DeDev

Growth UnsustainableEconomic collapse inevitable- resources are limited, and renewables actually make the problem worseTverberg, Casualty Actuarial Society fellow, 13[Gail, American Academic of Actuaries Member, M.S. in Mathematics from University of Illinois, 3/29/13, Our Finite World, “How Resource Limits Lead to Financial Collapse,” http://ourfiniteworld.com/2013/03/29/how-resource-limits-lead-to-financial-collapse/, 7/6/15, AEG]

Resource limits are invisible, so most people don’t realize that we could possibility be approaching them. In fact, my analysis indicates resource limits are really financial limits, and in fact, we seem to be approaching those limits right now.Many analysts discussing resource limits are talking about a very different concern than I am talking about. Many from the “peak oil” community say that what we should worry about is a decline in world oil supply. In my view, the danger is quite different:   The real danger is financial collapse, coming much earlier than a decline in oil supply . This collapse is related to high oil price, and also to higher costs for other resources as we approach limits (for example, desalination of water where water supply is a problem, and higher natural gas prices in much of the world).The financial collapse is related to   Energy Return on Energy Invested   (EROEI) that is already too low. I don’t see any particular EROEI target as being a threshold–the calculations for individual energy sources are not on a system-wide basis, so are not always helpful. The issue is not precisely low EROEI. Instead, the issue is the loss of cheap fossil fuel energy to subsidize the rest of society.If an energy source, such as oil back when the cost was $20 or $30 barrel, can produce a large amount of energy in the form it is needed with low inputs, it is likely to be a very profitable endeavor. Governments can tax it heavily (with severance taxes, royalties, rental for drilling rights, and other fees that are not necessarily called taxes). In many oil exporting countries, these oil-based revenues provide a large share of government revenues. The availability of cheap energy also allows inexpensive roads, bridges, pipelines, and schools to be built.As we move to energy that requires more expensive inputs for extraction (such as the current $90+ barrel oil), these benefits are lost. The cost of roads, bridges, and pipelines escalates. It is this loss of a subsidy from   cheap   fossil fuels that is significant part of what moves us toward financial collapse.Renewable energy generally does not solve this problem. In fact, it can exacerbate the problem, because the cost of its inputs tend to be high and very “front-ended,” leading to a need for subsidies. What is really needed is a way to replace lost tax revenue, and a way to bring down the high cost of new bridges and roads–that is a way to get back to the cost structure we had when oil (and other fossil fuels) could be extracted cheaply.

Western civilizations on the brink of collapse- empirics proveTverberg, Casualty Actuarial Society fellow, 13[Gail, American Academic of Actuaries Member, M.S. in Mathematics from University of Illinois, 3/29/13, Our Finite World, “How Resource Limits Lead to Financial Collapse,” http://ourfiniteworld.com/2013/03/29/how-resource-limits-lead-to-financial-collapse/, 7/6/15, AEG]

What History Says about Prior CollapsesUntil fossil fuels came into widespread use, civilizations regularly grew until they reached limits of some sort, and then collapsed. There are many books looking at this issue. David Montgomery, in   Dirt: The Erosion of Civilizations   talks about the role soil erosion and soil degradation play in bringing civilizations down. Sing Chew, in   The Recurring Dark Ages , talks about how ecological stress, deforestation, and climate change have led to long periods of collapse and low economic activity. Joseph Tainter, in   The Collapse of Complex Societies , talks about how increasingly complex solutions to the problems of the day lead to ever-higher administrative costs that eventually become too expensive to afford.Peter Turchin and Surgey Nefedov in the book   Secular Cycles   take more of an analytical approach. They look at how cycles actually played out, based on financial and other detailed records of the day. Their analysis considered eight economies, the earliest of which began in 350 B. C. E.. The pattern they found looks disturbingly like the pattern that the world has been going through since the widespread use of fossil fuels began about 1800: A civilization starts its existence when a new resource becomes available, for example by deforesting land to be used

for agriculture (or in our case, finding ways fossil  fuels could be used). A civilization experiences Growth for 100+ years as the population is able to grow with the new resource available to it.Eventually the civilization reaches a Stagflation period. This happens when the civilization starts reaching limits. Population is much higher, the size of the governing class is much larger, and feedbacks like erosion and soil depletion start to play a role. In my view, Stagflation period began for the United States around 1970, when US oil production began to fall.Turchin and Nefedov found that during the Stagflation period, population growth slows and wages stop rising. Wage disparity increases, and debt grows. The cost of food and other resources becomes more variable, and begins to spike. The level of required taxes grows, as the number of government administrators grows and as armies increase in size. (Joseph Tainter refers to this growth in government services as a product of increased complexity.)Eventually, after 50 or 60 years, a Crisis Phase begins, when it is no longer possible to raise taxes enough to cover all of the governmental costs. In this period, wages of commoners drop to such a low level that nutrition declines, leading to epidemics and a higher death rate. Commoners often revolt, leading to government collapses. Wars for resources are sometimes fought. The Crisis Phase lasts a variable length of time, typically 20 to 50 years, with the length of time seeming to be shorter in the more recent cycles analyzed. There is considerable die-off from illness and warfare in the Crisis Phase.It seems to me that the United States, most of Europe, and Japan are now very close to the point where they will enter the Crisis Phase of a similar cycle.

Environment Turns

Biodiversity – 1NC

Economic growth causes biodiversity loss, climate change, deforestation, fishery depletion, ocean acidification, ozone depletion and pollution—guarantees extinction unless the economy collapses Rees, Institute for Resources, Environment and Sustainability PHD, 10[William E., June, Journal Of Cosmology, “Growth and Sustainability Don’t Mix”, http://journalofcosmology.com/ClimateChange108.html, accessed 7/7/15, DA]

Unless economic growth can be reconciled with unprecedented rates of decarbonization (in excess of 6% per year), it is difficult to envisage anything other than a planned economic recession being compatible with stabilization at or below 650 ppmv CO2e (Anderson and Bows 2008, italics added). Anderson and Bow's model refers to total greenhouse gas (GHG) concentrations of 650 parts per million by volume of carbon dioxide equivalents. Note that 650 ppmv implies a catastrophic four Celsius degree increase in mean global temperatures. In early 2010, the CO2 level alone is 390 ppmv, up from a preindustrial level of 280 ppmv and rising at an accelerating rate in excess of 2.3 ppm per year. This unusually direct extension of scientific angst into the policy arena assumes an unambiguous connection among climate change, the role of economic growth, the necessary political response and consequences for global development. Needless to say, not everyone accepts this connection. Anderson’s and Bows’ warning, and the equally alarming findings of many other scientists and organizations (Cairns 2010; NAS 2010a,b,c), are going largely unheeded in the political arena. Talk of a planned economic recession in the midst of a chaotically unplanned one is dismissed as lunacy. Techno industrial society remains in deep denial of the global ecological crisis and when, occasionally, decision-makers are pricked by a sense of urgency they fall back on market forces and humanity’s demonstrated technological wizardry in hopes of maintaining the growth-bound status quo. But there is a problem —technology pressed to new limits has become an unreliable if not treacherous ally in the sustainability wars, particularly if sustainability is defined as sustaining the status quo. British Petroleum's (BP) drilling rig explosion in April of 2010, and the inability to cap the the subsequent oil well blow off in the depths of the Gulf of Mexico, are just the most recent reminders. According to the National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration over 40,000 barrels a day are gushing into the ocean (with some scientists estimating over 100,000). A worst case scenario includes the killing of fish breeding areas and coral reefs, and consequent effects of depleting and reducing oxygen to levels so low that it may kill off much of the sea life near the plumes and create vast dead zones . Perhaps compounding the damage is BP's unprecedented use of toxic chemical dispersants, over 700,000 gallons, as of May 20, 2010, which could pose a significant threat to the Gulf of Mexico's marine life. Thus, the "technical fix" is not a fix at all, but may only add to the catastrophe. After reviewing available technological options for confronting climate change Moriarty and Honnery (2010) reasonably conclude that the time has, in fact, come to rethink modern society’s addition to economic growth.. This commentary unreservedly supports Moriarty’s and Honnery’s (2010) conclusion on fundamental grounds. My argument starts from two indisputable premises not even directly related to climate change: 1) By modern interpretations of the second law of thermodynamics, the human economy is a self-organizing far-from-equilibrium dissipative structure (Prigogine 1997) that grows and maintains itself by extracting low-entropy energy/matter (exergy) from its ‘environment’ and by injecting degraded waste by-products back into the environment (Schneider and Kay 1994, 1995; Kay and Regier 2000). 2) The human enterprise is a fully contained, open, dependent, growing sub-system of a materially closed, non-growing, finite ecosphere (Daly 1991a, 1992; Rees 1995). Taken together, the economic and ecological implications of these premises are profound. The sustainability of humans and their economies depend entirely on continued access to pre-existing stocks/gradients of energy and matter (exergy) found in nature and on the viability of the productive ecosystems of which humans are a part (Rees 2003; 2006a,b). Ironically, however, the human enterprise, as a sub-system of the ecosphere, can produce itself and grow (ascend ‘far-from-equilibrium’) only by consuming and dissipating those same gradients and ecosystems. This biophysical reality anticipates or explains virtually all the so-called ‘environmental problems’ confronting modern society. Fisheries collapse, tropical deforestation, biodiversity loss, falling water tables, soils depletion, peak oil, etc. (Cairns 2010; Singer 2010), show that even current rates of consumption by humans exceed rates of resource renewal or replenishment in nature; rising carbon emissions (and anthropogenic warming), ozone depletion, ocean acidification, chemical contamination of food-webs—in fact, all forms of pollution—show that humanity’s dissipative output already exceeds the assimilative capacity of the ecosphere. This should not be a surprise—there are no exemptions from the second law. Beyond a certain point, sustaining the human enterprise necessarily comes at the expense of increasing the entropy of the ecosphere. Humanity is now living, in part, by consuming and permanently dissipating natural capital essential to its own existence. As this pathology deepens, the behaviour of vital life-support systems will become increasingly erratic and unpredictable . Pushed far enough some systems will succumb completely to overuse and degradation . All of which brings us to the question of growth. Prevailing economic reasoning sees no significant constraints on material growth because it ‘externalizes’ the ecosphere and ignores the second law. Indeed, neoliberal economic models are so abstracted from biophysical (and social) reality that they can make only marginal contributions to the sustainability debate (Daly 1991b). That said, we can use micro-economic logic to make the theoretical case for zero growth, even economic contraction, at the macro scale (Figure 1). Everyone recognizes that economic activity produces valuable goods and services (material benefits). These benefits are easy to identify and quantify with market prices. At the same time, every act of production and consumption generates costs, many of which are difficult to identify and harder to price in dollar terms (e.g., the costs associated with increasing

entropy). Conventional reasoning also accepts that there will be diminishing returns from growth—i.e., as the scale of the human enterprise increases, the marginal value of growth will gradually decline. Meanwhile, the marginal costs—resource depletion, ecosystem degradation and pollution, community disruption—will generally increase. This convergent relationship implies that at some point on the growth trajectory, the value of an additional increment of growth will be negated by the corresponding costs.

Biodiversity – 2NC

Increasing the economy destroys the environment and national securitySpeth, former Yale School of Forestry and Environmental Studies dean, 8[James Gustave, co-chair of the Democracy Collaborative’s Next System Project and a co-founder of the New Economy Coalition, 09/18/08, The Nation, “Global Warming and Modern Capitalism,”http://www.thenation.com/article/global-warming-and-modern-capitalism/, 7/6/15, AEG]

It is no accident that environmental crisis is gathering as social injustice is deepening and growing inequality is impairing democratic institutions. Each is the result of a system of political economy–today’s capitalism–that is profoundly committed to profits and growth and profoundly indifferent to nature and society. Left uncorrected, it is an inherently ruthless, rapacious system, and it is up to citizens, acting mainly through government, to inject human and natural values into that system. But this effort fails because progressive politics are too feeble and Washington is more and more in the hands of powerful corporations and great wealth. The best hope for change in America is a fusion of those concerned about the environment, social justice and strong democracy into one powerful progressive force. This fusion must occur before it is too late.Sadly, while environmentalists have been winning many battles, we are losing the planet. Half the world’s tropical and temperate forests are gone. The rate of deforestation in the tropics is about an acre a second. Half the planet’s wetlands are gone. An estimated 90 percent of the large predator fish are gone and 75 percent of marine fisheries are overfished, fished to capacity or depleted, up from 5 percent a few decades ago. Twenty percent of the corals are gone; another 20 percent severely threatened. Species are disappearing about 1,000 times faster than normal . The planet has not seen such a spasm of extinction in 65 million years, since the dinosaurs disappeared. Each year desertification claims a Nebraska-sized area of productive capacity worldwide. Toxic chemicals can be found by the dozens in essentially every one of us.Earth’s ozone layer was severely depleted before the change was discovered. Human activities have pushed atmospheric carbon dioxide levels up by more than a third and have started the most dangerous change of all–planetary warming and climate disruption. Earth’s ice fields are melting. Industrial processes are fixing nitrogen, making it biologically active, at a rate equal to nature’s; one result is the development of hundreds of dead zones in the oceans because of overfertilization. Withdrawals of fresh water consume more than half of accessible runoff, and water shortages are multiplying here and abroad. The following rivers no longer reach the oceans in the dry season: the Colorado, Yellow, Ganges and Nile, among many others.The United States–responsible for about 30 percent of the carbon dioxide added to the atmosphere–is, of course, deeply complicit in these global trends, and four decades of environmental effort have not stemmed the tide of decline. The United States is losing 6,000 acres of open space every day, and 100,000 acres of wetlands every year. Forty percent of US fish species are threatened with extinction, a third of plants and amphibians, 15 to 20 percent of birds and mammals. Half of US lakes and a third of the rivers still fail to meet the standards that the 1972 Clean Water Act said should be met by 1983, and a third of Americans live in counties that fail to meet EPA air-quality standards. We have done little to curb our wasteful energy habits or our steady population growth.All we have to do to destroy the planet’s climate and biota and leave a ruined world to our children and grandchildren is to keep doing exactly what we are doing, with no growth in the human population or the world economy. Just continue to release greenhouse gases at current rates, impoverish ecosystems and release toxic chemicals at current rates, and the world in the latter part of this century won’t be fit to live in. But human activities are not holding at current levels–they are accelerating dramatically.The world economy has more than quadrupled since 1960 and is projected to quadruple again by mid century. At recent rates of growth, it will double in fifteen to seventeen years. It took all of human history to grow the $7 trillion world economy of 1950. We now grow by that amount in a decade. Societies face the prospect of enormous environmental deterioration just when they need to be moving strongly in the opposite direction.The escalating processes of climate disruption, biotic impoverishment and toxification–which continue despite decades of warnings and earnest effort–are a severe indictment of capitalism. Capitalism as it is constituted today produces an economy and politics that are highly destructive to the environment. An unquestioning commitment to economic growth at any cost, powerful corporations whose overriding objective is to grow by generating profits (including profits from avoiding the environmental costs they create, from amassing deep subsidies and benefits from government and from continued deployment of technologies designed with little regard for the environment), markets that fail to recognize environmental costs unless corrected by government,

government that is subservient to corporate interests and the growth imperative, rampant consumerism spurred by sophisticated advertising and marketing, all economic activity so large in scale that it alters the fundamental biophysical operations of the planet– combine to deliver an ever growing world economy that is undermining the ability of the planet to sustain life.Mainstream environmentalism has proved largely incapable of coping with these forces. It works within the system–raising public awareness, offering responsive policies, lobbying and litigating. America has run a forty-year experiment on whether this environmentalism can succeed, and the results are in. The full burden of managing accumulating environmental threats has fallen to the environmental community, both in and outside government. But that burden is too great. The system of modern capitalism will grow in size and complexity and will generate ever larger environmental consequences, outstripping efforts to cope with them. Indeed, the system will seek to undermine those efforts and constrain them within narrow limits. Working only within the system will, in the end, not succeed. Transformative change in the system itself is needed.The fundamental questions thus are about transforming capitalism as we know it. Can it be done? If so, how? And if not, what then? The good news is that there are a variety of prescriptions to take the economy and the environment off a collision course and to transform economic activity into something benign and restorative. The most important of these prescriptions range far beyond the traditional environmental agenda.Market failure can be corrected by government, perverse subsidies can be eliminated and environmentally honest prices can be forged. The laws, incentives and governance structures under which corporations operate can be transformed to move from shareholder primacy to stakeholder primacy. But even more vital is the need to challenge economic growth and the consumerism it depends on. This challenge is as relevant to addressing social problems as environmental ones.The never-ending drive to grow the economy undermines families, jobs, communities, the environment, a sense of place and continuity, even national security–but we are told that, in the end, we will somehow be better off. America has not applied its growth dividend to meeting social and environmental needs. There is good evidence that increased incomes do not lead to greater satisfaction with life. In affluent countries we have what might be called uneconomic growth, to borrow Herman Daly’s phrase, where, if one could total up all the costs of growth, they would outweigh the benefits.

Climate Change – 1NC

Growth is unsustainable—collapse solves climate crisis that will otherwise risk extinction—movements are growing now Trainer, New South Wales University professor Social Sciences, 13[Ted, 11/4, The Bulletin, “Why a consumer society can't fix the climate”, http://thebulletin.org/why-consumer-society-cant-fix-climate, accessed 7/7/15, DA]

Policy makers throughout the industrialized world generally assume that humankind can solve serious global problems by adopting better technologies and regulations—without questioning the viability of consumer-capitalist societies. This faith is mistaken. The big problems, particularly climate change, are so serious that they cannot be solved without unprecedented and extremely radical change,

including abandoning the obsession with economic growth, market systems, and high living standards. The fundamental cause of the global problems threatening humanity is a grossly unsustainable level of over-consumption. The per-capita rates at which people living in

rich countries are using up resources are far beyond levels that can be kept up for long or that could be extended to all the world’s nations. Yet most people fail to grasp the magnitude of the overshoot or its significance. The reductions required are so big that they cannot possibly be achieved within a consumer-capitalist society. Among the factors that policy makers are ignoring are standards of living, available land, carbon emissions, and economic growth. Living standards. Many resources are already alarmingly scarce, yet a minority of the world’s people are currently using the majority of these resources. If the standard of living in countries such as Australia and the United States were to be extended to the entire world’s

population, which is expected to top 9 billion by 2050, production rates for most resources would have to be 7 to 10 times as great as they are now. Land availability.The per-capita area of productive land needed to supply one Australian with food, water, settlements, and energy is about seven hectares (or 17 acres), according to ecological footprint data published by the World Wildlife Federation in 2012. But when the world population reaches 9 billion, the per capita area of productive land available worldwide will be less than 0.8 hectare. In other words, the Australian “footprint” is already nine times as big as that which will be possible for all. Carbon emissions. In the four years since a team of European scientists warned that burning only half of the world’s proven, economically recoverable fossil fuel reserves would push temperatures well beyond the

danger level, global emissions have only continued to rise. The I ntergovernmental Panel on Climate Change’s recent fifth report says that to have a reasonable chance of keeping global temperature rise below 2 degrees Celsius we must reduce net anthropogenic emissions to zero well before 2050. Despite rosy projections for running the world on renewable energy alone, my analysis shows, in detail, that

replacing fossil fuels with renewable energy sources would not be affordable because of the built-in redundancy and energy-storage capability that would be required. Economic growth. These kinds of figures show that major global problems cannot be solved unless the wealthiest countries face up to enormous reductions in per-capita resource use. However, these countries are

obsessed with raising levels of production and consumption as fast as possible, and without any upper limit. The supreme, never-questioned goal is continuous economic growth. But for the world’s population to achieve Australian living standards by 2050, given an annual economic growth rate of 3 percent, total world production and consumption would have to be more than 30 times as great in 2050 as they are now. In addition to the problem of unsustainable resource and ecological impacts, there is the extremely unjust nature of the global economy. It operates mainly according to market principles, which means that scarce goods go to those who can pay most for them, rather than to those in greatest need. Even more important, in a market economy what is developed is what is most profitable in the market, not what is most needed. So the “development” that takes place in the Third World is mostly of industries that benefit corporations and rich-world consumers, rather than the billions of people living in poverty. Simply put, it is not possible to have a just and sustainable consumer-capitalist society that provides all people with increasingly affluent lifestyles. Unless the fundamental structures and systems of modern society are scrapped and replaced, the problems they are causing

cannot be solved. The magnitude of the over-consumption problem calls for a radical alternative to consumer-capitalist society, which I label “The Simpler Way.” This would involve people organizing frugal but sufficient material lifestyles within mostly local economies made up of small farms and firms,

using local resources and labor to meet local needs. There would be no economic growth, and the GDP would be a small fraction of its present level. The biggest changes would have to be in the political and cultural realms, including participatory self-government to ensure that the local economy would be geared to providing a high quality of life for all. The Simpler Way could not be run from afar, so it is incompatible with big-state socialism. Most problematic of all, it could not work without the willing acceptance of frugal and self-sufficient lifestyles, strong collectivism, and a desire to give and to nurture. These are not predictions, and they are not utopian dreams. If the limits are as coercive as I have argued, a sustainable and just world cannot be conceived other than in terms of some kind of Simpler Way. The literature supporting this “limits to growth” perspective has become overwhelmingly

convincing in recent decades, but the mainstream refuses to attend to it. Hardly anyone recognizes that the pursuit of affluence and growth is an enormous, suicidal mistake. Even if the magnitude and nature of the change required was recognized, modern political institutions and cultural traditions are not up to the task. In our winner-take-all society there is little willingness to share the costs of the readjustment fairly or sensibly. It is not surprising, therefore, that proposals for relatively minor reforms are resisted fiercely. What, then, are the chances of making enormous changes such as phasing out all fossil fuel power

generation? It is likely that we will continue to accelerate toward catastrophic collapse. However, there are people working to build the beginnings of a simpler way in their communities, with the hope that these groups will be sufficiently well established to provide a base for

reconstruction when existing systems begin to fail. There are small but thriving “Transition Towns,” and movements known as Voluntary Simplicity, Permaculture, and the Slow Movement. At this stage, most of these are only implementing reforms within consumer-capitalist society, but they provide the best hope for developing communities that will eventually take control of their own fate and build highly self-sufficient local economies.

Climate Change – 2NC

Economic collapse is 100% inevitable---the only question is whether it happens fast enough to avoid warming Alexander, Sustainable Society Institute Research Fellow, 14[Samuel, 2/14/14, Post Carbon Pathways, “Post-Growth Economics: A Paradigm Shift in Progress,” pg. 13-14, 7/7/15, AEG] There is one final post-growth perspective deserving of acknowledgement, even if the intricacies cannot be explored. It builds upon the recognition by some ecological economists that there is a close connection between energy use and economic activity (Hall and Klitgaard, 2012). From this view – sometimes called ‘biophysical economics’ – the unprecedented levels of

economic growth experienced since the industrial revolution have been largely due to the available abundance of cheap energy in the

forms of coal, gas, and especially oil. Fossil fuels are finite resources, however, and energy analysts since Marion King Hubbert (1956) have known that at some time the production of finite fossil fuels will ‘peak’ and, after a plateau, eventually enter decline. The concern here is that, while production may plateau, demand is still expected to increase (Hirsch et al, 2010), thereby putting an upward pressure on the price of fossil fuels, even as the ‘energy return on

investment’ declines (Murphy and Hall, 2011). This phenomenon seems to be underway already in relation to oil , with crude oil production entering a plateau around 2005, causing the price of oil to increase from around $25 per barrel, historically, to an average price of $110 since 2011 (IEA, 2013a: 2). In a world that consumes 90 million barrels of oil every day, such sharp price rises have significant economic implications, by sucking discretionary expenditure and investment away from the rest of the economy. Indeed, some analysts argue that expensive oil is at least part of the reason the global economy, which is

so dependent on oil for transport, pesticides, plastics, etc., is showing persistent signs of stagnation and instability (Heinberg, 2011). Furthermore, if expensive oil and other ‘limits to growth’ are indeed bringing an end to more than two centuries of economic growth, then this is likely to cause havoc with the heavily indebted societies around that world that currently, under a capitalist framework, depend on growth to pay back debts and keep unemployment

at bay. At the pessimistic end of the spectrum, some analysts argue that the global financial crisis was merely the first of series of forthcoming crises that are going to increase in magnitude as the growth model fails to deal with , or even acknowledge, energy, resource, and debt limits (Tverberg, 2012). From such perspectives, the world may have an alternative to the growth model imposed upon it sooner rather than later, irrespective of whether the world wants or is ready for such an alternative (see, e.g. Clarke and Lawn,

2010). The relationship between energy and economics also becomes problematic in the context of climate change mitigation. Currently, fossil fuels make up over 80% of the global energy supply (IEA, 2013b: 6). If nations around the world choose to decarbonise economies in response to climate change (see Wiseman et al, 2013), this may well imply an end to growth , or even significant economic contraction , because there are serious doubts about whether renewable energy will be able to fully replace the energy-dense fossil fuels in a timely or affordable way (see, e.g. Trainer, 2013a, 2013b). This is not an argument against renewable energy, of course; the suggestion is merely that growth-orientated consumer societies could not be sustained if the world rapidly decarbonised to run solely or primarily on renewable sources of energy (Hopkins and Miller, 2013). A transition to 100% renewable energy, therefore, may well imply consuming significantly less energy, and in the highly developed regions of the

world, energy descent would probably mean transitioning to some post-growth economic paradigm via a process of planned

economic contraction, or degrowth. Kevin Anderson’s work is particularly important here (see Anderson, 2013), for he is one of the only climate scientists who recognises

(or is outspoken enough to say) that the world’s shrinking carbon budget requires degrowth and reduced consumption in high consumption

societies. That is not an implication many are prepared to accept, even amongst many or even most participants in the broad environmental movement. Indeed, this blindness – it might even be wilful blindness – is arguably the environmental movement’s greatest short-coming.

Short-term collapse of the global economy is the only way to avoid catastrophic warming---delay locks in catastrophic emissions Holmgren, Australian environmental designer & ecological educator, 14[David, 01/20/14, Resilience, “Crash on Demand: Welcome to the Brown Tech Future,” http://www.resilience.org/stories/2014-01-20/crash-on-demand-welcome-to-the-brown-tech-future, 7/9/15, AEG]

Many climate policy professionals and climate activists are now reassessing whether there is anything more they can do to help prevent the global catastrophe that climate change appears to be. The passing of the symbolic 400ppm CO2 level certainly has seen some prominent activists getting close to a change of strategy. As the Transition Town movement founder and permaculture activist Rob Hopkins says, the shift in the mainstream policy circles from mitigation to adaptation and defence is underway (i.e. giving up).13 While political deadlock remains the most obvious obstacle, I believe at least some of that deadlock stems from widespread doubt about whether greenhouse gas emissions can be radically reduced without economic contraction and/or substantial wealth redistribution. Substantial redistribution of wealth is not generally taken seriously perhaps because it could only come about through some sort of global revolution that would itself lead to global economic collapse. On the other hand, massive economic contraction seems like it might happen all by itself, without necessarily leading to greater equity. The predominant focus in the "climate professional and activist community" on policies, plans and projects for transition to renewable energy and efficiency has yet to show evidence of absolute reductions in greenhouse gas emissions that do not depend on rising greenhouse gas emissions in other parts of the global economy. For example, the contribution of renewable technology installation to reduced GGE in some European countries appears to be balanced by increased GGE in China

and India (where much of the renewable technologies are manufactured). The Jevons' paradox14 suggests than any gains in efficiency or tapping of new sources of energy will simply expand total consumption rather than reduce consumption of resources (and therefore GGE). Richard Eckersley in his article 'Deficit Deeper Than Economy' identifies the improbability of ever decoupling economic growth from resource depletion and green house gas emissions. He states "Australia's material footprint, the total amount of primary resources required to service domestic consumption (excludes exports and includes imports) was 35 tonnes per person in 2008, the highest among the 186 countries studied. Every 10 per cent increase in gross domestic product increases the average national material footprint by 6 per cent. By 2050, a global population of 9 billion people would require an estimated 270 billion tonnes of natural resources to fuel the level of consumption of OECD countries, compared with the 70 billion tonnes consumed in 2010."15 Time seems to be running out for any serious planned reductions in GGE[Greenhouse Gas Emissions] adequate to prevent dangerous climate change without considering a powerdown of the growth economy . The ideas of degrowth16 are starting to get an airing, mostly in Europe, but the chances of these ideas being adopted and successfully implemented would require a long slow political evolution if not revolution. We don't have time for the first, and the second almost certainly crashes the financial system, which in turn crashes the global economy. IS TIME RUNNING OUT FOR BOTTOM UP ALTERNATIVES? Like many others, I have argued that the bottom up creation of household and community economies, already proliferating in the shadow of the global economy, can create and sustain different ways of well-being that can compensate, at least partly, for the inevitable contraction in centralised fossil fuelled economies (now well and truly failing to sustain the social contract in countries such as Greece and Egypt). When the official Soviet Union economy collapsed in the early '90s it was the informal economy that cushioned the social impact. Permaculture strategies focus on the provision of basic needs at the household and community level to increase resilience, reduce ecological footprint and allow much of the discretionary economy to shrink. In principle, a major contraction in energy consumption is possible because a large proportion of that consumption is for non-essential uses by more than a billion middle class people.

That contraction has the potential to switch off greenhouse gas emissions but this has not been seriously discussed or debated by those currently working very hard to get global action for rapid transition by planned and co-ordinated processes. Of course it is more complicated because the provision of fundamental needs, such as water, food etc., are part of the same highly integrated system that meets discretionary wants. However, the time available to create, refine and rapidly spread successful models of these bottom-up solutions is running out, in the same way that the time for government policy and corporate capitalism to work their magic in converting the energy base of growth from fossil to renewable sources.17 If the climate clock is really so close to midnight what else could be done? Economic crash as hell or salvation For many decades I have felt that a collapse of the global economic systems might save humanity

and many of our fellow species great suffering by happening sooner rather than later because the stakes keep rising and scale of the impacts are always worse by being postponed . An important influence in my thinking on the chances of such a collapse was the public speech given by President Ronald Reagan following the 1987 stock market crash. He said "there won't be an economic collapse, so long as people don't believe there will be an economic collapse" or words to that effect. I remember at the time thinking; fancy the most powerful person on the planet admitting that faith (of the populous) is the only thing that holds the financial system together. Two decades on I remember thinking that a second great depression might be the best outcome we could hope for. The pain and suffering that has happened since 2007 (from the more limited "great recession") is more a result of the ability of the existing power structures to maintain control and enforce harsh circumstances by handing the empty bag to the public, than any fundamental lack of resources to provide all with basic needs. Is the commitment to perpetual growth in wealth for the richest the only way that everyone else can hope to get their needs met? The economy is simply not structured to provide all with their basic needs. That growth economy is certainly coming to an end; but will it slowly grind to a halt or collapse more rapidly? The fact that the market price for carbon emissions has fallen so low in Europe is a direct result of stagnating growth. Past economic recessions and more serious economic collapses, such as faced by the Soviet Union after its oil production peaked in the late 1980's,18 show how greenhouse gas emissions can and have been reduced, then stabilizing at lower levels once the economy stabilized without any planned intention to do so. The large number of oil exporters that have more recently peaked has provided many case studies to show the correlation with political upheaval, economic contraction and reductions in GGE. Similarly many of the countries that have suffered the greatest economic contraction are also those with the greatest dependence on imported energy, such as Ireland, Greece and Portugal. The so-called Arab Spring, especially in Egypt, followed high food and energy prices driven by collapsed oil revenues and inability to maintain subsidies. The radical changes of government in Egypt have not been able to arrest the further contraction of the economy. The effects of peak oil and climate change have combined with geopolitical struggles over pipeline routes to all but destroy the Syrian economy and society.19 Slow Contraction or Fast Collapse The fragility of the global economy has many unprecedented aspects that make some sort of rapid collapse of the global economy more likely . The capacity of central banks to repeat the massive stimulus mechanism in response to the 2008 global financial crisis, has been greatly reduced, while the faith that underpins the global financial system has weakened, to say the least. Systems thinkers such as David Korowicz20 have argued that the inter-connected nature of the global economy, instantaneous communications and financial flows, "just in time" logistics, and extreme degrees of economic and technological specialisation, have increased the chances of a large scale systemic failure, at the same time that they have mitigated (or at least reduced) the impact of more limited localised crises. Whether novel factors such as information technology, global peak oil and climate change have increased the likelihood of more extreme economic collapse, Foss and Keen have convinced me that the most powerful and fast-acting factor that could radically reduce greenhouse gas emissions is the scale of financial debt and the long-sustained growth of bubble economics stretching back at least to the beginnings of the "Thatcherite/Reaganite revolution" in the early 1980s. From an energetics perspective, the peak of US oil production in 1970, and the resulting global oil crises of 73 and 79, laid the foundations for the gigantic growth in debt that super accelerated the level of consumption, and therefore GGE. Whatever the causes, all economic bubbles follow a trajectory that includes a rapid contraction, as credit evaporates, followed by a long-sustained contraction, where asset values decline to

lower levels than those at the beginning of the bubble. After almost 25 years of asset price deflation in Japan, a house and land parcel of 1.5ha in a not too isolated rural location can be bought for $25,000. A contraction in the systems that supply wants are likely to see simultaneous problems in the provision of basic needs. As Foss explains, in a deflationary contraction, prices of luxuries generally collapse but essentials of food and fuel do not fall much. Most importantly, essentials become unaffordable for many, once credit freezes and job security declines. It goes without saying that deflation rather inflation is the economic devil that governments and central banks most fear and are prepared to do almost anything to avoid. Giving credence to the evidence for fast global economic collapse may suggest I am moving away from my belief in the more gradual Energy Descent future that I helped articulate. John Michael Greer has been very critical of apocalyptic views of the future in which a collapse sweeps away the current world leaving the chosen few who survive to build the new world. In large measure I agree with his critique but recognise that some might interpret my work as suggesting a permaculture paradise growing from the ashes of this civilisation. To some extent this is a reasonable interpretation, but I see that collapse, as a long drawn-out process rather than resulting from a single event.21 I still believe that energy descent will go on for many decades or even centuries. In Future Scenarios I suggested energy descent driven by climate change and peak oil could occur through a series of crises separating relatively stable states that could persist for decades if not centuries. The collapse of the global financial system might simply be the first of those crises that reorganise the world. The pathways that energy descent could take are enormously varied, but still little discussed, so it is not surprising that discussions about descent scenarios tend to default into ones of total collapse. As the language around energy descent and collapse has become more nuanced, we start to see the distinction between financial, economic, social and civilisational collapse as potential stages in an energy descent process where the first is fast changing and relatively superficial and the last is slow moving and more fundamental. In Future Scenarios I suggested the more extreme scenarios of Earth Steward and Lifeboat could follow Green Tech and Brown Tech along the stepwise energy descent pathway. If we are heading into the Brown Tech world of more severe climate change, then as the energy sources that sustain the Brown Tech scenario deplete , and climate chaos increases, future crises and collapse could lead to the Lifeboat Scenario. In this scenario, no matter how fast or extreme the reductions in GGE due to economic collapse, we still end up in the climate cooker, but with only the capacity for very local, household and communitarian organisation. If the climate crisis is already happening, and as suggested in Future Scenarios, the primary responses to the crisis increase rather than reduce GGE, then it is probably too late for any concerted effort to shift course to the more benign Green Tech energy descent future. Given that most of the world is yet to accept the inevitability of Energy Descent and are still pinning their faith in "Techno Stability" if not "Techno Explosion", the globally cooperative powerdown processes needed to shift the world to Green Tech look unlikely. More fundamental than any political action, the resurgent rural and regional economies, based on a boom for agricultural and forestry commodities, that structurally underpins the Green Tech scenario, will not eventuate if climate change is fast and severe. Climate change will stimulate large investments in agriculture but they are more likely to be energy and resource intensive, controlled climate agriculture (greenhouses), centralised at transport hubs. This type of development simply reinforces the Brown Tech model including the acceleration of GGE. While it may be too late for the Green Tech Scenario, it still may be possible to avoid more extreme climate change of a long

drawn out Brown Tech Scenario before natural forcing factors lock humanity into the climate cooker of 4-6 degrees and resource depletion leads to a collapse of the centralised Brown Tech governance and a rise of local war lords (Lifeboat Scenario). The novel structural vulnerabilities highlighted by David Korowicz, and the unprecedented extremity of the bubble economics highlighted by

Nicole Foss suggest the strong tendencies towards a Brown Tech world could be short lived. Instead, severe global economic and societal collapse could switch off GGE enough to begin reversing climate change ; in essence the Earth Steward scenario of recreated bioregional economies based on frugal agrarian resources and abundant salvage from the collapsed global economy and defunct national governance structures.

A2: Tech Solves

The ONLY way to solve warming is by decreasing emissions through slow economic growth—under no circumstance will tech solve—it’s try or die and multiple, empirical models prove thisMartenson, Duke PhD, and energy and resource depletion researcher, 9[Chris, December 24, Peak Prosperity, “Copenhagen & Economic Growth - You Can't Have Both”, http://www.peakprosperity.com/blog/copenhagen-agreement-economic-growth-you-cant-have-both/33022, accessed 7/9/15, DA]

I want to point out that a massive discrepancy exists between the official pronouncements emerging from Copenhagen on carbon emissions and recent government actions to spur economic growth. Before and during Copenhagen (and after, too, we can be sure), politicians and central bankers across the globe have worked tirelessly to return the global economy to a path of growth. We need more jobs, we are told; we need economic growth, we need more people consuming more things. Growth is the ever-constant word on politicians' lips. Official actions amounting to tens of trillions of dollars speak to the fact that this is, in fact, our

number-one global priority. But the consensus coming out of Copenhagen is that carbon emissions have to be reduced by a vast amount over the next few decades. These two ideas are mutually exclusive. You can't have both. Economic growth requires energy, and most of our energy comes from hydrocarbons - coal, oil, and natural gas. Burning those fuel sources releases carbon.

Therefore, increasing economic activity will release more carbon. It is a very simple concept. Nobody has yet articulated how it is that we will reconcile both economic growth and reduced use of hydrocarbon energy. And so the proposed actions coming out of Copenhagen are not grounded in reality, and they are set dead against trillions of dollars of spending. There is only one thing that we know about which has curbed, and even reversed, the flow of carbon into the atmosphere, and that is the recent economic contraction. This is hard proof of the connection between the economy and energy. It should serve as proof that any desire to grow the economy is also an explicit call to increase the amount of carbon being expelled into the atmosphere. The idea of salvation via the electric plug-in car or other renewable energy is a fantasy. The reality is that any new technology takes decades to reach full market penetration, and we haven't even really begun to introduce any yet. Time, scale, and cost must be weighed when considering any new technology's potential to have a significant impact on our energy-use patterns. For example, a recent study concluded that another 20 years would be required for electric vehicles to have a significant impact on US gasoline consumption. Meaningful Numbers of Plug-In Hybrids Are Decades Away The mass-introduction of the plug-in hybrid electric car is still a few decades away, according to new analysis by the National Research Council. The study, released on Monday, also

found that the next generation of plug-in hybrids could require hundreds of billions of dollars in government subsidies to take off. Even then, plug-in hybrids would not have a significant impact on the nation’s oil consumption or carbon emissions before 2030. Savings in oil imports would also be modest, according to the report, which was financed with the help of the Energy Department. Twenty to thirty years is the normal length of time for any new technology to scale up and fully penetrate a

large market. But this study, as good as it was in calculating the time, scale, and cost parameters of technology innovation and penetration, still left out the issue of resource scarcity. Is there enough lithium in the world to build all these cars? Neodymium? This is a fourth issue that deserves careful consideration, given the scale of the overall issue. But even if we did manage to build hundreds of millions of plug-in

vehicles, where would the electricity come from? Many people mistakenly think that we are well on our way to substantially providing our electricity needs using renewable sources such as wind and solar. We are not. Renewable timetable is a long shot Al Gore's well-intentioned challenge that we produce "100 percent of our electricity from renewable energy and truly clean carbon-free sources within 10 years" represents a widely held delusion that we can't afford to harbor. The delusion is shared by the Minnesota Legislature, which is requiring the state's largest utility, Xcel Energy, to get at least 24 percent of its energy from wind by 2020. One of the most frequently ignored energy issues is the time required to bring forth a major new fuel to the world's energy supply. Until the mid-19th century, burning wood powered the world. Then coal gradually surpassed wood into the first part of the 20th century. Oil was discovered in the 1860s, but it was a century before it surpassed coal as our largest energy

fuel. Trillions of dollars are now invested in the world's infrastructure to mine, process and deliver coal, oil and natural gas. As distinguished professor Vaclav Smil of the University of Manitoba recently put it, "It is delusional to think that the United States can install in a decade wind and solar generating capacity equivalent to that of thermal power plants that took nearly 60 years to construct." Texas has three times the name plate wind capacity of any other state — 8,000-plus megawatts. The Electric Reliability Council of Texas manages the Texas electric grids. ERCOT reports that its unpredictable wind farms actually supply just a little more than 700 MW during summer power demand, and provide just 1 percent of Texas' power needs of about 72,000 MW. ERCOT's 2015 forecast still has wind at just more than 1 percent despite plans for many more turbines. For the United States, the Energy Information Administration is forecasting wind and solar together

will supply less than 3 percent of our electric energy in 2020. Again it turns out that supplanting even a fraction of our current electricity production with renewables will also take us decades. And even that presumes that we have a functioning economy in which to mine, construct, transport and erect these fancy new technologies. Time, scale, and cost all factor in as challenges to significant penetration of new energy technologies as well. So where will all the new energy for economic growth come from? The answer, unsurprisingly, is from the already-installed carbon-chomping coal, oil, and natural gas infrastructure. That is the implicit assumption that lies behind the calls for renewed economic growth. It's The Money, Stupid As noted here routinely in my writings and in the Crash Course, we have an exponential monetary system. One mandatory feature of our current exponential monetary system is the need for perpetual growth. Not just any kind of growth; exponential growth.

That's the price for paying interest on money loaned into existence. Without that growth, our monetary system shudders to a halt and shifts into reverse, operating especially poorly and threatening to melt down the entire economic edifice. This is so well understood, explicitly or implicitly, throughout all the layers of society and in our various institutions, that you will only ever hear politicians and bankers talking about the "need" for growth. In fact, they are correct; our system does need growth. All debt-based money systems require growth. That is the resulting feature of loaning one's money into existence. That's the long and the short of the entire story. The growth may seem modest, perhaps a few percent per year ('That's all, honest!'), but therein lies the rub. Any continuous percentage growth is still exponential growth. Exponential growth means not just a little bit more each year, but a constantly growing amount each year. It is a story of more. Every year needs slightly more than the prior year - that's the requirement. The Gap Nobody has yet reconciled the vast intellectual and practical gap that exists between our addiction to exponential growth and the carbon reduction rhetoric coming out of Copenhagen. I've yet to see any credible plan that illustrates how we can grow our economy without using more energy. Is it somehow possible to grow an economy without using more energy? Let's explore that concept for a bit. What does it mean to "grow an economy?" Essentially, it means more jobs for more people producing and consuming more things. That's it. An economy, as we measure it, consists of delivering the needs and wants of people in ever-larger quantities. It's those last three words - ever-larger quantities - that defines the whole problem. For example, suppose our

economy consisted only of building houses. If the same number of houses were produced each year, we'd say that the economy was not growing. It wouldn't matter whether the number was four hundred thousand or four million; if the same number of new homes were produced each year, year after year, this would be considered a very bad thing, because it would mean our economy was not growing. The same is true for cars, hair brushes, big-screen TVs, grape juice, and everything else you can think of that makes up our current economy. Each year, more needs to be sold than

the year before, or the magic economic-stimulus wands will come out to ward off the Evil Spirits of No Growth. If our economy were to grow at the same rate as the population, it would grow by around 1% per year. This is still exponential growth, but it is far short of the 3%-4% that policymakers consider both desirable and necessary. Why the gap? Why do we work so hard to ensure that 1% more people consume 3% more stuff each year? Out of Service It's not that 3% is the right number for the land or the people who live upon it. The target of 3% is driven by our monetary system, which needs a certain rate of exponential growth each year in order to cover the interest expense due each year on the already outstanding loans. The needs of our monetary system are driving our economic decisions, not the needs of the people, let alone the needs of the planet. We are in service to our money system, not the other way around. Today we have a burning need for an economic model that can operate tolerably well without growth. But ours can't, and so we actually find ourselves in the uncomfortable position of pitting human needs against the money system and observing that the money system is winning the battle. The Federal Reserve exists solely to assure that the monetary system has what it needs to function. That is their focus, their role, and their primary concern. I assume that they assume that by taking care of the monetary system, everything else will take care of itself. I think their assumption is archaic and wrong. Regardless, our primary institutions and governing systems are in service to a monetary system that is dysfunctional. It was my having this outlook, this lens, more than any other, that allowed me to foresee what so many economists missed. Only by examining the system from a new, and very wide, angle can the enormous flaws in the system be seen. Economy & Energy Now let's get back to our main problem of economic growth and energy use (a.k.a. carbon production). There is simply no way to build houses, produce televisions, grow and transport grape juice, and market hair brushes without consuming energy in the process. That's just a cold, hard reality. We need liquid fuel to extract, transform, and transport products to market. More people living in more houses means we need

more electricity. Sure, we can be more efficient in our use of energy, but unless our efficiency gains are exceeding the rate of economic growth, more energy will be used, not less. In the long run, if we were being 3% more efficient in our use of fuel and growing our economy at 3%, this would mean burning the same amount of fuel each year. Unfortunately, fuel-efficiency gains are well known to run slower than economic growth. For example, the average fuel efficiency of the US car fleet (as measured by the CAFE standards) has increased by 18% over the past 25 years, while the economy has grown by 331%. Naturally, our fuel consumption has grown, not fallen, over that time, despite the efficiency gains. So the bottom line is this: There is no possible way to both have economic growth (as we've known it in the past) and cut carbon emissions. At least not without doing things very differently.

War Turns

War – 1NC

Growth causes great power war—stats are conclusive Trainer, University of Sydney social rules PhD, 2[Ted, Conjoint Lecturer in the School of Social Sciences, University of New South Wales, 2002, Taylor & Francis Group, “If You Want Affluence, Prepare for War,” p. 282-3, Democracy & Nature, 7/9/15, AEG]

If we are determined to maintain let alone increase the rich world's high material "living standards" and its commitment to ever-increasing levels of economic turnover then we must maintain the empire . We cannot have these living standards unless we get much more than our fair share of the world's resource wealth. Therefore these living standards are incompatible with global economic justice or with enabling all Third World people to use their own resources to meet their own needs. It is a zero growth game; if all that land growing our export crops was diverted to growing basic foods for Third World people we would get far less coffee and pork. If more of their labour was to go into producing things they need we would get fewer cheap shirts and TV sets. There are no where near enough resources for all people to rise to our affluence so if we are going to maintain our levels of material consumption they will have to go on getting a miniscule share and go on seeing most of their resources flow to us. The limits to growth perspective. As is the case with the other major problems confronting the planet, such as environmental destruction, it is essential to understand the problem of global peace and conflict from the "limits to growth" perspective. This analysis focuses on the fact that the present living standards of the rich countries involve levels of production and consumption that are grossly unsustainable. Just to note two of the lines of argument documented in the large literature from the limits perspective, if all 9 billion people likely to live on earth by 2070 were to have the present rich world lifestyle and "footprint" we would need about 12 times the area of productive land that exists on the entire planet. Secondly if we were to cut greenhouse gas emissions sufficiently to prevent the carbon content of the atmosphere from increasing any more world per capita energy consumption would have to be cut to about one-eighteenth of its present amount If all 9 billion people likely by 2070 were to have the present rich world per capita resource consumption, resource production would have to be about 8 times the present rate. These multiples underline the magnitude of the overshoot. Sustainability will require enormous reductions in the volume of rich world production and consumption. Yet its supreme goal is economic growth, i.e., to increase the levels of production and consumption and GDP, constantly, rapidly and without any limit. That the absurdity of this is never recognised in conventional economic and political circles defies understanding. If we in rich countries average 3% economic growth to 2070 and by then all the world’s people had risen to the "living standards’ we would have by then, the total world economic output would be 60 times as great as the present grossly unsustainable level. If this limits to growth analysis is at all valid the implications for the problem of global peace and conflict and security are clear and savage. If we all remain determined to increase our living standards, our level of production and consumption, in a world where resources are already scarce, where only a few have affluent living standards but another 8 billion will be wanting them too, and which we the rich are determined to get richer without any limit, then nothing is more guaranteed than that there will be increasing levels of conflict and violence. To put it another way, if we insist on remaining affluent we will need to remain heavily armed. Increased conflict in at least the following categories can be expected. Firstly the present conflict over resources between the rich elites and the poor majority in the Third World must increase, for example as "development" under globalisation takes more land, water and forests into export markets. Secondly there are conflicts between the Third World and the rich world, the major recent examples being the war between the US and Iraq over control of oil. Iraq invaded Kuwait and the US intervened, accompanied by much high-sounding rhetoric, (having found nothing unacceptable about Israel's invasions of Lebanon or the Indonesian invasion of East Timor.) As has often been noted, had Kuwait been one of the world's leading exporter of broccoli, rather than oil, it is doubtful whether the US would have been so eager to come to its defence. At the time of writing the US is at war in Central Asia over "terrorism". Few would doubt that a "collateral" outcome will be the establishment of regimes that will give the West access to the oil wealth of Central Asia. Following are some references to the connection many have recognised between rich world affluence and conflict. General M.D. Taylor, U.S. Army retired argued "...U.S. military priorities just be shifted towards insuring a steady flow of resources from the Third World." Taylor referred to "...fierce competition among industrial powers for the same raw materials markets sought by the U nited States" and "... growing hostility displayed by have-not nations towards their affluent counterparts."62 "Struggles are taking place, or are in the offing, between rich and poor nations over their share of the world product; within the industrial world over their share of industrial resources and markets".63 "That more than half of the people on this planet are poorly nourished while a small percentage live in historically unparalleled luxury is a sure recipe for continued and even escalating international conflict."64 The oil embargo placed on the US by OPEC in the early 1970s prompted the US to make it clear that it was prepared to go to war in order to secure supplies. "President Carter last week issued a clear warning that any attempt to gain control of the Persian Gulf would lead to war . " It would "…be regarded as an assault on the vital interests of the United States."65 "The US is ready to take military action if Russia threatens vital American interests in the Persian Gulf, the US Secretary of Defence, Mr. Brown, said yesterday."66 Klare's recent book Resource Wars discusses this theme in detail, stressing the coming significance of water as a source of international conflict. "Global demand for many key materials is growing at an unsustainable rate." "…the incidence of conflict over vital materials is sure to grow." "The wars of the future will largely be fought over the possession and control of vital economic goods." "…resource wars will become, in the years ahead, the most distinctive feature of the global security environment."67 Much of the rich world's participation in the conflicts taking place through out the world is driven by the determination to back a faction that will then look favourably on Western interests. In a report entitled, "The rich prize that is Shaba", Breeze begins, "Increasing rivalry over a share-out between France and Belgium of the mineral riches of Shaba Province lies behind the joint Franco-Belgian paratroop airlift to Zaire." "These mineral riches make the province a valuable prize and help explain the West’s extended diplomatic courtship,..."68 Then there is potential conflict between the rich nations who are after all the ones most dependent on securing large quantities of resources. "The resource and energy intensive modes of production employed in nearly all industries necessitate continuing armed coercion and competition to secure raw

materials."69 "Struggles are taking place, or are in the offing, between rich and poor nations over their share of he world product, within the industrial world over their share of industrial resources and markets…"70 Growth, competition, expansion…and war. Finally, at the most abstract level, the struggle for greater wealth and power is central in the literature on the causes of war. "...warfare appears as a normal and periodic form of competition within the capitalist world economy." "...world wars regularly occur during a period of economic expansion."71 "War is an inevitable result of the struggle between economies for expansion."72 Choucri and North say their most important finding is that domestic growth is a strong determinant of national expansion and that this results in competition between nations and war. 73. World Wars I and II can be seen as being largely about imperial grabbing. Germany, Italy and Japan sought to expand their territory and resource access. But Britain already held much of the world within its empire…which it had previously fought 72 wars to take! "Finite resources in a world of expanding populations and increasing per capita demands create a situation ripe for international violence."74 Ashley focuses on the significance of the quest for economic growth. "War is mainly explicable in terms of differential growth in a world of scarce and unevenly distributed resources…" "…expansion is a prime source of conflict. So long as the dynamics of differential growth remain unmanaged, it is probable that these long term processes will sooner or later carry major powers into war. "75

War – 2NC

Growth causes larger wars than decline—low growth rates make leaders more cautious Boehmer 7—Charles, Assistant Professor of Political Science at The University of Texas at El Paso “The Effects of Economic Crisis, Domestic Discord, and State Efficacy on the Decision to Initiate Interstate Conflict” Politics & Policy, Volume 35, No. 4 (2007): 774-809I have theorized in this study that economic growth should be positively related to militarized interstate conflicts while at the same time it should reduce the risk of domestic regime changes. I also expected that domestic conflict would reduce the risk of interstate conflict. The research design used here specifically allows for a comparison of the relative probabilities of both interstate conflict and regime changes. I find only partial support for both my theory and the conclusions often made in studies of diversionary conflict that lower rates of economic growth should lead to interstate conflict, although in cases where this occurs, this is in fact followed by some form of regime change, suggesting that diversion was not successful or the only tactic politically necessary.In fact, the alternative theory presented here was supported in regard to the most severe interstate conflicts . Higher levels of economic growth are positively related to the onset of deadly interstate conflicts . However, the results concerning domestic conflict are interesting and both support and contradict my theory. Indeed, domestic conflict increases the threat of both regime changes and interstate conflict, but only to a point. The effects of protest and rebellion are generally nonlinear where only the middle levels contribute to interstate conflict. The highest levels of protest and rebellion actually reduce the risk of interstate conflict. This suggests that state leaders may attempt diversion as long as protest and rebellion are not so severe, although beyond some middle-range threshold leaders shy away from especially the most severe interstate conflicts . One post hoc rationale could be that leaders are insulated from domestic opponents to some degree and are not constrained until domestic conflict reaches a certain threshold.An alternative explanation, and one also suggested by the results here, is that the risk of regime change rises much more quickly with higher levels of protest and rebellion, but especially the former, relative to the opportunity to initiate a foreign conflict. Probabilistically, the opportunity to divert decreases as the chance to be toppled or institutionally altering the government increases first. While the results show that some leaders initiate interstate conflicts and then undergo regime change, a likely outcome for those facing high levels of domestic conflict is that they are removed before they can pull the trigger on a “gambling-for-resurrection” strategy. The results also show that this would be a very, very rare behavior on the part of democratic leaders, given the results of the democracy variable and the low probabilities of the events measured. Of the 755 country-years where a militarized interstate conflict was initiated, 79 of these foreign conflicts (11 percent) were related somehow to regime change. This means that some attempts to divert (if they were so) failed, while others following MIDs may be completely unrelated to diversionary behavior or possibility even a penalty for it. Moreover, these MID initiations likely include many conflicts which most would agree were not diversionary, such as U.S. interventions into Bosnia or Afghanistan, which is the common problem associated with this theory. This means that the risk of regime change for states under duress is probably even higher than the results show, which would be the times leaders would most prefer to divert. In summary, this study shows circumstantial evidence that supports aspects of diversionary conflict theory. At least some domestic conflict appears to increase the risk of interstate conflict. Yet, the results here present a more complex picture than other studies in that diversionary strategies (1) appear to occur less often than regime change, or (2) regime change occurs anyway after a foreign conflict has been initiated. Lower economic growth and domestic conflict both seem to lead to desperate situations where interstate conflicts are initiated , but again seem unsuccessful . Diversionary attempts appear quite rare and desperate in nature.Still, the results here show a more complex picture that partly contradicts aspects of diversionary theory. First, the odds are actually higher that states with domestic problems will be a target of foreign aggression than they would be an aggressor. This finding suggests predatory behavior on the part of other states. Moreover, leaders facing domestic problems associated with domestic conflict and poor economic growth avoid foreign conflicts that entail the loss of life . Instead, states are more likely to become involved in such violent disputes when economic growth is high and state leaders and their regimes appear secure, meaning they face manageable levels of internal protest and rebellion.

Access to resources is the key to great power war—it only happens during economic expansion—that means we control conflict escalation—try or die neg by 2030 Cashman 14—Greg, Professor @ Salisbury University, “What Causes War?: An Introduction to Theories of International Conflict” Pg 445

Goldstein's explanation for the link between K-waves and war is twofold First, increasing production produces a greater demand for resources , which in turn leads to international competition for these resources and to greater conflict over markets Second, this increased competition occurs during a period when production increases have made increased supplies of war materiel available to the military sector, drastically increasing the probability of war The first argument is essentially a lateral pressure argument without the emphasis on population growth The second argument is essentially a resource theory of war—wars are most likely when states have the resources to pursue them.'** War is most likely to occur, then, near the end of the long-wave upswing, when resources arc most abundant w‘ Note, how ever, that Goldstein falls back on state-level argument (the presence of economic wherewithal! to help explain a theory based on systemic-level factors(K-waves).Goldstein initially argued that the hegemonic cycle and the economic long-wave cycle, though they are not in phase with each other, operate in conjunction Thus, hegemonic decline does not by itself lead to war. it is only dangerous when it coincides with an expansionary phase of the economic cycle Economic expansion by itself is not dangerous either, it must be accompanied by

hegemonic stagnation. For example, the economic expansion of the 1960s was not associated with major wars because of the strong hegemonic position of the United Slates Goldstein (writing in 1988) predicted new economic upswings to coincide with the continuation of American hegemonic decline between 2000 and 2030 .1,0

War is inevitable—but more deadly when it comes during a growth cycle—empirics prove—decline will make leaders more cautious and less able Chase-Dunn 96 Distinguished Professor of Sociology and Director of the Institute for Research on World-Systems at the University of (Christopher, Conflict Among Core States: World-System Cycles and Trends, 23 January 1996, http://wsarch.ucr.edu/archive/papers/c-d&hall/warprop.htm)Note-figure omitted

Late in the K-wave upswing (i.e. in the 2020s), the world-system schema predicts a window of vulnerability to

another round of world war. This is when world wars have occurred in the past. Intensified rivalry and

competition for raw materials and markets will coincide with a multipolar distribution of military power among core states. The world-system model does not predict who the next hegemon will be. Rather it designates that there will be structural forces in motion that will favor the construction of a new hierarchy. Historical particularities and the unique features of the era will shape the outcome and select the winners and losers. If it were possible for the current system to survive the holocaust of another war among core states, the outcome of the war would be the main arbiter of hegemonic succession. While the hegemonic sequence has been a messy method of selecting global "leadership" in the past, the settlement of hegemonic rivalry by force in the

future will be a disaster that our species may not survive . It is my concern about this possible disaster that motivates this effort to understand how the hegemonic sequence has occurred in the past and the factors affecting hegemonic rivalry in the next decades. What are the cyclical processes and secular trends that may affect the probability of future world wars? The world-system model is presented in Figure 1. This model depicts the variables that I contend will be the main influences on the probability of war among core states. The four variables that raise the probability of core war are the Kondratieff cycle, hegemonic decline, population pressure (and resource scarcity) and global inequality. The four variables that reduce the probability of core war are the destructiveness of weaponry, international economic interdependency, international political integration and disarmament. The probability of war may be high without a war occurring, of course. Joshua Goldstein's (1988) study of war severity (battle deaths per year) in wars among the "great powers" demonstrated the existence of a fifty-year cycle of core wars. Goldstein's study shows how this "war wave" tracks rather closely with the Kondratieff long economic cycle over the past 500 years of world-system history. It is the future of this war cycle that I am trying to predict. Factors that Increase the Likelihood of War Among Core States The proposed model divides variables into those that are alleged to increase the probability of war among core states and those that decrease that probability. There are four of each. Kondratieff waves The first variable that has a positive effect on the probability of war among core powers is the Kondratieff wave -- a forty to sixty year cycle of economic growth and stagnation. Goldstein (1988) provides evidence that the most destructive core wars tend to occur late in a Kondratieff A-phase (upswing). Earlier research by Thompson and Zuk (1982) also supports the conclusion that core wars are more likely to begin near the end of an upswing. Boswell and Sweat's (1991) analysis also supports the Goldstein thesis. But several other world-system theorists have argued that core wars occur primarily during K-wave B-phases. This disagreement over timing is related to a disagreement over causation. According to Goldstein states are

war machines that always have a desire to utilize military force, but wars are costly and so statesmen tend to

refrain from going to war when state revenues are low. On the other hand, statesmen are more likely to

engage in warfare when state revenues are high (because the states can then afford the high costs of war). Boswell and Sweat call this the "resource theory of war."

A2: Decline Causes War

Economic collapse doesn’t cause war Drezner, Tufts IR professor, 2014(Daniel, “The System Worked: Global Economic Governance during the Great Recession”, World Poltiics, 66.1, January, proquest)

The final significant outcome addresses a dog that hasn't barked: the effect of the Great Recession on cross-border conflict and violence. During the initial stages of the crisis, multiple analysts asserted that the financial crisis would lead states to increase their use of force as a tool for staying in power.42 They voiced genuine concern that the global economic downturn would lead to an increase in conflict—whether through greater internal repression, diversionary wars, arms races, or a ratcheting up of great power conflict. Violence in the Middle East, border disputes in the South China Sea, and even the disruptions of the Occupy movement fueled impressions of a surge in global public disorder. The aggregate data suggest otherwise , however . The Institute for Economics and Peace has concluded that "the average level of peacefulness in 2012 is approximately the same as it was in 2007."43 Interstate violence in particular has declined since the start of the financial crisis, as have military expenditures in most sampled countries. Other studies confirm that the Great Recession has not triggered any increase in violent conflict, as Lotta Themner and Peter Wallensteen conclude: "[T]he pattern is one of relative stability when we consider the trend for the past five years."44 The secular decline in violence that started with the end of the Cold War has not been reversed. Rogers Brubaker observes that "the crisis has not to date generated the surge in protectionist nationalism or ethnic exclusion that might have been expected."43

Economic collapse doesn’t cause war Bazzi et al., UCSD economics department, 2011(Samuel, “Economic Shocks and Conflict: The (Absence of?) Evidence from Commodity Prices”, November, http://www.chrisblattman.com/documents/research/2011.EconomicShocksAndConflict.pdf?9d7bd4)

VI. Discussion and conclusions A. Implications for our theories of political instability and conflict The state is not a prize?—Warlord politics and the state prize logic lie at the center of the most influential models of conflict, state development, and political transitions in economics and political science. Yet we see no evidence for this idea in economic shocks, even when looking at the friendliest cases: fragile and unconstrained states dominated by extractive commodity revenues. Indeed, we see the opposite correlation: if anything, higher rents from commodity prices weakly 22 lower the risk and length of conflict. Perhaps shocks are the wrong test. Stocks of resources could matter more than price shocks (especially if shocks are transitory). But combined with emerging evidence that war onset is no more likely even with rapid increases in known oil reserves (Humphreys 2005; Cotet and Tsui 2010) we regard the state prize logic of war with skepticism.17 Our main political economy models may need a new engine. Naturally, an absence of evidence cannot be taken for evidence of absence. Many of our conflict onset and ending results include sizeable positive and negative effects.18 Even so, commodity price shocks are highly influential in income and should provide a rich source of identifiable variation in instability. It is difficult to find a better-measured, more abundant, and plausibly exogenous independent variable than price volatility. Moreover, other time-

varying variables, like rainfall and foreign aid, exhibit robust correlations with conflict in spite of suffering similar empirical drawbacks and generally smaller sample sizes (Miguel et al. 2004; Nielsen et al. 2011). Thus we take the absence of evidence seriously. Do resource revenues drive state capacity?—State prize models assume that rising revenues raise the value of the capturing the state, but have ignored or downplayed the effect of revenues on self-defense. We saw that a growing empirical political science literature takes just such a revenue-centered approach, illustrating that resource boom times permit both payoffs and repression, and that stocks of lootable or extractive resources can bring political order and stability. This countervailing effect is most likely with transitory shocks, as current revenues are affected while long term value is not. Our findings are partly consistent with this state capacity effect. For example, conflict intensity is most sensitive to changes in the extractive commodities rather than the annual agricultural crops that affect household incomes more directly. The relationship only holds for conflict intensity, however, and is somewhat fragile. We do not see a large, consistent or robust decline in conflict or coup risk when prices fall. A reasonable interpretation is that the state prize and state capacity effects are either small or tend to cancel one another out. Opportunity cost: Victory by default?—Finally, the inverse relationship between prices and war intensity is consistent with opportunity cost accounts, but not exclusively so. As we noted above, the relationship between intensity and extractive commodity prices is more consistent with the state capacity view. Moreover, we shouldn’t mistake an inverse relation between individual aggression and incomes as evidence for the opportunity cost mechanism. The same correlation is consistent with psychological theories of stress and aggression (Berkowitz 1993) and sociological and political theories of relative deprivation and anomie (Merton 1938; Gurr 1971). Microempirical work will be needed to distinguish between these mechanisms. Other reasons for a null result.—Ultimately,

however, the fact that commodity price shocks have no discernible effect on new conflict onsets, but some effect on ongoing conflict,

suggests that political stability might be less sensitive to income or temporary shocks than generally believed . One possibility is that successfully mounting an insurgency is no easy task. It comes with considerable risk, costs, and coordination challenges. Another possibility is that the counterfactual is still conflict onset. In poor and fragile nations, income shocks of one type or another are ubiquitous. If a nation is so fragile that a change in prices could lead to war, then other shocks may trigger war even in the absence of a price shock. The same argument has been made in debunking the myth that price shocks led to fiscal collapse and low growth in developing nations in the 1980s.19 B. A general

problem of publication bias? More generally, these findings should heighten our concern with publication bias in the conflict literature. Our results run against a number of published results on commodity shocks and conflict, mainly because of select samples, misspecification, and sensitivity to model assumptions, and, most importantly, alternative measures of instability . Across the social and hard sciences, there is a concern that the majority of published research findings are false (e.g. Gerber et al. 2001). Ioannidis

(2005) demonstrates that a published finding is less likely to be true when there is a greater number and lesser pre-selection of tested relationships; there is greater flexibility in designs, definitions, outcomes, and models; and when more teams are involved in the chase of statistical significance. The cross-national study of conflict is an extreme case of all these . Most worryingly, almost no paper looks at alternative dependent variables or publishes systematic robustness checks. Hegre and Sambanis (2006) have shown that the majority of published conflict results are fragile, though they focus on timeinvariant regressors and not the time-varying shocks that have grown in popularity. We are also concerned there is a “file drawer problem” (Rosenthal 1979). Consider this decision rule: scholars that discover robust results that fit a theoretical intuition pursue the results; but if results are not robust the scholar (or referees) worry about problems with the data or empirical strategy, and identify additional work to be done. If further analysis produces a robust result, it is published. If not, back to the file drawer. In the aggregate, the consequences are dire: a lower threshold of evidence for initially significant results than ambiguous ones.20

Diversionary war is wrong—qualitative AND quantitative studies go neg—decline facilitates coopFravel, MIT political science professor, 2010(M Taylor, “The Limits of Diversion: Rethinking Internal and External Conflict”, Security Studies, project muse)

The diversionary hypothesis offers one of the most powerful alternatives to rationalist explanations of war based on the state as a unitary actor. Strong empirical support for diversion would

identify a more complete set of causal mechanisms underlying international conflict. The cases investigated in this article, however, raise doubts about the strength of the diversionary hypothesis as well as the empirical validity of arguments based on diversionary mechanisms, such as Mansfield and Snyder’s theory about democratization and war.126 In Argentina and Turkey, the hypothesis fails to pass two most likely tests. In neither case was domestic unrest a necessary condition for the use of force as proponents of diversionary theory

must demonstrate. Instead, external security challenges and bargaining over disputed territory better explain Argentine and Turkish

decision making. The historical record , including leadership statements and reasoning, offers stronger ev idence for a standard realist model and the dynamics of coercive diplomacy. Drawing definitive conclusions about diversion from just two cases is impossible. Nevertheless, the modified most likely research design used in this article weakens confidence in the strength of diversionary arguments. Diversion as a principal or primary source of some conflicts may be much less frequent than scholars assert. These two episodes should be among the easiest cases for diversion to explain. Not only did embattled leaders escalate disputes into crises and then use force, but scholars have also viewed these cases as being best explained by diversionary mechanisms. If diversion cannot account for these decisions, it is unclear what the hypothesis can in fact explain.

My findings have several implications for the literature on diversionary war theory. At the most general level of analysis, the lack of support for the diversion hypothesis in Argentina and Turkey complements those quantitative studies of diversion that do not identify a systematic and significant relationship between domestic politics and aggressive foreign policies, including the use of force.127 In addition, the modified most likely research design used in this article raises questions about those quantitative studies that do provide empirical support for diversion because it demonstrates that despite the presence of domestic unrest, the underlying causal mechanisms of diversion may not account for the decisions to use force. The lack of support for diversion raises a simple but important question: why is diversion less frequent than commonly believed, despite its plausible intuition? Although further research is required, several factors should be considered. First, the rally effect that leaders enjoy from an international crisis is generally brief in duration and unlikely to change permanently a public’s overall satisfaction with its leaders.128 George H. W. Bush, for example, lost his reelection bid after successful prosecution of the 1991 Gulf War. Winston Churchill fared no better after

the Allied victory in World War II.129 Leaders have little reason to conclude that a short-term rally will address what are usually structural sources of domestic dissatisfaction. Second, a selection effect may prevent embattled leaders from choosing diversion. Diversionary action should produce the largest rally effect against the most powerful target because such action would reflect a leader’s skills through coercing a superior opponent. At the same time, leaders should often be deterred from challenging stronger targets , as the imbalance of military forces increases the risk of defeat and thus the probability of losing office at home. Although the odds of victory increase when targeting weaker states, success should have a much more muted effect on domestic support, if any, because victory would have been expected.130 Third, weak or embattled leaders can choose from a wide range of policy options to strengthen their standing at home. Although scholars such as Oakes and Gelpi have noted that embattled leaders can choose repression or economic development in

addition to diversionary action, the range of options is even greater and carries less risk than the failure of diversion . Weak leaders can also seek to deepen cooperation with other states if they believe it will strengthen their position at home. Other studies, for example, have demonstrated that political unrest facilitated détente among the superpowers in the early 1970s, China’s concessions in its many territorial disputes , support for international financial liberalization, and the formation of regional organizations such as the A ssociation of Southeast Asian States and the G ulf C ooperation C ouncil. 131

Decline doesn’t cause warJervis, Colubmia international affairs professor, 2011(Robert, “Forces in Our Times”, Survival, 25.4, December, ebsco)

Even if war is still seen as evil, the security community could be dissolved if severe conflicts of interest were to arise. Could the more peaceful world generate new interests that would bring the members of the community into sharp disputes? 45 A zero-sum sense of status would be one example, perhaps linked to a steep rise in nationalism. More likely would be a worsening of the current economic difficulties, which could itself produce greater nationalism, undermine democracy and bring back old-fashioned beggar-my-neighbor economic policies. While these dangers are real, it is hard to believe that the conflicts could be great enough to lead the members of the community to contemplate fighting each other. It is not so much that economic interdependence has proceeded to the point where it could not be reversed – states that were more internally interdependent than anything seen internationally have fought bloody civil wars. Rather it is that even if the more extreme versions of free trade and economic liberalism become discredited, it is hard to see how without building on a preexisting high level of political conflict leaders and mass opinion would come to believe that their countries could prosper by impoverishing or even attacking others. Is it possible that problems will not only become severe, but that people will entertain the thought that they have to be solved by war? While a pessimist could note that this argument does not appear as outlandish as it did before the financial crisis, an optimist could reply (correctly, in my view) that the very fact that we have seen such a sharp economic down-turn without anyone suggesting that force of arms is the solution shows that even if bad times bring about greater economic conflict, it will not make war thinkable.

Transition

Yes Transition – 2NC

Resource shortages guarantee a transition to socialism in a crisis Li, University of Utah Economics associate professor, 12[Minqi, 11/--/12, Political economy research institute @ University of Massachusetts Amherst, “SOCIALISM: THE 20TH CENTURY AND THE 21ST CENTURY Minqi Li,” http://www.peri.umass.edu/fileadmin/pdf/working_papers/working_papers_251-300/WP292.pdf, pg. 8, 7/7/15, AEG]

However, the neoliberal “success” had some serious side-effects. As the working classes in much of the world suffered from declining living standards, global effective demand was constrained.

Many economies attempted to get around this problem by pursuing export-led growth. But it was impossible for all countries to pursue export-led growth. From the 1990s to the early 2000s, the US had sustained the global economic expansion through debt-financed consumption. The large US trade deficits allowed the rest of the world to pursue export-led growth. The growth model was unsustainable and eventually led to the “Great Recession” of 2008-2009. All the advanced capitalist countries are now confronted with serious fiscal crises. According to the Bank of International Settlements, under the existing trends, government debt to GDP ratio is set to rise to 400 percent in France, 300 percent

in Germany, 250 percent in Italy, 6CK) percent in Japan, 5CK) percent in Britain, and 400 percent in the United States by the mid-21st century (Cecchetti, Mohanty, and Zampolli 2010). In the advanced capitalist countries or the core zone of the capitalist world system, the historical space for social compromise seems to have been exhausted. On the other hand, in recent years there have been large formations of industrial working classes in the non-western world. Until now, the large cheap labor force in the non-western world has been functioning as a pool of global reserve army that helps to undermine the global working class bargaining power. But this is about to change. In the coming decades, one would expect that as the non-western working classes continue to grow in size and learn to get organized, the workers in the non-westem world will demand higher wages as well as a growing range of political and social rights. Can the demands by the non-westem working classes be accommodated by the capitalist world

system? Historically, the western capitalist classes had managed to accommodate the working class challenge by providing a package of social reform. However , if the capitalist world system can no longer afford the social reform package for the comparatively small western working classes, there is little chance for it to offer and afford a similar package for the much larger non-western working classes. The historical social compromise between the western capitalist and working classes took place when global energy and natural resources remained abundant. By comparison,

centuries of relentless global capital accumulation has by now exhausted the global ecological space. In the coming decades, if global capitalism fails to accommodate the growing demands of the non-western working classes while maintaining social peace in the core zone of the world system, then

socialism as a global revolutionary project will be back on the historical agenda.

The post-growth paradigm is gaining critical mass---paradigm shifts can be incredibly rapid once they reach key thresholds Alexander, Sustainable Society Institute Research Fellow, 14[Samuel, 2/14/14, Post Carbon Pathways, “Post-Growth Economics: A Paradigm Shift in Progress,” pg. 13-14, 7/7/15, AEG] Despite the dominance of this growth model of progress around the world, it has never been without its critics, and as this paper will outline, there are reasons to think that grounds for opposition are growing in number, strength, and sophistication. It was the philosopher of science, Thomas Kuhn (1962), who argued that paradigm shifts in the natural sciences occur when the existing paradigm finds itself increasingly unable to solve the critical problems it sets for itself. As anomalies increase in number and severity, the need for an alternative paradigm becomes clearer, and eventually a new paradigm is developed that can solve more problems than the old one. At that stage a paradigm shift is set in motion, and over time the new paradigm becomes accepted and the old one loses its influence, sometimes quite abruptly. In much the same

way, this paper proposes that a paradigm shift in macroeconomics is underway, with a post-growth economic framework threatening to resolve critical anomalies that seem irresolvable from within the existing growth paradigm. We will see that a growing array of theorists, from various disciplinary backgrounds, are questioning the feasibility and even the desirability of continuous growth, especially with respect to the most highly developed regions of the world. Increasingly there is a call to look ‘beyond growth’ (see, e.g., Costanza et al, 2014; Kubiszewski et al, 2013; Stiglitz, Sen, and Fitoussi, 2010), on the grounds that growth may now be causing the problems it was traditionally hoped to solve. Not only can it be argued that a post-growth paradigm shift is in progress , it seems the fundamental importance of this shift lies in the fact that it is in relation to progress. That is, it is changing the very nature of what ‘progress’ means.

It creates cultural changesSpeth, Yale environmental studies dean, 2008(James, The Bridge at the Edge of the World, p. 211-213)

Unfortunately, the surest path to widespread cultural change is a cataclysmic event that profoundly affects shared values and delegitimizes the status quo and existing leadership. The Great Depression is a classic example. I believe that both 9/11 and Hurricane Katrina could have led to real cultural change in the United States, both for the better, but America lacked the inspired leadership needed. The most thorough look at this issue from the perspective here is Thomas Homer-Dixon’s The Upside of Down. He argues “that our circumstances today are surprisingly like Rome’s in key ways. Our societies are also becoming steadily more complex and often more rigid. This is happening partly because we’re trying to manage—often with limited success—stresses building inside our societies, including stresses arising from our gargantuan appetite for energy. . . . Eventually, as occurred in Rome, the stresses may become too extreme, and our societies too inflexible to respond, and some kind of economic or political breakdown will occur. . . . “People often use the words ‘breakdown’ and ‘collapse’ synonymously. But in my view,

although both breakdown and collapse produce a radical simplification of a system, they differ in their long-term consequences. Breakdown may be serious, but it’s not catastrophic. Something can be salvaged after breakdown occurs and perhaps rebuilt better than before. Collapse, on the other hand, is far more harmful. . . . “In coming years, I believe, foreshocks are likely to become larger and more frequent. Some could take the form of threshold events—like climate flips, large jumps in energy prices, boundary-crossing outbreaks of new infectious disease, or international financial crises.”23 Homer-Dixon argues that foreshocks and breakdowns can lead to positive change if the ground is prepared. “We need to prepare to turn breakdown to our advantage when it happens—because it will,” he says.24 Homer-Dixon’s point is critically important. Breakdowns, of course, do not necessarily lead to positive outcomes; authoritarian ones and Fortress World are also possibilities. Turning a breakdown to advantage will require both inspired leadership and a new story that articulates a positive vision grounded in what is best in the society’s values and history. A congressman is said to have told a citizens’ group, “If you will lead, your leaders will follow.” But it doesn’t have to be that way. Harvard’s Howard Gardner stresses this potential of true leadership in his book Changing Minds: “Whether they are heads of a nation or senior officials of the United Nations, leaders of large, disparate populations have enormous potential to change minds . . . and in the process they can change the course of history. “I have suggested one way to capture the attention of a disparate population: by creating a compelling story, embodying that story in one’s own life, and presenting the story in many different formats so that it can eventually topple the counterstories in one’s culture. . . . [T]he story must be simple, easy to identify with, emotionally resonant, and evocative of positive experiences.”25 There is evidence that

Americans are ready for another story. As noted, large majorities of Americans, when polled, express disenchantment with today’s lifestyles and offer support for values similar to those discussed here .26 But these values are held along with other strongly felt and often conflicting values, and we are all pinned down by old habits, fears, insecurities, social pressures, and in other ways. A new story that helps people find their way out of this confusion and dissonance could help lead to real change.

The current economic decline is different---multiple structural differences mean decline will cause capitalism to completely collapse---causes a smooth transition---key to solving extinctionLi, University of Utah, Department of Economics professor, 11[Minqi, 2011, Review of Radical Political Economics, “The 21st Century Crisis: Climate Catastrophe or Socialism,” p.290, SAGE, 7/9/15, AEG]

The impending climate catastrophe is but one of several aspects of the structural crisis of capitalism in the 21st century. We are currently in the beginning of a prolonged period of global instability and chaos . Similar periods of systemic chaos had happened before (for example, during the first half of the 20th century). Capitalism had managed to survive earlier crises, through institutional adjustments without changing the system’s essential features (production for profit and endless accumulation of capital). Because of this historical observation, some have developed the belief that capitalism is such a remarkably “flexible” and “creative” system that it can always reform itself, adapt to change, survive crises, and meet challenges. But this belief is short-sighted and fundamentally ahistorical. Like every

other social system, for capitalism to exist and function, it requires certain necessary historical conditions. Capitalism would remain viable (and therefore “reformable”) only to the extent the necessary historical conditions required for its normal operations are present. But the development of capitalism inevitably leads to fundamental changes in the underlying historical

conditions. Sooner or later, a point will be reached where the necessary historical conditions are no longer present, and capitalism as a historical system will cease to exist. If one compares the current systemic crisis with earlier instances of systemic crisis, what are some of the major differences ? First, in previous periods of crisis, the world’s natural resources remained relatively abundant and the global environment remained largely intact. Today, the global ecological system is literally on the verge of complete collapse . The impending climate catastrophe is only one among many aspects of global environmental crisis . Global capitalism has already exhausted the environmental space for further capital accumulation.

Secondly, the successful operations of the capitalist world system require it be regulated by an effective hegemonic power at the systemic level. However, with the decline of the US hegemony, no other big power was in a position to replace the US to become the new hegemonic power. Without an effective hegemonic power, the system would be unable to pursue its own long-term interest and solve system-wide problems. Thirdly, in the past the capitalist system had managed to survive crisis through social reforms . In essence, social reform is for the system to buy off certain opposition groups by making limited concessions.

The concessions have to be limited so that they do not undermine the essential interest of the ruling class. Today, the system has run out of its historical space for social compromise. In virtually all the advanced capitalist countries, now a restoration of favorable conditions for capitalist accumulation would require nothing short of large and sustained declines of working class living standards. Will the western working classes simply surrender and give up their entire historical gains since the 19th century? If not,

Western Europe and North America will again become major battlegrounds of class struggle in the coming decades. Fourthly, the world has reached the advanced

stage of proletarianization. Marx famously predicted that the proletariat would become the grave diggers of capitalism. For the entire 19th and much of 20th century, the process

of proletarianization was largely limited to the “West” (the advanced capitalist countries). In the neoliberal era, as capital is relocated from advanced capitalist countries to the rest of the world to exploit the reserve army of cheap labor force, there have been large formations of industrial working classes in the non-western world. Over time, the non-western working classes will have developed the

organizational capacity and demand a growing range of economic, social, and political rights. For the capitalist world system, if its economic and ecological resources are already so limited that it is no longer possible to accommodate the historical demands of the western working classes, what is the chance for the system to accommodate the demands of the much larger non-western working classes? If the system can no longer survive by buying off its potential oppositions, can it simply survive by repression, and for how long? How will the

combination of these trends play out in the coming decades? Will the current structural crisis turn out to be the terminal crisis of capitalism? One thing is clear. If capitalism does survive the current crisis, there is probably not much hope for the humanity to survive the coming global climate catastrophe . For the humanity’s sake, end capitalism before we are ended by capitalism.

Now Better Than Later

Only collapse now ensures there’s enough natural resources and ecosystem resilience left to create sustainable societies---delay means extinctionBarry, internationally recognized environmental advocate, scientist, and tech expert, 8[Dr. Glen, President and Founder of EcoInternet & University of Wisconsin-Madison Ph.D. in "Land Resources," 01/14/08, Earth Meanders, “Economic Collapse and Global Ecology,” http://www.countercurrents.org/barry140108.htm, 07/06/15, AEG]

Humanity and the Earth are faced with an enormous conundrum -- sufficient climate policies enjoy political support only in times of rapid economic growth.

Yet this growth is the primary factor driving greenhouse gas emissions and other environmental ills. The growth machine has pushed the planet well beyond its ecological carrying capacity, and unless constrained , can only lead to human extinction and an end to complex life. With every economic downturn, like the one now looming in the United States, it becomes more difficult and less likely that policy sufficient to ensure global ecological sustainability will be embraced. This essay explores the possibility that from a biocentric viewpoint of needs for long-term global ecological, economic and social sustainability; it would be better for the economic collapse to come now rather than later. Economic growth is a deadly disease upon the Earth, with capitalism as its most virulent strain. Throw-away consumption and explosive population growth are made possible by using up fossil fuels and destroying ecosystems. Holiday shopping numbers are covered by media in the same breath as Arctic ice melt, ignoring their deep connection. Exponential economic growth destroys ecosystems and pushes the biosphere closer to failure. Humanity has proven itself

unwilling and unable to address climate change and other environmental threats with necessary haste and ambition. Action on coal, forests, population, renewable energy and emission reductions could be taken now at net benefit to the economy. Yet, the losers -- primarily fossil fuel industries and their bought oligarchy -- successfully resist futures not dependent upon their deadly products. Perpetual economic growth, and necessary climate and other ecological policies, are fundamentally incompatible. Global ecological sustainability depends critically upon establishing a steady state economy, whereby production is right-sized to not diminish natural capital. Whole industries like

coal and natural forest logging will be eliminated even as new opportunities emerge in solar energy and environmental restoration. This critical transition to

both economic and ecological sustainability is simply not happening on any scale. The challenge is how to carry out necessary environmental policies even as economic growth ends and consumption plunges. The natural response is going to be liquidation of even more life-giving ecosystems, and jettisoning of climate policies, to vainly try to maintain high growth and personal consumption. We know that humanity must reduce greenhouse gas emissions by at least 80% over coming decades. How will this and other necessary climate mitigation strategies be maintained during years of economic downturns, resource wars, reasonable demands for equitable consumption, and frankly, the weather being more pleasant in some places? If efforts to reduce emissions and move to a steady state economy fail; the collapse of ecological, economic and social systems is assured. Bright greens take the continued existence of a habitable Earth with viable, sustainable populations of all species including humans as the ultimate truth and the meaning of life. Whether this is possible in a time of economic collapse is crucially dependent upon whether enough ecosystems and resources remain post collapse to allow humanity to recover and reconstitute sustainable, relocalized societies. It may be better for the Earth and humanity's future that economic collapse comes sooner rather than later, while more ecosystems and opportunities to return to nature's fold exist. Economic collapse will be deeply wrenching -- part Great Depression, part African famine. There will be starvation and civil strife, and a long period of suffering and turmoil. Many will be killed as balance returns to the Earth. Most people have forgotten how to grow food and that their identity is more than what they own. Yet there is some justice, in that those who have lived most lightly upon the land will have an easier time of it, even as those super-consumers living in massive cities finally learn where their food comes from and that ecology is the meaning of life. Economic collapse now means humanity and the Earth ultimately survive to prosper again. Human suffering -- already the norm for many, but

hitting the currently materially affluent -- is inevitable given the degree to which the planet's carrying capacity has been exceeded. We are a couple decades at most away from societal strife of a much greater magnitude as the Earth's biosphere fails. Humanity can take the bitter medicine now, and recover while emerging better for it; or our total collapse can be a final, fatal death swoon.

Collapse is inevitable—sooner is better—saves resources for sustainable living in a degrowth society Vail 5 – Jeff Vail, attorney at Davis Graham & Stubbs LLP in Denver, Colorado specializing in litigation and energy issues, former intelligence officer with the US Air Force and energy infrastructure counterterrorism specialist with the US Department of the Interior, April 28, 2005, “The Logic of Collapse,” online: http://www.jeffvail.net/2005/04/logic-of-collapse.html

But despite the declining marginal returns, society is not capable of reducing expenditure, or even reducing the growth in expenditure. I

discuss this at length in A Theory of Power, but the basic fact is that society is—at its very root—an evolutionary development that uses a continual increase in complexity to address social needs—and to ensure its own survival. So, as societies continue to invest more and more in social complexity at lower and lower marginal

rates of return, they become more and more inefficient until eventually they are no longer capable of withstanding even commonplace stresses. They collapse. This may seem too deterministic—after all, it suggests that all societies will eventually collapse. While that may cause our inherent sense of hubris to perk up for a moment, we should remember that this equation fits our data quite well—every civilization that has ever existed has, in fact, collapsed. Our present global civilization is, or course, the sole

exception. A look back at the contemporary chroniclers of history shows that every “great” civilization thinks that they are somehow different, that

history will not repeat with them—and their hubris is shared with gusto by members of the present global civilization. Of course, as discrete empires and societies grow ever more cumbersome they do not always collapse in the spectacular fashion of the Western Roman Empire. If they exist in a “peer-polity” situation—that is, they are surrounded by competitors of similar levels of complexity—then they will tend to be conquered and absorbed. It is only in the case of a power vacuum—like the Chacoans or Western Romans—that we witness such a spectacular loss of complexity. In the “modern” world, we have not witnessed such a collapse as we exist in a global peer-polity continuum. When the Spanish empire grew too cumbersome the British were there to take over, and the mantel has since passed on to America, with the EU, China and others waiting eagerly in the wings. In the modern world there can no longer be an isolated collapse—our next experience with this will be global. In fact, the modern civilization continuum has existed for so long without a global collapse because we have managed to tap new energy sources—coal, then oil—each with a higher energy surplus than the last. This has buoyed the marginal return curve temporarily with each discovery, but has not changed the fundamental dynamics of collapse. Perhaps we should take a step back and look at collapse in general. Our psychological investment in the “goodness” of “high-civilization” leads to the commonly held conclusion that collapse is bad—and that to advocate it would be irrational. But from a purely economic point of view, collapse actually increases the overall benefit that social complexity provides to society for their level of investment. It makes economic sense. In the graph above, C3-B1 and C1-B1 provide the same benefit to society—but for dramatically different support burdens required to maintain their respective levels of complexity. C1-B1 is a much more desirable location for a society than C3-B1, so collapse from C3-B1 to C1-B1 is actually a good thing. With the growing burden of today’s global society, the global inequality and injustice that seems to grow daily, collapse is beginning to make economic sense. In fact, an entire philosophical movement, Primitivism, has sprung up dedicated to convincing the world that a “C1-B1”, hamlet society is in fact a far better place. Despite the growing logic of collapse, in today’s peer-polity world that option does not exist except on a global scale. Today we have 3 options: 1. Continue business as usual, accepting declining marginal returns on investments in complexity (and very soon declining overall returns) until an eventual , inevitable collapse occurs globally . Continuation of present patterns will continue the escalating environmental damage, and will continue to grow the human population, with population levels in increasing excess of the support capacity of a post-collapse Earth (i.e. more people will die in the collapse). 2. Locate a new, more efficient energy source to subsidize marginal returns on our investments in complexity. This does not mean discover more oil or invent better clean coal technology—these, along with solar or wind power still provide lower marginal returns than oil in the heyday of cheap Saudi oil. Only the development of super-efficient fusion power seems to provide the ability to delay the decline of marginal returns any appreciable amount, and this will still serve to only delay and exacerbate the eventual return to option #1. 3. Precipitate a global collapse now in order to reap the economic benefits of this action while minimizing the costs of the collapse that will continue to increase with the complexity and population of our global civilization. When combined with a strategy to replace hierarchy with rhizome, as outlined in A Theory of Power, Chapter 9, this may even represent a long-term sustainable strategy. Whoa. Am I seriously suggesting the triggering of a global collapse? For the moment I’m just suggesting that we explore the idea. If, after deliberation, we accept the totality of the three options as outlined above, then triggering collapse stands as the only responsible choice. It is—admittedly—a choice that is so far outside the realm of consideration of most people (who are strongly invested in the Myth of the West) that they will never take it seriously. But critically, it does not necessarily require their consent… These may seem like the ramblings of a madman. But in the late Western Roman Empire, there is a fact that is simply not taught today because it is too far outside our tolerance for things that run counter to the Myth of the West: The citizens of Rome wanted to end the Empire, to dissolve its cumbersome structure, but could not reverse its pre-programmed course. Many—perhaps most—welcomed the invading barbarians with open arms. So should collapse be triggered now, or should we wait as long as possible? If we accept the inevitability of collapse, then it should be triggered as soon as possible, as the cost of implementing a collapse strategy is continually growing… Throughout history, when collapse has occurred, it has been a blessing. The mainstream continues to cling to the beliefs that collapse will be a terrible loss, and that it is not inevitable. Even with all of our cultural brain-washing, do we really have so much hubris as to hold on to the tired mantra that “this time, in our civilization, things will be different”?

A2: Collapse Worse

Their transition bad impacts are all happening now—we are a century too late to try to cling to the old system—collapse makes new alternatives possible Kingsnorth, Co-founder of the Dark Mountain Project, 9[Paul, 8/17/09, The Guardian, “Is there any point in fighting to stave off industrial apocalypse?”http://www.theguardian.com/commentisfree/cif-green/2009/aug/17/environment-climate-change, 7/7/15, AEG]

You say that you detect in my writing a yearning for apocalypse. I detect in yours a paralysing fear. You have convinced yourself that there are only two possible futures available to humanity. One we might call Liberal Capitalist Democracy 2.0. Clearly your preferred option, this is much like the world we live in now, only with fossil fuels replaced by solar panels; governments and corporations held to account by active citizens; and growth somehow cast aside in favour of a "steady state economy". The other we might call McCarthy world, from Cormac McCarthy's novel The Road – which is set in an impossibly hideous post-apocalyptic world, where everything is dead but humans, who are reduced to eating children. Not long ago you suggested in a column that such a future could await us if we didn't continue "the fight". Your letter continues mining this Hobbesian vein. We have to "fight on" because without modern industrial civilisation the psychopaths will take over, and there will be "mass starvation and war". Leaving aside the fact that psychopaths seem to be running the show already, and millions are suffering today from starvation and war, I think this is a false choice. We both come from a western, Christian culture with a deep apocalyptic tradition. You seem to find it hard to see beyond it. But I am not "yearning" for some archetypal End of Days,

because that's not what we face. We face what John Michael Greer, in his book of the same name, calls a "long descent": a series of ongoing crises brought about by the factors I talked of in my first letter that will bring an end to the all-consuming culture we have imposed upon the Earth. I'm sure "some good will come" from this, for that culture is a weapon of planetary mass destruction. Our civilisation will not survive in anything like its present form, but we can at least aim for a managed retreat to a saner world. Your alternative – to hold on to nurse for fear of finding something worse – is in any case a century too late. When empires begin to fall, they build their own momentum. But what comes next doesn't have to be McCarthyworld. Fear is a poor guide to the future.

Monbiot’s wrong---transition’s inevitable, doing it sooner’s key to avoid extinction Kingsnorth, Co-founder of the Dark Mountain Project, 9[Paul, 8/17/09, The Guardian, “Is there any point in fighting to stave off industrial apocalypse?”http://www.theguardian.com/commentisfree/cif-green/2009/aug/17/environment-climate-change, 7/7/15, AEG]

Dear George You say that you detect in my writing a yearning for apocalypse. I detect in yours a paralysing fear. You have convinced yourself that

there are only two possible futures available to humanity. One we might call Liberal Capitalist Democracy 2.0. Clearly your

preferred option, this is much like the world we live in now, only with fossil fuels replaced by solar panels; governments and corporations held to account by active

citizens; and growth somehow cast aside in favour of a "steady state economy". The other we might call McCarthy world, from

Cormac McCarthy's novel The Road – which is set in an impossibly hideous post-apocalyptic world , where everything is dead but humans, who are reduced to eating children. Not long ago you suggested in a column that such a future could await us if we didn't continue "the fight". Your letter continues mining this Hobbesian vein. We have to "fight on" because without modern industrial civilisation the psychopaths will take over, and there will be "mass starvation and war". Leaving aside the fact that psychopaths seem to be running the

show already, and millions are suffering today from starvation and war, I think this is a false choice. We both come from a western, Christian culture

with a deep apocalyptic tradition. You seem to find it hard to see beyond it. But I am not "yearning" for some archetypal End of Days, because that's not what we face. We face what John Michael Greer, in his book of the same name, calls a "long descent": a series of

ongoing crises brought about by the factors I talked of in my first letter that will bring an end to the all-consuming culture we have imposed upon the Earth. I'm sure "some good will come" from this, for that culture is a weapon of planetary mass destruction . Our civilisation will not survive in anything like its present form, but we can at least aim for a managed retreat to a saner world . Your alternative – to hold on to nurse for fear of finding something worse – is in any case a century too late . When empires begin to fall, they build their own momentum. But what comes next doesn't have to be McCarthyworld. Fear is a poor guide to the future.

Collapse is guaranteed which makes all their offense inevitable---only question is whether it happens now as a result of economic decline, or later as a result of ecological collapse---direct response to MonbiotKingsnorth, Co-founder of the Dark Mountain Project, 9[Paul, 8/17/09, The Guardian, “Is there any point in fighting to stave off industrial apocalypse?”http://www.theguardian.com/commentisfree/cif-green/2009/aug/17/environment-climate-change, 7/7/15, AEG]

Dear George , On the desk in front of me is a set of graphs. The horizontal axis of each represents the years 1750 to 2000. The graphs show, variously, population levels, CO2 concentration in the atmosphere, exploitation of fisheries, destruction of tropical forests , paper consumption, number of motor vehicles, water use, the rate of species extinction and the totality of the human economy's gross domestic product. What grips me about these graphs (and graphs don't usually grip me) is that though they all show very different things, they have an almost identical shape. A line begins on the left of the page, rising gradually as it moves

to the right. Then, in the last inch or so – around 1950 – it veers steeply upwards, like a pilot banking after a cliff has suddenly appeared from what he thought was an empty bank of cloud. The root cause of all these trends is the same: a rapacious human economy bringing the world swiftly to the brink of chaos. We know this; some of us even attempt to stop it happening. Yet all of these trends continue to get rapidly worse, and there is no sign of that changing soon. What these graphs make

clear better than anything else is the cold reality: there is a serious crash on the way . Yet very few of us are prepared to look honestly at the message this reality is

screaming at us: that the civilisation we are a part of is hitting the buffers at full speed, and it is too late to stop it . Instead, most of us – and I include in this generalisation much of the mainstream environmental movement – are still wedded to a vision of the future as an upgraded version of the present. We still believe in "progress", as lazily

defined by western liberalism. We still believe that we will be able to continue living more or less the same comfortable lives

(albeit with more windfarms and better lightbulbs) if we can only embrace "sustainable development" rapidly enough; and that we can then extend it

to the extra 3 billion people who will shortly join us on this already gasping planet. I think this is simply denial . The writing is on the wall for industrial society, and no amount of ethical shopping or determined protesting is going to change that now. Take a civilisation built on the myth of human exceptionalism and a deeply embedded cultural attitude to "nature"; add a blind belief in technological and material progress; then fuel the whole thing with a power source that is discovered to be disastrously destructive only after we

have used it to inflate our numbers and appetites beyond the point of no return. What do you get? We are starting to find out. We need to get real. Climate change is teetering on the point of no return while our leaders bang the drum for more growth. The economic system we rely upon cannot be tamed without collapsing, for it relies upon that growth to function. And who wants it tamed anyway? Most people in the rich world won't be giving up their cars or holidays without a fight. Some people – perhaps you – believe that these things should not be said, even if true, because saying them will deprive people of "hope", and without hope there will be no chance of "saving the planet". But false hope is worse than no hope at all. As for saving the planet – what we are really trying to save, as we scrabble around planting turbines on mountains and

shouting at ministers, is not the planet but our attachment to the western material culture, which we cannot imagine living without. The challenge is not how to shore up a crumbling empire with wave machines and global summits, but to start thinking about how we are going to live through its fall, and what we can learn from its collapse .

A2: Consumption Inevitable

Even if competition is biologically programed that doesn’t mean it has to come in the form of material consumption—past livelihoods prove degrowth is feasible Kallis 11—Giorgos, PhD, ICREA professor at ICTA, the Institute of Environmental Sciences and Technology of the Autonomous University of Barcelona, “In defence of degrowth” Ecological Economics vol 70: 873-880 http://degrowth.org/wp-content/uploads/2011/08/In-defense-of-degrowth.pdf

A State that institutes salary caps, sets strict emission caps, increases taxes to the rich or bans advertising will need some muscle. But there are currently strong and intensifying interdependencies between politicians and private interests, not least through the funding of political parties, which themselves depend on a growing economy. For some the control of governments by vested private interests marks the end of democracy and the dawn of an era of oligarchy (Kempf, 2010). The degrowth proposal is at odds with such tendencies, as it insists in the possibility to bring radical - ecological and redistributive - change through parliamentary democracy (see Latouche. 2009). We cannot surrender a priori the possibility of a non-totalitarian. popularly elected government with a mandate to redistribute and plan in the direction of sustainable degrowth. In the past we have had reasonable democratic planned economies that boldly redistributed surpluses from private consumption to public goods. Mike Davis (2007) documents how the U. S. economy was refashioned in a stroke to fight fascism: as investments were shifted from private consumption to the public war machine, cars were shared, hitchhiking became a popular way of transport, bicycles made a comeback, urban food gardens +multiplied and recycling and thrift reached unprecedented levels. As a voluntary communal spirit reigned, conspicuous consumption became socially ostracised (exhibiting publicly that you are rich remained unpopular well into the 1970s). It is a manifestation of the colonization of our imaginary that we now consider infeasible any bold collective attempt to plan our way out of the ecological catastrophe. As philosopher Slavoj Zizek puts it. it is much easier for us to imagine the end of the world than serious social change. van den Bergh is sceptical also of the prospect of individuals opting voluntarily for living a simpler and more frugal life (much less to fight politically to demand it). In his view, the image of the hunter-gatherer cannot appeal to a society of locked-in shopping mall consumers, more so given the biological - evolutionary - roots of selfish, conspicuous consumption. First, since this is a common - and easy -criticism, let me make clear that the hunter-gatherer or the caveman are not the ideal human subjects of degrowth. In my view, it is the convivial yet simple and content, enlightened human (my own preference goes for Kazantzakis* fictional hero “Alexis Zorbas"). Degrowth does not imagine turning back the clock to an idealized past that may have never existed, but using the capacities we have developed to create a mature future of being content with little material, but abundant relational, goods (Latouche. 2009). The desire for a simpler, secure and more communal life resonates with a large part of the population, well beyond radical environmentalists. Whereas social positioning and the desire for differentiation might as well be programmed in our genes, this does not need to take necessarily the shape of an endless rivalry for material accumulation. Ceremonial sport competitions are a much nobler and cleaner way to channel rivalry and status differentiation for testosterone-filled males. Anthropologists document the multiple forms rivalry has taken in human societies from gift-giving to self-sacrifice as the ultimate honour. Conditioned by genes, cultures still decide. Our capitalist culture does select for material possession, but the driving force is the structural imperative of the system to grow or die. not the genes of the people. The positional quest for wealth in our "affluent society" is linked to state policies that have shifted investments from public to private goods (Galbraith, 1998). in order to maintain at all costs private accumulation. Precisely because there are "complex factors of lock-in" (van den Bergh, 2011). we need to plan systemic change. People were alright without shopping malls and televisions a few decades back, and rest sure they will so be if they have to live without them in the future.

A2: Innovation Turns

Innovation is still a thing under degrowth. Callenbach, University of Chicago English and Communications Master, ‘11[Ernest, August 2011, The Solutions Journal, “Sustainable Shrinkage: Envisioning a Smaller, Stronger Economy”, http://www.thesolutionsjournal.com/node/968, accessed 7/6/15, GE]

These are big changes, and some of them will require capital, which will be harder to get. But some will thrive in conditions of declining capital, which will make them newly attractive. Saving money is the same as making money (sometimes better)

and it’s almost always less destructive ecologically. Some of the necessary changes will bring joy and happiness. Some will demand harder and smarter work—which may be good for our health. A lot of the changes, it’s crucial to note, will involve the creation of many new jobs: the renewable-energy industry (solar and wind, mainly) already provides more jobs in the United States (about 88,000) than coal mining (about 81,000); intensive agriculture has higher outputs per acre than commercial fossil-fuel-driven farming, but it requires more labor. This is good. While some changes will require massive technological innovations, many will spring up and spread by ordinary cussed human determination,

like the gardening that’s taking over areas of Detroit and Flint, Michigan, that General Motors has abandoned. Some innovations are within the power of present-day corporations, financed by our existing financial institutions: rooftop solar if we adopt German feed-in tariffs, plug-in cars, more efficient appliances. Some changes will happen faster if helped along by governments: incandescent lightbulbs are now illegal to import into the European Union, which is consequently far ahead of the United States in adopting compact fluorescents. A stable or shrinking economy will still be tumultuous, full of opportunities for entrepreneurs and jobs for all kinds of people.

The standard work week may shrink too, as in France and more recently in Germany—a kind of job sharing. Some industries will contract drastically, as airlines and construction are doing now; but others will grow, like medical services. The huge energy throughputs of the Internet can be reduced, and participant sports (not spectator sports) can grow. Battery building and other types of energy storage will thrive, while internal-combustion-engine manufacturing will decline. Wind turbines will become a big business (they already are), while coal- and nuclear-plant construction will collapse. There will even be a new construction-and-destruction industry of retrofitting car-dependent suburbs into compact, dense towns with lively centers and good transport connections, taking the place of the sprawl-construction industry. Airplane builders will convert themselves into train and streetcar and bus manufacturers. Bicycles, already bigger in unit sales than cars, will further expand, along with low-energy devices like scooters and light motorbikes. In fascinating, titanic struggles, power companies and oil companies will joust over propulsion energy for vehicles. Centralized power generators will be mortally threatened by distributed-energy solar and wind entrepreneurs.

A2: Transition Wars

They can win transition wars, the post-collapse order might be worse, and the benefits of the chance of transitioning to a post-growth system still outweigh---this card ends the debate Alexander, Sustainable Society Institute Research Fellow, 14[Samuel, 2/14/14, Post Carbon Pathways, “Post-Growth Economics: A Paradigm Shift in Progress,” pg. 13-14, 7/7/15, AEG] As industrial civilisation continues its global expansion and pursues growth without apparent limit, the possibility of economic, political, or

ecological crises forcing an alternative way of life upon humanity seems to be growing in likelihood (Ehrlich and Ehrlich, 2013). That

is, if the existing model of global development is not stopped via one of the pathways reviewed above, or some other strategy, then it seems clear enough

that at some point in the future, industrial civilisation will grow itself to death (Turner, 2012). Whether 'collapse' is initiated by an ecological tipping point, a financial breakdown of an overly indebted economy, a geopolitical disruption, an oil crisis, or some confluence of such forces, the possibility of collapse or deep global crisis can

no longer be dismissed merely as the intellectual playground for 'doomsayers' with curdled imaginations. Collapse is a prospect that ought to be taken seriously based on the logic of limitless growth on a finite planet, as well as the evidence of existing economic, ecological, or

more specifically climatic instability. As Paul Gilding (2011) has suggested, perhaps it is already too late to avoid some form of 'great disruption'. Could collapse or deep

crisis be the most likely pathway to an alternative way of life? If it is, such a scenario must not be idealised or romanticised. Fundamental change through crisis would almost certainly involve great suffering for many , and quite possibly significant population decline through

starvation, disease, or war . It is also possible that the 'alternative system' that a crisis produces is equally or even more undesirable than the existing system. Nevertheless , it may be that this is the only way a post-growth or post- industrial way of life will ever arise . The Cuban oil crisis, prompted by the collapse of the USSR, provides one such example of a deep societal transition that arose not

from a political or social movement, but from sheer force of circumstances (Piercy et al, 2010). Almost overnight Cuba had a large proportion of its oil supply cut off, forcing the nation to move away from oil-dependent, industrialised modes of food production and instead take up local and organic systems - or perish. David Holmgren (2013) has recently published a deep and provocative essay, 'Crash on Demand', exploring the idea

that a relatively small anti-consumerist movement could be enough to destabilise the global economy which is already struggling. This presents one means of bringing an end to the status quo by inducing a voluntary crisis, without relying on a mass movement. Needless to say, should people adopt such a strategy, it would be imperative to 'prefigure' the alternative society as far as possible too, not merely withdraw support from the existing society. Again, one must not

romanticise such theories or transitions. The Cuban crisis, for example, entailed much hardship. But it does expose the mechanisms by which crisis can induce significant societal change in ways that, in the end, are not always negative. In the face of a global crisis or breakdown, therefore, it could be that elements of the deep green vision (such as organic agriculture, frugal living, sharing, radical recycling, post-

oil transportation, etc.) come to be forced upon humanity, in which case the question of strategy has less to do with avoiding a deep crisis or collapse (which may be inevitable) and more to do with negotiating the descent as wisely as possible . This is hardly a reliable path to the deep green alternative, but it presents itself as a possible path.

DeDev AFF Answers

War Turns

Yes War – 2AC

Econ controls every other facet of deterrence – solves multiple hot spots for war Gelb, CFR president emeritus, 2010(Leslie, “GDP Now Matters More Than Force”, Foreign Affairs, Nov/Dec, ebsco)

Today, the United States continues to be the world's power balancer of choice. It is the only regional balancer against China in Asia, Russia in eastern Europe , and Iran in the Middle East . Although Americans rarely think about this role and

foreign leaders often deny it for internal political reasons, the fact is that Americans and non-Americans alike require these services. Even Russian leaders today look to Washington to check China. And Chinese leaders surely realize that they need the U.S. Navy and Air Force to guard the world's sea and trading lanes. Washington should not be embarrassed to remind others of the costs and risks of the United States' security role when it comes to economic transactions. That applies, for example, to Afghan and Iraqi decisions about contracts for their natural resources, and to Beijing on many counts. U.S. forces maintain a stable world order that decidedly benefits China's economic growth, and to date, Beijing has been getting a free ride. A NEW APPROACH In this environment, the first-tier foreign policy goals of the United States should be a strong economy and the ability to deploy effective counters to threats at the lowest possible cost. Second-tier goals, which are always more controversial, include retaining the military power to remain the world's power balancer, promoting freer trade, maintaining technological advantages (including cyberwarfare capabilities), reducing

risks from various environmental and health challenges, developing alternative energy supplies, and advancing U.S. values such as democracy and human rights. Wherever possible, second-tier goals should reinforce first-tier ones: for example, it makes sense to err on the side of freer trade to help boost the economy and to invest in greater energy independence to reduce dependence on the tumultuous Middle East. But no overall approach should dictate how to pursue these goals in each and every situation. Specific applications depend on, among other things, the culture and politics of the target countries. An overarching vision helps leaders consider how to use their power to achieve their goals. This is what gives policy direction, purpose, and thrust--and this is what is often missing from U.S. policy. The organizing principle of U.S. foreign policy should be to use power to solve common problems. The good old days of being able to command others by making military or economic threats are largely gone. Even the weakest nations can resist the strongest ones or drive up the costs for submission. Now, U.S. power derives mainly from others' knowing that they cannot solve their problems without the United States and that they will have to heed U.S. interests to achieve common goals. Power by services rendered has largely replaced power by command. No matter the decline in U.S. power, most nations do not doubt that the United States is the indispensable leader in solving major international problems. This problem-solving capacity creates opportunities for U.S. leadership in everything from trade talks to military-conflict resolution to international agreements on global warming. Only Washington can help the nations bordering the South China Sea forge a formula for sharing the region's resources. Only Washington has a chance of pushing the Israelis and the Palestinians toward peace. Only Washington can bargain to increase the low value of a Chinese currency exchange . rate that disadvantages almost every nation's trade with China. But it is clear to Americans and non-Americans alike that Washington lacks the power to solve or manage difficult problems alone; the indispensable leader must work with indispensable partners. To attract the necessary partners, Washington must do the very thing that habitually afflicts U.S. leaders with political hives: compromise. This does not mean multilateralism for its own sake, nor does it mean abandoning vital national interests. The Obama administration has been criticized for softening UN economic sanctions against Iran in order to please China and Russia. Had the United States not compromised, however, it would have faced vetoes and enacted no new sanctions at all. U.S. presidents are often in a strong position to bargain while preserving essential U.S. interests, but they have to do a better job of selling such unavoidable compromises to the U.S. public. U.S. policymakers must also be patient. The weakest of nations today can resist and delay. Pressing prematurely for decisions--an unfortunate hallmark of U.S. style--results in failure, the prime enemy of power. Success breeds power, and failure breeds weakness. Even when various domestic constituencies shout for quick action, Washington's leaders must learn to buy time in order to allow for U.S. power--and the power of U.S.-led coalitions--to take effect abroad. Patience is especially valuable in the economic arena, where there are far more players than in the military and diplomatic realms. To corral all these players takes time. Military power can work quickly, like a storm; economic power grabs slowly, like the tide. It needs time to erode the shoreline, but it surely does nibble away. To be sure, U.S. presidents need to preserve the United States' core role as the world's military and diplomatic balancer--for its own sake; and because it strengthens U.S. interests in economic transactions. But economics has to be the main driver for current policy, as nations calculate power more in terms of GDP than military might . U.S. GDP will be the lure and the whip in the international affairs of the twenty-first century. U.S. interests abroad cannot be adequately protected or advanced without an economic reawakening at home.

Economic decline causes global war Royal, U.S. Department of Defense, 10 (Jedediah, 2010, Department of Defense, “Economic Integration, Economic Signaling and the Problem of Economic Crises,” p. 213-215 Accessed 7/6/15 JMB)

Less intuitive is how periods of economic decline may increase the likelihood of external conflict. Political science literature has contributed a moderate degree of attention to the impact of economic decline and the security and defence behaviour of interdependent states. Research in this vein has been considered at systemic, dyadic and national levels. Several notable contributions follow. First, on the systemic level, Pollins (2008) advances Modelski and Thompson's (1996) work on leadership cycle theory, finding that rhythms in the global economy are associated with the rise and fall of a pre-eminent power and the often bloody transition from one pre-eminent leader to the next. As such, exogenous shocks such as economic crises could usher in a redistribution of relative power (see also Gilpin. 1981) that leads to uncertainty about power balances, increasing the risk of miscalculation (Feaver, 1995). Alternatively, even a relatively certain redistribution of power could lead to a permissive environment for conflict as a rising power may seek to challenge a declining power (Werner. 1999). Separately, Pollins (1996) also shows that

global economic cycles combined with parallel leadership cycles impact the likelihood of conflict among major, medium and small powers, although he suggests that the causes and connections between global economic conditions and security conditions remain unknown. Second, on a dyadic level, Copeland's (1996, 2000) theory of trade expectations suggests that 'future expectation of trade' is a significant variable in understanding economic conditions and security behaviour of states. He argues that interdependent states are likely to gain pacific benefits from trade so long as they have an optimistic view of future trade relations. However, if the expectations of future trade decline, particularly for difficult to replace items such as energy resources, the likelihood for conflict increases, as states will be inclined to use force to gain access to those resources. Crises could potentially be the trigger for decreased trade expectations either on its own or because it triggers protectionist moves by interdependent states.4 Third, others have considered the link between economic decline and external armed conflict at a national level. Blomberg and Hess (2002) find a strong correlation between internal conflict and external conflict, particularly during periods of economic downturn. They write: The linkages between internal and external conflict and prosperity are strong and mutually reinforcing. Economic conflict tends to spawn internal conflict, which in turn returns the favour. Moreover, the presence of a recession tends to amplify the extent to which international and external conflicts self-reinforce each other. (Blomberg & Hess, 2002. p. 89) Economic decline has also been linked with an increase in the likelihood of terrorism (Blomberg, Hess, & Weerapana, 2004), which has the capacity to spill across borders and lead to external tensions. Furthermore, crises generally reduce the popularity of a sitting government. "Diversionary theory" suggests that, when facing unpopularity arising from economic decline, sitting governments have increased incentives to fabricate external military conflicts to create a 'rally around the flag' effect. Wang (1996), DeRouen (1995). and Blomberg, Hess, and Thacker (2006) find supporting evidence showing that economic decline and use of force are at least indirectly correlated. Gelpi (1997), Miller (1999), and Kisangani and Pickering (2009) suggest that the tendency towards diversionary tactics are greater for democratic states than autocratic states, due to the fact that democratic leaders are generally more susceptible to being removed from office due to lack of domestic support. DeRouen (2000) has provided evidence showing that periods of weak economic performance in the United States, and thus weak Presidential popularity, are statistically linked to an increase in the use of force. In summary, recent economic scholarship positively correlates economic integration with an increase in the frequency of economic crises, whereas political science scholarship links economic decline with external conflict at systemic, dyadic and national levels.5 This implied connection between integration, crises and armed conflict has not featured prominently in the economic-security debate and deserves more attention.

Yes War – 1AR

Economic growth outweighs – collapse makes it impossible to confront any global challenge and makes nuclear war more likelyO’Hanlon, Brookings Center for 21st Century Security and Intelligence co-director, 2012(Michael, “The real national security threat: America's debt”, 7-3, http://articles.latimes.com/2012/jul/03/opinion/la-oe-ohanlon-fiscal-reform-20120703)Alas, globalization and automation trends of the last generation have increasingly called the American dream into question for the working classes. Another decade of underinvestment in what is required to remedy this situation will make an isolationist or populist president far more likely because much of the country will question whether an internationalist role makes sense for America

— especially if it costs us well over half a trillion dollars in defense spending annually yet seems correlated with more job losses. Lastly, American economic weakness undercuts U.S. leadership abroad . Other countries sense our weakness and wonder about our purport 7ed decline. If this perception becomes

more widespread, and the case that we are in decline becomes more persuasive, countries will begin to take actions that reflect their skepticism about America's future. Allies and friends will doubt our commitment and may pursue nuclear weapons for their own security, for example; adversaries will sense opportunity and be less restrained in throwing around their weight in their own neighborhoods. The crucial Persian Gulf and Western Pacific regions will likely become less stable. Major war will become more likely . When running for president last time, Obama eloquently articulated big foreign policy visions: healing America's breach with the Muslim world, controlling global climate change, dramatically curbing global poverty through development aid, moving toward a world free of nuclear weapons. These were, and remain, worthy if elusive goals. However, for Obama or his successor, there is now a much more urgent big-picture issue: restoring U.S. economic strength. Nothing else is really possible if that fundamental prerequisite to effective foreign policy is not reestablished.

Economic decline causes great power wars – goes nuclear Harris and Burrows, 9 – *counselor in the National Intelligence Council, the principal drafter of Global Trends 2025, **member of the NIC’s Long Range Analysis Unit “Revisiting the Future: Geopolitical Effects of the Financial Crisis”, Washington Quarterly, http://www.twq.com/09april/docs/09apr_burrows.pdf)

Increased Potential for Global Conflict Of course, the report encompasses more than economics and indeed believes the future is likely to be the result of a number of intersecting and interlocking forces. With so many possible permutations of outcomes, each with ample opportunity for unintended consequences, there is a growing sense of insecurity. Even so, history may be more instructive than ever. While we continue to believe that the Great Depression is not likely to be repeated, the lessons to be drawn from that period include the harmful effects on fledgling democracies and multiethnic societies (think Central Europe in 1920s and 1930s) and on the sustainability of multilateral institutions (think League of Nations in the same period). There is no reason to think that this would not be true in the twenty-first as much as in the twentieth century. For that reason, the ways in which the potential for greater conflict could grow would seem to be even more apt in a constantly volatile economic environment as they would be if change would be steadier. In surveying those risks, the report stressed the likelihood that terrorism and nonproliferation will remain priorities even as resource issues move up on the international agenda. Terrorism’s appeal will decline if economic growth continues in the Middle East and youth unemployment is reduced. For those terrorist groups that remain active in 2025, however, the diffusion of technologies and scientific knowledge will place some of the world’s most dangerous capabilities within their reach. Terrorist groups in 2025 will likely be a combination of descendants of long established groups inheriting organizational structures, command and control processes, and training procedures necessary to conduct sophisticated attacks and newly emergent collections of the angry and disenfranchised that become self-radicalized, particularly in the absence of economic outlets that would become narrower in an economic downturn. The most dangerous casualty of any economically-induced drawdown of U.S. military presence would almost certainly be the Middle East. Although Iran’s acquisition of nuclear weapons is not inevitable, worries about a nuclear-armed Iran could lead states in the region to develop new security arrangements with external powers, acquire additional weapons, and consider pursuing their own nuclear ambitions. It is not clear that the type of stable deterrent relationship that existed between the great powers for most of the Cold War would emerge naturally in the Middle East with a nuclear Iran. Episodes of low intensity conflict and terrorism taking place under a nuclear umbrella could lead to an unintended escalation and broader conflict if clear red lines between those states involved are not well established. The close proximity of potential nuclear rivals combined with underdeveloped surveillance capabilities and mobile dual-capable Iranian missile systems also will produce inherent difficulties in achieving reliable indications and warning of an impending nuclear attack. The lack of strategic depth in neighboring states like Israel, short warning and missile flight times, and uncertainty of Iranian intentions may place more focus on preemption rather than defense, potentially leading to escalating crises. Types of conflict that the world continues to experience, such as over resources, could reemerge, particularly if protectionism grows and there is a resort to neo-mercantilist practices. Perceptions of renewed energy scarcity will drive countries to take actions to assure their future

access to energy supplies. In the worst case, this could result in interstate conflicts if government leaders deem assured access to energy resources, for example, to be essential for maintaining domestic stability and the survival of their regime. Even actions short of war, however, will have important geopolitical implications. Maritime security concerns are providing a rationale for naval buildups and modernization efforts, such as China’s and India’s development of blue water naval capabilities. If the fiscal stimulus focus for these countries indeed turns inward, one of the most obvious funding targets may be military. Buildup of regional naval capabilities could lead to increased tensions, rivalries, and counterbalancing moves, but it also will create opportunities for multinational cooperation in protecting critical sea lanes. With water also becoming scarcer in Asia and the Middle East, cooperation to manage changing water resources is likely to be increasingly difficult both within and between states in a more dog-eat-dog world.

Environment Turns

Strong Growth Key – 2AC

A strong economy is necessary to enter a take-off phase of sustainable transition—financial investment, government reform, and public concern are negatively affected by economic declineGeels, University of Manchester Sustainable Consumption Institute System Innovation and Sustainability Professor, ‘13[Frank W, September, European Commission European Research Area, “The impact of the financial-economic crisis on sustainability transitions: Financial investment, governance and public discourse”, www.foreurope.eu, accessed 7/7/15, GE]

2.1. Entering the take-off phase in sustainability transitions After a decades-long emergence process, some green niche-innovations are gathering momentum in certain countries. Sustainability transitions may therefore be entering a new phase, moving from a pre-development phase (with

an emphasis on R&D and experimentation) to a take-off phase (with more emphasis on real-world deployment and installation of green solutions). In the agri-food sector, for instance, the niche-innovation of organic food has gathered pace (Table 1). In the energy sector, renewable energy has a share of 9% of primary energy in the European Union, with several countries scoring much higher (Norway. Sweden.

Austria) and lower (UK. Netherlands. Malta) (Table 2). For electricity, the European share of renewable power is higher, about 18% in 2009 (Fig- 3). In the US transport sector, sales of various 'green' cars (Hybrid-Electric Vehicles. Plugin Hybrid- Electric Vehicles, Extended Range Electric Vehicles and Battery-Electric Vehicles) peaked in 2007 (Fig.

4). reaching between 2 and 3% of overall sales.11 Sales in Europe are lower, but also dominated by hybrid-electric vehicles. 22. Wider challenges in the take-off phase With some green niche-innovations entering the take-off phase of sustainability transitions in certain countries, new kinds of challenges will gain importance. Firstly, greater amounts of financial investment are needed to facilitate on-the-ground deployment of green options. Whereas govern- ment R&D. complemented with some private equity and venture capital, tend to dominate in the pre-development

phase, up-scaling and deployment in the take-off phase tend to draw on other types of finance such public equity markets, credit markets, mergers and acquisition, and government subsi- dies (Fig. 5). The challenge for sustainability transitions is to mobilize large sums of money, as Giddens (2009: 123) notes: "The role of businesses, small and large, is going to be absolutely crucial in respon- ding to climate change, not least because they will have to supply a good deal of the funding and also pioneer new technologies". The availability of these types of finance is shaped by economic conditions, financial regulations, and investor confidence. The second challenge in the take-off phase concerns changes in policy and

institutional frame- works. In the pre-development phase green niche-innovations are sheltered, nurtured and protected from adverse regime conditions. But in the take-

off phase, they face multi-dimensional struggles with incumbent regimes. On policy dimensions, the odds are often stacked against niche-innovations, because formal institutions have been adjusted to the needs of incumbent actors

(Walker, 2000}. Niche-innovations often face a 'mis-match' with existing institutions (Freeman and Perez. 1988). So, further breakthrough and wider diffusion depends on changes in policy and institutional frameworks . This is especially the case for transitions towards sustainability, which refers to collective goods (with associated free rider problems). Because private actors have no immediate incentive to address sustainability problems, public authorities have to change economic frame conditions and formal institutions (regulations, subsidies, incentives, taxes). That is why many green growth reports not only call for more investment, but also for stronger policies. UNEP (2011: 2). for instance, claims that: "there is a need for better public policies, including pricing and regulatory measures, to change the perverse market incentives that drive this capital mis-allocation. (...) To make the transition to a green economy, specific enabling conditions will be required. (..,) At a national level, examples of such enabling conditions are: changes in fiscal policy; reform and reduction of environmentally harmful subsidies; employing new market-based instruments: targeting public investments to 'green' key sectors; greening public procurement; and improving environmental rules and regulations as well as their enforcement." The OECD (2011: 8) also argues for changes in fiscal and regulatory settings (such as tax and competition policy), innovation policy, environmental policies, which "include a mix of price-based instruments (for instance environmentally-related taxes)and non-market instruments such as regulations, technology support policies and voluntary

approaches". Making and implementing such institutional changes will be a difficult political process. Firstly, there is the normal

problem of reluctance to change, related to institutional inertia and institutional path dependence (Pierson. 2000; Barbier, 2011). Secondly, there will be active resistance and lobby- ing from powerful incumbent interests aimed at hindering institutional change or creating loopholes that reduce the effectiveness of policies. Corporate interests have much influence as Levy and Newell (2000: 14) note: 'The European commission undertakes business roundtables on a regular basis to consult with leading industrialists. The European Roundtable of Industrialists, made up of chief exec- utive officers from 45 leading European companies, is arguably the most influential interest group in Brussels. (...) Although environmental groups may exercise influence in setting the agenda, when the point of decision is reached, large

multinational companies and the organizations that represent them have key access to members of the commission, ministers, and heads of government in mem- ber states." As green innovations begin to compete with existing regimes, it is likely that incumbent players will flex their economic and political muscles even more to protect their interests. Following a useful distinction by Hall (1993). this political struggle will be played out at three levels: (a) The precise setting of policy instruments: there will be struggles over the strictness of environ- mental regulations, height of carbon taxes etc. (b) The kinds of policy instruments; many industries and policymakers have a preference for market- based instruments rather that regulatory instruments, and have actively lobbied for the former in the last 10 years. But since some of these market-based instruments (e.g. European emissions trading) have not delivered what was promised, struggles may ensue about the implementation of other policy instruments. (c) The overall goals that guide policies in particular fields and the associated belief systems (what Hall calls a policy paradigm). In the last few decades, many (Western) governments operated on the basis of a neo-

liberal policy paradigm. Both the financial crisis and exacerbating environmental problems have given rise to doubts about the

efficiency and capacity of markets to deliver with regard to public goods. Hence, there are pleas for changes in governance structures and a stronger role for governments in sustainability transitions . Scrase and MacKerron (2009: 232-233)

claim that: "Market efficiency and driving down costs have their place, but governments must now become much more active in steering societies through the necessary transitions to a low carbon future." And Meadowcroft (2011: 71) argues that: "State intervention and governance reform are essential. To put this in another way: markets may drive the uptake of the iPhone(...). but they will not produce a carbon emission-free energy system (...). Changes to law - modifying the regula- tory frameworks within which economic actors conduct their affairs (for example, by introducing a carbon tax of a GHC emissions cap and trade system) - and a significant expenditure of social revenue (for example, to accelerate development and deployment of new technologies and to ease

societal adjustment to new patterns of production and consumption) are essential to encourage sustainability transitions." The third challenge in the take-off phase entails securing wider public support and cultural legit- imacy (Geels and Verhees. 2011). This is instrumentally

important because "whatever can be done through the State will depend upon generating widespread political support from citizens" (Giddens, 2009: 91). Urgent demands from public opinion can offer politicians incentives to jockey for green agendas (Burnstein, 2003). Major policy shifts are therefore often accompanied by shifts in public opinion and cultural discourse, which, in turn, are shaped by social movements, media, industry asso- ciations, and special-interest groups (Hilgartner and Bosk, 1988). The literature on issue-attention cycles offers

interesting ideas in this respect. The basic proposition is that social problems ('issues') have dynamics of their own and go through several phases. Concerns about social problems tend to emerge in civil society, then affect public opinion, subsequently spill over to political debates, and possibly lead to policies (Fig. 6). The introduction of substantive legislation often coincides with a peak in public concern (Y-axis in Fig. 6). Issue-attention cycles do not

necessarily progress linearly through all phase. Public attention and concern may also decline before substantive legislation is introduced. Downs (1972) warned that such

declines may happen when publics realize that the costs of solving the problem are very high or may require sacrifices by large groups in the population. This realization may cause three reactions: "Some people just get discouraged. Others feel positively threatened

by thinking about the prob- lem: so they suppress such thoughts. Still others become bored by the issue" (p. 40). He also notes that attention to issues may decline because of competition with other prominent issues (see also Hilgartner and Bosk. 1988. who developed a conceptual model in which social

problems compete for attention in public arenas). These considerations may be relevant for contemporary sustainability tran- sitions, where the financial-economic crisis is potentially an issue that competes with sustainability concerns.

Growth Sustainable

Infinite growth is possible Harford, Senior columnist for the Financial Times, 14[Tim, 1/24/14, FreakNomincs “Can Economic Growth Continue Forever? Of Course!” http://freakonomics.com/2014/01/24/can-economic-growth-continue-forever-of-course/ Accessed 7/7/15 JMB]

Can economic growth continue forever? The internet seems to be full of physicists explaining that economists are clueless on this topic. There’s the late Albert Bartlett’s hugely popular videos – or Tom Murphy’s article “Exponential Economist Meets Finite Physicist.” The key issue is that exponential growth will eventually take you to impossible places. And by eventually, the physicists mean “sooner than we expect.” Exponential growth is any kind of growth that compounds like interest payments. The classic example is the rice on the chessboard. According to an old story, the inventor of the game of chess was offered a reward by a delighted king. He requested a modest-sounding payment: one grain of rice on the first square of the chessboard, two on the second, four on the third, doubling each time. Yet this is actually a colossal amount—many times the annual rice production of the entire planet. The chessboard prize was 100 percent growth per square; but 10 percent, 1 percent or even 0.0001 percent—it’s all exponential growth. And it all becomes trouble eventually, because each little bit of growth will itself be multiplied by growth in the future. As Albert

Einstein, yet another physicist, is famously said to have declared (but probably did not), “the most powerful force in the universe is compound interest.” The implication for economic growth seems obvious. Our economy grows at a few percent a year. That hasn’t

presented many insuperable problems so far. But growth of a few per cent a year is nevertheless exponential growth, and eventually—the physicists worry—we’ll reach a square on the economic chessboard that we just can’t fill. Economists understand this point perfectly well. One of the very first people to be called an economist was the Reverend Thomas Malthus, who died almost two hundred years ago. Malthus was worried about exponential population growth, and his math was incontrovertible. Fortunately, in the short term technological progress was faster than population growth. More recently population growth has been slowing down dramatically. There’s every reason to believe that the population of the planet is going to stabilize. I don’t think anybody believes zero population growth is unsustainable. You might well respond that even if population growth stops, growth in the economy – in GDP – will continue, and fall foul of the rice-on-the-chessboard problem. But I think that here we find a serious gap in the logic of the exponential doomsayers. They’re looking at exponential growth in physical processes—things like heating, cooling, lighting, movement. This is understandable, because they are, after all, physicists.

Tom Murphy’s blog post is particularly startling on this point. He points out that if our energy consumption grows at 2.3 percent a year—less than historical rates but enough to increase energy consumption tenfold each century—then the entire planet will reach boiling point in just four centuries. It’s not the greenhouse effect at work; it’s irrelevant to Professor Murphy’s point whether the energy comes from fossil fuels, solar power or fairy dust. This is simply about the waste heat given off, inevitably, when we use energy to do useful work. And it’s pretty hard to argue with the laws of thermodynamics. The calculation sounds shocking, but it’s just the rice on the chessboard all over again. Here’s the logic lapse: energy growth is not the same as economic growth. GDP merely measures what people are willing to pay for, which is not necessarily connected to the use of energy, or any other physical resource. True, since the beginning of the industrial revolution the two have tended to go hand in hand, but there’s no logical reason why that tendency needs to continue. Indeed, it appears to have stopped already. Would you like to take a guess at energy growth per person in the United States over the last quarter of a century? It’s not just less than 2.3 percent. It’s less than zero. The same is true for other developed economies such as Germany, Japan and the United Kingdom. Now this is partly due to offshoring to China – but the offshoring effect just doesn’t seem big enough to explain what is going on. It’s also about the changing nature of what is bought and sold in a modern economy

A2: Degrowth Solves Climate

Economic contraction doesn’t reduce emissions—only growth can solveStepp, Senior Analyst with the Information Technology and Innovation Foundation, 12[Matthew, 1/24/12, The Innovation Files, “The Future of Global Climate Policy: Is Economic Contraction a Climate Solution (Part 2)” http://www.innovationfiles.org/the-future-of-global-climate-policy-is-economic-contraction-a-climate-solution-part-2/ Accessed 7/9/15 JMB] So is voluntary economic contraction a key lever for climate mitigation? In fact, there are two problems with this as a key climate policy strategy. First, it will obviously be very difficult, if not impossible, to actually get political economies anywhere to voluntarily and substantially stifle economic growth. And second, the math just doesn’t add up; even in the most ideal circumstances, voluntary economic contraction in the developed world can’t drive global carbon emissions towards zero. That it would be very difficult to convince nations to voluntarily reduce economic welfare should be a fairly uncontroversial notion. Roberts, to his credit, knows how fantastical his proposal sounds. In his book, The Climate Fix, Roger Pielke Jr. formulates an Iron Law of Climate Policy, which states that “even if people are willing to bear some costs to reduce emissions, they are only willing to go so far.” In other words, when policies on emissions reductions require reduced economic welfare, public tolerance for such policies will be extremely limited. Societies do sometimes opt to pay slightly higher energy prices for cleaner air, domestic energy production, or other “intangible” goals. But acceptance of such policies always comes after a big fight, and it can only be sustained if the economic impacts of these policies are limited. But acceptance of such policies always comes after a big fight, and it can only be sustained if the economic impacts of these policies are limited. In other words, a climate strategy that hinges on significant, voluntary economic contraction is going to be a steep uphill battle that at best results in marginal results and at worst will expend significant political capital on a proposition that will almost certainly lose. Roberts counters that the only way his approach works is through an intense climate communications effort. But it still seems all but certain that something like the Iron Law of Climate Policy holds even under an intense PR push by climate advocates and the most charismatic and courageous political leadership. Public tolerance for voluntary economic contraction in the name of climate mitigation will be extremely limited at best. But let’s play devil’s advocate: say an intense climate communications effort convinces the rich world that we are already far too wealthy for our own good and should happily begin a substantial reduction in our incomes and GDP. Is this a core climate solution? The short answer is no. The math just doesn’t add up. Let’s work through a thought experiment. Current global GDP per capita is roughly $9,000 per person and the global population is about 7 billion. Let us assume for this exercise that around $15,000 per capita constitutes a “happiness threshold” where real improvements in welfare and happiness stops being strongly correlated with increased wealth, as some social researchers contend. If global wealth were somehow perfectly redistributed to each person equally (this is clearly a thought experiment!), we would therefore need to see per capita GDP increase by 67 percent by 2050 in order for each of the world’s inhabitants to reach incomes consistent with this happiness threshold. But at the same time, global population is expected to rise to at least 9 billion people by 2050, an increase of 28 percent. Using our Kaya Identity terms, we can see that global GDP would then have to rise by over 100 percent (+67% per capita GDP * +28% population = +114% GDP). In other words, even if we were to achieve this perfect redistribution of global wealth at exactly the ideal happiness threshold, global GDP would still have to more than double by mid-century, at the same time that global carbon emissions should be cut by half or more. Clearly, this is also the most optimistic thought experiment possible, with perfect global wealth redistribution. Per capita GDP would fall in the richer parts of the world to $15,000 per person (down to about half of today’s per capita GDP in OECD nations) and rising in the poorer parts of the world to $15,000 per person. You be the judge as to how likely this scenario is, or how happy you would be to see your income fall to around $15,000. Any real-world scenario that resembles Roberts’ proposal for “voluntary economic contraction” in the developed world is likely to have far more modest outcomes and will certainly lack the perfectly equal distribution of global wealth in this example. Meaning unless we’re going to try to condemn the emerging economies to permanent poverty as well, we’re going to see global GDP far more than double over the next four decades. Economic contraction is thus a non-solution to significantly reduce emissions: it simply cannot result in the kind of substantial absolute decline in (at least) one of the Kaya Identity terms above. We will not bend global carbon emissions rapidly downward through even the most humane vision of voluntary economic contraction and global wealth redistribution. Returning to our Kaya Identity, we can thus be clear: both the population and GDP per capita terms of our equation are going to rise steadily through at least the next half century, whether we see voluntary economic contraction in the world’s rich nations or not . That leaves us with just one key strategy to drive emissions towards zero: we must accelerate the decarbonization of the global economy to significantly reduce the C/GDP term of our equation. Thus, if we must drive carbon emissions towards zero as quickly as possible, there is only one core climate lever that can get the job done: we must decarbonize the economy as quickly as possible. As we’ll argue in Part 3 of this series, the most important thing we can do to greatly accelerate the global adoption of clean energy technologies and the decarbonization of the global energy supply is to accelerate the pace of energy innovation and make clean energy cheap.

Degrowth doesn’t solve climate change Hepburn and Bowen, University of Oxford Environmental Economics Professor and London School of Economics Principal Research Fellow, 2012

[Cameron and Alex, October, Center for Climate Change and Economic Policy, “Prosperity with growth: Economic growth, climate change and environmental limits”, http://www.lse.ac.uk/GranthamInstitute/wp-content/uploads/2014/02/WP93-prosperity-with-growth-climate-change.pdf, accessed 7/7/15, GE]

The conclusion is that even halting economic growth does not produce absolute decoupling (as ( > 0), and it certainly does not deliver , as required to restrain temperature increases to less than 2oC. Achieving this, under Jackson’s zero growth scenario, would still require a radical, structural shift in technology to T/T=-5.6%, implying a dramatic reduction in the emissions intensity of GDP. Indeed, it is precisely this sort of structural shift that Jackson rules out to justify his ‘no growth’ world. It is clear to a very large number of scholars and others that shifting from –0.7% to –7% p.a. is an extreme challenge. However, reducing to –5.6% while simultaneously is reduced to 0% is even more difficult economically (observe the relationship between affluence, R&D investment and the potential for a structural shift), and impossible politically, and is socially undesirable. The consequences of sharply slowing (let alone stopping) growth are observable in the West at present: high unemployment, increased levels of crime and mental illness, large-scale strikes and so on show the social damage wrought by an economic contraction. Our point is that both paths involve Herculean challenges, and a ‘no growth’ world does not solve the problem of climate change or other environmental problems. Rather, for the sake of prosperity and indeed the likelihood of success, it is better to drive increases in technological progress, leading to reductions in intensity, to generate absolute decoupling along with stable growth. Instead of trying to work out how to stop growth at least cost, the significant and important question is how to stimulate a structural shift and a radical change in T. We need ‘green growth’, not ‘no growth’.

Transition Answers

Collapse Worse – 2AC

Transition will fail – shutdown of the economy will and cause extinctionCobb, 11/23/2014 Kurt, after and author of the peak oil-themed thriller Prelude, “Nuclear war: A forgotten threat to human sustainability” http://www.resilience.org/stories/2014-11-23/nuclear-war-a-forgotten-threat-to-human-sustainabilityOnce a machine civilization has been in operation for some time, the lives of the people within the society become dependent upon the machines. The vast interlocking industrial network provides them with food, vaccines, antibiotics, and hospitals. If such a population should suddenly be deprived of a substantial fraction of its machines and forced to revert to an agrarian society, the resultant havoc would be enormous. Indeed, it is quite possible that a society within which there has been little natural selection based upon disease resistance for several generations, a society in which the people have come to depend increasingly upon surgery for repairs during early life and where there is little natural selection operating among women, relative to the ability to bear children--such a society could easily become extinct in a relatively short time following the disruption of the machine network. The modern global economy is like a shark; it has to move forward or it dies. The widespread adoption of just-in-time inventory has resulted in acute vulnerabilities from even very short disruptions. The modern global machine now requires continuous inputs of energy and materials and continuously operating global freight transportation or it starts to break down. Even partial destruction, say, 15 to 20 percent of the industrial plant in the world , might be enough to make the global economic system inoperable. Because self-sufficiency has become a dirty word in our free-trade crazed political culture, countries have become so specialized in their manufacturing that it might not be possible to reproduce the necessary facilities nearer home quickly enough to prevent a global systemic breakdown . We would not simply revert back to the level of economic activity of, say, the 1950s. Instead, we could experience a total breakdown that leads to our inability to restart modern technical civilization after even a limited nuclear war.

Try or die for growth—economic collapse is worse for all their impacts—causes extinction of every other species and then humansMonbiot, Oxford visiting fellow, 9[George, 8/17/9, Theguardian, http://www.theguardian.com/commentisfree/cif-green/2009/aug/17/environment-climate-change Accessed 7/9/15 JMB]

The interesting question, and the one that probably divides us, is this: to what extent should we welcome the likely collapse of industrial civilisation? Or more precisely: to what extent do we believe that some good may come of it? I detect in your writings, and in the conversations we have had, an attraction towards – almost a yearning for – this apocalypse, a sense that you see it as a cleansing fire that will rid the world of a diseased society. If this is your view, I do not share it. I'm sure we can agree that the immediate consequences of collapse would be hideous: the breakdown of the systems that keep most of us alive; mass starvation; war. These alone surely give us sufficient reason to fight on, however faint our chances appear. But even if we were somehow able to put this out of our minds, I believe that what is likely to come out on the other side will be worse than our current settlement. Here are three observations: 1 Our species (unlike most of its members) is tough and resilient; 2 When civilisations collapse, psychopaths take over; 3 We seldom learn from others' mistakes. From the first observation, this follows: even if you are hardened to the fate of humans, you can surely see that our species will not become extinct without causing the extinction of almost all others. However hard we fall, we will recover sufficiently to land another hammer blow on the biosphere. We will continue to do so until there is so little left that even Homo sapiens can no longer survive. This is the ecological destiny of a species possessed of outstanding intelligence, opposable thumbs and an ability to interpret and exploit almost every possible resource – in the absence of political restraint. From the second and third observations, this follows: instead of gathering as free collectives of happy householders, survivors of this collapse will be subject to the will of people seeking to monopolise remaining resources. This will is likely to be imposed through violence. Political accountability will be a distant memory. The chances of conserving any resource in these circumstances are approximately zero. The human and ecological consequences of the first global collapse are likely to persist for many generations, perhaps for our species' remaining time on earth. To imagine that good could come of the involuntary failure of industrial civilisation is also to succumb to denial. The answer to your question – what will we learn from this collapse? – is nothing. This is why, despite everything, I fight on. I am not fighting to sustain economic growth. I am fighting to prevent both initial collapse and the repeated catastrophe that follows. However faint the hopes of engineering a soft landing – an ordered and structured downsizing of the global economy – might be, we must keep this possibility alive. Perhaps we are both in denial: I, because I think the fight is still worth having; you, because you think it isn't.

Transition Fails – 2AC

Transition is impossible—globalization and capitalism permeate every level of society—local communities won’t adopt radical alternativesWilson 14 Geoff A., Professor of Human Geography, University of Plymouth, School of Geography, Earth and Environmental Sciences, "Community Resilience, Transitional Corridors and Macro-Scalar Lock-in Effects", Environmental Policy and Governance, Volume 24, Issue 1, Jan/Feb 2014, Wiley Online LibraryMacro-economic Lock-insEconomic ideologies at societal level have major repercussions both for how economic capital at community level is regulated, accumulated and distributed, and for the worldviews of community members. As a result, the importance of ideologies associated with globalization, capitalism and neo-liberalism have been emphasized by many authors (e.g. Castree, 2008), and it is probably in this arena that communities have least flexibility for autonomous decision-making. Indeed, globalization means that most communities are increasingly embedded in complex macro-economic interlinkages that influence individual decision-making . As a result, macro-economic lock-ins are among the most important transitional corridors influencing the implementation of more resilient pathways at community level (Wilson, 2012b). These lock-ins are defined by economic values and worldviews at societal/nation-state level, although nation-states have begun to lose their autonomy of economic decision-making (e.g. member countries of the Euro Zone in the EU; increasing importance of World Trade Organization policies on global trade arrangements). Macro-economic lock-ins and their impacts on local community resilience revolve in particular around four inter-connected processes: economic globalization, the spread of global capitalism, the increasing importance of Anglo-American neo-liberal economic ideologies, and the increasingly powerful role of multinational corporations.Economic globalization refers to the increasingly global economic interlinkages between geographical spaces, the embeddedness of (almost all) local communities within complex financial and monetary flows, and processes associated with increasingly uniform patterns of economic interconnectedness and embeddedness (Harvey, 2005). A hundred or so years ago many communities still had some level of economic autonomy – i.e. key decisions affecting economic capital at community level were taken within the community itself. Macro-economic lock-ins of communities in the 18th and 19th centuries were thus less pronounced as global economic flows were characterized by internationalization (extension of global economic activities across national boundaries) rather than economic globalization which, since the 20th century, has meant the economic integration of even the remotest communities into the global economy (Castree, 2008). Before the 20th century, economic integration of communities was therefore more ‘shallow’ based primarily on arm's length trade in goods and services, while today's globalized communities are characterized by a much deeper degree of community economic integration – and indeed economic dependency – based upon interconnected configurations of economic production (Gray, 2002).This suggests that even if communities wish to disengage from global economic flows and retake control over processes related to economic capital, it is increasingly difficult for them to break free of the shackles of economic globalization (Davidson, 2010). Local Exchange Trading Systems (LETS), as an example of community-level attempts to partly disengage from transitional corridors associated with economic globalization, have only partly been successful (relatively low levels of public acceptance). LETS schemes may struggle to compete with the efficiency, choice and global reach of the ‘formal’ economy, and may be abandoned or never taken up by more mobile and globalized community members. Alternative economic models at community level can therefore not hide the fact that most communities where these ‘alternative currencies’ have been used continue to be firmly embedded ideologically and practically in globalized economic pathways that define most community actions. Gray (2002) therefore emphasized that, because of economic globalization processes, economic capital at community level is mainly shaped by exogenous forces, which increasingly shoehorn communities into macro-economic lock-ins. This suggests that almost all of humanity is now within the same macro-economic capitalist transitional corridor of economic globalization with all its advantages and disadvantages for raising local community resilience . Economic globalization is closely interlinked with the spread of global capitalism during the 20th century affecting even the remotest communities on the globe. Global capitalism as a macro-economic lock-in for many communities is closely associated with ideological lock-ins (see above), especially as capitalism is not just an economic system but also an ideology that permeates all aspects of modern life which, with its profit-driven maxim and ideology of continuous expansion and economic growth, influences decision-making at all geographical levels (Harvey, 2005). Community resilience is often negatively affected by the spread of global capitalism, precisely because of the specific attributes associated with capitalism in the form of greed, profit-maximization, selfishness and the increasing need for community members to integrate vertically (i.e. with the global economy) rather than horizontally (i.e. with an emphasis on economic interlinkages within and between the community itself) (Gray, 2002).

The downfall of the Soviet empire in 1990 and what some have hailed as the ‘ideological victory of the capitalist West’ has meant that almost all communities on Earth – increasingly including formerly staunchly socialist countries such as China – are now embedded within transitional corridors defined by global capitalist dictates, with often few economic alternatives (Gray, 2002). Yet, the spread of capitalism is by no means uniform. For example, emerging economies like China are facing geographically differentiated impacts with regard to the influence of capitalism. While local communities in most Chinese urban areas have begun wholeheartedly to embrace capitalism (islands of capitalism), communities in rural China still remain largely in a ‘sea of subsistence’ hardly touched by capitalist influences (Wilson, 2012a). This has pronounced implications for the embeddedness of Chinese communities within capitalist transitional corridors. Chinese communities in urban areas, for example, have begun to be locked into capitalist decision-making structures, including profit-maximization, greed, belief in private enterprise and a dramatic move away from past socialist ideologies, with concurrent changes in economic, social and environmental capital at community level. Economic capital tends to increase (through vertical rather than horizontal interlinkages), social capital is gradually eroded (many residents in the rapidly growing urban areas are migrants from rural areas with little social embeddedness in urban networks) and environmental capital is often reduced (e.g. large-scale pollution in most cities) (Wilson, 2012b).The post-2008 global economic crisis has highlighted how almost all communities are affected by similar economic processes that may have, until recently, been perceived to be rather ‘distant’ (e.g. unscrupulous lending of banks leading to bankruptcy of many community-level businesses). The spread of both global capitalism and economic globalization is the main reason why the formerly clearer geographical boundaries of ‘communities’ have become increasingly blurred and more globally than locally orientated. The latter also largely explains why community relocalization movements have, so far, not shown much tangible success, as almost all members of the relocalization process at community level are simultaneously embedded within the global capitalist system through their dependencies on jobs, pensions (especially through globally operating pension funds), and economic exchanges with often global customers, such as Internet-based firms/individuals that, although operating from within a geographical ‘community’, are economically more interlinked with global customers (Bailey et al., 2010). In the absence of an alternative global economic model and ideology (at least for the moment), the transitional corridor ‘imposed’ by the spread of global capitalism is therefore likely to continue to exert a substantial impact on the range of decision-making options available at community level for the foreseeable future.

Transition Fails – 1AR

Environmental policies are more effective than De-Growth—their transition fails to alter behavioral economicsBergh, Amsterdam University Environmental and Resource Economics Professor, PhD, ‘10[Jeroen C.J.M. van den Bergh is an ICREA Research Professor in the Institute of Environmental Science & Technology of Universitat Autònoma de Barcelona, PhD in economics from Amsterdam, Ecological Economics Journal, “Environment versus growth — A criticism of “degrowth” and a plea for “a-growth”, http://www.wachstumimwandel.at/wp-content/uploads/van-den-Bergh_2010_Degrowth-versus-a-growth-EcolEcon.pdf, accessed 7/7/15, GE]The main concern about degrowth as a primary or overarching goal to solve environmental problems is that it reflects a misinterpretation of the relevant causality. It suggests that degrowth, however interpreted, is a first step, necessary and perhaps sufficient, to reach

environmental aims. Instead, one better would reverse the causality, and start with a safe environmental policy which then may or may not

give rise to (some type of) degrowth. Even if one might support GDP, consumption or work-time degrowth for reasons of equity or happiness, they cannot be defended as appropriate strategies to reach environmental aims. The

reason is that they function at best as blunt, ineffective and inefficient instruments of environmental regulation. A degrowth strategy gives much weight to the scale of the economy or consumption, and underestimates or even neglects the role of composition and technical change.8 In relation to consumption it also often reflects a belief in the effectiveness of voluntary, bottom-up solutions. One additional belief that I have often encountered in debates with degrowth proponents is that environmental policies do not work, or will not be implemented, and that we therefore have to find solutions outside the standard environmental policy framework. This view and judgement I cannot share. Without (standard) policies we certainly will not be able to solve the major global environmental problems. Their global and externality nature requires that we strike international agreements to create an international level playing field which allows countries to implement regulatory policies that create the necessary incentives to alter all behavior that contributes to the environmental problems. This is not enough, as

suggested in the previous section on a wider policy package, but it represents the core of any effective solution. The voluntary, bottom-up view behind many (notably radical) degrowth expressions in my opinion gives insufficient attention to modern insights of psychology and behavioral economics. These state that humans show bounded rationality, myopia, a large degree of self-interest (and a smaller role for altruism), and a propensity to compare, seek status and imitate (sensitivity to fashions). Add to this the interactions between large numbers of individuals, increasing returns to scale which lead to lock-in of undesirable behaviors and technologies, and (energy) rebound, and we end up with an altogether impressively complex and difficult to alter system (Gsottbauer and van den Bergh, forthcoming). This should stimulate social scientists to think about systematic solutions and instruments as well as about very clever strategies to attain social– political acceptance for these. Just proposing voluntary grassroots initiatives is too easy and idealistic. It neglects the aforementioned complications. Of course, this does not mean a plea against grassroots initiatives but more attention for their upscaling and system-wide impacts and associated policies. Certainly something can be learned here too from studies in psychology and economics on how to elicit pro-environmental behavior. One may argue, of course, that I should not worry too much about a degrowth strategy, as it is highly uncertain to receive widespread social and political support. I indeed fear that degrowth as a political strategy is unlikely to be taken serious by economists and politicians, or even a significant group of citizens. Arguing in favor of degrowth runs a serious risk of preaching to the choir, i.e.

convincing only already-believers. In Section 4 it was argued why the pessimism about the political feasibility of environmental policies as a motivation to support degrowth is unfounded. I am much more optimistic about the political feasibility of

environmental (including climate) policies, but these things simply need time. We should be patient even though we are running out of time — which does not deny that we should do everything in our power to speed up the realization of climate agreements and environmental policies. For me this includes trying to convince the mainstream of shifting to an a-growth strategy, ignoring GDP, relaxing about growth rather than be unconditionally in favor or against growth. This may alter the balance in trading-off costs and benefits (in a broad sense) of climate policies (van den Bergh, 2010a).

Crisis establishes pro-globalization consensus – ironic reversal.Bhagwati 2011Jagdish, University Professor of Law and Economics at Columbia University, Globalization Marches On, Project Syndicate, January 25th 2011, http://www.project-syndicate.org/commentary/globalization-marches-on

Indeed, the West accepted the view that globalization would result (as with trade) in mutual gain, embracing what I called in 1997 the notion of “benign neglect.” In the case of foreign investment and aid flows, the West went further, viewing them as being motivated by altruism, or “benign intent,” whereas the East regarded globalization in a world of poor and rich nations as implying “malign impact.” In some analyses, malign impact turned into a more sinister “malign intent.” Thus, foreign aid was regarded as a plot to trap poor nations in a neo-colonial embrace. What happened next was what I have called an “ironic reversal.” As the benefits of globalization became manifest, and the damage wrought by autarkic policies also became evident, policymakers in the East began to appreciate that their anti-globalization stance had been a mistake. But then fear of globalization moved to the West. The East had feared that it could not gain from trade with the West, which had superior infrastructure and human capital; now, the West had come to fear that it would lose from trade with the East, which had abundant, cheap labor. The longstanding stagnation in wages for unskilled labor was attributed to low-cost, labor-intensive imports, ignoring the corollary that Western workers’ consumption of labor-intensive Asian goods offset the effect on real

wages. To take another example, the East worried about a “brain drain” of professionals to the West, where opportunities seemed to be

more plentiful. Today, the West is witnessing anti-globalization opposition from members of professional groups, who fear the loss of their jobs to foreign counterparts. Rudyard Kipling famously wrote in “The Ballad of East and West”: “Oh, East is East, and West is

West, and never the twain shall meet.” Given the ironic reversal of globalization fears, Kipling is still right: convergence has continued to elude East and West. The current crisis did not create the debate about globalization now heard in the West; it only made it slightly more salient.

Yet the crisis may be tilting Western policy outcomes in favor of globalization. For example, on trade, there has been a remarkable commitment to efforts – largely successful – to avoid significant backsliding into protectionism. Moreover,

the G-20 leaders have continued to express the need to conclude the Doha Round of multilateral trade-liberalization negotiations. There are also initiatives such as the appointment by the governments of Britain, Germany, Indonesia, and Turkey of a High-Level Expert Trade Group, with Peter Sutherland, former Director General of GATT and the WTO, and myself as co-chairs. The four governments will report at this year’s World Economic Forum in Davos on how to conclude Doha this year. In other words, Kipling could yet be proved wrong. A reversal in the West is possible, perhaps even likely. So the current crisis may thus, accidentally, establish a pro-globalization consensus that spans East and West.

There are other alternatives instead of de dev that solve Barnhizer, Professor of Law @ Cleveland-Marshall College of Law, 06[David, 4/06, Cleveland-Marshall College of Law, “Waking from Sustainability’s “Impossible Dream”: The Decision-Making Realities of Business and Government,” http://ssrn.com/abstract=878405 Accessed 7/9/15 JMB]The scale of social needs, including the need for expanded productive activity, has grown so large that it cannot be shut off at all , and certainly not abruptly . It cannot even be ratcheted down in any significant fashion without producing serious harms to human societies and hundreds of millions of people . Even if it were possible to shift back to systems of local self-sufficiency, the consequences of the transition process would be catastrophic for many people and even deadly to the point of continual conflict , resource wars , increased poverty , and strife . What are needed are concrete, workable, and pragmatic strategies that produce effective and intelligently designed economic activity in specific contexts and, while seeking efficiency and conservation, place economic and social justice high on a list of priorities. n60 The imperative of economic growth applies not only to the needs and expectations of people in economically developed societies but also to people living in nations that are currently economically underdeveloped. Opportunities must be created, jobs must be generated in huge numbers, and economic resources expanded to address the tragedies of poverty and inequality. Unfortunately, natural systems must be exploited to achieve this; we cannot return to Eden . The question is not how to achieve a static state but how to achieve what is needed to advance social justice while avoiding and mitigating the most destructive consequences of our behavior.’

The transition is impossible, but attempting it causes disaster. Their argument is wishful thinking.Barnhizer, Professor of Law @ Cleveland-Marshall College of Law, 06[David, 4/06, Cleveland-Marshall College of Law, “Waking from Sustainability’s “Impossible Dream”: The Decision-Making Realities of Business and Government,” http://ssrn.com/abstract=878405 Accessed 7/9/15 JMB]Some advocates of sustainability think they can slow the world down to a point of elegant stasis. n48 Because such people are invariably humane, I conclude they simply do not understand the consequences to human societies and the ordinary residents of those societies that would flow from their positions if the nightmare that they mistake for a dream were accomplished. The naive attitudes underlying [*614] such positions are similar to the "deep ecology" movement where nature is accorded only benign intentions. n49 The fact that we inhabit a savage and unheeding natural world in which species consume each other, earthquakes destroy, tsunamis overwhelm, and volcanoes spread ash, creating years without summers, is conveniently ignored . Sustainability represents a wide and diverse variety of functions, methods, and values that on many levels are incompatible . On the idealized plane this includes the values of ecological, economic, social, and political harmony. These values are used to support an argument in favor of a form of economic and social stasis writ large on the global stage. As an ideal, this form of sustainability stands for such principles as the precautionary principle and embodies the warnings about overuse of resources found in Garrett Hardin's Tragedy of the Commons, the Club of Rome's Limits to Growth, or Lester Brown's Twenty-Ninth Day, where Brown argued that an exponential progression in abuse and overuse of natural resources will generate a catastrophic collapse of systems. n50 These predictions of disaster are well worth heeding , but there are countervailing social disasters that can result if we take too aggressive a stance in our efforts to prevent the ecological harms. These trade-offs include the need to generate wealth sufficient to sustain existing social justice and equity obligations and the need to create jobs and opportunities to alleviate the tragedy of abject poverty and denial of fair opportunity.

Economy DA’s

Privacy Bad DA/Corporate Surveillance Good

Links – EU Standards

Federal legislation on privacy laws always fails – only the businesses can make standards that’re meaningful to customers and don’t hamper business.Davenport, Harvard Business School Visiting Professor, 13[Thomas H., 3/10/13, Wall Street Journal, “No: Stronger Privacy Rules Could Squelch Innovation” http://www.wsj.com/articles/SB10001424127887324338604578328393797127094, accessed 7/7/15 CWS]

A push by the European Union to make its already-tough privacy laws even tougher, and to extend them to any company that collects data on EU citizens, has sparked renewed debate about whether the U.S. needs stronger data-privacy laws, too.The U.S. now has fairly restrictive rules governing the collection and distribution of health and financial data, but few constraints in areas such as online marketing. Some people believe the U.S. needs to emulate Europe's approach and regulate the collection and trafficking of all types of personal data.I think that's a bad idea. Although I'm not a committed believer in the eternal wisdom of markets, in this case the market-based approach has advantages.To be sure, sensitive health-care and financial information must continue to be heavily restricted. I'd even argue for greater penalties for data breaches than we have today. Privacy laws and penalties for breaches for children's data also should remain strong. But before we rush to restrict the use of all kinds of personal information, we have to consider that there is both a downside to stronger and more consistent privacy legislation and an upside to leaving it relatively weak.We Can't Trust ThemThe downside to stronger laws is that the current Washington incumbents—particularly those in Congress—can't be trusted to do a good job of crafting privacy legislation. If they can't pass a budget or a debt-ceiling increase, they have no business venturing into complex online privacy issues. It is unlikely that Congress could achieve consensus, but if it did, I suspect the outcome would be a bad law. The White House last year proposed a Consumer Privacy Bill of Rights, but it's only a voluntary code of conduct. Its very existence implicitly acknowledges that effective legislation from Congress is unlikely.The upside of lax privacy regulation, meanwhile, is innovation. The promise of using online data for marketing has always been that consumers would receive targeted benefits of value to them. Granted, it's pretty rare to receive offers we really value, but it happens.Caesars Entertainment Inc., for example, has very extensive information on its customers' gambling habits and vacation preferences—more than most loyalty programs, and certainly more than most online sites. Yet Gary Loveman, the company's chief executive officer, says customers never complain about how the information is used. Why? Because Caesars provides value in its offers—free dinners and shows if you're a frequent, valuable customer, and incentives to get to the next level of play if you aren't. Many of us would be happy to trade a little privacy in return for offers that really meet our needs, but companies like Caesars might have to abandon them altogether under more stringent legislation.And let's face it, Americans don't seem too worried about the negative consequences of lax online privacy. Yes, it's easy to find out a lot about almost anyone online, but many of us make it easier with Facebook profiles, tweets and blog posts.

European Tech companies will move to the US due to EU regulations.Burton, Chief Reporter at Computing, 15[Graeme, 6/16/15, Computing, “New EU Data Protection Regulation will drive internet businesses 'out of Europe'” http://www.computing.co.uk/ctg/news/2413329/new-eu-data-protection-regulation-will-drive-internet-businesses-out-of-europe accessed 7/7/15 CWS]

IAB Europe claims that there are three main causes of concern with the new regulation.

First, it says, the regulation is likely to place "additional restrictions on companies' ability to process data, making the new rules more restrictive than those now in force". For example, it adds, "several provisions of the text, taken together, may outlaw the processing of aggregated customer data that provides advertisers crucial information about the effectiveness of their ads". This, it says, will turn back the clock – not help to adapt EU rules to the internet age.Second, the new regulation will expose companies to the risk of punitive fines in even inadvertent breaches of the rules, including for data processing that causes no meaningful privacy risk to users, or for cloud computing companies that simply provide the platform for others to run their organisations.Finally, the idea of the 'one-stop shop' principle that was the centrepiece of the original proposal, which meant that instead of dealing with 28 different national privacy regulations, organisations would be able to work with just a single data protection authority, has been ditched."This one-stop shop would have increased efficiency and represented a major advance in Europe's quest to create a functioning digital single market. But today's text gives any 'concerned' authority the power to object to a decision taken by another national regulator," claimed IAB Europe."The current approach is blunt and indiscriminate – a far cry from the supposed objective of making EU rules fit for purpose in the internet age," said Townsend Feehan, CEO of IAB Europe. "The future regulatory framework needs to enable digital advertising to fund the informational, educational, entertainment and E-commerce services that European users enjoy online at little or no cost."That is not what is on the table right now. It is no exaggeration to say that a draconian regulation could drive small and medium-sized companies responsible for much of the innovation we see in the industry today out of Europe.

China Tech Tradeoff DA

1NC

NSA scandal is letting China capture huge amounts of tech market shares---the plan reverses thisAziz, Economics and Business correspondent, 13[John, the week, 11/14/13, “How the NSA is hurting America's tech industry — and helping China's,” http://theweek.com/articles/456426/how-nsa-hurting-americas-tech-industry--helping-chinas date accessed 7/6/15, Evann]So as we move toward a new era in computing and server technology — the so-called "internet of things," a realm projected to be worth up to $8.9 trillion by 2020, in which American companies like Cisco are in hot competition against Chinese companies like Huawei and ZTE — it would not be surprising if American companies fell behind in market share simply because customers wanted to avoid being spied on by the NSA. Countries, companies, and communities that don't want to be surveilled are even starting to talk about building separate self-contained internets for critical infrastructure.But companies' and countries' aversion to the NSA seems to miss the bigger picture. Certainly, Edward Snowden's revelations have disclosed a lot about the scope and shape of the NSA's spying activities. But there hasn't been a comparable level of disclosure about the activities of intelligence agencies in foreign countries, including Brazil, Russia, and China. Consumers moving away from American networking companies out of a desire to avoid surveillance, and adopting Chinese networking technology instead , could be jumping out of the frying pan and into the fire. China is still an authoritarian one-party state in which dissidents are routinely put to death.

High value economic sectors are key to avert CCP collapse Hung, associate professor of sociology at Johns Hopkins University, et al 15[HO-FUNG HUNG, ARTHUR R. KROEBER, managing director of GaveKal Dragonomics, an independent global economic research firm, HOWARD W. FRENCH, associate professor at the Columbia University Graduate School of Journalism, he is working on a book about the future of Chinese power, SUISHENG ZHAO, Professor and Director of the Center for China-U.S. Cooperation at Josef Korbel School of International Studies, University of Denver, Foreign Policy, 3/13/15, “When Will China’s Government Collapse?” http://foreignpolicy.com/2015/03/13/china_communist_party_collapse_downfall/ date accessed 7/7/15, Evann]I defer to others on the specifics of China’s known challenges, but a few points seem fairly obvious. The early, and one might say easy, phase of China’s takeoff is over.. That period consisted in large measure of stopping doing stupid things and inflicting damage on oneself. Moving forward now from here becomes exponentially more difficult. This means finding a way to sustain relatively high growth rates, when almost everything points to a natural, secular slowdown. It means coping with environmental challenges on a scale never seen before. It means dealing with the emergence of a middle class, and everything that political science suggests about the difficulties that this poses for authoritarian regimes. It means finding a way through the middle-income trap. It means restraining corruption that is, if anything, even worse, meaning more systemic, than commonly recognized. It means coping with the accelerating balancing of nervous neighbors. It means coping with issues of ethnic and regional tensions and stark inequality. It means drastic and mostly unfavorable changes in demography. And it means doing all of these things, and facing any number of other serious challenges that space doesn’t allow one to detail here, without the benefit of a coherent or appealing ideology other than nationalism and, tentatively, budding personality cult-style leadership.We don’t know how this is going to turn out. For every success one can point to involving China, it is easy to point to at least one stark and serious problem, or potential failing. I don’t share Shambaugh’s confidence in predicting the demise of the party, but it does not strike this reader as a reckless prediction. It should not surprise us, and neither should its opposite, China’s continued relative success. Such is the degree of uncertainty we must all live with.Yes, the CCP regime is in crisis. But it has muddled through one crisis after another, including the catastrophes of the chaotic, decade-long Cultural Revolution and the 1989 Tiananmen crackdown, by tackling its symptoms. It is too difficult to predict the arrival of the cracking up moment now.This current crisis comes after more than three decades of market-oriented economic reform under one-party rule, which has produced a corruptive brand of state capitalism in which power and money ally. The government officials and senior managers in state-owned enterprises (SOEs) have formed strong and exclusive interest groups to pursue economic gains.

China ranks among the countries of the highest income inequality in the world at a time when China has dismantled its social welfare state, leaving hundreds of millions of citizens without any or adequate provision of healthcare, unemployment insurance, and a variety of other social services. Meanwhile, China has become one of the world’s most polluted countries. The crisis has worsened as China’s economic growth is slowing.As the worsening economic, social, and environmental problems cause deep discontent across society and lead many people to take to the streets in protest, China has entered a period of deepening social tensions. Apparently, Beijing is frightened and has relied more and more on coercive forces. The cracking up moment could come when economic growth has significantly slowed, and Beijing is unable to sustain the regime’s legitimacy with its economic performance.

CCP instability causes extinctionYee and Storey 2 Herbert is a Professor of Politics and IR @ Hong Kong Baptist University, and Ian is a Lecturer in Defence Studies @ Deakin University. “The China Threat: Perceptions, Myths and Reality,” p. 5

The fourth factor contributing to the perception of a China threat is the fear of political and economic collapse in the PRC, resulting in territorial fragmentation, civil war and waves of refugees pouring into neighbouring countries. Naturally, any or all of these scenarios would have a profoundly negative impact on regional stability. Today the Chinese leadership faces a raft of internal problems, including the increasing political demands of its citizens, a growing population, a

shortage of natural resources and a deterioration in the natural environment caused by rapid industrialization and pollution. These problems are putting a strain on the central government’s ability to govern effectively. Political disintegration or a Chinese civil war might result in millions of Chinese refugees seeking asylum in neighbouring countries. Such an

unprecedented exodus of refugees from a collapsed PRC would no doubt put a severe strain on the limited resources of China’s neighbours. A fragmented China could also result in another nightmare scenario- nuclear weapons falling into the hands of irresponsible local provincial leaders or warlords . From this perspective, a disintegrating China would also pose a threat to its neighbours and the world.

Uniqueness – China Tech High

China’s tech sector is on an upward trend – status quo momentum solidifies China as a global leader for innovation and rebounds the stock market. Chen and Browning, Bloomberg, 15 [Lulu Yilun Chen and Jonathan Browning, updated 6/12/15, “The 4,200% Rally That’s Bringing Tech Stocks Back to China,” http://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2015-06-11/the-4-200-rally-that-s-bringing-internet-stocks-back-to-china date accessed 7/7/15, Evann]Hugo Shong, the man behind the highest-flying stock in China, says he knew that Beijing Baofeng Technology Co. was destined for big returns.He just didn’t realize how quickly they’d come. In the 55 trading days since Shong took Baofeng public on the Shenzhen stock exchange, the developer of online video players has jumped 4,208 percent. The rally, equivalent to 11 years of gains in Apple Inc., has given Baofeng a price-to-earnings ratio 13 times higher than that of Alibaba Group Holding Ltd.While the surge has a lot to do with China’s growing mania for equity investment, it’s also emblematic of a shifting attitude among the nation’s technology companies toward local capital markets. Led by Baofeng and Carlyle Group LP’s Focus Media Holding Ltd., the industry is dismantling overseas ownership structures to take advantage of soaring valuations on domestic stock exchanges and government incentives to list at home.“A lot of Chinese companies are contemplating the same move,” Shong, a pre-IPO investor in Baofeng at IDG Capital Partners in Beijing, said in a June 10 phone interview. “Their buyers, products and users are in China. And the country also has the largest mobile Internet population, so they would get a much better valuation.”New EconomyIDG Capital, which worked for about 10 months to prepare Baofeng’s listing, is an investor in at least 20 other companies that may consider coming back to Chinese markets. More than a dozen technology businesses are working on similar moves, according to China Renaissance Partners, a Beijing-based advisory firm.Beyond enriching shareholders, the deals are helping President Xi Jinping’s government raise the status of Chinese financial markets on the world stage and boost the role of technology businesses in Asia’s largest economy. City and provincial authorities across the country are handing out subsidies to companies that sell shares locally, while Premier Li Keqiang has encouraged firms using so-called variable interest entity structures to list in China.VIEs, pioneered by Internet portal Sina Corp. 15 years ago, allow firms to get around China’s foreign ownership restrictions. While the structures made sense for companies when valuations were higher on overseas exchanges, the case for unwinding them is getting stronger as mainland markets surge.Capital WarInternet companies on Chinese exchanges now trade at a median 89 times estimated 12-month earnings , versus 25 times for global peers, according to data compiled by Bloomberg. Songcheng Performance Development Co., which took over the assets of video website Beijing 6Rooms Technology Co. in March, has a multiple of 71 after more than doubling over the past three months.The Shanghai Composite Index rose 0.9 percent at the close of trading on Friday, with a gauge of technology shares on mainland exchanges slipping 0.1 percent.Attracting capital at higher prices is becoming more important for Chinese Internet companies as competition in the industry intensifies, according to Bao Fan, the founder of China Renaissance.“There’s a capital war,” he said. “The ability to fund becomes a strategic advantage.”The shift isn’t without risks. Many investors view China’s stock-market rally as a bubble, with Janus Capital Group Inc.’s Bill Gross saying shares in the tech-heavy Shenzhen market will become the next big trade for short sellers. Baofeng is valued at 715 times reported earnings, versus 55 for Alibaba, the Chinese e-commerce company that went public in the U.S. last year.

China is en route to be a global tech leader nowSharif, Associate professor in the Division of Social Science at the Hong Kong University of Science and Technology, 7-9-15[Naubahar, South China Morning Post, "Three reasons why China has the makings of a global technology leader," http://www.scmp.com/comment/insight-opinion/article/1835035/three-reasons-why-china-has-makings-global-technology-leader, date accessed 7-9-2015, Evann]

A recent report on Chinese investments in research and development organisations in the US indicates Beijing's desire to leverage US-based research to generate new patents. This is part of China's concerted long-term effort to become the global leader in technology and it is clearly setting its sights on hi-tech, high-value-added industries on an ever-increasing scale.Although there is widespread scepticism about China's capacity to be a global tech leader, it has three distinct advantages that should enable it to claim leadership in two to three decades.First is China's rapidly growing domestic market. Already the world's second largest, the Chinese economy is likely to overtake the US economy by 2020 or soon after. It is well known that market size is a powerful indicator of demand, and that growing demand for new products and services drives innovation.Indeed, China is now the world's largest producer in nearly a third of the most important industrial sectors, and leads the world in producing steel, cement, automobiles and fertiliser.The second big advantage lies in its autocratic model of governance. Few developed or newly emerging economies are growing under governments that enjoy the latitude China has to shape industrial and business policy. Fuelled by a 20 per cent annual growth in research and development investments, China is encouraging "indigenous innovation". Having doubled the share in gross domestic product of R&D expenditure since 1999, it is on pace to triple that rate by 2020. Say what you will about China's approach to governance, it can channel public funding and facilities to spur growth where it sees fit.Finally, China will continue to reap the benefits of globalisation for the foreseeable future. This means, on the one hand, that China can acquire innovative technologies on the global market without having to foot the total bill for the R&D and commercialisation of such technologies. Examples of China's increasing presence in the global marketplace include the acquisition by BAIC Group of the intellectual property of Swedish automaker Saab, and Geely's acquisition of Volvo in 2010.On the other hand, globalisation means China will be increasingly attractive to foreign firms seeking new markets, creating what economists call spillover effects.Foreign companies will increasingly invest in and partner Chinese firms to cash in on the nation's growth. Foreign firms are also increasingly deploying state-of-the-art technology in China and even seeking patents there, with corresponding technological spillovers to Chinese firms.

China’s tech industry is thriving and will boost the global markets. Stratfor, geopolitical intelligence firm, 15[George Friedman founded Stratfor in 1996 to bring customers an incisive new approach to examining world affairs, 6/12/15, “China's Outward Push in High-Tech Investment and Innovation,” https://www.stratfor.com/analysis/chinas-outward-push-high-tech-investment-and-innovation date accessed 7/6/15]China's rapid expansion into high-tech sectors, both domestically and abroad, will continue to accelerate as the Chinese economy — particularly its technology sector — matures.Concerns about the true intentions behind Beijing's overseas investment goals will persist.As increased technological capabilities move China up the value chain both at home and abroad, the country will initially be perceived as an imitator rather than an innovator, but signs are emerging that it will overcome this perception.A decade ago, Chinese electronics company Lenovo bought out IBM's personal computer arm for $1.75 billion in what was China's first major overseas acquisition in the technology sector. The deal cemented Lenovo's status as one of the world's biggest PC manufacturers (it now ranks as the largest), and it launched China's journey to becoming one of the world's largest foreign investors in the technology sector. That process has accelerated exponentially; in 2014, for example, Chinese direct investment in the U.S. information and communications technology industry accounted for about half of all Chinese investment into the United States. In some areas, such as semiconductors, biotechnology and green energy, investment came almost entirely from private Chinese investors.This expansion abroad differs from traditional Chinese outward investment patterns. Chinese state-owned companies dominate overseas acquisitions in most sectors, but high-tech areas are the domain of companies with weak or no ties to the government. Despite the relative lack of Chinese state involvement, the growth of investment will still raise concerns among Western companies and governments, particularly in the United States, over Beijing's investment strategy and the impact Chinese companies could have on those markets. Meanwhile, China is becoming more innovative itself and evolving into a world leader in some high-tech areas. China's aptitude in a number of tech-related sectors will only increase, and given China's size, incremental changes in its capabilities can have a significant impact on world markets.

Uniqueness – China Econ

Chinese economy is high now, but continued momentum is needed. Hunter, Wall Street Journal, 15[Gregor Stuart Hunter, 7-9-2015, "China Stocks Make Biggest Daily Gain in Six Years ," WSJ, http://www.wsj.com/articles/asians-shares-lower-as-chinas-rout-grips-global-markets-1436405225, date accessed 7-9-2015 Evann]Chinese shares made their biggest daily gain in six years Thursday, a tentative step toward restoring confidence in Beijing’s suite of measures to rescue its stock market.The Shanghai Composite rose 5.8% to 3709.33, after losses in eight of the previous 10 trading days. The smaller Shenzhen market rose 3.8%. Still, both indexes have lost around a third of their value in the past month. The small-cap ChiNext board, which has shed some 38% from its June highs, rose 3%.Shares of some firms that had been halted from trading resumed trading, and their stock prices immediately rose by the maximum 10%. These include Hangzhou Iron & Steel Co., Zhejiang Huahai Pharmaceutical Co. and Leshi Internet Information and Technology Corp. Beijing.Nevertheless, a total of 1,473 companies, or 51% of all stocks on the Shanghai and Shenzhen markets, remain suspended. Companies can request a trading halt under circumstances such as a takeover or restructuring, or a stock exchange can impose a suspension if it sees a need to.Stocks in Hong Kong, which suffered their worst trading session since the global financial crisis on Wednesday, closed up 3.7%, the biggest one-day gain for the index in three months. A gauge of Hong Kong-listed Chinese companies, known as H-shares, advanced 3.1%.“The market shows signs of stabilizing because the regulator came to rescue small-caps, especially those on the ChiNext, which eased the liquidity crisis and gave investors a much-need dose of confidence,” said Tang Yonggang, an analyst at Shenyin Wanguo Securities. On Wednesday, regulators announced that the China Securities Finance Corp., a unit of the China Securities Regulatory Commission that provides financing for margin trading, would step up purchases of small-cap stocks.The gains also follow a report by the state-run Xinhua News Agency that Chinese police had visited the commission to investigate “malicious short selling,” a move widely interpreted as another stab at arresting the selloff.Regulators have increased scrutiny of short selling as Chinese stocks have plunged, wiping out roughly $4 trillion in value from Chinese equities. Short selling involves borrowing shares and selling them, in hopes that the stock can be bought later at a lower price, yielding a profit.China’s yuan was flat at around 6.22 per U.S. dollar in the offshore market, where it is freely traded, after hitting a four-month low on Wednesday. Domestic bonds also stabilized following Wednesday’s selloff: Benchmark 10-year debt issued by the central government gained ground, but then slipped back, boosting its yield by 0.02 percentage point to 3.5%. Yields fall when prices rise.Whether Beijing’s moves are enough to reverse the broader selloff, closing in on its fourth consecutive week, remains unclear. China’s outstanding margin loans—money borrowed to invest in stocks—fell to 1.5 trillion yuan ($241.7 billion) as of July 8, down from 2.27 trillion yuan at its peak on June 18, according to Wind Information Co., a data provider. But some say the unwinding of margin loans—one of the main triggers for the recent spate of volatility—is still far from complete.Until the margin buyers are gone, we don’t expect a stabilization or possibility for the market to start heading higher again,” said Sean Yokota, head of Asia strategy for SEB Bank. “We are only one-third of the way through [deleveraging].”As stocks have fallen, many investors who borrowed to buy shares have had to sell in order to meet demands for more collateral from their lenders.In recent days, Beijing has added to a growing list of attempts to get the market back in gear. On Wednesday, the government set out new emergency tactics to encourage loans for buying stocks and prevent some selling among big shareholders. Analysts said the net effect of the moves has left the market with nowhere to go but up.

NSA Link

Chinese tech corporations directly capitalize off of surveillance policies from the NSA. Dou, Wall Street Journal, 14[Eva, writes about China's technology industry, 7/29/14, “NSA Concerns Give Chinese Server Maker a Boost,” http://www.wsj.com/articles/nsa-concerns-give-chinese-server-maker-inspur-a-boost-1406653858?mg=id-wsj date accessed 7/6/15, Evann]BEIJING—A Chinese company that once made computer accessories is seeking to rival International Business Machines Corp. as a top provider of big-ticket computer servers in China.Its strategy, in part: Bring up Edward Snowden.Inspur Group Co. is using Chinese worries about U.S. gear as part of its effort to take market share from IBM, Hewlett-Packard Co. and other foreign rivals. U.S. technology companies fell under a cloud in China last year after the former U.S. National Security Agency contractor disclosed that the U.S. government was collecting sensitive data from American companies.Inspur Chairman Sun Pishu, a member of the country's legislature, proposed measures this year to review critical technology purchases and accelerate the shift toward homegrown gear. The company unveiled a marketing program called I2I—IBM to Inspur—aimed at convincing businesses to switch from Big Blue.Since the NSA controversy began, Inspur, which started out in the 1960s making computer accessories in China's northeast Shandong province, has seen domestic server sales soar. It overtook Dell Inc., China's Huawei Technologies Co. and H-P in the first quarter to top China's charts for server shipments, according to data from researcher Gartner.The boom in China has also lifted Inspur to the No. 5 spot globally. U.S. vendors Dell, H-P and IBM all saw market-share declines in China and globally during the same period.A spokesman for Dell declined to comment. Representatives at IBM and H-P didn't respond to a request for comment.But neither Inspur nor Huawei are in the top five list globally when it comes to revenue, and even in China, they lag behind their U.S. rivals. That means foreign companies still have a firm hold on the market for the most sophisticated and expensive machines needed to run the country's big banks and other important areas, Gartner says.Inspur's rapid growth showcases the successes and challenges for Beijing's long-running push to shed its dependence on the likes of IBM, Oracle Corp., Cisco Systems Inc. and other Western companies for high-tech equipment. China eventually hopes to replace Western equipment running the critical functions in major state-run banks and other government-controlled companies, though experts say that day is far off.Beijing's push has been accelerated by rising tensions between the U.S. and China over cybersecurity threats. In recent months, major U.S. tech firms like Apple Inc. and Microsoft Corp. have been in the cross hairs of Chinese state media, which questioned the security of their technologies.China is also pursuing antitrust investigations of both Microsoft and Qualcomm this year, showing that its officials are taking a harder line against foreign firms.China has worked for decades to develop homegrown technologies to wean itself off its dependence on U.S. firms. Since 1986, the government has used something called the 863 Program to fund technology development in sectors deemed strategic, ranging from spacecraft to automation. Most recently, the country is pouring $5 billion into its microchip industry, as well as encouraging the development of homegrown software to compete with Microsoft's Windows and Google Inc.'s Android.

The NSA harms US tech companies and simultaneously allows China to benefit. Pestano, United Press International, 15[Andrew, 6/10/15, “Report: Government surveillance costs U.S. tech companies billions,” http://www.upi.com/Top_News/US/2015/06/10/Report-Government-surveillance-costs-US-tech-companies-billions/9371433932573/ date accessed 7/9/15, Evann]WASHINGTON, June 10 (UPI) -- The competitiveness of the U.S. technology sector has been harmed by the "pervasive" use of government surveillance and the ineffective debate surrounding it, according to a new report.The Information Technology & Innovation Foundation estimated in 2013 that U.S. companies' foreign market share for cloud computing could drop because of U.S. surveillance concerns following the revelations by former National Security Agency contractor Edward Snowden.

The organization's "Beyond the USA Freedom Act: How U.S. Surveillance Still Subverts U.S. Competitiveness" report released Tuesday states it underestimated the damage of the effects of government surveillance on U.S. tech companies.The organization previously estimated a drop of between $21.5 billion and $35 billion by 2016."Since then, it has become clear that the U.S. tech industry as a whole, not just the cloud computing sector, has underperformed as a result of the Snowden revelations," according to the report. "Therefore, the economic impact of U.S. surveillance practices will likely far exceed ITIF's initial $35 billion estimate."NSA digital surveillance programs have led foreign customers to "shun U.S. companies" and even allowed foreign governments, including China, to use the fear of digital surveillance to force companies to relinquish valuable intellectual property."In the short term, U.S. companies lose out on contracts, and over the long term, other countries create protectionist policies that lock U.S. businesses out of foreign markets," the report states. "A failure to sufficiently reform U.S. surveillance policies is hurting U.S. technology companies, costing American jobs, and weakening the U.S. trade balance."

Surveillance empowers the Chinese government to use its tech industry to boost its economy Castro, M.S. in Information Security Technology and Management from Carnegie Mellon University, and McQuinn, B.S. in Public Relations and Political Communications from Texas-Austin, 15[Danie Castro Vice President of the Information Technology and Innovation Foundation(ITIF), BS in foreign service from Georgetown, and Alan Mcquinn, research assistant at ITIF, June 2015, ITIF report, “eyond the USA Freedom Act: How U.S. Surveillance Still Subverts U.S. Competitiveness,” accessed from http://www2.itif.org/2015-beyond-usa-freedom-act.pdf?_ga=1.182454886.1744347471.1433849593 date accessed 7/9/15, Evann]Protectionist policies in China have further strained the U.S. tech industry. In January 2015, the Chinese government adopted new regulations that forced companies that sold equipment to Chinese banks to turn over secret source code, submit to aggressive audits, and build encryption keys into their products.38 While ostensibly an attempt to strengthen cybersecurity in critical Chinese industries, many western tech companies saw these policies as a shot across the bow trying to force them out of China’s markets. After all, the Chinese government had already launched a “de-IOE” movement—IOE stands for IBM, Oracle and EMC— to convince its state-owned banks to stop buying from these U.S. tech giants.To be sure, the Chinese government recently halted this policy under U.S. pressure.40 However, the halted policy can be seen as a part of a larger clash between China and the United States over trade and cybersecurity. Indeed, these proposed barriers were in part a quid pro quo from China, after the United States barred Huawei, a major Chinese computer maker, from selling its products in the United States due to the fear that this equipment had “back doors” for the Chinese government.41 Since the Snowden revelations essentially gave them cover, Chinese lawmakers have openly called for the use of domestic tech products over foreign goods both to boost the Chinese economy and in response to U.S. surveillance tactics. This system of retaliation has not only led to a degradation of business interests for U.S. tech companies in China, but also disrupted the dialogue between the U.S. government and China on cybersecurity issues.42

Surveillance costs the US global tech leadership it once had. Castro, M.S. in Information Security Technology and Management from Carnegie Mellon University, and McQuinn, B.S. in Public Relations and Political Communications from Texas-Austin, 15[Danie Castro Vice President of the Information Technology and Innovation Foundation(ITIF), BS in foreign service from Georgetown, and Alan Mcquinn, research assistant at ITIF, June 2015, ITIF report, “eyond the USA Freedom Act: How U.S. Surveillance Still Subverts U.S. Competitiveness,” accessed from http://www2.itif.org/2015-beyond-usa-freedom-act.pdf?_ga=1.182454886.1744347471.1433849593 date accessed 7/9/15, Evann]When historians write about this period in U.S. history it could very well be that one of the themes will be how the United States lost its global technology leadership to other nations. And clearly one of the factors they would point to is the long-standing privileging of U.S. national security interests over U.S. industrial and commercial interests when it comes to U.S. foreign policy.This has occurred over the last few years as the U.S. government has done relatively little to address the rising commercial challenge to U.S. technology companies, all the while putting intelligence gathering first and foremost.

Indeed, policy decisions by the U.S. intelligence community have reverberated throughout the global economy. If the U.S. tech industry is to remain the leader in the global marketplace, then the U.S. government will need to set a new course that balances economic interests with national security interests. The cost of inaction is not only short-term economic losses for U.S. companies, but a wave of protectionist policies that will systematically weaken U.S. technology competiveness in years to come, with impacts on economic growth, jobs, trade balance, and national security through a weakened industrial base. Only by taking decisive steps to reform its digital surveillance activities will the U.S. government enable its tech industry to effectively compete in the global market.

Tech Key to Diversification

Continued innovation reverses slow growth and propels reforms. Xinhua, editorial, 15[6/26/15, posted on China Daily, http://europe.chinadaily.com.cn/business/2015-06/26/content_21110153.htm date accessed 7/7/15, Evann]BEIJING -- Despite a slowdown of growth, economists said the Chinese economy still has great potential and future growth can come from innovation.Growth may remain at the relatively comfortable rate of about seven percent by 2023, when China is expected to be the world's largest economy, said Liu Wei, economist and executive vice-president of Peking University at a forum.A weak property sector and shrinking exports due to sluggish external demand dragged economic growth to 7.4 percent in 2014, the weakest expansion in 24 years. Growth slowed further to 7 percent in the first quarter of the year, and recent data pointed to continued weakness in the second quarter.The slowdown fueled market concerns about the economy, but some economists remain upbeat.China has ample tools and policies to support the economy, such as the opening up strategies of the Belt and Road Initiative, industrial upgrading and ongoing urbanization, Liu said.As traditional engines such as exports and investment lost steam, policymakers and economists turned their attention to innovation.Gu Shengzu, a Beijing-based senior economist said China's "new normal" of slower growth "needs Schumpeter, not Keynes," explaining that to reboot economic growth, the country should depend on enterprise-initiated innovation , rather than government-led massive spending.To foster innovation, the government must improve laws and regulations to ensure a fair and orderly environment for innovation, while further developing the country's capital markets, Gu said.Despite the slowdown, policymakers have refrained from rolling out massive stimulus policies.A wide range of measures have been unveiled, including financial support, construction of facilities and administrative assistance for startups.Arrangements are also being made to help make financing more accessible to emerging and creative businesses. Plans in the pipeline include easing rules on IPOs and a new board at the Shanghai bourse for emerging and creative firms.Technological and institutional innovation is key to facilitate economic restructuring, with more reforms expected to allow the market a more decisive role in allocating resources, and the promotion of rule of law, Liu said."China is still halfway toward urbanization and industrialization. The potential for economic expansion is huge," said Chen Siqing, president of Bank of China.Chen expects growth of six to seven percent in five years to come.

Now is key, sustained innovation elevates long term growth and party legitimacy. Magnus, Associate at Oxford University’s China Center, a senior economic adviser at UBS Financial Services, 15 [George, reporting by John Mauldin, Equities, Is This a Do-or-Die Moment for China's Ruling Communist Party? http://www.equities.com/editors-desk/international-investing/asia/is-this-a-do-or-die-moment-for-chinas-ruling-communist-party date accessed 7/7/15, Evann]In the longer-term, economic reforms have to go much further now that China’s potential to derive growth from the deployment of physical labour, or from limitless capital accumulation is diminishing quickly. A different sort of economic growth is required for China to grow its per capita GDP strongly as well as its nominal GDP. This would be based much less on the dominance of state institutions, and more on innovation, higher educational attainment standards, stronger productivity, and entrepreneurship. This is all the more relevant because China’s working age population share of the population is declining, and rising wage costs and digital technologies are encouraging foreign companies to go home or to cheaper manufacturing nations in Asia, such as Vietnam, Cambodia, Bangladesh, and now perhaps Modi’s India.China’s leaders are well aware that the growth and development model has to change. The anti-corruption campaign is essential to securing the reforms that would lead to that change. But, as argued, the campaign has weaknesses and shortcomings. Reforms, especially to create robust and inclusive institutions that would really put China on course to become a high income country are most likely incompatible with the central philosophy of Party,

which is to rule unchallenged. A purified Party is no substitute for political reforms in which the Party has no interest.We can understand the resulting insecurity that seems to pervade the behaviour of the leadership, which has manifested itself in fear, distrust, and a major crackdown on opponents, critics, liberals, and most recently, Western values and influences. The government has forbidden universities from teaching or discussing universal values, press freedom, civil society, civil rights, historical errors of the Party, capitalism and an independent judiciary — collectively known as the ‘seven don’ts’. Ironically, allowing these don’ts would go much further in purging the country of corruption than an extra-legal campaign of going after tigers and flies that by comparison, seems quite limited.

New technological innovation for China is necessary to solidify its economic take-off.Hengyuan, Associate professor at Tsinghua University's School of Economics and Management, 15[Zhu, vice chair at the Department of Innovation, Entrepreneurship and Strategy, Caixin Online, 7/6/15, “China Is Poised for Technology Takeoff,” http://english.caixin.com/2015-07-06/100825666.html date accessed 7/6/15, Evann]For the past 20 years, "Made in China" has driven global economic growth, with Chinese manufacturing contributing to more than one-fifth of total output worldwide. But it is stuck in an awkward position now, as developed countries roll out measures to win back high-end manufacturers while poorer countries offer cheap labor as a comparative advantage.The "Made in China 2025" strategy announced on May 19 is the central government's response to the problem. Its goal is to promote the country's industrial transformation and upgrading by shifting emphasis from raw materials to innovation and added-value.This is not a new prescription. The fifth full meeting of the 16th Central Committee of the Communist Party in 2006 raised the idea of building an innovation-driven country, but little progress was made. The situation feels different this time around because businesspeople have taken center stage in discussions and the ideas they propose are realistic. In fact, before the government's recent call for innovation, start-ups had already appeared to provide, for example, "smart" technologies, meaning Internet-based, highly automated devices and systems. The emptying pool of cheap labor in the Yangtze River Delta, in the east, and the south's Pearl River Delta – two traditional hubs of labor-intensive manufacturing – have been replacing workers with robots on a large scale. This is also a sign that China is about to take off technologically.The phrase "science and technology takeoff" is used to describe a phenomenon that sees developed countries intensify investment in research and development, measured as a share of a country's GDP. It often takes a long time for the level to reach 1 percent, but after that, it takes off, growing quickly to 2 percent and then stabilizing. This process took the United States 10 years from 1950 to 1960, Germany 11 years from 1951 to 1962 and Japan 19 years from 1959 to 1978. South Korea did it in only five years, from 1983 to 1988. Regardless of the length of the period, once a country embarks on this path, innovation spreads, new businesses grow and its products become dominant.China's economy has grown rapidly since reform and opening up to the outside world started in the late 1970s, but it has lagged in terms of innovation. From the 1980s to the 1990s, its level of R&D investment was always below 1 percent of GDP, sometimes dipping to 0.5 percent. In 2000, it hit 1 percent for the first time, then took off, growing to 2.08 percent in 2013.This was a watershed. By the United Nations' definition, China is an upper-level middle-income country, but its R&D investments have been stronger than those of its peers and on par with some developed countries. Its national spending on R&D ranked behind only the United States, and nearly four-fifths of it was carried out by companies. China has the most R&D engineers in the world and recently their number has been growing by nearly 1 million every year. The numbers of Chinese research papers and patents filed are also among the most in the world. The country is now a hotbed for innovation.There is, of course, legitimate concern that these numbers are exaggerated, but they are still reasons for believing that a great pool of resources has been built for innovation to grow. Innovation requires practice. All of the countries that escaped the middle-income trap have, at some point, relied on imitation and then moved on to innovation. Over the past decade, many multinational corporations have started moving their R&D capabilities to China, a reflection of their confidence in the market's potential. Given the right circumstances and conditions, innovation will blossom.China has started getting these circumstances and conditions right. Its national per capita GDP has reached US$ 7,500, and a more demanding middle class is fueling consumption. A research report by the consultancy McKinsey & Co. said that about three-quarters of all Chinese households will become middle class by 2020. That is roughly

the same as in Europe. Even better, this new middle class will see its spending capacity grow by 20 percent annually. This will provide the market that foreign companies urgently need and also encourage domestic innovation.China also a complete system of manufacturing industries, which means that in every field it has the factories to turn ideas into products. A bustling e-commerce industry can break geographic boundaries and better connect the country. In other words, the threshold has been significantly lowered for innovation and commercialization. This is the setting for China's industrial transformation – and why opportunities abound.

Tech competitiveness overcomes diminished growth in the Chinese economy.Radio Free Asia, nonprofit broadcasting company, 15[Reported by Big News Network, 7/6/15, “China Trade Growth Tumbles Amid Weakened Demand,” http://www.bignewsnetwork.com/index.php/sid/234507731 date accessed 7/6/15, Evann]China's foreign trade has sagged far below government targets as the country's traditional engine of growth begins to drag on the economy.The country is struggling to meet the government's goal of 6-percent trade growth for 2015 after total imports and exports fell 7.8 percent in the first five months, according to General Administration of Customs (GAC) figures.The problems for trade are an underlying concern for China's once-booming economy as growth rates fade and investors struggle to digest a 12-percent loss in the country's key stock market last week.On Friday, the Shanghai Composite Index dropped 5.7 percent, contributing to a slide of over 28 percent from a high recorded just three weeks before. On Monday, the index rebounded slightly with a 2.4-percent gain after a series of supportive measures over the weekend.But the negative turn in trade suggests longer-term trouble for the economy following a trend of weakening growth over several years.In 2014, total trade rose 3.4 percent in U.S. dollar terms, less than half the government target of 7.5 percent. In 2013, trade increased 7.6 percent, falling short of an 8-percent growth goal, GAC data showed.In 2012, trade gained 6.2 percent against a 10-percent target. The last year of double-digit growth was 2011, when trade soared 22.5 percent as both imports and exports surged by over 20 percent.The downturn deepened in May, when exports declined 2.8 percent and imports dropped 18.1 percent from the year-earlier period in yuan terms.While exports have posted a string of monthly losses, the import slide has been particularly steep."The data shows the Chinese economy is still in the process of seeking a bottom," said Liu Yaxin, macro strategist at China Merchants Securities in Shenzhen, as cited by Reuters.Gary Hufbauer, senior fellow at the Peterson Institute of International Economics, said the slippage in imports is a sign of slower expansion and consumer demand at a time when China has promoted a shift to a consumption-led economy.Although official first-quarter gross domestic product (GDP) growth of 7 percent was the lowest since 1999, the 17.2-percent dip in five-month imports suggests that real growth may be worse."The economy is underperforming," said Hufbauer. "The government is probably topping up the statistics to portray a better picture than in fact exists. I think Chinese consumers as well as industries are pulling back."Export issuesOn the export side, several factors have contributed to the tough times for trade.China's key foreign markets have recovered only slowly from the global financial crisis, creating less demand for its products abroad."The lethargic world economy is the main reason," said Hufbauer. "The markets are not growing for the kinds of things that China typically sells."Through April, for example, the value of exported garments and clothing accessories fell 4.6 percent. Rare earth exports, used in cellphones and electronics, lost over 30 percent. In the broad category of high-tech products, exports rose a scant 0.5 percent.Higher labor costs have also made China less competitive with lower-cost or closer suppliers like Vietnam and Mexico.In a sense, weaker export growth has been a sign of transition in China, although change has come at a cost.In its current Five-Year Plan through 2015, the central government targeted annual minimum wage increases of 13 percent, and while wages are set locally, the gains have been largely achieved.In the manufacturing center of coastal Guangdong province, average minimum wages rose 19 percent in May after a previous hike two years earlier, Xinhua reported.

Monthly pay in the capital Guangzhou increased 22.2 percent to 1,895 yuan (U.S. $305), the official news agency said.But higher wages have added to China's manufacturing costs.As of last year, costs of labor and social insurance in Vietnam were less than half of those in China. In India, the costs were 22 percent of China's, consultants Dezan Shira amp; Associates in Hong Kong said.Exchange rates and regional tensionWhile cost comparisons are pushing low-wage exporting to other countries, exchange rates have also been playing a part.China's yuan has been virtually pegged to the U.S. currency all year, trading in a narrow range of around 6.2 to the dollar. But as the greenback has strengthened, so has the yuan against other currencies, making China's goods less competitive in many markets.Through April, China's exports to the United States were up 9 percent in dollar value, but exports to the European Union were down 1 percent.Regional tensions with Japan have also hurt China's trade. Imports from and exports to Japan have been falling since 2013.In the first four months of this year, imports and exports were both down by over 12 percent, the Japan External Trade Organization (JETRO) said.Ironically, China's trade growth was stronger when the world economy was weaker during the global downturn of 2008-2010.Hufbauer said that may have been due to longer-term supply contracts and investments that kept exports flowing. Lower wage costs and weaker currency may also have played a part.But clearer readings of China's trade data may be clouded by past inflows of "hot money." The illicit moves by currency speculators, disguised as payments for phantom exports with fake invoices, have skewed official growth rates for years.Interpretations of the import slide are also complicated by commodities like crude oil and iron ore that have risen in volume but fallen in value as prices have plunged.As of April, oil imports have climbed 7.8 percent by volume this year, but the U.S. dollar value has dropped by over 43 percent, driving trade totals down.Government responseChina's government has promoted several remedies for the declining trade trends, including its "belt and road" initiatives to establish modern versions of historic Silk Road trade routes.Premier Li Keqiang has pushed innovation , high-tech exports and services to reduce reliance on traditional manufacturing and assembly operations, where China has lost competitive ground."Previously known as the low-cost factory of the world, China is no longer satisfied with low-value manufacturing," Xinhua said in May.

Tech Key to CCP

Continued tech innovation in China’s State Owned Enterprises becomes a powerful source for CCP leadershipZhang, University of Chicago Assistant Law Professor, 14 [Angela Huyue Zhang, J.S.D. (2011), J.D. (2008), and LL.M (2006), Summer 2014 “Foreign Direct Investment from China: Sense and Sensibility,” Northwestern Journal of International Law & Business 34 NW. J. INT'L L. & BUS. 395, “lexis, date accessed 7/9/15, Evann]*SOE = State owned enterprise*SOEs in China have an insatiable desire to expand: the bigger it is, the more powerful it becomes; the more powerful it is, the easier it becomes to obtain financial resources for overseas expansion. It thus grows even bigger and more powerful, resulting in a vicious cycle. Chinese firms are vying to become leaders in their particular industries so that they will be deemed indispensible to local and central governments. Such incentives have been well documented in Yasheng Huang's Selling China, an excellent book about FDI into China. n275 Huang finds that SOEs' obsession with technology drives them to partner with foreign multinational companies to create joint ventures in China. As profits no longer serve as a guiding criterion, SOEs like to use tangible inputs to showcase their competitiveness. n276 This leads to a destructive consequence: SOEs pile up hard assets and the government allocates resources according to the technological capabilities of the SOEs. n277 Worryingly, Huang identifies evidence that SOEs know how to accumulate assets but do not know how to use them efficiently; he points out that Chinese SOEs are more interested in spending money to acquire hard assets than in generating positive return from their assets. n278Worse yet, distortions in China's capital markets compound distortions [*443] in managerial incentives. n279 China's capital markets are dominated by banks, especially the big four state-controlled banks. As China's financial system allocates resources according to a political rather than economic pecking order of firms, n280 inefficient SOEs enjoy a superior advantage in obtaining funds for investment. As pointed out by Morck, Yeung, and Zhao, China's recent FDI surge is likely a manifestation of its inability to reinvest efficiently its high corporate and individual savings. n281With superior access to financing, Chinese SOEs have been expanding not only in the domains of their specific industries, but also investing outside. Indeed, Chinese SOEs have been seen elbowing out private domestic firms in competitive industries, especially those with high risk and high return. This phenomenon has been known as "the state advances, the private sector retreats." The problem has been exacerbated by the recent financial crisis, as the Chinese government loosened monetary policies to increase bank lending and SOEs became the main benefactors of the policy. For example, a government spokesperson recently admitted that 74% of the SOEs owned by the central government are engaged in the highly profitable but risky real estate business and that these companies also run about 2,500 hotels in the country. n282 These SOEs face significant public pressure and the official media has criticized them for "not doing their proper business." n283 According to Xinhua News Agency, the Chinese government recently ordered 78 companies to withdraw their investments in the real estate sector. n284But an SOE's overseas investment faces less public scrutiny and fewer complaints from domestic competitors. In fact, takeovers of foreign firms can bring enormous national pride and serve the purpose of image building for the Chinese government. Moreover, managers of SOEs can use overseas investment to demonstrate their skill at managing international businesses, and thereby claim political credit for responding to the government's "going out" policy. n285 As such, CEOs of central SOEs may use their corporate careers as springboards into the national leadership. Cheng Li, an expert on Chinese leadership, observes that "[the] younger, business-savvy, politically connected and globally minded Chinese CEOs [*444] have recently become a new source of the CCP leadership[,]" a phenomenon he attributes largely to the meteoric rise and growing power and influence of the SOEs. n286

CCP Collapse Bad

CCP collapse outweighs all of the aff – causes multiple nuclear wars – Korea, Taiwan, Japan, India, and Asian economic collapse.Perkinson 2012 Jessica Perkinson, Master School Of International Service American University, “The Potential For Instability in the PRC: How The Doomsday Theory Misses the Mark”There are a number of areas of concern among China’s immediate regional neighbors and partners, including those

on the Korean Peninsula, Taiwan, Japan, and India. Though China currently adheres to a strict foreign policy regime based on the Five Principles of Peaceful

Coexistence151 and has been able to significantly advance their own interests internationally using this method, the potentially destabilizing effect that forced political reform could have on the country may derail their relations and security with their neighbors. Chief among these regional concerns are North Korea’s dependence on China’s exports, South Korea’s dependence on China’s North Korea deterrence and trade,

the security and stability of the Taiwan Strait, Japan’s reliance on Chinese trade and message consistency regarding territorial disputes, and stability of the Sino-Indian border area. First, the stability of the Korean Peninsula rests in large part on the stability of China’s political system . Both North and South Korea have vested interests in the continued stability of the CCP for their own security. As is generally well-known in the international community, North Korea relies in large part on China superseding international trade sanctions not only for luxury goods, but for basic needs such as food and oil. For example, the United States led the charge and enacted its first set of sanctions against North Korea over two decades ago in response to the existence of fissile material on the Korean Peninsula and its risk for proliferation.152 Over time, these sanctions have been expanded upon and have attracted the support and participation of the United Nations Security Council (UNSC). Specifically, these sanctions have included blocked property and interests in property, banned transactions involving North Korean vessels and bans on reception of imports originating in North Korea.153 Though these sanctions have not encouraged the North Korean regime to change its policies (and in some cases have made them more militant), they have unfortunately had a devastating effect on the North Korean people, including depravation of access to critical resources such as medication, food and water and energy supplies such as oil.154 In addition, due to a succession of floods and droughts and the refusal of the international community to intervene in a country violating international laws, pervasive malnutrition has led to “up to one

million excess deaths since the 1990’s.155 In order to maintain stability on the Peninsula and prevent the North Koreans from becoming desperate, China continues to export both luxury goods and basic commodities into North Korea. For example, in 2005, China accounted for 53% of North Korea’s international commerce. However, this has increased rapidly since sanctions have become stricter and have increased pressure in the country. In 2009, China accounted for 79% in North Korea’s international commerce and as of 2010 was up to 83% of North Korea’s $4.2 billion in trade156 in order to ease the effect of the existing

international sanctions. In addition, China has been a facilitator of the Six-Party Talks, the primary international diplomatic forum for handling tensions on the Korean Peninsula. Countries involved in the Six-Party Talks include China, North Korea, Russia, the United States, South Korea and Japan,

and the first round of talks was initiated and hosted by China, taking place in Beijing in August 2003.157 During the talks, China served as a moderator between the US and North Korea during tense times of debate, also insisting on certain thresholds of success before members could leave the talks, such as the drafting of diplomatic agreements158. Though the talks have remained in an on-and-off pattern over the last decade, China still makes consistent efforts to bring North Korea back to the diplomatic negotiations

over their nuclear regime.159 South Korea’s dependence on China’s continued stability is twofold. Not only does South Korea rely on China’s continued deterrence of North Korean aggression both through diplomacy and satisfaction of their trade needs, but they also rely on China as a trade partner. For example, on November 23, 2010, North Korea fired dozens of missiles onto the South’s Yeonpyeong Island, killing two South Korean soldiers, significantly escalating

tension on the Peninsula as South Korea threatened military retaliation for the attack.160 In response, China focused their energy on deterring an armed

response by the South Koreans, which could have potentially led to protracted civil war between the two countries. Though the international community has

expressed deep disagreement with China’s soft-line approach toward North Korea, it appears their understanding, ‘big-brother’ style of handling North Korean aggression toward

South Korea has at least prevented a violent, protracted conflict, though not necessarily further North Korean acts of aggression.161 Not only does South Korea rely on the continued intervention of the Chinese in North-South relations, but they have a deep economic integration and dependence on Chinese trade. For example, in 2010, South Korea was China’s fourth-largest trading partner, exchanging goods of $207.2 billion, up 32.6% over 2009.162 In other words, both North and South Korea rely heavily on China not only for their continued economic prosperity, but also for the survival of

their people and territorial security. Should the Chinese government undergo a period of reform and instability great enough to interrupt these benefits to the Korean Peninsula, the international system may be faced with a serious nuclear and conventional military conflict between North and South Korea . A second region that relies heavily on the continued

stability of China’s government is the island of Taiwan. Because China and Taiwan have a long history of conflict over the

status of Taiwan’s sovereignty, maintenance of stability in the Taiwan Strait continues to be an issue of critical interest to the international community as a whole. For example, in 1995, the third Taiwan Strait Crisis occurred in response to what may seem like a small event to the international community, but what was viewed by the Chinese as a grave threat to their sovereignty. In 1995, then-US President Bill Clinton allowed Taiwanese President Lee Teng-Hui to come and visit his alma-mater at Cornell University. Though the visit alone sparked some controversy between the US, China and Taiwan, the remarks made at Cornell by Lee Teng-Hui during an address tipped the security balance on the Taiwan Strait. In his address, Lee referred to Taiwan as the “Republic of China” on multiple occasions, and made references to “nation” and “country”.163 These events led the Chinese leadership to believe that the US was making overtures toward Taiwanese independence from the mainland. The following year, the PLA fired missiles off the coast of Taiwan, nearly drawing the international community – including the US – into a conflict on the Strait.164 Some scholars argue this was to deter the US from developing closer ties with Taiwan.165 However, since that incident, the Strait has remained relatively calm and stable, as the Taiwanese leadership under Ma Ying-jeou has remained very moderate in their stance on China-Taiwan relations and has

been very careful not to make any inflammatory statements that could set off conflict on the Strait. However, a period of significant reform within the CCP could lend itself to instability on the Taiwan Strait. There is no guarantee that pro-independence factions within Taiwan would not take advantage of the CCP and PLA’s distraction with their own transformation to take dramatic, perhaps

militaristic, steps toward independence. For example, during Taiwan’s most recent election cycle, the pro-independence candidate Tsai Ing-wen, though she lost the election, garnered enough support to make the government in mainland China nervous about her rise in support.166 The potential destabilization of the Taiwan Strait could spell disaster for the entire region, as other countries and allies could be pulled into a protracted conflict between the two regions. A third

region that has a deep interest in China’s political stability is their neighbor Japan. Not only is Japan deeply integrated economically into the Chinese trade system, it also has a number of ongoing territorial disputes with the country. For example, in January 2007, total trade between China and Japan was $18.1 million. That amount spiked to $344.9 million in December, 2011 (an 1808.1% increase)167, a clear indicator that

China and Japan are growing their trade dependence at an astounding rate. In addition, Japan and China continue to disagree over the status of some hotly contested territories, including the Diaoyu/Senkaku Islands. Not only do both countries have a territorial claim to the islands, but the area contains vast amounts of oil and natural gas resources that both countries want to develop. For example, it is estimated that the Japanese side of the disputed East China Sea area contains up to 500 million kiloliters of crude oil volume.168 As China is the world’s second-largest consumer of oil and Japan third, with Chinese demand for oil expected to rise

14% by 2025, these oil deposits are of crucial national security interest to both countries.169 Tension in the region has been rising as China has continued to press closer to the median line that Japan has drawn around the islands , at one point coming as close as five kilometers from the line.170 The consistency of the Chinese message on the status of these disputed territories, though tense and combative for the Japanese, have at least lent a level of

predictability to China’s stance and actions. However, should the CCP undergo a period of instability and reform, and if their message or actions were to change regarding the status of these islands, it could cause a significant conflict over these territories between China and Japan, and could severely destabilize an already weakened Japanese economy .

Much like the potential destabilization of the Taiwan Strait, the destabilization of the East China Sea region could draw the countries’ regional neighbors and international partners into a protracted conflict between the two nations . A fourth region that would be negatively affected by political destabilization in China is their southern neighbor, India. Though China and India are becoming increasingly reliant on one another economically, they still suffer from a number of serious areas of conflict, including a hotly contested border area and India’s support of the Dalai Lama and the Tibetan government-in-exile. In 1962, the PLA invaded India through the Arunachal Pradesh region, laying claim to portions of the Himalayas that had previously been under Indian control in what became known as the Sino-Indian War. Though the Chinese eventually called a cease-fire and withdrew from the region171, the conflict over it remains tense for a number of reasons, including access to water resources, forestry resources and China’s enduring theme of

territorial integrity. Similar to the destabilization of the two regions mentioned above, the inconsistency of China’s message during a time of political destabilization or reform could lead the Indian military to either panic from the unpredictability of China’s potential actions or move to take the Arunachal Pradesh region by force . Not only could political instability in China

cause a border conflict between India and China, but it could also cause an influx of Tibetans into the country , as India’s government is sympathetic to the Tibetan plight. Though China has labeled the Dalai Lama and his government-in-exile a separatist force working to separate Tibet from mainland China, India has provided the group sanctuary in Dharamsala, India.172 Abroad, the Dalai Lama continues to draw supporters from around the world, occasionally attracting Tibetans inside Tibet to make the treacherous journey across the Himalayas to Dharamsala. China, in turn, has taken up guarding this area in an attempt to prevent flows of Tibetans out of Tibet and into India

to reach the Dalai Lama.173 However, should the CCP undergo a period of significant political reform, this could encourage Tibetans to either take advantage of the CCP’s distraction to seek independence by force, or could cause massive immigrant flows across the Sino-Indian border . Both China and India already have a regional example of destabilization due to immigrant flows, as China already suffers from this issue on its border with North Korea. In addition, any political stability within the CCP would spell disaster for the Indian economy , which is becoming increasingly reliant on China as a trading partner. Partially as a counterweight to the two nations’ conflict, India and China have been dramatically growing their bilateral trade in the last three decades. Though this has served to promote peace in the region and between the two giants in particular, it has also made India increasingly reliant on China’s continued stability for its economic prosperity. For example, in 1990, trade between India and China had bottomed out at near $0. However, this figure shot up drastically between 2000 and 2008 to around $35 billion174, with no sign of leveling off. It is obvious from these statistics that the two nations continue to build their trade dependency and that India’s economy is deeply intertwined with China’s. The consistency of China’s message on the contested border area, as well as the fairly stable environment surrounding the Tibetan dispute, lend at least some predictability to the disagreement between the two

nations. However, if China were to undergo a period of political instability, this series of predictable messages and actions from China on these disagreements could change, and cause aggression from either side, destabilizing the region and India’ economy in the process . Outside of China’s immediate vicinity, there exist a number of countries that would be challenged by political instability in China. Due to intense and growing economic and military integration between China, the East Asian region and the world, these other countries have a significant reliance on the continued stability of the CCP. Chief among these global concerns are China’s growing integration with European countries and its continued commitment of foreign direct investment (FDI) into developing countries, primarily on the African continent.

The CCP would lash out for power, and they would use bioweaponsRenxin 05 Renxin, Journalist, 8-3-2K5 (San, “CCP Gambles Insanely to Avoid Death,” Epoch Times, www.theepochtimes.com/news/5-8-3/30931.html)Since the Party’s life is “above all else,” it would not be surprising if the CCP resorts to the use of biological, chemical, and nuclear weapons in its attempt to postpone its life. The CCP, that disregards human life, would not hesitate to kill two hundred million Americans, coupled with seven or eight hundred million Chinese, to achieve its ends. The “speech,” free of all disguises, lets the public see the CCP for what it really is: with evil filling its every cell, the CCP intends to fight all of mankind in its desperate attempt to cling to life. And that is the theme of the “speech.” The theme is murderous and utterly evil. We did witness in China beggars who demanded money from people by threatening to stab themselves with knives or prick their throats on long nails. But we have never, until now, seen a rogue who blackmails the world to die with it by wielding biological, chemical, and nuclear weapons. Anyhow, the bloody confession affirmed the CCP’s bloodiness: a monstrous murderer, who has killed 80 million Chinese people, now plans to hold one billion people hostage and gamble with their lives. As the CCP is known to be a clique with a closed system, it is extraordinary for it to reveal its top secret on its own. One might ask: what is the CCP’s purpose to make public its gambling plan on its deathbed? The answer is: the “speech” would have the effect of killing three birds with one stone. Its intentions are the following: Expressing

the CCP’s resolve that it “not be buried by either heaven or earth” (direct quote from the “speech”). But then, isn’t the CCP opposed to the universe if it claims not to be buried by heaven and earth? Feeling the urgent need to harden its image as a soft egg in the face of the Nine Commentaries. Preparing publicity for its final battle with mankind by threatening war and trumpeting violence. So, strictly speaking, what the CCP has leaked out is more of an attempt to clutch at straws to save its life rather than to launch a trial balloon. Of course, the way the “speech” was presented had been carefully prepared. It did not have a usual opening or ending, and the audience, time, place, and background related to the “speech” were all kept unidentified. One may speculate or imagine as one may, but never verify. The aim was obviously to create a mysterious setting. In short, the “speech” came out as something one finds difficult to tell whether it is false or true.

China Econ AFF Answers

China tech low nowChina’s tech industry continues to plummet because of neglect at the federal level – they were overvalued to begin with. Horwitz and Timmons, Quartz, 15[Josh and Heather, 7/6/15, “China is neglecting the internet and tech startups that are supposed to fuel the economy,” http://qz.com/445469/china-is-neglecting-the-internet-and-tech-startups-that-are-supposed-to-fuel-the-economy/ date accessed 7/7/15, Evann]This past weekend, China’s State Council, a central governing body led by premier Li Keqiang, released a detailed outline of Internet Plus, an ambitious plan to boost the economy by promoting new web-based businesses (link in Chinese).But the plan is being promoted at an awkward time for Li—after all, as the government’s intervention in China’s stock markets shows, that support and encouragement is mostly theoretical right now. Stocks of massive state-owned enterprises were stabilized on Monday by billions of dollars in governments stimulus, while private tech and internet companies have watched their stock prices continue to plummet.On Monday’s close, the Shanghai Composite was up 2.4 percent after shares in PetroChina, ICBC, Agricultural Bank of China, Bank of China, and other SOEs rose more than 8 percent during Monday’s trading.But ChiNext, the NASDAQ-style board of the Shenzhen Stock Exchange created to attract small-cap technology firms, has continued to slide despite the stimulus, and was down over 4 percent Monday.The CSI China Internet ETF, a Nasdaq-listed fund of Chinese internet stocks, has fallen steadily since its mid-June peak, and dropped another 7% on Monday. Even Huawei Techologies, the giant network equipment company, closed down 8.78% in Shenzhen on Monday.Of course, when any government decides it is time for a financial bailout, it will look at the country’s biggest, most influential firms, which are often banking or oil. And there’s plenty of reason to believe that China’s tech stocks were overvalued to begin with—perhaps due to undue investor enthusiasm for Internet Plus.But China’s steep and unchecked drops in internet stocks threaten to undermine confidence in the entire growing internet and tech industry itself . Because China’s state banks are notoriously tight-fisted when it comes to lending to new businesses, start-up tech and internet firms have mostly grown thanks to a mix of venture capital, willing equity investors, and other private funding.China’s fund managers and brokers recently pledged to support the stock market as well—but they’re not supporting private internet and tech companies, and stock prices are falling as a result.A retail investor who gets burned on China’s tech and internet companies isn’t likely to buy into the sector any time in the near future. A global venture capital fund who sees China’s state-owned enterprises will be bailed out at the expense of tech and the internet may decide to focus on other high-growth markets like Southeast Asia or Latin America in the short term.China-focused investors in these stocks believe they will still be rewarded in the long-term. “Internet Plus has not been fully rolled out in the policy sphere and should be a gradual process over the next five years,” Ken Xu, partner at Gobi Partners, a venture capital firm based in Beijing, told Quartz on July 6. “As tech companies take on a more prominent position in the economy, policies will begin catering more to their benefit.” Still, he said, “for the immediate term, SOEs are still an integral part of the economy and depend on government support.”Li has far-reaching ambitions for China’s internet expansion, as the State Council paper shows. It singled out eleven industries vital to the Chinese economy that the internet could boost: entrepreneurship, manufacturing, agriculture, energy, banking, healthcare, education, logistics, e-commerce, transportation, and the environment.The paper highlighted internet-based loans, insurance, and securities from private companies, online education services and online medical record-keeping. It also said the internet can improve the the quality of transportation, which should give ride-sharing companies like Uber or Didi Kuadi a reason to feel optimistic about their future in China.But many of these sectors have traditionally been served by state-owned enterprises, making it difficult to see how sustainable this support support for private internet business is. Already Ant Financial, an Alibaba spin-off, competes with state-owned banks like ICBC and the China Construction bank to offer loans and funds for the nation’s consumers. The entry of more internet banks threatens to erode China’s state banks’ falling profits even further.It’s easy for China’s central government to talk about embracing the disruption that the growth of a tech and internet economy bring. But following through is going to be more difficult

Econ not key to prevent warEconomic factors don’t prevent conflict. Militarization is inevitableMalaysia Chronicle, editorial, 15[6/15/15, “WORLD WAR III? China & US on collision course for war over South China Sea,”http://www.malaysia-chronicle.com/index.php?option=com_k2&view=item&id=532752:world-war-iii?-china-us-on-collision-course-for-war-over-south-china-sea&Itemid=4#ixzz3fEv8fZoc date accessed 7/6/15, Evann]A QUIET battle lingering over the South China Sea just got a whole lot more dangerous after reports China tested hypersonic glide vehicles capable of carrying nuclear weapons.The vehicle, dubbed the WU-14, was the fourth test of the missile in 18 months, RT News reports.The weapon is extremely advanced and can travel at 10 times the speed of sound.And it’s ticking off the Americans.The US has labelled the testing as an “extreme manoeuvre” amid tensions in the South China Sea, theSouth China Morning Post reports.But China has been quick to dismiss any suggestion the tests were anything other than a normal exercise.“The scheduled scientific research and experiments in our territory is normal, and those tests are not targeted at any country and specific goals,” the ministry told thePost.Tensions between the two military superpowers have been increasing due to a cluster of tiny islands in the South China Sea.And the US and China have been doing a lot of peacocking about them.US Secretary of Defence Ash Carter has previously warned the US would not shyaway from confronting Beijing about the continued expansion.The problem is also placing Australia in an awkward position over who it would be better off being best buddies with.The tiny man-made islands popping up in the South China Sea have been dubbed a “flashpoint” of war due to the land grab they inspire.The Chinese have used dredging engineering to create the islands from what were previously reefs — and it claims it has the sovereign right to do this, despite some of them being 1400km from China’s mainland or on the continental shelfs of the Philippines and Vietnam.Militarisation of those islands could very well result in conflict between China and US, which runs its ships through the area.That would drag Australia firmly into the war muck — Australia needs China for trade, but the US is one of its closest defence allies.As well as US military interests in the area, countries including the Philippines, Brunei, Malaysia, Taiwan and Vietnam also have a stake in the region.As each island appears, China stakes a claim in the sea around it and this is the crux of the issue for China’s neighbours.About 1500 hectares of land has been reclaimed by the Chinese. It gives the country another 12 nautical miles of territory at each new border, and also creates 200 extra miles of economic zones to dig for oil, gas and to fish in.The deputy dean of global studies at the Royal Melbourne Institute of Technology, Professor Joseph Siracussa, told news.com.au that the two nations were “spoiling for a fight”.Despite the economic ties between China and the global economy, he said it wouldn’t stop a war.“Economics mean very little at the end of the day,” said Prof Siracussa, who is an expert in human security and international diplomacy.“Once you militarise a problem, you don’t get a diplomatic solution.“The [US] Secretary of Defence’s job is to think about the next war and how to beat them up.“The trigger is there, it’s just waiting to happen,” he said.During a “Re-assessing the Global Nuclear Order” conference in January, Prof Siracussa said discussions about “inevitable” war between the US and China were quite open and on the table.“They were discussing the inevitable war with China,” he said.“This will happen. This is about power.“The American pentagon is on a collision course with China.“So the South China Sea has become a flashpoint for war.”China also had a grand military plan in place, he said, which included claiming the land, and blocking the US military.

“The Chinese need resources to feed the ‘Chinese miracle’. They see it as part of their manifesto of destiny,” he said.“Those resources are central to the health of China.”So who would fire the first shot? America, “if things spin out of control”, Prof Siracussa said.“I’d say the war with China will probably take place in the next 10 years,” he said.A statement issued on the US Department of Defense website said Mr Carter’s had met with the China’s vice-chairman of the Central Military Commission, General Fan Changlong, at the Pentagon last week.“Secretary Carter stressed his commitment to developing a sustained and substantive US-China military-to-military relationship based on a shared desire to deepen practical, concrete cooperation in areas of mutual interest,” the statement said.The pair also exchanged views over concerns in the South China Sea and called on China and to “implement a lasting halt on land reclamation, cease further militarisation, and pursue a peaceful resolution of territorial disputes in accordance with international law”.Prof Siracussa said the world was watching this issue and, as a result, other countries could very well be stockpiling weapons in preparation for a war.That theory is backed up by a new report on nuclear stockpiles.Nuclear armed states continue to upgrade their stockpiles despite an international trend towards disarmament, The Stockholm International Peace Research Institute’s annual disarmament report revealed.It pointed to extensive “long-term modernisation programs” in the world’s two largest nuclear powers — the US and Russia — which account for 90 per cent of the weapons.“Despite renewed international interest in prioritising nuclear disarmament, the modernisation programs under way in the nuclear weapon-possessing states suggests that none of them will give up their nuclear arsenals in the foreseeable future,” institute researcher Shannon Kile said in a statement.

Econ not key to CCP collapse Growth doesn’t sustain legitimacy, well-being among economic elites is key.Panda, A.B. in Public and International Affairs from Princeton University, 15 [Ankit, The diplomat, 6/18/15, “Where Does the CCP's Legitimacy Come From? (Hint: It's Not Economic Performance)” http://thediplomat.com/2015/06/where-does-the-ccps-legitimacy-come-from-hint-its-not-economic-performance/ date accessed 7/7/15, Evann]There’s a pernicious and persistent piece of conventional wisdom in conversations about China’s political stability that is often presented as a truism: the Chinese Communist Party’s (CCP) legitimacy stems from its ability to deliver high economic growth; if economic growth disappears, so will its legitimacy; this in turn will lead to the beginning of the end of the CCP.The a priori appeal is evident since the reason stands the test of common sense. After all, assuming a broad definition of “legitimacy,” it would make sense that keeping citizens happy through high economic growth would prevent social unrest or calls for a new form of government. How do you keep citizens happy? Well, you can expand the economic pie, ensuring that everyone gets a larger slice—more per capita GDP leads to more per capita happiness leads to less revolution and upheaval. For CCP elites, mass upheaval over economic outcomes is best avoided by keeping China’s year-on-year growth rates as high as possible.New research challenges this conventional wisdom with evidence. A new Global Working Paper (PDF warning) from the Brookings Institution inverts the reasoning I outlined above. Measuring “legitimacy” is of course a tricky endeavor, so the paper instead measures well-being—roughly how happy citizens are—against China’s economic performance (the word “legitimacy” does not appear in the paper). The paper additionally looks at the prevalence of mental health disorders in China. The finding of interest, distilled in a Brookings blog post, is as follows:We find that the standard determinants of well-being are the same for China as they are for most countries around the world. At the same time, China stands out in that unhappiness and reported mental health problems are highest among the cohorts who either have or are positioned to benefit from the transition and related growth—a clear progress paradox. These are urban residents, the more educated, those who work in the private sector, and those who report to have insufficient leisure time and rest.The paper’s finding has already drawn intelligent commentary from a few commentators (political scientist Jay Ulfelder and blogger T. Greer have posted important reactions). The finding that well-being, particularly among Chinese economic “elites,” is decoupled—and even inversely correlated—with China’s overall economic growth would suggest that th e CCP’s survival might be independent of China’s overall economic performan ce . Thus, the CCP thrives not because it makes Chinese elites happy, but despite Chinese elites’ unhappiness.As Ulfelder summarizes:These survey results contradict the “performance legitimacy” story that many observers use to explain how the Chinese Communist Party has managed to avoid significant revolutionary threats since 1989 (see here, for example). In that story, Chinese citizens choose not to demand political liberalization because they are satisfied with the government’s economic performance. In effect, they accept material gains in lieu of political voice.The decline in overall well-being among elites does present a serious challenge to the conventional explanation of the CCP’s legitimacy. The authors of the Brookings report also highlight previous studies of well-being and life satisfaction in China that measured a large decline in happiness among “the lowest-income and least-educated segments of the population.” In previous studies, China’s “upper socioeconomic strata” exhibited a rise in happiness, somewhat confirming the conventional wisdom explanation. Additionally, the authors note numerous independent variables that affect happiness, including rural/urban status, internal migration status (urban households and migrant households report lower happiness levels than their rural, non-migrant counterparts).Where does the CCP’s legitimacy come from then? As Greer notes, maybe looking at the per capita distribution of wealth in China has been the wrong measure all along—it’s unnecessarily reductive and dismissive of the opinions of actual Chinese people. Instead, Chinese people would attribute the legitimacy of the CCP to specific policy initiatives (i.e., fighting corruption, delivering justice to wrong-doers within the country’s power apparatus) as well as more diffuse, nation-level factors (i.e., the CCP’s “role in helping China, as a country and a nation, become wealthy, powerful, and respected on the international stage”).The long-term survival of the CCP may be the most consequential question for China in the 21st century, both for external observers watching China’s rise and for internal stakeholders. It’s undoubtedly important thus to understand how Chinese citizens relate to their government and experience life as China continues to grow. Still, it’s best to update our beliefs on how the CCP sustains its political legitimacy when presented with new data. The often-

repeated economic performance explanation of the CCP’s legitimacy is not only outmoded—it appears to have never really been based in reality.

Alt cause to CCP collapseOverwhelming amount of officials lead to the demise of the communist party, Soviet Russia proves. Sonmez, Editor of the Wall Street Journal's China Real Time Report, 15 [Felicia, Wall Street Journal, 6/30/15, “China’s Communist Party: Still Big, and Getting Bigger,” http://blogs.wsj.com/chinarealtime/2015/06/30/chinas-communist-party-still-big-and-getting-bigger/ date accessed 7/7/15, Evann]At its heart is the pursuit of the party’s survival. Xi and other top leaders have made a point of reminding cadres that the Chinese Communist Party must avoid the same pitfalls that brought about the demise of the former Soviet Union – particularly disloyalty to Communist ideals – with some Chinese scholars warning that the Soviet collapse came when the ranks of its Communist Party had swollen to an unwieldy 19 million , or nearly 10% of the Soviet Union’s adult population.The membership of the Chinese Communist Party currently stands at about 7.8% of China’s adult population.Yet despite a vow by China’s Politburo leaders to limit the party’s size and purge “unqualified members,” statistics released by the Organization Department show that membership has actually grown over each of the past four years, albeit at an increasingly slower rate.At the end of 2011, the CCP’s membership was 82.60 million – a net increase of 2.9% from a year earlier, according to the Organization Department. By the end of 2012, its membership had risen a net 3.1%, to 85.13 million. 2013 saw the party’s ranks increase yet again, to 86.69 million, a net rise of 1.8%. And the latest figure of 87.793 million at the end of 2014 represents a 1.3% increase from the previous year.The figures take into account the recruitment of new members and the loss of previous members due to death or leaving the party.The Organization Department’s communique did not directly address the issue of thinning the Communist Party ranks, saying only that the new figures show that “the party’s vitality and vigor continue to be strengthened.”Some users of China’s popular online social networks, however, voiced skepticism of the claim.“How many of these party members actually believe in Communism?” one user wrote Tuesday morning on Weibo.Wrote another: “University students only join the party so that they can gain connections and shamelessly seek personal gain.”

Alt cause to SCSSovereignty issues outweigh on the South China Sea conflict.Nye, Distinguished Service Professor, Harvard University, 15[Joseph, 6/03/15, Huffington Post, ”Is U.S.-China Conflict Imminent in the South China Sea?” http://www.huffingtonpost.com/joseph-nye/us-china-south-china-sea_b_7503966.html date accessed 7/7/15, Evann]When a U.S. Navy P8-A surveillance aircraft recently flew near Fiery Cross Reef in the Spratly Islands in the South China Sea, it was warned eight times by the Chinese Navy to leave the area. Chinese Foreign Minister Wang Yi said that, "China's determination to safeguard its sovereignty and territorial integrity is as firm as a rock." U.S. Defense Secretary Ashton Carter replied that, "There should be no mistake [about this]: the United States will fly, sail, and operate wherever international law allows us, as we do all around the world." So, is a U.S.-China conflict in the South China Sea imminent? In 1995, when I was serving in the Pentagon, China began building structures on Mischief Reef, which is claimed by the Philippines and lies much closer to its shores than to China's. The U.S. issued a statement that we took no position on the competing claims by five states over the 750 or so rocks, atolls, islets, cays and reefs that comprise the Spratlys, which cover a vast area -- 425,000 square kilometers (164,000 square miles) -- of the South China Sea. We urged that the parties involved to settle the disputes peacefully. But the U.S. took a strong stand that the South China Sea, which includes important sea lanes for oil shipments from the Middle East and container ships from Europe, and over which military and commercial aircraft routinely fly, was subject to the United Nations Law of the Sea Treaty. To back up its territorial claim, China relies on a map inherited from the Nationalist period -- the so-called "nine-dashed line," which extends nearly a thousand miles south of mainland China and sometimes as close as 40 or 50 miles from the coastline of states like Vietnam, Malaysia, Brunei and the Philippines. All of these states claim the 200-mile exclusive economic zones granted under UNCLOS. When the dispute over Mischief Reef erupted, Chinese officials failed to clarify the meaning of the nine-dashed line, but, when pressed, they agreed that the dashes demarcated areas where China had sovereign claims. At the same time, they agreed that the South China Sea was not a Chinese lake, and that it was governed by the UN treaty. On this basis, the U.S. and China avoided conflict over the issue for nearly two decades. But China did not avoid conflicts with its maritime neighbors. Although it pledged to adhere to a code of conduct negotiated by the Association of Southeast Asian Nations in 2002, it used its superior military might in disputes with the Philippines and Vietnam. In 2012, Chinese patrol vessels chased Philippine fishing boats away from Scarborough Shoal off the Philippine coast, and the Philippine government has taken the dispute to the International Tribunal for the Law of the Sea, which China claims has no jurisdiction. In 2014, after China stationed an oil rig in waters claimed by Vietnam, ships from the two countries engaged in ramming and water-cannon battles at sea; anti-Chinese riots in Vietnam followed. The region's smaller states sought American support. But the U.S. remained careful not to be drawn into the competing claims over sovereignty, some of which are tenuous, while on others China sometimes has a stronger legal position. Moreover, the U.S. had to focus on larger issues in its relationship with China. This began to change when China initiated an active policy of dredging sand to fill in reefs and build islands in at least five locations. Earlier this year, analysts released images of what is expected to be a 10,000-foot (3,000-meter) runway on Fiery Cross Reef. The U.S. argues that UNCLOS grants foreign ships and planes free access beyond a 12-mile territorial limit, while China claims that military flights cannot cross its 200-mile economic zone without its permission. If China claimed such a zone for each of the sites it occupies, it could close off most of the South China Sea. As one U.S. official put it, China seems to be trying to "create facts on the ground" -- what Admiral Harry Harris, the U.S. commander in the Pacific, calls a new "great wall of sand." China correctly declared that it was within its sovereign rights to dredge, and that it was merely following the lead of its neighbors, whose governments had also been creating structures to bolster their claims. But American suspicions were heightened by the fact that in 2013, in a separate dispute between China and Japan over the Senkaku/Daiyou Islands in the East China Sea, the Chinese government unilaterally declared an Air Defense Identification Zone without prior warning. The U.S. response was to fly two B-52 bombers through the unrecognized zone. This set a precedent for the recent naval reconnaissance flight (which had a team of CNN reporters on board). The U.S. response was designed to prevent China from creating a fait accompli that could close off large parts of the South China Sea. Nevertheless, the original policy of not becoming embroiled in the sovereignty dispute

continues to make sense. The irony is that the U.S. Senate's failure to ratify UNCLOS means that the U.S. cannot take China to ITLOS over its efforts to convert reefs into islands and claim exclusion zones that could interfere with the right of free passage -- a major U.S. interest. But, because China has ratified UNCLOS and the U.S. respects it as customary international law, there is a basis for serious direct negotiation over clarification of the ambiguous nine-dashed line and the preservation of freedom of the seas. With properly managed diplomacy, a U.S.-China conflict in the South China Sea can and should be avoided.

Econ low – Manufacturing.China’s economy is weak now and manufacturing is more important to the Chinese economyZhu and Yu, Wall Street Journal, 15 [Grace Zhu and Rose Yu, 7/1/15, “China’s Economy Signals More Weakness,” http://www.wsj.com/articles/chinas-economy-signals-more-weakness-1435727102 date accessed 7/6/15, Evann]BEIJING—China’s economy showed signs of flagging in June, with gauges of factory activity missing market expectations and suggesting weakening momentum in the world’s second-largest economy.Economists said more stimulus policies, especially fiscal measures such as more tax breaks and infrastructure spending, are needed to prop up growth, which they said likely continued to slow during the second quarter of the year.China’s official manufacturing purchasing managers index remained at 50.2 in June, the same as in May, the National Bureau of Statistics said Wednesday. The reading stood above 50, the level which separates expansion from contraction, but it missed the median 50.4 forecast from a Wall Street Journal poll of 11 economists.A competing index by HSBC and research firm Markit, also released Wednesday, rose to 49.4 in June from 49.2 the previous month, but came in lower than a preliminary reading of 49.6 reported a week ago.The lackluster readings follow the recent release of other statistics from trade to industrial profits that portray an economy struggling to find its feet. A bright spot for much of the year, the country’s stock markets have tumbled over the last two weeks, adding to uncertainty about the economy.“We are concerned that the second-quarter economic growth might miss the government bottom line of 7%,” said ANZ economist Zhou Hao. “Fiscal policy should take the driver’s seat to help restore market confidence over the economic outlook.”China’s economic growth slowed to 7% in the first quarter of the year, its weakest performance in six years. Beijing has introduced many stimulus measures, relaxing monetary policy, boosting spending on infrastructure projects and providing tax breaks for businesses and consumers.In the latest move, the central bank on Saturday cut the benchmark one-year lending and deposit interest rates for the fourth time since November and reduced the required amount of funds that certain banks need to keep in reserve in an effort to encourage more lending to struggling corporate borrowers.The four interest-rate cuts and other monetary easing, however, haven’t done enough to lower borrowing costs, especially because the economy faces increased deflationary pressure, Jacqueline Rong, an economist with BNP, said.The PMI readings showed further challenges for growth. Both new orders and export orders fell in June from a month ago, suggesting further headwinds for growth, said Zhang Liqun, an analyst at the China Federation of Logistics and Purchasing, which issues the official PMI data with the statistics bureau.Mr. Zhang also said that the debt crisis in Greece will cast a shadow over China’s exports outlook and that Beijing needs to roll out more measures to increase investment and boost domestic demand.The HSBC PMI pointed to problems in manufacturing employment, with “the sharpest rate of job shedding across the sector since early 2009,” according to Annabel Fiddes, an economist at Markit. Chinese manufacturing employment declined for the 20th consecutive month in June, Markit said in a statement.On a positive note, the official nonmanufacturing purchasing managers index also released Wednesday rose to 53.8 in June from 53.2 in May, lifted by healthy construction activity, the statistics bureau said.

Econ low – Stock Crash Stock market crash in China prevents puts its economy on downward spiral that tech can’t solve instability.Barron, Forbes, 15[Oliver Blade, 7/5/15, “Did China's Stock Market Crash Just End Economic Reform?” http://www.forbes.com/sites/oliverbarron/2015/07/05/did-chinas-stock-market-crash-just-end-economic-reform/ date accessed 7/6/15, Evann]The beauty of markets is that they have a mind of their own. For the Chinese government, this has been a tough pill to swallow.Try as it might, the Chinese government was unable to arrest the decline in the domestic stock market last week. The central bank cut benchmark interest rates and the amount of money banks must keep with it on reserve. A government investment vehicle made it known that it was buying ETFs. The securities regulator eased regulations on margin trading and the Stock Exchange cut transaction fees. Despite this, the benchmark Shanghai Composite Index declined 12% over the course of the week, bringing the total decline since June 12th to more than 28%.If the government is honest with itself, it must admit that it failed to control the market. It tried, and tried some more, and the market kept doing what it wanted. Plagued by a deterioration in sentiment and deleveraging, it kept falling.One might be tempted to rejoice that the Market triumphed over the Communist Party. Along a similar vein, Bloomberg News last week wrote: “Stock investors of the world unite! For the first time in modern China, you outnumber the Communists.”There will, of course, be many China bears highlighting the risk of social instability from the recent market collapse. It is certainly reasonable to question whether the Chinese people are losing faith in the Chinese government’s willingness and ability to watch over its people after the recent crash. After all, the prevailing view in China was summed up by comments from a retail investor quoted by Bloomberg:“The tone from the state media is particularly helpful to retail investors like me, as I have a job to do and am pretty busy,” said Yao, 35. “China’s stock market is really different from other countries. The government surely has some measures to control the movement.”It is likely for this reason that the securities regulator suspended IPOs and 21 securities firms released a statement on Saturday that they will spend 120bn yuan ($19.3bn) to buy stock as long as the benchmark index is below 4,500. Ultimately, the government was afraid it would lose the faith of the Chinese people.The latest support measures will surely drive a recovery in the market regardless of how dangerous they may be. Offering investors what is essentially a risk-free return of 22% (driving the market from its current level of 3,687 back to 4,500) will mean that they pile the risk back on, leverage and all. This suggests that another crash awaits the market at some point in the future.Instead of delighting in the power of the market or worrying about the next stock market boom-bust cycle, we should instead try and discern what lessons the Chinese government took from this whole experience. After the stock market collapse, I worry that instead of respecting the market, the government now fears it.The core theme of China’s economic reform is reducing the role of the government in the economy in order to let market forces play a larger role. Undoubtedly after the market’s declines over the last two weeks, there will be those within the government that are suggesting to slow market reforms and maintain control as long as possible, citing as evidence the social unrest that was brewing during the collapse.No one knows if this is in the conclusion that authorities will reach. If it is, and China backs away from the economic reforms that are desperately needed, then the real troubles are only just beginning.

No zero sum

The thesis of technological competition is false, growth in US benefits China and vise-versa.’Kakaes, fellow at New America, 12[Konstantin, 1/9/12, “No One Can Win the Future,” http://www.slate.com/articles/technology/future_tense/2012/01/u_s_scientists_are_not_competing_with_china_or_any_other_country_.single.html date accessed 7/5/15, Evann]

Obama and the Republicans might disagree on the answers, but they agree on the question: "How can America compete with the rest of the world, especially China?" But this is the wrong question to be asking. We are not actually engaged in economic or technological competition with China or with anyone else. Absent a state of open war, our economic growth helps that of other countries, and vice versa. New technology developed in the United States will benefit the rest of the world, and vice versa.The extremely complicated interactions between countries—goods, people, culture, and ideas all flowing back and forth—are not akin to a sporting competition. To pretend that we are all engaged in a giant worldwide track meet for economic domination serves the interest of business above individuals. To pretend that there is a field event for technological domination actually hurts American business by imposing futile regulations on technology exports. This deeply entrenched misunderstanding about the nature of technological innovation leads to unnecessary tax breaks and prioritizes trendy metrics of performance (where putative relative success can be measured) over the fundamentals necessary to shaping a better society. By thinking we are racing with China, or Europe, we will end up worse off.The case that we are in competition is often linked to the claim that the United States is somehow “falling behind.” A July report by the Information Technology and Innovation Foundation that ranked countries on the basis of how “innovative” they are typifies this perspective: “It is worth reiterating that in 2000 the United States ranked first, a position it likely held for the majority of the post-war period, but in a decade it has fallen to fourth. At this rate, where will the United States rank at the end of the next decade?” The United States was “behind” Singapore, Finland, and Sweden. Comparing a country of 300 million people with a city-state and a couple of Nordic countries whose combined population is less than that of Los Angeles doesn’t mean much. But it lets ITIF sound the trumpets of alarm and claim that drastic action is needed.On the surface, there is a sort of international competition over jobs. Commerce Department data show that U.S.-based multinationals cut 2.9 million domestic jobs during the first decade of the century and added 2.4 million jobs abroad. But look more closely, as in a November report from the Commerce Department, and you’ll see that of those new jobs abroad, only 8.9 percent involved sales to U.S customers—the overwhelming number of new jobs abroad were related to economic growth abroad. It looks like jobs “moved” from the U.S. to other countries, since the numbers are about the same size.But the truth is that jobs were lost in the U.S. for many reasons: technological change, corporate consolidation, and a sluggish economy. The jobs that were created abroad are, by and large, different jobs than the jobs lost in the United States. As Paul Krugman wrote in an essay for Foreign Affairs in 1994, “it is simply not the case that the world's leading nations are to any important degree in economic competition with each other, or that any of their major economic problems can be attributed to failures to compete on world markets.” It’s easy to blame today’s bleak economic outlook on a failure to compete. But doing so is just finding a scapegoat for domestic shortcomings.The bible of the competitiveness crowd is a National Academy of Sciences report called Rising Above the Gathering Storm. (In terms of melodramatic white paper titles, the United States is surely a world leader. The report was first issued in 2005; a 2010 revision was subtitled: Rapidly Approaching Category 5.) The 2010 report notes, “30 years ago the United States had 30 percent of the world’s college students. Today we are at 14 percent and falling.” This is cited as evidence of a decline in American competitiveness. But that’s like saying the United States has a smaller percentage of the world’s well-nourished people than it did 30 years ago. It is good for people around the world to go to college and be well-fed. Neither takes anything away from the United States.The competition rhetoric is almost always linked with calls for increased investment in research. But as Argentino Pessoa of the University of Porto, among others, has pointed out, there is a slight negative correlation between R&D intensity and GDP growth —in other words, spending more on research doesn’t necessarily make you richer. Amar Bhide, in his book The Venturesome Economy, cites the example of Norway, which isn’t even in the top 20 countries ranked by share of scientific papers published, but has the highest labor productivity in the world.

Knowledge—of which technology is a kind—gets shared widely. A Dec. 7 New York Times article called “China Scrambles for High Tech Dominance” gets it exactly wrong. “If the future of the Internet is already in China, is the future of computing there as well?” The future of the Internet isn’t in China any more than the present of the Internet is in the U.S. Technonationalists (as Bhide calls the competitiveness caucus) like to trumpet the fact that Google is an American company. But the benefits of quartering Google’s corporate headquarters are dwarfed by the benefits of using Google (and its peers, like Baidu, a Chinese search engine) and other revolutionary technologies. And those benefits get spread widely. The Internet, for example, was invented in the United States—but that does not mean we get the most benefit from it.Indisputably, more scientific research is going on in China today than 30 years ago. But let’s do a simple thought experiment. Imagine that someone in a lab in China cured cancer tomorrow. Technology spreads quickly—that cancer cure would be applied in the United States (and throughout the world) with tremendous benefit for human welfare. In no way would we be worse off. Sure, a Chinese pharmaceutical company would make money. But so would the pharmacist who sold the drug in the United States and the doctor who prescribed it. American researchers would build on the Chinese discovery. American workers would be more productive, and American families would have their sarcoma-ridden loved ones futures restored to them. The money made by the notional Chinese pharmaceutical firm is inconsequential compared with the worldwide effect of the miracle cure.

Link Turn Chinese tech firms are harmed by NSA surveillance. Data localization is ultimately worse. Griffiths, University of Liverpool Bachelor of Laws, 15 [James, South China Morning Post, 7/3/15, “Two years after Snowden, NSA revelations still hurting US tech firms in China: report,” http://www.scmp.com/tech/enterprises/article/1831657/nsa-spy-revelations-damaging-us-tech-firms-competitiveness-china date accessed 7/6/15, Evann]

Cloud computing firms and data centres have been some of the worst hit, with foreign companies choosing to avoid storing their data in the US following revelations about the NSA's digital surveillance programmes. A 2014 survey of British and Canadian businesses by Vancouver-based Peer 1 Hosting found that 25 per cent of respondents planned to pull data out of the US due to fears relating to data privacy. In February, Beijing dropped a number of major American tech firms from its official state procurement list, including network equipment maker Cisco Systems, Apple, and security firm McAfee. "The Snowden incident, it's become a real concern, especially for top leaders," Tu Xinquan, associate director of the China Institute of WTO Studies in Beijing, told Reuters in April. "In some sense, the American government has some responsibility for that. [China's] concerns have some legitimacy." The White House and US International Trade Administration declined to comment on the matter, when contacted by the Post. IBM, Microsoft and Hewlett-Packard have all reported diminished sales in China as a result of the NSA revelations, which first emerged in the summer of 2013. The NSA was found to have tapped into the servers of major internet players like Facebook, Google and Yahoo to track online communication, among other forms of digital surveillance.Chinese firms have also suffered due to security concerns, particularly in the US. In 2012, a Congressional committee said that smartphone makers Huawei and ZTE were a national security threat because of their alleged ties with the Chinese government. In April, US officials blocked technology exports to Chinese facilities associated with the Tianhe-2 supercomputer project, a blow to Intel and other hardware suppliers. Both countries are looking into restrictions because of security, that's not a good idea for either of them," said Castro. The ITIF paper recommends establishing international legal standards for government access to data, and developing what it terms a "Geneva Convention on the Status of Data". "We need to take certification out of the national level and move it to the international level. We don't want each country to set security standards," Castro said. He warned that China's pursuance of "protectionist" policies in the name of security could backfire if other countries follow suit and adopt standards that favour domestic over foreign firms for key infrastructure projects. "China doesn't want every other country to say ‘We have security concerns about you and refuse to buy your products,’” he added. Castro pointed to China's new security legislation, passed by the country's top legislature on Wednesday, to shore up his argument that Beijing is "still going down that path". The sweeping law defines the scope of national security in far-reaching terms, ranging from finance, economy, politics, the military and cybersecurity to culture, ideology and religion. One clause deals with establishing systems "for the protection of cyber and information security". Washington must respond if China keeps pursuing such protectionist policies but this will be problematic until concerns about NSA spying have been addressed, Castro said. "At the end of the day, it is very hard to say with a straight face that you should buy US tech products, if the [US] government is not willing to stand up and say ‘We will not use this as a way to conduct surveillance in your countries.’"

No Impact – No CCP Collapse

No instability-CCP is seen as legitimate and no one wants regime change-all their evidence is Western misperceptionLundquist, Tsinghua University western philosophy lecturer, 2012(David, ‘Why China Won't Collapse”, 6-22, http://nationalinterest.org/commentary/china-isnt-headed-collapse-7046?page=1)

China is said to be headed for collapse for several reasons, any and all of which might combine to overwhelm its increasingly expensive repressive apparatus. Within this supposed house of horrors is corruption, exorbitant housing prices, costly education, an antsy middle class and college graduates with dreams deferred—not to mention frustration stemming from China’s shortage of females, dubbed China’s “bachelor bomb.” But those reasons take a narrow view of political change, assuming dissatisfaction will morph into regime change. For a more nuanced perspective, economic analysis has to give way to political analysis. One well-articulated China-collapse theory comes from Gordon Chang, who says that the country is enjoying the tail end of a “three-decade upward supercycle” spurred by Deng Xiaoping’s reforms, globalization and demography. Chang’s analysis might be entirely on point, but it doesn’t suggest a dramatic collapse. For one thing, although China is slowing, a hard landing is looking less likely. But Chang has more than economic arguments. And that’s where his case weakens severely; he foresees economic weakness aggravating deep-seated tensions in Chinese leadership and society, tensions which in turn will bring conflict among decision makers and general discontent among the masses. It’s a plausible picture, but the evidence behind it is lacking. We must ask: How exactly could an economic crisis destabilize China? That is, how do graphs and pie charts become chaos in the streets? Charting Revolutions The textbook example of a similar change might be Iran’s 1979 revolution, widely thought be propelled by a dramatic fall in global oil prices. But the Chinese economy is no oil-addicted dictatorship, and China has no Ayatollah Khomeini antagonizing it through sermons on scratchy cassette tapes. Contrary to the banal collapse theories, there are reasons to believe that a slowing Chinese economy will bring a chill of calm to the

simmering cauldron of society. China is a modern, complex polity with an adept, agile government. In his landmark work Political Order in Changing Societies, Samuel Huntington argued that violence is a mark of modernizing societies. To Huntington, modernity meant three things: the government gains recognition as the legitimate wielder of force; the division of labor is divided between military, administrators, scientists and the judiciary; there is mass political participation, by which Huntington meant all forms of participation, be it democratic or totalitarian (as in the Cultural Revolution). By Huntington’s standards, the PRC is a quite modern polity, one he would deem “civic” because its institutions are developed beyond its level of political activity. In short, the system can withstand economic pressure. Indeed, Beijing is well-prepared to confront, divert or grant concessions to popular discontent. With firm institutions established, a state is less susceptible to economic vagaries, something Chang’s argument doesn’t consider. By proactively heading off economic distress, the PRC might even stand to gain trust and legitimacy in the eyes of its citizens. After all, as Western governments rushed to ease the liquidity crunch of 2008–2009, baffled and nervous citizens said nary a word of protest as unelected bureaucrats worked their money-printing and bailout magic. Only after the crisis, years later, did diverse Occupy Wall Street movements include this as a minor detail in their failed campaign against capitalist excesses. A faltering economy does not necessarily cause disorder, even when effective institutions are absent. A recent New York Times editorial opposing Western sanctions on Iran broaches this notion, arguing that the Iranian people might stand up to oppression once well-fed and prospering. The same very well could be true for China. Reform in China There are hundreds of thousands of conflicts between the Chinese people and the state every year. But putting aside egregious land-grab cases like the one in the southern Chinese village of Wukan last year, they rarely rise to the level of violence—much less regime-change—as many such events are simply labor disputes. The participants have little notion of a future democratic China, unlike some of their middle-class counterparts, who in contrast have few material incentives to protest but much to lose. “Chinese people generally do not have revolutionary intentions,” Gordon Chang recognizes. But reform is another story. No Chinese citizen goes unaffected by the government’s heavy-handedness—the paternalistic, technocratic, socialist or vulgarly utilitarian blemishes in its laws and administration. That means there’s a lot to fix. Unfortunately, important domestic-reform initiatives often receive comparatively little attention from Western media, fostering the perception that China is a radically illegitimate oligarchy powered by the blood of its treasured working class. This is a distorted picture that panders to democratic, wishful thinking about Chinese society. The truth is that however slowly and ham-handedly, the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) has accrued political capital by improving the lives of its people in ways many bygone regimes could not. In late February, the World Bank issued a report entitled "China 2030.” Its suggestions for China’s economic health include decreasing state ownership of major industries, establishing protections for society’s most vulnerable citizens, as well as calls for tax reform, reduced carbon emissions and green energy. Lost in the foofaraw of a lone Chinese man interrupting a bank press conference to defend state-owned enterprises (SOEs) was the fact that the PRC’s State Council coauthored the report. A Chinese government body signed off on prescriptions counter to the interests of SOE monopolists—a milestone for the development of civil society there. SOEs have been criticized in China as price manipulators and as magnets for rent seeking. For example, oil companies like Sinopec have stymied fuel-quality regulations and refused to supply petro to stations, running them out of business. Often shielded by nationalistic sentiment, SOEs have now come under assault by academics and newspaper editorials that echo the World Bank report, identifying SOEs as special interests, distinct from public interests. Elsewhere in China, regional governments are having a crack at mending the controversial hukou system, which threatens to fragment China into two entrenched groups: legally recognized urbanites and migrant workers, the latter of whom generally enjoy no entitlement to medical care or education in the cities where they’ve come to toil. In a country of peasants, internal migration is not just a matter of civil rights. It’s a matter of economic transformation, as those former farmers have settled into cities and long forgotten tilling a field. As China’s population urbanizes, policy makers have proven adaptive and willing to experiment. The CCP has demonstrated a concern for China’s social fabric. Beijing has decreed that television programming, including wildly popular dating shows, avoid the depths of crass sexual and material indulgence. Obviously, such policies might be in the ultimate interest of self-preservation (especially given Hu Jintao’s less than subtle warning about Western culture’s ideological penetration of China). And it’s debatable whether traditional, native values are what China or any country needs for stability or prosperity. Granted, on some reform proposals, like liberalization of criminal law, conflict has emerged. But do these

disagreements reveal cracks in the party leadership, as Chang implies? Probably n ot. First, these are practical differences among

technocrats who are after the same thing: stability via steady growth. Second, policy disputes are also a sign that China’s decision making is more consultative and decentralized than before. As the hukou example above illustrates, once delegated certain powers, provinces and

municipalities can innovate on a smaller scale than the central government, as in the U.S. federal system. Finally, interest groups and factions are nothing new to Chinese politics. Thus, it’s unrealistic to think factional tension could paralyze party leadership, military and police at the same time that protesters agitate and show potential for violence and greater lawlessness. What’s more, scholarly work on factional politics over recent decades, often with a focus on China, has shown how factions can coexist and even thrive by nearing some sort of competitive equilibrium. This may explain the relative quietude of Chinese elite politics since 1989. Why China Won’t Fall The political must be analyzed alongside the economic. China’s institutions are still significantly ahead of the demands of its society. Beijing’s apparent influence by Huntington’s theories is not surprising, as his works are

popular among the PRC-establishment intellectuals, especially those on the government payroll. Meanwhile, the authoritarian CCP junta keeps the trains running fast and on time. This means a lot to the swaths of China’s massive, aging population. Hard landing or soft, don’t look for the Beijing to suffer any hits to the head in 2012. Collapse theories are rooted in idealism, but they’re no more likely to pan out because of it.

Predictions of CCP collapse are always wrongBell, Tsinghua International Political Philosophy professor, 2012(Daniel, “Why China Won't Collapse (Soon)”, 7-9, http://www.huffingtonpost.com/daniel-a-bell/chinese-government-legitimacy_b_1658006.html) Or so we are told. Such predictions about the collapse of China's political system have been constantly repeated since the suppression of the pro-democracy uprisings in 1989. But the system didn't collapse then, and it won't collapse now. The key reason such dire predictions are taken seriously -- especially in the West -- is that non-democratic regimes are seen to lack legitimacy. A political regime that is morally justified in the eyes of the people must be chosen by the people. In the case of China, the political leadership is a self-selected elite. Such mode of rule is fragile, as the Arab Spring has shown. But this view assumes the people are dissatisfied with the regime. In fact, the large majority of Chinese people support the single-party state structure. Since the 1990s, scholars in the West and China have carried out many large scale surveys into the legitimacy of Chinese political power and by now they have virtually arrived at a consensus: the degree of legitimacy of the Chinese political system is very high. Surveys have been modified to prevent people from telling lies and the results are always the same. To the extent there is dissatisfaction, it is largely directed at the lower levels of

government. The central government is viewed as the most legitimate part of the Chinese political apparatus. How can it be that the Chinese government managed to achieve a high level of political legitimacy without adopting free and fair competitive elections for the country's leaders? However paradoxical it may sound to Westernears, the Chinese government has succeeded by drawing upon sources of non-democratic legitimacy. The first source of non-democratic legitimacy can be termed performance legitimacy, meaning that the government's first priority should be the material well-being of the people. This idea has long roots in China -- Confucius himself said the government should make the people prosperous -- and the Chinese Communist Party has also put poverty alleviation at the top of its political agenda. Hence, the government derives much, if not most, of its legitimacy by its ability to provide for the material welfare of Chinese citizens. It has substantially increased the life expectancy of Chinese people, and the reform era has seen perhaps the most impressive poverty alleviation achievement in history, with several hundred million people being lifted out of poverty. The second source of non-democratic legitimacy can be termed political meritocracy: the idea that political leaders should have above average ability to make morally informed political judgments.It too has deep historical roots. In Imperial China, scholar-officials proved their ability in a fair and open

examination system, and consequently they were granted uncommon (by Western standards) amounts of respect, authority, and legitimacy. Political surveys have shown that Chinese still endorse the view that it is more important to have high-quality politicians who care about the people's needs than to worry about procedural arrangements ensuring people's rights to choose their leaders. In recent decades, the Chinese Communist Party has increased its legitimacy by transforming itself into a more meritocratic political organization, with renewed emphasis on examinations and education as criteria for political leadership. The third source of non-democratic legitimacy is nationalism. An important part of legitimacy can be termed "ideological legitimacy": the regime seeks to be seen as morally justified in the eyes ofthe people by virtue of certain ideas that it expresses in its educational system, political speeches, and public policies. The CCP was of course founded on Marxist principles, but the problem is that few believe in the communist ideal anymore. Hence, the regime has increasingly turned to nationalism to secure "ideological legitimacy". Nationalism has more recent roots in China: in Imperial China, the political elites tended to view their "country" as the center of the world. But this vision collapsed when China was subject to the incursions of Western colonial powers in the mid-twentieth century, leading to a "century of humiliation" at hands of foreign powers. The CCP put a symbolic end to abuse and bullying by foreign powers with the establishment of a relatively secure state in 1949 and it constantly reminds Chinese of its function as protector of the Chinese nation. In short, it should not be surprising that the CCP is widely seen to be legitimate in the eyes of the people, and barring unforeseen events there is no reason to expect imminent collapse of the regime. But the key word is "imminent". In the absence of substantial political reform, China'snon-democratic sources of political legitimacy may not be sustainable in the long term.