith-out it beingthecase thatY has the right o do thatthing. f this can besatisfactorilyhown obe a possibility,hen preliminaryeneral rejudicenour mindsagainsttheposition have just stated will be removed, hepre-judiced rejection f thepossibilityhat n ourlogically rimitive -Y exampleofhumankillingtcan be Y's duty okillX, but not hisright.



8/18

343

Considerthepoor,thedeprived,he afflictedfthe world. t is clearly urhumanduty o care forthem nd alleviate heirmisery. ut is it ourright odo so?Can I go to a sickman anddemand, s a right,hatheallow me tocareforhim?Thiswouldbe an inexcusablemposition ponhim.Of coursesomewaywould have to be found of lookingafterhim fhe adamantly nd irra-tionallyrefuseshelp, but not as a right.Sometimes, hough, n a similarsituation, person ouldclaim a right ohelpsomeone ndistress,n additionto acknowledging is dutyand expressing is inclination o do so. But hewouldhavetohave a very pecialclaimover theperson ndistress, claim oflove and identitynd identification. doctor,merelys a doctor,wouldnothave such a claim over a patientwho refuses reatmentnd help,and con-sequently o rightohelphim.A parent, brotherr sister, r a friendmight.Such a personcould say to thepatient I want to helpyou, t is mydutytohelpyou,but it s also myright o do so, because I loveyou." I cannotresistthe temptation t this point to remarkthat,eminentlyaudable thoughorganized humanitarianism an be, the reason it is oftenarrogantandcounterproductiveas todo with failure o see that t can at bestbe ourdutyto help theneedy,rarely ur right.The moreorganizedand remote aringbecomes,thegreaters therisk of it becoming rrogant, nd then t is notcaringbutsomethinglse,somethingesshuman, essadmirable.)Do these xamplesmakemoreplausible he claim that ven f t s or couldbe ourduty ometimes okill humanbeing, tneed not everbe ourright? etus note that too eager acceptance f humankilling s being ven sometimesa right ouldbe disastrous;n acceptance f tas being ometimes oth rightand a duty an onlyresult n insufferableelf-righteousnessherefear nd asense of the tragic imitations f the human condition are called for; arecognitionf tas being ometimes duty lthoughnever right eemsmostlikelyto me to encouragethe balance betweencourage and ahirhsd hatGandhiji alked bout. In theGTta, rjunacan be seenas claiming hathe hasno right o killtheenemy, nd SriKrsna can be seen as conceding hispointbut drawingArjuna's attention o the fact thatit is underspecific ircum-stancesthathisduty s to kill). I am not suggestinghat the idea of humankilling eing ometimes duty a terriblend painful uty) sby tselfikely obe correctivefhumanovereagernesso kill. t can be so only nconjunctionwith he dea thathumanbeingsneverhaveanyright o killone another.But Iam arguing orthetruth f a certain hesis, ot tsefficaciousness,lthougham convincedthat in the sphereof the spirit ruth s the most efficaciouspolicy.I think hethesis am proposingwillbe better nderstoodf we reflect otupon thewrongness f murder,mportant hough t is to do so, but on thebadness f all humankilling,whether r notwrongnessttaches o it.For evenwhere t is a duty o kill a humanbeing, hekilling taresus in the faceas aprofound isvalue.Far moredisconcertinghananyothermanner fdying sthethought fdying t the handsofa humanbeing.One might sk whether



9/18

344 Gandhi

for terminal atientnunbearable gony uthanasia dministeredya lovedone can be seenas representingenderness nd nota profound isvalue, ndwhethermurders a human ispensationnd thedeath tbrings boutthoughtragic s not,like all otherkindsof death,absurd?When, n SouthAfrica,Gandhijisaw a potentialmurdererpproachinghim,he had thethought Ishouldnot minddying t thehands of a brother."Regarding hefirst fthesequestions, should like to pointout thatlovinghands cannotwithout heseverest hock and guiltand moral self-stultificationdminister eath to alovedone. The secondquestiondescribes spiritual nd notmerely moralpath, pathonly aints an tread.Let us notpresumptuouslyry o oin themin their adhana.For thegeneralityfmankind hepicture f humankillingremains,s itshould, bhorrent.Let us considermoreclosely hedisvalueof humankilling. he badnessofhumankillinghas something navoidably o do withthe idea of prematuredying, or very eathbykillings a premature eath. But this ouldnot be allthat there s to thebadnessofhumankilling. he murder f a very ld andsick man is also a shatteringhing, lthough learlynotdue to ourregret orprematureeath.The badnessof humankilling as of course omethingo dowith heunnaturalnessf t,but thisunnaturalness ustbe distinguishedromtheunnaturalnessfdeathdue to accidents. udden naturaldeathcan be seenas beingquitesimilar o death due to an accidentrunaway lood pressure rrunaway ars,forexample),but not deathto killing.There is a perversionabout humankilling-this is its unnaturalness-thatno accident nvolves,unless ofcourse the act ofkillings itself ccidental. f we could understandthe perversion f human killingwe would also, I think,understand hedistinguishingeature f tsbadness n a moral and socialway.Humanbeingsin theirmoral nd social ives ustain neanother.Without his ustenanceherecan be no human ociety.Humankillings thenegation fthisfoundation fhumansociety, f the principles f mutualitynd cooperation.That is itsperversion.utaremutualityndcooperation bundantly nough nevidenceinhuman ocial life obe itshallmark? his is an uncomfortableuestionforsocial and political omanticismf all kinds, reminderf the rrationalityfmost xistingorms f human ocial ife.The irrationalityf humankilling,othetough-mindedebuttal f romanticism ouldgo, is merely reflectionfthe rrationalityfhuman ocial life,not tsperversion. lthough think hisis too strong, here s force n this spoil-sport hought.How might t beanswered?The badness of humankilling an perhapsbe understood estbycontrast-ing it neitherwiththe indifferencef "lettingive,"norwiththe inconstantexemplificationfmutualityndcooperativenessnthe ocial life fmankind,but with hegoodness nherentn humanbirth.One might skwhether,n thedemographic ituation f human existence oday,we may stillunqualifiedlytalk ofthegoodness nherentn humanbirth. uthumanbirth as not ost ts



10/18

345

goodness, t has onlybecome shrouded n thetragedy fnumbers, he mostironical nstance f thegeneraldistortionfqualitybyquantityn our times.The goodness nherentn humanbirth s not alwaysimmediately erceivedeven by thosewho witness t most closely,mother,nurse,father, iblings,though neighbors think nvariablydo. And of course wise men do, asportrayedwith uchpowerand beauty n thetradition fChristian aintingson the theme f the Adorationof theMagi. That themehas an applicationoutsideChristianheology lso. It takesa certainwisdom, ssistedby nstinct,to unravelthemoral structuref biochemistrynd labor and caringwhichconstituteuman birth s it "becomes" in the creative imebetween oncep-tion and the acquisitionof communicative apacities-a shortperiod ofchronological ime, bout twoyears, utfraught ith hetimelessnessfself-unfolding. shall nowattemptn unravellingf this tructure,hich believeis a structureffelicity,hough have smallclaimstowisdom.

Rampantdrug-abuse nd nuclearmadnessmay, n thefuture,make it im-possiblefortheconception fpotentially ormalhumanbeingsto occur.Inthattimeof a merelyurviving,nd nota generative,umanity, ill t makesense to talk ofthehumanright o life?At itsdeepest evel, ny talk of thehumanright o life is significant nly on the assumptionof an indefinitehumanfuture.When ndwhere t willbecome mpossibleo makethis ssump-tion, t willbeginto become impossible lso forhumanbeingsto think fthemselves s a species.A dying pecies s a speciesonly bycourtesy.And tobe able to talkaboutthehumanright o life s to be able to talkabout humanlife n a species-specificay, something nongenerativeumanitywill notplausiblybe able to do. Also, if I am right n thinkinghatthebadness ofhumankilling an be graspedonly n contrastwiththegoodnessof humanbirth, hefollowingonclusion s inescapable:whenhumanbirth ecomesanimpossibility,tsgoodnesswilllack any exemplification,nd thebadness ofhumankillingwillbecomedifficulto grasp, eriously andicapping, oth thetheorynd thepractice f human ife.Yet humankillingwillalwaysbe there,capable ofbeingostensivelyndicated, utifhumanbirth an neverbe there,incapable of beingostensivelyndicated, he power of the formerwill beunmitigatedoth n the worldand in thought.Could itbe that dvocates ofuniversalcelibacyhave always unconsciously nticipated uch a fate formankind nd sought, ymeans of theself-denying oralitywhichgoeswiththeadvocacyofuniversal elibacy, himrsdeing tscenter, o preparehumanbeingsfor uch an eventuality?his would be voluntary ongenerativenessspreparation orthemoral and existential azards of inevitablenongenera-tiveness.)

Assuming hevalidity f thequalificationsmadeearlier, shall talk abouthuman birthwith the confidence hat,as of now, there s no reason fordoubtingthat human conceptionand birth will indefinitelye capable ofoccurring, nd that a certainminimum cceptability nd normalcywill



11/18

346 Gandhi

centrally ttachto them.Now I can say this: a formof goodness is un-questionablynherentn prenatalhumanexistence,t-is the goodnessof awhollyooperative nvironmentnd thegoodnessof a form f assistance ohuman lifewhich s significantlynd substantiallyndependentf anythingthatanyhumanbeingdoes. Duringpregnancyhe human mother oes nothave anything erymuchpositivelyo do to keeptheprenatalhumanbeingsheharbors liveandhelp tdevelop.Ofcourse he mustnotdo certain hings,she mustnotstarveherself, illherselfr killtheprenatalhumanbeingwithinher.But etus notsaythatbynotdoingthese hings,he makes contributionto the quickening f herfetalprogeny.To say such a thingwould be likesayingthathuman life is sustainedby nourishmentnd labor and by theabsence of death The prenatalhuman being also presumablyhas to donothing o survive nd develop can any doingbe predicated f a foetus?).Neveragain inhuman ife re survival nd developmentssistedbya whollycooperative nvironment,or is a comparablefeat of survival nd develop-ment chievedwithout heefficaciousnessfextremely ositive teps nitiatedbyoneselfndothers. erhaps hecondition fmysticalommunionwithGodis theonlyexception o what have ust said. Human prenatal xistence otonlyunquestionablyossessesgoodness,tsgoodness s of a singular ind.Postnatalphasesof humanbirth, rom he timeofdelivery f the humanprogenyntotheworld, ts ituation utside hebodyof tsmother,ll thewayup to the firmcquisition f communicativeapacities, onstitute spiritualstorywhosebeginnings thebringingnto heworld f a human reatures anautonomous ivingbeingand whose culminations thebringing orth f thepersonhoodof such a creature.These are deep ministrations,he deepestimaginable.Were it not the case that theyproceedoverwhelminglyrominstinct, ur debt to those who do us thisservicewould be crushing nddestructivef autonomy.With the adventof socialized nfant-rearing,asednot on instinctutcommitment,hisdanger s probably navoidable.This isthe finalform fthegoodnessof humanbirth, hegoodnessofministration.Let us now contrastwiththeseforms fgoodness, tructuresf felicity,heunacceptable hape of humankilling. t willbecome clearthat tsunaccept-ability erives rom strict erversionf theformer.here s firstf all in theact of killing, n insane hastening f death whichis the precise perverseoppositeof all that is impliedby thephrase"the quickening f life."Thequickening f life n thewomb owes nothing o intentionalctivity,whilekillings a very articular ieceofdoing.What inhumanbirth s achieved nthe form ftheautonomy f a livinghumanbodyis set at nought n killingwith ruthless xactitude. he mortallywounded humanbody is what it isbecause thas lostautonomy.tsparts nd powersdo nothang together,heyrunout,symbolized y flowing lood orvanishing reath nd heartbeat. heperversionfkillings this: hecreation f death s thecreation fdestruction,a spiritual elf-contradictionf there s any. What in human birth s the



12/18

347

bringingorth fself-consciousness,heteasing ut ofpersonhood nd speech,is inkilling hedisregard fpleas, protests,ffirmationthe "silencing" f thevictim).Human birthsthebringingntotheworldofa humanbeing, ut t salso thewelcoming f a humanbeinginto theworld.Welcomingmust beamong the most ancient anthropological ites. In human killinganotherdatelessanthropological ite,the oppositeof welcoming, stracization, e-ceives ts cosmicdimension. he victim fhumankillings thrown utoftheuniverseya human eing.Not death butkillings theoppositeof birth.Thesting fkillings thedeepest nthropological umiliationmaginable; his s itsultimate adness.The powerofcosmicostracizations givento man,who has thepowertokill his fellowhumanbeing. Human killing nd human birthdo not allowthemselveso be nonmetaphoricallyomprehended. his is because they resituated t the imits f anthropologicalonsciousness. iteralunderstandingcan neverbe of anthropologicalonsciousness r oftheworld,onlyof whatfallswithinhesedomains).But can man exercise his errible owerbyright?Glorious and freedom-definingnd freedom-securinghough heexercise frightss, itsfield f operation s restrictedo the domain of anthropologicalconsciousness. his isbecausewhat claimas territorynwhich can by rightsituatemyselfs alreadyreallymyterritory.n thisway myclaim and exerciseofright r rights oes not lead me beyondthe world. Anthropologicalon-sciousnesshas a rightof expansion. It can conceptuallydomesticate hecosmos,but t cannotby right ranscendt).Human killing annot be graspedwithout he unavoidablymetaphoricalthoughthat tsvictims soughtbyitsperpetratoro be made to traverse heplaceorplacelessnessnd time rtimelessness etween he osmosand what sbeyond.There is hubris n humankilling, nd it is not our right o temptfate.Where,however, elf-defensiver defensive illings a necessity,nd inthat sense a duty,we must n fear and tremblingot "transport" humanbeingbeyondthecosmos.We must be able to say to ourselves hatwe are"withdrawing"he cosmosfrom he humanbeingwho is in dangerofdoingthe formern relation o some otherhumanbeing. It is significantn thisconnection o observe that we can speak of a terrible uty, painfulobli-gation,a distressing esponsibility,ut we cannot talk of a terrible ight,painful ight, distressingight, rwhatever.One mayaskwhether herightto sacrifice neself s a terrible ight?No. It is not a right t all, although tmay,for he aintorhero,be a supreme uty.)The language of rights s incapable of comprehendinghe tragedy ndextreme risis fhumankilling. elf-defensiver defensive illing, heret s anecessity,s a terrible,ainful, istressing,ngst-riddenuty. t is a measure fkali yuga'smechanistic andicap,our distancefromgrace. (One might skwhetherwe shouldbe lessapologeticwhen tcomes to thenecessityfkillingraksasas, fbombing hem utof existence. aksasas surelybound nhistory



13/18

348 Gandhi

as hardenedmurderersnd soulless yrants. ut a raksasa s identifiables oneonlybya Sri Rama or a SriKrsna. Let us not arrogate o ourselves uch acapacity ordistinguishingetween uman nd demoniac vil.)In theperformancefduty, s opposedto the xercise fright, e are neververy arfrom hethought fbeingon the dgeof a no-man's-land etween hemundaneand the mystical, he profaneand the sacred (a no-man's-landcannot,bydefinition,e theterritoryfrightswhichdefine nd extend ut donot transcend uman erritory.)ut we are not thrown ack from hisedgeinto themundanerealm because dutysummonsus to thisedge. (Arjuna'srecoilfromkillingn the GTtdprings rom he frustrationf his unconsciousexpectationhat his impending articipationn killingwill showitself s hisright.He goes to the edge unsummoned nd is violently hrownback. SriKrsna does notteach hat t sArjuna's vadharmao kill.As a ksatriya ero tis Arjuna'ssvadharma o be ready o kill whenkillings dharma.) f we havenot schooled ourselvesn theperformancefduty "duty" in its egal-moral-spiritualense uggested ytheprefixhuman" n thephrase humanduty"),weareunlikelyobe summonedo a duty o kill.Ourbloodlust rblindtriballoyaltymayrushus to thefront, ut the fronts really heedgeof no-man'sland, and if we are sattvicby naturewe mayrecoil,but more ikelyrajasicblindnesswillhurlus headlong ntomortal in. On the otherhand, fwe haveschooled ourselves n theperformancef duty nd are summoned ymoralauthorityothe dgeof theno-man's-land hich s humankilling, ewill tayat ourpostthere, otwithoybut nsorrow,nhumility,ubmittingurselvesboth to the udgment nd the ikelihood f unnatural eath.However, larityregarding he consequences,of our actions is not giveneven to saintsorincarnations,ndparticipationn obligatory illingwillforever e threatenedbydoubtanddespair.What arethe riteriawith he id of whichwe can udgethat t s theduty fa certain umanbeing,X, to killanother umanbeing,Y? Given theabsolutebadness nherentn humankilling,ll humankilling,nethings clear: t mustbe thedutyof everyhumanbeingto do whatever e can towardthetotalabolitionofhumankilling.An analogyfrommedicinewillhelp.An absolutebadnessattaches o cancer nrelation o the ivinghumanbody.Cancer s thelife-threateningehaviorof the cells of life Thisbiologicalself-contradictionof cancer is what constitutests absolute badness, ust as the moral andspiritualelf-contradictorinessf humankillings what onstitutests bsolutebadness.Indeedone could say with trict nalogythathumankilling s thesoul-threateningehavior f theunits f human ife, hat s, ndividual umanbeings, nd so killing s cancer n the spiritual ody of mankind.And justas thepreventionnd cureof cancer s an absolutemedicalobligation, o isthe preventionnd cure of killing n absolutehuman moral and spiritualobligation.With hese nalogies n mind et usboldly urn o the askofspelling utthe



14/18

349

needed criteria. et us keep theX-Y situationdeally imple, n the sense ofassuming hat heX-Y situation oes notmorally rpracticallyffect he restofmankind,nd that t s not so affectedytherest fmankind. everalkindsof caseshavetobe considered.(1) NeitherX norY is tryingo kill theotheror intends o do so. Clearlyneither norY is under n obligation o do so. (Butwhat feithers alreadyunder an obligation o killthe other?This is to presuppose hatwe alreadyunderstand henature f such an obligation,whichwedo not).(2) X and Y are tryingo killeach otheror intend o do so such that theonlywaythey an not do so is foreach forthwithnd utterlyo desistfromtryingo do so and to abandonthe ntentionodo so. Clearly ach is under nobligation orthwithnd utterlyodesist rom ryingodo so and to abandonthe ntentiono do so. (WhatifX and Y are demonichumanbeingsmankindis under n obligation okillbutpowerless o kill? nterestinghough his aseis, tpresupposes hatwe understand hat t sfor humanbeing, r mankindas a whole,to be under n obligation o kill someotherhumanbeing,whichwedo not.)(3) X and Y are tryingo killeach other r intend o do so, but it is morelikely hat X will killY withoutbeingkilledby Y than thatY will killXwithout eingkilledbyX. (This is thesituation fdevelopedmortal ombatalluded to earlierherein.)ClearlyX and Y are underan obligation o desistfrom ryingo killeachother nd to abandon the ntention o do so. Itwouldbe wrongto say that only X is under such an obligation,because theirsituation s suchthat ny slackeningnX's partmayenableY to killX.(4) X is tryingo killY or intends okillY, butY isnottryingo killX nordoesY intend o killX, such that heonlywayY can be preventedrom eingkilledbyX is byY killingX. Is Y in this ituation nder n obligation o killX? Only f Y is also under n obligation o live. willcomeback to thisnewelementn ourdiscussion, ut let me firstomplicate lightlyur simpleX-Ysituation ecausewe wouldnototherwise otice very mportant ointcon-nectedwith apitalpunishment.

Supposetheres a third umanbeingZ, who is also nottryingokillX norintends o do so and who is goingto be killedbyX, suchthat heonlywayZcan be prevented rombeingkilledbyX is byY killingX. In thissituation,whetherr notZ is under n obligationo ive,Y wouldbe under n obligationto killX. Let us give ocial dentitiesoX, Y, and Z. X is an executionerbouttokill ondemnedmurderers andZ simultaneouslyrsequentially. wouldbe under n obligation o killtheexecutioner,ot to save hisownlife Y maynot be underan obligation o live),but to save Z's life.Further,heprisonofficers,hemagistrate,nd all humanbeings nattendancewouldbe under nobligationto kill the executioner cannot think of a stronger rgumentagainstcapital punishment. here is an easy way out of thisprisonhousedilemma.The magistratehould staythe executioner's and. In fact,he is



15/18

350 Gandhi

under an obligationto do so, unless he prefers o be the killerof theexecutioner nd to be killedbythe atter's eplacementooneror later Betterstill, heexecutioner hould stayhis own hand, althoughhe must not stopthere, ecause he would also be underan obligation o killhis own replace-ment est the latterkill Y and Z Not the grim tragedy f premeditatedmurder, ut thefarcical ituationdescribed arlierwhichsocietywould beunder a moralobligationto create s the decisiveargument gainst capitalpunishment. maybe failing o see some subtlepointwhichwould ustifycapital punishment,ut I cannot see anyfault n the ogic of theprecedingargument,lthough tmight e perceived s too strongit could be suitablymoderated ysupposing hateven f Y is under n obligation o be killedbyX, X maynot be under an obligation o kill Y. Rather,he maybe under nobligation o forgive .) I willnotgo into themorecomplexquestionof thejustificationfcapital punishmentor econdoffenders.Let us, withthisunavoidableand important igression ut of theway,returnothe deally impleX-Y situationwhich described t (4) above. I hadasked whether rnot in this ituation would be under n obligation o killX, and I had suggestedhat he nswer o this uerywoulddependon whetherY is under n obligation o live. When s a humanbeingunder n obligationto liveorunder n obligation o dieor neither?Whatever e theanswer o thisvexedquestion, nd an answerwouldresolve hequestion fsuicide, ne thingat least s clear.The obligation f defensive illingseasierto understand hantheobligation fself-defensiveilling.t is easierto see thatone can be underan obligation o kill thewould-bekiller fa humanbeingother han oneselfthan thatone is undera self-evidentbligation o killthe would-bekiller foneself.Butthisvery onsiderationnswers hequestion nourX-Y exampleearlier, hequestionwhether is underan obligation o live,theanswertowhichwoulddetermine hether r notY was underan obligation o kill X.The answer s this: f at anytime t all in human ifeY can come underanunquestionable bligation o kill the would-bekiller fanotherhumanbeing,thenhe is under n obligation o liveas faras this ies in hispowerbecausehemustbe alive inorder o discharge he ormer bligation. his answer an begeneralized nd thefollowing nswerwillbecomeavailable to thequestion"Am I underan obligation o live?"thequestionof suicide: am under anobligationto live because I am underan obligationto help otherhumanbeings n a variety fways,ranging rom hemost trivial ourtesies f life odefendingheir ives fnecessaryt the cost ofmyown lifeor at the terriblecost ofmyhaving o killotherhumanbeings, ndbecausemybeing live s anecessary ondition for the dischargeof this whole range of obligationstowards thers.To returnnce moreto ourX-Y situation. is under n obligation o live,because no humanbeing an be under n obligation o die,and consequently,



16/18

351

in the situation nderconsideration, is under an obligation o kill X. Apowerful-lookingounterexample uggests tselfat this point,but it canfruitfullye citedonly ater.(5) X is tryingokillY or intends o killY becauseX is under n obligationto do so. The onlywayY can be prevented rombeingkilledbyX is byYkilling . Is Y under n obligation o killX? Our firsteaction o this uestionisprobably o saythat fX is under n obligation okillY, thenY isunder nobligation o bekilledbyX. Thatbeing o,howcanY be under n obligationtopreventhisfrom appening,nd that oo by killing ? Butcan we saythatY's obligation o letX kill him s hisprimary bligation?Would not wewantto saythatY's primarybligations to releaseX from heobligation okillY?Even fyouareobliged okillmeyouareobliged o me X is obliged oY andY can releasehimfrom hisbond.How?Let us fill ut ourexample.Let us supposethatY is tryingo killX or intends o killX (without hereverse eingthecase) such thattheonly wayX can be prevented rom eingkilledbyY is byX killing . In thiswayX comesunder heobligation o killY. But themoment ceasesto try r intend o killX, X's obligation o killYwillalso ceace. Ifevenafter ceases to be a threat o X's life,X continues otry nd intends o killY, then the roleswillbe reversed. willnow comeunder heobligation o killX, andX cease to be under n obligation o killY.Only f Y is unstoppablyryingr intendingo kill X does X come under nobligation o killY and Y underan obligation o let himself e killedbyX.But etus notforgethatY inthis ituation s also,and indeedmoreprimarily,under an obligation o let go of X. At whatpointin his would-be mortalassaulton X does Y come moreundertheobligation o letX kill himthanundertheobligation o letgo of X? There s, ofcourse, pointof no returnhere,butuntil hatpoint s reachedY is both under n obligation o letgo ofX and toletX killhim.SupposingY doesgetto killX, would Y now be underan obligation o bringX back to life? think o, but it is an obligationY (aseveryman)annot n all eternityulfill.What a terriblehing, o be underanobligationthat one can neverfulfill his is surelyanotheraspect of thebadnessofkilling.Suppose,however, hat ustice triumphs,nd X, the first arget f mortalattack,getsto killY, in discharge f a clear obligation o do so. Is X nowunderan obligationto bringY back to life?No, surely Even if he couldsucceed n bringing back to life, here s no guarantee hatY would notpounceuponhimagain. But would notY be gratefulo X forbringing imback to life nd mendhisways?Humanbeings reveryungratefulreatures,and we cannot takerisks But can thisbe a decisivereasonfordisowning nobligation? he obligation s thatof undoingthebadness of humankilling.Merelybecause t s not n ourpowerto bring his bout,or becauseitmightbe risky,we cannot deny thatwe are under this obligation.Does ought



17/18

352 Gandhi

presuppose an?Perhaps,butnot in thiscase. The badnessof killing s toogreat, nd there s no logical mpossibilitynvolved.All killing, bligatoryrnot,must reate humanly nallayable nxiety.At the endof 4) earlier had stated hatno humanbeing an be under nobligation odie,rather arelessly,ecause havealreadyprovided counter-exampleto thatassertion. n (5) above I have conceded that there ould besituationswhereY wouldbe under n obligation o let himself e killedbyX.But hewould also be under varietyf other bligations,moreprimarynes,such as theobligation o letgo ofX, not injurehimtoo seriously,nd theobligation o wish hatdespitehimself e Y) wouldbe stoppedfrom illing .And insofar s X maybe lacking hepower elf-defensivelyokillY, Y wouldbe under the obligationto wish that somebodyelse would stop him, ifnecessary y killinghim,theobligation o wish that fnecessary e shoulddropdead before arming irreversibly,nd so on. I ambeing engthyboutthisbecause I want to emphasizethat wherethere an be an obligation oallow oneself to die, even to wish that one were dead, perhapseven anobligation okilloneself, he ife fanother uman einghas to be at stake. f Ido not say this would needlessly ive supportto fallaciousargumentsnsupport fsuicide.Take guilt, reatguilt. upposeX unjustifiablyillsY andis stricken ith emorse. e maywishhe weredead,wantto killhimself, antanyone o killhim, nd so on-the rangeof morbidpossibilitiess enormous.Butnothing fthiskindwillmakeY come back to life,fanythingould.X issimply ot,under hese ircumstances,nder n obligation o killhimself. eis underan obligation o annul thearrogance nd destructivenessf his actliving lifeofhumilitynd creativity,fnecessaryn conditions f enforcedharmlessness.Consider trickyxamplenow.X is stricken ith n incurable nd uncon-tainable nfectious isease which hreatenshe ife f mankind.OnlyX's deathcan sparemankind. s X under n obligation o killhimself r let some otherhumanbeingkillhim?But this s a bizarre xample nd a dangerous xample.There are situations n human lifewhichought verycarefully o be dis-tinguishedrom hispieceoffantasy r anythingike t.Old and sickpeopleoftenthink, nd theyare subtly ncouraged n this,that theyare an un-mitigated urdenon theirfamilies nd theyoften ontemplateuicide.Theyare utterlymistakenn thinkinghat suicidewould be justified.A hundredalternativeso suicide an suggest hemselves ere, fwe can bring o our careof theguilt-riddensufficientmagination.Although have in the last fewparagraphsbeen reluctantlyoncessiveregardinghe dea thatwemaysometimes e under n obligation o die,andalthough feel hatmore areful rgumentan enablemeto withdrawome ofthe concessions I have made, I would, however,draw attention o thefollowing. ven ifwe are sometimes r can be under an obligation o allowourselves o be killed, o wishthatwe woulddropdead,evento killourselves,



18/18

353

'we stillneverhavetheright okill ourselves r to invite eath' t is the falsesupposition hat we do thatmakes manywould-besuicides take the finalirreversibletep.The thought I have theright o takemyown life" makesloneliness olipsisticnd unredeemable,ecause withwhomcan I debate thequestionofmy allegedright o takemyown life?Withno one exceptmyself,with elf-deceptionaving field ay.Render his s an X-X situation,n thelogicalmodel of thefamiliar -Y situation fdefensend self-defenseollows:X is tryingr intends o kill X such that theonly wayofpreventing fromkillingX is by X killingX. Only humorless elf-deceptionan fail to beliberated ythispieceofabsurdity.here sno self-defensensuicide.The almostcontinuous hesisof thisessayhas been that there s no suchthing s thehumanright o killhumanbeings,not even such a thing s anindividual umanbeing's right o killhimself. his thesis s identicalwith hecontemplationnd care of human ife nd life tselfn acknowledgmentf itssanctitynd mystery.f I have also arguedthat, ometimeswithustice,wemaybe said to be underan obligation o end human ife n defense r self-defense, have not wanted to retract hethesisof this article.For such anobligation, nxiety-ladennd always n embarrassment,s also a tribute othesanctityf ife, hetribute f ourignorance nd incapacity. findiberationnthe thought hat human beingsdo not meritdeath at the hands of oneanother, lthoughoften hey sk fortrouble.But humanbeingshave beendying ver ince hey eganto be born. Does thismean that hey-we-meritdeath after ll, althoughnotat one another'shands?Do we offend he natureofthingsnsomeunavoidableway? s death kindof ransom r sacrifice?s itmaya? These are dark and deep questions,quite beyondmy capacitiestoattemptventobegin o answerhere.

Date post:	03-Jun-2018
Category:	Documents
Upload:	ashfaqamar
View:	230 times
Download:	0 times

Gandhi, Ramchandra -- On Meriting Death

Documents