GENERAL GEORGE WASHINGTON:GRAND STRATEGIST OR MERE FABIAN?

by

LIEUfENANT COLONEL DAVB R. PALMER, USA

INTRODUCTION

The historiography of the AmericanRevolutionary War may for convenience bedivided into three discrete schools. The first,dominant in establishing the still-prevalentmythos of the American experience, wasmarked by an effusive idealism andself-congratulatory patriotism. In this view,America's soldiers and leaders-notablyGeorge Washington among them-waged warwith a heroism and skill truly epic in scale.The tenor of this early historical perspective isrecaptured annually in all the hooplafamiliarly associated with American Fourth ofJuly celebrations.

Inevitably, of course, the historicalrevisionists arose to supply a "neededcorrective" to such extravagantly romantic"distortions." They painted the militaryscenes somberly in black and gray, withbleakness the predominant theme.Washington was clearly a stumblebumgeneral-impressive in ways, to be sure-but a

LTC Dave R. Palmer, Armor, USAWC '73,graduated from USMA in 1956 and received his M.A.in military history from Duke University in 1966.Colonel Palmer has served as a military historyinstructor at West Point, as an Aide-de--Camp toCOMUSMACV, and as an armored battalioncommander in Germany. His fIrst book, The River andthe Rock (1969), dealt withthe Hudson fortress at WestPoint during the AmericanRevolutionary War. Hissecond, The Way of the Fox,treats Washington thes t r ategist and will beforthcoming in the spring of1975. He is presently assignedto the Office of the ArmyChief of Staff.

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stumblebum nonetheless. His lieutenants wereno better. Stubbornness was the greatest ofthe Patriots' military virtues; they had simplyhung on, and somehow muddled through towin. British leaders were even worse doltswho repeatedly snatched defeat from the jawsof victory. The War of Independence wasreally a case of Englishmen blundering thewar away more than of Americans winning it.

. •• THE STRATEGIC SIDE OFTHE WAR, PARTICULARLYINSOFAR AS GEORGEWASH INGTON'S ROLE ISCONCERNED, HAS NOTRECEIVED THE CRITICAL ANDSYSTEMATIC TREATMENT ITDESERVES. IF WASHINGTON'SSTRATEGY IS MENTIONED ATALL IT IS LIKELY TO BECHARACTERIZED AS"FABIAN."

Lately, as might be expected, historianshave found a more proper middle ground,rejecting both of the two earlier extremes.The conduct of the fighting and thepersonalities of the participants have beendepicted in a more objective and balaricedperspective, all with commendable precision.Still, the strategic side of the war, particularlyinsofar as George Washington's role isconcerned, has not received the critical andsystematic treatment it deserves. IfWashington's strategy is mentioned at all it islikely to be characterized as "Fabian." That is

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to say, in the manner of the Roman generalQuintus Fabius Maximus, the Patriots arecommended for their adroitness at avoidingdecisive battle and for their ability to weardown and outlast the British. But they rarelyreceive even honorable mention for possessingor displaying any positive attributes ofstrategic skill. Washington is pictured as aone-sided general, almost entirelydefensive-minded.!

But can we be so sure? His standing in theranks of great coaches may not be in theselect top ten, but it is probable that hedeserves far better treatment from thesportswriters of history. After all, his gameplan was solid. It appears to have beencarefully thought out, taking intoconsideration the ground rules of his peculiarstadium, remaining always attentive to thedemands of his alumni, and allowing a properdegree of flexibility. And he followed itthrough to win a resounding upset, despite

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the dual handicaps of a woefully green squadand a bench having almost no depth at all.

ENVIRONMENT

To appreciate the strategies pursued in theRevolutionary War it is necessary first tocomprehend the conflict's setting. One mustmentally cartwheel from the age ofintercontinental ballistic missiles back to theera when one held his fire until seeing "thewhites of their eyes." The forested wildernesswhich was Colonial America 200 years agoeludes the imagination of most 20th-centuryAmericans. It was a wild, rough-and-tumble,primordial land pricked ever so slightly bycivilization. Someone observed that a squirrelcould have travelled to almost every squaremile in the 13 colonies without once touchingground. Roads, the few there were, were meretrails snaking tortuously through the forests.Rivers were not bridged. Coachmen computeda trip by carriage from New York toPhiladelphia in terms of days rather thanhours. The frontier in most places was onlymiles from the ocean; all the large towns wereseaports. The economy centered onagriculture and trade; manufactured goods,for the most part, came from Europe. Therewere few capable gunsmiths in America, andnot all of those sided with the revolutionaries.But perhaps the single most significantgeographical factor of George !II's rebelliousNew World provinces was the sparseness ofpopulation. Cities were small. To be sure,Philadelphia was second in size only toLondon in the British Empire, but it wasexceptional. Only three others (Boston, NewYork, Charleston) had populations of over10,000. All the inhabitants of New York City,by way of comparison, would fit neatly intotoday's M~dison Square Garden. Moreover,more people dwell today in Brooklyn thanlived then in all the colonies combined.Totalling something over two and a halfmillion, those early Americans were scatteredin an eleven-hundred-mile are, extendingalong the coast from Boston to Savannah. 2

This, then, is the America which rose inrebellion in April 1775. Its few people, livingnear rivers and the ocean, subsisted mostly on

what they alone could grow and make. Itslargely uncharted lands were inadequatelyserved by rudimentary roads. Its ability toproduce sufficient weaponry of war wasvirtually nonexistent. All in all, the countrywas poorly suited to warfare as practiced byprofessionals of that day.

ENEMY STRATEGY

A thorough study of British strategicconcepts and practices during the conflictwhich Englishmen called "The AmericanWar" is beyond the scope of this paper.Nevertheless, since the enemy's aims andattempts always have a marked impact on thedevelopment of friendly thinking, a briefsketch of London's strategy is necessary.

Reduced to its basic form, Great Britain'sgrand strategy was quite simple: to obtainsome sort of negotiated settlement whichwould keep the rebellious colonies subservientmembers of the British Empire. London'saims were not to destroy the insurgents ortheir countryside, but to apply whateverdegree of pressure was required to coercethem into returning to their colonial statusquo. But how to apply that pressure· wasanything but simple.

Examining the North American Continent,royal planners came up with four distinctalternative strategies. First, they mightoccupy strongholds along the coast fromwhich to conduct a naval blockade. In time,policymakers thought, the Americans wouldbecome so strapped economically that theywould sue for peace. The primary weakness ofthis idea was that it would easily consumemore time than the English themselves wouldaccept, and there was no assurance that therebels would find a blockade all that galling.Or, launch a campaign to detach the southerncolonies from the others. That scheme wasfeasible, since the terrain south of thePotomac provided no impregnable .barriers toshield American forces, while the proximityof the invading British to their bases in theCaribbean would permit relatively reliablelogistical support. But such a strategy wouldhardly be decisive, for the heart of therebellion beat in New England. Another

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concept-one which seems to sprout in everywar-was to seize the enemy capital.Philadelphia, however, was not a seat ofgovernment in the European sense. It justhappened to be a convenient place where theContinental Congress held meetings. Itscapture would damage Patriot morale orweaken the American cause no more than theloss of any other major city. The fourth planenvisaged occupying a line from New YorkCity up the Hudson River to Lake Champlainand on north to the St. Lawrence River. Onceroyal forces held that line, the reasoningwent, the rebellion would be severed, for theHudson cut the resources of both food andpeople roughly in half. Having first separatedNew England from the other colonies, Englishgenerals could then cut down the Yankees byinvading from the west and driving to the sea.It was the only plan which held hope of aquick victory, but it required both a verylarge force and unity of command in theentire North American theater. Only twicedid George III send an army big enough, andthen he failed to establish an overallcommander.3

During the course of the war the Britishtried all four strategies. None worked. True,the failures were partly attributable to Britishblunders. But success in war is a function ofthe opponent's actions as well, andWashington had an important hand inthwarting British designs.

AMERICAN STRATEGY

Strategy was not a word Washington used.It entered the language some years later, atabout the time that Napoleon's startlingsuccesses extended theorists' comprehension

STRATEGY WAS NOT A WORDWASH I NGTON USED....NEVERTHELESS, IT WAS ACONCEPT WHICH THEGENERAL FROM VIRGINIAUNDERSTOOD ANDIMPLEMENTED.

of warfare. Nevertheless, it was a conceptwhich the general from Virginia understoodand implemented. He gained his knowledgenot from books or military schooling, butfrom common sense and uncommonwisdom-and from the fount of experience.

At the level of grand strategy, the UnitedStates had two aims: the first, an obviousone-to achieve and protect its independence;the second, a rarely mentionedone-territorial aggrandizement. The former isself-explanatory, although the Patriotsactually fought for over a year before theyarticulated their claim to independence in aunanimous declaration. The latter goal,however, is neither so well known nor sogenerally accepted. Nonetheless, a quickperusal of the writings of Revolutionary Warleaders is enough to convince one thatterritorial expansion was from first to last awar aim of the Americans. A North AmericanContinent entirely free of European controlwas their maximum goal. They looked uponCanada as the fourteenth colony, and neverceased conniving to capture or annex it. Thewestern lands stretching invitingly to theMississippi River were powerful magnets evenbefore the war, attracting settlers .andspeculators in mushrooming numbers. A viewof the great territory that lay before them wasa sustaining vision for the Revolution'sleaders. Henry Knox, stopping in Albany inDecember 1775, noted that town's centrallocation with respect to Canada and thewestern lands. He predicted that it "must oneday be, if not the capital of America, yetnearly to it." An astute historian writing inthe twentieth century put it succinctly:"Washington and the other leaders saw thatindependence with a mere fringe ofland alongthe seacoast would scarcely be worth thestruggle.... An inland empire was the stakefor which Washington was playing...."4

Throughout eight years of fighting, GeneralWashington's operational decisions weresteadfastly oriented on his overall missions ofsecuring the independence of the UnitedStates and expanding the borders of theoriginal 13 colonies. He accomplished both,failing only to annex Canada and the Floridas.

Accepting that brief description of the

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HE CLUNG TO NO SINGLESTRATEGY THROUGHOUT, HEWAS FLEXIBLE, AND HETAILORED HIS ACTIONS TO FITTHE CHANGING SITUATIONS.

guiding national policy of the infant UnitedStates, we then ask what Washington'smilitary strategy was? How did he employ hisresources to accomplish the two goals set bythe Continental Congress? The answers aretha t he clung to no single strategythroughout, that he was flexible, that hetailored his actions to fit the changingsituations. The long war passed through fourdistinct phases, each presenting an entirelydifferent military situation, each reqUiring anentirely different strategic application ofmilitary force. 5

APRIL 1775-JULY 1776

This phase, nearly 15 months long, was the"revolutionary" period of the RevolutionaryWar. It opened with a clash between redcoatsand minutemen at Lexington and closed witha Congressional declaration that the UnitedStates would henceforth be a free nationindependent of the English monarch. When itbegan, royal governors, judges, and generalsruled-or at least regulated-the colonies;when it ended, rebels were in control of everyprovince except Canada, and not a singleEnglish soldier stood anywhere on the soil ofthe United States.

Virtually by definition, a revolutionarymovement is required to assume the offensive.Its very purpose is to gain power bydestroying or ejecting those authorities andinstitutions which happen at that moment topossess the power it wants. Therevolutionaries must take the initiative, mustattack the established order; they are the oneswho must overcome. And that is what thePatriots did, at first by spontaneous reaction,later by calculated intent.

Word of the fatal English incursions intoLexington and Concord spread on the wind.

In a spontaneous upnsmg that astonishedeven the most ardent American agitators,infuriated New Englanders flocked to Bostonby the thousands. That clamorous army ofindividuals, all seeking to shoot a"lobsterback," promptly penned the shakenroyal forces in Boston. Unable to break intothe city and uninterested in merely besiegingthe Britons, the rebels looked around forother objectives. Ticonderoga, the greatfortress on Lake Champlain, was the nearestnest of enemy soldiers. The instinctiveoffensive bent of the rebellion's leaders isperhaps nowhere better displayed than intheir rapid decision to seize Fort Ticonderoga.Within a fortnight of the initiation ofhostilities at Lexington, Benedict Arnold andEthan Allen had captured the British redoubtcomplete with its extensive stores of militaryequipment.

Meeting in Philadelphia on 10 May theContinental Congress was taken aback by themilitary boldness of the Yankees, whoserepresentatives forthwith applied to their

sister states for assistance. Continentaldelegates had no authority to assume controlof the mob in Massachusetts, nor did theyhave a mandate to wage war. Yet theexigencies-and the opportunities-of thesituation demanded that some central controlbe exercised. So, by default more than bydesign, Congress seized the flapping reins ofrebellion. The delegates created a ContinentalArmy by adopting the throng outside Bostonand raising a few additional units from otherstates. Then, in what must rank as its wisestdecision of the war, Congress appointed oneof its own members, a Virginia planter, to theposition of Commander in Chief. Washingtonhumbly accepted the commission and rodeoff to join his army.

Meanwhile, impatient insurgents in NewEngland, continuing to probe for ways to getat the English garrison in Boston, had sparkedthe bloody battle of Bunker Hill. It was thethird clash of arms in as many monthsbetween Old World professionals and NewWorld amateurs. On the whole the aggressive

Washington taking command of the American Army at Cambridge, 1775.

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if impulsive revolutionaries had come out ontop in the exchanges. Momentum was clearlygoing their way. Washington's immediate jobwas to maintain that initiative.

Having nothing to lose (except their heads,of course) and everything to gain, therebellious Americans found audacity a virtue.Washington saw the logic of accomplishing asmuch as possible before London could sendreinforcements. His men were marginallytrained and equipped, his officersinexperienced, his war chest empty, but theBritish were also weak-and the opportunitieswere inviting. Boldness would have to do forexperience, elan for knowledge, spirit formoney. The Commander in Chief dared notwait; time would surely work against him, forEngland could build up its strength inAmerica much faster than he could train atruly professional army. He would have toovercome British regulars with a people'sArmy.

ONE SEEKS IN VAIN TODISCOVER THE SHADE OFQUINTUS FABIUS MAXIMUS INGEORGE WASHINGTONDURING THIS PHASE OF THEWAR OF INDEPENDENCE.

Besides Boston, English soldiers stilloccupied the vast region of Quebec, a fewbases in Florida, a handful of forts scatteredthroughout the western lands, the province ofNova Scotia, and several islands in the WestIndies. Washington searched his meager bag ofstrategems for ways to get at his foe in everyone of those locations. He had not even seenall his army when he ordered preparations foran invasion of Canada, an expedition helaunched before the summer was out, sendingone column toward Montreal and another toQuebec. He made overtures to the Indians,hoping to secure their help against thewestern posts, and studied propositions forraids on Nova Scotia and Florida. He tried topersuade citizens of the West Indies to join

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the fight against the Mother Country, whileencouraging rebel assemblies in the 13 coastalcolonies to purge their provinces ofindividuals and officials loyal to the Crown.6Finding himself unable to strike at most ofthe King's possessions for lack of a fleet, theCommander in Chief promptly took steps tobuild himself a navy. 7

While his lieutenants were fighting forterritory along the St. Lawrence, Washingtonwrestled with the perplexing problem ofousting the British from Boston. "The state ofinactivity in which this army has lain for sometime past," Washington wrote Congress inSeptember 1775, "by no means correspondswith my wishes, by some decisive stroke, [todefeat the enemy garrison]." But an outrightassault of the formidable breastworks was outof the question. So, too, was an amphibiousmaneuver while royal warships held sway inthe harbor. Nonetheless, so strong was hisdesire to attack, he pondered everyimaginable course of action, no matter howslight the chances of success. He evenconsidered a risky plan for rushing the townover the ice should the bay freeze. Finally,when heavy snows permitted the use of sleds,he had the artillery pieces captured at FortTiconderoga dragged to Boston. Emplacingthem on high ground overlooking both thecity and the harbor, he forced the British toevacuate in March 1776. 8

At that moment 13 provinces in NorthAmerica were in fact independent. Everyoneof them was headed by a provincialgovernment professing adherence to theContinental Congress and supporting aCo ntinental Army. Americans andEnglishmen still contested for Canada, but the13 colonies themselves were free for the firsttime ever of royal military forces.Temporarily, at least, the revolution hadsucceeded-the insurgents had seized controlof the government and created a new nation.When Congressmen declared theindependence of the United States, they weresimply confirming on paper what men in armshad already established on the battlefields.

Washington's strategy had been simple inthe extreme: take the offensive whenever andwherever possible. His aim had been to

Tioonderoga's guns being hauled to Boston.

grapple with and defeat the British any placethey could be found. His forces had beenweak, but, at that point in time, the enemyhad been weaker. The Commander in Chiefhad taken serious risks, but the potentialrewards had been great-and the obviousalternative was eventual defeat. One seeks invain to discover the shade of Quintus FabiusMaxhnus in George Washington during thisphase ofthe War ofIndependence.

Now, however, having seized their freedom,the Patriots would be required to defend it.On 2 July 1776, the same day Congressdeclared America's independence, theanticipated British invasion force arrived inNew York Harbor and began landing troopson Staten Island.

JULY 1776-DECEMBER 1777

Only twice during the course of the war didLondon assemble and send to America majorexpeditionary forces-one in 1776, the otherin 1777. English generals viewed their mission

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as one of entering royal colonies to throw outa renegade regime in order to restore lawfulgovernment. Not surprisingly, Patriot generalsdefined their own task in rather differentterms-they saw it as the defense of nationalshores against a foreign invader.

Whereas in the earlier period Americanshad possessed but little to lose, now they hadeverything at stake. Before, a military defeatwould have been bitter but hardly fatal; nowit could signal the death of the infantrepublic. Previously, Washington's primarythrust had been to defeat enemy forces; nowhis foremost imperative was to prevent adecisive defeat of his own army. Still and all,his mission was to defend the United States;he could not coldbloodedly sacrifice any ofthe new Continental states for the sake ofsaving the Continental Army. He was clearlyexpected to stand and fight, but it would haveto be in such a way that he could alwaysdisengage to fight another day. As broadunderlying principles, audacity and boldnessgave way to tenacity and shrewdness.9

Patriot leaders had fully anticipated anattempt by the Crown to suppress therebellion, but they were not at all preparedfor the massive scale of London's reaction.Sailing into New York Harbor that fatefulJuly was the largest expeditionary forceEngland had ever sent anywhere. GeneralWilliam Howe headed an army of about35,000 English and German regulars, while hisbrother, Admiral Richard Howe, backed himup with a fleet of several hundred warshipsand transports. One observer told how"onlookers gazed with awe on a pageant suchas America had never seen before-fivehundred dark hulls, forests of masts, anetwork of spars and ropes, and a gay displayof flying pennants." Not only had Americansnever seen such a sight, they had neverimagined themselves facing -such an armada.Worse yet, English forces far to the north,rested and reinforced, stood poised to pushsouth on Lake Champlain against the reelingsurvivors of the ill-fated Canadian invasion.! 0

The bulk of the "veterans" who hadexchanged blows with the redcoats in 1775had gone home when their short enlistmentsexpired, obliging the Commander in Chief toraise and train an almost entirely new army

Washington's first success at Boston.

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for campaigning in 1776. Hence, for thedefense of New York General Washington hadfewer than 10,000 men, most of whom wererelatively recent recruits. Frantic appeals toCongress and nearby states brought in enoughreinforcements to double the number if notthe quality of Patriot forces in New York bythe time the British finally attacked inAugust. It was to be the most numerous armyWashington would ever have under his directcommand, but, significantly, it was largelyuntrained and woefully inexperienced.

Washington's one great strategic blunder ofthe war was his decision to defend the city of

WASHINGTON'S ONE GREATSTRATEGIC BLUNDER OF THEWAR WAS HIS DECISION TODEFEND THE CiTY OF NEWYORK.

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New York. Apparently, a combination ofpolitical pressure, his own inexperience inhigh command, and an overly optimisticassessment of the fighting qualities of hisgreen troops led him to taking a stand there.New York City was a trap. Americans had nofleet at all, while the waters surroundingManhattan Island were choked with hostilesail. Had Howe elected to land above thePatriot positions to cut them off from themainland it is hard to see how Washingtoncould have escaped annihilation. However,Howe was not a bold strategist, andfurthermore he was operating under politicalconstraints conceived to promote thepossibility of eventual compromise with thecolonists. He settled for a more prosaicoperation on Long Island rather than a deepturning movement up the Hudson River.

There followed through a dismal summerand fall a series of sharp clashes, first on LongIsland, then on Manhattan Island, and finallyon the mainland above. Battered and

demoralized continentals then backed acrossthe Hudson and retreated by stages throughNew Jersey to the Delaware River. In battleafter battle Howe's force proved superior toWashington's amateur army, but "the oldfox," as British officers were beginning to callhim, emerged from each setback with thenucleus of his army still intact. Lady Luck,British bumbling, and an occasional brilliantPatriot stroke (such as Washington's superbevacuation from Long Island or BenedictArnold's gutsy defense of Lake Champlain)combined to thwart London's hopes ofquickly snuffing out the rebellion. As amatter of fact, English and Hessian columnscould and should have pursued the rebelsrelentlessly into the very laps of theContinental Congress. But Howe was not thatcut of soldier; mindful of his charge topromote an eventual political settlement, itwas not in his indulgent mind to push thesword to the hilt when the blade was alreadyweighted with ice. He followed Washingtonacross New Jersey and prepared to bed hisarmy down in winter quarters.

Although the bitter months from August toDecember could have spelled the finish ofwhat up to that time had been an altogetherundistinguished military career, they providedinstead Washington's education in generalship.Never again after New York did he handHowe or his successors such a goldenopportunity to destroy the American armyoutright; never again did he need more than afair share ofluck to survive.

That Winter, when Napoleon Bonapartewas a seven-year-old schoolboy and Frederickthe Great basked in the twilight of hisillustrious career, George Washington directedan astonishing campaign, ranking with thebest of Frederick's past accomplishments andNapoleon's future exploits. Had he achievednothing before or after, Washington's ten daysfrom 25 December 1776 to 4 January 1777would alone assure him high mention in theannals of military history.

After the Commander in Chief gathered hisshattered and demoralized army in temporarysecurity beyond the Delaware River, even hewas surprised at its small size and sorry state."Pitiful" was a term often used to describe

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the men-and properly. Many had no shoes,all were in rags, few had retained suchequipment as they had been issued. Theywere gaunt scarecrows posing as soldiers.Despair prevailed, among officers as well asmen. An army, however, is never beaten untilit thinks it is. One man resolutely refused toacknowledge defeat: the commanding general,George Washington.

The General had not prevented the invadersfrom carving out an enclave in the UnitedStates; parts of New York and most of NewJersey were now controlled by Howe'sgarrisons and patrols, and a body of 6,000men had occupied Newport, Rhode Island inDecember. However, Washington hadaccomplished his primary mission of keepingthe Continental Army in being-until thiscritical moment, at least. But now thataccomplishment, too, seemed to be dissolving.Washington's strategic defensive had limitedBritish conquests and had kept the flame ofindependence alight, but constant retreat anddefeat had eroded spirit and will. To restoreconfidence it was now necessary to strikeback, to inflict a defeat on the enemy.Washington resolved to go immediately on theoffensive against the over-confident Englishand Hessians, no matter what. It was obviousto him that to save his army he had to risk it.

Moreover, he saw what he had not notedbefore-a way to wedge the British ou t ofNew Jersey by maneuver alone. By strikinginto New Jersey at the overextended andunsuspecting enemy garrisons he hoped toachieve morale-raising tactical victories. Hewould also be in position to grab sorely

IN THE SHORT SPACE OF TENDAYS A DEMORALIZED ARMYWO N TWO MODEST BUTSPLENDID VICTORIES, ELUDEDA SUPERIOR FORCE, CAUSEDHOWE TO EVACUATE MOST OFNEW JERSEY, AND RENEWEDITS OWN PRIDE AND SENSE OFPURPOSE.

needed supplies, and could drive on to themountains in the northern part of the state.Once ensconced there he would be able tosupply himself, would be impervious toenemy attack, and, most importantly, wouldsit in a commanding position on the flank ofHowe's lines of communication through thestate. The English leader would then havelittle choice but to withdraw his posts to NewYork.

It was a bold plan, perhaps even desperate.But Washington, sensing that defeat would beno worse than failing to take any action, andrealizing the benefit of riding with surpriseand initiative, was grimly resolved to launchthe make-or-break effort. True enough, theContinental Army numbered just a smallfraction of its summer self, but those still inranks were the ones who counted. They hadbeen toughened in battle and had remainedsteadfastly loyal through all the defeats. Theywere the hard core, the winter Patriots, withnot a sunshine soldier among them.

What they did is history. In the short spaceof ten days a demoralized army, whicll nearlyeveryone had expected shortly to disintegrate,won two modest but splendid victories,eluded a superior force, caused Howe toevacuate most of New Jersey, and renewed itsown pride and sense of purpose. Englishhistorian George Trevelyan later wrote:

From Trenton onward, Washington wasrecognized as a farsighted and ahlegeneral all Europe over-by the greatmilitary nobles in the EmpressCatherine's court, by the French marshalsand ministers, in the King's cabinet atPotsdam, at Madrid, at Vienna, and inLondon. He had shown himself ... botha Fabius and a Camillus'!!

England's grandest expeditionary force hadaccomplished precious little to crow about.Despite its size, strength, and tacticalsuccesses, Great Britain's army found itself at

The Battle of Trenton.

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the end of the campaign of 1776 with just thetoeholds around New York and Newport toshow for its efforts.

The King's disgruntled ministers formedand shipped to America a second largeexpeditionary force in 1777. This one, underGeneral John Burgoyne, went to Canada.Their grand scheme was for Burgoyne tomarch south along the Lake Champlain routewhile another officer led redskins down theMohawk Valley, and Howe took his troops upthe Hudson River. Meeting somewhere nearAlbany, the combined forces would have thestrength and position to turn on and conquerNew England. Properly executed, the plancould have worked.

Washington, who probably had a moreeffective intelligence system than anyAmerican army has enjoyed since, learnedearly of English plans. He was concerned,unsure of his ability to defeat his opponents'ambitious efforts. He strengthened thoseforces defending to the northward andconcentrated elements under his owncommand to block Howe's movement up theHudson River. Thus disposed, he had thebenefit of an interior position between thehostile pincers. The ability to operate oninterior lines was Washington's only counterto British sea-borne mobility. Ordinarily theEnglish commander owned this advantagebecause he could move by water to any spoton the seaboard faster than his land-boundAmerican opponent could march to that samepoint. But not in this case, not with Britisharmies split between Canada and New Yorkwhile Americans held the Hudson. No oneexplained it better than Washington himself:

Should the enemy's design be topenetrate the country up the HudsonRiver, we are well posted to oppose them;should they attempt to penetrate intoNew England, we are well stationed tocover them; if they move westward wecan easily [intercept them] ; and besides,it will oblige the enemy to leave a muchstronger garrison at New York.!2

As it turned out, for reasons which to thisday remain unclear, Howe decided against

II

helping Burgoyne. Instead, he went by sea toattack Philadelphia. Howe, who always vividlyremembered his bloody encounter at BunkerHill, would not have found to his liking theprospect of attacking through rugged hillsdefended by a waspish Patriot force. Butwhatever his reason, he went to ChesapeakeBay, where Washington intercepted him as hehad said he could.

Events that autumn turned the war around.Burgoyne, operating inland where the Britishfleet could not support him, lost his entirearmy at Saratoga. Meanwhile, Howe foughthis way into Philadelphia, once again bestingWashington in a series of tactical clashes. Butthe surprisingly resilient Continental Armyemerged from each defeat undaunted andready to fight again. At the Battle ofGermantown, in fact, where the two sides hadstruggled to something of a draw, the Patriotseven came to consider themselves the victors.So apparently did officials at the court ofLouis XVI. The happy results at Saratoga andthe encouraging performance of Americanarms around Philadelphia convinced Louisthat England, France's old adversary, was justthen especially vulnerable. The opportunitywas too good to miss. France formed analliance with the United States that winter,and the war abruptly entered a new andultimately decisive phase.! 3

JANUARY 1778-DECEMBER 1781

As the second phase of the war hadpresented Washington a set of conditionsentirely different from the first, so was thethird-the coalition phase-wholly differentfrom either of the previous two. France'sentry into the fray added legitimacy to therevolutionary cause, assured a continuingsource of supply, and held forth the promiseof reinforcement from a Frenchexpeditionary army. But, important as theseadvantages were, none was the decisive factor.The key consideration was the fact thatFrance had a navy-a fleet to oppose Britishsupremacy in North American waters. Nolonger would English generals have theprivilege of shifting units at will along theAtlantic seaboard; no longer, that is, would

they enjoy the uncontested strategicadvantage of interior lines. Their onlymobility edge over the Americans was thusendangered if not lost.

This meant that the entire thrust ofWashington's strategy could be reversed.Whereas he had been limited to the strategicdefensive while Great Britain remainedsuperior at sea, the arrival of a French fleetwould make it feasible for him once again topass over to the offensive. Military victorybecame possible. The invaders could bedecisively beaten, could be driven offAmerican soil. Moreover, risks could be morefreely taken, for the loss now of a majorportion of the Continental Army would notnecessarily be fatal; the Revolution had takentoo firm a hold in the country to be rootedout by an England at war also with France.Seizing the initiative was Washington's newimperative, defeating the British army hisoverriding goal. The predominant thememotivating American activities during the fouryears between Saratoga and Yorktown wasthe desire to lash out at the enemy.

One lesson Washington had learned wasthat his rag-tag army needed better trainingand organization if it were to have a chance ofbeating the British and Hessians. Theamorphous mass of soldiery with which hehad previously fended off English parries hadbeen none too responsive or dependable; itwas not a weapon with which he couldconfidently carry the war to the enemy. MostAmericans tend to look upon the winter atValley Forge as an epic of suffering andsurvival. And it was indeed a terrible time forthe underfed, iII-clothed, poorly paidContinentals. But it was not the worst winterthey would endure, nor was mere survivaltheir greatest accomplishment. TheContinental Army came of age that winter.When it marched forth in 1778 it bore thestamp of Steuben, the professional Prussianadvisor who taught it to form line fromcolumn, to maneuver on the battlefield, towield the bayonet. For the first time,Washington led an army not only rich inexperience but one well-trained and full ofconfidence, one the equal or better of its foe

12

in many respects. He intended to overcomeBritish regulars with American regulars. 14

He lost no time in testing his new force.General Henry Clinton, who had succeededHowe, recognized the danger should a strongFrench fleet find his forces dispersed betweenPhiladelphia and New York. He decided toconsolidate in the latter city. As soon as theBritish started their march from Pennsylvania,Washington eagerly threw his own army inpursuit. Intercepting the English column nearMonmouth in New Jersey, the Commander inChief aggressively attacked. Missing amagnificent victory because of themalfeasance of his deputy, Washingtonnevertheless punished and humbled theBritish, proving the worth of Steuben'sadvice, and putting Clinton on notice that hefaced a revitalized American Army.

That was just the first strike of the year.With Philadelphia freed and Clintonentrenched in New York, Americans surveyedtheir situation. Not until the French fleetappeared could they attack the hostile basesat New York or Newport, but other, lesserobjectives were within reach. That year, forexample, saw United States soldiers invadingFlorida, marked the start of George RogersClark's decisive campaign in the westernlands, and recorded the first of John PaulJones's raids along the English coast. Whenthe French fleet crossed the Atlantic it wentinitially to the Chesapeake hoping to trapClinton in Philadelphia. Learning that theEnglish were in New York, French AdmiralD'Estaing took his fleet there. He andWashington planned at first to attack theBritish in their own lair, but D'Estaing fearedthat his deep-draft ships would be unable tomaneuver over the shoals leading into theharbor. Therefore, the American general andthe French admiral agreed on a plan to smitethe other English stronghold at Newport.That attack was duly carried out, but failedbecause of poor allied coordination and aviolent storm which scattered the fleet. Thatended campaigning for the year. The resultsof joint operations between United Statesarmies and French naval forces had sorelydisappointed everyone involved, but the

Battle of Monmouth.

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significant facts· were that the fleet hadarrived and coordinated attacks had beenattempted. Though less successful than mighthave been expected, Americans had taken andkept the offensive through 1778.

The next year opened with an English raidresulting in the capture of Savannah, theirfirst offensive move since Howe tookPhiladelphia. Nevertheless, Washingtoncontinued to dream of combining his armywith the French navy to eject Clinton fromNew York. Fearing that very event, theEnglish commander prudently evacuatedNewport to bolster his defensive strength atthe mouth of the Hudson. However,D'Estaing remained reluctant to try thestrange and constricted harbor, so the alliedoffensive effort was devoted to an attempt toretake Savannah. Once again faultycoordination between Frenchmen andAmericans seriously hampered operations,and British defenders won a clear victory. Asecond time D'Estaing sailed away leavingfallen hopes and bitter recriminations in hiswake. The coalition was experienci\lg growingpains.

Elsewhere, on the other hand, 1779 was a

13

happy year for Americans. John Paul Jonesraided England again, carrying the war to theenemy homeland a second time. AnthonyWayne stormed Stony Point in a daringbayonet assault to remind Clinton of theoffensive spirit of the Continental Army. AndWashington sent large forces westward toravage the settlements of hostile tribes and tooverpower various British outposts.

For a while in 1780 the pendulum ofoffensive action swung back to the Britishside. French General Rochambeau landed inNewport with an army of 5,500 men, but theRoyal Navy penned the major French fleet upin Brest, on the wrong side of the ocean,dooming plans for a combined attack inAmerica. Meanwhile English columns movedfrom their base in Savannah to overrun mostof the territory in Georgia and the Carolinas.But the renewed British efforts to recapturethe initiative did not mean Washington everrelinquished his own concept of attacking anddefeating his foe. He sent Nathanael Greene,his best general, southward with orders tochase Cornwallis out of the southern states,while he himself stubbornly plotted torecapture New York using both American and

French soldiers. When word came that theFrench Navy would be unable to reach theUnited States that year, Washington tried toget Rochambeau to let a Spanish fleet escortan expedition of French and American forcesto Florida. The French general demurred;instead, he and Washington decided to unitetheir two armies in the north for an all-out,decisive campaign in 178J.l5

The plan worked out in the manner thetwo commanders had intended, except for thelocation. Washington calculated that a Frenchfleet which refused to enter New York Harborto help Americans would have no choice ifthe French army as well were involved.Accordingly, he talked Rochambeau intoagreeing to assault the enemy bastion in NewYork City. The allied generals maneuveredtheir armies to a position above the city andawaited word from the fleet, led this time byAdmiral DeGrasse. In the meantime, Greene,in a superb campaign which is itself a strategicclassic, pushed the invaders out of thesouthern states. All English forces were thentightly penned up in coastal enclaves, thelargest at Yorktown in Virginia whereLafayette held Cornwallis and some 10,000men at bay. But DeGrasse, reasoning thatVirginia was a safer plum than heavilydefended New York, calmly informedWashington and Rochambeau that he wouldsail his fleet only to the Chesapeake.Washington, who had been waiting more thanthree years for the opportunity to launch asuccessful sea-land assault, bit his tongue andpromptly headed southward. Continentalsand Frenchmen marched together. TheAmerican commander sent a courier toDeGrasse telling him that, should they findthe English still in Virginia when they arrived,the allies "ought, without loss of time, toattack the enemy with our united force."16

The resulting siege of Yorktown andsurrender of Cornwallis became the finalplanks in the platform of Americanindependence. Within weeks of the startlingnews, London agreed to begin negotiationswith the United States.

JANUARY 1782-DECEMBER 1783

By the beginnlng of 1782 Washington was

14

reasonably sure that his forces had won thestruggle for American independen'ce. England,now fighting Spain and Holland as well asFrance and the United States, was engaged infar-flung theaters ranging from the WestIndies all the way to India. The island nationwas overextended, and a negotiated peacebecame essential. Washington's job in thesecircumstances was to employ his militarypower in such a manner as to maintain and ifpossible strengthen the American bargainingposition. The final two years of the long warmay thus be captioned, "shaping the peace."

With independence virtuallY assured, theUnited States once again had more to lose inbattle than it stood to gain. Preserving theContinental Army was now more importantthan defeating the enemy army. Washingtoninformed his officers that offensive actionswere to be undertaken only when the Patriotshad a "moral certainty of succeeding."Nonetheless, it would be wrong to portray hisattitude during this period as defensive. Recallthe two national goals: independence andterritorial expansion. Having for all intentsand purposes gained the first he turned nowto the second'! 7

Even in the midst of the crucial year of1781, the Commander in Chief had continuedhis campaigns to reduce the threat posed byIndians on the frontiers. In the winter afterYorktown he closely monitored actions inthat forested theater, where Americans weretrying vainly to take Detroit. He wrote thathe was concerned lest British garrisons in theWest "establish and secure their claim to theextended limits of Canada." In March 1782he ordered General Irvine to cut a road fromFort Pitt to Niagara in preparation for acampaign to clear the Great Lakes of enemyposts. In May of that year, he consideredanother invasion of Canada, giving as hisreason the necessity to provide for the"future peace and quiet of these states." Healso felt that a strike against Halifax wouldfurnish the United States a superior claim tothe lucrative northern fishing waters. Thefuture shape of the new nation held hisabiding interest to the moment itself whenpeace was actually declared. George RogersClark's destruction of Chillicothe in Ohio onI0 November 1782 was the war's final clash

in the West, but Washington, ever bent onexpansion, suggested that Congress mountone last campaign against the Indian nationsin 1783.1 8

As it turned out, few of the Commander inChief's schemes during those final two year8came to fruition. Euphoria swept the countryafter Yorktown, and it took all the General'spowers just to keep his army intact throughthe extended negotiations. The struggle hadseemed interminably long. The citizenry wastired and the soldiers wanted to go home. TheBritish could not have won the war at thatlate date, but the Americans could haveforfeited their victory-which they indeedverged on doing. Some say Washington'sgreatest achievement was preventing acollapse of national will and resolve duringthose last trying years. Circumstances blockedhis ambition to annex Canada, limiting him tocampaigns against the Indian nations whilepassively guarding against English excursionsfrom their coastal bases. The British soonevacuated every enclave except New YorkCity, which had been occupied continuouslysince its capture in 1776. When redcoats leftthat city too in 1783, the 13 original coloniescontrolled all territory from Maine (then partof Massachusetts) to Georgia, and from theAtlantic to the Mississippi Valley. Boundarieswere ill-defined, and with Spaniards to thesouthwest and British to the northwest futuredisputes were certain, but the new republicwas easily the dominant power in NorthAmerica. The final peace treaties werefavorable to the United States, largely becauseAmerican negotiators had always bargainedfrom a position of strength-strength whosecontinued maintenance was largelyattributable to the vision and will of GeorgeWashington. 19

In December 1783, Washington stode intothe Continental Congress, which was thenassembled in Annapolis, and resigned thecommission he had accepted more than eightyears earlier. Afterwards, he rode to MountVernon in time for Christmas dinner.

GENERAL WASHINGTON IN RETROSPECT

A modern biographer has characterizedWashington's strategy as "a Darwinian

15

TO IMPLY THAT WASHINGTONMERELY REACTED TOEXTERNAL FORCES IS QUITEMISLEADING.

achievement of adaptation to environment; itwas evolved to overcome the specificproblems with which he was faced." In asense that is an accurate observation, but tothe extent that it implies Washington merelyreacted to external forces it is quitemisleading. For the American leader did notmerely react; he was an innovator as well. Ageneral always has two aims; to defeat theenemy and to avoid his own defeat.Sometimes the two are convergent, sometimesnot. Washington knew the difference. Thedistinction derives from an analysis of theparticular situation prevailing at a givenmoment and the integration of that analysiswith long-range or national goals. 2 0

Keeping the twin objectives ofindependence and territorial expansion ever inmind, the Commander in Chief tailored theAmerican strategies individually for each ofthe war's four phases. First, he attacked atevery conceivable turn, taking the strategicoffensive to the full extent of his powers.Bea ting the enemy was of primaryimportance. Then, in the second phase, heturned cautious, not refusing battle, butfighting with his wagons facing the rear. Hisstrategic defense was designed to defend theUnited States, to be sure, but primarily itspurpose was to avoid a decisive defeat. Next,in conjunction with French allies, he returnedto the foremost aim of inflicting militarydefeat on his foe. His strategic offensive,though greatly prolonged because of problemsinherent in cooperating with a foreign fleetoperating from a base thousands of milesaway, resulted finally in victory at Yorktown.After that, with independence all but won, heshifted his strategic offensive towardachieving the aim of expanding nationalborders. But once again avoiding defeatbecame more important than gaining victory.For the most part, the military weakness of asmall nation tired of war frustrated his efforts

in this final phase, though by keeping an armytogether and exerting constant visible pressureon the enemy he helped assure a favorablesettlement. He was completely successful inachieving the goal of independence, andpartially successful in gaining that ofexpansion. Given what he had to work with,more could hardly have been hoped for.

Washington's place in history is secure. Heneeds no defenders. If he had possessed nostrategic ability whatsoever, but rather, assome claim, had won the war in spite of hislack of a broad military vision, hisoutstanding traits and deeds in civi1life wouldbe enough to mark him as a great man.Nevertheless, in order to understand him fullyand to comprehend the strategic frameworkof the Revolutionary War, one cannot ignoreWashington the general, which is to say,Washington the strategist. And that hepossessed unusual strategic grasp can hardlybe doubted. Indeed, even before the wordstrategy was coined, George Washington hadbecome this nation's first strategist-andperhaps one of its best.

NOTES

J. The General's two most recent biographiesbear out this contention. North Callahan in GeorgeWashington: Soldier and Man (New York: Rinehart,1958), p. 279, backs the theory that "Washington didnot really win the war but Britain lost it, mainly tocircumstances rather than the American enemy."James T. Flexner in George Washington in theAmerican Revolution 1775-1783 (Boston: LittleBrown, 1968), pp. 544-47, does credit Washingtonwith creating an effective hit-and-run capability, butstill clings to the traditional view that he was a Fabianstrategist. The Roman general Fabius believed thebest way to defeat Hannibal was to avoid battle,letting time, attrition l and frustration wear theCarthaginians out.

2. The first US census, taken in 1790, shows apopulation spread and density not much changedfrom that existing during the Revolution. See FranclsA. Walker, Statistical Atlas of the United States at theNinth Census, 1870 (Washington, D. C., 1874), PlateXVI.

3. The best modern study of the war as seen byLondon is Piers Mackesy, The War for America,1775-1783 (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard Univ. Pres~ 1964).

16

4. Division of Archives and History of theUniversity of the State of New York, TheSullivan-Clinton Campaign in 1779 (AJbany, 1920),p. 10. See also North Callahan, Henry Knox, GeorgeWashington's General (New York: Rinehart, 1958), p.39.

5. General accounts of the Revolutionary Warabound. Probably the best remains John R. AJden,The American Revolution, 1775-1783 (New York:Harper, 1954). A fine compendium is Mark Boatner,Encyclopedia of the American Revolution (NewYork: D. McKay Co., 1966).

6. John C. Fitzpatrick, The Writings of GeorgeWashington, III (Washington, D. C.: GPO, 1931),302-03,374,415,437-38,475-76,51J.

7. U.S., Naval History Division, Naval Documentsof the American Revolution, ed. William Bell Clark, II(Washington, D. C.: GPO, 1964-70),1·2.

8. Fitzpatrick, Ill, 51 J.9. Fitzpatrick, V. See all Washington's letters to

the President of Congress between May and August1776.

10. Quoted in North Callahan, GeorgeWashington: Soldier and Man, p. 47.

I J. Sir George Otto Trevelyan. The AmericanRevolution (New York: Longmans, Green and Co.,1928), III, 143. Camillus was a Roman hero (c.447-365 B.C.) who, through offensive campaigns,extended Rome's sway by the conquest of Veil, therout of Brennus' Gauls, and victories in Latium.

12. Fitzpatrick, VII, 272-76.13. Jared Sparks, ed., The Diplomatic

Correspondence of the American Revolution(Washington, D. C., 1857) I, 259-545; Henri Doniol,Histoire de la Participation de la France aL 'etablissement Des Etas-Unis D'Amerique (Paris:Imprirnerie nationale, 1888), I, 154,

14. Jay Luvaas, "'Baron' von Steuben:Washington's Drillmaster," American HistoryIllustrated, 2 (April 1967), 4-11, 55-58.

15. Fitzpatrick, XX, 56-57, 76-81, 480-84; XXI,416-28; XXJI, frontispiece, 105-07.

16. Fitzpatrick, XXJII, 8.17. Fitzpatrick, XXIV, 124.18. Fitzpatrick, XXJII, 396, 402-03; XXIV, 17,

87, 197-200; XXVI, 368·69, 419-20.19. Richard B. Morris, The Peacemakers (New

York: Harper & Row, 1965), opposite p. 350. Thissketch depicts the varIous boundary proposalsbetween 1779 and 1783.

20. Flexner, p. 536.