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Contents

ListofPlates

Timeline:TheMongolConquestsandtheCareerofGenghisKhan

TheFamilyTreeofGenghisKhan

Who’sWhoinThirteenth-CenturyMongolia

Map

Introduction

Chapter1Genghis’World

Chapter2WarontheSteppes

Chapter3TheKhan’sArmies

Chapter4TheFirstCampaignsintheEast

Chapter5WarintheWest

Chapter6TheFallofNorthChina

Chapter7AMongolEmpire?

Chapter8Genghis–TheVerdict

SourceNotes

SourcesandRecommendedReading

ListofPlates

1.Theopengrassland,orsteppe,ofcentralMongolia.(Fotolia)

2.ThebarrenwastesoftheGobiDesert.(Fotolia.)

3.TypicalMongolponies.(Fotolia)

4.ModernstatuesofMongolwarriors,outsidetheGenghisKhanMuseuminUlaanbaatar.(Fotolia)

5.TheBattleofHuan-erh-tsuiin1211,asdepictedintheJamialtawarikhofRashidud-Din.

6.Mongolcavalrypursuingaroutedenemy,fromRashidud-Din.

7.Lance-armedEgyptianMamlukspursueMongolmountedarchers.Fromthefourteenth-centuryHistoryoftheTartarsbytheArmenianhistorianHaytonofCoricos.

8.Theonlynear-contemporaryportraitofGenghisKhan.

9.StagesintheconstructionofamodernreplicaofaMongoliancompositebow(photoscourtesyofGreenManLongbows).Thisphotographshowsthewoodencoreofthebow,withseparateplatesofhornreadytobeattached.

10.Preparingthecorefortheattachmentofthe‘siha’.

11.Thecoreofthebowwiththesihaandcentralhandgripgluedinplace.

12.Thehornisstrappedtightlyinplacewhilethegluedries.

13.Bundlesofshreddedsinew,whichwillbesoakedinglueandappliedtothewoodencore.

14.Thefinishedweapon.

15.Drawingacompositebow.

16.Anotherviewofthedraw.

17.A variety of siege techniques is illustrated in this picture of the siege of Baghdad,takenfromRashidud-Din’shistory.

18.Mongoltent,onahugewagon,fromColonelYule’seditionofMarcoPolo’sTravels,1876.

19.Mongolkettledrums.(Yule)

20.ThePassofDerbentthroughtheCaucasusMountains,traversedbyJebeiandSuboteiin1222.(Yule)

21.AfortifiedpassthroughthemountainsnorthofChung-tu.(Yule)

22.Genghis’grandsonHuleguandhisqueen,asdepictedbyRashidud-Din.

23.TheGenghisKhanmonument,Mongolia.(Fotolia)

Timeline:TheMongolConquestsandtheCareerofGenghisKhan

c.800AD EmergenceofMongoltribes.907 FoundationofKhitanLiaodynasty.960 FoundationofSungdynastyinChina.1138 FoundationofTangutHsiHsiadynasty.1125 LiaooverthrownbyJurchens.Qara-Khitaistateestablished.c.1150 KabulKhanformsfirstMongolconfederation.1161 KabulKhandefeatedbyJurchens.c.1162 BirthofTemujin.c.1170 DeathofTemujin’sfather,Yesugei.1177 TemujinescapesfromTayichi’utcaptivity.1178 TemujinmarriesBorteandswearsallegiancetoToghril.1179 AbductionofBorteandwarwiththeMerkits.c.1180–1210 DroughtinMongolia.1186 KhwarizmianEmpirefounded.c.1189 TemujinbecomesKhan,takestitleofGenghis.c.1190 GenghisdefeatedbyJamuqaatDalan-baljut.1195 GenghisjoinsJurchensinwaragainstTatars.1201 BattleofKoyiten.JamuqadefeatedandTayichi’utsdestroyed.1202 GenghisdefeatsTatarsatDalan-nemurges.

1203FirstcampaignagainstNaimans.SplitwithToghril.GenghisdefeatedatQalaqaljitSands.‘BaljunaCovenant’.KeraitsdefeatedatJer-qabchiqayPass.

1204 SecondwarwithNaimans.GenghisvictoriousatMountNaqu-kun.MerkitsdefeatedatBlackSteppe.

1205 CaptureofJamuqa.FirstMongolraidsagainstHsiHsia.1206 GenghisproclaimedrulerofMongolia.1209 UighurssubmittoGenghis.1209–1210 FirstwarwithHsiHsia.1211 InvasionofChinEmpire.GenghisvictoriousatBattleofHuan-erh-tsui.1215 CaptureofChung-tu.1215–1216 Samukha’sraidintoChina.

1216WarsagainstTumadsandMerkits.Kirghizrevoltsuppressed.Firstclash

withKhwarizmians.VictoryoverChinatShen-shui.1217 MukhaliappointedviceroyinChina.

1218 FirstinvasionofKorea.JebeiconquersQara-Khitai.MukhalidefeatsChinatBattleofLang-yaLing.

1219 GenghisinvadesKhwarizmianEmpire.

1220 CaptureofBokharaandSamarkand.MukhalidefeatsChinatHuang-ling-kang.

1221 BattlesofParvanandtheIndusRiver.DefeatofJalalud-Din.InvasionofIndia.

1221–1223 JebeiandSubotei’sBlackSeacampaign.1222–1227 WarwithSungChinese.

1223RussiansdefeatedatBattleofKalkaRiver.MongolsrepulsedbyBulgars.DeathofMukhali.MongolsdefeatSungatBattleofWu-maHills.

1224 SecondinvasionofHsiHsia.Tangutsagainsubmit.1225 TangutsformalliancewithChin.ThirdMongolinvasionofHsiHsia.1227 DeathofGenghis.FinaldefeatofHsiHsia.SuccessionofOgodeiKhan.1228 Jalalud-DindefeatedatBattleofIsfahan.1231 DeathofJalalud-Din.1234 CaptureofK’aifeng.EndoftheChindynasty.1237–1241 MongolinvasionofEurope.1241 DeathofOgodei.1256 MongolinvasionofMiddleEast.

1260 AccessionofKubilaiasGreatKhan.MongolsdefeatedbyEgyptiansatAinJalut.

1268 CivilwarbetweenKubilaiandKaidu.FragmentationofMongolEmpire.1271 KubilaiproclaimsYuandynastyinChina.1279 FinaldefeatofSung.1368 FallofYuandynasty.

TheFamilyTreeofGenghisKhan(‘GreatKhans’andtheperiodoftheirreignsin

capitals)

Who’sWhoinThirteenth-CenturyMongolia

Ala-qush-digit-quri:Chiefof theOnggutsandcommanderof theOnggutcontingent intheMongolarmyin1206.

Ala-qush Tagin: Chief of the Ongguts, successor to Ala-qush-digit-quri and ally ofGenghisinthewarsinChina.

Ambakai:NephewofKabulKhan,executedbytheJurchensin1161.

Bekter:Half-brotherofTemujin,killedbythelatterinachildhoodquarrel.

Belgutei:Half-brotherofTemujin.

Bo’orchu:OneofGenghis’‘fourwar-horses’.

Boroqul:OneofGenghis’‘fourwar-horses’,killedbytheTumadsin1216.

Borte:Genghis’seniorwife.

BuyiruqKhan:NaimanchiefdefeatedbyGenghisin1202.

Chagatai:SecondsonofGenghisandfounderofthe‘ChagataiHorde’.

Chaghan:OfficerofTangutorigin,commanderofGenghis’guardin1206.

Chila’un-ba’atur:OneofGenghis’‘fourwar-horses’.

DorbeiDoqshin:Mongolofficer.VictorintheTumadWarof1216,senttoinvadeIndiain1221.

Gemyabek:Mongolofficer,killedbytheRussiansin1223.

Ho’elun:WifeofYesugeiandmotherofTemujin.

Inancha-bilgeKhan:Naimanchief,fatherofTayangKhan.

Ja’afar:MuslimmerchantandspyinGenghis’employ.

Jamuqa: Chief of the Jajirat Mongols, childhood friend and later rival of Genghis.Executedin1205.

Jarchi’udai:ChiefoftheUru’utMongolsandfatherofJelme.

Jebei: FormerTayichi’ut prisoner ofwar, one ofGenghis’ ‘four hounds’.Conqueror ofQara-KhitaiandcommanderofRussianexpedition,diedc.1223.

Jelme:SonofJarchi’udaiandoneofGenghis’‘fourhounds’.

Jirqo’adai–seeJebei.

Jochi:EldestsonofGenghis,died1227.

KabulKhan:Great-grandfather ofGenghis and founder of firstMongol confederation.DefeatedbyChinin1161.

Kokse’u-sabraq:Naimangeneral.

KubilaiKhan:GrandsonofGenghisandfounderoftheYuandynastyinChina.

Kuchluq:Naimanprince,sonofTayangKhan.TookoverQara-Khitai,andwasdefeatedandkilledbyJebeiin1218.

Megujin-se’ultu:TatarKhan,defeatedbyGenghisin1195.

Metiken:GrandsonofGenghis,killedatBamiyanin1221.

Monglik:FriendofGenghis’fatherYesugeiandfatherofTebTengri.

Mukhali:OneofGenghis’‘fourwar-horses’,andhisviceroyinChina.Diedin1223.

Ogodei:Genghis’thirdsonandsuccessor.

OngKhan–seeToghril.

Qachi’un:BrotherofTemujin.

Qadaqan:GrandsonofGenghis.

Qasar:BrotherofTemujin,renownedforhisstrengthandskillasanarcher.

Qorchi:Mongolofficer,originallyadefectorfromJamuqa,whoseimprisonmentwasthecauseoftheTumadWarof1216.

Qubilai: One of Genghis’ ‘four hounds’. His name is spelt thus in this narrative todistinguishhimfromKubilai,Genghis’grandson.

QultuqanMergen:Merkitprince,sonofToqto’a,defeatedbyJochiin1216.

Quyildar:Mongolofficer,commanderoftheMangqutsattheBattleofQalaqaljitSands.

Samukha:Mongolofficer,servedinChina1214to1216.

Senggum:Keraitprince,sonofToghril,defeatedbyGenghisin1203.

Shigi-qutuqu:AdoptedTatarorphan, rose tohighofficeunderGenghis.CommanderattheBattleofParvanin1221.

Sorqan-shira:Tayichi’utMongol,earlysupporterofGenghis.

Subotei: Mongol officer of Uriangqat origin, joint commander with Jebei on Russianexpedition. Also served in China and continued his career under Genghis’ successorOgodei.OftenregardedasthegreatestoftheMongolcommanders.

Taichar:BrotherofJamuqa,killedc.1182.

Tarqutai:Tayichi’utchiefandrivalofGenghis,defeatedin1201.

TayangKhan:Naimanchief,defeatedbyGenghisatMountNaqukunin1205.

TebTengri:Mongolshaman,originallyasupporterofGenghis,laterturnedagainsthimandwaskilledbyTemugein1206.

Tekechuk:Mongolofficer,defeatedatValiyanin1221.

Temuge:BrotherofTemujin.

Temujin:SonofYesugei,knownfromc.1195asGenghisKhan.

Temulun:SisterofTemujin.

Toghril:ChiefoftheKeraits,allyandlaterrivalofGenghis,defeatedin1203.

Tolui:SonofGenghis.

Toqto’a:ChiefoftheMerkits,defeatedandkilledattheErdishRiverin1205.

Toquchar:Mongolofficer,killedatNishapurin1220.

Yesugei: Chief of the BorjiginMongols. Father of Temujin, the future Genghis Khan.MurderedbyTatarsc.1170.

Introduction

In many respects Genghis Khan needs no introduction. Eight hundred years after helaunchedhiscareerofconquestheremainsoneofthebest-knownfiguresinhistory,notonly in his home country ofMongolia but across the globe. ‘The East’, says UrgungeOnon in the introduction tohis translationof theSecretHistory, ‘has knownonly threegreatmen.’These, inhisview,were theBuddha,ConfuciusandGenghisKhan.At firstsightthisverdictisstartling;twofamousmenofpeacesittingsidebysidewiththemostsuccessful conqueror in history. But among present-day Mongolians Genghis enjoys astatus not far short of divinity,while the neighbouringPeople’sRepublic ofChina laysclaimtohimwithalmostequalenthusiasm.Hehasbecomeasortofglobalbrand,withhisimageappearingonproductsfrombeerbottlestopostcardsasfarwestasTurkey.In1995theWashingtonPostvotedhim‘themostimportantmanofthelastthousandyears’.Itiswell known that he founded the biggest land-based empire the world has ever seen,stretchingfromtheBlackSeainthewesttoKoreaintheeast,unitingpeopleswhountilthenknewnothingofeachother’sexistence.Andyetitissurprisinghowlittlewereallyknowabouthim–orratherhowfarthepopularperceptiondiffersfromwhatwedoknow.

MyaiminthisbookistotrytoexplainhowGenghisachievedwhathedid,andtotrytoanswersomeofthequestionsthatarestillbeingdebatedtoday.Washeatrueempire-builder,orjusttheworld’smostsuccessfulbandit?Washeageniuswhosingle-handedlyalteredthecourseofworldhistory,ordidheridetosuccessonthebackofforcesstrongerthananyhumanwill?HowdidtheMongolsconquermostoftheknownworld?Wecantalkaboutmotivation,courage,disciplineandevenmilitarytechnology,buthowexactlydid these translate intosuccesson thebattlefield?MuchofGenghis’story isnot for thesqueamish.Behind suchabstractwordsas ‘conquest’ and ‘empire’ lies thegrisly realitythat these were obtained by killing other people, or at least by terrifying them intosubmission. Did Genghis and his followers really kill the millions and produce thewastelandsthattheyarereputedtohavedone?

TheSources

I have tried – as far as is possiblewhen relying on translatedworks – to answer thesequestionsbygoingback to theoriginalsources.Very fewof these, in fact,are ‘originalsources’inthesensethatamodernhistorianwouldusetheterm;theyarenot,forexample,contemporaryeyewitnessreportsoradministrativedocumentspreservedinstatearchives.

Insteadtheyaremostlychronicleswrittenwithinafewyearsordecadesoftheeventstheydescribe,butnevertheless subject to selectivityandbias.Theyare,however,essential ifGenghis’storyistobeunderstoodatall.Forallpracticalpurposestheonlysourceforhisearly life – and the only Mongolian source for his career of conquest – is the bookgenerally knownas theSecretHistoryof theMongols.Thisworkwasprobablywrittenoriginally in Mongolian, using the script which Genghis adopted from the Turkish-speakingUighurs,andatsomepointhadcometoberegardedastabootonon-Mongols,hencetheterm‘Secret’.Howeverithassurvivedtothepresentdayonlyintheformofafourteenth-centuryChinese transcription,under the titleYuanCh’aoPiShih.Wedonotknowthenameoftheauthororpreciselywhenitwaswritten;theepiloguestatesthatitwasfinished‘in theYearof theRatand theMonthof theRoebuck’,but in theMongolchronologyaRatYearrecurredeverytwelveyears,andthereisstilldebateaboutwhichcycle is meant. Urgunge Onon, whose English translation is referred to in this book,arguespersuasivelyfortheyear1228,thoughsomematerialmusthavebeenaddedlater.ThisisonlyayearafterthedeathofGenghisKhan,sotheSecretHistorycanberegardedasanear-contemporarysourcefor theevents itdescribes.Thisdoesnotofcoursemeanthat it is necessarily accurate.Much of thematerial dealingwithGenghis’ ancestors isclearlymythical,andsomehistorians–notablyArthurWaley,whopublishedoneof thefirstEnglishtranslations–haveregardedthewholeworkasfiction.Mostscholarsdonotacceptthisargument,however,andMorganhaspointedoutthattheSecretHistorycantosomeextentbevalidatedbycomparisonwithanowlostwork,theAltanDebterorGoldenBook,whichwasusedasasourcebythePersianwriterRashidud-Din.Thisisfortunate,because without the Secret History it is hard to see how any convincing account ofGenghis and his era could be written. Nevertheless, from a Western viewpoint it is aparticularlyfrustratingdocument,becauseitvirtuallyignoreswhatwetendtoseeasthemost significant aspect of Genghis’ career – the extension of his conquests after theunificationofMongoliaitself.Infactitisnotreallywhatthemodernreaderwouldregardasa‘history’atall.Itsfocusismainlygenealogical,recordingeventsbecauseofthelightwhich they shed on the relationships between members of the Khan’s family, and theprivilegesofvariouseminentMongolswhichtheylegitimised,ratherthanbecauseoftheirwider significance. For this reason the SecretHistory concentratesmainly onGenghis’ancestry,hisearlyyearsandthewarswhichgavehimcontrolofMongolia,culminatinginthegreatassemblyor‘quriltai’ in1206,atwhichhewasproclaimedsupremeruler.TheHistory is by no means a eulogy, and includes several episodes which do not seemintendedtoenhanceitssubject’sreputation,butarecurringthemeisthedouble-dealingofhis various rivals and allies, who one by one attempted to stab him in the back andtherefore had to be eliminated in self-defence. This process is assisted by the differentflawsof characterwhichmakeall these individualsunfit to rule, at least incomparison

withGenghis.TheresultofthisbiasisthatanarrativebasedontheSecretHistory–asthefollowingaccountofhisrisetopowernecessarilyis–hasafeelingofinevitabilitywhichcouldnothavebeenapparentatthetime.Mongolia,beforeGenghisunifiedit,hadbeenfoughtover for severaldecadesbyacollectionofwarlords, allhappy toeliminate theiropponents by poisoning, assassination by hired thugs and other gangstermethods. Thereadershouldbearinmindthatallwehavetodayisanaccountwrittenbythehenchmenof the most successful gangster. The events which followed Genghis’ takeover inMongolia are covered inmuch less detail, even those involving the conquest of ChinawhichabsorbedthebulkofMongolenergiesforsevendecades,andthecampaignsinthewestarementionedalmostasanafterthought.ItisasthoughtherewasnoneedtoexplaintotheMongolshoworwhytheirancestorsmanagedtoconquermostoftheknownworld;oncetheyhadbeenunifiedandprovidedwitheffectiveleadership,therestwasinevitable.IfthisreflectsagenuinecontemporaryMongolperspective,though,itisonewhichdoesin fact explain a lot. The veterans of several decades of warfare against the mostformidable of enemies – their fellow steppe dwellers – may well have found thecampaignsagainstmore‘civilised’victimseasygoingbycomparison.

The accounts of the ‘civilised’ victims themselves are naturally less sympathetic totheMongols,which iswhy twoof thePersian sources are especially valuable, becausetheywerewritten bymenwho had attained high office in the service of laterMongolkhans.AtaMalikJuvainiwasGovernorofBaghdadunderGenghis’grandsonHulegu,andhisHistoryoftheWorldConquerorcoversnotonlythelifeofGenghisbutthereignsofhissuccessorsuptoabout1260.NexttotheSecretHistorythishasbeenthemostvaluablesourcefor theearlyMongols,althoughit isnotalwayseasytoread; thenarrative isnotconsistently presented in chronological order, so that Juvaini sometimes deals with thesame events under different headings, and it is interruptedby countless digressions andquotationsfromearlierIslamicliterature.TheotherimportantPersianchroniclerisRashidud-Din,whowaschiefministerofGhazanKhan,ruleroftheIlkhanidMongolstatewhichHulegu’s family established in the Middle East. Rashid wrote around the end of thethirteenthcenturyandnaturallyhadtorelyonearliersources–includingJuvaini–fortheeventsofGenghis’reign,butheneverthelessrecordsalargeamountofusefulinformationwhichwouldotherwisehavebeenlost.Unfortunatelyonlypartofhismodestly-titledJamial-tawarikh orCollection of Histories is available in translation. Also valuable is theTabaqat-iNasiriofJuzjani,whohadactuallyservedintheKhwarizmianarmyatthetimeoftheMongolinvasionof1219,andwrotehisbookabout1260whileinexileinDelhi.Notsurprisinglyheisfiercelyanti-Mongol,butmuchofwhathesaysiscorroboratedbyJuvaini’scontemporaryaccount.

ToGenghis and his followers Chinawas by far themost important region outside

Mongolia, and the bulk of their resources were devoted to conquering it. ThereforeChinesesourcesareinvaluableforunderstandingtheMongolconquests,butunfortunatelyfewofthemareavailableinEnglish.IhavereliedheavilyonH.DesmondMartin’sworkforthecampaignsinChina,andfortheusefulinformationontheMongolarmyrecordedbyMengHung.Thelatterwasathirteenth-centurygeneralwhowroteaperceptivereportfor the Sung Emperor on the invaders and the prospects for defeating them. Chineseofficialrecordstendtobeshortonmilitarydetail,butHsiaohastranslatedsomerelevantsections of theOfficial History of theYuan dynastywhichwas established by anothergrandson of Genghis, Kubilai. Also useful isWaley’s translation of the account by LiChih-ch’angofthevisitoftheTaoistsageCh’angCh’untoGenghisin1222.

When the expanding Mongol empire began to threaten Europe from the 1240sonwards several missions were sent east on behalf of the Papacy, ostensibly asambassadors to theGreatKhans, but in reality principally as spies,with instructions toreporton theMongols’militaryabilitiesandothermattersofpracticalconcern. JohndePlanoCarpini andWilliam ofRubruck have left especially valuable records,which arecoveredbyDeRachewiltz inhisPapalEnvoys to theGreatKhans.Dating fromhalf acentury later, but still valuable for our purpose, is the better-known account ofMarcoPolo,whoservedatthecourtofKubilaiKhaninChina.

Needless to say I am indebted to numerousmore recent scholarswhoseworks arelistedintheBibliography.Anyreaderwantingamorein-depthorwide-rangingstudyofMongolhistorythatisattemptedherearerecommendedtoconsultthese,inparticularthebooks by De Hartog, Morgan and Rachtnevsky. There are many different ways ofrendering Mongol, Chinese and Persian names into English, and the inconsistenciesbetweenvariousauthoritiescanbeconfusing.InmostcasesIhavetriedtominimisetheconfusionforthereaderbyusingtheformofaparticularnamefromthesourceinwhichitis most likely to be encountered – thusMongol names tend to be taken from Onon’stranslationoftheSecretHistory,andChineseonesfromH.D.Martin.ThelatterthereforeappearintheoldWade-Gilestransliteration,whichremainsthemostaccessiblesystemforEnglish speakers. The choice between Genghis, Chinggis, Chinggiz and the numerousotherwaysinwhichtheKhan’stitlehasbeenwrittenisbasedpurelyonitsfamiliaritytothegeneralreader.

Chapter1

Genghis’World

TheCountryandthePeople

Mongoliaconsistsmainlyofahighplateauattheeasternendofthebeltofopengrassland,or steppe, which stretches acrossmost of Asia between the latitudes of forty and fiftydegreesnorth.FurthernorthliestheSiberianforest,andtothesouth,wherenotboundedbymountain ranges, the steppemerges imperceptibly into scrub and stony desert. Thewholeregionisverydistantfromthesea,andsoissubjecttoseasonalextremesofclimatewhich, together with shortage of rainfall, make it generally unsuitable for agriculture.Thereforeinpre-moderntimesitsprincipalinhabitantswerenomadicherdsmenwholivedoff their herds of sheep, cattle, camels and horses. Both the land and the people havetraditionallybeenseenasremoteandbackward,butthisstereotypeismisleading.Foronething,throughthesouthernpartofthesteppezoneranthegreatesteast-westtraderouteoftheancientandmedievalworlds,knownfromitsmostprestigiouscommodityastheSilkRoad,whichconnectedChina,viaa seriesof localmiddlemen,with theMediterranean.The route not only allowed ideas and inventions to flow between the steppe and theagricultural civilisations to the south, but supported a string ofwealthy cities along itscourse, from Hami on the borders of China west to Bokhara on the Oxus River, andbeyond to Baghdad. The steppe itself had also been the source of world-changingtechnologicaldevelopments,manyofthembasedaroundthemostcharacteristicofitswildfauna,thehorse.HorseshadprobablyfirstbeenriddennearthesouthernendoftheUralMountains around 4000BC, and 2,000 years later, in the same region, theywere beingyokedtotheearliestwarchariots.Thespreadofthismilitarytechnologyhasbeenlinkedto the dispersal of Indo-European languages across an area from Europe to India,suggesting that the steppe warriors had dominated their sedentary cousins from a veryearlydate.Byhistoricaltimesthethemeofnomadichorsemendescendingfromthehighgrasslands to pillage and conquer had become a familiar one, from the SkythianswhowreckedtheAssyriancapitalatNinevehin612BCtotheHunsofAttila,whointhefifthcenturyADnearlydidthesametoConstantinople.MostimportantofallweretheTurks,who during the six centuries afterAD 600moved south andwest in a series ofwaves,eventually coming to dominate most of theMiddle East, while at the same time their

relativesdidthesameinnorthernChina.

ButalthoughMongoliahadbeentheoriginalhomelandofmanyoftheTurkishtribes,it remainedsomethingofabackwater.Here thesteppezonereached itsgreatestaltitudeabovesealevel,anditsgreatestdistancefromthesea.Thusthecountrywasdry,coldandbleakevenbyCentralAsianstandards,andmigrationwithinthesteppezonehadalwaystendedtobefromtheeasttowardsthemilderandwetterwest.BythetwelfthcenturyADthepeoplestilllivingonthehighplateauwereincrediblyhardy,butalsorelativelypoor.Theyweredividedamongseveraltribalconfederations,ofwhichtheMongolsthemselveswereamongtheleastimportant.Inthewest,inthefoothillsoftheAltaiMountains,livedtheNaimans, who are generally regarded as of Turkish origin, although the distinctionbetweenTurk andMongolwasmainly linguistic rather than cultural, and is not alwaysdetectable inour sources.TheNaimansweremostlyBuddhists orNestorianChristians,havingbeenconvertedbytheUighurs,sedentaryTurkswhoseterritoryintheTarimBasinofwhatisnowtheChineseprovinceofXinjiangborderedtheirstothesouth.PossiblyitwasdistantrumoursofChristiansinthisremoteregionthathadgivenrisetotheEuropeanlegend of Prester John, amythical Christian potentatewho at various times during thetwelfthandthirteenthcenturieswassupposedtobeheadingwesttohelphiscoreligionistsintheirwarswiththeMuslims.

The Naimans were former allies of another Turkish people, the Kirghiz, who hadbrieflydominatedthewholeofMongoliaintheninthcentury,buthadsincebeendrivenbytheirnumerousenemiesintotheforestsalongtheRiverYeniseifurthernorth.Eastofthe Naimans were another powerful group, the Keraits, also mainly Nestorian, whooccupiedthecentralMongoliansteppebetweentheOrkhonandOnonrivers.ThenorthernneighboursoftheKeraitsweretheMerkits,wholivedonthelowerSelenggeRiversouthof LakeBaikal. TheMerkit countrywasmostly forested and the peoplewere asmuchhuntersasstockbreeders,althoughthedistinctionbetweenthetwogroupswasveryfluid.IndailylifetheMerkitsrodereindeerratherthanhorses,butitisobviousfromthesourcesthat theymaintainedsignificantcavalryarmies,whichsuggests that theireconomymustsomehowhavesupportedlargenumbersoflivestockaswellaspeople.TheOiratslivingfurthernorthandwest, eastof theupperYeniseivalley,hada similar lifestylebutwerefewerinnumbers.

IneasternMongolia,between theKerulenRiverand theKhinganMountainswhichmarked the border with Manchuria, the dominant people were the Tatars. They arecharacterised in theSecretHistory as the deadly enemies of theMongols, but in fact itseems that the two clans later known as ‘Mongqol’ orMongol – the Borjigin and theTayichi’ut–hadoriginallybeenbranchesoftheTatarpeople.TheTayichi’utinhabitedtheedge of the forest zone in the north of theTatar territory and had a reputation as great

hunters,whiletheBorjiginfurthersouthwereclassicstockbreedingnomads.Othertribesin the region included the Jalair, said to haveoriginated as a bandofTurkish refugees,wholivedbetweentheMerkitsandtheKeraits;theOnggiratsinthefarsoutheast;andtheOngguts,whoatsomeunknowndatehadmigratedsouthoftheGobiDesertasfarasthebordersofChina,butstillmaintainedcontactswith their relatives furthernorth.Despitetheirapparentisolation,however,mostofthesetribeshadbeeninvolvedtosomedegreeinthepowerpoliticsofEastAsia,andbythethirteenthcenturytheroadsouthtoChinawasalreadyawell-troddenone.

TheRoadtoEmpire

OneofthemostdramaticfeaturesofthemillenniumorsoafterAD300wasthelongseriesofincursionsbyarmiesfromCentralAsiaintothesettledempiresonthecoastalfringesofthecontinent.Accordingtothetraditionalview,theHuns,Magyars,TurksandMongolswereallpartof the sameprocess, thedriving forcebehindwhichwas the imbalance inwealthbetweentheprosperouscivilisationsof the littoralzonesofAsiaandEuropeandthebarrensteppesof the interior.Thepastoraleconomiesof thegrasslandswere rich inlivestock and certain natural resources, but were not self-sufficient in grain and otheragricultural produce, in textiles, or in goods which required specialist craftsmen toproduce. The theory is that the nomads needed to acquire these from their settledneighbours, either by trade, or bywar and the imposition of tribute. Thus theMongolconquestshavesometimesbeenseenastheculminationof‘aprimitiveattempttoabolishinequality:asthemoststupendousandcontinuousprogrammeofforcedaidevercarriedout’. But recent research has modified this view in several important respects. Firstly,archaeologicalwork inpreviouslyneglectedregionsofCentralAsiahasestablished thatsteppe societies were farmore self-sufficient than had been appreciated.Metalworkingwaswidespread, exploiting extensive local reserves of iron and copper; crops could begrowninirrigatedareasandalongriversfedbymeltwaterfromthemountains;andevenwheremostofhisfoodcamefromanimals,theaveragenomadwasbetternourishedthanhiscontemporariesinfarmingcountries.Equallyimportantwastheroleoflong-distancetrade.ThisnotonlysupportedthecitystatesoftheSilkRoadwhichconnectedChinaandtheMediterranean, butdiffusedpreciousmetals andothergoods among thenomads, astollsortribute,orbystimulatingdemandforhorses,hidesandotherlocalproducts.ThetributeexactedfromChinabynomadinvadersoftenincludeditemslikesilkandgold,butthese were easily-transported prestige goods which may have been more of symbolicvaluetothevictorsthanessentialtotheirsocieties.Ithasbeennotedthatthelootwhichthey took by force was more often people and livestock, which represented moveablewealth in their economy, than thegrainwhich theywere supposed toneed for survival.Oneanalysishasgonesofarastoturnthewholeargumentonitshead,maintainingthat

theCentralAsiansweremoreoftenthannotthevictimsofaggressionbythesurroundingempires–especiallyChina–andthatourideaoftheformeras‘barbarians’stemssolelyfromanuncriticalrelianceonbiasedChineserecords.

SoweneednotsupposethattheMongolsweredriventoexpandoutwardsbyvagueworld-historical forces, nor that poverty and envy of their settled neighbours wereinevitableresultsoftheirlifestyle.Itmayneverthelessbetruethataparticulartriggerfortheir conquests was a period of drought which is known to have affected the easternsteppes during the late twelfth century. However, the most recent tree ring data fromMongoliaprovidesamoredetailedandmorecomplexpicture.Thegrowthringsontreesvaryinthicknessfromoneyeartoanother,beingwiderinseasonswithplentyofrain,soifsamplescanbefoundgoingbackfarenoughtheycangiveanindicationoftheweatherconditionsinaspecificyear.Itappearsthataperiodofdroughtdidbegininthe1180s,andcontinueduntil1211,whichwasanexceptionallywetyear.Thefollowingtwoyearswereagaindry,butthenfortwelveyearsfrom1214therewasasuccessionofheavyrains.Thisissignificantbecausetheincreasedrainfallwouldhaveimprovedgrowingconditionsnotonlyforthetrees,butforthegrassonwhichtheMongolsreliedtofeedtheirherds.Infactproductivity might have increased by a factor of four or five, enabling much largernumbersofhorses,cattleandsheeptobemaintained.Itwouldalsoofcoursebeeasiertomovelargearmiesacrossthesteppeifmoreforagewasavailableforthehorses.Theeraofdroughtmightbetiedinwiththeperiodofviolenceonthesteppeasthetribesfoughtoverscarcegrazinggrounds,culminatingintheirenforcedunificationafter1206.Theincreasedrainfall came too late to account for Genghis’ rise to power, but it could have greatlyimproved both the economy and the logistic flexibility of his new empire from 1211onwards.Itisalsopossiblethatitencouragedmorewidespreadacceptanceofhisregime,in accordance with the Chinese tradition that associated good weather with Heaven’sendorsementofamonarch’srighttorule.

The apparently barren steppe was also rich in other ways. The Mongols’ use ofregular autumnhunts as training forwar iswell known, but the grassland fauna is lessoftenappreciatedasalogisticfactorintheircampaigns.Modernecologistsrecognisewhattheycalla‘shiftingbaselinesyndrome’–areferencetothefactthatourexpectationsarenow so diminished thatwe find it impossible to appreciate howmuchmore productivemost natural environments were before the era of mass overexploitation. But there isreasontobelievethatthewildgameoftheCentralAsiansteppewasonceasabundantasthe buffalo herds of theNorthAmerican plains in the nineteenth century, and farmorediverse.AccordingtotheSecretHistory,whenGenghisdespatchedhisgeneralSuboteiinpursuit of the sons of Toqto’a in 1216, his main concern was that the men might bedistracted by the abundance of wild animals they would encounter, and tempted into

exhaustingtheirhorsesbychasingthem.AndJuvainitellshow,whenGenghissummonedhissonJochitojoinhimafterthecaptureofSamarkand,thelatterarrivedfromthesteppestothenorthdrivingherdsofwildassesinfrontofhim‘likesheep’.Onthisoccasiontheanimalswerenoteaten,butcapturedwhenexhausted,brandedandpresumablydraftedasbaggageanimals.AtthesametimeChagataiandOgodeiwenthuntingswansatQaraKol,the‘BlackLake’inUzbekistan,andsentfiftycamel-loadsofthebirdseveryweektotheirfather ‘as a sample’.With such abundance of food available, there can have been littledifficulty in supplying theMongolwarriors or their families in their own environment.Andashunters,theMongolswouldalsohavebeenskilledatmakinguseofwildanimalproducts such as bone, hides and glue to repair their armour and other equipment. Themain constraint on the mobility of the nomads and their armies was undoubtedly theavailabilityofgrassandwaterforthehorses,anissuetowhichwewillreturninChapter3.

If their nomadic lifestyledidnot automaticallymake theCentralAsian tribesmoreaggressive,orforcethemtoattacktheirneighboursoutofsheerdesperation, itcertainlycontributed to their effectiveness if they did decide to go to war. Hunting encouragedfamiliaritywithweapons–bowsandarrowsinparticular.Herdsmenoftenworkedwithoutsupervisionandneededtobeself-reliant,butatthesametimetobeabletocooperatewiththeirneighboursinoccasionallarge-scalemigrations.Mostnomadsdidnotwanderacrossthe steppe at will, but followed regular traditional routes between summer and winterpastures,sothattwiceayearthewholecommunitywouldmovetogetherwiththeirtents,wagons and other possessions. Such a migration could involve transporting severalthousand people over a distance of hundreds ofmiles,while at the same time ensuringtheir security againstpredators,bothhumanandanimal.Thiswasexcellent training forthelogisticalsideofwarfare,andatthesametimeitinstilledinthepeoplearespectforthe virtues of discipline and loyalty.An armyof stockbreederswas also highlymobile,becauseofitseasyaccesstolargenumbersofhorses,andcouldtakeitsfoodsupplyandevenitsfamilieswithitoncampaignwithaminimumofdisruptiontotheeconomy.Thisiswhy, despite the disparity in numbers between the sparsely-populated steppe and thesurroundingagriculturalcivilisations,thepeopleoftheformermanagednotonlytoretaintheirindependenceoverthousandsofyears,butonoccasiontoimposetheirauthorityonthefarmers.

TheNomadsandChina

Ofall thesettled landsaround theedgesof thesteppe theoneclosest toMongolia,andmost intimately involved with events there, was China. Along the northern frontier ofChina a series of nomad invaders from the north managed to establish themselves atvarious times in the settled zone, only to be gradually absorbed into the larger native

population. Then the Chinesewould resume the initiative and push their garrisons andagricultural colonies out into the steppes, until they eventually overreached themselvesand the whole cycle began again. Under the T’ang dynasty of the seventh to ninthcenturiesAD Chinese power had extended far into Central Asia, but in 907 the T’angempirecollapsedandChinawasdividedamongnumerousmutuallyhostilewarlordsinaneraknownasthe‘FiveDynastiesandTenKingdoms’.Atthattimeseveraltribesfromthenorth had taken advantage of the confusion tomigrate into north China. Among theseweretheSha-t’oTurks,whohadbeenbroughtinbytheT’angasmercenaries,theTangutsfromtheTibetanborderlandswhowererecognisedbytheT’angassubordinate‘kings’intheOrdossteppeoftheupperYellowRiverinreturnforsimilarservices,andtheKhitansfromwhat isnowManchuria,newlyunitedunder theirownself-styled‘emperor’of theLiaodynasty.In960aChineseofficernamedChaoK’uang-yinmanagedtobringmostofthe country under his control and established a new native dynasty, the Sung, but theKhitans retained control of sixteen districts in the northeast. They also pushed theirfrontier west into what was later to become known as Mongolia, holding a line ofgarrisonsalongtheOrkhonRiverandimposingatemporarypeaceinthatturbulentregion.TheSungwerealsoforcedtorecognisetheTangutstateofHsiHsiainthenorthwestasanindependent,ifnominallysubordinate,kingdom.TheSungmadealastingpeacewiththeKhitans in 1004, but in 982 they launched the first in a long series of unsuccessfulcampaignsagainstHsiHsia.OnereasonfortheirhostilitywasthattheTangutscontrollednot only the best horse-rearing lands in the empire, but also the economically valuabletrading cities along the Silk Road. Another was that the interlopers refused toacknowledge theSungemperors as their overlords as theyhadwith theT’ang; in1040their rulerChaoYuanhao even proclaimed himself emperor, thus putting himself on anequalfootingwiththeSungemperorastheheadofafullyindependentstate.

TheChinesecampaignsagainstHsiHsiacontinueduntil1119,butsucceededonlyinweakening the Sung state. Although greatly outnumbered, the Tanguts had superiorcavalry and were usually fighting on the defensive, so they were almost invariablyvictorious.But by this time an even greater threat had emerged at the other end of theSung’snorthern frontier.Oneof theKhitan’sManchurian subjectpeoples, the Jurchens,had rebelled against their overlords, and in 1115 had set up their own Chinese-styledynasty, the Chin or ‘Golden’ under Wan-yen Akuta. The Sung Emperor Hui-tsung,insteadofsupportingtheLiaoasafriendlybufferstate,stabbedtheminthebackinthehopeofregainingthelostsixteendistricts,butsucceededonlyindistractingtheKhitanslongenoughtoenabletheJurchenstooverruntheentirenortheasternfrontier.ManyoftheKhitanrulingclassesfledwestwardsintoCentralAsia,wheretheyestablishedthestateofQara-Khitaiwest of theAltaiMountains,while others became reluctant subjects of the

Jurchens. In 1127 the Chin armies captured the Sung capital at K’aifeng and tookpossessionofthewholeofthenorthernhalfoftheempire,forcingtheSungtoretreattoanewcapitalatHangchowinthesouth,nowknownas‘Lin-an’or‘TemporaryPeace’.Overthenexthalf-centuryboththeChinandtheSungtriedrepeatedlytooverthrowtheotherandreunitetheempire,buttheresultwasonlytoweakenboth.

What was more, the Jurchen regime had already established itself as the naturalenemy ofwhoever controlledMongolia. Inmanyways theChin had become a typicalChinesedynasty,butithadneverturneditsbackonthesteppesasmostothersuccessfulinvaderstendedtodo.Neither,however,didittrytomaintainadirectmilitarypresenceastheKhitanshaddone.InsteaditabandonedtheOrkhongarrisonsandpursueda‘forwardpolicy’inMongolia,bysupportingitsownprotégésamongthecontendingnomadchiefswhomovedintothevacuumleftbehind.However,thewayinwhichthispolicyhadbeenexecutedwasremarkablyinept.AccordingtotheSunggeneralMengHung,theJurchenrulershadreversedalongstandingChineseembargoonsupplyingirontothesteppetribes,andinfacthadmadethesituationworsebyrefusingtoaccepttheoldSungironcurrencyas legal tender.The people had therefore sold their useless coins as scrap tomerchantswhohadtransportedthemtoMongolia,wheretheywereforgedintoweaponsandarmour.ThismayhavebeenafactorintheincreasedavailabilityofmetalintheMongolarmies,butitisunlikelytohavebeenassignificantasMengHungsuggests.TheTurksandothersteppepeopleshadinfactbeenfamousasironworkerssinceatleastthefifthcenturyAD,andmostoftheirsuppliesofmetalundoubtedlycamefromwithinCentralAsiaitself.

MoreseriousfortheChinwasthattheirmeddlinginsteppepoliticshadmadethemsomeformidableenemies.Inthemid-twelfthcenturytheyhadsupportedtheTatars,whichmadethemnaturalopponentsoftheBorjiginMongols,whohadmadeasuccessfulbidforindependenceunderKabulKhan,thegreat-grandfatherofthefutureGenghisKhan.Kabulseems tohavebeenon theway to establishing some sort of central controlover all thevariousMongoliantribes,butJurchenplottingsabotagedtheattempt.TheChinemperorfirst invited Kabul to a conference in his capital at Chung-tu (modern Beijing), thenconnivedatabotchedattempttoassassinatehimonhiswayhome.Finally, in1161, theChin sent troops to support a Tatar army which smashed the Borjigin confederation.Ambakai, Kabul’s nephew, was handed over to the Jurchens by the Tatars andhumiliatinglyputtodeathbybeingimpaledonawoodendonkeywithknivessetintoitsback.ButtheTatarswereunabletoconsolidatetheirvictory,andassoonastheJurchentroopswerewithdrawnMongoliacollapsedintoanarchy.TheChinemperorsneverthelesscontinued to consider themselves the overlords of the Mongol chiefs, awarding thememptytitlesanddemandingtributeinreturn.

OneBorjiginwhomanagedtomaintainasmallfollowingintheseturbulenttimeswas

Kabul’sgrandsonYesugei.HesupportedaKeraitneighbour,Toghril,inhisbidtobecomechiefof that tribe,andwas rewardedwith thestatusof ‘anda’,orbloodbrother.Buthealso earned the renewed hatred of the Tatars, and one day about the year 1170, aftervisitingaTatarcamp,hefellillanddied.Hisfamilyalwaysbelieved,astheSecretHistoryalleges,thathehadbeenpoisoned.Yesugeileftbehindawidow,Ho’elun,andfiveyoungchildren, of whom the eldest was eight-year-old Temujin. Temujin also had two half-brothersbyajuniorwifeofYesugei.TheboyhadbeennamedafteraTatarcaptivetakenatthetimeofhisbirth,atraditionalwayofcelebratingavictoryovertheoldenemy.ThenameisderivedfromtheTurkishandMongolianwordforiron,implyingaworkerinthatmetal,andsoisanearequivalentof theEnglishSmith.ButTemujinwastobecomefarbetterknownbythetitlehetookforhimselfinlaterlife–GenghisKhan.TheoutlineofhisearlycareergivenintheSecretHistorycontainsanumberofmythologicalelements–suchastheclotofbloodwhichhewassupposedlyclutchinginhishandwhenhewasborn–butalsovividlydepictstheanarchyofthetimesandtheprecariousnessoflifeforaboywithoutpowerfulprotectors.Ho’elunfelloutwithtwonoblewomenoftheTayichi’utclan,who persuaded Yesugei’s people to desert her and follow one of their leading men,Tarqutai, leaving the widow and her seven children and stepchildren to fend forthemselves. They survived by fishing, hunting and gathering wild plants, but life wasdifficult and the boys often quarrelled over the meagre spoils. It was at this time thatTemujinkilledhisfirstvictim–hishalf-brotherBekter,shotwithanarrowinretaliationfor stealing a small fish that he and his brother Qasar had caught. Their mother wasfuriouswithher sons for fightingwith theirownkinsfolkat a timewhen, as theSecretHistoryputsit,‘apartfromourshadowswehavenofriends,apartfromourtailswehavenofat’.(Thelatterisanallusiontothefat-tailedsheep,whichintimesofscarcitylivesonits reserves like a camel on its hump.) Her lecture on the need for the family to sticktogether, quoted at length by the same source, seems to have had amajor influence onTemujin, who throughout his life insisted on the value of family solidarity andmutualloyalty.

Chapter2

WarontheSteppes

By1177Temujinwasapproachingmanhood,andtheTayichi’utchiefTarqutaiseemstohaverealisedthathecouldonedaybecomeathreat.Ho’elun’sfamilymusthavegotwindofaplottoabducttheboy,becausetheSecretHistorydescribesthembuildingabarricadeof logs in the forest from behind which they could defend themselves. When theTayichi’uts came anddemanded that theyhandoverTemujin, he escapedonhorsebackwhilehissiblingsfoughtadelayingaction.Qasar,whowasalreadyknownasapowerfularcher, shot arrows from the shelter of the barricade, while his brothers Qachi’un andTemuge,andtheiryoungersisterTemulun,preparedtofightfromthecoverofanarrowgorge. But the enemy ignored them and rode after their older brother, whom theyeventuallycapturedaftercorneringhiminathicket.ItisnotclearwhatTarqutaiintendedtodowithhisprisoner,buthefirstorderedhimtobefastenedintoa‘cangue’–awoodenplankwithholesthroughwhichtheheadandhandsweresecured–anddisplayedineachofhispeople’scampsinturn,perhapstoconvincethosewhowereinclinedtosympathisewithYesugei’ssonthathiswasnowalostcause.Butinthetentofoneman,Sorqan-shira,Temujindidmeetwithsympathy,andhishost’ssonsloosenedtheropesthatfastenedthecanguetomakehimmorecomfortable.Thefollowingeveningtheprisonerwastakentoeatbyaninexperiencedyoungmanwhowasholdingoneendoftheropeattachedtothecangue.SeeinghisopportunityTemujin jerked the rope,pulling theyouth towardshim,knockedhimdownwiththeedgeoftheboard,andranforthenearbyOnonRiver,wherehesubmergedhimselfuntilonlyhisheadwasvisible.TheguardgavethealarmandtheTayichi’utsstartedafterhim.Itwasnowdark,butthemoonwasfull,andTemujinwouldcertainly have been recaptured but for the appearance of Sorqan-shira, who not onlydecidednottogivehimaway,butdistractedthepursuersbysuggestingotherplacestheyshouldsearch.Helatergavethefugitivetemporaryshelterinhiscampandprovidedhimwithahorse.EventuallyTemujinreturnedtohismother.

Thoughstillpoor, and forced to subsistonmarmotsand fieldmice, the familywasbeginning to assemble a small herd of horses. The Secret History tells how one dayrustlerssweptdownanddroveoffeightofthem,leavingonlyachestnutonwhichoneofthebrothers,Belgutei,hadbeenouthuntingmarmots.Temujintookthishorseandtracked

thethievesforthreedays,untilhemetayouthnamedBo’orchutendinghisfather’sherd.Bo’orchunotonlyshowedTemujin thedirection the thieveshadtaken,but immediatelyofferedtoaccompanyhim.ThiswasanotherexampleofTemujin’sextraordinaryabilitytowinfriends,thoughitislikelythatBo’orchuwassimplyboredwithhistaskandeagerforanyadventure.Together they located the rustlers’campanddroveoff the stolenhorses,whileTemujinshotarrowsata lonepursueruntilhegaveup thechase in thegatheringdusk.Thetwobecamefirmfriends,andBo’orchulatercametojoinTemujin’ssmallband.Another reinforcement arrivedat about the same time.WhileYesugeiwas still alivehehadbetrothedTemujintoBorte,thedaughterofDeisechen,achiefoftheOnggirats,andtheboynowbroughtherhomeashisbride.Withhercameadowry,avaluableblacksablejacket,whichherhusbandrealisedcouldbeturnedintothepoliticalsupporthesobadlyneeded. So he went in search of his father’s old friend, Toghril of the Keraits, andpresentedhimwiththejacketasatokenofallegiance.Toghrilwassufficientlyimpressedto promiseTemujin that hewould provide troops to reunite the scatteredBorjigins andrestorehim tohis rightfulplaceas theirchief.On thewaybackhome theboy receivedanothervaluable addition tohis group in thepersonof Jelme, sonof Jarchi’udai of theUru’ut clan, whose father had apparently dedicated him to Temujin’s servicewhen thelatterwas born, in the days when Yesugei was powerful enough to be a patron worthcultivating.ButitsaysmuchforeitherJarchi’udai’sfaithorTemujin’sgrowingcharismathattheoldmanstillthoughtitwasworthwhilekeepingtothebargain.JelmeeventuallyrosetobecomeoneofGenghis’fourleadinggenerals.

In the followingyear,while the familywascampednear the sourceof theKerulenRiver,theyweresurprisedatdawnbyanotherraidingparty.Anoldservantwomangavethe alarm, and supposing that the attackerswereTayichi’uts come to kill him,Temujinmounted a horse and escaped, followed by his mother, brothers and sister. The SecretHistory describes how Ho’elun took her daughter Temulun on the front of her saddlewhileleadinganotherhorse.ButtheresultwasthattherewasnomountleftforBorte,whowas forced tohideundera loadofwool inacartdrivenby theold servant.Theywerequickly overtaken and captured by the enemy, who in fact turned out to be Merkitspursuingaveryoldfeud–forHo’elunwasherselfaMerkit,whohadbeenabductedbyYesugeiinsimilarcircumstancesmanyyearsbefore.ThreeoftheMerkitswentafterthefleeingmen,whopresumablydidnotstoptofindouthowfewtheywere,butkeptridinguntiltheyreachedtheforestsontheslopesofMountBurkhanKhaldun.Temujinstayedinhidingforthreedaysuntilhiscompanionsrodeoutandassuredhimthattheenemyhadgone. The SecretHistory tells how he expressed his gratitude to the servant who hadraisedthealarm,andtoBurkhanKhaldun,whichwashenceforthregardedbytheMongolsas a sacredmountain: ‘Iwasgreatly afraid.Everymorning I shall sacrifice toBurkhan

Khaldun,andeverydayIwillpraytoit.Theseedofmyseedshallknowthis.’Thewholeaffair seemsratherdiscreditable to the futureKhanand tohismother,whosurelycouldhaveallowedBorte to ride the sparehorse.OneevenwonderswhetherHo’elunwasanaccessory to her fellowMerkits’ plan. However, the real motive behind the tale is notentirelyclear.TosupposethattheSecretHistoryrelatesanyincidentfornootherreasonthanthatithappened,inthestyleofamodernhistoricalwork,wouldbetomisunderstandits purpose. One objective seems to have been to establish the credentials of BurkhanKhaldunasaholyplace;anotherwasperhapstosetthesceneforforthcomingevents.ThisisnotthefirstinstanceofthissourcetellingastorythatonemighthavethoughtGenghiswouldratherhavesuppressed.WhenYesugeifirst tookhisyoungson tomeetBorte,heleft him in her father’s camp with instructions to look out for him because he wasfrightened of dogs. This is sometimes taken as an example of the Secret History’sadmirablehonestyingivinga‘wartsandall’portraitofitshero,butitisneverthelessanunusual detail to encounter in such a source. Onon suspects that it may be a codedreferencetoathreatfromhumanenemies,whichsubsequenteventshadclearlyshowntobewellfounded.

Temujin’sFirstCampaigns

Temujin’snextmovewastogotovisitToghrilandcall inthefavourhewasowed.TheKerait leader not only agreed to field an army to attack theMerkits, but suggested toTemujinthatheshouldalsoseekhelpfromanotherfamilyfriend,Jamuqa,withwhomhehadbeencloseasaboy.AtthispointthetruevalueoftheconnectionsthatTemujinandhis fatherhadmaintainedwith thevarious tribal aristocraciesbecameapparent,becauseJamuqawasbynowchiefoftheJajiratclan,andtheSecretHistoryindifferentpassagesdescribeshisfollowingastotallingeither10,000or20,000men.WithToghrilprovidingasimilar number, the youth who only a short time before had been a poverty-strickenfugitivesuddenlyfoundhimselfattheheadofaformidablearmy.Theactualnumbersareprobably greatly exaggerated, but the reversal of fortune must have been real enough.Furthermore,JamuqahadsomeusefulintelligenceabouttheMerkitcommandersandtheirdispositions.Their‘beki’orprince,Toqto’a,hesaid,wascampedbetweentheOrkhonandSelenggeRivers.Hewasanervouscharacter,who‘takestheflappingofthesaddleclothfor the beating of drums’, while his two subordinates were cowardly and treacherous.Jamuqa’sinformationprovedtobeaccurate.HejoinedupwithToghril,andthecombinedforcecrossedtheKilkoRiveronraftsmadeoflogstiedtogetherwithsedges.Thentheyadvanced up the Selengge towards Toqto’a’s camp,whichwas apparently defended byonly300men.Onlearningoftheenemy’sapproachtheMerkitsfled,andtheKeraitsandMongolsgalloped through thecamp, lootingandcuttingdownany fugitives theycouldovertake.Temujin rodeaheadcallingout forBorte, and thecouplewere reunited in the

midstoftheslaughter.

After their victory Temujin and Jamuqa exchanged gifts and renewed the oath ofbrotherhoodthattheyhadfirstmadeaschildren.Theytravelledtogetherforayearandahalf, but eventually Jamuqa suggested that they should separate. The Secret Historyimpliesthathisideamayhavebeensimplytomakethebestuseoftheavailablegrazing,butBorte persuadedTemujin that his friendwas planning somekind of treachery.Thiswasabout1182,andthefutureGenghisKhanwasaroundtwentyyearsold.Bythistimehewasalreadytheleaderofasubstantialfollowing,anditislikelythatJamuqasawhisfriend’sgrowingpopularity as a threat tohisownposition. If sohewas right todo so,becauseafterthesplitmanyofJamuqa’smenlefthimtofollowTemujin.AccordingtotheSecretHistoryoneofthese,Qorchi,relatedtohisnewmasteradreamwhichforetoldthathewouldonedaybecome‘masterof thenation’.Temujin’s replysuggests that the ideawasnotaltogethernewtohim:‘Ifwhatyousayistrue…’hetoldQorchi,‘Iwillmakeyouthecommanderoftenthousandhouseholds.’OverthenextfewyearsmoreandmoreoftheMongolbandsralliedtoTemujin’scause,andinabout1189,withtheapprovalofhisoldprotectorToghril,hewasformallyproclaimedKhanoftheMongols,withauthorityoverthirteencamps.AtthispointtheSecretHistorystartstorefertohimnotasTemujinbutasGenghisKhan,thoughitisnotclearexactlywhenheadoptedthistitle.‘Khan’wasa title already in widespread use to denote the ruler of a tribe or nation. The precisemeaningofGenghis,or‘Chinggis’asitisoftenwritten,hasalwaysbeencontroversial,buttheconsensusstillseemstobeinfavourofaderivationfrom‘tengiz’,or‘oceanic’,whichin the Turkish and Mongol languages has the additional sense of ‘universal’. Analternative theory associates it with the word ‘ching’; ‘firm’ or ‘strong’. Ratchnevskysuggests that the former was the original meaning, but that the Mongols themselveseventuallyforgotit,leadingtoconfusionwiththeideaofstrengthorferocity.AccordingtoJuvainithetitlewascoinedbyaMongolshaman,TebTengri,whowasinstrumentalinpromotingthecauseofthenewkhan,butlaterfelloutwithhimandwasmurderedbyhisbrother,Temuge.

Jamuqa,however,hadnointentionofacceptinghisrival’sclaims,andsoonfoundanopportunitytodeclarewar.HisyoungerbrotherTaicharhadstolensomehorsesfromoneofGenghis’allies,amannamedJochi-darmala,whopursuedTaicharandshothimdead.On thepretextofavenginghisbrother, Jamuqa raisedanarmysaid tobe30,000strongandmetGenghisinbattleatDalan-baljut.Wehavenodetailsoftheencounter,exceptthatGenghiswasbeatenandforcedtogointohidinginthewoodsalongtheOnonRiver,whileJamuqa committed some inexplicable atrocities against his prisoners, boiling many ofthemaliveincauldrons.Thissoundsaratherunlikelycharge,butifJamuqahadbeguntoact in a brutal and arbitrary fashion after his victory it could explain why the flow of

deserterstoTemujin,insteadoflessening,actuallygatheredpace.Amongtheclanchiefswhonowbrought theirwarriors tohimwere Jelme’s father Jarchi’udai,Quyildarof theMangquts,andYesugei’soldfriend‘Father’Monglikwithhissevensons.SoonGenghiswas able to rally his people, despite an unfortunate incident when fighting broke outbetweentheJurkinandtheotherclansoverprecedenceatafeast.TheSecretHistorythencontinueswiththenewsthatwarhadbrokenoutbetweentheTatarsandtheChinemperor,butitseemsthatthismayconcealanobscurepassageinGenghis’career.Chinesesourcesdatethiseventto1195,sixyearslater,andRatchnevskyquotesoneofthem,ChaoHung,assayingthattheKhanoncespenttenyearsasaslaveoftheChin.Itisconceivablethatthisepisodeoccurred in theaftermathof thedefeatbyJamuqa,butperhapsmore likelythattheallegationwasconcoctedlaterbyChinesepropagandists.Itiscertainlyhardtoseehow Genghis could ever have recovered his position in Mongolia after such a longabsence,giventhenumberofpotentialrivalsforthetitleofkhan.

Thewarof1195occurredwhen theTatarKhanMegujin-se’ultu refused topay thetributeduetotheChin,andaJurchenarmyadvancednorthintothesteppes,drivingtherebels before it. Genghis immediately saw this as an opportunity to destroy the hatedTatars,andsentamessagetoToghrilproposingajointcampaign.OnceagainToghrilwaseagertohelp,andwithinthreedayshehadassembledanarmy.Megujin-se’ultuhadbuiltastockadedcampontheUljaRiverandwaspreparingtomakeastandagainsttheChin,butwhenGenghisandToghrildescendedonhimfromtheoppositedirectionhewastakenbysurprise.TheTatarchiefwaskilledintheensuingfight,whilemanyofthoseworkingonthedefencesweretakenprisoner.ThevictorsthenwenttomeettheChincommander,who rewarded them with Chinese titles. Toghril became a ‘Wang’, or king, and wasknownsubsequentlybytheMongolianversionofthetitle,‘OngKhan’.Genghis,whowasobviouslystillregardedasthejuniorpartnerinthealliance,wasgiventherankof‘Ja’ut-quri’,orcommanderofafrontierdistrict.ThemenoftheJurkinclanhadfailedtojointhecampaign,andonhisreturntohiscampGenghisfoundthattheyhadcausedmoretrouble,killingtenmenandstealingaquantityofclothingbeforetakingtoflight.Hethereforeledthearmyoutagainandfound theJurkinonan island in theKerulenRiver.Hedefeatedthem, executed their chiefs, and ‘reorganised’ the people, distributing them among theother clans. Thiswas perhaps the first instance of amethodwhich hewas later to usemuchmorewidelytopreventtheestablishmentofrivalpower-basesbytribalchieftains.However,inthiscaseitfailed,asJurkinwarriorsarelaterrecordedaspartofacoalitionfightingagainsthim.

TheTayichi’utsandtheTatars

In1201,clearly fearfulof thecombinedpowerofToghrilandGenghis, theTayichi’uts,Merkits,Naimansandvarioussmallertribesformedaconfederacyundertheleadershipof

Jamuqa.InthefollowingyeartheopposingarmiesmetinbattleataplacecalledKoyiten.Afteranindecisivestruggleupanddowntheslopesofamountain,duringwhichGenghishadhishorseshotunderhim,agreatstormbrokeandforcedbothsides toabandon thebattle. Jamuqa’s coalition, probably never very well organised, disintegrated as thedifferentcontingentseachheadedfortheirhometerritories.(TheSecretHistoryascribesthisdisastertotwoshamansinJamuqa’sarmy,whobungledanattempttoemploymagicrainstonesagainsttheirenemies.)ToghrilandGenghisrodeinpursuit,thelatterfollowinga band of Tayichi’uts under A’uchu-ba’atur, while the Ong Khan went after Jamuqahimself. Eventually Genghis caught up with the Tayichi’uts, and another protractedstruggletookplace.Thetwoarmiesfoughtuntilnightfall,thencampedonthebattlefield,still in close proximity. Genghis had again been in the thick of the fighting, and waswoundedintheneckbyanarrow:theSecretHistorytellsthefamousstoryofhowJelmesavedhislifebysuckingtheclottedbloodfromthewound,thensneakedintotheenemycamptostealabowlofcurdsforhimtodrink.Butinthemorningitbecameapparentthattheenemyhadscattered,andby thenGenghishadrecoveredsufficiently to leada freshpursuit.Among the fugitives thevictorsovertookawomanwhoaddressed theKhanbyname,and turnedout tobe thedaughterofSorqan-shira, themanwhohadrescuedhimfromtheTayichi’utcampmanyyearsbefore.Shebroughtinherfatherandtherestofhisfamily, who claimed that they had only been waiting for the right moment to defect;amongthemwasayoungmancalledJirqo’adai,whoconfessedtohavingshotGenghis’horseattheBattleofKoyiten.Impressedbybothhishonestyandhismarksmanship,theKhantookhimintohisservice,bestowingonhimthenameofJebei,‘theArrow’.

In the aftermath of the victory theTayichi’ut aristocracywere eliminated, says theSecretHistory,‘sothattheyblewinthewindlikeash’.Thiswasnotageneralmassacre,however, for the same source thendescribeshowmostof thepeoplewere incorporatedintoGenghis’growingempire.HisoldenemyTarqutaiwascapturedbythreeofhisownfollowers,whoputhiminacartandstartedforGenghis’campwiththeideaofhandinghimover.Ontheway,however,theyrepentedoftheirtreacheryandlethimgo.TheywerelaterbroughtbeforeGenghis,whoexplainedthathewouldsparethem,butthatiftheyhadgone through with their plan to betray their rightful lord he would have had themexecuted.Thushepubliclyreinforcedthemessagethatwhathevaluedinmenaboveallelsewasloyalty.Sofar,infact,Genghis’successseemstohavebeenbasedmainlyonhisability to inspire thedevotionofadiversecollectionof followers,and toorganise themintoacoherentforce.Hehadnotdistinguishedhimselfbyanyoutstandingpersonalfeatsofarms,norhadheparticularly shoneasabattlefield tactician.Hehadup to thispointenjoyed no easy victories, exceptwhen he possessed overwhelming numbers, as in therescueofBortefromtheMerkits,ortheadvantageofsurprise,asagainsttheTatarsonthe

UljaRiver.Heandhisarmywereundergoinga toughapprenticeship,having to relyonluck and determination to survive in conflicts with foes as formidable as they werethemselves.Butatlastthishardtrainingwasbearingfruit.

Jamuqa’s alliance never reassembled, and Genghis’ rivals became increasinglyisolatedfromeachother.In1202hemarchedagainsttheTatars,bringingthemtobattleatDalan-nemurges. His orders issued before the clash, reported by the Secret History,suggestanewemphasisondiscipline.Noone,hesaid,wastostoptolootuntiltheenemywas completely routed, and if theywere forced to retire temporarily his troopswere torallyattheplacewheretheybegantheattack,ratherthandispersingtotheirhomesaswastheusualpractice.Theresultwasadecisivevictory,withtheTatarcampandmostoftheirpeoplefallingintothehandsoftheMongols.ThreeofGenghis’officerswhohadstoppedto round up horses and goods from the enemy campwere punished by having all theirplunderconfiscated,andsubsequentlydesertedtotheKeraits.TheTatarswerethefirstofthemajor tribes tobe completely atGenghis’mercy, andashereditary enemies and themurderers of his father, they suffered a particularly harsh fate.All themaleswhoweretallerthanthelinchpinofawagonwerekilled,whilethewomenandsmallchildrenweredistributedamongthevictorsasslaves.Afewmen,however,werewarnedbyGenghis’half-brotherBelgutei andmanaged to escape.Genghishimself took twoTatar sisters aswives,despitethefactthatoneofthemwasalreadymarriedtoaTatarfugitivewhowasstillatlarge.Oneday,saystheSecretHistory,Genghisheardthewomansighdeeply,andrealising that she must have recognised someone from her past life, he immediatelyorderedallthemeninthecamptoparadeintheirunits.Onemanwasleftstandingalone,andconfessedthathewasthemissinghusband,whohadhopedtoremainundetectedinthe crowd. Genghis’ reaction reveals not just his ruthlessness, but also his continuinginsecurity. ‘What has he come looking for?’ he asked. ‘We measured those like himagainstalinchpin.Whatdoyouexpect?’Sothismanwasalsokilled.

TheSplitwiththeKeraits

InthesameyearToghril’sKeraitsfoughtasuccessfulcampaignagainsttheMerkits,andthen he and Genghis joined forces to attack Buyiruq Khan, one of the leaders of theNaimans.Whethertherewasanyunderlyingmotiveforthiswar,orwhethertheirpolicywasnowtosuppressallpolitical rivals inMongolia, isnotclear.BuyiruqrefusedbattleandtriedtoescapewestacrosstheAltaiMountains,butwascaughtatLakeKishil-bashiandhisforcesscattered.ButontheirwayhomethetwoalliesfoundtheirwayblockedbyanotherNaimanarmyunderKokse’u-sabraq.Theywereunable to joinbattleatonceasduskwasfalling,sotheycampedforthenightandpreparedtoattackonthefollowingday.However,duringthehoursofdarknessToghrildecampedandmovedoffuptheQaraSe’ulRiver,leavinghiscampfiresburning,sothatitwasnotuntildawnthatGenghisrealised

that he had been abandoned. He at once gave orders to avoid pursuit by the strongerNaiman forces by crossing the mountains that bordered the river valley, and his armyemergedunscathedontotheSa’ariSteppe.TheSecretHistoryaddsthatfromthenonheno longer regarded theNaimans asworth fighting.He had perhaps been influenced bytheirfailuretoattackhimwhenhewasvulnerable,butinfactKokse’u-sabraqhadinsteadmarched in pursuit of theKeraits.HeovertookToghril anddefeatedhim, capturinghiswifeandhissonSenggumaswellasthebulkofhisherds.TheSecretHistoryattributesToghril’s desertion of Genghis to Jamuqa’s intrigues, but whatever the reason for hisactionsToghrilseemstohavenohesitationinappealingtoGenghisonceagain.Thelatteragreed to help, and sent his four best generals, the ‘war-horses’ Mukhali, Boroqul,Bo’orchu and Chila’un-ba’atur, who liberated the captives and returned them to theirpeople.AgratefulToghril,nowapparentlyconsciousofhisdeclininghealthandawareofSenggum’s lack of leadership qualities, now declared Genghis to be his ‘son’ andsuccessoraskhanoftheKeraits.

ThiswasanobviousslighttoSenggum,whorespondedbyenteringintonegotiationswith Jamuqa and trying to turn his father against Genghis. The SecretHistory depictsToghrilasanincreasinglyfeebleandratherpatheticcharacter,whotriedtokeepthepeacebetweenhis‘sons’,buteventuallyagreedtoletSenggumhavehisway.Thelatter’splanwas topretend to agree to amarriagebetweenhis sister andGenghis’ eldest son Jochi,thentocapturetheKhanandhisentourageatthebetrothalfeast.Genghissetoutforthefeastwithonly tenmen,but theKeraitshadbeendiscussing theplot too freely in theircamp,andtwosympathisersarrivedtowarnhimintimetomakehisescape.HeshookoffpursuitbyfleeingthroughtheGreatKhinganMountainsonthebordersofManchuria,andrejoinedhisarmyintimetoprepareitfortheinevitableclash.AttheQalaqaljitSandshewasengagedbyaKeraitforcewhichwasunderthenominalcommandofToghril,butinfactithadbeendrawnupforbattlebytheoldenemyJamuqa.Botharmiesseemtohavebeen deployed in depth. The Secret History gives a comprehensive list of the tribalcontingents on both sides. Jamuqa placed the Jirkins in the vanguard, followed insuccessionbytheTumen-Tubegens,theOlon-dongqayits,theTorqodsandtheKeraitmainbody,eachplacedtoguardtherearoftheunitsinfront.OnGenghis’sidetheUru’utsandMangqutsvolunteeredtoleadtheattackanddroveofftheJirkins,onlytobeattackedbythe Tumen-Tubegens, who wounded and unhorsed Quyildar, the commander of theMangquts.Whilethelatterralliedaroundtheirfallenchief,theUru’utsunderJarchi’udaimadeaheroicstand,defeatingthenextthreewavesoftheenemyinturn.SenggumthenadvancedwiththebulkoftheKeraits–withoutorderswearetold–buttheattackfalteredwhenhewashitinthecheekbyanarrow.ButdespitetheheroicsdescribedbytheSecretHistory it is evident thatGenghiswas in fact defeated, because he is then described as

breakingofftheengagementandhaltingbrieflytocollectstragglers,amongwhomwashissonOgodei,whohadbeenbadlywounded in theneckandwasbrought inbyBoroqul.Rashidud-Din adds that it was only thewounding of Senggum that had prevented theKeraits from totally routing theMongols. In theSecretHistory’s version theKhankeptrepeating,‘Iftheenemycome,wewillfight’,butwhenthedustoftheadvancingKeraitswasseentheycontinuedtoretreat,eventuallyarrivingatDalan-nemurges,thesceneofthevictoryovertheTatars.IftheSecretHistory’sfiguresareevenapproximatelycorrectthedefeatmusthavebeenserious,becausewhenhefinallyreassembledhisarmyGenghishadonly2,600menstillunderhiscommand.Hedividedthemintotwoequalcolumnswhichmoved down opposite banks of theQalqa River towards the country of theOnggirats,wherehehopedtofindreinforcements.

MeanwhileToghrilhadbeenpersuadedthatGenghishadlosttoomanymeninbattleor todesertiontobeable torecoverhisstrength,andhadabandonedthepursuit to lookafterhiswoundedson.SotheKhanwasabletonegotiateunmolestedwiththeOnggirats,collect further stragglers – who eventually included his brother Qasar – and graduallyrebuildhisstrengthintheforestsaroundLakeBaljunainthefarsoutheastofMongolia.Some recruits arrived from further afield, including two Khitan princes, Ila Ahai andTuka, who hoped for support against the Jurchens. Some Muslim traders, including acertainJa’afar,wholaterperformedusefulserviceinChina,mayalsohavemadecontactwithGenghisatthistime.JuvainiandtheChinesesourcesallrefertowhatbecameknownasthe‘BaljunaCovenant’,bywhichGenghisdeclaredaspecialbondwithnineteenloyalfollowerswhohadremainedwithhimthroughoutthisdarkesthour,and‘drunkthemuddywater’ofthelakewithhim.AccordingtoJuvainithenamesofallthosewhoaccompaniedGenghisatBaljunawererecorded,downtotheslavesandgrooms,whorathersurprisinglyincluded‘Turks,TajiksandIndians’.TheSecretHistory,however,doesnotmentionthisepisode, possibly because some of the men involved later fell from favour. It does,however, quote from a series of messages which Genghis sent from his hideout in anattempt toprovokedissensionamonghisenemies.Qasar,whohad lefthis family in theKeraitcamp,alsousedhissituationtoopennegotiationswithToghril.

ThemessengersreturnedtoreportthattheoldmanhadsplitwithJamuqa,andthatheandSenggumwerecampedattheJer-qabchiqayPass,feastingandapparentlyunpreparedforwar.Genghisrespondedwithouthesitation.Toghrilhadalsodespatchedamessenger–orspy–Iturgen,whoasheapproachedGenghis’campsawtheMongolarmyadvancinginbattlearray,inanattempttotaketheKeraitsbysurprise.Iturgenturnedandgallopedbacktowarnhismaster,butaMongolnamedChaqurqanbroughtdownhishorsewithanarrowshotatextremerange,andthescoutwascapturedandexecutedbyQasar.Consequentlythe Keraits were completely unprepared when Genghis surrounded and besieged their

camp.Theyneverthelessresistedforthreedays,buteventuallyToghrilandhissonbrokeoutandescaped,andthesurvivorssurrendered.IncontrasttotheTatars,theKeraitsweretreated relatively leniently. The people were mainly distributed among the Mongolcommanderstoformpartoftheirretinues.BadaiandKishiliq,thetwomenwhohadfirstwarnedtheKhanofSenggum’streachery,wererewardedwith thegoldententandotherpersonal possessions that had belonged to Toghril. The Ong Khan himself fled to theNaimans, where hewas killed by a sentrywho failed to recognise him. SenggumwasabandonedintheCholDesertbyhisgroom,whowenttoreporttoGenghiswhathehaddoneandwasexecutedforhispains.However,hisformermastersurvivedandfledasfarwestasKashgar,inthecountryoftheUighurs,beforehetoomethisdeath.

TheNaimanWar

NowallofGenghis’MongolianrivalshadbeenvanquishedapartfromtheNaimansandJamuqa,whohadnowgonetojointhem.TheruleroftheNaimans,Inancha-bilgeKhan,wasold,andhisheirwasastupidandirresponsibleyoungmanknownasTayangKhan(anotheremptyChinesetitle,meaninginthiscase‘GreatKing’).AccordingtotheSecretHistory he and his mother mocked Genghis and his followers as uncouth barbarians,boasting that theywould round themupas slaves,and joking that theymightallow theMongolwomentomilktheNaimancattleaslongastheywashedtheirhandsfirst.TheirgeneralKokse’u-sabraq,whohadalreadyencounteredtheMongolsatfirsthand,advisedcaution,butin1204TayangsentamessengertotheOngguts,askingthemtojoinhiminawar againstGenghis.TheOnggut chiefAla-qush-digit-quri refused, and insteadwarnedGenghisoftheimpendingattack.WhenthenewsarrivedtheKhanestablishedacampatKeltegeiCliffsontheRiverQalqa.TheaccountintheSecretHistoryofthepreparationswhich tookplace there is the firstdetaileddiscussionof theorganisationof theMongolarmy,anditseemsthatmanyofitsbest-knownfeatureswereintroducedatthistime.Thesoldiers were organised into units of ten, a hundred and a thousand, under officersappointed personally by theKhan.One thousand picked ‘heroes’ formed an elite guardunit under Arqai-qasar. There was also a smaller bodyguard for Genghis himself,consistingofseventydayguardsandeightynightguards.

Thenwhen his preparationswere complete, in the early summer of 1204,Genghisrode out to meet the Naimans. On top of Mount Qangqarqan, overlooking the Sa’arlSteppe,theyencounteredascreenofenemyscouts,andintheensuingskirmishaMongolhorsewascapturedandtakenbacktoTayangKhan.Genghiswasawarethathismountswere still lean after thewinter, and themarchhad tired them, sohe accepted advice tocamp on the steppe and rest. Because Tayang was known to lack determination, theMongols were ordered to light extra camp fires, five per man, to give the enemy theimpressionofoverwhelmingnumbers.TheSecretHistorytellshowscoutsreturnedtothe

Naimancampwith thediscouragingnews that ‘there aremore fires than stars’.TayangwassoworriedthatheproposedtoretreatandtrytoluretheMongolsintoanambush,buthissonKuchluqregardedthisascowardice,pointingoutthatGenghiscouldnothavethatmanymensincesomanyoftheMongolswereontheirside,withJamuqa.WhatwasmorethecapturedhorseshowedhowoutofconditionGenghis’mountsmustbe.Kuchluqwenton to lament the fact that Kokse’u-sabraq was getting too old to take the field, andsuggested that his grandmother should be sent for, as she would do a better job ofcommanding the army than Tayang. The Naiman Khan, insulted, agreed to fight. HecrossedtheOrkhonRiverandmarchedtowardsGenghis’position,butthenseemstohavelosthisnerveagain,becauseastheMongolsdeployedforbattletheNaimansfellbackandtookupadefensivepositionontheslopesofMountNaqu-kun.

According to the SecretHistory, Genghis personally took charge of the vanguard,withhisbrotherQasarcommandingthemainbody.Heissuedhisordersaccordingtowhatmust by nowhave been a standard tactical doctrine,with the troopsmarching in ‘bushclump’formation,deployingin‘lakearray’,andchargingwitha‘chiselattack’(seepages70–1 for a discussion ofwhat these termsmay havemeant).Certainly the order of theMongolarmyasitadvancedmusthavebeenimpressive,becausethesamesourcegoesontodescribehowTayangKhan’smoralecollapsedevenbeforeablowhadbeenstruck.Inawell-knownbut ratherpuzzlingpassage, it relateshowTayangasked Jamuqa,whowasstandingbyhisside,whotheenemywereandwhattheyweredoing.Jamuqarepliedwitha series of tall tales about the prowess ofGenghis’men,which frightened his ally intoretreatingfurtherandfurthertowardsthetopofthemountain.HethensentamessagetohisrivalGenghis,assuringhimthathehadneutralisedtheNaimanthreat,andthathehadhimselfdesertedthem.EventuallytheNaimanswereforcedtocampforthenightonthesummit,whereGenghis surrounded them.During the night they tried to break out, butmanywerekilledbyfallingfromtherocks,andinthemorningtheMongolsmoppedupthe survivors with ease. The Naimans were crushed beyond recovery, though Kuchluqmanagedtoescapetothewest.TheMongolswhohadfollowedJamuqaalsowentovertoGenghis,buttheirformerleaderwasnowheretobefound.

The whole story is rather difficult to believe, as no motive is given for Jamuqa’sbetrayaloftheNaimans,anditisinanycaseimplausiblethatTayangshouldhavebeensodemoralised that he allowed his army to be destroyed without a fight. We might alsoexpect, ifJamuqahaddecided tohelpGenghis, thathewouldhave joinedhimafter thebattle,whereasheisnextheardofasarefugeeinthemountains,huntingwildsheepwitha handful of companions. Rashid ud-Din says that in fact he did unintentionallydemoralisetheNaimans,butonlybecausehepanickedhimself.ThepassageintheSecretHistoryissurelyanexcusetoreproduceanumberofverseswhichwerecurrent,extolling

the valour and ferocity of the Mongol leaders. Jebei, Jelme, Qubilai and Subotei aredescribedasfourhoundsfedonhumanflesh,whochasetheenemyaswolvesdosheep.TheUru’utsandMangqutsgointobattlerejoicingandridingincircles,likefoalskickingtheir legs in excitement as they are released in themorning. Qasar is a giant who canswallowamanwhole,whileGenghishimselfhas the lookofastarvedfalconeager forflesh. It must have made stirring reading for a Mongol audience, but for us it isunfortunatethat therealeventsof themostdecisivebattle inGenghis’earlycareerhavebeenobscuredinthisfashion.

AfterhisvictoryattheBattleofMountNaqu-kun,howeveritwasachieved,Genghisturnedhisattention to theMerkits. In theautumnhemetToqto’a inbattleon theBlackSteppe and defeated him. The Merkit leaders escaped, but many of their people werecaptured.Theywere treated leniently,but subsequently rose in rebellion twice,obligingGenghistodispersethesurvivorsamongtherestofhisfollowers.Toqto’ajoinedupwithKuchluq theNaimanand foughtanotherbattlewithGenghisat theErdishRiver,whereToqto’awaskilledandmanyofhismendrownedintheriverastheyfled.Finally,in1205,Jamuqawasbroughtinbyhisremainingfollowers.PredictablyGenghisexecutedthemenwhohadbetrayedtheirmaster,andthen,accordingtotheSecretHistory,forgaveJamuqaand urged him to join theMongols. Jamuqa, however, replied that the twomen couldnevertrusteachotheragain,andwasputtodeathathisownrequest.Whetherthisistrue,or whether this source is merely trying to avoid accusing Genghis of murdering hischildhoodcompanion,wedonotknow.Understandably,Morgansuggeststhatinrelatingthisversionofevents theauthorof theHistorywasdisplayinga rathercynical senseofhumour.But the resultwas thatGenghisnowhadundisputedcontrolover thewholeofMongolia. After he had ‘unified the people of the felt-walled tents’, says the SecretHistory, ‘theyassembledat thesourceoftheOnonRiverintheYearoftheTiger’.Thiswas 1206, and the event was one of the most significant in world history – the greatassembly,or‘quriltai’,atwhichtheunitedMongolnationformallycameintobeing.

MoppingupinCentralAsia

The‘quriltai’of1206mayhavemarkedanimportantstageinGenghis’risetopower,buttheexpansionofhisempirewasbynomeansatanend.In1207hesenthissonJochitoestablishMongolauthorityovertheOiratsandKirghizwhooccupiedtheforestswestofLake Baikal. According to the SecretHistory they all submitted voluntarily, and Jochiadded 20,000warriors to theMongol strength without losing aman or a horse, to hisfather’s great satisfaction. Unrest continued sporadically for several years, however. In1216 the Tumads, another people living in the same region who had previously senttributetoGenghis,imprisonedQorchi,theMongolofficerwhomGenghishadappointedto govern them. (The Secret History dates these events to a decade earlier, but most

scholarsfollowRashidud-Din,whoplacesthesuppressionoftheTumadrevoltin1217.)TheKhanhadgivenQorchipermission to take thirtyTumadgirls ashiswives,but theinsensitive way in which he had done this had upset the tribesmen. When the newsreachedGenghis he sent another official, Quduqa, to secure Qorchi’s release. That theKhan resorted to diplomacy rather than immediately sending a military expeditionsuggeststhatheknewthatQorchihadprovokedthetrouble,butonhisarrivalQuduqawasalsoheldprisoner.ThistimeawarpartywasdespatchedundertheleadershipofBoroqul,oneofthefour‘war-horses’andanadoptedsonofGenghisofwhom,accordingtoRashidud-Din, he was particularly fond. Boroqul set out along the narrow trails through theforest, but one evening he marched into an ambush and was killed. According to theSecretHistoryhewasscoutingaheadofthearmyatthetimewithonlythreecompanions.ThisdisastersoangeredGenghisthathepreparedtorideouthimselftoavengeBoroqul.TheKhanwasdissuadedbyBo’orchuandMukhali,andeventuallythetaskwasdelegatedto Dorbei Doqshin, who according to the Secret History planned his campaignmeticulously.Strictdisciplinewasimposedonthetroops,whowereorderedtotravelnotby theman-made routeswhichwerebeingwatchedby theTumad sentries, butbywildanimal trails, cutting down trees and clearing the undergrowth if necessary. TheSecretHistoryimpliesthattheMongoltroopswerenervousinthevastSiberianforests,aswouldbenatural for thosebroughtupon theopensteppe,because theyweregivenstaffswithwhichtheyweretobeatanyoneaheadofthemwhorefusedtoadvance.Meanwhilepatrolsactingasdecoysmovedalongthenormaltrailstodeceivetheenemyintothinkingthatthearmy was following Boroqul’s route. In this way Dorbei Doqshin climbed over asupposedlyimpassablemountain,anddescendedontheenemycampasthough‘throughthe top of the Tumad people’s smoke holes’ as theywere feasting. The prisonerswerereleased,andtheTumadsweredividedintheusualwayamongthefollowingsofGenghis’leadingnobles.OnehundredofthemwereallocatedinperpetuityasservantstoBoroqul’sdescendants.

Simultaneously with Dorbei Doqshin’s expedition, Jochi and a promising officernamedSuboteiweresentwith20,000mentoeliminatethelastoftheMerkits,whounderToqto’a’ssonQultuqanMergen(‘thearcher’)hadestablishedthemselveswestoftheAltaiMountains andbegun launching raids intoMongolia.TheMerkits fledwest before thisoverwhelmingforce,butwereeventuallyovertakenanddestroyed.Juvainisays that thisencountertookplacebetweentheRiversQailiandQaimich,whichMartinplacesnorthoftheIrghizRiveronwhatisnowtheKazakhstansteppe.QultuqanwascapturedandJochiwantedtosparehimbecauseofhislegendaryskillasanarcher,buthisfatherwouldnotallowitandthelastMerkitprincewasexecuted,alongwiththerestofhisfamily.

TheKirghizfurthernorthalsorevoltedaroundthistime.Rashidud-Dinsaysthatthey

hadalreadyrebelledbeforeBoroqul’sdeath,butMartin,followingtheMeng-wu-erhShih,arguesthatitwasthatdisasterthathadpersuadedthemthatthetimewasrighttochallengetheMongols.Genghishadasked theKirghiz tosend troops tohelpagainst theTumads,buttheyhadrefused,solatein1216Jochiwassenttodealwiththem.HismarchtookhimacrosstheTannuUlaMountainswhichseparatenorthwesternMongoliafromSiberia,andintothevalleyoftheupperYeniseiRiver.TheKirghizgavebattleonthefarsideofthemountains butwere defeated, and Jochi rode north down theYenisei, travelling on thefrozen river, according to theMeng-wu-erh Shih, in preference to the forests on eitherbank. Near present-day Abakan, west of the Sayan Mountains, the Mongols found anextensiveareaofopengrasslandandfieldsofgrain,surroundedbytheforest,whichwasthe main centre of Kirghiz power. There the rebels surrendered and agreed to providehostages,andJochireturnedvictorioustoMongolia.Thiswasthefurthest thatGenghis’armies ever penetrated into the northern forests. But by this time greater events wereunfoldingfartothesouth.

Chapter3

TheKhan’sArmies

TheOrganisationoftheMongolArmy

WehaveseenhowGenghis,likemanyofhisleadingfollowers,startedhiscareerwithoutthebenefitofa traditional tribalpower-base. Inhiscase thishandicapresultedfromthedeath of his father and the defectionswhich followed, but for others it was inevitable,thanks to their relatively humble origins. Paradoxically, however, this was one of thereasons for Genghis’ success: with no traditional political structure to worry about, hecould start from scratch and organise his diverse forces in a newway. The solution headopted was to group them not by their tribal origin but into units of standard sizes,commandedbymenwhomhepromotedonthebasisofmeritandnotbirth.Thissystemwas even able to incorporate other, non-Mongol steppe nomads with a minimum oftrouble,enablingeverbiggerforcestoberaisedastheconquestsgatheredpace.Itseemsfrom Genghis’ pronouncements in the Secret History and elsewhere that he was old-fashioned enough to regard his empire ultimately as the private possession of his ownfamilyandtheclosely-relatedMongolaristocracy,buthewasalwayswillingtoemploy–andrichlyreward–capableindividualsfromoutsidethatrestrictedcircle.Healsohadtheundoubted gift of inspiring loyalty. As explained in Chapter 2, one of his ‘four war-horses’,Bo’orchu,hadmetGenghisasaresultofachanceencounterwhenthelatterwaspursuingsomestolenhorses.Bo’orchuhadriskedthewrathofhisfatherbyabandoninghis ownherds tohelphis new friend, andwas later to becomeoneof theKhan’smosttrustedadvisors.ThemanwhowastobecomethebestknownofalltheMongolgenerals,Subotei, was the son of a blacksmith of the Uriangqat, a reindeer-herding tribe of thenorthern forests, while Chaghan, the commander of the Guard, was a Tangut who hadbeenadoptedasachild.Otherswereformerenemies,orevenprisonersofwar.Jebei‘theArrow’,whohasbeendescribedas‘probablythegreatestcavalrygeneralinthehistoryoftheworld’,was fightingwith the Tayichi’utswhen hewas captured after theBattle ofKoyiten. And the three leading civil administrators of the empire, Shigi-qutuqu, Ta-taT’ong-aandYehluChu-tsai,wererespectivelyofTatar,UighurandKhitanorigin.Shigi-qutuqu had been found as a young boy in an abandoned Tatar camp and adopted intoGenghis’family,wherehisorganisationalskillssoonbecameapparent.Theresultofthis

pragmaticpolicywasthatGenghiswasexceptionallywellservedbyhissubordinates,andunlikemostofhisopponentsheseemsnevertohavebeenforcedtoadapthisstrategytotakeintoaccountthepotentialdisloyaltyofhisofficersormen.

DescribingGenghis’ reorganisationof theMongolpeoples at the ‘quriltai’of1206,theSecretHistory names eighty-five ‘commanders of thousands’, plus three chiefswholedlargertribalcontingentsnotyetincorporatedintothenewsystem–Alchiguregenwith3,000Onggirats,Butuguregenwith2,000Ikires,andAla-qush-digit-quriguregenat thehead of 5,000Ongguts. The ‘thousands’, or ‘minghans’, were civil as well asmilitaryunits, being based on communities of a thousand households, each of which wasresponsible for supplying a fightingman.Theywere further organised into higher-levelformations of 10,000, known as ‘toumans’, and subdivided into ‘hundreds’ and ‘tens’,eachundertheirowncommanders.Thesewereofcourse‘paper’strengthswhichmaynotalways have been achieved in reality: we know from the Official History of the Yuandynasty that later in the century ‘toumans’were often nomore than 3,000 strong. Thecommandersofeach‘tenthousand’wereappointedfromamongthosewhohadbeentheKhan’smostloyalcompanionsduringhisrisetopower;amongthemwereBo’orchuandMukhali,whowashonouredpartlyforhisowncontributionandpartlyforthesakeofhisfather, who had been killed two years earlier after he gave his own horse to GenghisduringaskirmishwiththeNaimans.Thesetwomenwerealsoplacedinoverallchargeofthe units responsible for the western and eastern flanks of the army respectively (the‘RightWing’and‘LeftWing’inMongolterminology,accordingtowhich–asinancientChinesetradition–thearmywasalwaysenvisagedasfacingsouth).Thenominalstrengthofthearmywas95,000men,‘excludingthepeopleoftheforest’,whopresumablyservedintheirtraditionaltribalunitslikethecontingentsmentionedabove.Writingtowardstheendofthethirteenthcentury,MarcoPoloalsomentionsaunitof100,000men,knownasa‘tuk’,butitisunlikelythatinGenghis’dayanyfieldarmywassolargeastorequiresuchasubdivision.

Genghissubsequentlyorderedhisbodyguardtobeenlargedfromtheoriginalseventydayguardsandeightynightguardstothestrengthofafull‘touman’of10,000.Thiswasdonebytransferringthebestmen,especiallythesonsofofficers,fromthe‘line’units.Theexpandedguard,likemanyoftheotherinstitutionsofMongolgovernment,wasprobablyinspired byKhitan practice, because the Liao emperors had had similar bodyguards of10,000or20,000men.TheKeraitkhansmayalsohavecopied the idea for their1,000-strong‘dayguard’,andithasbeensuggestedthatitwasviatheKeraitsthattheideawastransmitted to the Mongols. The Secret History provides a detailed account of thecommanders appointed to the various ‘thousands’ of Genghis’ guard, and of theregulationsgoverningtheirdutiesandthepunishmentsforevadingthem.Securitywasso

tightaroundtheKhan’stentatnightthatapersoncouldbearrestedforenteringtheareapatrolled by the night guards, or even for asking howmany guardswere on duty. ThesamesourcealsorecordsGenghis’decreethateachindividualguardsmanwasconsideredtobeseniorinranktoacommanderofathousandintherestofthearmy.Theguardsnowbecametheregularcoreofthearmy:‘Intimesofpeace,letthemstandguard.Butondaysofbattle,letthemstandtotheforeaswarriors.’Thenightguards,whonownumberedafull thousand, also seem to have had certain judicial duties, performed under thesupervision of Shigi-qutuqu. Nevertheless, Genghis emphasised that their primaryfunction was to protect his person, so they were not to fight in battle unless he waspresent,andanyofficertryingtoorderthemtodosowastobepunished.

Rashidud-DingivesanorderofbattlefromthetimeofGenghis’deathin1227whichsuggests that, although the strength of the army had increased since 1206, it was stillrelativelysmallincomparisonwiththoseofitsenemies.Itnowcomprised62,000menintheArmy of the LeftWing; 38,000 in theArmy of theRightWing; 1,000men of theKhan’s guard in the centre; 4,000 each for his sons Jochi, Chagatai and Ogodei; and16,000 commanded by the other members of the Khan’s family. The total strengthaccordingtothislistwas129,000,althoughthisdidnotincludethenumerousnon-Mongolunits.Ofcoursethiswasthetotalofthearmedforceavailableforthewholeempire,anditwasneverallconcentrated inanyoneplace.Campaignswereundertakenby taskforcesbuilt around the units belonging to their generals, who were usually commanders oftoumans. Sometimes this gives us a fairly accurate guide to the strength of individualarmieswhichcanbeconfirmed fromother sources, aswhen Juvaini says that the forcesent to pursue ShahMuhammad of Khwarizmia in 1220, commanded by three namedofficers, totalled 30,000 men – the equivalent of three full-strength toumans. MorefrequentlythesourcesfailtogiveusanindicationofthesizeoftheMongolarmies,butinthelightoftheabovefigureswecanatleastbecertainthatsomeofthehigherestimatescannotbecorrect.ForexampleJuzjaniclaimsthatthearmywhichinvadedKhwarizmiain1219 was 800,000 strong, but even the Russian scholar Barthold, who reduced thisenormousnumberbythree-quarters,wasstillascribingtoGenghisfarmorethanthetotalrationstrengthofhisentireempireatthetime.

An increasinglypopularpracticeas timewentonwas forMongol task forces tobeformed by drafting men from other units to create new ones from a mixture of tribalorigins,bothMongolandnon-Mongol.ThispracticedoesnotseemtohavebeencommoninGenghis’day,butbecamemoresounderhissuccessors.ThusJuvainisaysthatMongkeKhanallocatedtwomenoutofeverytentoHulegu’sarmywhichwassenttoinvadeIraqin1256.Theseadhocforceswereknownas‘tamma’armies,andwereoftenemployedoncampaignswhichwould require them to be stationed on the frontiers of the empire for

extended periods. One of their advantages may have been that, as the men were fromdifferent tribes and at first strangers to one another, they would be more amenable todiscipline and less likely to revolt. Some of these forces remained at their posts forgenerations, until they eventually lost contact with the government in Mongolia,intermarried with local women and evolved into what might be thought of as new‘synthetic tribes’. For example, Professor Jean Aubin proved that the Qaraunas ofAfghanistan,a tribeofmysteriousoriginwhomMarcoPolomet in1272,hadoriginallybeen a ‘tamma’ army despatched there by Genghis’ successor Ogodei three or fourdecadesearlier.

TheMongolSoldier

ItisdifficultfromthesurvivingsourcestotellwhichoftheorganisationalfeaturesofthenewMongol army were introduced by Genghis, and which had their origins in tribaltradition.A systemof groupingwarriors in tens andmultiples of ten, for example, hadlongbeenafeatureofTurkishandothersteppeforces.Inanycasethetechnicaldetailsofmilitaryorganisation areonly everpart of the story.The real secret ofMongolmilitarysuccess was surely the qualities of the ordinary trooper, brought up in a harshenvironment,learningfromanearlyagetosurvivetheperilsoffamine,badweatherandhostileneighbours,hisskillshonedbyseveraldecadesof internecinewar.Juvainistatesthat ‘it is recorded in nobook that anyof thekings thatwere lords of thenations everattained an army like the army of the Tartars, so patient of hardship, so grateful forcomforts,soobedienttoitscommandersbothinprosperityandadversity’.(‘Tartar’wasaterm commonly used in thewest at the time for theMongols and other peoples of theeasternsteppes.ItmayhavegainedcurrencyfromanunderstandableconfusionbetweenGenghis’oldenemiestheTatars,manyofwhomwerenowincorporatedintotheMongolarmies,andtheinhabitantsofTartarus,theClassicalhell.)JuvainigoesontocomparetheMongolsoldierstohungrydogs,whichmakethebesthunters.Theywereusedtoobeyingorders,totallyfamiliarwiththeirweapons,whichtheycarriedwiththeminpeaceaswellasinwar;theywillinglypaidtheirtaxes,andperformedlabourserviceaswellasmilitaryservice as a due to their rulers without having to be paid. Discipline was draconian.AccordingtoJohndePlanoCarpini,‘unlesstheyretreatinabody,allwhotakeflightareput to death’. The death penalty could also be imposed for leavingwounded comradesbehindonthebattlefield,orevenforlosingequipment.Unlikethesettledfarmers,whosecrops would fail if left unattended, nomads could leave their livestock to graze andmultiplyinthecustodyofthewomen,childrenandoldmen.Sowhileotherkingscouldraiseanarmyonlyatenormousexpense,andusuallytookmonthstodoso, thoseoftheMongolkhanswerereadyforactionatalltimes.MengHungsaysthateveryMongolmalebetweentheagesoffifteenandsixty-onewasliabletoserveinthearmywhensummoned.

InfactinJuvaini’sviewtheyaskednothingmorethanthattheyshouldbesenttowar,asplunderwastheirmainsourceofincome.Astheircommandersledthemtovictoryaftervictory, their courage and confidence increased to the point where even overwhelmingodds did not daunt them.Martin quotes the response of a general named Baiju to theconcernsofaGeorgianofficerwho,beforeabattleagainsttheSeljuqTurksatKuzadaghin 1243, pointed out that the Mongols were vastly outnumbered: ‘You know not ourMongolpeople.Godhasgivenusthevictoryandwecountasnothingthenumberofourenemies;themoretheyarethemoregloriousitistowin,andthemoreplunderweshallsecure.’

The ability of Mongol troops to cope with forbidding terrain and harsh winterconditionswasequallyproverbial.InMongoliaitselfwintertemperaturescanfallto-42ºCorlower,andeveninsummersnowisnotunknown,whileviolentwindscanariseatanytime. The steppe environment also required its inhabitants to be prepared to undertakelong journeys on horseback with minimal preparation. Hence feats which outsidersconsideredmiraculous, such as the passage of theGobi or Kyzyl KumDeserts, or thecrossingof thefrozenYellowRiver inJanuary,wereroutine to theMongols.Evenhighmountainrangesseemtohavepresentednoseriousobstacle.MuchofeasternMongolialies at an altitude of around 4,000 feet above sea level, and in summer the herdsweremovedtoevenhigherpasturestoescapetheheatandtheinsects.Thismusthavehelpedtoacclimatisethemenandhorsestotheconditionstheywouldfacewhencrossingthehighpasses.Martincitesseveral instancesofMongolarmiesusingpassesbetween9,000and10,000feethighintheAltaiMountains,andinthesummerof1218,whilepursuingtheNaimanKuchluq,JebeitookhismenovertheBedelPassintheTienShanatanaltitudeof12,600 feet. According to both Carpini andMarco Polo, rivers too deep to ford werecrossed with the aid of large leather sacks which were filled with the troopers’possessions, tied up so that they were watertight and used as floats. The horses weredriven into thewater andguided across by a few scouts.Eachmanwould thenput hissaddle on top of his sack and sit on it while holding onto the tail of a horse, oralternatively propelling himself with improvised oars. As described in Chapter 2, theSecretHistoryalsomentionsrivercrossingsmadewiththeaidofimprovisedrafts.

Juvaini isourmainsourcefor thegreathuntingexpeditionswhichtookplaceeveryautumnonthesteppe,andwhich–apartfromtheirtraditionalroleinprovidingmeatforthe winter – were consciously used as an opportunity to train the men for war. It isunlikelythatGenghiswasthefirstleadertodothis,butfromJuvaini’saccountitisclearthathishuntsmusthavebeenonafarbiggerscalethanhadpreviouslybeenseen.Militaryunits up to the strength of whole toumans were deployed around the area selected,sometimes starting many miles apart. They would then form an enormous ring which

graduallycontracted,trappingthewildgameinside.ItwasstrictlyforbiddeneithertokillanyanimalbeforetheKhangavehispermission,ortoletitescape.Thisrequiredcarefulcooperationbetweenunitsaswellasstrictdiscipline,especiallywhenitisconsideredthatthe creatures swept up in these hunts would include not only deer, horses and similarharmlessspecies,butdangerousones likewolves,bears,andeven lionsor tigers.Whenthe ringwas small enough the killing groundwould be surrounded by ropes decoratedwith pieces of cloth to deter the quarry from escaping, and theKhanwould personallybegintheslaughter.Eventuallythefewsurvivinganimalswerereleased,andthecarcassesweredividedupamongthehunters.Thisannualeventwasobviouslyaprecursorof thelarge-scale annual manoeuvres used bymodern armies to improve their techniques forhandlinglargeforces,anditmayhavegiventheMongolgeneralsasignificantadvantageinthisrespectovertheirsettledopponents,whogenerallylackedthenecessaryspaceforsuchexercises,aswellastheready-madeopponentinthegreatherdsofwildgame.

Clothing,WeaponsandArmour

TheMongolsoldierwasequippedinasimplebutpracticalfashionfortheharshclimateofhishomeland,thoughtheredoesnotseemtohavebeenanythingthatwewouldrecogniseasauniform.AccordingtoJohndePlanoCarpini,heusuallyworealongfurorsheepskincoat,afurcapwithearflaps,andfeltboots.Chinesepaintingsshowthatinhotweatherhemightdiscardthecoatandreplacethecapwithasortoflowturban.Hewasarmedwithabowaswellasaselectionofweaponsforhand-to-handcombat,andinbattlehedonnedanironhelmetand–ifhecouldaffordit–asuitofironorleatherarmour.Menprobablysuppliedmost of their own equipment, and so the quality andquantity ofweapons andarmourmightvarysignificantlywithinaunit.ModernwritersoftenrefertoMongol‘light’and ‘heavy’ cavalry, implying the sort of distinctionwhich existed between the hussarsandcuirassiersofnineteenth-centuryEuropeanarmies,forinstance.However,inthegreatmajority of contemporary accounts there is no suggestion that the members of the‘minghans’or ‘toumans’weredifferentiated inanywayaccording to theirequipmentortheirfunctiononthebattlefield.ItistruethatCarpinisaysthatwithineachunitthebest-armouredmenwereplacedinthefrontrank,butthatisnomorethanonewouldexpectofanymilitaryformation,anditneednotmeanthattheir tacticalrolewasanydifferent.Afewunits–theguards,andtheUru’utsandMangqutsduringthewarsofunification,forexample–seemtohavebeenregardedasespeciallyeffective,butthedistinctionsbetweenthebetterarmedandequippedaristocratic‘knights’andthelighter‘skirmishers’ thatweseeindescriptionsoftheKhitan,JurchenandothercontemporaryarmiesdonotappeartohaveexistedintheMongol‘toumans’.Juvaini,emphasisingthe‘levéeenmasse’natureoftheMongolarmy,describes it ‘apeasantry in thedressofanarmy,ofwhich, in timeofneed, all, from small to great, from those of high rank to those of low estate, are

swordsmen,archersorspearmen’.Butthiswriterisnotverypreciseinhisuseofmilitaryterminology,andwecannotnecessarilyconcludefromthisoneremarkthatthemenwithswords, bows and spearswere not the samepeople.Nowhere else, in fact, is there anysuggestion that there were Mongol soldiers who were not equipped with the bow, aweapon so characteristic of them that theywere often referred to as ‘the nation of thearchers’.

TheMongolbow

Mongol sources seldom give much tactical detail, but the impression gained from theSecretHistory tends to confirm this reliance on archery. Genghis’ mother, praising thestrengthofhisbrotherQasar, recallshowheforcedhisenemies tosubmit in long-rangearcheryduels.Jamuqa,attemptingtodemoraliseTayangKhanbeforetheBattleofMountNaqu-kun in1204,describesQasarasagiant,whocanshoothisarrows toan immensedistanceandslay tenor twentymenwitheachshot.Arrowwoundsalsopredominate inactualbattleaccounts.ItisrecordedthatseveralofGenghis’leadingopponents,includingSenggumoftheKeraitsandtheMerkitToqto’a,werekilledorwoundedbyarrowsonthebattlefield,while others, like theOngKhan’s officer Iturgen,were capturedwhen theirhorseswere shot.Genghishimself famouslyhadahorsekilledunderhimby Jebei ‘theArrow’,whobroughttheanimaldownwithasingleshotinthevertebraeoftheneck.Theother tribes ofMongolia,most ofwhomwere eventually incorporated into theMongolEmpire, apparently depended on archery to a similar extent; for example the SecretHistorymentionsthreestragglerswhoreturnedtotheMongolcampafterthebattleagainsttheOngKhan’sconfederationatQalaqaljitin1203.Oneofthesemenhadlosthishorsetoanarrow,whileanotherhadbeenshotintheneck.

ThebowusedbytheMongolsandtheirnomadicneighbourswasthecompositetypecommoninCentralAsiaandtheMiddleEast,madefromlayersofhorn,animalsinewandglue built around a wooden core. The all-wooden ‘self bow’ which was widespreadelsewhere was much simpler to manufacture, but was less suitable for the steppeenvironment. Most importantly, wood was hard to obtain on the open grassland, andalthoughmuchofnorthernMongoliaisforested,itdoesnotprovidewoodofthequalityneededtomakepowerfulbows;inparticulartheyew,regardedinEuropeasthebestwoodfor longbows, does not grow so far east. So as early as the thirdmillenniumBC steppecraftsmenhadbeenexperimentingwithbows reinforcedwithothermaterials, and sometime in the secondmillenniumBC the composite bow had appeared in an almost fully-developedform,probablyintheLakeBaikalregion.Makingsuchabowisaskilledandtime-consuming task, but the end result is a weapon that is not just a substitute for awooden bow, but actually has several advantages over it. The greater elasticity of thematerials improves the cast,which is the speed atwhich the limbswill straighten after

beingbent,andhence increases thevelocityof thearrow.Acompositebowcanalsobedesignedsothat it isonlycertainsectionswhichbend, incontrast tothetraditionalyewbowwhichwasmadetocome‘roundcompass’,orinotherwordstobendevenlyalongitswholelengthtoformasemi-circle.Sothesteppeweaponcanbebentmuchfurtherthanitswoodenequivalentwithout riskofbreakage,and illustrationsof steppearchersoftenshow them drawing their bows to well behind the ear. Furthermore, by the firstmillenniumAD thesebowswerefrequently fittedwithforward-angledrigidendsectionsknownas‘siha’,whichactedaslevers,makingiteasiertodrawaheavybowaswellasfurtherincreasingthecast.StricklandandHardyquoteamoderntestinwhichacompositebowwithadrawweightof59.5lbsshotanarrowatthesamevelocityasayewlongbowdrawing 74lbs. Hence theMongol bows could bemade shorter without loss of power,making themmore convenient for use onhorseback.ExcavatedCentralAsianweaponsaveragebetween three and five feet long (with those fromMongoliabeingat theupperend of this size range), whereas self bows are normally about the same length as theshooter’sheight.Alongerbowcanbeshotfromthebackofahorse,butitisdifficulttomanoeuvre it quickly, and in particular to swing it round to shoot backwards over theanimal’stail–afavouritetacticofCentralAsianhorsearchers,whichbecameknownasthe‘Parthianshot’aftertheParthianhorsearchersofIran.

The actual method of drawing the composite bow is also different. Most archersaround theworldpull back thebowstringwith twoormore fingers, either gripping thearrowatthesametimeor,inthe‘Mediterraneanrelease’favouredinEurope,placingthefingers either side of the arrow without actually touching it. The latter was animprovementonmoreprimitivemethodsasitenabledthefullstrengthofthefingerstobedevoted to pulling the string, but with the short composite bow, combined with theextreme length of draw, the string is at such an acute angle that it pinches the fingers,interferingwiththerelease.Sothesteppeweaponisinsteaddrawnwiththethumb,whichislockedinplacebytheindexfingerandusuallyprotectedfromtheconcentratedpressurebyaringmadeofleather,hornormetal.Requiringthemovementofonlyonedigit, thethumb release is slightly faster and ‘cleaner’ than any of the various styles of fingerrelease.Anotherfactoristhatwiththethumbrelease,thepositionofthearcher’swristisroughly horizontal, and its natural rotation tends to push the arrow gently to the left(assuming a right-handed archer); the arrow is therefore placed on the right side of thebow,sothatthepressurewilltendtoholditinplace.ExactlytheoppositeisthecasewiththeMediterraneanrelease,inwhichthewristisheldverticalandthepressureistowardstheright,encouragingtheplacingofthearrowontheleftofthebow.Thedifferentarcherystyles are not therefore simply amatter of fashion or habit as is often thought, but areprecisely tailored to the characteristics of the weapons in use. The author’s own

experimentssuggestthatwitharrowskeptinaquiverontherighthip,astheMongolsdid,and the arrowsplacedon the right sideof thebow,nockingand shooting ismarginallyfaster(again,foraright-handedarcher)thanwithanyotherarrangement.Itisalsoworthnotingthatifanarrowisdesignedtobeusedwiththethumbdraw,thefletchingscanbeplacedcloser to thenock,where the shaft is fitted to the string, than is thecase for theMediterraneandraw,whereroommustbeleftfortheknucklesofthedrawingfingers.IthasbeenarguedthattheMongoliandesigngivesgreatercontrolfortheequivalentsurfaceareaof fletching, so that thearrowwill travel furtherand flymore steadily.Howmuchdifferencethesefactorsmakeinpracticeisdifficulttoquantify,assomuchdependsontheskilloftheindividualarcher,butevenaveryslight‘edge’inspeedoraccuracyofshootingmightbesignificantwhentherearetensofthousandsofmeninvolved,astherecouldbeinamajorbattle.Itmaybesignificantthatmostoftheexceptionalfeatsofrapidshooting,bothhistoricalandcontemporary,seemtohavebeenachievedwithbowsofthecompositetype.

Discussionofmethodsofdrawingthebowleadsustothequestionofdrawweight,whichistheamountofpullappliedbythearchertobringtheweapontofulldraw,usuallyexpressed in terms of lifting an equivalentweight. So for example a bow described as‘weighing’ 100lbs, if held parallel to the ground, can be bent fully by attaching thatamountofweighttothestring.Clearlythereareadvantagesinusingbowsofhigherdrawweight,astheenergyrequiredtodrawthemwillbetranslatedintogreatervelocityforthearrow,andhencegreater rangeandpenetratingpower,but themathematicsare far fromsimple.Therehasbeenagreatdealofcontroversyinrecentyearsoverthedrawweightsof English longbows, especially in view of the enormous figures quoted for the bowsrecoveredfromthewreckofHenryVIII’sshiptheMaryRose.Itmaythereforebehelpfulto establish a few benchmarks.Modern target archers generally favour bows of around30lbsdrawweight, andwould regardanythingover40lbsas ‘heavy’.Fieldarchers andmedieval re-enactors, who generally shoot fewer arrows in a given time, often useweapons in the 50 to 70lb range, but very fewof them seem to be able tomanage theheavieronesconsistentlyoverseveralhoursofshooting.Ithasbeensuggestedthatforamanofaveragebuildwithoutalifetimeoftraining,theheaviestbowthatcanrealisticallybeshotwithisabout85lbs.SomeoftheMaryRosebowsareinthe170lbrange,andthereare a few archerswho shoot bows of theseweights today, but they are verymuch theexception.Wemustalsobearinmindthatinacombatsituationanarcherwouldprobablybe required to repeat the performance dozens or even hundreds of times, in rapidsuccession.What can be achieved by a few picked athleteswho practice continually isunlikelytobeaguidetotheaverageperformanceofamasslevyliketheMongolarmy.Neverthelessafigureof166lbs(120cattiesbyChinesemeasurement)forthedrawweight

ofMongol bows is often quoted; it appears to be derived fromMengHung viaH. D.Martin,whoalsocitesH.G.Creelassayingthatthe‘PekingGuard’oftheCh’ingdynasty(presumablyinthenineteenthcentury)usedbowsof156lbsdrawweight.

To put these claims into perspective it may be of interest to consider the archeryregulationsofthoseChinesedynastieswhoserecordsareavailable.IntheeighthcenturyAD,officersoftheT’angarmyhadtopassanarcherytestusingcompositebowsof120lbsdrawweight. It was generally T’ang practice to promotemen on the basis of physicalstrengthaswellas leadershipability,andtheofficerexaminationsalso includedweight-liftingcompetitions,sowecanassumethat therank-and-filewerenotexpectedtowieldbowsofthispower.TheManchuswhoestablishedtheCh’ingdynastyin1644,althoughnotactuallyanomadicsteppepeople,wereneighboursoftheMongols,andhadadoptedaverysimilartraditionofarcherybasedontheuseofthecompositebowfromhorseback.TheywerethelastmajorpowerinEurasiatorelymainlyonmountedbowmen,andinthemid-eighteenthcenturytheywerestillusingthesetraditionalweaponswithgreatsuccessagainst theMongol tribes,who had by then largely adopted firearms. In 1760 imperialregulations laid down aminimum drawweight of 30 ‘jin’ (18kg, or around 40lbs) forbowsforuseonhorseback,and50‘jin’(66lbs)forthoseusedonfoot(vonEssen).OtherManchusourcesdescribedbowsofbetween92and152lbs,butitisimpliedthatweaponsof80 ‘jin’ (106lbs) andoverwere intended fordisplays and trialsof strengthonly, andwerenotusedinbattleexceptperhapsbyafewexceptionalarchers.Theemperorandtheimperial princeswere supposed to be able to draw bows of up to 180 ‘jin’ inmilitarydisplays,but if thiswasactuallydoneatall itmusthavebeenforanoccasionalone-offdemonstration, and surely has no bearing on battlefield practice. More significant,perhaps,isthesuggestionthattheManchuarmieswhichdefeatedtheMongolsandothersinthe1750smayhavedonesowithbowsnotmuchheavierthanthosewieldedbytoday’ssportarchers. Inearliercenturies,whenarmourwas inmorewidespreaduse, theremayhave been a greater incentive to master heavier weapons to give a better chance ofpenetratingit,butthisfactorishardtoquantify.Inmoderntestsa144lbbowsentarrowsofvarioustypesthroughbothfrontandbackofamailcoatfittedtoadummy,butinmostcases armour must have provided adequate protection against commonly-encounteredthreats.If ithadnot, itwouldnothavebeenworththetroubletomanufactureandwear.ThisisnottosaythatMongolbowsof166lbsdrawweightdidnotexist,onlythattheyareunlikelytohavebeeneitheruniversalornecessaryforeffectivearcherytactics.

Arrowquiversweremade of birch bark and leather; theywere so characteristic anitemofequipmentthatintheSecretHistory‘takingawaysomeone’squiver’isusedasaeuphemism for reducing them to subjection.Chinese illustrations show that the normalpracticewas tocarryabowinacase,strungreadyforaction,onthe trooper’s leftside,

andaseparatequiverontheright.Severaldifferent typesofarrowarementionedintheSecretHistory,andalthoughitisnotalwaysclearwhatthetermsmean,itseemsthatsomedesigns were optimised for long range, and others for inflicting maximum damage atshorterdistances.ForexampleToqto’atheMerkitwaskilledbya‘shiba’,whichUrgungeOnonsayswas‘aparticular typeofarrow’,addingthat in theOrkhonTurkishlanguagethetermmeant‘arrowsthatcamerainingdown’.Thismightthereforerefertoaprojectiledesigned for high-angle shooting at long range. Senggum’s wound at the Battle ofQalaqaljitSandswascausedbyan ‘uchuma’,whichaccording to thesamewriterhadashort shaft and contained no iron or steel. Some arrows had horn or bone tips, thoughthesewouldhavebeenlesseffectivethanironatpenetratingarmour,andmayhavebeenmore popular for hunting than for battle. Elsewhere the same source mentions arrowscalled‘kebiyur’,whichwere‘thinanddart-like’,and‘angqu’a’,whichhadforkedheads,and may have been the type which Marco Polo describes as cutting the enemy’sbowstrings.Othershadheadsdesignedtoproduceawhistlingsoundastheyflewthroughthe air, either for signalling or to intimidate an enemy. When Temujin and JamuqarenewedtheiroathofbrotherhoodaftertheirjointattackontheMerkits,Jamuqagavehisfriendawhistlingarrowheadmadeofcowhornwithholesboredintoit‘tomakeitsing’.BothMengHungandMarcoPoloconfirmthatdifferentarrowheadswereemployedfordistance shooting and for penetrating armour at close range. The latter says that eachMongolsoldiercarriedsixtyarrowsintobattle,thirtyheavyoneswithbroadheadsforuseat close quarters, and thirty lighter ones. Archaeological finds fromMongolia and theAltaimountainsalsoincludenarrow,pointedironarrowheadssimilartothe‘bodkins’usedbyEnglishlongbowmen–andlikethempresumablydesignedtopiercearmour–aswellasheavy triangularbroadheadswhichcould inflict lethalwoundson lesswell-protectedtargets.Surprisingly,allthesedesignsappeartohavebeentangedratherthansocketed;inotherwordstheheadwasfixedtothearrowshaftbymeansofapointedtangwhichwasinsertedintoaholeorsplitintheshaftbeforebeinggluedandboundinplace.Thistendsto weaken the shaft and make it more liable to split on hitting a hard object than thealternativemethod,inwhichthesolidwoodisinsertedintoahollowsocketinthemetalhead.Ithasbeenarguedthatthetangfittingwasadesignweaknessthatseriouslylimitedtheeffectivenessofearlymountedarchery.ButitisunlikelythattheMongolswouldhavepersistedsolongwithasignificantlyinferiordesign.Socketedheadshadbeencastfrombronze in the firstmillenniumBC, butwhen iron came intowidespread use the castingmethodwasnolongerappropriate.Forgedtangedheadsarefareasierthansocketedonestomanufacture in iron,whichinviewof theenormousnumbersofarrowsemployedbythe Mongol armies might have been considered to outweigh any slight disadvantages.Poplar, willow or reed were the most popular materials for the arrow shafts. Thethirteenth-centuryIndianwriterFakhr-iMudabbirsaysthatpoplarwastooheavyforlong-

range arrows, and that the best all-round shafts were made from reed, but this wasprobably difficult to obtain inMongolia. Jamuqa in theSecretHistory once refers to a‘peach-bark arrow’. Poisoned arrows are occasionallymentioned; the poison appears tohave been made either from plants or from the venom of snakes (Nicolle andShpakovsky).Howroutinelyarrowswerepoisonedisnotclear,thoughifitwasknowntobeariskitwouldexplaintheincidentsintheSecretHistoryinwhichthelivesofGenghisand his sonOgodei were reportedly saved by companionswho sucked the blood fromtheirwounds.

Archerytactics

Despite the advantages of the composite bow, itmay seem that they cannot have beendecisiveagainstotherCentralAsiannomads,oragainsttheJurchencavalryoftheChinortheTurkish‘ghulams’whoservedintheKhwarizmianarmy,allofwhomusedweaponsofvery similardesign.Andyet there is evidence that theway inwhich theMongolsusedtheir bows was different, and may have been better calculated to maximise thoseadvantages.Frustratingly fewcontemporary sourcesgiveanydetailsof exactlyhow theMongolsengagedtheiropponents,butausefulstarting-pointisabriefstatementbyJohndePlanoCarpini,whosaysthat‘Itshouldbeknownthatwhentheycomeinsightoftheenemytheyattackatonce,eachoneshootingthreeorfourarrowsattheiradversaries;iftheyseethattheyarenotgoingtobeabletodefeatthem,theyretire,goingbacktotheirownline’.Presumably thesevolleyswereusuallydischargedon themovewhileclosingwiththeenemy,thoughTurnbullarguesthattherewouldbenotimetoshootthreeorfourarrows from within effective range if charging at the gallop, and so Carpini must bedescribinganumberof separatecharges,eachone resulting in thedischargeofa singlearrow. It is not, however, certain that the Mongols would necessarily be galloping,especially if theywereadvancing in theclose,disciplined formations that somesourcesseemto imply.Forexampleapassage in theSecretHistory referring to theUru’utsandMangqutsinGenghis’armyappearstobedescribingmanoeuvresinformedbodies,ratherthanawildchargeatthegallop:‘everytimetheyturnaround,theirbattleordermatches.Everytimetheyturnabout,theirskillmatches’.KingHaithonofArmenia,whotravelledtoMongolia in1254, says that theMongolsoftendeployed inbodies so tightlypackedthat ‘you would not take them for half their real numbers’. And according to onefourteenth-centuryMamlukmanual,onerecognisedMongoltacticwasforthewholearmytoattackinasinglebody,drawnupincloseorderwiththeaimofpreventinganyretreat:‘TheMongols…customarilyformonesquadron,inordertopushoneanotheragainsttheenemy, to prevent all of them from retreating andwithdrawing’. The experience of theNapoleonic periodwas thatmoving quickly in dense formationswas very difficult andliable to result inaccidents,evenwithexperiencedriders.Steppemountedarchersoften

trained their horses to stopdead, even fromagallop, to enable their riders to shoot, soperhapsweshouldimagineaMongolunitclosingataslowerpace–perhapsata trot–andbrieflystoppingeverysooftensothattheriderscoulddresstheirranksandgaintheadvantages of shooting from a halt while still being able to manoeuvre. A devastatingvolleycouldthenhavebeendischargedfromwithinafewyardsoftheenemy,beforethetroopersurgedtheirhorsesintoagallopforthefinalchargeagainstanyonewhowasstillstanding and prepared to face them. It would require a high degree of discipline andcontrolover thehorsesforanentireunit todothisat thesametimewithoutfallingintodisorder,buttheseareexactlythequalitiesthattheMongolsaredescribedaspossessing.Drawingabowwhilecontrollingthehorsewiththelegsalone–whileat thesametimeaimingaccurately, taking intoaccount themovementofboth shooter and target and theconstantly changing range – required great skill, but according toCarpini theMongolspracticed this regularly from three or four years of age, so that the whole processeventuallybecameinstinctive.

ProfessorJ.M.SmithisapparentlyrelyingonCarpiniwhenhesuggeststhattheusualMongol tactics involved ‘unit afterunitgallopingat theenemyas fastascouldbewitheachmanshootingoneheavyarrowfromascloseaspossible;eachunitwouldthenturnawayandoutofthepathandlineoffireofthenextunit,whichcouldfollowalmostonitsheels.’Basedonthecommentsofthefourteenth-centuryMamlukwriterTaybugha,Smithfurther deduces that a typical engagement range would be no more than thirty yards,which would be close enough for an arrow shot from a heavy bow to inflict seriousdamage.Thissortofstagedattackwouldhavetheeffectofconcentratingagainstonepartofanenemyline,whichwouldbepinnedandthenhitbyasuccessionofchargesuntilitbroke.Itwouldhavetheadditionaladvantagethatanarrowdischargedwhiletheshooterwasmovingtowardsthetargetwouldhavegreatervelocity,andhencepenetrativepower,than if shot from the halt orwhile riding away.Amitai-Preiss, commenting on Smith’stheory,considersthatamanoeuvreofthistypewouldhavebeentoodifficulttoperforminpractice, because of the risk of the units impeding and disordering each other as theyadvancedandthenretracedtheirstepsintothepathofthosecomingupfrombehind.But–althoughitisobviouslyriskytoattempttoreconstructanentiretacticalsystemfromafewscattered hints in the sources – there is evidence that this problem had already beensolved.

TheKhitanLegacy

TheMongolswereoriginallyilliteratenomads,withfewifanyofthepoliticalinstitutionsand administrative skills needed to run a large empire. Therefore it was inevitable thattheywerestronglyinfluencedbyneighbouringsocietieswhichdidpossesssuchskills.IthaslongbeenrecognisedthatthetwomostinfluentialofthesepeoplesweretheUighurs

andtheKhitans.BothmaintainedmainlyfriendlyrelationswiththeMongols;theUighursoftheTarimBasinjoinedthemvoluntarilyin1209,andalthoughsomeKhitansfoughtfortheChin inChina,otherswelcomed theMongols as liberators from theirhated Jurchenoverlords.TheKhitan successor state ofQara-Khitai, conquered in 1218,was probablyanotherimportantconduitbywhichKhitanadministrativemethodswereadoptedintotheMongol Empire. Yeh-lu Ch’u-ts’ai, who eventually became Genghis’ most trustedminister,was aKhitan captured after the fall ofChung-tu, andbothKhitan andUighurgovernorswere employed in the formerKhwarizmianEmpire after the conquest. Theircontributionswerenotlimitedtopersonnel.GenghisadoptedtheUighurscriptforthefirstattemptsatwritingtheMongollanguage,forexample.AmajorcontributionoftheKhitanswasapparentlyinthefieldofmilitaryorganisation.

TheKhitanpeoplespokealanguagerelatedtoMongolian,butfromatleastthefifthcentury AD they had followed a more settled way of life in the forests of southernManchuria.Manchuriaseemstohavebeenanimportantcentreofmilitaryinnovationinthe early medieval period, perhaps encouraged by the interaction between the stock-rearingnomadsofthenorthandwest,thefarmersofP’o-hai,whichwassituatednearthegulfofthatnameinthenortheasternsectoroftheYellowSea,andthenearbycentralisedstates of China and Korea. Manchurian inventions may have included the first fully-armoured cavalry in theEast, and perhaps also the stirrup. It is therefore reasonable tosupposethattheorganisationandtacticsusedbytheKhitanarmyaftertheestablishmentof the Liao dynasty in 907were indigenous developments. TheOfficial History of thedynasty,theLiaoShih,providessomeinterestingdetailsaboutthesematters.Thecoreofthearmyconsistedoftheregular‘ordo’cavalryregiments,whichwerebetween500and700strong;tenoftheseunitsmadeupadivision,andtendivisionsanarmy.Eachsoldierwassupposedtobringwithhimtwoservants,a‘forager’andan‘orderly’,torideafully-armouredhorse,andtoprovideaselectionofweaponsincludingfourbows,twospears–onelongandoneshort–andahalberd.Thisarsenalwouldofcoursebetoomuchforonemantohandle,andChinesepaintingsshowKhitanarmouredcavalrymencarryingjustonespear, one bow, and a sword ormace as a sidearm.No doubt the other weaponswereintendedtoequiptheservants,andelsewheretheLiaoShihdoesstatethattheforagersatleastwerearmedandworebodyarmour.Thisarrangementmayhavebeenreflectedinthestandardbattlefield deployment, according towhich theKhitansdrewup in three lines,with thefully-armoured troopersat therear,partially-armouredcavalrymen(presumablytheforagers)infrontofthem,andmountedbutunarmouredskirmishersinthefrontrank.The latter may have been drawn from among the orderlies, but were probablysupplementedbyvarioustribalirregulars.

More significant from the point of view of later developments were the tactics

prescribed for the ‘ordo’ units. When on the offensive they were trained to attack insuccession,witheachregimentcharginginturn,thenretiringifitfailedtobreakthrough,and being replaced by a following unit. Combined with the three-line deploymentdescribedabove,thiswouldhavemeantthattheenemywerehitbyaseriesofevermoredangerous charges, beingpinned andworndownby the lighter troops before having tofacethemoreformidableheavies.Thenassoonasagapwasopenedintheenemyline,theentiredivisionwouldadvance toexploit it, controlledby signals from the flagsanddrums which accompanied the commanders. Sometimes the horsemen would drag treebranchesbehindthemtoraisedustandconfusetheenemyabout their truenumbersanddispositions.These charges could be repeated for days if necessary, until the exhaustedenemybecamevulnerable to a finalpush.But inorder for this technique towork theremust have been enough space for each unit to manoeuvre, and to retire if necessary,without obstructing its neighbours.The supports obviously could not be placeddirectlybehindtheadvancedunits,asitwouldthenbeimpossibleeithertoreachtheenemylinetosupport them, or to allow them to pass if they fell back. The solution adopted ineighteenth-and nineteenth-century Europe was to deploy the cavalry ‘in echelon’, in astaggeredlinewitheachunitbehindandtothesideofthenext.WeareusuallytoldthatthiswasaPrussian inventionof theSecondSilesianWar,but it seems that itmayhavebeen independently discovered inManchuriamany centuries before. The advantages ofthe echeloned attackwerewidely discussed during theNapoleonic period, andmost ofthemwouldhaveappliedequallywellinearliereras.Thelargegapsbetweenunitswouldhavemadeiteasiertomanoeuvreandchangedirectiontoconcentrateagainstavulnerablespot;theenemylinecouldbeeffectivelypinnedbythethreatofattackfromtheunitstotherearwithouthavingtoactuallycommitthemuntiltheycouldseehowthesituationwasdeveloping; and the most appropriate units could be sent into action at a time of thecommander’schoosing.Thismight involvecommittingthebest troopsfirst toachieveaquickbreakthrough,withtheirflanksprotectedbytheirlesswell-equippedcomrades,or,as theKhitans preferred, allowing the lighter troops to soften up the enemy before thedecisivecharge.Anotheradvantageof thismethodofdeploymentwas that anattackingunitcouldeasilybewithdrawntorestandresupply,whereastheenemy,unsureofwhereor when the next blow would fall, would be forced to stand-to continuously. It wassometimes argued that each unit was more vulnerable in an echelon formation as anadvancing enemy line could overlap and envelop its flanks, but the advocates of thesystem considered that that would onlymake the enemy himself vulnerable to a flankattackbythefollowingunits.Ontheotherhand,iftheenemyseizedtheinitiativeorthetroops in echelonwere irresolute, they could easily find themselvesoutnumbered at thepoint of contact and swept away by amassed charge. The tactic thereforeworked bestwithsteadyandwell-disciplined troops ledbyexperiencedofficers–allqualitieswhich

theKhitans,liketheirMongolsuccessors,undoubtedlydidpossess.

FurtherevidenceforasystemofsuccessiveattackscanbefoundinasourceclosertotheMongolsthemselves–thePoliticalandMilitaryInstitutesofTamerlane,recordedbySharafuddinAliYezdi.Theauthenticityoftheseregulationsiscontroversial,andtheymaydatefromconsiderablylater thantheMongolperiod,but theyneverthelessrepresent thetactics,evenifidealised,ofanarmythatconsciouslysawitselfastheheirtotheMongoltradition.Timur-i-Leng,orTamerlane,wasaTurco-MongolwarlordwhoclaimeddescentfromGenghisKhan (apparently falsely, thoughhiswifewas agenuineGenghisid), andestablishedapowerfulempirebasedintheSamarkandregionattheendofthefourteenthcentury.AccordingtoYezdi,hedecreedthatifthestrengthofanenemyexceeded40,000,thearmysenttoattackitwouldbeledbythe‘emperor’inperson.Itwouldconsistoffortyunits of cavalry (described as ‘squadrons’ in the translation byMajor Davy quoted byZaman), each presumably corresponding to aMongol ‘thousand’. Theywere organisedinto a ‘Hurrauwul’ or vanguard, a ‘Burraunghaur’ or right wing, and a left wing,‘Jurraunghaur’, plus a reserve, or ‘Koul’, consisting of the ruler and his guards. Thevanguardandbothwingsweredeployedindepth,withscouts infront, followedby twolines of six squadrons each. The trooperswere tomaintain their station and not attackwithoutspecificorders.Whentheactionbegan,theprescribedsequencewasforthefirstlineof the ‘Hurrauwul’ to attack first, eachof its six squadrons charging in succession.The second line would then follow suit, and if the enemy still remained unbroken thecommanders of the two wings would similarly send in their units one after the other,followingupthemselveswiththeirpersonalguardsifnecessary.‘Thus,bythepowerandassistanceofAlmightyGod,wheneighteenchargesshallhavebeenmadeonthelineofthe enemy, theywill break and disperse.’ It is interesting that, in contrast to this ratherrigidsystem,thesmall-scaletacticstobeusedbyeachsquadronseemtohavebeenlefttothediscretionofitscommander:‘heshouldaccommodatehismodeofattacktothatoftheenemy; and that he should observe in what manner the foe advanced into battle, andcounteracthisdesigns.’AswiththeMongolsofGenghis’day,thismighthaveinvolvedachoicebetweenusingclose-rangearcherytodisorderasteadyopponent,forexample,oranimmediatechargewithcoldsteelagainstonewhowasalreadywavering.Ifvictoryhadstillnotbeenwonby thesemeans,Timurenvisagedhaving tocommit theroyalguards,with himself at the head of the last reserve: ‘And if at this period the victory be notdecided,itisthedutyoftheemperor,withfortitudeofheartandwithexaltedresolution,toputhimselfandtheKoulofhisarmyintomotion.’

ItisnotsuggestedthatthisschemerepresentsexactlytheorganisationandtacticsoftheMongolarmiesofGenghisKhan’sera,butif thesimilaritiesbetweenthepracticeofthe tenth-centuryKhitans inManchuria, and thoseof the fourteenth-or fifteenth-century

Timurids in Samarkand, aremore than coincidence,Genghis’ armies aremost likely tohavebeenresponsiblefortheirtransmission.TheSecretHistory’saccountoftheBattleofQalaqaljit Sands, discussed in Chapter 2, seems to be describing just this sort ofdeploymentindepth,withsuccessiveunitsadvancingtosupportthoseinfront.Apartfromthis singleexample this tactic isnever specificallydescribed for thearmiesofGenghis,but according to their Egyptian opponents, theMongols at the Battle ofHims in 1281‘wereorganisedassquadrons…andfollowedoneanotherasgroups’,whichmaybeanattempttodescribethesamething.

OfcoursethisneednotimplythatanarmyassuccessfulastheMongolsknewonlyoneway to deploy in battle. Themassed close order charge described on page 49, forexample, would have been particularly useful if an enemy was suddenly seen to bevulnerable to a rapid attack, and might account for the virtually instantaneousbreakthroughsseenatbattlessuchasHuan-erh-tsuiin1211andtheKalkaRiverin1223.Inanycaseabow is aversatileweapon, and the theoryofMongol close-rangearcherydoctrineneednotprecludethepossibilitythatothermethodsofshootingwereemployedwhen required. A carved stone found on the River Onon, now in St. Petersburg,commemorates the feat of Genghis’ nephew Yisungge, who once shot an arrow to adistanceof335‘alds’(aMongolianunitofmeasurementwhichtranslatestoaroundfiveandahalffeet),orover600yards.Butthefactthatthisshotwasrememberedprovesthatitwasexceptional,andnobattleaccountsuggests thatanything like itwasattempted inaction. Carpini says that each trooper carried two bows, and although this would be asensibleprecautionincaseofbreakage,itisalsopossiblethatthebowsweredesignedfordifferent tasks. One might have been heavier, intended for shooting armour-piercingarrowsatclose range,whilea lighterweaponcouldbeuseful for rapidshooting fromadistance,whichcouldquicklytireamandrawingaheavybow.Thetacticofshootingatelevation against long-range targets is often regarded by modern writers as relativelyineffective, but earlier eyewitnesses were divided on the issue. Nicolaes Witsen, aseventeenth-century Dutch observer, reported that the Tartars of the Black Sea steppescould achieve a primitive ‘time on target’ effect with this method: ‘they always shootupwards so that the arrow falls straight from the top down so that it has themaximumpower…hecouldcountthetimesopreciselythatwhenheshotthesecondarrowIcouldsee a few timeshow the second almost touched the first andboth arrows landed at thesametime,close toeachother’.Noteveryonewasso impressed.TheBarondeMarbot,whoencounteredbow-armedBashkirhorsemenduringNapoleon’sRussiancampaignof1812, recalled that ‘theBashkirs are totally undrilled, and have nomore notion of anyformation than a flock of sheep. Thus they cannot shoot horizontally in front of themwithout hitting their own comrades, and are obliged to shoot their arrows parabolically

intotheairsothatnine-tenthsofthearrowsarelost,whilethefewthathitareprettywellspent…’.NodoubttheBashkirshadlostagreatdealofthemilitaryknowledgeoftheirTurko-Mongolancestors,whounderstoodverywellthevalueoffightinginformation,anditisdifficultforthoseofuswhohavenotpersonallyexperiencedthisstyleofcombattobetoocritical,butitisnotclearexactlywhatMarbotisdescribing.Theperformanceofanarrowatlongrangeisquitedifferentfromthatofamusketballorriflebullet,becausethearrow itself is a relatively heavy object,more ofwhose energy is retained in itsmass,ratherthanitsvelocity.Unlikeabullet,anarrowfallingtoearthattheendofaparabolictrajectoryisnot‘spent’,butretains(orratherhasrecoveredasitfalls)agreaterproportionof its initial velocity, so that it is very nearly as dangerous as it would be if shothorizontallyatpoint-blankrange.

ArcheryamongtheMongols’enemies

TheclosestparallelstotheMongolianstyleofmountedarcherywereprobablytobefoundamong the Jurchens andKhitans ofManchuria andnorthernChina,whosemethods arediscussed on pages 92 to 93 and 50 to 53 respectively, and it is possible that in theirheydayeitherof these armieswouldhavebeenamatch for theMongols.However, theKhitans had been reduced to subjection by the Jurchens a century before, andmost ofthose remaining inChina eventually defected to theMongols.The Jurchen cavalry haddeclinedinnumbersandprobablyinfightingspiritsincetheysettledinChina,andtheirarmieswerenowheterogeneouscollectionsofJurchensandvariousalliedcavalrytogetherwith largenumbersof not always enthusiasticChinese infantry,most ofwhomseem tohavetakenthefieldwithoutarmourandsowereeasilyshotdownbytheMongolarchers.The campaigns in the west provided a more interesting test of the different archerytechniquesofthecombatants.ThetribalTurksandotherinhabitantsoftheCentralAsiansteppes fought in a skirmishing style which is described fairly consistently by manysources from Classical times to the Crusades. They shot their arrows from a distance,usingtheirspeedtoevadetheattacksoftheiropponents,andonlyclosinginforthekillwhen they were disorganised and weakened by volleys of arrows. As AmmianusMarcellinussaidoftheHunswhothreatenedtheRomanEmpireinthefourthcenturyAD:‘Astheyarelightlyequippedforswiftmotion,andunexpectedinaction,theypurposelydividesuddenlyintoscatteredbandsandattack,rushingaboutindisorderhereandthere,dealing terrific slaughter.’ The Byzantine princess Anna Comnena described how theTurkswhomherfathertheEmperorAlexiusencounteredintheearlytwelfthcentury‘donotfightwith lances,butcompletelysurroundtheenemyandshootathimwitharrows;theyalsodefendthemselveswitharrowsatadistance’.TheCrusaderswhoencounteredthesetacticsfoundthemfrustratinglydifficulttodealwith,astheTurkswouldnotstandandfightintheWesternknightlytradition,butwouldinsteadgallopawayfromacharge

whileturninginthesaddletoshootbehindthem.Theycouldshoottheirlightarrowsveryrapidly,andcouldalsoengageanopponentatwhatwereforthetimeverylongranges.Atthe Battle of Dorylaeum in 1097, says the author of theGesta Francorum, the SeljuqTurks‘cameuponusfromallsides,skirmishing,throwingdartsandjavelins,andshootingarrows fromanastonishing range’.Nicolleconsiders that the ‘darts’wereactually shortarrowsshotfroma‘nawak’orarrow-guide,alengthofwoodwithagrooveforthearrow,likethetillerofacrossbow,whichenabledmissilestobeusedwhichwereshorterthanthedraw length of the bow.Because thesewere very light, they could attainmuch greaterrangesthanordinaryarrows:StricklandandHardysuggestanextremeof800yards,andamorepracticalbattlefieldrangeof400yards.

However, the lightnessof theTurkishmissiles, aswell as the ranges atwhich theywere discharged,meant that they seldomdid serious damage to an armoured opponent.ThisexplainsBehaud-Din’softenquotedobservationabouttheFrankishinfantryhesawontheThirdCrusade,whoweremarchingwith‘fromonetotenarrowsstickinginthem,and still advancing at their ordinary pace without leaving the ranks’. An even clearerstatementisgivenbyAnnaComnena,quotingherfather’sorderstohismountedarchers(who on this occasion were fighting on his side against the Crusaders) to shoot at thehorses rather than their riders: ‘forheknew thatcuirassesandcoatsofmailmade themalmostifnotentirelyinvulnerable;toshootattheriders,therefore,wouldinhisopinionbeawasteofarrowsandentirelyridiculous’.Armiesusingthesetraditionalmountedarcherytactics could certainly be successful in battle, even against opponents who were betterarmoured than themselves, but they needed to take their time, wounding, tiring andweakeningtheirenemieswitharrowsbeforetheycouldfinallycloseintofinishthemoff.Victorieswonby theseattritionalmeans, like thoseof theParthiansover theRomansatCarrhaein53BCandtheSeljuksagainsttheByzantinesatManzikertin1071,usuallytookawholedayorevenlongertoachieve,instarkcontrasttothedecisivechargeswhichweseeinaccountsofMongolbattles.Forexample,attheBattleoftheKalka(discussedonpages 137 to 139) the Galician and Chernigov contingents in the Russian army weredefeatedsoquicklybytheMongolchargethattheirallieshadnotimetoreact.NicolleandShpakovsky, in their book on the campaign, accept that Subotei, the commander of theattacking‘touman’,didnotwait forhisarchers tosoftenup theenemybeforecharging,butclosedimmediatelywithhisheavycavalry,andinsupportofthistheyquoteareportthataRussianofficerridinginthevanguardwaskilledwithaspear.Theseauthorsseemto have seen this tactic as a departure from what they regard as the usual Mongolskirmishing methods, but if the analysis of Mongol tactics presented above is correct,Subotei’schargewouldinfacthavebeenastandardmanoeuvre.WecannowperhapsseewhytheTurksandothersteppetribesperformedsopoorlyagainstMongolarmies,which

couldmatch their archery and their speed ofmovement, sowould notwait to beworndownbyslowattrition,butwerealsoeffectiveinhand-to-handcombatbyvirtueoftheirdenserformations.

A very different style of archery was associated with the heavier cavalrymenwhoformedtheelitecoreofthearmiesoftheMuslimstatesfromEgyptinthewesttoIranintheeast.Thesewerethe‘ghulams’or‘mamluks’–bothtermsmeaning‘slavesoldiers’.Inmost, ifnotall,casesthesewereactualslaves,purchasedasboysfromthesteppetribesandtrainedasprofessionalsoldiers.Theywerevaluednotonlybecausetheywereentirelydevoted to the profession of arms, but also because they were thought less likely tobecome involved in internal power struggles than men recruited locally. They wereequipped by their owners or employers, and so in comparison to their relatives on thesteppe theyhadbetter armour and equipment, but they lacked access to thegreat horseherdsrearedonthegrasslands.Becauseoftheweightoftheirarmourandtheshortageofremounts,these‘mamluks’reliedlessonrapidmanoeuvresthanonshootingfromthehalt,in order not to tire their horses. A favourite tactic was to receive an enemy chargedismounted in line, disorder it with arrows, then remount and charge with sword andlance.MilitarytrainingwasstudiedscientificallyintheMuslimarmies,andanumberofmanualsofhorsemanship,archeryandotherskillssurvive.Oneofthese,bytheEgyptianinstructorTaybugha, describes their archery techniques in detail.He claims that a fullytrained‘mamluk’,shootingfromthehaltandholdinghisarrowsinhislefthandtogetherwiththebow,coulddischargefivearrowsintwoandahalfseconds–a‘rateoffire’eighttimes faster that attained by a steppe archer shooting from the gallop,who had towaituntil hismount had all four feet off the ground before he could shootwithout his aimbeingdisruptedbyitsverticalmovement,andsocouldmanageonlyoneshoteveryfoursecondsatbest,regardlessofhispersonalskill.Furthermorethe‘mamluk’couldattainarangeofseventy-fiveyards,whereashisopponentwouldhavetoshootfromthirtyyardsorlessinordertohaveachanceofpenetratingthemamluk’sarmour.Otherwritersmadeextravagant claims for the battlefield effectiveness of this tactic. For example al-Jahiz,writing of the armyof theAbbasids,who ruledEgypt andSyria in the early thirteenthcentury,saysthat‘ifathousandTurkish[i.e.mamluk]horsemenarehardpressedtheywillloosealltheirarrowsinasinglevolleyandbringdownathousandenemyhorsemen.Nobodyofmencanstandupagainstsuchatest.’WritingoftheMongol-Egyptianwarsofthelater thirteenth century, Professor Smith has argued that this rapid volley shooting,combinedwiththeintensivetraining,heavierarmourandbiggerhorsesoftheMamluks,wouldhavemadethemfarsuperiorsoldierstotheMongols.

Theproblemwith thisargument is that it is indangerofproving thatwhatactuallyhappenedmust have been impossible. TheMongols did repeatedly defeat armies using

thesetactics,intheKhwarizmianEmpire,inSyria,andlateragainsttheMamlukSultansofEgypt.Theywereadmittedly lesssuccessfulagainst the latterafter1260,butbythentheywereattheendofverylongsupplylinesandoperatingintheunsuitableterrainoftheSyriandesert.Archeryisinrealityalwaysamatterofreconcilingconflictingrequirementsandstrikingabalancebetweenrange,speedofshooting,accuracyandhittingpower.Longrangecanbeachievedbyusingheavybowsandlightarrows,butonarrivalatthetargetsuchmissileswilllacktheenergytopenetratearmourorinflictfatalinjuriesonhorses.Toachievetheseresultsneedsbothaheavybowandaheavyarrow,whichwilllosevelocitymorequickly and sowill be ineffectivebeyondamoderate range.Reasonable accuracycan be combined with rapid shooting if the range is not too great and if the archer isaiminginstinctively,aswouldbenecessaryinbattlewhentargetswereconstantlymovingorappearingatdifferentranges,butifabowistoopowerfulfortheshooterhewillnotbeabletoholditsteadyandsoaccuracywillsuffer.Theresultisthataskilledarchermightbeabletoengagetargetsat300or400yards,tosendanarrowthrougharmour,ortoshootoneeveryhalfasecond,atleastforabriefperiod,buthewillnotbeabletodoallthesethingssimultaneously.Inthiswriter’sopinion,basedonpersonalexperiment,itispossibletoshootarrowsveryrapidlyby‘snatching’atthestring,drawingitpartwaybackinsteadof tofulldraw,andreleasing itassoonaspossible,but thissacrificesrange,powerandaccuracy.Therewere in fact three prescribedways of releasing an arrow; onewith thedrawandreleaseinonemovement,anotherrequiringthestringtobeheldbrieflybeforerelease,anda thirddescribedas‘twisted’, inwhich thebowwasdrawnpartof thewayback, then there was a pause to aim, followed by a quick pull to full draw and aninstantaneous release.Only the first of these could possibly have been compatiblewithTaybugha’s‘fivearrowsintwoandahalfseconds’.Itwouldbeunwisetocontradictanauthority like Taybugha and state that the feats he records are impossible. Someexceptionalmencouldperhapsshooteffectivelyat thisrate inbattle,but itseemslikelythatformostitwouldhavebeenmoreofacircustrickthanarealistictactic.TheEgyptianMamluks did in fact stage displays of horsemanship and military exercises in the‘hippodromes’, and many of the practices illustrated in their manuals seem moreappropriate for this environment than for the battlefield. Of course this schematicdiscussionoftacticsoversimplifieswhatmusthavebeenafarmorecomplexsituationonthebattlefield,andnoarmyneedhavebeenrestrictedtoasinglemethodofshooting.Thesteppetribesusuallymaintainedasmallnumberofheavily-armouredmen,perhapsridinglarger horses obtained from the agricultural regions, who would charge and fight theenemyhand-to-handoncehehadbeenweakenedanddisorganisedbytheshootingoftheircomrades. Mamluks were also trained to shoot on the move, and exercises involvingshootingdownwards, at rangesof twenty feetor less, at targetson thegroundpreparedthemfortheuseofarcheryinconjunctionwithachargetocontact.

Similarly,theMongolswouldhavebeenjustascapableasthetribalTurksofturninginthesaddletoshootwhileretiring,andsomewell-knownChinesepaintingsillustratethepractice.ButbattleaccountsdonotgivetheimpressionthattheMongolsmademuchuseofsuchtactics,orneededto.Intheattacktheytendedtoconcentrateagainstonesectionofan enemy line and smash through it, as they did against the Jurchen at Huan-erh-tsui.Feignedflightswereusedaspreplannedmanoeuvrestodrawanopponentoutofposition,ashappenedtothegarrisonsof theTangutandChinfortsontheChinesefrontier,but ifcharged on the battlefield the Mongols generally stood and fought, sometimesdismounting to do so. Nasawi describes how in 1216 a Khwarizmian army attacked asmallerMongol expeditionary force passing their borders, but the latter seem never tohaveconsideredresortingtoskirmishing.InsteadtheKhwarizmianswereshockedbytheferocitywithwhich their victims resisted, ‘givingblowswith thepoint and edgeof thesword’.Marco Polo, it is true, gives a classic description ofCentralAsian skirmishingtacticsinhisaccountofthe‘Tartar’armies:‘Theyareneverashamedtohaverecoursetoflight.Theymanoeuvre freely, shooting at the enemy,now from this quarter, now fromthat…When theyare fleeingat topspeed, they twist roundwith theirbowsand let flytheir arrows…’But – even apart from the fact that hewaswriting seventy years afterGenghis’ death – it is unwise to place too much reliance on Marco Polo’s battledescriptions. Most are very formulaic, and it is by no means certain that he was aneyewitness to any of them. It is now accepted that his editor Rustichello, a popularromancewriter,wasresponsibleformostofthemoredramaticpassagesinPolo’sTravels,and Rustichello would certainly have been more familiar with the Huns and similarmounted archers described in Classical texts than with contemporaryMongol practice.KingHaithonofArmenia,whodid see theMongols inaction,givesa slightlydifferentaccount.Theyare,hesays,‘forthemostpartvictoriousovertheirenemies,yettheyarenotafraidtoturntheirbacksinafightifitistotheiradvantage…andiftheyhappentoberoutedtheyfleeintroopsandbandssowellorderedthatitisverydangeroustofolloworpursue them,because they shoot arrowsbackwards in their flight, oftenwoundingbothmenandhorsesthatpursuethem’.Inotherwords,theycouldemploythesetribalTurkish-styletacticsveryeffectively,buttheydidnotoftenneedtounlessthingswentwrong.

MarcoPolo’sfamousdescriptionofoneofKubilaiKhan’sbattlesagainsthisMongolrivals no doubt owes a lot to the imagination of his editor, but it may also preserve agenuineimpressionofwhatanencounterbetweentwoarmiesusingthesetacticswaslike.Hedescribestheirweaponsas‘bowandswordandclub’,plusafewlances,anddescribeshowtheywouldwaitcalmlyuntilthesignalwasgivenbeforecommencingthefight:‘FortheTartarsdonotdare to start abattleuntil their lord’sdrumsbegin tobeat; andwhiletheyarewaitingit istheircustomtosingandtoplayverysweetlyontheirtwo-stringed

instrumentsandtomakeverymerryinexpectationofbattle’.Thisapparentnonchalancemighthavefrightenedtheenemymorethananyamountofshoutingandthreatening,andhelpstogivesubstancetoJuvaini’spoeticdescriptionoftheMongolsasfearlesswarriorswhoweresoeagerforthefraythatthey‘consideredthepricksoflancesthekissesoffairmaidens’. Polo continues: ‘now you might see arrows flying like pelting rain, for thewholeairwasfullofthem.Nowyoumightseehorsemenandhorsestumblingdeadupontheground.Soloudwastheshoutingandtheclashofarmsthatyoucouldnothaveheardthethunderofheaven.’Haithonconfirms,probablyfrompersonalexperience,that‘Theirmethod of fighting is very dangerous, so that in oneTartar battle or skirmish there aremore slain or wounded than in any great conflict between other nations, which resultsfromtheirarchery,fortheyshootstronglyandsurely,beingindeedsoskilfulintheartofshootingthattheycommonlypierceallkindsofarmour…’

Close-combatweapons

Despitethepredominanceofarcheryintheirbattles,theMongolswouldalsohaveneededtoresortto‘coldsteel’onoccasion.AdmittedlyCarpinibelievedthattheydidsoonlyasalastresort:‘ifpossible…[they]neverengageinhand-to-handfighting.Theyalwaysfirstusearrowstokilltheenemyandtheirhorses.’IntheSecretHistoryJamuqadescribestheUru’utsandMangquts,fightingforGenghisatMountNaqu-kun,intermswhichsuggestthattheymighthavebeenaccustomedtofightingenemieswhowerebetterequippedthantheywereforhand-to-handcombat:‘Theychasemen[armed]withspears,theypursuethebloody bandits and men [armed] with swords. They cut them down and kill them.’Nevertheless,theaccountsofcombatintheSecretHistoryincludenumerousreferencestoMongols using weapons designed for hand-to-hand fighting, principally spears andswords.For example,whenhis father’s people abandonedTemujin andhis family afterYesugei’sdeath,anoldmanwhoobjectedwasstabbedinthebackwithaspear.LateronBelguteiwasslashedontheshoulderwithaswordinafightwithaJurkinwarrior.Othersourcesconfirmtheuseofsuchweapons.AtBaghi-KhurramoutsideGurganj,accordingtoJuvaini,theKhwarizmianswerekilledwith‘bow,swordandlance’,andattheBattleofHuan-erh-tsuiin1211,T’uChisaysthatMukhali’smenchargedtheChinwithlances.

According to Carpini Mongol spears or lances often had hooks below the head,designedtocatchinamountedopponent’sclothingorequipmentandpullhimoutofthesaddle.Thiswouldhavebeenespeciallyusefulagainstothersteppetribes,whohabituallyrodewithmuchshorterstirrups thancontemporaryEuropeansandsowere lesssecurelyseated.OneofthemenwhostoletheyoungTemujin’shorseschasedhimwithalassoonthe end of a pole, normally used for catching horses,whichmight similarly have beenintendedtounhorsehimsothathecouldbetakenalive.TheSecretHistory records thatGenghisplaced‘thebanners,drums,pikesandspears’inthecareofhisnightguards,soat

leastsomeoftheseweaponsmighthavebeenstoredcentrallyandissuedtothetroopsasrequired, rather than being their personal possessions. On one occasion Genghis alsoseems to have given permission for some of his senior officers to wear swords, againsuggestingthattheymighthavebeenregardedastheKhan’sproperty.MarcoPolorefersto ‘clubs’,whichwereprobablymetal-headedmacesof the sortwhichareknown fromarchaeologicalcontexts,andCarpinisaysthateverywarriorcarriedanaxe;thesearenotmentioned in battle accounts and may have been primarily tools rather than weapons,althoughtheycouldofcoursehavebeenusedforself-defenceinemergenciesbymenwholackedswords.

ArchaeologicalfindsfromRussiaandMongoliasuggestthatMongolswordscouldbeofavarietyoftypes,someofthembroadandstraightlikecontemporaryEuropeanblades,butbyfarthemostcommonwereslightlycurved,single-edgedsabres,withbladesaroundametrelong.ThesewerelighterthantheswordstypicallyusedinmedievalEurope,andaswemightexpectfromthewrittensourcestheywereoptimisedforcutting.OnseveraloccasionsGenghisgiveshisfollowersinstructionstoslicethroughthenecksorshouldersof his enemies, implying that swords were normally employed as cutting rather thanstabbingweapons.Thecurvatureofasabremakesitmoreeffectiveforthispurposethanastraight sword, for two reasons. One is that a shorter section of the edge comes intocontact with the target, so that the force of the blow is more concentrated. Moreimportantly it facilitatesa ‘drawingcut’, inwhich theswordsmandrawshishandeitherbackwardsorforwardsasthebladehits,slicingmoredeeplyandinflictingmoredamagethancanbeachievedbyasimplechoppingmotion.Withastraightbladetheinitialblowandthesubsequentcutrequiretheswordarmtomoveintwodifferentdirections,whileacurved weapon allows the whole sequence to be completed in one smooth movement.Moreofthebladecanalsobebroughtintoplaywithouthavingtoextendthearm,simplybyslicingbackwardsanddownwards,whichcouldhavebeenanadvantage ina tightly-packedmelee(seeNosworthyforaninterestingdiscussionofthisfactorinaNapoleoniccontext).Asingle-edgedswordmightseemtobelessversatilethanonesharpenedonbothsides, but it has the advantage that the back, being left unsharpened apart from a shortsectionnearthetip,canbewideenoughtoprovideextrarigidity,andcanalsobeusedtoparry an opponent’s weapon without risking damage to the cutting edge. So while theMongol sabre might have been less effective than the heavy, straight swords used byEuropeans and Arabs at smashing through metal armour, it could probably have beenwieldedmoredexterously in thepressofa fight,andwouldhavedonemoredamage tolesswell-protectedpartsofanopponent’sbody.Theverybestswordbladesweresaidtocome from India and Syria, but although these could have been traded along the SilkRoad, it isunlikely thatanybut thewealthiestMongolswouldhavebeenable toobtain

them.

Armourandshields

Illustrations in fourteenth-century editions of Rashid ud-Din’s work show most of theMongolsubjectswearinglongcoatsofmetalarmour,andvirtuallyidenticalitemsappearin Chinese paintings from the Yuan dynasty. These are of a type known as lamellar,widespreadinCentralAsiasinceatleastthesixthcenturyAD,whichwasmadeofsmalliron,bronzeorleatherplateslacedtogether.Thisproducedadefencewhichwastoughbutflexible, and provided better protection against arrows than European mail, which hadgapsintheringsthroughwhichasharppointcouldpenetrate.Normally,ofcourse,armourwould be worn over a padded fabric coat which would further cushion an impact andreduce injuriesdue to thehardarmourplatesor ringsbeingdriven into theflesh. In theMongolarmyasilkundershirtwasanotherpopularitem,asitwouldnottearwhenstruckbyanarrowbutwouldbepushedintothewound,makingiteasiertoextractthemissilebypullingontheshirt.Itisunlikely,however,thatsilkwouldhavebeengenerallyavailabletotherankandfilebeforetheconquestofnorthernChina.

The question of how widely armour was worn by Mongol soldiers has been thesubjectofconsiderablediscussion.Wecanbecertainfromarchaeologicalfindsaswellascontemporary illustrations and written accounts that some men had metal or leatherarmourforthemselvesortheirhorses,butwedonotknowhowmanyofthesearmouredmentherewereorhowtheywereorganised.Theycouldhaveformedafrontrankorranksover which their comrades would shoot, as was once widely believed, but this idea isderived from H. D. Martin’s theory that the Mongols might have adopted the samedeploymentastheJurchentroopsoftheChindynasty,andthereisnohardevidenceforthis.Nicolle andShpakovsky, in theirdiscussionof theKalkaRiver campaignof1223,arguethatJebeiandSubotei’s‘toumans’startedoffwithabouttwo-fifthsoftheirmenasarmouredswordsmenandlancers,andthat thisproportionwouldhaveincreasedas theyacquiredequipmentfromtheirdefeatedenemiesontheirrideacrossIran.However,theydonotproduceanyevidence for thisconclusion,and the two-fifthsproportionseems toderive fromMartin’s suggestion, while the idea that the number of armoured troopersmusthaveincreasedbythetimeoftheKalkabattleisapparentlybasedontheerroneousbelief,discussedabove, thatSubotei’stacticsonthatoccasionweresomethingnew.Thesameauthorsdodiscussexcavatedexamplesofarmour,buttheseareanunreliableguideto its prevalence simply because any negative archaeological evidence, for men notpossessingarmour,isbyitsnatureunavailable.

It is often argued that the prevalence of metallic protection indicated by laterillustrations would not necessarily be typical of the time of Genghis, before the great

arsenalsandworkshopsofChinaandIranhadfallenintoMongolhands.NumerousotherChinesepictures,aswellasthoseontheJapaneseMongolInvasionScroll,whichdepictseventsofthelater thirteenthcentury,showtroopersapparentlywearingonlyhelmetsforprotection,althoughbodyarmourofsomesortcouldbeconcealedunderneaththeirlongcoats.Someevidence for thewidespreaduseof armour from theverybeginningof theMongol conquests, however, comes from references in the Secret History. Jamuqa,respondingtoTemujin’spleaforhelpinrescuingBortefromtheMerkits,tellshimthathehas taken up his lance, bow and sword, and ‘put onmy leather-thonged armour’. Thereferencetoleatherthongsreferstothelacingwhichheldtheplatestogether,andifitisanythingotherthanapoeticconventionthephrasemightimplythattheplatesthemselveswerenotmadeofleather,andsowerepresumablymetallic.ExcavatedpiecesoflamellararmouroftheMongolperiodfoundintheTuvaregionaresaidtobeofhigh-qualitysteel,andCarpinidescribesmetalplatessobrightlypolishedthatanobservercouldseehisfacein them. Marco Polo mentions armour made of buffalo hide. There is also indirectevidence forarmour in the formofdescriptionsof thewoundssuffered inbattle,whichweremost commonly to the face and neck – areas usually left unprotected by armour.GenghiswashitintheneckbyanarrowinabattlewiththeTayichi’utsin1201,andthesamemisfortunebefellhissonOgodeiatQalaqaljitSands.Inthesameengagementtheiropponent Senggum was brought down by an arrow through the cheek. By contrast,woundstothetorsoseemtohaveoccurredmorefrequentlyincontextswherearmourislesslikelytohavebeenworn.ThusJamuqa’sbrotherwasshotinthebackwhilestealinghorseswith an arrowwhich broke his spine, andBelgutei received a sword cut on theshoulderduringabrawlincamp.

SmitharguesthattheMongolscouldnothavewornlargeamountsofarmourbecausetheirhorsesweretoosmalltocarrytheweight.HecalculatesthatatypicalMongolponywouldweighonlyabout600lbs,andquotesamodernruleofthumbthatananimalshouldcarrynomorethan17percentofitsownbodyweight.Thiswouldmeanthatifcarryingaman and all his equipment plus armour, a Mongol horse would have been verysignificantly overloaded. But this argument does not seem convincing in view of thecontradictoryevidenceforMongolarmour.Trooperswerenormallyaccompaniedbylargenumbersofsparehorses,someofwhichwouldhavecarriedtheheavyequipmentonthemarch,whileafreshhorsecouldhavebeenkeptinreserveforbattle.Furthermore,aswehave seen, Mongol battle tactics would not necessarily have involved a great deal ofmanoeuvring at the gallop. In fact there is some evidence that horses were not onlyexpected to carry armoured riders in battle, but may sometimes have worn armourthemselves,ascontemporaryKhitanandTibetancavalryhorsescertainlydid.

Shields are occasionallymentioned in contemporary sources.MengHung lists four

types,butoneseemsactuallytobeasortofvisorwornovertheface,andtwooftheothersareverylargeandprobablyrestrictedtousebysentriesorinsieges.Oneofthesetypesisprobably the same as the tall rectangular wicker shields shown carried by dismountedMongol troopson theMongol InvasionScroll.MengHung’s finalvariant isspecificallysaidtobeusedasaprotectionagainstarrowswhenfightingonfoot.However,illustrationsfromthefourteenthcenturyshowhorsemenfromtheGoldenHordeandIlkhanidPersia–bothMongolsuccessorstates–carryingsmallroundconvexshieldsofthetypeknowninPersia as ‘khalkha’,made ofwoven caneswith ametal boss in the centre. ThesemayalreadyhavebeeninusebytheMongolsofGenghis’day,andwouldhavebeenalightbuteffectivemeansofdefenceagainstarrows, thoughtheywereprobablynotoftenusedbycavalrymenwhilemounted, and it is difficult to seehow they couldbemanagedby anarcherwhorequiresbothhandstodrawhisbow.

Horses

EvenmoreimportanttoaMongolwarriorthanthisarmourandweaponswerehishorses.As their economywas basedmainly on grazing livestock, theMongols possessed largenumbersofhorses,whichwereaccustomedto livingoutofdoorsandfindingtheirownfood in allweathers. In the twentieth century the fitnessof theMongolianbreed for itsharshenvironmentwasstillbeingenhancedbydeliberatecrossingwithwild‘Przewalskihorses’,andthepracticewasprobablyevenmoreprevalentinearliertimes,whenthewildhorsesweremorecommon.Theresultwasananimal(variouslydescribedasahorseorapony)whichgrewathickcoattoprotectitinwinter,coulddigthroughsnowtofindgrass,and had hooves so hard that it seldom needed to be shod. War-horses were usuallygeldings,whichwere relativelydocile,andMarcoPolodescribes themasbeingaswelltrained and responsive asdogs, even allowing their riders to sleepon their backswhiletheygrazed.Mongolhorsescouldalsocovergreatdistancesathighspeed.MartinquotesDouglasCarruthersassayingthatintheearlytwentiethcenturyaMongolridingasinglepony would routinely travel 600 miles in nine days, and calculates that on a two-daymarchfromBamiyantoGhaznain1221Genghis’armycovered130miles.Aswouldbeexpectedof a stockbreedingpeople, theMongolsvalued their horseshighly and lookedafterthemwell,thoughasdiscussedabovethisneednothaveprecludedburdeningthemwithwhat bymodern standardswouldbe considered excessive loads.Theydidnot usespursbutcontrolledtheirmountswiththeaidofasmallwhip,orjustbythepressureofthelegs.AccordingtotheSecretHistory,whenGenghissentSuboteiagainsttheMerkitsin1216hegavehimdetailedinstructionsforthecareofthehorses.Healsodecreedthedeathpenaltyforanyonewhostruckahorseanddamageditseyes.MengHungsaysthatinordernottocauseinjurytheanimalswereneverriddenuntiltheywerethreeyearsold,andCarpiniaddsthatahorsewhichhadbeenriddenonedaywouldifpossibleberested

forthenextthreeorfour.

Thephenomenalenduranceoftheseanimalswasanimportantfactorinthesuccessofthe Mongol armies, but their adaptations came at a price. They were small, varyingbetweenabout twelveand thirteenhands,andProfessorJ.M.Smithhasarguedthatnotonlywere they too light to carry aheavily-armouredwarrior for longperiods, but theirsmall stature would have placed their riders at a disadvantage in hand-to-hand combatagainst a Muslim ‘mamluk’ mounted on a bigger animal. However, numerous battleaccountsshowthattheMongolswerecapableofcarryingoutdecisivechargesdespitethesmallsizeoftheirmounts.Amoreseriousprobleminthelongrun,mentionedinseveralsources,was the inability of the breed to thrive in hot climates. Juvaini says thatwhenDorbeiDoqshinwassentintoIndiainthewakeoftheBattleoftheIndusRiverin1221,hewas forced to retreat by ‘thegreat heat of the climate’.The effect on the animals isconfirmedby the traveller IbnBattuta,writing in the fourteenthcentury,whostates thatlarge herds of horses were exported to India from theMongol Khanate of the GoldenHorde,andthatwhentheyreachedthelandofSindtheherdsmenhadtocollectforageforthemasthelocalgrazingwasinsufficient;evenso,hecontinues,‘thegreaterpartofthehorsesdieorarestolen’.

Tactics

Onon, in an appendix to his edition of theSecretHistory, gives a list of sixteen battletacticsattributedtoGenghisKhan.ThesourcehecitesisamodernworkinChinese,soitisdifficulttoevaluateit,butittiesinwellwithwhatweknowfromothersources.SeveralofthetacticsmentionedareevidentlyderivedfromtheworkofMengHung.Includedinthelistarethe‘bushclump’and‘chiselattack’usedagainsttheNaimansatMountNaqu-kun. The former required the men to advance cautiously in small groups, maintainingcontact with each other but keeping a low profile; it was useful in conditions of poorvisibility, and so was undoubtedly intended to conceal either the movements or thenumbersof theMongolarmy,orboth.The ‘chiselattack’ seems todescribeexactly thesortofechelonedattackthatwehaveproposedabove–asuccessionofchargesbyuptothreewavesofcavalry,followedbyageneraladvanceoncetheenemyweredisordered.Theother tacticscompriseamixofmarchformations,battlefieldmanoeuvresandrusesdesignedtoconfusetheenemy.Outflankingmanoeuvrescouldbeeithertactical,aswhenDorbeiDoqshinsentadetachmentbyamountainpathtotaketheTumadsintherearinthecampaignof1216,orstrategic,likethe400-miledesertmarchbywhichGenghistookBokhara in 1220 (for which see Chapter 5). In the ‘crow soldiers and scattered stars’manoeuvre the men dispersed widely in small groups before a battle to avoid beingoutflanked,andtoencouragetheenemytodothesame.MengHungsaysthatathousandmencouldcoverafrontofahundred‘li’(roughlythirty-fivemiles)inthisway.Whenthe

enemy tried to regroup theMongolswould follow suit, but being allmounted andwelldrilledinsuchmanoeuvres theycoulddosomuchmorerapidly,concentratingagainstaweak point while he was still trying to gather his forces. This, says Carpini, was onereasonwhy theMongols’opponents tended tooverestimate theirnumbers.Avariantonthistacticwastoadvanceinanarcor‘bow’formation,withthewingsofthearmycurvedforwardlikethetipsofabow.Theenemywouldthenadvanceagainsttherefusedcentreand find himself encircled. Alternatively an unprepared opponent could simply besurprisedbyaforcedmarchandcaughtwhilestillinhiscamp,ashappenedtotheKeraitsin1203.

Once battle was joined, Mongol tactics would be tailored to the strengths andweaknessesoftheenemy.Ifheexposedhisflankshecouldbesurrounded.Ifhestoodinastrong defensive position he could be observed and harassed by cavalry patrols untilshortageofsuppliesforcedhimtomove,whenthemainarmywouldattack.TheMongolsmight dismount and shoot from behind the cover of their horses, concentrating enougharrowsonavulnerablepointtocreateagapintheline.MukhaliusedthistacticinChinaonseveraloccasionsinordertoconcentratethearcheryofhistroopersagainstopposinginfantry, who were too slow-moving for there to be much risk of the Mongols beingcaughtonfootbyasuddencharge.Incidentally,ProfessorSmithconsidersthatthenormalprocedurewhenshootingdismountedwas todoso froma sitting rather thana standingposition.HequotestheOghuzTurkishepic,theBookofDedeKorkut,whichdescribestheheroinePrincessSaljanasdoingjustthis.Thispositionwouldbenaturalforamanwhocustomarilyshotfromthesaddle,andwiththeshortcompositebowitwouldbeafarmorefeasible tactic thanwith aEuropean longbow. If the arrowswere laid on the ground infrontof thearcher theycouldbe takenupand shotmore rapidly than if theyhad tobedrawnfromaquiver,andasittingmanwouldalsomakeasmallertargetforanyincomingmissiles.Analternativewouldbetokneel,asTimur-i-Leng’smenaredescribedasdoing.Smithspeculatesthattheneedtoengageanopponentsittingonthegroundmightexplainthemamluktechniqueknownas‘qighaj’,whichinvolvedshootingdownwardsandtotheleftatatargetbelowtheshooter’sleftknee.

Mongol commanders could even drive herds of horses or cattle into an enemystrongpoint to cause confusion, under cover of which they would attack. Listed as aseparate tactic, but obviously complementary to several of the others, was ‘combiningswords and arrows’, first ‘softening up’ the enemy with archery before charging in toattackhimhand-to-hand.Stratagemsincludedprovokinganenemyintoarashpursuitbypretendingtoretreat,oralternativelyintimidatinghimbymakingtheMongolforceslookstrongerthantheywere.Thiscouldbedoneinvariousways;forexamplebylightinglargenumbers of extra camp fires, asGenghis did before theBattle ofMountNaqu-kun, by

sendingdetachmentstodragbranchesbehindtheirhorsesandraisedust,orbymountingnon-combatants and even straw dummies on spare horses, a tactic employed by Shigi-qutuquagainstJalalud-DinattheBattleofParvanin1221.Itseemstohavebeenstandardpractice in themedievalperiod toexaggerate thesizeofone’sownarmyin thehopeofintimidatinganopponent.Fakhr-iMudabbir,writing in theDelhiSultanate,advises that‘Although thekingor the commanderof an armymayknow thenumbersofhorse andfoot, he must say two or three times this number: for it may happen that spies andinformersmakeknowntotheenemythesizeofthearmy’.AndyetGenghis’armiesmayhave been equally easy for the uninitiated to underestimate. As we have seen theyprobablyworelessarmourthanthesoldiersofmostof thesettledempires,rodesmallerhorses, andwere generally unimpressive in appearance. The expensively-costumed andlavishly-equippedChineseandMuslimarmieswereespeciallypronetooverconfidenceinthe presence of theMongols. Ibn ‘Abd al-Rahim, for example, tells us that during hiscampaignof1277theMamlukSultanBaybarsadmittedthat‘Ihadbelievedthatif10,000horsemenofmyarmyweretomeet30,000Mongols,Iwoulddefeatthem’.ThismayhelptoexplainwhythetrickofluringapursuerintoanambushbymeansofafeignedretreatsucceededsooftenagainstopponentsasdiverseastheChinese,Khwarizmians,GeorgiansandRussians.Averysimilartactic,notspecificallymentionedbyOnon,isreferredtointheSecretHistoryas ‘adog’s fight’.Thiswas theplanput forwardbyTaiyangKhanatMount Naqu-kun (though not adopted on that occasion), and involved the entire armyretreatingbeforetheenemyuntiltheyreachedafavourableposition,thensuddenlyturningandattackingunexpectedly.Theideawasthattheadvancingenemywouldhavelosttheirorderduringthepursuit,withthoseonfasterhorsesleavingtheircomradesbehind,whiletheretreatingarmywouldbeabletoconcentrateandcollectanyreserveswhichitmighthavebehindit,thussecuringsuperiorityofnumbersforlongenoughtoturnthetables.

Attheendofabattle,iftheenemyseemedreadytofighttothedeath,theMongolswoulddeliberatelyleaveanescaperouteopeninthehopethattheywouldretirethroughitandcouldbecutdownwithimpunityastheyfled.Andfinally,oncetheenemywasontherun,hewouldbepursuedrelentlesslytoensurethathedidnotrally.ThisisconfirmedbytheaccountofCarpini:‘Ifithappensthattheenemyfightwell,theTartarsmakeawayofescape for them, then as soon as they begin to take flight and are separated from eachothertheyfalluponthemandmoreareslaughteredinflightthancouldbekilledinbattle.’However, if theMongols were defeated, they deliberately scattered in all directions tomakesuchapursuitmoredifficult.Psychologicalwarfaremustalsohavebeenimportant,andaswehaveseeninChapter2theSecretHistoryattributesGenghis’victoryover theNaimans at Mount Naqu-kun solely to the demoralising effects of Jamuqa’s stories.Enemycommandersseemtohavelosttheirnerveonotheroccasions,mostnotablyinthe

case of ShahMuhammad ofKhwarizmia, discussed in Chapter 5. Not surprisingly theseemingly irresistible progress of Genghis’ armies caused widespread panic anddemoralisation. Referring to the final campaign against Hsi Hsia, a Chinese sourcelamented:‘PeoplehideinvainamongmountainsandcavestoescapetheMongolsword…SincethebeginningoftimenobarbarianshavebeensopowerfulastheMongolsaretoday.Theydestroykingdomsasonetearsupgrass.WhydoesHeavenpermitit?’

Signals were given on the battlefield principally by large kettledrums carried onhorses or camels – Jamuqa in theSecretHistory refers to his drum ‘made of the blackbull’shide’.Standardswerealsoinusetomarktherallyingpointsforthedifferentunits,andtoaugmentthedrumsignalswhennecessary.Mongolstandardsconsistedofyaktails,varyinginnumberaccordingtotherankoftheofficerwhomtheyaccompanied,fixedtoalongpole.TheKhan’sownstandardwasbelievedtohavefallenfromheavenandtohavesupernaturalpowers,sothatabirdflyingoveritwouldfalldeadfromthesky.Itboreninewhite yak tails, and in Genghis’ time the only other man permitted to carry a similaremblemwasMukhali,whenhewas acting as theKhan’sviceroy inChina.The roleofscouts,whoskirmishedaheadofthemainarmiesandsometimesfoughtduelswiththeircounterparts in theopposingarmy, is referred toseveral times in theSecretHistory,butdespite the obvious importance of the role, there are hints that the job was unpopular.WhenOgodeiwasKhan he threatened to punish his sonGuyuk for insubordination bymaking him a scout, ‘so that he must climb city walls like mountains, until his tenfingernails drop off’. Marco Polo, however, says that no Mongol army would movewithoutprotecting its flanksand rearwith screensofmountedscouts,whoalsohad thetaskofmaintainingcontactbetweenthewidelyseparatedcolumnswhichwereemployedwhentheterrainwasfavourable.

Non-MongolTroops

AsGenghis’empireexpanded,itsarmiesincorporatedmoreandmoremenofnon-Mongolorigin, fightingeitherasmembersof the regularMongol ‘toumans’or in separateunits.TheKeraits,Merkits,Onggutsandothereastern steppe tribeswhichbecamepartof theMongol‘nation’inthefirstdecadeofthethirteenthcenturyeitherwerealreadypartofthesame military tradition – as the battle accounts in the Secret History suggest – orassimilatedtoitveryquickly.InfactbythetimeoftheMongolinvasionsofChinaallofthesecontingentswouldhavebeenindistinguishablefromeachother,fightingsidebysideinthesameunits.If thetheoryputforwardaboveiscorrect, theKhitanswhojoinedtheMongolsduringtheirwarsinnorthChinaalsofought inaverysimilarstyle,andwouldhave fitted into the Mongol tactical system with little or no retraining. Other steppepeoples,suchastheTurkomanswhofoughtinKhwarizmia,andtheBrodnikioftheDonvalley who joined Jebei and Subotei in 1223, probably fought in a skirmishing style

similartothatofthetribalTurksdiscussedabove.ThereseemtobefewifanyindicationsfromGenghis’daythatsuchauxiliariesactuallyfoughtinthelineofbattlealongsidetheMongols, and he may have felt that their assistance was unnecessary and might evenweakenthecohesionofhisforces.Afterall,healreadypossessedthebestcavalryintheworld. The loyalty of some of these tribes was also suspect. For example, Juvainidescribes how a detached force of 10,000 Turkomans, which had been sent on anindependentmissionduringtheinvasionofKhwarizmiain1219,thenmutiniedandkilleditsMongolcommander.AMongolunitunderTainalNayan,whichwasoperating in thesamearea,hadtobedivertedtohunttherebelsdown.

More significant was the role of those foreigners who could supply skills that theMongols lacked, especially in infantry fighting and siegewarfare. Later in the century,duringtheYuanperiodinChina,KubilaiKhan’sministersregardedthediversityoftroopsavailable to themasasourceofstrength,andconsciouslyselectedtheunitswhichweremostsuitedtotheterrainandclimaticconditionstobeencounteredoneachcampaign.Forexample,Chineseinfantrymadeupahighproportionofarmiesfightinginthemarshesofthe south, or those sent on seaborne expeditions to Japan and Java, while theMongolcavalrywereconcentratedonthenorthernsteppefrontier.ButallofGenghis’battlesintheopenfieldwerewonbythecavalry,andwhenfootsoldiersweredeployedagainsthim,asatHuan-erh-tsui,theyhadbeenifanythingaliabilitytotheenemy.Soitisunlikelythatheconsidered it worthwhile to develop a corps of infantry, especially as the Mongolsthemselves had proved adept at operating in difficult terrain usually thought of as thepreserveofthoseoperatingonfoot.Inhis1216campaign,forexample,DorbeiDokshinhad surprised the forest-dwelling Tumads by taking mountain paths so narrow andovergrownthathismenhadhadtocutapathfortheirhorses.Also,unlikeforexampletheHuns, whom Ammianus Marcellinus described as ‘almost glued to their horses’, theMongolswerehappytodismounttofightwhenthesituationcalledforit.

SiegeTechniques

TheonetypeofoperationforwhichtheMongolcavalrywasentirelyunsuitedwassiegewarfare. Since theMongolian tribes did not possesswalled towns themselves, the longwarsofunificationhadprovidednoexperienceinattackingthem;theyhadneverneededtodevelopthelong-rangecatapultsandotherenginesemployedinthesettledregionsofEurasia;andtheconstructionandearthmovingskillswhichweresecondnaturetofarmingpeopleswereentirelyforeigntothenomads.Notsurprisingly,thecitieswhichweretakenin Genghis’ first campaigns in China fell either to a stratagem – such as the feignedretreatswithwhichJebeiandMukhaliluredoutthegarrisonsoftheChinesefrontierforts,or, like the cities of Chung-hsing and Chung-tu, after long and tedious blockades (seeChapter4).

But by the time of theKhwarizmianwar in 1219, this situation had changed. Thegreat cities of the Khwarizmian Empire fell one after the other to Mongol armiesemploying advanced siege techniques. Juvaini tells of large-scale engineering works,including the filling-in of ditches and the erection of siege towers, and of assaultslaunchedunderthecoverofbombardmentsofstones,logsandincendiarynaphthabombshurledfromhugecatapults.Soonafterwards inChinawehearofMongolsusingsimilarmethodsagainstplaces likeK’aifeng,whichwasbesieged in1232. It seems that itwasstilltheeliteMongolsoldierswholedtheassaults,butthepreparatoryworkwasdonebyothers.InbothChinaandCentralAsiacommandersmadeahabitofroundinguptheable-bodiedmenfromonecapturedcityforuseagainstthenext–anothertacticalsoattestedfor the Khitans – but these would mostly have been untrained – and no doubtunenthusiastic – levies, useful for labouring work and as human shields, but no betterqualified than the Mongols themselves as siege engineers. What changed the Mongolarmy from a brilliant but limited cavalry force into an unstoppable juggernautwas theinflux of Chinese deserters from the Chin during the years after 1211. Just as China’scitieswerethebestfortifiedintheworld,sothemenwhosejobitwastotakethemweretheacknowledgedexpertsinsiegewarfare.WearenowherespecificallytoldthatChineseengineersaccompaniedGenghis inhis invasionof theKhwarizmianEmpire, thoughwedo know that when in 1256 his grandson Hulegu marched against the castles of theAssassins in northern Iran he was accompanied by a thousand Chinese artillerymenborrowedfromhisbrotherKubilai.Surprisingly,MartinquotestheSungwriterHsuTing,whovisitedtheMongolcourtin1235,assayingthatmostoftheMongolsiegeequipmenthadbeentakenfromtheMuslims.ThiscouldonlyhaveoccurredaftertheinvasionoftheKhwarizmian Empire, but it was true that the most advanced type of machine, thecounterweightedcatapultortrebuchet,wasunknowninChinaatthattime.Itwasoperatedbyreleasingaheavycounterweight–whichcouldbeasolidpieceofwoodoracontainerfilledwithstones–andwascapableofthrowingaheaviermissiletoalongerrangethantheolderversionsworkedby teamsofmenpullingonropes. Ithasbeenclaimedthat itwasalsomoreaccurate,asitavoidedtheproblemofhavingtoco-ordinatethemovementsofagangofmentoachieveaninstantaneousreleaseofthethrowingarm.Counterweighttrebuchets were probably invented in Europe early in the Middle Ages, and are firstrecordedinChinaatthesiegeofHsiang-yangandFanCh’engbyKubilaiKhanin1268to1273.MarcoPoloclaimstohavebeenresponsibleforthisinnovation,butChineserecordsattributeittotwoengineersfromIraq.Thereisnoreason,however,whythesemachinesshouldnothavebeenadoptedinthewestoftheMongolempireasearlyasGenghis’day.

Itwouldbeofgreat interest toknowwhether someof themostup-to-dateChineseinventionswerealsoavailabletoGenghis’armies,butdirect informationis lacking.The

world’sfirstdocumenteduseofexplosive(asopposedtomerelyincendiary)gunpowderweapons dates from 1221, when Chin forces used iron-cased bombs, thrown fromcatapults,at thesiegeof theSungcityofCh’i-chou.Tenyears lateraChin fleeton theYellowRivershotsimilarbombs,knownas‘chien-t’ien-lei’or‘heaven-shakingthunder’,ataMongol forcewhichwaspursuing italong theshore,and in1232,according to theChindynasty’sOfficialHistory, theysawextensiveuseat thesiegeofK’aifeng.OnthelatteroccasiontheMongolsweresofrightenedbythesemissilesthattheyprovidedtheirsiegeworkswithoverheadcovermadefromcowhides,butthedefenderscounteredthisbylettingthebombsdownfromthewallsonchains,thendetonatingthemdirectlyontopofthehides,‘withtheresultthatthecowhideandtheattackingsoldierswereallblowntobits, not even a trace being left behind’. In all these instances only the Chinese aredescribedaspossessingsuchmissiles,butitwouldbesurprisingif theMongolshadnotobtainedsomecapturedexamples,alongwithmenwhoknewhowtousethem.Certainlybythe1270sKubilaiKhanwasemployingnotonlyexplosivebombs,asdepictedontheJapanese‘MongolInvasionScroll’,butevenadeviceknownasa‘huop’ao’,whichmayhavebeenaprimitivehandgun.Ontheotherhandthisnewtechnologywasbynomeansdecisive, as is shown by the fact thatK’ai-feng fell to theMongols despite the ‘chien-t’ien-lei’, and Genghis and his immediate successors may have felt that it was toounpredictabletobereliedupon.ThelogisticdifficultiesoftransportinglargequantitiesofgunpowderacrossthesteppecouldalsohaveprecludeditsuseintheatresofwaroutsideChina.

TheLogisticsoftheMongolConquests

Itseems tohavebeen thepracticeof the tribalMongols to fightonlywhen theirhorseswerewell fed.TheSecretHistory tellsof theconsternationofGenghis’menwhen theylearnedofanimpendingNaimanattackwhiletheywereouthunting.‘Manyofthemsaid:“Our geldings are lean, what can we do now?”’ Clearly, horses which were in goodenough condition for the hunt were not necessarily considered fit for war. But thequantitiesofgrassneededtokeepanarmy’smounts inprimeconditionwereenormous.Thisquestionhasbeen studiedby severalmodern scholars inpursuit of a livelydebateabout the role of logistics in setting limits to theMongol conquests.Morgan has beenamongthosewhoarguethatitwasshortageofpastureratherthanthemilitaryresistanceencountered that prevented theMongols overrunningSyria, and the same argument hasbeenapplied toSubotei and Jebei’sBlackSeacampaign, and toGenghis’ownabortiveincursionintoIndia.ProfessorSmithhasproducedsomedetailedcalculationsinsupportof this thesis. Starting with an estimate for a large Mongol army of 60,000 men andallowing fivehorsesperman, itwouldhavebeennecessary to findpasture for300,000horses. This does not allow for the herds of sheep and goats that also accompanied

Mongolarmies,ofwhichthefourteenth-centuryMamluksourceal-Umarisaysthattherecould be asmany as thirty perman. Thesewould eventually be slaughtered and eatenduring the courseof a campaign,butwithout itshorses aMongol armywaseffectivelyhelpless.Smithcalculatesthateachhorsewouldhaverequiredonaverage9.33lbsofgrassaday,which– taking theproductivityofgoodCentralAsianpasture landas534lbsperacreperyear–wouldmeanthat300,000horseswouldconsumethegrassoveranareaofabouteightsquaremileseveryday.Watercouldalsobeaproblem;assumingthatahorseneedsfivegallonsaday,ofwhichhalfmightbeobtainedfromfreshgrass,thetheoretical60,000-manarmywouldconsumeat least three-quartersofamilliongallonsperday.Amajorrivercouldcopewiththisdemand,buttheflowofmostCentralAsianandMiddleEasternriversvariesdramaticallywiththeseasons,andwouldprobablyfalltoinadequatelevelsduringthesummerandautumn.OnthisbasisitwouldclearlybeimpossibleforaMongol army to remain very long in one place, even in well-watered grazing country,while the lower productivity ofmore arid regionsmight prevent campaigning by largearmiesaltogether.

It is certainly important to bear these constraints in mind when considering themovementsofMongolarmies,andespeciallythoseinexplicablewithdrawalswhichoftenconfused contemporaries. For example, the Egyptians appear to have thought thatHulegu’swithdrawal fromBaghdad toAzerbaijan in 1261was permanent, encouragingtheir puppet Caliph to risk a counter-attack, when in fact he was simply migrating insearch of grazing just as aMongolian communitywould do in peacetime.MarcoPolo,writingfortyyearslater,saysthattheMongolsintheMiddleEastwerestillfollowingthesame route, concentrating in Azerbaijan for the summer grazing, then moving to thewarmerlowlandsofIraqinwinter.Inthe1250stheArmenianKingHaithonwentsofarastoreassuretheCrusadersinPalestinethattheMongolswerenothreattothem,astheyhadonlyentered theregion insearchofgrassfor theirhorses.ButAmitai-Preisshasarguedconvincinglythattheproblemofshortageofgrazinghasbeenexaggerated.OnefactoristhattheMongolexpeditionaryforceswereoftensmallerthantheirenemiesbelieved.Wehave seen that Genghis’ entire army at its peak numbered around 129,000 men, andalthough non-Mongol auxiliaries are not included in this total, these units would notgenerally have had the great horse herds that consumed the bulk of the supplies.Mostcampaignswere probably conductedwith a fraction of this total, and evenwhere verylargearmieswererequiredtocrossunproductiveregions–asduringthecrossingof theGobiin1211–theycouldhavemovedinseparatecolumns,onlyconcentratingwhentheyreachedmorefertilecountrywhereoppositionwouldbeexpected.Thenumberofhorsesaccompanyingeachtrooperisalsouncertain,andmaywellhavevariedaccordingtothesupplysituation.OneversionofMarcoPolo’sTravelsclaimsthattherewereasmanyas

eighteenperman,butSinor favoursanaverageof threeor four.More significantly, theconqueredareascouldusuallybecountedontosupplyotherfodderthangrass.Genghis,when he entered Bokhara, scandalised the religious community by ordering thereceptaclesinthegreatmosquetobeclearedoftheirsacredbooksandfilledwithgrainforhishorses.Amitai-PreisscitestheexampleofAleppoin1281,whoseinhabitantsfledontheapproachofaMongolcolumn,and‘abandonedcrops,granariesandfoodstuffs’,andalsopointsoutthattheMongolswouldhavehadnoreservationsaboutlettingtheirbeastsgraze in standing crops, or encroach on the pastures of local nomads. The samewritergoesontoestimatethatintheearlytwentiethcenturynorthernSyriawashometoaround80,000Bedouinnomads,whichimpliesthataforceofthatsizeshouldhavebeenabletosupport itself in a similar area of rather poor pasture, at least for the duration of acampaign.

At times it may nevertheless have been necessary for Mongol armies to employemergencymeasurestosolvetheirsupplyproblems.Horseswillinfacteatawidevarietyoffoodsifnecessary,includingtreebranchesandevenmeat,andslaughteringsomeoftheremountswouldcertainlyhavebeenpreferable to seeing theentireherd starve. JohndePlanoCarpiniandMarcoPolobothreportthatthementhemselvescouldsubsistforuptotendayswithouthavingtostoptocookfood.Theysurvivedmainlyondriedmilk,whichwasmixedwithwaterandreconstitutedintoaliquidastheyrodebytheconstantmotion.They would supplement this with blood drawn from the veins of their horses, andoccasionallywithmeatboiled in the stomachof the animal it came from.SomehostilesourcesaccusedtheMongolsofresortingtoevenmoredrasticexpedients.MatthewParis,writinglongafterwardsabouttheinvasionofEuropein1241,repeatedrumoursthattheywerecannibals,whofeastedonhumancorpses‘asiftheywerebread’,andsavedthemostsucculentyoungwomenfortheirofficers.Carpinirelatesanequallyunlikelytalethatin1214,duringtheinvasionofnorthChina,Genghis’armiesweresoshortoffoodthathehad to order them to kill and eat one in every ten of their own number. Evidently theatmosphereofterrorsurroundingtheMongolswassuchthattherewerepeoplepreparedtobelievethemcapableofanything.

Asfarasothermilitarysupplieswereconcerned,wehaveevidenceforsomesortofcentralised network which could supply the troops with equipment for particularconditions likely to be encountered on campaign. For example, according to theSecretHistoryDorbeiDoqshin’smen,whohadbeenorderedtocuttheirwaythroughtheforesttosurprisetheTumadsduringthecampaignof1216,tookwiththem‘axes,adzes,saws,chiselsandothertools’.AndRashidud-DinsaysthatthemenservinginHsiHsiaintheunusually coldwinterof1225 to1226wereprovidedwith special sheepskin coats, andtheir horses with felt coverings. Unfortunately the details of the sophisticated supply

department which must have been necessary to procure such items in the necessaryquantitiesandshipthemtowheretheywereneededhavenotbeenrecorded.

GrandStrategy

Whatmightbecalledthegrandstrategyof theMongolarmieswasasadvancedas theirbattlefieldtactics;infacttheywereamongtheveryfewarmedforcesoftheperiodwhichcan be shown to have had the ability to co-ordinate themovements of separate armiesacross an extended front. The narrative of the campaigns outside Mongolia includesnumerousexamplesofoutflankingmovesbeingcarriedoutsuccessfullyoverhundredsofmiles–Genghis’attackonBokharain1220forexample–andofwidely-separatedforcescomingtogetherattimesandplacespreviouslyspecifiedintheirorders.Afavouriteploywhen advancing into a hostile country was to send a subsidiary army to operate on aroughlyparallelbut independentaxis to themainarmy, sometimesseparated from itbymany days’march, probablywith the aim of confusing the enemy about theMongols’objectiveaswellasprotectingtheflankofthemainattack.Genghis’sonswereentrustedwithsuchamissionduringthecrossingoftheGobiDesertin1211,andSuboteisimilarlysupportedJebeiinQara-Khitaiin1218.ThissortofoperationcouldonlybesuccessfuliftheMongolarmiesremainedintouchwitheachotherviaregularmessengers,travellingatgreatspeedusingrelaysofhorses,sothattheycouldconcentratequicklyifnecessarytoprevent an alert enemy from defeating them in detail. It also required precise timing.DiscussingtheexpeditionofJebeiandSuboteitotheBlackSeasteppesbetweenin1222to1223,Sinorremarksthat‘ThecoordinatedmovementsofMongoltroopsseparatedbyathousandmilescouldonlybeachievedbyrigidadherencetoatimetablewhichobligatedindividual commanders to appear at a given time and place, but which left to theirinitiativetheactionstobeundertakeninthemeantime.’

Mongol grand strategy also required detailed knowledge of the geography ofcountries where they had never previously operated, and in an age long before theappearanceofaccuratemaps.ThedetailsofhowGenghisandhiscommandersacquiredthisknowledgeareunclear,buttheymusthavereliedheavilyonthereportsoftradersandother travellers. A few of these, like the Muslim merchant Ja’afar, are named in oursources.Theimpressiongiventhereisthattheywereconsultedonanadhocbasiswhenthey happened to be available, but it seemsmore likely that many of these men werepermanentlyontheMongolpayroll.

TheMongolswereilliterateuntilthetimeofGenghis,andweknowofnoindigenousmap-making tradition among them. Joseph Needham, in Science and Civilisation inChina,referstoa‘MongolianStyle’ofcartographyinwhichnamedplaceswerelocatedrelative to each other on a rectangular grid, butmost other geographical features were

omitted.Thisstyle,however,firstappearedundertheYuandynastyinfourteenth-centuryChina, and its antecedents are obviouslyChinese. Sophisticated surveyingmethods hadbeeninuseinChinasincethethirdcenturyAD,anditislikelythatGenghis’conquestsinthatcountrywere facilitatedby theuseofChinesemaps.TheCentralAsiansteppewasunmapped,butwascrossedbyanetworkofnomadtrailsleadingbetweensourcesofwaterandpasturewhichwouldhavemadenavigationpossibleovergreatdistances,especiallywith thehelpof localguides.TheMuslimmerchants travellingon theSilkRoadwouldalsohavehadagoodknowledgeoflong-distanceroutes,andweknowthatmanyofthesemenweresympathetictotheMongols.Theclearskiesofthisaridregionmusthavemadeorientation by means of the stars fairly straightforward. There are suggestions in thesourcesthatGenghishadafairlyclearideaofwherethefurthestprovincesofhisempirelayinrelationtoeachother,eventhoughhemayneverhavevisitedthempersonally.ForexamplehesentJochitolinkupwithJebeiandSuboteinorthoftheCaspianSea,afeatureof which he must have been aware, even though Jebei had last been seen travellingsouthwest through Iran.Genghis alsoappears tohaveknown thedirection inwhich theTangutkingdomofHsiHsialaywhenhewascampedontheIndusRiveronthefrontierofIndia, as hemade enquiries aboutwhether a road existed.These considerations help toexplain howMongol armies couldmovewith such assurance across the expanseof theEurasiancontinent,thefullextentofwhichwasstillunknowntoanyofthecivilisationsonitsperiphery.

Theopengrassland,orsteppe,ofcentralMongolia.HereGenghis’people,theBorjiginMongols,followedtheclassicnomadicstockbreedinglifestyle.(Fotolia)

ThebarrenwastesoftheGobiDesert,whichliessouthofthesteppezoneandseparatesMongoliafromChina.Despitethe lack of water and pasture, Genghis’ armies successfully crossed the desert in the course of several campaigns.(Fotolia.)

TheMongolarmyowedmuchofitssuccesstotheimmenseherdsofhorseswhichweresupportedbythegrasslands,justastheirdescendantsaretoday.ThetypicalMongolponywasnottheelegantanimalrepresentedinRashidud-Din’sillustrations,butwasstockilybuilt,nomore than12or13handshigh,andgrewashaggycoat toprotect it fromthewintercold.(Fotolia)

Thesemodernstatues,outsidetheGenghisKhanMuseumintheMongoliancapital,Ulaanbaatar,showhowthebetterequippedMongolwarriorsofthethirteenthcenturymayhavelooked.(Fotolia)

TheBattle ofHuan-erhtsui in 1211, as depicted in theJamial-tawarikh ofRashid ud-Din.Thesewidely-reproducedimages are the earliest to showMongol soldiers in action, but they date from nearly a century later than Genghis’campaigns,andmaynotbeanaccurateguidetotheclothingandarmourstylesoftheearlierperiod.

Mongolcavalrypursuingaroutedenemy,alsofromRashidud-Din.

Lance-armedEgyptianMamlukspursueMongolmountedarchersinthisdepictionoftheEgyptianvictoryattheBattleofHims in1281.Twoof the latterappear tobeconductinga rearguardactionwhile theircomradesescape tosafety.Fromthefourteenth-centuryHistoryoftheTartarsbytheArmenianhistorianHaytonofCoricos.

The only near-contemporary portrait of Genghis dates from later in the thirteenth century, and is preserved in theNational Palace Museum in Taipei. It may be a somewhat idealised image, but it certainly does not depict thebloodthirstymonsterofWesternlegend.

Stages in the construction of a modern replica of a Mongolian composite bow (photos courtesy of Green ManLongbows).Thisphotographshowsthewoodencoreofthebow,withseparateplatesofhornreadytobeattached.Horn,which resists compression, is fixed to the belly, the sidewhich is nearest the shooterwhen the bow is in use,whileanimalsinew,whichtendstospringbackaftertensionlikearubberband,formstheback,facingawayfromthearcher.

Preparingthecorefortheattachmentofthe‘siha’,therigidendsectionswhichactasleverstoincreasethelengthofthedrawandimprovethe‘cast’,thespeedatwhichthebowreturnstoitsoriginalshapeonthereleaseofthestring.

Thecoreofthebowwiththesihaandcentralhandgripgluedinplace.

Thehornisstrappedtightlyinplacewhilethegluedries.

Bundlesofshreddedsinew,whichwillbesoakedinglueandappliedtothewoodencore.

Thefinishedweapon.Notethatwhenunstrungitcurvesstronglyin theoppositedirectiontotheshapeitwillassumewhendrawn.

Drawingacompositebow.UnlikethecontemporaryEnglishlongbow,theMongolweapondoesnotbendthroughoutitslength,butonlyintherelativelyshortsectionsbetweenthehandgripandthesiha.Itfeelslesssmoothtodrawthanalongbow,butthereleaseisfasterandtheinitialvelocityofthearrowgreaterforthesamedrawweight.

Anotherviewofthedraw.MedievalillustrationsshowthatMongolarchersoftendrewthestringbackmuchfurtherthanisshownhere,asfarasorevenbeyondtheear.Acompositebowwaslesslikelytobreakthanawoodenone,evenwhenoverdrawninthisway.

Avarietyofsiegetechniques,includingtheuseofheavystone-throwingengines,isillustratedinthispictureofthesiegeofBaghdad,takenfromRashidud-Din’shistory.

Mongoltents,or‘gers’,couldbetransportedwiththearmyonhugewagons,asdepictedinthisillustrationfromColonelYule’seditionofMarcoPolo’sTravels,1876.

Mongolkettledrums,usedforsignallinginbattleandcarriedonhorsesorcamels.(Yule)

ThePassofDerbentthroughtheCaucasusMountains,traversedbyJebeiandSuboteiin1222.Itisnotcertainthatthepasswasfortifiedatthisperiod,butthecrossingwasregardedatthetimeasafeatofunprecedenteddaring.(Yule)

AfortifiedpassthroughthemountainsnorthofChung-tu.AlthoughdatingfromaftertheMongolconquest,thisarchwaymaybesimilartothoseencounteredbyGenghisduringtheinvasionof1211.(Yule)

Genghis’grandsonHulegu,founderoftheIlkhaniddynasty,andhisqueenDokuzKhatun,asdepictedbyRashidud-Din.

TodayGenghisKhanisreveredasthefounderoftheMongoliannation.ThismonumentoutsideUlaabaatar,completedin2010, is said tobe theworld’s largestequestrianstatue– fittingly for themanwhoconquered theworld’sgreatestempireonhorseback.(Fotolia)

Chapter4

TheFirstCampaignsintheEast

By1209the‘moppingup’campaignsagainstGenghis’survivingopponentsinMongoliahadbeenmostlyconcluded,andtheKhanfoundhimselfincommandofalargeandbattle-hardenedarmywhichurgentlyrequiredfurtheremployment.ItshouldberememberedthattheMongoltrooperswerepaidonlyinashareofthelootfromtheircampaigns,butthatsofartheyhadbeenfightingagainstfellowsteppepeoples,whomighthaveyieldedasupplyoflivestockandcaptives,butnotofthecovetedsilks,preciousmetalsandotherproductsofsettledcivilisation.Inordertoensurehissoldiers’continuedloyaltyGenghishadlittlechoice but to embark on another war, and there cannot have been much debate aboutwhere that war should be directed. Both politically and strategically, China was theobvioustarget.Fromastrategicpointofview,theMongolswouldbefollowinginalongtraditionofincursionsbynomadarmiesfromthesteppeintotheagriculturallandsalongtheYellowRiver.Northof theriver laya long-standingecological frontier,between theregions to thesouth,whichweresufficientlywarmandwell-watered tosupport farmingandthegrowthoftowns,andthearidgrasslandsfurthernorth,fitonlyforgrazinghorses,cattle and sheep. SuccessiveChinese dynasties had attempted to fortify portions of thisfrontier, but on thewhole itwas not defensible from amilitary point of view. In someplaces – especially in the east – thereweremountain barrierswhich could channel anddivert invasions from the north, but furtherwest the valley of the upperYellowRiver,whichflowedroughlywesttoeastacrossnorthChina,providedarelativelyeasymeansofoutflanking them. Here the river formed an enormous loop to the north, enclosing anexpanseofsteppeknownastheOrdos–ineffectanadvancedgrazingbaseforanynomadarmythatcouldoccupyit,ontheexposedflankoftheChinesefront.TheapproachtotheOrdosfromthenorthwasguardedbyseveralhundredmilesofthestonydesertknownasthe Gobi, but this had never proved an insuperable obstacle to well-mounted nomadarmies accustomed to travelling long distances in arid terrain. EarlierChinese regimes,notably theCh’in andHan dynasties of the late firstmillenniumBC and the early firstmillenniumAD,hadattemptedtodenythisbasetoinvadersbyoccupyingitwithChinesemilitary-agricultural colonies, but these had never flourished for long. In fact by thebeginningofthetwelfthcenturyADtheOrdoswasnolongerinChinesehandsatall.

FormanycenturiesthebalanceofpowerbetweenChinaandsteppeshadfluctuatedinfavourofone sideor theother,but the situationhadneverbeenas encouraging for thelatter as itwas in1209.WhenGenghisKhan turnedhis attention south,whathadoncebeen a strong and united Chinese empire was divided among three mutually-hostileregimes,HsiHsia,ChinandSung,ofwhichthefirsttwo–theonesclosesttothenorthernfrontier – were not actually Chinese at all. By the time of Genghis’ rise to power the‘Altan Khans’ or ‘Golden Kings’, as the Jurchen emperors of the Chin dynasty wereknownonthesteppe,wereuniversallyhatedamongtheMongoltribes.Dissidentswithinthe empirewerewell aware of this, and after 1206Genghis began to receive a steadystreamofrefugeesfleeingfrompunishmentatthehandsoftheChin.Inthatyearhehadbeen approached by a Jurchen prince named Ta-pien who was seeking support for aplanned rebellion, but at that timeGenghis had not considered his own position strongenough. At around the same time, however, Ala-qush Tagin, the ruler of the Ongguts,made itknown thathewould join theMongols if theypassed throughhis territory.TheOngguts were former vassals of the Chin who lived along the northern frontier andcontrolled themost direct approach toChung-tu, theChin capital, and so their supportwouldbeinvaluableintheeventofaninvasion.In1206therewerealready5,000ofthemin Genghis’ army, but it was not until the pro-Mongol Ala-qush Tagin was firmly incontrolthathecouldbesureoftheloyaltyofthewholenation.Thenin1208fourChineseofficersarrivedwithvaluableintelligenceabouttheChinarmy’sdispositions,emphasisingtheweaknessoftheirformeremployersandurgingtheKhantostrikeassoonaspossible.

TheFirstHsiHsiaCampaign

InthesameyearanembassyfromtheChinalsoarrivedinGenghis’camp.ThiswasledbyYun-chi, thePrinceofWei,whowas anuncleof the reigning emperor, and its purposeseems tohavebeen todemand theresumptionof theold tributearrangementsbywhichtheMongolshadpreviouslyrecognised theChinas theiroverlords.Notsurprisingly theKhanrefused,andYun-chireturnedtoChinatoargueforanimmediatedeclarationofwar.However, theoldemperordiedat thispoint,andaccording to theYuanOfficialHistorythewarplanswereputonholdduring theensuing interregnum.Butfor thisaccidentofhistoryGenghismighthavefoundhimselfintheroleofavictimofChineseaggression,ratherthantheaggressorhimself,butbythespringof1209hehaddecidedtostrikefirst.Hisinitialtarget,however,wasnottheChinEmpirebuttheneighbouringTangutstateofHsiHsia. From amilitary point of view thiswas logical, asHsiHsiawasmore easilyaccessible, and its citieswere less formidable targets for an army still inexperienced insiege warfare. Furthermore, as explained above, it occupied a strategic position on theflank of theChin frontier. But thiswas one of the few invasions launched byGenghiswhichappearstohavebeenentirelyunprovoked.Martinsuggeststhathemayhavebeen

offendedby the failureof theTanguts toarrest Ilkha, thesonofToghrulof theKeraits,whenhefledwestwardsafterthedefeatofhispeoplein1203.TheTangutshadoncebeenallies of theKeraits, but this hardly seems a sufficient reason forwar.More likely theexposedwesterntownsofHsiHsiahadbeentraditionaltargetsforraidsbytheMongoliantribesinsearchoflivestocktoaugmenttheirherds,andGenghiswassimplyfollowingawell-travelled war trail. In fact in 1205 he had already sent two small raiding partiesagainst theTun-huangdistrict,perhapswith theaimofgathering intelligenceaswell asloot.Accordingtoonewell-knownaccount,hecapturedabordertownbydemandingcatsandswallowsastribute,thenreleasingthembackintothetownwithburningragstiedtotheir tails to set the buildings alight. However, this story derives from a seventeenth-centuryMongol chronicle, and is told of numerous conquerors in different parts of theworld. It seems safest to regard it with scepticism, especially as more contemporarysourcesdonotevenrecordthattheKhanaccompaniedthisexpeditioninperson.

But inApril 1209,Genghis enteredHsiHsia at the headof hismain army. Itmayhave seemed an easy opponent in comparison to the Chin, but the Tangut army wasneverthelessaformidableforce.Mostofourinformationonitcomesfromthemiddleoftheeleventhcentury,whenEmperorChaoYuan-haohadcommandedaforceof158,000mendrawnfromapopulationof fouror fivemillion,butMartinargues that there isnoreason tobelieve that its strengthhaddeclined since then.Certainly ithadcontinued toinflict defeats on the Sung until the 1120s, and since then had maintained Hsi Hsia’sindependence against the numerically stronger Jurchens, who paid grudging tribute tothem as ‘fiercely stubborn … and valiant in battle’. The population of Hsi Hsia wasethnicallyverymixed,anditislikelythattroopsdrawnfromthevariouspeoplesfoughtintheir own traditional styles, but the core of the army was the Tangut cavalry, whosemobilityhadbeendecisiveinthewarswiththeSung.TheTangutswereprobablyheavily-armouredlancersliketheirTibetanpredecessors,asillustratedintenth-centurypaintingsfromTun-huang,which showmenwearing long coats of lamellar armour and carryingbows and lances. They may also have been supplemented by more lightly-equippedmountedarchersdrawnfromthelocalTurkishtribes.ThecitiesalongtheSilkRoadwereinhabited bymanyUighurs andChinese, who probably fought as infantrywith spears,bows or crossbows. The Tun-huang paintings also show men using what look likeexplosive grenades and Chinese-style fire-lances, suggesting that Chinese gunpowdertechnologyhadbeenimported(orpossiblyevendevelopedindependently)fromanearlydate. The fire-lance was a primitive flame-thrower consisting essentially of a Romancandleonastick,sometimescombinedwithaspearpoint.Ithadonlyashortrangeandburned out quickly, but was useful for keeping an opponent at a distance and wasespeciallypopular insiegewarfare.SungChinesearmiescertainlyemployed fire-lances

againsttheMongols,thoughthereseemstobenorecordoftheirusebytheTangutsortheMongolsthemselves.

Martin,relyingontheHsiHsiaShuShih,hasreconstructedGenghis’routefromhisstarting point on the grazing grounds aroundAvraga inMongolia, southwest down theOnginGolRiverandacrosstheGobitotheGurbanSaikhanUlaMountains.Thesehillsformeda sort of oasis in thedesertwhere richgrass and abundantwildlifewouldhaveenabled the Mongols to rest and resupply. Then they moved southeastwards across adesolateexpanseofsanddunes,andfinallysouth,westofandparallel to thenorthwardflowingstretchoftheYellowRiver.Thetotaldistancewasabout650milesacrosslargelyuninhabited desert, but the route was probably already well known to herdsmen andtraders, and it seems to have presented few problems to the Mongol cavalry. It alsoenabledthemtoavoiddetectionbyTangutscoutsuntiltheystruckthecultivatedcountryatWu-la-hai,northwestoftheHsiHsiacapitalatChung-hsing(modernYinchuan).HereaTangutarmyof50,000menunderLiTsun-hsiangandKaoLiang-huicameouttomeettheinvaders,only tobedecisivelydefeated.ThiswasGenghis’ firstbattleagainst themainarmyofanorganisedstate,butunfortunatelywehavenodetailsoftheevents.WemightspeculatethattheTangutheavycavalry,whohaduntilthennoexperienceofthefightingqualitiesoftheMongols,launchedaheadlongcharge,andeitherrodeintoanambushorwerebrokenbyflankattacks;certainlythisiswhathappenedonotheroccasions.TheHsiHsiaShuShih saysonly thatKaoLiang-huiwascaptured,ordered tobow to theKhan,and then executedwhen he refused. TheMongols then pressed on towards theHo-lanMountains,whichranparalleltotheriverbetweenWu-la-haiandChung-hsing.

Therewasonlyoneroadthroughthemountains,andthatwasblockedbythefortofK’e-iMen,heldbyWei-mingLing-kungwithaforcesaidtohavenumbered70,000.Wei-mingdidnotwaittobebesieged,butadvancedtomeetGenghisontheedgeoftheplain.AgaintheTangutcavalrychargedandthistimetheMongolsfellback,butWei-mingdidnot follow up his success, instead returning to the fort and resuming his defensiveposition.ItislikelythattheMongolretreathadbeenanotherfeint,andtheTangutgeneralmayhaverealisedjustintimethathewasbeingledintoatrap,becausehedidnotemergefromhisdefences for another twomonths, evenwhen theMongols returnedand setupcampnearby.ThenearlyinAugustGenghisstruckhiscampandmovedoff towardsthesteppe, leaving only a small rearguard to cover his retreat. Wei-ming immediatelyadvanced with his entire force to destroy this rearguard, whereupon the main Mongolarmy,whichhaddoubledbackandwaitedinambush,envelopedhimfromallsides.Wei-mingwascapturedandhisarmyrouted.

Martin suggests that the fort at K’e-i Men must have surrendered without furtherresistance,becausethenextwehearofGenghishewasoutsidethewallsofChung-hsing.

ThedefencewasconductedbytheTangutrulerLiAn-ch’uaninperson,andthecitywasprotectednotonlybyhighwallsbutbyanetworkofirrigationcanalswhichhamperedtheMongol deployment.What ismore, at this stage theMongols didnot possess the siegetrainortheskilledChineseengineerswhichtheywerelatertousewithsucheffectagainstfortified cities. So by October, when the autumn rains began, the siege had made noprogress. Genghis then ordered hismen to build a great earth dam to divert the risingYellowRiver intothecity,butalthoughthiscausedagreatdealofdamagethedefencescontinued to hold. Itwas at this point that LiAn-ch’uan sent amessenger to theChinemperoraskingforhelp.Thenewemperorwas theformerPrinceofWei,Yun-chi,whohadledtheembassytoMongoliaduringthereignofhispredecessor,andwasnowrulingunder the thronenameofWeiShao.Despitehavingbeen the leaderof theanti-Mongolwarparty,henowthrewawayhisbestchanceofeliminating the threat.Remarking thatbothMongolsandTangutswere theenemiesof theChin,and thathewashappy to seethemdestroyeachother,herefusedtointervene.

By January 1210 the Tanguts were demoralised and their walls were in a state ofdisrepair, having probably been damaged as much by the floods as by Mongol siegeoperations. There seems to have been no remaining Hsi Hsia field army available torelieve the city, which suggests that their losses in the two frontier battles had beenextremely heavy. The defenders enjoyed a brief reprievewhen the river broke throughGenghis’ dam and flooded his camp, but were eventually forced to negotiate. Li An-ch’uan swore allegiance to the Khan, gave him one of his daughters in marriage, andhandedover an immense tribute in camels,woollen cloth, satin and trained falcons.Healso promised to supply troops for theMongol army if called upon in the future. TheSecretHistory describes how the Hsi Hsia (whom it calls Qashin) accepted that theirtroopswouldbeunabletokeepupwiththeMongolsoncampaign,butcouldservewith‘established camps and solidly built cities’, which might imply that they were mainlyvaluedfortheirskillsinlogisticsupportandsiegeengineering.GenghisthenwithdrewtoMongolia,wellsatisfiedwithhisfirstforeigncampaignofconquest.Infacttheresultsofthewarwere evenmore in his favour than he realised, because the humiliatedTangutsthendeclaredwarontheChinwhohadfailedtosupportthem.Hostilitiesbetweenthetwostatescontinuedforthenextfifteenyears,distractingtheChinfromtheirmainenemyinthenorth.

Genghis lostno time in initiating thenext campaign.Onhis return toMongoliaheencounteredanembassyfromtheChin,informinghimthatWeiShaohadbecomethenewemperor. According to protocol he was supposed to bow in the direction of the Chincapitalasa tokenofsubmission,but theYuanOfficialHistorydescribeshowinsteadhespatonthegroundandaskedwhyheshouldkowtowtosuchaweaklingasthePrinceof

Wei.Thiswasnodoubtintendedasadeclarationofwar,butthesamesourcerecordsthatWei Shao stubbornly refused to accept that Genghis would dare to challenge him. Heimprisoned one of his own officers for provoking trouble when he dared to report theMongol preparations for war, and seems to have thought that the Khan was actuallyplanning to lead a tributemission.He even hatched a plot tomurderGenghiswhenhearrivedat thecourtwithhispresents.But itwasnopeacefulembassy thatGenghiswasintendingtoleadsouth.

WarwiththeChin

Rashidud-DintellshowtheKhanclimbedthesacredmountainofBurkhanKhaldunandprayedtotheEternalHeavenforvictory,presentingthewarasrevengeforthemurderofhis predecessors Ambakai and Okin Barkhak by the Jurchens. Equally revealingly, theSecret History gives no reason for the invasion at all, no doubt assuming that to theMongolsitwasobviouslyajustcause.AndincontrasttotheuncertaintyattheChincourt,Genghisseemstohavepossesseddetailedintelligenceaboutthecapabilitiesandintentionsofhisopponent.SomeofthiscamefromdefectorsfromtheJurchenarmy,andsomefromtheOngguts,butit is theroleofMuslimmerchantslikeJa’afaringatheringintelligencefor theMongols that is constantly emphasised in our sources. ThesemenweremostlyUighurs and Sogdians, who controlled the trade along the Silk Road to the west andbetween China and the steppes to the north. It was in their interests to have the traderoutes under the control of a single power which could guarantee the security of theircaravans,andtheyseemalreadytohavedecidedtothrowintheirlotwithGenghis.

Even with these advantages, the task facing the Mongols was formidable. ThepopulationoftheChinEmpirewasassessedinacensusof1195at48,490,000,ofwhich6,158,636 belonged to the hereditary military families who supported a standing armyperhapshalfamillionstrong.Martindescribesitasnotonlythelargestarmyintheworldat that time,but‘alsothemostpowerful’.BeforetheyoverthrewtheKhitansandseizedpowerinnorthChinatheJurchenshadfoughtexclusivelyascavalry,organisedaccordingtoatraditionalsystemknownas‘meng-anmou-k’o’,or‘thousandsandhundreds’.Theirprincipalweaponwasthecompositebow,withwhichtheywerehighlyskilled;theChinfounderWan-yenAkutaissaidtohavedemonstratedhisabilitytohitatargetatarangeof320paces.Thestandardunitwasknownasthe‘kuai-tzuma’,or‘horseteam’.Thiswasformedoffiveranks,ofwhichthefirsttwoworearmourandcarriedhalberdsandlancesaswellasbows,whiletherearthreeranksweremorelightlyequippedandwouldprovidesupportbyshootingovertheheadsofthemeninfront,whilebeingthemselvesprotectedfromenemyshooting.Onetraditionstatesthattheyactuallyfoughtchainedtogether;thisis obviously unlikely as it would sacrifice the manoeuvrability which was the mainstrengthofcavalry,butitmayderivefromthefactthattheyoperatedindisciplined,close-

order formations. It is interesting that thissystemofdeploymentwas thereverseof thatused by the Jurchens’ predecessors theKhitans,who screened their heavy cavalrywithlighttroopsratherthantheotherwayaround(seepages50–3).Bythethirteenthcentury,however,theJurchensweredeclininginnumbersandbeingincreasinglysupplementedbyKhitans,Onggutsandotheralliedcavalrymen.Thearmyhadalsocometorelyheavilyonlocal Chinese troops, who served mainly as infantry. An indication of the relativeproportionsisgiveninanaccountofacampaignin1161,whenHai-lingWangdeployed120,000Jurchensand150,000ChineseforanattackontheSunginthesouth.

Evenmoreformidable thanthefieldforcesof theChinweretheirfortificationsandwalledcities.AftertheestablishmentoftheempiretheJurchenshadbecomeenthusiasticfollowersof theage-oldChinese traditionofbuildingfrontierwalls.AlthoughtheGreatWallasweknowittodayisaconstructionofthesixteenthandseventeenthcenturies,therewas in theChin period a network of rammed-earthwalls north of the capitalChung-tuextendingnearly 300miles into the steppe, and shelteredbehind a single outer rampartstretching more than 500 miles westwards from the Gulf of Po-hai. However, thiselaboratedefensivesystemseemstohavepresentednoobstacletotheinvadingMongols.Itwasrelativelyeasytooutflankfromthewest,andoursourcesgivenoindicationthatitwasevenmannedatthetimeofGenghis’campaigns.ThisfailuremayhavebeenduetothefactthatthegarrisonswereoriginallytheresponsibilityoftheOngguts,whohadnowdefected to the Mongols. The Chin walls were in any case poorly sited and not verysolidly constructed, and even at the time of their construction oneminister argued thattheywere awaste ofmoney, since theywere flattened by sand-storms as soon as theywerebuilt.Todayfewvisible tracesof themremain.Theonlyeffectiveborderdefenceswerethefortserectedtocontrolmovementthroughthemountainpasses,andasweshallseeeventhesecouldoftenbebypassed.Theempire’smaindefenceconsistedofthewallssurrounding itsgreat cities.Thesewerebuilt in the traditionalChinese styleof rammedearth,facedwherepossiblewithstone,andwereoftenonanenormousscale.ThewallsofChung-tu,forexample,weretenmilesincircumference,fortyfeethighandforty-fivefeetthick.Theywerewellprovidedwithbattlementsandwatchtowers,andprotectedbythreeconcentric water-filled moats. Such fortifications were also defended by an array ofweaponry including rope-powered catapults and heavy crossbows, and possibly evenprimitivegunpowderweapons(forwhichseethediscussioninChapter3).

ThehistoryofChinesedynastiesisoftenseenasacycleofriseanddecline,witheachregimefallingvictimtocorruptionanddissentonceitpassedthepeakofitspower.Thereareindicationsthatby1211theChinEmpirewasenteringthedownwardsphaseofsuchacycle; Martin, for example, points to official corruption, lack of confidence in thecurrency,adisaffectedlandlesspeasantry,andadisastrousalterationofthecourseofthe

YellowRiverin1194whichhadcausedwidespreaddamageandlossoflife.Nevertheless,the regimewas to show great resilience in the struggle against theMongols, and if itsarmieswereoftenoutmanoeuvred theycontinued to fightwithgreatdetermination.ThewarwithChinwastobeGenghis’greatesttest,andwouldabsorbthegreaterpartofhisarmiesuntiltheendofhislifeandbeyond.

‘IntheYearoftheSheep[1211]’,theSecretHistorytellsus,GenghisKhan‘rodeoutagainst theKitadpeople’ (i.e. theKhitans,whosenamewasstillwidelyassociatedwithNorthChina).Asinthecaseof theHsiHsiacampaignof1209thismusthaveinvolvedthecrossingofseveralhundredmilesofdesert,but theMongolaccounthasnomore tosayaboutit,implyingthatsuchmarcheswerealreadyregardedasroutine.Martinbelievedthat the advance was made in two separate columns, which set out from the KerulenValleyinMarchorApril1211,assoonasthespringgrasshadgrownenoughtosupportthehorses,andbeforetheheatofsummerhaddriedupthestreamsflowingintothedesertfromthesurroundingmountains.Genghishimself,incommandoftheArmyoftheCentre,was accompanied by the left wing army underMukhali, while the Khan’s sons Jochi,ChagataiandOgodei took the rightwingarmyona roughlyparallel route furtherwest.ReachingOnggutterritoryinMay,Genghisrestedhisanimalsoverthesummer,whiletheJurchenshurriedlymusteredtheirownforcesbehindtheYeh-luMountainstothesouth.If,as Martin believed, the right wing army under the three princes was intended as adiversion, it seems to have failed, because the Chin forces were concentrating facingGenghisaroundWu-shaPao,onthenorthernsideoftherange,intwocorpsdeployedtoblocktheonlytwopracticableroutestotheplainaroundChung-tu.Variousattemptshavebeenmadetoestimatethesizeofthearmiesfieldedinthiscampaign.MartinarguedthattheMongolsmighthavenumbered110,000altogether,70,000ofthemwithGenghisandMukhaliandtheremainderwiththeprincesinthewest.HoweverthiswasbasedpurelyonanestimateofthetotalforcesavailabletotheKhan,withadeductionof20,000or25,000left behind to protect his base in Mongolia, and the real numbers may have beenconsiderablylower.Chinesesourcesgiveimprobablyhightotalsof300,000to500,000forthe Chin, but it does seem likely that, whatever the actual figures, the Mongols wereoutnumbered.

Martinpointsoutthatalthoughthemainhorse-breedingregionoftheChinempire,insouthern Manchuria, lay on Genghis’ left flank behind the shelter of the KhinganMountains,noattemptwasmadetothreatenhimfromthatdirection.Hesuggeststhatthiswas because the Jurchens already recognised the Mongol superiority in a war ofmanoeuvreontheopensteppes,andcertainlytheyseemtohavesufferedfromadefensivementality.Theyadvancedintothemountainsintwobodies,thefirstofwhichreachedWu-shaPaoinAugustandbegantobuildfortifications.GenghissentJebeionanoutflanking

movethroughthemountainswhichtooktheChintroopsbysurpriseandscatteredthem,thenfollowedupbycapturingthesmall townsofWei-ningandFuChou.Attheformertheyencounteredanencouragingomenforthefuturewhenoneoftheofficersinchargeofthedefencedefectedbyhavinghimselfloweredoverthewallsonarope,andreturnedtopersuade his colleagues to surrender. Another defector, Ke Pao-yu, changed sides afterbeingcapturedatWu-shaPao,andprovedtobeanexpertsiegeengineerwhoseassistancewastobeinvaluableinlatercampaigns.Then,whilecampedatFuChou,Genghislearnedthat the second and larger part of the Chin army had arrived on the scene and wasfortifyingapositionnorthofthepassatHuan-erh-tsui,the‘YoungBadger’sMouth’.ThisforcewascomposedmainlyofeliteJurchenandKhitancavalry,butalsocontainedmanyChineseinfantry.Itscommander,Ke-shih-liehChih-chung,hadsofaradvancedslowlysothat thefootsoldierswouldnotbe leftbehind,rejectingtheadviceof twoofhisofficersthathe should launcha swift attackwithhis cavalry andcatch theMongolswhile theywerestilloccupiedinlootingFuChou.Hearguedinsteadthattheenemywastoostrongtoberoutedbycavalryalone,andsothesupportoftheinfantrywasessential.Ontheotherhand,healsorefusedtowaitforthereinforcementswhichwereontheirwaytojoinhimundertheJurchenprinceWan-yenHu-sha.

TheBattleofHuan-erh-tsuiandtheCollapseoftheFrontier

As the opposing armies advanced towards each other, Chih-chung made a last-ditchattempt to negotiate, sending aKhitan officer named Shih-moMing-an to askGenghiswhat grudge he bore against the Chin dynasty. One Chinese source says that this wassimplyadiversion, and that it backfiredwhenMing-andefected andgave theMongolsdetailedinformationontheChinplansandorderofbattle.AnothersaysthatGenghisdidnot trust his apparent change of sides and had him tied up, but released him after thebattle.EitherwayitwasanearlyindicationofwhatwastobecomeaseriousproblemfortheJurchens;manyof theirKhitansubjectsregardedtheMongolsnotasenemiesbutasliberators.The spotwhere the armiesmet, northofHuan-erh-tsui,wasverynear to theboundarybetweenthesettledcountryofChinaandthesteppe.WecannotbesurewhetherGenghis chose the battlefield, perhaps on the basis ofMingan’s report, but the terrainobviouslyfavouredtheMongols.IftheyweredefeatedtheywouldhaveanuninterruptedlineofretreatbacktoMongolia,whileiftheenemywasforcedbackhewouldbedrivenintoabottleneckinthepassbehindhim.Furthermore,itseemslikelythatthesitewastoonarrow for the enormous Chin army to deploy properly, as – despite Chih-chung’spreference forcombined-arms tactics–hewascaughtwithhiscavalry ina long line infront,whiletheinfantryweremasseduselesslyintherear.TheMongolsattackedatonce,probablyintheechelonedformationthattheyhadlearnedfromtheKhitans.AccordingtoMartin, citing theMeng-wuerhShih, twoChinese biographies ofMukhali state that the

generalledthefirstattackwiththeMongolleftwingarmy,chargingwithlances.Genghishimself then led the centre army into action. Martin says that ‘successive waves’ ofMongol light troopswere first sent forward to disorganise the enemywith arrows, butdoesnotquotea source for this, and thebiographieshecites imply that thechargewaslaunchedimmediatelyafterGenghisandMukhalihadobservedtheChindeployment.InanycasetheJurchencavalryweredrivenbackontheirinfantry,butinsteadofprovidingsupportthelattermerelyobstructedtheirmovements,andsoonthewholeChinarmywasin hopeless confusion. In thewords of theYuan ShengWuCh’inCheng Lu, ‘theChinsustainedaterriblereverse,menandhorsestramplingeachotherdownintheroutandthedeadbeingwithoutnumber’.Rashidud-Din,writingacenturylaterattheotherendoftheMongol empire, said that the Mongols still remembered Huanerh-tsui as among thegreatestoftheirvictories.Thisisunderstandable,foritwasthisbattlethatmadepossibletheeventualconquestofthewholeofChina.

Our sources offer varying andoften confused accounts of the aftermath, though allagree that the Chin suffered very heavy losses. The Secret History says that Genghispursuedthemastheyfledsouth,andlefttheirdead‘piledlikerottenlogs’allthewaybacktothefarsideofthemountains.Tenyearslater,whenCh’angCh’uncrossedthepass,hefound thousandsof skeletonsstillunburied.Keshih-liehChih-chungescaped, rallied thesurvivorsandapparently reacheda rendezvouswithWan-yenHu-sha,but the latter fledwith7,000pickedcavalrymenwhenheheardthenewsofthedefeat,leavingChih-chungtobe overtaken and routed again byGenghis atTing-an.TheheadlongMongol pursuitcontinued–nodoubt, asMartin says,makinguseof freshhorses–andatHui-hoPao,thirty miles from Huan-erh-tsui, Hu-sha was also caught and his bodyguard scattered,thoughhehimselfcontinuedhispanic-strickenflight.Chih-chungmadeyetanotherstand,probably on the Sang-kan River, with the aid of 3,000 reinforcements, but was againforced to flee after a day of fighting. Requisitioning horses and cash as he went, heeventuallyfoundsafety,togetherwithHu-sha,withinthewallsofChung-tu.

During the following twomonths,OctoberandNovember1211, thepasses throughthe mountains and the fortified frontier towns behind them all fell to the Mongols. ItseemstobeatthispointthatJebeiseizedtheformidablefortatChu-kungYuan–thoughtheSecretHistory,notalwaysreliableabouteventsoutsideMongolia,describestheactionasapreludetotheBattleofHuan-erh-tsui.Findingtheplacetoostrongtoassault,Jebeiadopted the strategy that Genghis had used against the Tanguts at K’e-i Men. Hepretendedtoretreat,andluredthegarrisonintopursuinghimforthirty-fivemiles.Then,near a hill called Chi-ming Shan, he turned and routed his pursuers. The continuingsuccessofthisoldtrickisrathersurprising,butthemainroleofthefrontiergarrisonswasnormallytoprotectthesurroundingcountrysidefromraids,andaggressivepursuitwasno

doubt the standard response to the appearance of what must have looked like a smallraidingparty.ThedefeatedJurchensfledbackintothefort,wheretheyspreadsuchpanicthatitscommanderevacuateditandallowedJebeitoenteritunopposed.

SodemoralisedweretheJurchensbythesereversesthattheEmperorWeiShaoevencontemplated abandoning Chung-tu, but was persuaded to stay and fight by his ownImperialGuards.However,Genghisknewthathewasnotyetstrongenoughtoattackthecity, and insteaddespatched several columns toplunder the surrounding country, takingadvantageofthetemporaryabsenceoftheenemy’sfieldarmies.AdeserternamedLiuPo-lin now appeared in the Mongol camp with a proposal for an attack on Tung Ching(formerlyknownasMukden,nowShenyang)intheJurchens’Manchurianheartland,200milestotheeast.InJanuary1212Jebeiwassenttotryandtakethecitybysurprise,butfound that thedefendershadalreadybeenalerted.Soonceagainheemployeda typicalMongol trick, and again the enemy reacted exactly as expected.Heordered hismen toretreatasifinpanic,leavingtheirbaggageandtheloottheyhadcollectedbehindintheirdeserted camp. The Mongols retired for six days’ march (by Chinese calculation, soprobably, asMartin says, based on infantry marching speed and equivalent to about ahundred miles). When their scouts reported this, the people of Tung Ching felt safeenoughtoopenthegatesandplunderthecamp.TheythenproceededtocelebratetheNewYear,leavingthegatesunmanned.ButforaMongolarmyequippedwithsufficientsparehorses,asJebei’swas,ahundredmilescouldbecoveredinaforcedmarchoftwenty-fourhours.Theyreturnedduringthenightandscatteredthecelebratingcrowds,thenrodeintothecityunopposedandlooted it.However,Jebeididnotattempt tooccupyTungChingpermanentlyatthisstage,butreturnedtolinkupwithGenghis.MeanwhiletheChinhadonce again mishandled the political situation. Suspecting the loyalty of the Khitans –manyofwhomhad fought loyally for thematHuanerh-tsui– theysent Jurchensettlersinto their Manchurian homeland to keep them under control, thus provoking the veryrevolt they feared.Genghis had already sent two emissaries to theKhitan territory, butwhilestillenroutetheymetalargeKhitanarmyunderYeh-luLiu-ke,comingtojointheMongols.

Then in February 1212 the victorious Mongols began the long march home fromChina with their loot. But this was only intended to be a temporary withdrawal, as isshown by the fact that Genghis left garrisons among the Ongguts and in a number ofborder towns including T’ien Ch’eng, which was entrusted to the defector Liu Polin.During his absence in China one Onggut faction had overthrown Ala-qush Tagin andattemptedtogoovertotheChin,butnowtherebelsfledandtheremainderofthepeoplehastily reaffirmed their loyalty. Meanwhile a Chin army had been sent to destroy theKhitan rebelYeh-luLiu-ke, butGenghis sent 3,000Mongols to reinforce his new ally,

whowasvictoriousattheBattleofTi-chiNorandsenttheenemy’scapturedbaggagetotheKhanasatokenofhisloyalty.ItisdifficulttodisagreewithMartinthatthisChinesecampaignwasGenghis’‘greatestfeatofarms’.Later,againsttheKhwarizmianEmpire,heled more troops and conquered a larger area, but there the opposition was much lessformidable. If he had indeed attempted to distract theChinwith the thrust of the rightwingarmyinthewest,hehadnotsucceeded,buthehadadaptedhisplanstothechangingsituation and taken instant advantageof thepiecemeal deployment of the enemy facinghim–anabilitywhichhewas todemonstrateagain in theKhwarizmiancampaign (seeChapter 5). By attacking without hesitation he had smashed three Chin armies insuccessionastheyarrivedatthefront,andforcedopenthefortifiedmountainbarrierthathadprotectedtheYellowRiverplain.

ClosinginonChung-tu

In the autumnGenghis returned and laid siege to the townofHsiChing.AChin armyunderAoTun-hsiangadvanced to relieve the town,but theKhanwithdrewbeforehim,luringhim intoanambush inavalleyknownasMi-kuK’ouandannihilatinghisarmy.Genghisthenreturnedtothesiege,butwasseverelywoundedbyanarrowshotfromthewall. He broke off the campaign and his army escorted him back to Mongolia torecuperate. However, he was back by September 1213, when he encountered a newly-raisedChinarmy,saidtobe100,000strong,atWei-ch’uan.AccordingtotheYuanCh’aoPiShih‘thewholearmyofChinwaspresent’,butitwasprobablyweakerincavalryandfar inferior in overall quality to the forces that had been destroyed two years earlier.Martin points out that the empire was now so short of manpower that it had beennecessarytodeclareanamnestyforallcriminalsinseveralnorthernprovinces,inthehopeofrecruitingthemintothearmy.GenghisobservedthattheenemyweredeployedacrossthevalleyatWeich’uanwithbothflanksrestingonhillyterrain,sohesentflankingforcesthroughthehillsoneitherside,whileheattackedfrontally.Hesucceeded inforcing theChinlinebacktoapointwherethevalleywaswider,allowingtheflankingdetachmentstodescendonitfrombothsides.TheChinbroke,andthechroniclesrelatetheusualstoriesofthelineofretreatlitteredwithbodies.TheSecretHistorymentionsthedestructionofanelite Jurchenunit known as the ‘Red Jackets’ or ‘RedCapes’.The fugitives fled to thegreat fortress at Chu-yung, which guarded the final mountain pass before the city ofChung-tu, now only twenty miles away. Genghis sent Jebei to take some of theneighbouring forts by surprise attack,while hebypassedChu-yungby following a pathshowntohimbythemerchantJa’afar,whohadnodoubtusedtheroutebeforeontradingmissionstoChina.

AnewChinarmyarrivedatthefrontjustintimetoseetheMongolsemergingfromthe supposedly impregnable pass, and dissolved in panic. Chu-yung was then attacked

from the rear by Jebei and Subotei, and the starving garrison surrendered.While theirfrontierarmieswerethusdisintegrating,theChinwerebeginningtotearthemselvesapart.Ke-shih-liehChih-chunghadbeentemporarilydisgracedafterhisdefeatatHuan-erh-tsui,buthad thenbeenpardonedand stationedatChung-tuwith abodyguardof5,000men.However,heseemstohavebeenblamedbyoneofthecommandersatWei-ch’uan,Wan-yenKang,forthedefeat–apparentlybecausehehadfailedtoblockoneofthemountainpasses.KangdenouncedhimtoEmperorWeiShao,soChih-chung,fearingpunishment,staged a coup, murdered both Kang and the emperor, and set himself up as regent. AJurchen prince calledUtubuwas proclaimed emperor under the throne name ofHsuanTsung, but Chih-chung began issuing his own orders without reference to him. ThusChung-tu came under the control of the man whose ineptitude had largely beenresponsible for thedanger thecitywasnow in. InNovemberChih-chung took the fieldagainst twosmallMongoldetachmentswhichapproached thecity,but theengagementsseemtohavebeeninconclusive.TheChingeneralblamedthelackofsuccessonanotherofficer,Chu-huKao-ch’i,whomheorderedtoredeemhisreputationbyleadingasuicidalattackontheMongolswithonly5,000men,threateninghimwithexecutionifhefailed.InevitablyKao-ch’iwasdefeated,soheracedbacktothecityaheadofthenewsandtookChih-chungbysurprise,killinghimwhenhetriedtoescape.Kao-ch’ithentookhisrival’ssevered head and presented it to the emperor, making a full confession. As he had nodoubtcalculatedHsuanTsungwasbynomeansdispleased,butpromotedKao-ch’itotherankofViceCommanderoftheEmpire.

‘SmokeandDrums’

MeanwhileMukhaliwasbesieging thestrongholdofChoChou,whichfellafterasiegevariouslyreportedaslastingone,twentyorfortydays.EvenmoreominousfortheChinthan this enemy success in siege warfare was the means by which it had beenaccomplished, for three native Chinese officers formerly in Chin service had joinedMukhaliwiththeirwholecommands.Itmayhavebeenthissetback,asMartinsuggests,that persuadedHsuanTsung to sue for peace.However,Genghis, realising that hewasnowinapositionofstrength,rejectedhisovertures.Leaving5,000mentoblockadethedemoralisedgarrisonofChung-tu,hedividedtherestofhisarmyintothreecolumnsandset out over the winter of 1213 to 1214 to ravage the countryside as far south as theYellow River. Numerous small and medium-sized towns were also taken, mainly byassault,using the ruthless tacticofdrivingcapturedcivilians in frontof theattackers tobuildsiegeworksandshieldtheMongoltroopsfrommissiles.Chinesesourcesclaimthatthedefendersoftenrefusedtofightforfearofkillingtheirownrelatives.ThebiographyofMukhaliintheYuanCh’aoMingCh’enShihLiaogivesavividpictureoftheterrorspreadby theMongolarmies: ‘Everywherenorthof theYellowRiver therecouldbeseendust

andsmoke’,itlaments,‘andthesoundofdrumsrosetoHeaven.’

Yeh-luLiu-ke,whosedefectionhadobviouslyprovokedthespecialhatredoftheChinemperors,was the target of twomore punitive expeditions during 1214, but hisKhitantroops crushed them both, and in the aftermath he consolidated his hold overmuch ofManchuria.By thebeginningof1214 theChin still heldonly seven townsnorthof theYellowRiver,andChung-tuwaseffectivelycutofffromresupplyorreinforcementsfromthesouth.ThisnodoubtwasGenghis’intention,becausethecapitalwasfartoostrongtobetakenbydirectassaultwiththestillrudimentarysiegetrainavailabletotheMongols.When the columns reassembled outside the city in March they did in fact make twoattemptstostormit,withtheKhan’sreluctantconsent,butweredrivenbackwithheavylosses. It is not surprising that Genghis was pessimistic about his chances of stormingChung-tu,because thiswasperhaps themost strongly-fortifiedcity in theworld. Itwassurrounded by the usual wall of rammed earth behind three concentric moats, anddefended by 900watchtowers filledwith catapults and huge crossbows.But during theprevious century the governor, Nien Han, had decided that the city was still toovulnerable,andhadorderedtheconstructionoffourhugeoutlyingforts,eachaboutamilesquare and garrisoned by 4,000men.Thesewere providedwith their own arsenals andgranariesandwereintendedtobeself-sufficient,butwereconnectedtothecityitselfbyanetworkofundergroundtunnels.ItwasfromthesefortsthattroopssalliedouttoattacktheMongols in the rearwhenever they attempted to assault themain citywalls.But if thefortificationsofthecityremainedimpregnable,themoraleofthedefenderswasshowingsignsofcrumbling. InMarchorApril1214Genghissentamessenger toproposepeaceterms. The Yuan Sheng Wu Ch’in Cheng Lu has preserved details of the subsequentdiscussion between the emperor and his generals. One of the latter suggested that theMongolsmustbesufferingfromsupplydifficulties,andthatboththemenandtheirhorseswouldnowbeweakenedbyexhaustionandsickness.TheChinshouldthereforesallyoutand give battle.On the other hand,Wan-yen Fu-hsing, the commander of the garrison,argued that their remaining troopswere toounreliable.Theyhadbeenconscripted fromdistantprovincesandtheirloyaltywasdoubtful;ifdefeatedtheywouldsimplyscatterinalldirections,whileeveniftheyweresuccessfulitwouldbeimpossibletopreventthemreturninghome,leavingthecityonceagainvulnerableoncetheMongolshadrallied.

HsuanTsung accepted this argument, and agreed to payGenghis a huge tribute inhostages,horses,goldandsilkinreturnforpeace.ItislikelythattheMongolsreallyweresufferingfromshortages,asitisatthispointthatCarpiniallegesthatGenghisorderedoneintenofhissoldierstobekilledandeatenbytherest.Itislikely,however,thatthehorseswere suffering worse than the men, because suitable pasture was scarce south of thefrontier.AChinese account states that the invaders retired as far as theChu-yungPass

wheretheyslaughteredalltheirprisoners,perhapsbecausetheywereunabletofeedthem,thoughMartin argued that theywereunlikely tohave jeopardised thepeace so soonbysuchan‘outrageouspieceofbarbarity’.InanycasetheydidnotretireasfarasMongolia,camping instead by the Dohon Nor, one of a series of lakes in what is now InnerMongolia, not far from the Chin frontier. Hsuan Tsung, no doubtwell aware that theywouldreturn,decidedtomovetheseatofgovernmenttosafetyinthesouth,andinJunesetoutwithhis court for thecityofK’aifeng, leavingChung-tuunder thecommandofWan-yenFu-hsing.Thirtymilessouthofthecity,theemperorbecameworriedabouttheloyalty of the 2,000 Khitans who formed part of his guard, and ordered them to bedeprived of their horses. Instead theymutinied and rode back toChung-tu,where theyoutmanoeuvred and defeated a Jurchen force and stole more horses, before continuingnorth to join theMongols. Learning from these defectors of the emperor’swithdrawal,Genghisseizedonthisasapretextforrenewingthewar.Hehadalsobeenannoyedbytherefusalof theChintoallowaMongolembassytotheSunginthesouthtopassthroughtheirterritory,butofcourseit isprobablethathehadintendedtoreturntoChinainanyevent,assoonashismenandhorseshadrestedandrecoveredtheirstrength.

TheCaptureofChung-tu

SoinJuly1214GenghissentanarmyunderSamukhaandShih-moMing-an to resumetheblockadeofChung-tu.Theinhabitantsbegantostarve,andinApril1215HsuanTsungsent two relief armies north, everymanofwhichwas said to havebeenburdenedwith70lbsof food inaddition to thesuppliescarried inwagons.Botharmieswerebadly ledandwereeasilydefeatedbysmallMongoldetachments,thecommanderofone,LiYing,beingcapturedwhiledrunk.AllthesuppliesfellintothehandsoftheMongols,whilethepeople of Chung-tuwere beginning to resort to cannibalism.Wanyen Fu-hsing and hiscolleagueMo-janChin-chungquarrelledaboutwhethertoescapeordiefighting,resultingintheformercommittingsuicidewhileMo-janfledtoK’aifeng,wherehewasexecutedfor treason. In June the leaderless garrison opened the gates and surrendered. ThetriumphantMongolsplunderedandset fire to thecity,partsofwhichweresaid tohaveburned for a month. Genghis had apparently not been present when the surrenderoccurred,butnowfoundhimselfmasteroftheChinimperial treasury,andofalmostthewhole of China north of the Yellow River. Considering the campaign successfullyconcluded,hereturnedtoMongolia,leavingShih-moMing-anwithamixedMongolandChinesegarrisonincommandofwhatremainedofChung-tu.MeanwhiletheChinEmpirebegan to disintegrate. Their surviving troops in northern Manchuria declaredindependence,whileinShantungontheeastcoastthepeasantry,infuriatedbyanattemptto distribute their lands to refugees from the north, rose in a revolt which lasted for adecade.IntheeasttheTangutsofHsiHsia,nowatleastnominallyvassalsoftheMongols,

launched a series of invasions which, although repulsed, continued to occupy a largeproportionoftheChinforces.

Meanwhile, a complicated series of events delivered still more of Manchuria, theoriginal homeland of both the Jurchens and theKhitans, intoMongol hands. P’u-hsienWan-nu,theChingeneralwhohadbeensenttodealwiththepro-MongolKhitanYeh-luLiuke,finallysucceededinsurprisinghisopponent’scampandtemporarilyscatteringhistroops,butWan-nuthenantagonisedtheChinemperorbyhimselfdeclaringindependenceas‘KingofTungChen’.AChinexpeditiondrovehimeast intoKorea,andLiu-ke tookadvantageofthedistractiontore-establishhisposition.However,hestillfeltvulnerabletoanotherChinattack,sohewent inperson tovisitGenghis,whodespatched twoarmies,under Mukhali and Qasar, to assist him and finally reduce Manchuria to submission.Mukhali’staskwasgreatlyaidedbythelocalKhitans,whomostlywentovertohim.Earlyin1215thecityofPeiChingwasdeliveredtohimbyaKhitannamedShi-moYesen,whoambushedandkilled the Jurchenofficer sent to takeover thegarrison,usedhiswrittenorders and his inside knowledge to impersonate the new commander himself, and thenorderedthegatestobeopened.Thegarrisoncommanderfoughtonforawhile,andthensurrendered.Mukhali intendedtoexecutehim,butShihmoYesenpersuadedhimthathehadmoretogainbyclemency,andtheprisonerwasinsteadretainedascommanderofPeiChingunderMongolrule.ThisenlightenedattitudeseemstohavepersuadedotherChinorformerChinofficerstosurrender,includingarebelnamedChangChing,whohandedoveraprovincestretchingasfareastastheGulfofP’oHai.

ChinResistance

Nevertheless despite these territorial losses the Chin regime remained surprisinglyresilient. Angrily rejecting Genghis’ demand that he renounce the title of emperor andaccept vassal status as ‘King of Honan’, Hsuan Tsung offered huge rewards for anygeneral who could defeat theMongols and re-take Chung-tu. The Khan responded bysending four columns back south to keep up the pressure. One of these, consisting of10,000 men led by Samukha, linked up with 30,000 Tangut cavalry in the west andadvanced towards Yen-an in the Ordos Steppe. It is not clear whether Samukha’ssubsequent movements had been specifically ordered by Genghis or whether he wasactingonhisowninitiative,buthenowembarkedonthemostspectacularlong-distanceraid of thewar.When he approached the fortress ofT’ungKuan on theWeiRiver thegarrison commander came out to fight, but was defeated and the fort was taken bysurprise.SamukhacontinueddowntheYellowRivereastof theOrdos loop,crossing tothesouthbankandheadingforK’aifeng,wheretheChinnowhadtheircapital.FourChinarmieswerenowinthefieldagainsthim,butheevadedthembycrossingthemountainsnear Ju Chou by rough tracks, and emerged at Hsinghua-ying, only six miles from

K’aifeng. The city was heavily fortified and Samukha had no siege train, althoughforcibly-conscriptedChineseinfantryhadnowswelledhisforceto60,000men,sohewasobligedtoturnbackwestwards,followedbytheconvergingChinarmies.AtMienChouoneofthesearmiescaughtupwithhim,butSamukhadefeateditinbattlebeforecrossingback to the north bank of theYellowRiver, now frozen, in January 1216.TheMongolcommanderthenlaidsiegetoP’ing-yang,butwasrepulsedbythegarrisonandforcedtoretire before he was trapped by the pursuing field armies. At this point the ChinproclaimedanamnestyforanyonewhohadbeenforcedtofightfortheMongols,whichresultedin13,000ofSamukha’sinfantrydeserting.ThentheTangutcontingentalsowenthome,butSamukhawasabletoextricatehisMongolswithoutfurtherlosses,eventakingthetownofHsiChingonhiswaybacktojoinGenghisontheMongoliansteppes.MartincalculatesthatinhisadvancetothevicinityofK’aifenghehadtravelled700milesinonlyfiftyorsixtydays.UnfortunatelynothingmoreisheardofSamukha,whowasclearlyoneofthemostpromisingofGenghis’generals,anditispossible,asMartinsuggests,thathediedorwaskilledsoonafterhisgreatestfeatofarms.

Manchuria was still not completely subdued. The defector Chang Ching had beenorderedbyMukhalitotakehistroopssouthtojointhewaragainsttheChinintheYellowRivervalley,buthad refused,beenarrested, andwaskilledwhile attempting to escape.His brother Chang Chih therefore raised the country in revolt. Mukhali knew that thetownswhichtherebelshadseizedwouldbeextremelyhardtoretake,soheemployedastratagemtolurethemintogivingbattleintheopenfield.Hewaiteduntilthelatesummerof 1216, when all his forces were mustered, then sent part of his army to besiege thefortressofLiu-shihShan,whileanotherdetachmentadvancedtokeepChangChih’smainarmy, based atYung-te, under observation.WhenChangChih learned that the fortwasbeing attacked by what seemed to be a small and isolated Mongol force, he sent hisnephewChangTung-p’ingtorelieveitwithanarmyof8,000cavalryand30,000infantry.ItsmovementswerereportedtoMukhali,whomadeaforcedmarchwithhismainbodytointercept it, and brought Chang Tung-p’ing to battle at Shen-shui. According to thebiographiesofMukhalicitedbyMartin,theMongolcommanderrealisedthattheenemy’sChineseinfantry–whoworenoarmour–werevulnerabletoarchery,andsoheorderedasection of his army to dismount and engage them with arrows. The remainder of theMongols, who had remainedmounted, then charged and completed the victory. ChangTung-p’ingand12,000ofhismenwerekilled.ChangChihthentookrefugeinthecityofChinChouwithhispersonalguardof12,000men,whoweredressed inblackuniformsandknownas theBlackArmy.However, he antagonisedhis ownofficers by executingtwenty of themwhom he held responsible for the defeat at Shenshui, andwas himselfmurderedinhis turn.Thesurvivingrebels thenopenedthegates toMukhali.TheBlack

Armysurrenderedenmasse,but itmusthave impressed theMongolsnevertheless,as itwasincorporatedintotheirforcesunderthecommandofShih-moYesen.ThewillingnessofGenghisandhisgeneralstoacceptthesurrenderordefectionofChinesetroopswasinsharpcontrasttotheirattitudesinothertheatres,whereturncoatswereseldomtrustedandunitswhichsurrenderedwerefrequentlymassacred.TheynodoubtacceptedthenecessityofemployinglocalalliesiftheywereevertosubdueacountryaslargeandpopulousasChina,anditislikelythatevenatthisearlystagetheirarmiesincludedasmanyChinese,KhitansandotherauxiliariesasMongols.

Earlyin1217GenghisappointedMukhalitotakeoverallcommandofoperationsinChina,whichnowmainlytooktheformofsiegesofisolatedChingarrisonsnorthoftheYellowRiver,ratherthanthesweepingstrategicmanoeuvresoftheprevioussixyears.InthefollowingyeartheKhanhimselfreturnedbrieflytoChinawhentheHsiHsiarulerLiTsun-hsiang, no doubt discouraged by the losses incurred in his campaigns against theChin, refused toprovidefurther troops.GenghisarrivedoutsideChung-hsing inJanuaryor February 1218, andLi quickly saw the error of hisways. In exchange for peace heagreedtorenewhispledgeofallegiance,butassoonastheMongolsretiredhisgeneralsagainforcedhimtochangehismind,sendinganinsultingmessagetotheeffectthatiftheKhancouldnotdealwithhisenemieswithoutTanguthelp,hewasnotaspowerfulashepretendedtobe.Genghiswasbynowtoodeeplyinvolvedineventsinthewesttobeabletopunishhisvassal’sinsolenceatonce,soHsiHsiaenjoyedafewyearsofrespitebeforetheinevitableretaliation.Furthereast,however,thewaragainsttheChincontinued,withtheTangutsalternatingbetweensupportfortheMongolsandvariousdegreesofdefiance.

InJanuary1218GenghishadsentYeh-luLiu-ke to finishoff the lastof theKhitanrebelswhohadtakenrefugeinKorea.BythistimehisoldenemyP’u-hsienWan-nuwasfightingonthesideoftheMongols,andcontributedhisJurchentroopstotheexpedition.ThiscampaignledtothesubmissionofthekingoftheKoryodynasty,formerlyavassaloftheChin,whocooperatedwith theMongols in thecaptureofKang-dong,where50,000rebelswerereportedlytakenprisoner.Liu-ke,presumablywiththeapprovaloftheKhan,showed unexpected leniency on this occasion, merely executing a hundred of theringleaders and deporting the rest. P’u-hsien Wan-nu was captured in 1233 anddecapitated,hisdeathfinallybringingpeacetoManchuria.TheKoreansagreedtopayatributewhich included,apart fromcotton,gauzeandsilk,100,000largesheetsofpaper.Yeh-luLiu-kethenreturnedtoChina,but leftbehindfortyMongolswith instructions tolearn the Korean language. This was typical of the thoroughness of the Mongolintelligencesystem,andsuggeststhatGenghisanticipatedhavingtoreturnatsometimeinthefuturetoconsolidatehisauthority.Infactthiswasnottohappenuntilafterhisdeath.Wan-nuchanged sides again afterMukhali’s death in1223andmanaged toholdout in

easternManchuriauntil1231,whenthenewKhan,Genghis’sonOgodei,determinedtosuppress him once and for all.He requested help from theKoryo king,who – like theTangutsin1218–wasunwiseenoughtorefuse.OgodeithereforesentanarmytoinvadeKorea,beginningan intermittent conflict that lasted for fourdecades.The first invasionwas repulsed, after a hard-fought siege at Kuju, when theMongol general Sartaq waskilledwhileattackinganotherdefensiveline.Theinvadersreturnedin1235,butalthoughtheKoreanswere repeatedlybeaten in the field thewar lasteduntil1273,prolongedbytheirskillatdefendingtheirfortifiedtownsandoffshoreislands,andbyguerrillawarfareinthemountains.

Chapter5

WarintheWest

TheConquestofQara-Khitai

Genghis’unificationofMongoliain1206hadbroughthimintocontactwiththekingdomof Qara-Khitai, a Khitan successor state which had been established west of the AltaiMountainsafter theJurchenconquestofnorthChina in1125. Ithadbeen foundedbyaprinceoftheLiaoroyalhousenamedYeh-luTa-shih,whomanagedtoleadaKhitanarmyacrossMongoliaanddefeat theSeljuqandQarakhanidTurkswhocontrolled the regionbetweentheTienShanMountainsinthesouthandLakeBalkhashinthenorth,inwhatisnoweasternKazakhstan.EventuallytheQara-Khitairulers,whocametobeknownbythegrandiosetitleof‘Gur-khans’or‘UniversalRulers’,extendedtheirpowerasfarsouthastheSilkRoadcitiesofKhotanandKashgar, in theTarimBasinsouthof theTienShan,though their capital remained atBalasaghun, on thenorth sideof the range.TheywereBuddhists,whichmadetheirruleunpopularwiththeMuslimmajorityintheregion,andsotheirmilitarypowerremainedbasedonthedwindlingdescendantsoftheKhitantroopswhohadaccompaniedYeh-luTa-shih.FurtherweakenedbywarswiththeirKhwarizmianandGhuridneighboursinthefirstdecadeofthethirteenthcentury,theQara-Khitaiwereprepared towelcomewhatat first seemed likea timely reinforcement from theeast.AsrelatedinChapter2,Kuchluq,thesonoftheNaimanTayangKhan,hadescapedfromthedisasterwhichhehadhelpedtobringonhispeoplein1205,andhadtakenrefugebeyondthe Altai Mountains in the west. In 1208, following another defeat by a Mongolexpedition,hesoughtrefugewiththereigningGur-khan,Chiluku.

Kuchluq, like many of the Naimans, was a Nestorian Christian, but the Gur-khanprobably thought of him as a useful ally against the Muslims, so he gave him hisdaughter’shandinmarriageandallowedhimtoorganisetheNaimanandMerkitrefugeesin the country, numbering around 8,000 fighting men, into a private army. In 1209Barchuk,the‘Idi-kut’orruleroftheUighurTurksintheTarimBasin,whohaduntilthenbeen a vassal of Qara-Khitai, revolted and transferred his allegiance voluntarily toGenghisKhan.AtthesametimewarbrokeoutbetweenChilukuandShahMuhammadofKhwarizmia, his neighbour to thewest.While dealingwith these threats, theGur-khanlearned thatKuchluqhad takenadvantageof thechaos to loot the imperial treasury.He

returnedanddefeatedtherebelliousNaimansontheRiverChinbujenearBalasaghun,butwas himself defeated by aKhwarizmian armybefore he had a chance to followup hisvictory.Whatwasworse, theGur-khan’sown troopshadkept for themselves thebootywhich they had taken from theNaimans at theChinbuje,which comprisedmost of theimperial treasure.WhenChilukuorderedthemtogiveitupsothathecouldcontinuetofinance thewar, theymutiniedandhandedhimover toKuchluq,whohadby thenbeenallowed to rally his troops.Kuchluq treated his father-in-lawwith outward respect, butfrom now on acted as if he himself was the rightful ruler of Qara-Khitai, although inpractisethismeantlittleasthestatedescendedintochaos.HeprovedevenlesstolerantofIslam than his predecessor, and is accused by Juvaini and otherMuslim chroniclers ofnumerousatrocities,includingthecrucifixionoftheImamofKhotan.

No doubt Genghis would eventually have sought the final destruction of his oldenemy,buttheimmediatecauseofwarwasapleafromSugnaqTegin,thesonofBuzar,therulerofthetownofAlmaligh,eastofBalasaghun.BuzarhadbeenarrestedandheldcaptivebyKuchluq,andhissonbesiegedinthetown.HeappealedtoGenghisforhelp,andintheearlysummerof1218Jebeiwassentinresponsewithanarmyof20,000men.AtthesametimeanotherarmyunderSuboteitookamorenortherlyroute,passingsouthof Lake Balkhash, in order to protect Jebei’s flank from any hostile move by theKhwarizmiansortheTurkishtribesofthesteppes.JebeicrossedtheAltaiMountainsandmarched to relieve Almaligh, being joined on the way by a contingent of Uighurs.Kuchluqretiredbeforehim, then tried tomakeabriefstandoutsideBalasaghun,buthemusthaverealisedthathissubjectswerenotrallyingtohissupport,especiallyafterJebeiissuedaproclamationpromisingfullreligioustoleration.Balasaghunopeneditsgates totheMongols,andKuchluqfledsouthovertheTienShanMountainswithJebeiinpursuit,chasinghim,asJuvainisays,‘likeamaddog’.EverywheretheMongolsfoundthemselvesin the unfamiliar position of being welcomed as liberators. Kuchluq sought refuge inKashgar,but the inhabitants refused to lethim in,and insteadsurrendered toJebei.ThefugitivewasfinallycorneredontheremoteBadakhshanPlateauinthePamirMountains,whereabandofhunterstrappedhimandhandedhimovertotheMongols.JebeireturnedintriumphwithKuchluq’sseveredhead,thesightofwhichwasreceivedwithjoybyhisformersubjects.HisformerNaimanandMerkitfollowersdispersedinalldirections,someofthemevenfindingrefugewiththedistantKipchaqtribesoftheBlackSeasteppe,wheretheywouldencounterJebeiagainfouryearslater.

TheKhwarizmianWar

Of all Genghis’ wars, the best known in the west is the invasion of the KhwarizmianEmpire,whichbegansoonafter theconquestofQara-Khitai, in1219.Infouryears thiscampaignutterlydestroyedwhathadbeenthegreatestMuslimpowerinCentralAsiaand

took theMongolarmies to thewesternperimeterof thecontinent,openingupanentirenewworldofwhichtheyhadpreviouslybeenunaware.Notonlydoesthewarmarkthetransition of Genghis’ empire from an essentially East Asian to a global power, but itinvolved a catastrophe for the settled peoples of the region – those whom the SecretHistorycallstheSarta’ul–fromwhichtheyappearnevertohaverecovered.Andyetthisepic undertaking appeared to the Mongols themselves as of limited significance. TheSecretHistory,forexample,hasverylittletosayaboutit,regardingitasnomorethananappendixtotherealstory,ofGenghis’risetopowerinMongoliaandhisunificationofthesteppetribes.Fromamilitaryperspectiveatleast,thereisnodoubtthattheMongolswereright.

OnpapertheKhwarizmianEmpirewasindeedaformidableopponent,butitsufferedfromanumberoffundamentalweaknesses.Itwasanewcreation,stillruledin1219bythemanwhohadeffectivelyfoundedit, theKhwarizmShahAlaud-DinMuhammadII.HehadoriginallybeenavassalofQara-Khitai,butasthepowerofthelatterfadedhehademergedvictoriousfromalongthree-waystruggleinvolvinghisformeroverlordsinQara-KhitaiandtheGhuridSultansofAfghanistan.Thisculminatedin1215withtheoverthrowof the Ghurids, many of whom took refuge in their possessions in India, leavingMuhammad in control of theAfghanplateau.This region now formed the southeasternsection of what was in effect a conglomeration of four separate and tenuously linkedterritories. North of the Afghan mountains, in the region known as Sogdia (now inUzbekistan),werethegreatSilkRoadcitiesofSamarkandandBokhara,dominatingthetrade routes between China and the Mediterranean. It was originally at Bokhara thatMuhammad established his capital. From Sogdia two rivers flowed northwestwardsthroughthedesertintotheAralSea.ThesouthernmostofthesewastheAmuDarya,theancientOxus,whoseupper course flowed through thecountryknownasKhurasan, andwhosefertilelowerreachesformedKhwarizmiaproper.Some300milestothenortheast,androughlyparallel,flowedtheSyrDarya,whichwaseffectivelythefrontierbetweenthesettledKhwarizmianlandsandthesteppeswhichhadbeencontrolledbyQara-Khitai.Astrategicweaknessofthisfrontierwasthatmostofthefortifiedtownswereonthenorthbankoftheriver,andsowereunprotectedagainstanattackfromthatdirection.Bothrivervalleyswereirrigatedanddenselyinhabited,butbetweenthemlayanexpanseofscrub-covereddesertknown inTurkishas theKyzylKumor ‘RedSands’,whichmadedirectmovementbetweenthemdifficult.Thecommunicationshuboftheempirewasthereforethe territoryknownasZarafshan,betweenSamarkandandBokhara.Zarafshanhadbeenthe site of conflict between Central and East Asian armies before, notably under theChineseT’ang dynasty in the eighth centuryAD,but its eastern approaches had alwaysbeenprotectedbytheformidablebarrierof thePamirMountains.This time, though, the

threatcamenotfromtheeastbutfromthenortheast,andifaninvadercouldcrosstheSyrDaryaandoperate in thearidcountrybeyond,hewouldfind the left flankofZarafshancompletelyopen.

Muhammad’sempirewasvulnerablenotonlygeographically,butalsopolitically.AlargepartofthearmywhichhadbroughthimtopowerwasmadeupofmercenariesfromtheQangli tribe, aTurkish-speaking steppepeople related to theKipchaqsof theBlackSea,buttheirloyaltywasalreadysuspect.InfacttheShah’smother,TerkenKhatun,wasaQangliprincesswhoseemstohavecontrolledKhwarizmiaproperasapersonalfief,andhad alienated many of the local aristocracy. When the Mongols captured the city ofGurganjontheOxus, theyfoundtheprisonfullofKhwarizmiannoblesincarceratedfortheiroppositiontoherrule.ThroughouttheempireTurksandPersianswereonbadterms,a situationexacerbatedby theShah’s religiouspolicy.Hisattempts toextendhispowerintoIraqhadbeenopposedbytheCaliphal-NasirinBaghdad,whowastheheadoftheorthodox Sunni Muslim community. To counter the Caliph’s influence Muhammadattempted toconciliate thePersianShi’ites,but thisonly furtherupset theSunnis in therestofhisempire.

The Khwarizmian army was said to number as many as 400,000 men. Its mainstrikingforceconsistedofmercenary‘ghulam’heavycavalry,armedinTurkish‘mamluk’stylewithswords, lances,macesandcompositebowsofsimilardesigntothoseusedbytheMongols.Troopsof this typeservedinmostMiddleEasternMuslimarmies,but theKhwarizmiansseemtohavebeenmoreheavilyarmouredthantheirneighbours,andalsohadahigherproportionofmenridingarmouredhorses.Therewerealsolightermountedarcherssuppliedby theQanglisandotherTurkish tribes,aswellas largecontingentsofinfantry recruited from the former Ghurid realm. An unusual tactic recorded for theGhuridswastheuseofasortofmoveablepavisecalleda‘karwah’madeofoxhidestuffedwithcotton,whichcouldberolledinfrontoftheinfantrytoprotectthemfromarrows.Anumberoftheseitemscouldalsobeformedintoatemporarybarricadeonthebattlefieldtosurroundanopponentorobstructcavalrycharges.The‘karwah’wouldseemtobeaneffectivecountertomanyofthetacticsusedbytheMongols,butthereisnorecordthatitwasactuallyusedagainstthemduringtheKhwarizmiancampaign.

ThefirstencountersbetweentheMongolandKhwarizmianEmpireshadinfacttakenplaceasearlyas1216.JuzjanisaysthataroundthattimeMuhammadsentanembassytoChinaunderanofficialnamedBahaad-DinRazi.Althoughostensiblyatrademission,itsrealpurposewastoinvestigatearumourthatGenghishadsucceededincapturingChung-tu.Thewallsofthecitywereregardedatthetimeasthemostformidableintheworld,andtheShahwasnaturallyanxioustoknowwhetheritwastruethatanewpowerhadarisencapableofovercomingsuchanobstacle.Theambassadorshadconfirmedhisworstfears.

Not only had Chung-tu fallen, but it had been the scene of terrible destruction. Theyreportedthattheyhadwalkedfordaysovergroundsaturatedwiththefatfromthousandsofdecomposedhumancorpses,andoutsidethewallstheyhadseenahugepileofboneswhichwasallthatremainedof60,000youngwomen,whohadthrownthemselvestotheirdeathsratherthanbeviolatedbytheinvaders.WhetherornotthiswaswhatBahaad-DinRazi actually told the Shah, this account is clearly exaggerated, but Juzjani, who wasserving in the Khwarizmian army at the time, may have recorded a story which waswidely circulated. More encouragingly, the envoy added that he had been granted anaudiencewithGenghis,whofarfrombeinghostilehadexpressedadesireforfriendshipandtraderelationswithMuhammad’sempire.TheKhanconsideredhimself theruleroftheEast,headded,andwashappytorecognisetheShahastheruleroftheWest.

Itwasprobablyshortlyafter thisexchange that thefirstarmedclash tookplace.AsdescribedinChapter2,in1216JochiandSuboteihadbeensenttohuntdowntheMerkitsledbyQultuqanMergen,andhaddestroyedtheminabattleinthevicinityoftheQailiandQaimichRivers.BychanceShahMuhammadwasalso in thearea,having ledanarmy,allegedly of 60,000men, to punish a dissidentQangli chief.The subsequent events arerelatedbyJuvaini.TheShaharrivedonthefieldofthebattlebetweentheMongolsandtheMerkitssoonafter ithadbeenconcluded,andlearnedfromawoundedsurvivorthat theMongol army was still nearby. He followed its trail, and overtook it early the nextmorning.JochiexplainedthathehadbeensentonlyagainsttheMerkitsandhadnowishtofighttheKhwarizmians,butMuhammadrepliedthatallunbelieverswerehisenemies,anddeployedforbattle.Bothsidesthenattacked,andtherightwingofeachdrovebacktheenemyopposite.TheMongolsthenchargedinthecentre,nearlycapturingtheShah,who was only saved by the intervention of his son Jalal ud-Din, commanding thevictorious rightwing. It seems that at somepoint Jochiwas also indanger, asGenghislaterrewardedYeh-luHsieh-he,aKhitanrecruitservingintheMongolarmy,forsavinghis son’s life. The battle, however, was a draw, and as night approached both armieswithdrew to their camps.Muhammadwasprepared to renew the fighton the followingday,buthefoundthatduringthenighttheMongolshadretired,leavingtheircampfiresburning to deceive the enemy. In doing so Jochi was only obeying his orders and notnecessarilyacknowledgingdefeat,anditseemsthattheShahwaswellawareofthepoorperformanceofhisarmyagainstanopponentathirdofitssize.InthewordsofNasawi,‘Afear of these infidelswas planted in the heart of the Sultan, and an estimation of theircourage;ifanyonespokeofthembeforehim,hesaidthathehadneverseenmenasdaringnorassteadfastinthethroesofbattle,orasskilledingivingblowswiththepointandedgeofthesword.’

So by the time the firstMongol embassy arrived in Samarkand early in 1218, the

Shahhadalreadyhadtwoexperiencesofhisnewneighboursandtheirfightingabilities,neitherofwhichcanhaveencouragedhimtothinkthathecouldeasilydefeatthem.Thismakeshissubsequentconductevenhardertoexplain.Manywritershaveplacedtheblamefor the disaster which was now to befall his empire on the character of Muhammadhimself.‘No-onehasagoodwordtosayforthisappallingcreature’saysJohnMan,‘…adisaster inwaiting.’ InDenisSinor’sview theShah’s ‘arrogant folly…wasbackedbyneither statesmanship nor by adequate military abilities’. Juvaini describes him as adrunkard,‘satisfyinghisdesiresinthecompanyoffairsongstressesandinthecontinualdrinkingofpurplewine’,andelsewhereasacting‘withoutthinkingorreflecting’.ButtheShahhadpreviouslyactedwithconsiderableenergyinhiswarswithQara-KhitaiandtheGhurids,and it ishard toaccept thatamanso lacking incourageand judgementcouldever have founded an empire, however short-lived. Perhaps the most charitableinterpretation is that he was attempting the impossible task of pleasing all the variousfactions among his subjects. He might have turned increasingly to alcohol and self-indulgence as an antidote to the stress this caused, so that eventually hismental healthgavewayunderthestrain.

ThefirstmessengertoarrivefromGenghiswasaMuslimmerchantnamedMahmudAliKhwajah,whopresentedextravagantgifts,includingalumpofgoldfromChinasaidtohavebeenthesizeofacamel’shump.Alongwiththese,accordingtoNasawi’saccount,came a message from the Khan, subtly drawing attention to the Mongol victories, ofwhich theShahmust have heard, but assuring him thatGenghis regarded him as ‘on alevel with the dearest of his sons’.Muhammad took offence at this, believing that theword ‘son’ impliedvassal status, and interrogatedMahmud, askingonceagain if itwasreallytruethattheMongolshadtakenChung-tufromtheChin.Theenvoyrepliedthatitwastrue,butattemptedtocalmtheShahbyaddingthatGenghis’armieswereinnowaytheequalof thoseof theKhwarizmianEmpire.Therehasbeenmuch speculationaboutwhetherGenghisintendedtoprovokeawarbyusingdeliberatelyoffensivelanguage,butthis isunlikely.Foronething,Juvainidoesnotrecordthisconversation,whichsuggeststhatitwasnotpublicknowledgeatthetimehewrote.Ifithadbeengenuinelyoffensive,Muhammadwouldsurelyhavepublicisedittojustifyhisresponse.InanycasethissortofterminologywasfairlyroutineincommunicationsbetweenAsianmonarchs,allofwhomwere obliged to tolerate their neighbours’ use of terms like ‘Gur-khan’, which impliedsomesortofauthorityoverthelandsbeyondtheirborders.

Soon after the return ofMahmud’s embassy, however, the promised trade caravanfromMongoliaarrivedatthebordertownofOtrarontheSyrDaryaRiver.Itconsistedof500camelsladenwithsilk,fur,gold,silverandotherluxurygoods,andwasaccompaniedby a hundred Mongols and 450 merchants, all of whom, Juvaini emphasises, were

Muslims.ButinsteadofsendingthistreasureontohismasterinBokhara,thegovernorofOtrar, Khadir Khan, seized it for himself and arrested, and later murdered, the escort.(KhadirKhanisinfactnotanamebutatitle,andmeans‘GreatLord’.Somesourcesrefertohimas ‘Inalchik’, aderisivenicknamemeaning ‘LittleLord’,whichwaspresumablygiven to him by his enemies.) Only one camel driver escaped to take the news of themassacrebacktoGenghis.JuvainisaysthatKhadirwasactinginpursuitofaprivatefeud,butthatthedeedwassanctionedinadvancebytheShah.InNasawi’sversionthegovernorinformedMuhammadthat themerchantswerespies,andonlythenreceivedtheordertoexecutethem.TheShahmaywellhavebeenimplicatedinthecrime,butinanycasehewasunwillingorunabletopunishKhadir,whohadthesupportoftheQanglielementinthearmy.Sowhenanotherembassyarrived fromGenghisdemanding that thegovernorshouldbehandedovertohim,heexecutedtheMuslimwholeditasatraitor,andsenthisMongolcompanionshomewiththeirheadsshaved.

TheInvasion

Genghisobviouslycouldnotoverlooksuchaninsult,andimmediatelymadepreparationsforwar.Hewastoleadthearmyinperson,leavingaffairsinChinaunderthecontrolofhis trusted general Mukhali, and Mongolia itself in the hands of his younger brotherTemuge.JuvainisaysthattheKhanmadenosecretofhisplans,andevensentmessengerstoMuhammadtowarnhimthathewascoming,sodeterminedwashetobeseentohavejustice on his side. TheMongol army assembled on the IrtyshRiver in the summer of1219,andintheautumncrossedtheAltaiMountainsandadvancedacrossthesteppesouthofLakeBalkhash, formerly part of the newly subjugated realm ofQara-Khitai.On theway Genghis was joined by a number of allied contingents: 10,000 Uighurs, mainlyinfantry,under theIdi-qutBarchuk,6,000QarluqTurks ledbytheirKhanArslan,andacontingentofwhatJuvainicalls‘veteranwarriors’drawnfromtheMuslimpopulationofQara-Khitai,underSignaqTeginofAlmaliq.Noneofoursourcesgiveplausible figuresfortheoverallstrengthofthearmy.Martinsuggestsatotalofaround150,000,butithasbeenargued that therewereonly70,000or80,000Mongol troops in the empire at thattime, and that many of these were deployed in China or in reserve in Mongolia. AsGenghis would hardly have taken the risk of forming an army in which the foreignauxiliariesgreatlyoutnumberedtheMongols,hecannothavehadmanymorethan50,000menavailable for thewesterncampaign. Juvainidescribesmanyof thegarrisonsof theindividualKhwarizmiancitiesasbeinglargerthanthis.Soalthoughnoprecisefiguresareavailableforeitherside,itisreasonabletoconcludethattheKhwarizmianforcesgreatlyoutnumbered the invaders. The Shah’s obvious strategy would therefore have been toconcentrate his troops and attack the Mongols as they approached his frontier, andGenghisprobablyexpectedhimtodothis.Ananalysisofthesituationpublishedin1933

by Squadron Leader C. C. Walker, and discussed by Martin, remains valid in manyrespects today. Walker pointed out that the line of the Syr Darya was strategicallyindefensible,butthatitmighthavebeenpossible,byadvancingalongthemainroutefromSamarkand, to trap theMongols between amobile army and the garrison of Otrar. Tocounter this threatGenghisdispersedhis forces, sendingChagatai andOgodei to attackOtrardirectly,while Jochimoveddown the rivernorthwestwards towards theAralSea,andadetachmentof5,000menthreatenedFanakat,wheretheroadeastfromSamarkandcrossedtheSyrDarya.MeanwhiletheKhanhimselfremainedoutonthesteppewiththemain army. The small Fanakat force was therefore the bait which would first lureMuhammad across the river, then fall back to Otrar. The Shah would believe that byadvancingonthetownfromthesoutheasthehadoutmanoeuvredtheMongolsandtrappedtheirmainarmy,atwhichpointGenghis,sofarundetected,woulddescendonhisrearandsurround him in his turn. If his analysis is correct it well illustrates the sophisticatedplanningofwhichGenghis’armieswerecapable,buttheplanfailedforthesimplereasonthatMuhammadwasafraidtotakethebait.

Hisdoubtsabouttheallegianceofmanyofhissubjectshelptoexplainwhyhefailedtoconcentratehisforcesandtaketheoffensive.JuvainisaysthathewasadvisedtodothisassoonasnewsoftheMongolinvasionarrived,buthewasnodoubtapprehensivethathispredominantlyQangliTurkishandSunniarmymightfirstdecidetodisposeofhimbeforeconfronting the invaders. Instead he dispersed his army to reinforce the garrisons atSamarkand,Bokhara,andthetownsalongbothriverlines,thuspermanentlysurrenderingtheinitiative.Againstanenemywhocouldbothmanoeuvreinthedesertandtakefortifiedcities, this deploymentwas disastrous.Of course, armieswith this dual capabilitywereexceptional,buttheMongolspossesseditandby1219Muhammadmusthaveknownthis.And although he was an experienced commander with a record of success on thebattlefield,henowcompoundedhisproblemsbylosinghisnervecompletely.

IfGenghis’originalplanhadbeenthwartedassuggested,heshowedhisversatilityassoonasthisbecameclearbyadoptinganewone,justashehadinChinain1211.ChagataiandOgodeiwerelefttobesiegeOtrar,whereKhadirKhan,nodoubtawarethathewouldreceivenomercy, resisted for fivemonths.Ourmainsource for theseevents, as for theKhwarizmianwar in general, is Juvaini. He says that the defenders ofOtrar numbered60,000, including both cavalry and footsoldiers – the former probably used for sortiesagainsttheMongolsbeyondthewalls,astheirmobilitywouldhavebeenlittleusebehindfortifications.TheMongolcommandersmayhaveleda‘touman’of10,000meneach,soifJuvaini’sfiguresareevenapproximatelycorrect thedefendersoutnumberedthem,buttheyseemtohavemadenoattempttoengagetheminapitchedbattle.AfterthesiegehadbeeninprogressforsometimeKhadir’ssecond-in-command,Qaracha,surrenderedwith

most of theQangli troops. Itmay have been the fear of just such a defection that hadprevented Khadir from taking the initiative, but the Mongols do not appear to haveencouragedit.InsteadtheyexecutedQarachaandhismenastraitors.WehaveseenthatGenghisoftentreatedthosewhobetrayed theirownlords inasimilarway,even if theiractions had ultimately been to his benefit, but the systematic refusal to accept Qanglidefectors in this campaign contrasts with the welcome usually extended to those whojoinedtheMongolcauseinChina.Wedonotknowwhetherthiswasofficialpolicy,butitispossiblethatthevacillatingbehaviouroftheShahandhissoldiers,aswellastheattacksonpeacefulcaravans,hadencouragedthebeliefthattheQangliswerenottobetrusted.

ThesurrenderleftKhadirKhanwithonly20,000men,withwhomhenowwithdrewto the citadel, abandoning the city itself to the Mongols. These diehards held out foranothermonth, sometimes sallying out, says Juvaini, to ‘seekmartyrdom’ in groups offiftyatatime.Whenthecitadelfinallyfell,Khadirretreatedontotheroofwithonlytworemainingbodyguards.TheMongolswereunderorderstotakethegovernoralive,buthestillfoughtonafterhistwocompanionswerekilled,throwingbrickswhichwerehandedtohimbythewomenofhisharem.Atlasthewascapturedand,inJuvaini’swords,forced‘todrink the cupof annihilation’, thoughhegivesno furtherdetailsofhowhedied.Astorywaslatercurrentthathewaspunishedforhiscrimesbyhavingmoltensilverpouredintohiseyesandears,but this sortofelaborate torturewasnot typicalof theMongols,whousuallyput noble captives todeathby suffocation inorder to avoid shedding theirblood. The walls of the town and citadel of Otrar were demolished and the survivingpopulationdeportedaslabourersorartisans,‘topractisetheirtrade’forthebenefitoftheMongolsasJuvainisays,butnogeneralmassacretookplace.

Meanwhile Jochiwas taking the towns furtherdown theSyrDaryaonebyone.AtSuqnaq thepeoplekilled anambassador sent to advise them to submit, so theMongolsstormedthewalls,fightinginrelaysfromdawntillduskforsevendaysuntiltheexhausteddefenders could resist no longer. On this occasion Juvani says that the people weremassacred,buttheslaughterwasclearlynottotal,asheaddsthatthesonofthemurderedenvoy was installed as governor, ‘that he might gather together the survivors that stillremainedinoddcorners’.Thenexttown,Barjligh-Kant,didnotresist,andsowasspared.TheeventsatthecityofJand,furthernorth,werealmostfarcical,andprovideanall-too-rare episode of light relief in the narrative of the Mongol conquests. The garrisoncommanderhad fledwithhismenasJochiapproached,andagainaMongolenvoywassentintothetowntonegotiatesurrender.Onceagainsomeofthecitizenstriedtoincitethemob to murder him, but the quick-thinking messenger described to them what hadhappened at Suqnaq, and persuaded them to agree to submit. On 21 April 1219 Jochiarrivedoutsidethewalls,butfoundthegatesstillshutandtheinhabitantsliningthewalls,

thoughwithout anyobviouspreparations forbattle.Soheorderedhis catapults, scalingladders and battering rams to be brought up and prepared for action. While this washappeningthepeopleofJandwereseensettingupacatapultoftheirownonthewalls,butin theabsenceof themilitarygarrison theyobviously lacked theexpertise tooperate it.Theyloadeditwithaheavystoneandtriedtoshoot itat theMongols,but itmusthavebeendischargedtoonearthevertical,becausethestonefellbackonthemachinethathadlauncheditandsmashedittopieces.IntheensuingconfusiontheMongolsclimbedoverthewallandopenedthegatesfrominside.‘Noonewashurtoneitherside’saysJuvaini–aratherunexpectedconclusiontoanaccountofaMongolsiege.Jochichosetooverlookthebotchedattemptatresistanceandsparedthepopulation,thoughhedidallowhismentolootthecity.The5,000MongolssenttoFanakatwereattackedbythelocalgarrisonandfought a pitched battle east of the river which lasted for three days, but were able toovercometheenemywithoutthehelpofthemainarmy,andonthefourthdaysecuredthesurrenderof thetown.Thesurvivingmembersof thegarrisonwereput todeathandthecitizensonceagaindraftedasalabourcorps.

TheSiegeofKhojend

Juvaini describes the siegeofKhojend at some length, and it isworth examining as anexampleofthesiegetechniquesemployedbytheMongolsatthistime,andthemethodsavailable to their enemies to counter them. The citadel was held by a famous warriornamed Temur Malik, who commanded no more than 1,000 men. However. it wasexceptionally difficult to attack, being a ‘tall stronghold’ situated on an island in themiddle of the Syr Darya, out of range of bows or catapults placed on either bank.Thereforethe20,000besiegingMongolscollectedleviesfromthetownsalongtheriver–atotalof50,000menaccordingtoJuvaini–andorderedthemtocarrystonestotheriver,wheremountedMongols rode into thewater anddropped them to forma causeway. InresponseTemurMalikhadtwelvecoveredbargesmade,providedwithloopholesthroughwhichmeninsidecouldshootandprotectedwithdampfeltandalayerofclaymixedwithvinegar to fireproof them.Eachdayandnight thesebargeswere rowedacross from theisland toharass theworkmenanddemolish thecauseway,unaffectedby the fire arrowsandincendiarynaphthabombswhichtheMongolsshotatthem.Buttheywereunabletopreventthecausewayextendingfurtherintotheriver,graduallybringingthecitadelwithinrangeof theenemyartillery.EventuallyTemurMalikandhismenbrokeoutandsaileddownstream in seventy small boats, exchanging arrows with the Mongol cavalry whopursuedthemalongthebank.

At Fanakat theMongols stretched a chain across the river, but the fugitives brokethroughitandcontinuedasfarasJand.ThereJochihadbuiltabridgeofboatscarryingcatapults toblock theirpassage, andwhenhewaswarnedof thisTemurabandonedhis

vesselsandfledwestacrossthedesertonhorses,whichhadpresumablybeenembarkedwith him.AMongol armywent in pursuit, and despite heroic rearguard actions Temureventuallylosthisbaggageandmostofhismenwerescattered.Atlasthefoundhimselfaloneanddowntohislastthreearrows,withthreeMongoltroopersgainingonhimfrombehind.Heshotonearrow–whichlackedapoint,andsowasunbalancedandhardertoshootaccurately–andhittheleadingMongolintheeye,whereupontheothertwobackedoffandallowedhimtoescape.Juvainialsorecountstheunfortunatesequel.Temurfoughtwith theShah’ssonJalalud-Dinuntilhisdeath,carriedonguerrillawarfareagainst theMongols for awhile longer, then sought asylum in Syria.Many years later, during thereignofGenghis’successorOgodei,hereturnedandrevealedhisidentitytohisson,whohadfoundfavourattheMongolcourt.ButwhileattemptingtorecoverhispropertyTemurwas recognised and arrested by Ogodei’s son Qadaqan, who questioned him about hiscampaignsagainsttheMongols.Inhisrepliestheoldwarrior‘neglectedtheceremoniesofrespect that are incumbent on those that speak in the presence of royalty’, and aninfuriatedQadaqanshothimfatallywithanarrow.ElsewhereJuvainipraisestheMongolrulersfortheirlackofceremonyand‘excessivealoofness’,butevidently,twogenerationsafterGenghis,thisadmirabletraitwasdisappearing.

BokharaandSamarkand

GenghiswaitedonthesteppeuntilFebruary1220,whenitmusthavebeenobviousthattheShahwasnotgoingtoenter thetrapthathadbeensetforhim.Insteadhehadtakenrefuge inSamarkandwith a forcewhich Juvainiputs at 110,000men, including60,000eliteQangliTurksandtwentywarelephantsimportedfromIndia.Otherwritersgivemoreconservative figures – Juzjani says there were 60,000 defenders, Nasawi only 40,000.Nevertheless the position was obviously far too strong to attack directly, so Genghisbypassed it, crossing the Syr Darya near Fanakat and then swinging north towardsBokharaviaZarnuqandNur.ThisroutetookhimthroughtheKyzylKumDesert,astonywasteland dotted with low scrub, in a manoeuvre which has excited the admiration ofmanymodern commentators. Legg calls it ‘seemingly impossible… amarch of nearly300milesthroughoneofthemostfearsomedesertsintheworld’.ButneitherJuvaininortheSecretHistorybothertoexplainhowitwasdone;theimpressiontheygiveisthat,likethe crossingof the evenmoredesolateGobi, itwasnothingout of theordinary for theMongols.Infactatleastpartoftheroutemusthavebeenwelltravelled,asJuvainitellsusthatthecitizensofNuropenedtheirgatestoGenghis’armybecausetheymistookitforamerchantcaravan.ButhisdescentonBokharainMarch1220doesseemtohavetakentheKhwarizmianscompletelybysurprise.Twentythousanddefenderssalliedoutandtriedtogivebattle,butthenabandonedthestruggleandfledtowardstheOxusRiver,wheretheywereovertakenanddestroyed.Thepeopleofthecitythenopenedthegatesandallowed

theMongolstoenter.

Here Juvaini describes one of the best-known episodes of Genghis’ career. Hesummoned the leading citizens, 280 in number, and proceeded to lecture them on thereasonsforhiscoming.‘Knowthatyouhavecommittedgreatsins,’hetoldthem,‘andthatthegreatonesamongyouhavecommittedthesesins.IfyouaskmewhatproofIhaveforthesewords, I say it isbecause Iam thepunishmentofGod. Ifyouhadnotcommittedgreatsins,Godwouldnothavesentapunishmentlikemeuponyou.’Thisextraordinarypublicstatementisnotofcourseapoliticalmanifesto.Ifhewantedthepeopletosubmittohimwithoutfurtherresistanceitwouldbenaturaltoexploittheirreligiousbeliefsinthisway, so we cannot be certain that Genghis himself actually believed that he was theconscious agent of God’s will. Some scholars have argued that the incident neverhappened, but reflects Juvaini’s idea ofGenghis’ role in history rather than that of theKhanhimself.Butthechronicler’sdetailedaccountringstrue,andwhenhewroteitfortyyearslatertheremayhavebeeneyewitnessesstillliving,soitisunlikelythatthestoryisentirelyfictional.Othersseemalsotohaveacceptedthetheoryofdivinepunishment.Thewoodenreceptacles thatheld thecopiesof theKoran in thegreatmosquewereemptiedandthenfilledwithgraintofeedtheMongolhorses.Juvainitellshowwhentheirhoovestrampled the sacred books littering the floor, one of the clerics present protested to thegreat Imam Rukn ad-Din Imamzada, who replied, ‘Be silent; it is the wind of God’somnipotencethatbloweth,andwehavenopowertospeak.’God’swrathhadnotyetrunits course. The rich citizens were forced to pay a substantial fine, though Juvainiemphasisesthatnoonewastorturedorotherwiseforcedtopaybeyondhismeans.ButthegarrisonofBokharahadretiredintothecitadelandcontinuedtolaunchhit-and-runraidsintothecity,soGenghisorderedthetownburned,anddraftedthepeopletohelpfillinthemoataroundthestronghold.Juvainialsorefersto‘firehurledintothecitadel’,presumablynaphthabombslaunchedfromcatapults.Eventuallythedefenderssurrendered,onlytobemassacredand theirwivesandchildrensold intoslavery.Thecitywas then temporarilyabandoned,andthemalepopulationwasmarchedawaytoserveaslabourersatthenextsiege–thatofSamarkand.

Genghisnowclosed inon theShah’sheadquarters from thewest, at the same timesending orders for his detached armies to rendezvous outside the city. ButMuhammadabandonedhispeopleandfledwestwith30,000soldiers, so three toumansunderJebei,SuboteiandToquchar, totalling30,000men,weredivertedtohunthimdown.Whentherest of theMongol army closed in onSamarkand, the garrison emerged and exchangedarrowswith themuntil nightfall,when theyweredrivenbackwithin thewallswith thelossof1,000dead,accordingtoJuvaini.Juzjanisays,moresensationally,that50,000ofthe citizens joined the attack, all ofwhomwere killed. The nextmorning theMongols

advanceduptothewalls todeprivetheKhwarizmiancavalryofroomtomanoeuvre,sotheysentouttheelephantsinstead.ItwaswellknowninClassicalandmedievaltimesthathorses which were unaccustomed to elephants were too afraid to face them, but theMongolshadthedisciplinetoovercomethisproblemandshowerthebeastswitharrowsuntiltheyturnedbackandtrampledtheirowninfantry.ItisofcourselikelythatGenghis’menfacedtheattackdismounted,asMarcoPolodescribestheirsuccessorsunderKubilaiKhandoingagainstBurmeseelephantsattheBattleofVochanin1277.Onthethirddayof the siege thepeopleopened thegatesand thegarrison retiredasusual to thecitadel,though 1,000men under Alp Khan escaped, and the elephants with their drivers werecaptured.TheKhanobviouslydidnot think the animalswereworth recruiting, becauseJuvainisaysthatwhentheirkeepersapproachedhimtoaskforfoodfortheircharges,heaskedwhattheylivedoninthewild.Theyreplied‘thegrassoftheplains’,sotheKhanordered them to be released to fend for themselves. Of course the arid region aroundSamarkandwasnot their natural habitat, and Juvaini adds that they all eventually died,perhapsinthecoldofthefollowingwinter.ThecitadelofSamarkandwasthensurroundedand subjected to the usual barrage of arrows and flaming naphtha, after which theMongols stormed the gates.Therewere nowonly 1,000 defenders left and the fightingwasoverinafewhours,orasJuvainiputsit,‘thespacebetweentwoprayers’.TheQangligarrisonsufferedtheusualmassacre,butthepopulationwasallowedtoreturnhomeafterpayingafine.However,severalcontingentsofforcedlabourerswerelaterleviedfromthecity,whichJuvainiblamedforitstemporarydecline.

MassacreatGurganj

With the fall of Jand, Bokhara and Samarkand, Khwarizmia itself was isolated, inJuvaini’swords‘leftinthemiddlelikeatentwhoseropeshavebeencut’.TheflightoftheShah had left the armies stationed there leaderless, especially since theQueenMother,TerkenKhatun,hadalsoescapedtothewest.Muhammad’ssonJalalud-Dinhadtriedtomake a stand in the city ofGurganj (modernUrgench), but had left for the south afterdiscoveringanattempttoassassinatehim.JuvainisaysthatalthoughJalalwasbyfarthemostablemilitarycommanderintheempire,hewasunpopularwithmanyofhisfather’sofficials,ashewasknowntobelieveinappointingmenonthebasisofmeritratherthanpolitical connections. So eventually the troops inKhwarizmia elected one of their owncommanders,arelativeoftheroyalhousenamedKhumarTegin,astheir‘Sultan’.KhumarensconcedhimselfinGurganjwhileChagataiandOgodeiweresenttoeliminatehim.TheMongol brothers decided to reduce the odds against them by a stratagem, so theyconcealed their main force behind an ancient wall at Baghi-Khurram, outside the city,while a small raiding party ran off a herd of cattle thatwas grazing beneath thewalls.WhatJuvainidescribesasadisorderlymobofKhwarizmiansoldiers,someonhorseback

and someon foot, pouredout of the city inpursuit, and inevitably ran into an ambush.Emerging from behind thewall, theMongols blocked the road in front and behind theenemy and slaughtered them; Juvaini gives the obviously exaggerated total of 100,000killed.The survivors fled back toGurganj through theQabilanGate and their pursuerspouredinafterthem,buthereboththegarrisonandthecitizensweredeterminedtofight.BynightfalltheMongolshadbeendrivenout,andthenextmorningChagataiandOgodeicommencedformalsiegeoperations.HereinthelowervalleyoftheOxustherewerenolargestones,sotheMongolsiegeengineerscutdownmulberrytreesandsawedthetrunksinto logs touseas ammunition for thecatapults.Under thecoverof thisbombardment,localconscriptsweresentforwardtofillinthemoat.KhumarTeginfollowedtheexampleofhissovereignandfled,followingwhichtheattackersstormedthewalls,butthepeoplecontinued to resist, and ferocious street fighting broke out during which the townwasdeliberately or accidentally set on fire. On the second day of fighting 3,000 Mongolsmanaged to reach thebridgeacross theOxuswhichdivided thecity into twoparts,butthey were cut off and annihilated. The popular resistance enraged the Mongols, buteventuallytheywerevictorious,andtheinhabitantswereturnedoutintothecountryside.Here, says Juvaini, skilled craftsmen were separated for deportation, the women andchildrenwereenslaved,andtheremainingmenweremassacred.EachMongolsoldierwasallocated twenty-fourvictims tokill, and thecitywas razed to theground. JuvainiaddsthatinhisdaymanyplacesintheeastwereinhabitedbyrefugeesfromKhwarizmia,butthat‘IhaveheardofsuchaquantityofslainthatIdidnotbelievethereportandsohavenotrecordedit’.

GenghisMovesSouth

GenghishimselfrestedhismenandhorsesintheregionofSamarkandoverthesummerof1220, then in theautumnhemarchedsouth to thefortofTirmizon theOxus.Here, forreasons which are not entirely clear, the behaviour of the Mongols towards the localpopulationseemstohavebecomemorebrutal.Juvainidescribeshowtheinhabitantswereencouragedtoresistbythenaturalstrengthoftheirfortress,whichwaswellequippedandpartially protected by the river, and that siege engineswere used on both sides.But hedoes not explain why when Tirmiz fell, after a siege of eleven days, even the non-combatants were killed. Genghis then sent out patrols to subdue the people in thesurroundingcountryside, ‘somebykindness,butmostbyseverity’.He thencrossed theOxus and advanced on Balkh,which submitted at once. Nevertheless, the peopleweredrivenoutonto theplain,ostensibly foracensus, thenslaughtered,while theircitywasburnedtotheground.Juvainisaysthatthiswasdoneforfearofrebellion,astheShah’ssonJalalad-Dinwasactiveintheregionwithanarmy.Hedescribeshowsomanybodieswereleftunburiedthatlions,wolves,vulturesandeaglescouldallfeedtogetherwithout

quarrelling. Genghis’ youngest son Tolui was then sent west into Khurasan, where hecapturedthegreatSilkRoadcityofMervafterasiegeofonlysevendays,thenbrokeapromiseofclemencyandslaughteredallbut400ofthepopulation.InAprilToluicarriedout another massacre at Nishapur, allegedly in revenge for the death of Toquchar, hisbrother-in-law,whohadbeenkilledduringanunsuccessful assault thepreviousautumnwhilehewaspursuingShahMuhammad.Juvainidescribesthedesperateresistancewhichthe city now put up, employing 3,000 crossbows and 300 siege engines against theMongols,whoinresponsecollectedsomanystonesfromthesurroundingregionforuseasmissilesthatnine-tenthsofthemwereneverused,butremainedwheretheywerepiledupon theplain.Once theattackerswereon thewalls thefightingcontinuedforanotherday,withpeoplebeingcontinually throwndownto theirdeaths,butat last theMongolsstormedintothestreets.Onthisoccasionthecitywascompletelydestroyed,eventhecatsand dogs being killed.AtHerat therewas no resistance, soTolui left it under the jointcontrol of a Mongol and a Muslim governor, and returned to join his father. From amilitarypointofviewthiscampaignhadbeenaspectacularsuccess,thoughmarredbytheapparently unnecessary destruction.Meanwhile Genghis was besieging a stronghold atTalaqanwhichwas ‘crammed full of warriors’ and had so far resisted all assaults, butwhenTolui’sreinforcementsarriveditwasquicklycaptured.

At this point news arrived that Jalal ud-Din had attacked and defeated a MongoldetachmentunderTekechukwhichwasbesiegingacastleatValiyaninthePanjshirvalley.Jalal had managed to join up with two other Khwarizmian generals, Amin Malik,commanding 50,000 Qanglis at Ghazna, and Saif ud-Din Ighraq, who brought 40,000‘valiantwarriors’ including Turkomans and ex-Ghurid soldiers, and hadmade a forcedmarchtosurpriseTekechuk,leavinghisheavybaggagebehind.Inthefirstonslaught,saysJuvaini,a thousandMongolswerekilled,and thesurvivors retreatedacross thePanjshirRiver. Having raised the siege, Jalal then returned to his base at Parvan. Genghisrespondedbysending30,000mentoParvanunderShigi-qutuqu–asurprisingchoiceforsuch a mission, as his previous experience seems to have been in the field of civiladministration rather thanmilitary command. Jalalud-Din ledouthis army tomeet theMongols,placingAminMalikincommandoftherightwingandIghraqontheleft,whileheremainedinthecentre.TheentireKhwarizmianarmywasorderedtodismount,buttokeepholdoftheirhorsesandbereadytomountandchargewhenanopportunityarose.Anapparentexceptionwasaunitof10,000cavalryunderAminMalik,whomustpresumablyhave remained mounted, since Juvaini describes them attacking theMongol army andforcing it to fall back. Jalal then reinforced his right from the centre and left until itsucceededinpushingtheMongolsall thewaybacktotheirstartingpoint.Afiercefightcontinued until nightfall, when both sides returned to their camps. During the night

Shigiqutuquattemptedtodeceivetheenemyintothinkingthatreinforcementshadarrived,bymakingevery trooper setupadummyonasparehorse.According toJuvaini,whenmorningcame thisploynearlysucceeded,andJalal’sofficersbegan todebateabout thedirectiontheyshouldtakeintheirretreat.Buttheircommanderpersuadedthemtostandfast,andtheyagaindeployedforbattle.OntheseconddayofthefightShigi-qutuqutooktheinitiativeandchargedIghraq’smen,buttheyonceagaindismountedanddroveofftheMongol chargewith arrows.Then Jalal ordered his drums to be beaten,whichwas thesignalfortheentirearmytomountupandadvance.TheoutnumberedMongolsbegantoretreat.Atonepointtheyralliedandcounter-attacked,strikingdown500oftheirpursuers,but Jalal ‘rode up like a lion of themeadow or a leviathan of the raging sea’, and theMongolarmyfinallyfledthefield.

When he learned of the defeat, Genghis at once marched to confront the enemy.Juvainisaysthathe‘inhishastereckonednightasday,andtravelledtwostagesatatime,sothatitwasimpossibletocookfood’.NodoubthewasawarethatoncetheMongolslosttheir reputation for invincibility itwould be impossible for them to keep the people insubjectionintheareasalreadyconquered.

His armywas held up by fierce resistance first at Gurzivan, which held out for amonth, and then at Bamiyan, the site of the famous stone Buddhas, now destroyed, innorthernAfghanistan.HereasonofChagatai,Metiken,whoJuvaini sayswasGenghis’favouritegrandson,waskilledbyastraymissile,and inretaliationevery living thing inthe townwas slaughtered, just ashadhappenedatNishapur. Juvaini adds thatBamiyanremaineddeserted‘tothisveryday’.

Meanwhile, in Jalal ud-Din’s camp his subordinateswere arguing over the plundertaken at Parvan.AminMalik hit Ighraq over the headwith awhip, but Jalal dared notpunishhimforfearthathisQangliswouldmutiny,soIghraqabandonedthearmyundercover of darkness and led his 40,000 men into the mountains. He was later killed inanotherpointlessdisputewith fellowMuslims. Jalal realised that thisdefectionhad lefthim tooweak to confront Genghis, so he turned southeastward and rode for the IndusRiver,beyondwhichhehopedtofindsafetyintherealmoftheSultanofDelhi.SowhentheMongolsreachedParvantheyfoundthattheirquarryhadalreadyleft.GenghisdidnotpunishShigi-qutuqu forhis failure there,but instead rodeover thebattlefieldwithhim,pointingoutwherehisdispositionshadbeenatfault.ItislikelythattheKhanalsorealisedthat the faultwaspartlyhis, ashehadunderestimated theenemy’s strengthandsentaninexperiencedgeneralintobattleagainstaforceperhapsthreetimesthesizeofhisown.

TheDefeatofJalalud-Din

Jalal’s pursuers caught up with him as he was preparing boats for the crossing of the

Indus,andGenghis,nowwiththeadvantageofsuperiornumbers,extendedbothhisflanksand trapped the Khwarizmians with their backs to the water. In Juvaini’s words, theMongols‘stoodbehindoneanotherinseveralringsintheshapeofabowandmadetheIndus likeabowstring’.Genghisbegan thebattlewithanattackonAminMalik,on theKhwarizmianright,whowasdefeatedandbrokeoutwithagroupofsurvivors,aimingforPeshawar.Ontheway,however,hewasinterceptedbyaMongolpatrolandkilled.Jalalwasleftattheheadofonly700diehards,buthechargedtheMongolbattlelinerepeatedly,drivingbacktheenemyinfrontofhim.Genghis’menwereunderorderstotakehimalive,so he remained unharmed as his men fell one by one around him. Nevertheless, theMongol line stood firm, and each time Jalalwithdrew to regroup theymoved forward,leavingtheKhwarizmianswithlessroomtomanoeuvre.AtlastJalalledonelastcharge,thenhewheeledhishorseandgallopedoverthesteepriverbankintotheIndus.Genghisforbadepursuitandwatchedinadmirationashisopponentswamhishorsetosafetyonthefarbankstillcarryinghisweapons,exclaiming‘Suchsonsshouldafatherhave!’Buthistroopersshotattheotherfugitiveswhotriedtofollowhim,sothatallbutaboutfiftywerekilledordrowned.

AtleasttemporarilyJalalud-DinwasremovedasathreattotheMongoloccupiersofhisfather’sempire,butthiswasbynomeanstheendofhiscareer.AsGenghismadehiswaybackthroughGhaznahewasinformedthathisenemywasattemptingtoraisetroopsin India. The Khan therefore sent Dorbei Doqshin, the victorious commander in theTumadWar,across theInduswith twotoumanstofinishhimoff.Juvainisays thatJalalhadwithdrawntowardsDelhi,soDorbeiDoqshinsackedthefortressofNandanaandthenbesiegedMultan,wherehehadtobringinstonesforhiscatapultsbyraftdowntheriver.Hesucceededinbringingdownasectionofthewalls,butthecitywassavedbecausetheIndiansummerwasapproachingand‘thegreatheatoftheclimatepreventedhisremaininglonger’. So he raised the siege and returned to Ghazna to rejoin Genghis. The ‘SlaveDynasty’ of the Sultans of Delhi had been founded in 1206 by Qutb ud-Din Aybak, aformer Ghurid officer, and at this timewas still in the process of taking overmost ofnorthern India.Thearmyof theSultanate reliedmainlyon itsTurkish ‘ghulam’cavalryand its elephants,while theHindu infantrywerenot alwaysenthusiastic. Itwas later tobecome one of themost intractable opponents ofGenghis’ successors, but for the timebeingtheSultanwiselyavoidedaconfrontationwiththeMongols.

AfterGenghis’ departure from theKhwarizmianEmpire, Jalal ud-Din returned andraisedyetanotherarmy.HewasdefeatedbyaMongolexpeditionattheBattleofIsfahanin August 1228, but again escaped and continued the fight until he was murdered bybandits in 1231. His soldiers remained in the field and took part in the civil wars inAyyubid Syria until 1246, when they picked the wrong side and were crushed by the

AyyubidSultan.Theirbest-knownfeatduringthisperiodwastherecaptureofJerusalemfromtheCrusadersin1244.TheKhwarizmianshadshownthatwitheffectiveleadershipthey could have been a formidable opponent for the Mongols, and it is interesting tospeculatewhatwouldhavehappenedifJalalud-Dinhadcommandedthearmyfromthebeginningof the invasion.Butby the timehewas inaposition todoso,his fatherhadalreadyunderminedtheempirebyhisineptitudeandcowardice,thenabandoneditspeopletotheirfate.

PursuitandReconnaissanceintheWest

ThethreegeneralswhohadbeensentinpursuitofShahMuhammadafterhisescapefromSamarkand followed separate routes across Iran, and the sources which mention theiractivitiesareofteninconsistent.ToqucharhadapparentlybeengiventheadditionaltaskofformingacordontopreventtheShah’ssonsescapingsouthfromGurganjtocontinuetheirresistance in Afghanistan. In this he was unsuccessful, allowing Jalal ud-Din to breakthroughtoAfghanistan,andToqucharwaseventuallykilledwhileattemptingtostormthecity of Nishapur. Jebei and Subotei first came to Balkh, where the people made noresistance but supplied themwith food and guides. At Zava the inhabitants closed thegates,butastheMongolswereinahurrytheyrodeon.However,thepeopleonthewallscould not resist the temptation to shout insults at them as they departed, so Jebei andSubotei returned and attacked the place. They captured it after three days of fighting,killed everyone they could find within the walls, and burnt what they could not carryaway.Elsewhere thecityofNishapurandmostof thevillages theypassedsubmittedatonceandweresparedfromdestruction,temporarilyatleast.Thetwogeneralssplitupastheyrodewest,thenmetupagainatRayy,southoftheCaspianSea.ButtheShahhadleftthe town just ahead of them, and joined his sonRukn ud-Din and his 30,000 troops atnearby Qazvin. Although he was now strong enough to strike back at his pursuers,Muhammad once again hesitated.He first considered seeking asylum inBaghdad, thenreturnedtoHamadan,wherehisarmyclashedwithJebei’stoumanintheautumnof1220.Truetoform,however,theShahdidnotleadhistroopsintobattlebutleftthemtofightarearguard action while he took flight again. The Mongols defeated them easily andresumed the pursuit, but Muhammad managed to cross the Elbruz Mountains to theCaspian,wherehetookaboatouttoaremoteisland.There,inlate1220orearly1221,hedied, probably of pneumonia. Soon afterwards, it seems, Jebei’s patrols captured theShah’s mother, Terken Khatun, and sent her back toMongolia, where she remained aprisonerfortherestofherlife.

JebeialsosentamessengertoGenghis,askingpermissiontoremaininthewestandreconnoitre the surrounding regions, till then entirely unknown to theMongols.He andSubotei then established abaseon theMurganSteppe inAzerbaijan,where thepasture

wasplentifulandthelocalruler,Ozbeg,theAtabegofTabriz,wasfriendly.ManyoftheTurkomanandKurdishnomadsoftheregionalsoarrivedtojointheMongols,presumablyin the hope of sharing in their plunder. From this base, andwith the help of their newallies, Jebei andSubotei launched raids in all directions. First they advancednorth intoGeorgia,wheretheywereatfirstmistakenforfellowChristianssincetheywereknowntohave been fighting against the Muslim Khwarizmians. When the mistake becameapparent,theMongolshadtofaceanattackbyanarmyof10,000menunderKingGeorgiIV Lasha. The Georgians were formidable opponents, whose noblemen, althoughChristian,foughtinsimilarstyletotheTurksasarmouredcavalrywithlance,swordandbow. However, they were unfamiliar with Mongol methods, and were defeated at theBattleofKhunan, inwhichGeorgi receivedawound in the chest fromwhichheneverrecovered.JebeithenturnedhisattentionbacktonorthernIran,wherehesackedRayyandHamadaninretaliationforthesupporttheyhadgiventotheShah,beforeheandSuboteireturnedtoGeorgiaintheautumnof1222.AfresharmyhadbeenraisedtoconfrontthemoutsidethecapitalcityofTbilisi,buttheGeorgiancavalryagainfellintoatypicalMongoltrapwhenSuboteipretendedtoretreatandprovokedthemintoaheadlongpursuit.Justashehaddone sooften inChina, Jebei then emerged fromambush and routed them.ThesurvivorsfledinsidethewallsofTbilisi,buttheMongolsdidnotfollowupasexpectedbyattackingthecity.Insteadtheyturnednorthagain,androdeofftowardstheDerbentPassthroughtheCaucasusMountains.

It appears that Jebei hadnever intended to conquerGeorgia, only toneutralise anypossiblethreattohisrear.PermissionhadnowbeenreceivedfromGenghistoreturnhomeby the routearound thenorthernendof theCaspianSea, andguideshadbeenobtainedwho could be persuaded to lead the army through the precipitous mountains, whereJuvainisaysthatnoonecouldrememberanarmypassingbefore,totheopensteppeonthefarside.Butas theMongolsdescendedfromtheDerbentPassvia theDaryalskRavine,theguidesescapedandwentaheadtogivewarningoftheirapproach.SoastheymovedthroughthefoothillsoverlookingtheTerekRivertheyfoundtheirwayblockedbyahugearmyofmountedwarriors.ThesewerethemenoftheKipchaqsandAlans,nomadswhoinhabitedthesteppesnorthoftheBlackSea,reinforcedbyLezgiansandCherkessesfromtheCaucasus.TheKipchaqswerecloserelativesof theQangliTurks,andinfact turnedout to includeanumberof refugees from theKhwarizmianarmy.TheAlansandotherswereofadifferentethnicorigin,butmostofthemfoughtasmountedarchersinasimilarstyletotheTurkishtribesthattheMongolshadencounteredinCentralAsia.TheMongolarmyattempted to ride through them,but their numberswere toogreat, and thebrokenterrainmadeitdifficultfortheinvaderstodeployforbattle.SotheArabhistorianIbnal-AthirdescribeshowJebeiandSuboteiresortedtodiplomacy,sendingenvoystopersuade

theKipchaqs that theyand theMongolswerekindredpeoples,whereas theother tribeswereuntrustworthyforeigners.ThisploymayhavebeenhelpedbythepresenceoflargenumbersofTurkomans,whowereindeedrelatedtotheKipchaqs,withtheMongolarmy.TheKipchaqKhanKotenfellforthisandagreedtoabandonhisallies,whowerequicklyscattered.JebeithenovertooktheKipchaqsontheirhomewardmarchanddestroyedtheirarmyinaseriesofbattleneartheRiverDon.Koten,however,escapedandfledforhislifeintotheforestedcountrythatlaynorthofthesteppes.TherehecanvassedtherulersofthevariousRussianprincipalitiesforsupport,arguingthattheinvaderswouldsoonbeseizingRussianlandaswell.

Infactthiswasnottheirobjectiveatall.JebeiandSuboteispentthewinterof1222to1223onthesteppes,mountingonlylimitedexpeditionstoexplorethisnewcountry.TheyseemtohaveestablishedfriendlyrelationswiththeBrodniki,RussianrefugeeswhohadsettledonthesteppealongtheRiverDon,someofwhommayhavefoughtalongsidetheMongolsinthesubsequentclashwiththeRussianprinces.EarlyinthenewyearSuboteiraided into the Crimean Peninsula and – possibly at the instigation of rival Venetianmerchants – captured the town of Sudak, a trading port belonging to Genoa. JebeiadvancedasfarwestastheRiverDniester,ontheborderofpresent-dayMoldova,whichmarkedthewesternmostpointreachedbyGenghis’armies.ItmayalsohavemadeJebei,who a few years before had been campaigning on the shores of the Yellow Sea inManchuria, the best-travelled soldier in history up to that time. His campaigns hadspannedninetydegreesoflongitude,oraquarterofthewayroundtheglobe.ThenheandSuboteiturnedbackforhome.ButaboutthemiddleofMay1223,neartheRiverDnieperinwhatisnowUkraine,theywereinterceptedbyKotenandhisnewRussianallies.Theirarmywas led by the Princes of Kiev, Galicia and Chernigov (all three of whomwerecoincidentallynamedMstislav),andwassaidtohaveacombinedstrengthof90,000men.The core of the princes’ armies consisted of the ‘druzhina’ or guard cavalry,whoworearmourand foughtwith swordsandspears, andNicolleestimates their totalnumbersatbetween 15,000 and 20,000. The ‘polk’ or townmilitia, and the impressed peasants or‘smerdy’,whoformedthebulkofthearmy,werelesswellequippedandfoughtmainlyasinfantry with spears and shields. The Kievans also fielded bowmen, both on foot andmounted, including not only Kipchaq allies but mercenary horse archers known as‘ChernyeKlobuki’,or‘BlackCaps’.

TheBattleoftheKalkaRiver

At first the Mongols sent messengers to explain that they did not want to fight theRussians,buttheprincesfoolishlyallowedtheKipchaqstokill thesemen.The‘RussianChronicle’ recorded Jebei’s reply, which followed closely the formula attributed toGenghis by Juvaini: ‘If you support thePolovtsians [thiswas theRussianname for the

Kipchaqs],killourambassadorsandaremarchingagainstus,thendowhatyouwill.WedidnotattackyouandGodwillbeourjudge.’TheRussiansadvanceddownthewestbankof the riverDnieper tomeetupwithacontingentofGalician infantrywhoweresailingupstreaminboats,thensentanadvanceguardacrosstotheeasternbankwhichattackedaMongol detachment under an officer calledGemyabek, who had been observing them.PrinceMstislavofGalicialedthepursuit,andGemyabekwascapturedwhenhetriedtomakeastandonanoldKipchaqburialmound.ThenextdayanotherpatrolencounteredsomeMongolherdsmen,whofledandlefttheanimalstoberoundedupbytheRussians.These encounters were no doubt staged by Jebei and Subotei in order to convince theenemy that the Mongols were afraid of them, and in this they succeeded. The entireRussianarmynowcrossedtheriverbyabridgeofboatsandmarchedeastwardsintothesteppeinsearchoftheirenemies.

Thefeignedretreatwasofcoursea traditionalstratagem,butonthisoccasionJebeiandSubotei elevated it fromabattlefield tactic to a full-scale strategicmanoeuvre.TheMongols retreated eastwards for nine days, luring the Russians into an increasinglyreckless pursuit. They seem to have allowed their pursuers to capture whole herds oflivestockontheway,toencouragetheiroverconfidenceandperhapstoslowthemdown,because the Russian chronicles tell us that ‘the whole army was full of cattle andcontinuedonitsway’.Thenonthetenthday(probably31May1223),ontheopenplainsalong theKalkaRiver in present-dayUkraine, theMongols struck back. TheGalicianswere in thevanof thealliedarmy, theircommander,MstislavMstislavich ‘theDaring’,having pressed on across the river while the other princes argued about whether toabandon the pursuit.Ahead of theGalician division rode PrinceDaniilRomanovich ofVolhyniawiththehorsemenofhisown‘druzhina’.TheChernigovforceshadeventuallyfollowed the Galicians, but there was still a wide gap between the two contingents,coveredonlybyKipchaqscouts.Theexactlocationofthebattlefieldisunknown,butitislikely that the Mongol commanders had carefully chosen it in advance. Nicolle andShpakovskyreproduceseveralphotographsofthegeneralarea,whichshowopen,rollingsteppe interrupted only by the valley of the Kalka and the scattered woods and rockybluffs on both banks. The river itself was fairly narrow, certainly less than a bowshotacross,andwasbynomeansanimpassableobstacle.ButitwouldbeenoughtoslowtheRussian cavalry and prevent it frommoving forward quickly to support their advancedunits,aswellashamperingany retreat.Meanwhile,on theopengrasslands furthereast,theMongolarmycouldmanoeuvrewithouthindrance.

SuddenlySubotei’s‘touman’appearedoutofafoldinthegroundandsweptawaytheKipchaqsinaswiftcharge,thencrashedintotheVolhynianadvanceguard.Thefightingmust have been hand-to-hand, because one of Prince Daniil’s officers, Vasilyok

Gavrilovich,waskilledwithaspear,whiletheprincehimselfwaswoundedinthechest.MstislavofGalicia tried todeployhis troopsbut theywere thrown intodisorderby thefleeingKipchaqs.SuboteithenattackedtheChernigovarmy,whichwasstillcrossingtheriver, and despite a heroic rearguard action by Prince Oleg of Kursk drove it back inconfusion.HethenwheeledtoattacktheGaliciansfromtherear.Thelattercuttheirwayoutdespiteheavy losses,butalthoughMstislavSvyatoslavichofChernigovmanaged torally his troops, he did not return to assist his allies. Instead he abandoned them andretreatednorthwards.Thisdidhimnogood,astheMongolslatercaughtupwithhisarmyand routed it, but it ensured the destruction of the third Russian force, underMstislavRomanovichofKiev.ThiswasstillencampedwestoftheKalkawhenJebei,whoseemsto have led the Mongol right wing on a wide outflanking move, surrounded it. TheKievansresistedforthreedaysunderarelentlessbarrageofarrows,butwereeventuallyforcedtosurrender.TheirprinceandhisleadingvassalswerethenexecutedinretaliationforthemurderoftheMongolambassadors,bybeingcrushedtodeathunderaplatformofwoodenplanks.Thisapparentlysadisticmethodwasnodoubtemployedbecauseof thetraditionalprohibitiononsheddingthebloodofroyalandnobleprisoners.

TheBulgars

Even byMongol standards thiswas an extraordinary victory; one of the largest armiesEurope had ever produced had not just been beaten by a much smaller opponent, butactuallysurroundedandcrushedbeyondrecovery. Itappears,however, thatmanyof theRussian and Kipchaq troops played little part in the fighting; the latter were perhapsdemoralisedbytheirearlierdefeats,whilemanyoftheRussianmilitiawereonfootandmusthavebeen too slow-moving to influence the initial cavalrybattle eastof the river.TheChronicleofTverdescribesthebattleasadisaster‘suchashasneverbeenseensincethe beginning of the Russian Land’. And yet the Secret History dismisses the wholecampaigninalineortwo,andJuvainiignoresitcompletely.FromaMongolperspective,itwasjustanothersideshow.

JebeiandSuboteididnotstaytoexploittheirsuccess,butcontinuedtheirmarchbackto Mongolia. They reached the River Volga somewhere near modern Volgograd, thenmovednortheastupthewesternbanktoattacktheVolgaBulgarswholivedontheedgeoftheforestzonearoundtheVolgaandKamaRivers,nearthepresent-daycityofUfa.Ithadoriginally been planned that they should rendezvous here with another Mongol armyunder Jochi,but the latterhadapparentlybeen ill andhisarmywas still far to theeast.JebeiandSuboteineverthelessproceededwithouthim,crossingtheVolganeartheBulgartownofSuvar,butaccordingtoIbnal-Athirtheymarchedintoanambushandsufferedanunprecedenteddefeat.TheMongolswereforcedtoabandonthecampaignaftersufferingheavylosses.Jebeidisappearsfromtherecordsafterthis,anditisgenerallysupposedthat

hediedfromdiseaseonthereturnjourneytoMongolia.Martin,however,suggeststhathemayhavebeenkilledby theBulgars,ordied laterofwounds received in thebattle–ahumiliatingendtohiscareer,whichmightexplainwhyMongolsourcesaresilentonthematter.

TheVolgaBulgarshadoriginallybeenasteppepeople,butnowlivedbyfarmingandtrading,andhadbeguntobuildcastlesofwoodandstone.TheyhadconvertedtoIslaminthe tenthcentury,andhadapparently receivedengineers fromBaghdad tohelp improvetheirfortifications.BythethirteenthcenturytheirnoblecavalrywasequippedinRussianstyle,buttherewerealsomanyinfantry–principallyarchers–providedbythelocalforesttribes.Theywereobviouslybetter equipped than theMongols for fighting in thedenseSiberian forests, but we have seenMongol armies operate successfully in such terrainbefore–forexampleagainsttheTumadsin1216.However,JebeiandSubotei’sforcehadalreadybeenweakenedbytheattritionofalongcampaign,andwasaverylongwayawayfromanyresupplyorreinforcement.Itmayhavebeenasensibledecisiontoretireratherthanriskanotherassault,andthere isnoevidencethatGenghisblamedhiscommandersforthisfailure.Suboteieventuallyobtainedhisrevengein1237,whenheconqueredtheVolgaBulgarsduringthesecondMongolinvasionofEuropeunderBatuKhan.

Chapter6

TheFallofNorthChina

Meanwhile, in China itselfMukhali had been carrying on thewar asGenghis’ viceroyunder a banner of nine white yak tails, a distinction shared only by Genghis himself.Martin calculates the mounted contingent of Mukhali’s army at between 65,000 and70,000men,butonly10,000of theseweresentdirect fromMongolia, thoughnodoubtotherMongolsalreadystationedinChinawerealsounderhisauthority.Thecavalryalsoincluded10,000Ongguts,aswellasKhitans,JurchensandChinese.Despitethegreatsizeofthisforce,MartinbelievedthatMukhali’smissionwasalimitedone,intendedonlytoseizefurther territorywhichcouldbeusedasaspringboardforanadvanceonK’aifengwhenGenghis returned from thewest. In the autumnof 1217hedividedhis army intothree columns whichmarched east, west and south fromChung-tu, takingmany smalltowns but apparently avoiding the stronger cities. At this point the Chin were alsoinvolvedinawaragainsttheSungtothesouth,whohadpreviouslypaidthemtributebuthaddiscontinued it in1212.Nevertheless, theymanaged todespatcha fieldarmyunderChangJowhichencounteredaMongolarmyatLang-yaLinginthelatesummerof1218.The Chin were defeated, and Chang Jo was captured when his horse threw him. Herefused to kneel before his captors, butwas spared andpersuaded to join theMongols.Most of his surviving troops followed him, so he was permitted to lead them as anindependent columnwhich achieved several victories against his old comrades inChinservice. In September 1218 Mukhali himself laid siege to the city of T’ai-yuan, anoperation which is of interest because of the contrast with previous Mongol siegeattempts.Bynowtheywerenolongertheamateursthattheyhadbeenasrecentlyas1215,but came to the town with a train of siege artillery which wrecked the northwesternbastion, breached themainwalls and provided cover for a final assaultwith ‘a rain ofstonesandarrows’.Threemonths later, theequally strong fortressofChiangChouwastaken by mining operations which caused a tower to collapse. Apart from Chang Jo’sexpedition,noChin field armies appear tohaveattempted to interveneas the cities fellonebyone.

TheSungIntervene

Thegradualmopping-upcontinuedduring1219and1220,whileaSungarmyunderLi

Ch’uanpushedupfromthesouthandreceivedthesubmissionoftheChincommandersintheprovinceofShantungontheeastcoast.However,aChinofficernamedMengKu-kangdecidedtofighton,andeventuallyluredtheSungintoanambushanddefeatedthem.TheSungarmyusuallygetsabadpress,butdespiteits lackofcavalryithadplentyofsolidinfantryandwasbackedupbystate-of-the-arttechnology.Itstacticswerenotasdefensiveasisoftensupposed,andmuchemphasiswasplacedontheroleofpickedinfantryassaultdetachments, personally led by high-ranking generals. The downside to this, of course,wasthatthequalityoftherestoftheinfantrywouldoftensufferfromtheremovaloftheirnatural leaders. Mukhali marched into the power vacuum resulting from the SunginterventioninNovember1219.OneoftheChingenerals,YenShih,immediatelychangedsides again and joined the Mongols, giving them control of a population of 300,000familieswithoutafight.Thenearlyin1220theChingovernmentsentanewarmyunderWu-ku-lunShih-hutorecoverShantung.Shih-hucrossedtheYellowRiverfromthesouthbythefordatHuang-ling-kang,andratherunwiselysent20,000infantryaheadtoattemptasurpriseattackonMukhali.Thelatterwaswarnedoftheirapproach,andscatteredthemwithaforcewhichaccordingtohisbiographyintheYuanOfficialHistorynumberedonly500cavalry.Martin regarded this as ‘quite incredible’ and suggested thatMukhalimusthavehadat least ten times thatnumber,but theChin troopsmaywellhavebeenpoorlytrained,anditseemsquitelikelythattheycouldhavebeendemoralisedbyasuddenattackbyarelativelysmallforceofhorsemen,especiallyifitcamefrombehindaflank.Mukhalithenadvanced toHuang-ling-kangandengaged themainChinarmy.Martin reasonablybelieved that this toomust have consisted almost entirely of infantry, probablywithoutarmour,because theymadenomovetocounter-attack,butstoodon thedefensivewhiletheMongolsdismountedandshotthemdownwitharrows.Mukhalithenorderedacharge,and thedemoralisedChinesewerepushed into the riverwheremanyof themdrowned.Somesourcesgiveadifferentaccountofthisbattle,claimingthattheChinpositionwason the south bank of the river, but Martin argues that the river was too wide for theMongolstohaveengagedthemfromtheoppositeshore.

Soonafterwards,MukhalireceivedambassadorsfromboththeChinandtheSung.Hewelcomedthelatterhospitably,butsent theChinenvoyontoGenghis,whopointedoutthathisgeneralhadnowconqueredalmostalltheterritorynorthoftheYellowRiverthathehaddemandedas thepriceofpeace in1214.Nevertheless,hewould leave theChinunmolested in the south if they agreed to surrender the last few cities in the district ofKuan-hsi in thefarwest, inwhatarenowtheprovincesofShensiandKansu.Thiswasrefused,andMukhalimarchedwestin1222totakethecitiesbyforce.AtfirsthemetlittleoppositionastheChingarrisonseitherdesertedorfledbeforehim,butthestrongholdofYen-an resisted, and the Chin general Wan-yen Ho-ta even launched a counter-attack,

falling on a Tangut force which was operating in conjunction with the Mongols anddestroyingit.MukhaliadvancedonYen-anandmetWan-yenHo-taabouttenmilestothenortheast.The30,000menof theChin armyweredrawnupon a steephill.AMongolofficernamedMongkaBukhareconnoitredthepositionwith3,000cavalry,andreturnedto report to Mukhali that the enemy were in a strong position but, having apparentlymistaken the scouting force for themainMongolarmy,wereoverconfidentand seemedeagertoattack.So,onthefollowingdayMongkaBukhawassentforwardtomakeafeintattack,whileMukhalideployed thebulkofhisarmyinambush in twovalleyssevenoreightmilesaway.TheChintookthebaitasusualandcharged,soMongkaBukha’smenthrewawaytheirbannersanddrumsandpretendedtoflee.Wan-yenHo-tarodestraightinto theambushandwas lucky toescapewithhis life,but leftbehind7,000ofhismendead.MukhalifollowedupbybesiegingYen-an,butwasstillunabletotakeit,soinsteadhedroveeastdowntheYellowRiver toChing-chao(modernXian),with thesupportofanotherTangutarmysent fromHsiHsia.Tohis surprisehe found thecitydefendedbyWan-yenHo-ta,whohad been hurriedly transferred fromYen-an,with an army said tohave been 200,000 strong. This timeHo-ta refused to come out from his defences andfight,butmaintainedastubbornresistanceevenafterMukhalireducedallthesurroundingtownsandisolatedthegarrison.ThenthecommanderoftheTangutarmywaskilledbyanarrow,andhis troops–perhapsactingunderorders fromthenewemperorLiTeWang,whosucceededhisfatherin1223andwasknowntobewaveringinhisallegiancetotheMongols–wenthome.SoonafterwardscamenewsthataSungarmyunderP’engI-pinhad invaded Shantung. Then, in April 1223,Mukhali himself unexpectedly fell ill anddied.

TheConquestFalters

The Chin took advantage of the resulting confusion to recapture several towns in thenorth,andWuHsien,aformerdefectortotheMongols,changedsidesagainandmarchedtojoinupwithP’engI-pin.AtfirstitmusthaveseemedthatallofMukhali’sgainswerelikelytobelost.ThatthisdidnothappenwaslargelythankstoayoungChineseofficernamed Shih T’ien-tse, whom Martin describes as ‘one of the outstanding figures ofMongolmilitaryhistory’.Hegatheredasmallarmywhichatfirstconsistedonlyof1,700Chinese troops and 3,000 Mongols, and defeated Wu Hsien at Chung-shan. He thenadvanced to attack the Sung, collecting reinforcements on the way. At Tsan-huang heencounteredamuchlargerarmyunderP’engI-pinandWuHsien,deployedwiththeWu-ma Hills in their rear. P’eng was apparently worried about being outflanked, whichsuggeststhatT’ien-tsewassuperiorincavalry,sotheSungsetfiretothevegetationonthehillstodenythemtotheMongols.Somehow,however,T’ien-tsemanagedtogetarchersonto theslopes,perhapsundercoverof the smoke,andattacked fromboth sides.P’eng

was captured and the Sung army destroyed.Nevertheless, P’eng’s colleague LiCh’uancontinued to hold out in the city of I-tu,whichwas besieged by aMongol armyunderBoruinOctober1226.LearningthatLiwasplanningasortie,BoruluredhimintoanotherambushbyafeignedretreattotheTzuRiver,whereheturnedandslaughtered7,000Sungtroops. Li fought on untilMay 1227,when,with the garrison starving, he surrendered.Boru, with Genghis’ agreement, spared him and appointed him governor of ShantungunderMongolauthority.ThisbroughttoanendthefirstwarwiththeSung,andwiththedeath of Genghis in August the attention of theMongols was directed elsewhere. Theconquests inChinawerenot to resume in earnest until 1231,butGenghis andMukhalibetween them had established a permanent bridgehead extending across Manchuria,ShantungandtheYellowRiverplainasfarwestastheOrdos.Withthefrontierdefencesgone, neither the Chin nor the Sung were ever able to regain the initiative. In 1234K’aifeng itself fell and theChindynastywasextinguished.TheSung in the south,whohad foolishly stabbed the Chin in the back instead of supporting them, were now leftwithoutprotectionagainstfurtherMongolexpansion.Nevertheless,SungChinawasstilltherichestandmostpopulousstateintheworld,anditwasanotherfortyyearsbeforeitscapitalatHangchowfinallyfelltoGenghis’grandsonKubilai,whobecamethefirstmaninthreeandahalfcenturiestorulethewholeofChina.

TheDestructionofHsiHsia

In 1223 Genghis began his journey back to Mongolia after the conclusion of theKhwarizmiancampaign,buthe travelledata leisurelypaceanddidnotarriveuntil twoyearslater.InthemeantimetheTangutsofHsiHsia,whomusthaveknownthattheKhanintendedtopunishthemonhisreturn,hadnotwaitedpassivelytobeattacked.Aftertheirarmyhadwithdrawnfromthewarwith theChinearly in1223, theyhadbeatenoff twolimited Mongol invasions and even retaliated by launching raids northwards intoMongolia itself. In the early summer of 1224 aMongol army besieged the city of ShaChou, but an attempt to dig under the walls was frustrated by a Tangut countermine.Genghis,whowaskept informedofeventsbymessengers, thenorderedBorutostageadiversion by attacking Yin Chou, in the east of Hsi Hsia. This diversion was moresuccessfulthanthemainoperation,asBorudefeatedaTangutarmyoutsidethetownandthenstormedit.LiTeWangsubmittedagaintoGenghisandofferedhissonasahostage,while at the same time secretly negotiating with the Chin, then changed his mind andinformed aMongol emissary that the hostagewould not be given up. Then inOctober1225a treatybetweenHsiHsiaand theChinEmpirewasmadepublic.MartinsuggeststhattheTangutshadreceivednewsoftheclashesbetweentheMongolsandtheSung,anddecided to throw in their lotwithwhat looked like an increasingly united anti-Mongolfront.But,not surprisingly,Genghis’patiencewasexhausted. In theautumnof1225he

gatheredalargearmyandmarchedintoHsiHsiaatitshead.

As usual our sources give various figures for the size of this army.Rashid ud-Dinprovidesadetailedorderofbattlewhichaddsup to170,000men.These included largenumbers of foreign allies: 50,000 Khwarizmians, 30,000 Kipchaqs and other westernsteppenomads,and20,000Indians.Unfortunately,asMartinpointsout,thislistcannotbereliablesinceitincludesamongthegeneralsJebei,whobythenhadapparentlybeendeadfor three years, andChaghatai,whowe know fromother sources had been left to lookafter affairs in Mongolia. The Khwarizmians and Kipchaqs, as very recent formerenemies,alsoseemunlikelyadditions.TheHsiHsiaOfficialHistorysaysthattheinvadersnumbered100,000, and this figuremaybe closer to the truth, thoughprobably still toohigh.InNovember1225GenghisstoppedatAburqa,ontheupperreachesof theOnginRiver,tohuntwildhorses,andwasthrownfromhisownstartledhorsewhentheanimalsstampededpast.Itwasobviousthathewasseriouslyinjured,andhisgeneralsadvisedhimtoabandonthecampaign.TheTanguts,theypointedout,werenotnomadsandcouldnotescape, so their punishment couldwait until he had recovered.TheSecretHistory saysthatnegotiationswereopenedwith the enemyand thatLiTeWangwasprepared tobeconciliatory,but hismilitary commanderAsha-gambu replied inprovocative terms. ‘Bynow’,hesaid,‘youMongolsshouldhavelearnedhowtofight.Ifyousay“Letusfight”,IhaveacampintheAlashaiMountains.’Genghisreplied‘EvenifIdie,Ihavenochoiceother than to confront his boastful words’. First, says the Secret History, he corneredAsha-gambuinhismountainstrongholdanddestroyedhisarmy.Chinesesourcesrecordthebattleinthemountainsastakingplacelater,inJanuary1227,butforwhateverreasontheMongolswereallowed tokeep the initiativeas they set about reducing thecitiesofwesternHsiHsiaonebyone.LiTeWanghadorderedthedestructionofabridgeovertheSha-chiRiver–whichwasineptlydone,sothatSuboteiwasabletorepairthedamageinasingle night – but otherwise remained passive, perhaps in the hope that the westerngarrisonswouldholdoutlongenoughtoallowaChinarmytocometohisassistance.ButtheMongolswerefarmoreexpert insiegewarfare than theyhadbeen in theirpreviousinvasion,andwereabletoconcentratetheirfullstrengthagainsteachtowninturn.Noneof them held out longer than two months, while Hsiliang, described byMartin as the‘secondcity’ofthekingdom,capitulatedwithoutresistance.Genghisspentthesummerof1226 in themountains, controllingoperations fromadistance as he recovered fromhisinjuries,butinSeptemberheoncemoretookcommandofthearmy.

ThroughouttheautumntheMongolslaidsiegetothefortressofYing-li,controllingtheNineFordsacrosstheYellowRiver,butitwasnotuntilDecemberthattheysucceededin forcing a passage. They then marched through the Ordos Steppe and attacked LingChoufromthenorth.Thiscitywassituatedontheeastbankofthenorth-flowingsection

oftheYellowRiverwhichformsthewesternboundaryoftheOrdos,andwasatthecentreofaproductiveregionofirrigatedfields.Theirrigationditcheswouldnormallyhavebeenan obstacle to the Mongol cavalry, but by this time the river and the surroundingwaterwayswerefrozen.LiTeWanghadnowdied,andhissuccessorLiHsiendespatcheda large army underWei-ming Ling-kung to relieve Ling Chou. The Hsi Hsia OfficialHistory again gives the suspiciously round figure of 100,000 for this force, so we canassumethatitwasroughlycomparableinnumberstoGenghis’army,buttheTangutshadrepeatedly shown their inability to match the enemy in open battle. On this occasionGenghiscrossedthefrozenrivertothewesternbanktomeetthem,andinflictedanothercrushingdefeat.Rashidud-Dinsaysthatthebattleactuallytookplaceonthefrozenriver,but no other sources mention this; the same writer also gives the incredible figure of300,000 for theTangutcasualties. Itwas,however, certainlyadecisiveMongolvictory,andthegarrisonofLingChou,havingnohopeofrelief,surrenderedsoonafterwards.

Pressing on southwards Genghis next approached the Hsi Hsia capital at Chung-hsing,provokingLiHsientobringanotherarmyfromtheeastinperson.HecrossedtheAlashaiMountains unopposed – perhaps because, asMartin suggests,Genghis allowedhimtodosobecauseitwouldbeharderforhimtoretreatifdefeatedonthewesternside.TheTangutswere once again beaten, andLiHsienwasbesieged inChung-hsingwhileMongoldetachmentsweresentouttomopupresistanceintherestofthecountry.Suboteiwas sent east to prevent any attempt by the Chin to intervene; on another of the epicmarchesforwhichhewasbecomingfamous,hecapturedseveralbordertownsaswellas5,000horseswhichhesentbacktoGenghis,butnoChinfieldarmymaterialised.ByMay1227,thecapitalaloneremainedinTanguthands,andinJulyLiHsienfinallyagreedtosurrender.HewasgivenamonthtocollectpresentstobringtoGenghis,butbythetimehearrivedtheKhanwasdead.HehadfallenillagainduringAugust,andprobablydiedonthe 25th. The ultimate cause is usually supposed to be the accident he suffered in theautumnof1225,butthereweremanyotherpotentialcausesofdeathoncampaign.Earlierin theyear, forexample, theKhitanministerYeh-luCh’u-ts’aihadbeenbusycollectingmedicinestocombatanoutbreakofdiseaseamongthetroops.JuvainisaysthatGenghis’dyingwordsincludedaninstructiontoconcealhisdeathfromtheTanguts,whichnodoubtexplainsthebizarreaccountintheSecretHistory,inwhichLiHsienarrivedintheMongolcampandhadanaudiencewithGenghisthroughthecloseddoorofhistent,withouteverbeingallowedtoenter.ThelastkingofHsiHsiawasthenkilled,alsoinaccordancewiththe lastwishesof theKhan.Mostpopular accountsof this campaignconcludewith thestatement that theHsiHsia civilisationwas completelydestroyed.Martin calls this ‘themost destructivewar in the annals ofMongol history’. As discussed in Chapter 7, thedestructionfellfarshortofgenocide,andmanyTangutssurvivedasMongolsubjects,but

thecitiesdonotseemever tohavebeenrebuilt.HsiHsiawas thefirstof threeChineseregimesthatGenghisandhissuccessorsweretoextinguish.Genghis’bodywasreturnedtoMongoliatobeburied,butdespitecountlesstheoriesandfruitlesssearchesthelocationof his tomb remains a mystery (see Man, 2011, for an interesting if inconclusivediscussionofthequestion).MarcoPolosaysthatthesoldiersescortingthefuneralcortègekilledeveryonetheymetsothattheirspiritscouldservetheKhaninthenextworld,butthoughthestoryisstillrepeated,itisfoundinnoneofthemorecontemporarychroniclesandisprobablyjustoneofthemanylegendsthatattachedthemselvestoamanwhohadsodrasticallychangedtheworld.

Chapter7

AMongolEmpire?

AnyattempttoevaluateGenghis’legacyencountersthedifficultythatwecannotbesurewhathewastryingtoachieve.FromhisordertokeephisdeathasecretuntiltheTangutshadfinallylaiddowntheirarms,wecandeducethatheexpectedthenewstoencouragehis enemies to resist. They may well have anticipated that the Mongol empire wouldcollapseimmediatelyashisleadinggeneralsfoughtamongthemselvesoverthespoils,justas theempiresofotherconquerorshadoftendone.But thisdidnothappen. Instead thesuccession passed peacefully to his son Ogodei, in accordance with his last wishes.Several versions of Genghis’ last words are reported. The Yuan Official History, forinstance,saysthathedevotedhislastenergiestodevisingadetailedstrategicplanfortheconclusionoftheChinwar.ButthemoredetailedaccountofJuvaini,ifaccurate,suggeststhat he foresaw a long-term future for the empire he had created.He sent for his sonsOgodeiandTolui,andtoldthem:‘ForyouIhavecreatedthisempire…Mylastwillandtestamentarethese.Ifyouwanttoretainyourpossessionsandconqueryourenemies,youmustmakeyoursubjectssubmitwillinglyanduniteyourenergies tooneend,as in thatwayyoumaycontinue toholdyourpower.’HethenappointedOgodeiashissuccessor.TheSecretHistory tellsus thathehadpreviouslydecidedonOgodeibecause thebitterpersonal rivalrybetweenhis twooldersons, JochiandChagatai,made it impossible foreithertosubmittotheother.Theyhadalmostcometoblowsinfrontoftheirfather,withChagataicallinghisbrothera‘Merkitbastard’(anallusiontohismotherBorte’senforcedresidencewiththeMerkitsbeforeJochi’sbirth),andtheelderboyretortingthatChagataiwashissuperior‘onlyinstupidity’.Ogodei’smainfaultwasthathedranktoomuch,buthehada reputation for tact andgenerosity, aswell as a senseofhumour.According toRashidud-Din,Chagataioncepersuadedhimtolimitthenumberofcupsofwinehedrankevery day; Ogodei kept his word, but simply procured an extra-large cup. The SecretHistory says that Ogodei later regretted his one lapse into cruelty, when he had theunmarriedgirlsofoneMongolianclanenslavedbecausetheirfamilieshadtriedtomarrythem off without his permission – a lapse which he blamed on the influence of hiswomenfolk.BycontrastJuvainigivesnumerousexamplesofhisopen-handednessandhisconcernforthewelfareofallhissubjects,notjusttheMongols.Genghiswasanexcellentjudgeofcharacter,andhischoiceofsuchamantocontinuehisworkgivesustheclearest

possibleindicationofthedirectionwhichhehopeditwouldtake.

Professor Owen Lattimore has argued that Genghis’ wars were all part of a greatstrategicplan,designed tobuilda state free from themainsourceofweakness thathadbedevilled other steppe-based empires. This arose from the fact that previous nomadicconquerors, as soon as they had built up an army strong enough to invade one of theirwealthy neighbours – usually China – had done so, establishing themselves and theirfollowersastheoverlordsofthesettledpopulation.Butthiscreatedapowervacuumonthesteppes,whichwouldinevitablybefilledbyanewconquerorwhowouldfollowthesame route. SoGenghis first neutralised theChinese states ofHsiHsia andChin, thenreturnedtoCentralAsiatoconsolidatehispositionoveralltheMongolianpeoplesandtherelatedTurks,atthesametimesecuringhisrearbyeliminatingtheKhwarizmianEmpire.Only then did he set out to permanently conquer and occupy his principal objective,China. This would have been a vision of extraordinary scope, but unfortunately, asMorganpointsout,thereisnoevidence,apartfromtheactualsequenceofcampaigns,thatsuch a plan existed. If Genghis had something of this sort in mind, our sources nevermention him discussing itwithmembers of his family or his army commanders.Apartfrom China, in fact, his most important foreign conquests happened more or lessaccidentally. Even in Mongolia itself the Secret History casts him as the victim ofaggressionbytheMerkits,KeraitsandNaimans,ratherthanplanningtheirdownfallfromthe beginning. For example, it describes him sending Jochi and Subotei against theMerkits in 1216 not to fill any power vacuum, but explicitly for revenge for previousperceivedwrongs.Similarly,Qara-Khitaiwasconquerednotforitsownsake,butinordertodisposeofKuchluq.AndinJuvaini’saccounttheKhwarizmianwaroccurredcontraryto the wishes of the Khan, who would have been happy to maintain friendly traderelations.What is more, he did not defer territorial conquest in China after the fall ofChung-tuin1215,butsimplyleftitinthecapablehandsofMukhali.Thisisnottosuggestthat Genghis was merely the peace-loving victim of a succession of aggressors. HepursuedtheunificationofMongoliaruthlessly,andhavingachievedthis,likemanyofhispredecessorsonthesteppe,hesawChinaastheobviousnexttarget–thougheventhewarwiththeChincouldbeseenaspartlydefensive,inviewofthepastChinsupportfortheenemiesofhisclan.Butthereisnoreasontobelievethatwhenhebeganhisconquestsheenvisaged them extending as far as they eventually did. Every great empire tends toexpand of its own accord, sometimes against the wishes of its rulers, as for examplehappened to the British in Africa in the nineteenth century. Every advance brings theconquerorsintocontactwithnewpotentialenemieswhomustbesubduedtoguaranteethesecurityoftheexistingpossessions;theperfectdefensiblefrontierisalwaysalittlefurtheraway.

Nevertheless, there is evidence that Genghis eventually came to see his ownachievements in termsofadivineplanof somesort.Hiscommentsafter thecaptureofBokhara,forexample,havebeendiscussedinChapter5.Hissuccessorscertainlybegantopresent themselvesascarryingoutaGod-givenmission toconquer theworld.MatthewParisrecordsthat,priortoGenghis’grandsonBatu’sinvasionofEuropein1238,he‘hadsentthreateningletters,withdreadfulemissaries;thechiefofwhichdeclaredthathewasthe messenger of God on high, sent to subdue the nations who rebelled against him’.PerhapsthenearestthingwehavetotheKhan’sownpoliticalmanifestoinlaterlifeisaletterwhichhesentin1220totheChineseTaoistmasterCh’angCh’un.Hisobjectwastopersuadethesagetovisithimandsharethesecretofimmortality,andsohenaturallytriedto present himself in the best possible light. After stressing the austerity of his ownlifestyle, in sharp contrast to the ‘arrogance and luxury’ encountered in China, hecontinued:‘IhaveforthecommonpeoplethesolicitudeIwouldhaveforalittlechild,andthe soldiers I treat as my brothers. Present at a hundred battles, I have ever riddenpersonallyintheforefront.InthespaceofsevenyearsIhaveaccomplishedagreatwork,andin thesixdirectionsofspaceall issubject toasingle law.’The‘greatwork’wasofcoursetheempirewhichhehadcreated.

Thisneednotimplyanybeliefinuniversalbrotherhood.Genghis’ideasseemtohaveremained centred onMongolia and its people, and although hemay have occasionallytriedtoadoptawiderperspective,inday-to-daymattersheregardedtheempireasrunforthebenefit of theMongols, ormore specificallyofhisown family and their immediateentourage.Proofof this is theway inwhich theSecretHistory records the rewardsandprivilegeshegavethem.Wholeconqueredpeopleswere‘given’tohisrelativesfortheirsupport, and favoured individuals were allowed to commit up to nine crimes withimpunitybeforetheywerepunished.Evidentlyrelationsbetweentherulingclassandtheconqueredpeopleswerestillbasedonexploitation rather than the ruleof law.Thiswasprobablyanadhocpolicyintendedtoretaintheloyaltyofthepeopleonwhomthewholeenterprise depended, and in this it was very successful. What struck outsiders mostforcibly about theMongols ofGenghis’ daywas their solidarity, theunited frontwhichthey presented to the rest of theworld. Juvaini relates a famous story of howGenghisillustrated this point to his sons by asking them to break first one arrow shaft, then aprogressivelylargerbunchuntiltherewerefourteen,whichevenstrongathletescouldnotbreak.‘Soitis,’hesaid,‘withmysonsalso.Solongastheytreadthepathofregardforone another they shall be secure…’ (This story also appears in theSecretHistory, butthereitistoldofthesemi-legendarymatriarchAlanQo’aandherfivesons.Evidentlyitwasapopularmotif inMongolculture.) In lateryears thissolidaritywas tobeseverelytested,butsostrongwastheideathataccordingtoJuvaini,whenafalconersearchingfor

a lost bird stumbled on a plot by fellowMongols against Genghis’ grandsonMongkeKhan (reigned 1251–9), his report was at first disbelieved: ‘they were quite unable tobelievethatsuchastateofaffairsexistedandtheymadehimrepeathimselfoverandoveragain’.

Nevertheless, opinion has long been divided on whether Genghis was a genuineempire-builder,ormerelyarobberbarononavastscale.Ithasbeenarguedthatalthoughhecametoruleoverlargeagriculturalsocieties,heneverunderstoodhowtheyfunctioned,butregardedthemsimplyassourcesofplunderforhisarmies.Itishardtomaintainsuchanegative view, however, in the light of the innovations which he copied from thesesocieties. Perhaps themost important of thesewaswriting, previously unknown amongtheMongols, forwhichGenghis introducedascriptbasedon thatof theUighurs. Ithasalsobeenargued,forexamplebyRatchnevsky,thatGenghisintroducedaformalcodeoflaws for his empire, known as the ‘GreatYasa’. However,Morgan has shown that theevidence for this is very sparse. Rashid ud-Din preserves what were thought to befragmentsofthiscode,buttheyprobablyrepresentanincompletecollectionofindividualdecrees,recordedoriginallybyJuvaini,coveringawidevarietyofsubjects.Basedontheaccount in the Secret History, Morgan argues that Genghis appointed Shigi-qutuqu tosomesortofsupremejudicialposition,butthatratherthanformalisingasetofregulationshewassimplytokeeparecordofhisdecisionstoformthebasisofasortofcaselaw.Thiswasneverthelessafar-sightedpolicywhichimpliesthatGenghisenvisagedalong-lastingstateorganisationbasedonthekeepingofwrittenrecords–hardlythepreoccupationofatypicalbandit.

Inmany respects, admittedly, the administration of theMongol empire did remainrudimentary.Where possible local chiefs or governors were employed to carry out theroutinerunningoftheconqueredterritoriesaccordingtoexistinglocalcustom,thoughinChina Khitans, Uighurs, and even Europeans like Marco Polo, seem to have beenpreferredtonativeChinese.MorganconsidersthattheMongoltaxationsystemwasneverstandardised,butconsistedmostlyofadhoclevies.AsJuvainicomplains,Mongolrulersweresometimes induced to farmout thecollectionof taxes tounscrupulousagentswhoresorted to violentmethods of extortion. One of the dueswhichwe knowwere leviedsystematicallywastheobligationtosupportandmaintainthekhan’smessengers.Aformalpostalservice,the‘Yam’,wasintroducedduringthereignofOgodei,withpermanentwaystations at intervals along themain routeswhere the riders could obtain food and freshmounts. The Secret History reveals that this was necessary because messengers hadpreviously been abusing their position, commandeering horses and goods in excess oftheirneeds,andplacinganunbearableburdenon the inhabitantsof thedistricts throughwhich they regularly passed. From this we can deduce that Genghis probably issued

commissions to individual officerswhowere entrustedwithmessages, leaving them tomaketheirownarrangementsfortheirjourneys.Inalifeofalmostceaselesscampaigning,heprobablyneverhadthetimetodevotetoregularisingthisandotheraspectsofhisrule.Butevenhere,theregimewhichheestablishedcanbeseentobetakingstepstoensurethecontinuedprosperityoftheterritoriesunderitscontrol.OneaspectinwhichtheMongolregimewasunusualamong itscontemporaries–andveryprogressive tomoderneyes–was its attitude to religion. The Mongols believed in a single supreme being, Tengri,thoughtheyalsoworshippedthesun,andregardedmountains,streamsandothernaturalfeatures as sacred.Their taboos included polluting runningwater bywashing in it, andeating animalswhich had been struck by lightning. On thewhole, however, theyweretolerant of other religions, and willing to accept aspects of them which they foundworthwhile.When they established their rule over non-Mongol peoples, this tolerationcouldbecomeasourceofstrength.WehaveseeninChapter5,forexample,howJebei’sdeclaration of religious freedom won over the Muslims of Qara-Khitai. William ofRubruckdescribesadebatewhichheattendedatthecourtoftheGreatKhanMongkein1254, in which Nestorian and Catholic Christians, Muslims, Buddhists, Taoists andShamanistsallputforwardtheirreligiousviews: thiswasprobablytheonlyplaceintheworldatthattime,andforcenturiesafterwards,wheresuchagatheringcouldhavebeenheld.

Genghis’Successors

FortyyearsafterGenghis’deathhisunitedworldempirehadbeenreplacedbyfourmainsuccessorstates,allruledbyhisdescendants–theYuanregimeofKubilaiKhaninChina;theIlkhansinPersia;theGoldenHordeonthewesternsteppes;andtheChagataiKhanatebasedontheoldMongolianheartland.ItistemptingtoseethisfragmentationasproofthatGenghis’ ‘great work’ had ultimately failed, but this may be an oversimplification. Arecurring theme in thehigher level political andmilitaryorganisationof theMongoliantribesseemstohavebeentheconceptofacentralauthoritysituatedinthecentreoffoursubordinate entities, sometimes referred to as the ‘khan and four beys system’. Inaccordancewiththis traditionGenghishaddividedhisempirebeforehisdeathintofour‘ulus’orprovinces,eachofwhichwasallocatedtooneofhissons.Similarly,inhisearlycareer,hewas seenasbeing servedandprotectedby themenwhom theSecretHistorycallshis‘fourwar-horses’–Bo’orchu,Mukhali,BoroqulandChila’un-ba’atur–andhis‘fourhounds’, Jelme, Jebe,SuboteiandQubilai.This systemmayhavehad itsultimateoriginsintheChineseideaofthefourdirections,butinfactitwaswidespreadthroughoutmedievalCentralAsia,whereit isattestedfor theTurks,Koreans,TibetansandKhitansamongothers.InviewoftheotherevidenceforKhitaninfluenceonMongolinstitutions,theymayhavebeentheinspirationforitsadoptioninGenghis’empire.Fromthispointof

view, the division of the empire into the four successor khanates can be regarded as anatural progression, whichGenghismay have foreseen. The fact that at the end of thethirteenthcenturyeveryoneofthesestateswasstillruledbymembersofhisfamilymightwellhaveseemedtohimthemostimportantindicatorofhissuccess.

Thedetailsofhowthissituationhadcomeaboutwere,ofcourse,lesstidythananypoliticaltheory.Underthenew‘GreatKhan’OgodeitheempirecontinuedtoexpandafterGenghis’ death,with the final defeat of theChin in China and the reoccupation of theBlack Sea steppes. By this time it constituted the largest expanse of territory evercontrolledbyasinglemonarch.Ata‘quriltai’in1235thekhanandhisgeneralsplannedthe simultaneous invasions of Korea and Poland, something which even Stalin neverattempted.Ogodei died in 1241, a setbackwhichmay have saved central Europe frombecominganotheroutpostoftheempire,andwasfollowedafteraperiodofuncertaintybyhis son Guyuk (1246–8), and then by Mongke (1251–9), a son of Ogodei’s youngerbrotherTolui.Bythis timetensionswithin theroyalfamilywerebecomingevident,andTolui’sclansecuredthesuccessiononlybymeansofabloodypurgeoftheiropponents.After1259Mongke’sbrotherKubilaiwasnominatedasGreatKhanaswellasheadofthe‘ulus’ofChina,butheneversucceededinenforcinghisauthorityovertheotherprovinces.Thesebecameineffectindependentandoftenmutuallyhostilekingdoms.

TheMongolswhoremainedinMongoliaandtheadjacentregions,includingthoseoftheChagataiHorde (the descendant of the ‘ulus’ ofGenghis’ second son), increasinglysaw themselvesas theguardiansof traditionalnomadways.Undermen likeArikBokeandKhaidu,Kubilai’smain rivals for the title ofGreatKhan, they spentmuchof theirtimefightingtheirfellowMongols– thoughtheChagataiscontinuedtocampaignasfarafieldas theDelhiSultanatefor therestof thecentury.SultanGhiyasud-DinBalbanofDelhi(1266–87)wassuccessfulinfightingoffaseriesofincursionsbytheChagatais,andbecametheprincipalfocusofresistancetotheMongolsintheeast.Hewasproudofthefact that he had fifteen former sovereigns from all over Asia at his court, all of themrefugees from theMongols. The Chagatai Horde inflicted a shock defeat on the DelhiarmyaslateastheBattleofKiliin1299,butsoonafterwardsitlostitsmainpower-baseintheformerKhwarizmianterritoriesandgraduallydeclinedintoobscurity.

In1256MongkesenthisbrotherHulegutocompletetheconquestofPersiaandtheMiddleEast,which had been left in an anarchic state following the original invasion ageneration earlier. Hulegu destroyed the castles of the Assassins in Persia, capturedBaghdad and Damascus, and established a permanent base on the grasslands ofAzerbaijan,whereJebeiandSuboteihadrested theirhorses thirty-fiveyearsbefore.HisattacksontheMuslimsmadehimanaturalallyoftheCrusadersaswellastheGeorgiansandArmenians (thoughhewasactuallyaBuddhist), andhewaspreparing tomarchon

Jerusalem and Cairo when news of the death of Mongke forced him to abandon thecampaign.His troopssettledinIraqandPersiaandestablishedtheIlkhanidstate,whichfought several wars against theMamluks of Egypt in the second half of the thirteenthcentury. The Mamluks were a dynasty of slave soldiers, originally imported by theirAyyubid predecessors, who had overthrown their masters in 1250. Ironically, many ofthemhadbeensurplusKipchaqprisonersofwar, sold to theAyyubidsby theMongols.TheMamluk victories atAin Jalut in 1260,Abulustayn in 1277 andHims in 1281 areoften seen as the first real checks to the Mongols’ long career of conquest, whichprevented the Mongols penetrating further than the borders of Syria. The IlkhanidsconvertedtoIslamduringthereignofHulegu’sgreat-grandsonGhazanaround1295.TheMongol ruling class was gradually absorbed by its Persian and Turkish subjects, andGenghis’directlinecametoanendwithKhanAbuSa’idin1335.

Thewesternsteppehadoriginallyformedthe‘ulus’ofGenghis’eldestsonJochi,whohaddiedbeforehisfatherandbeensucceededbyhissonBatu.Batuextendedhisterritoryfurtherwest into easternEurope during the campaign of 1237 to 1241.At the time his‘ulus’ was referred to as the Kipchak Khanate, which reflects the fact that most of itstroopswereKipchaksrecruitedduringBatu’scareerofconquest,butitlaterbecamebetterknownas theGoldenHorde, afterBatu’s spectaculargolden tent.Underhis successors,theHordekeptRussiainsubjectionandoccasionallyraidedfurtherwest,butmostofitsenergieswere taken up by itswarswith the Ilkhans.Despite its sometimes uninspiringmilitary record, the Golden Horde outlasted all the other Mongol successor states,survivingontheUkrainiansteppesuntilthesixteenthcentury.

When Mongke died in 1259, his brother Kubilai broke with tradition by havinghimself proclaimedGreat Khan, not by a ‘quriltai’ inMongolia, but by his own army,whichhehadcommandedinChinasince1251.In1261hedefeatedarivalclaimant,ArikBokeoftheChagataiHorde,butsevenyearslateranotherrevoltbyArikBoke’ssuccessorKaiducutChinaofffromthewestern‘ulus’.KubilaiwasnowinpracticetheruleronlyoftheChineseportionoftheMongolempire,afactwhichheacknowledgedin1271whenheproclaimedhimselfthefounderofanewChinesedynasty,theYuan.ThisregimesurvivedKubilai’sdeathin1294andendureduntil1368,whenaChineserebelnamedChuYuan-chang ejected the Mongols and established the native Ming dynasty. The rulers ofMongolia remained a threat to China until theManchus finally subjugated them in theeighteenthcentury,butToghonTemur,whodiedin1370,wasthe lastkhanof theroyalhouseofGenghistoruleinhishomeland.Afterthat,outsidetheCentralAsiansteppesatleast,theMongolswerelittlemorethanamemory–andusuallyabadone.TheYuanandIlkhanid regimes were never very efficiently run and left behind them a legacy ofeconomic decline,while theRussianswho had once been subject to theGoldenHorde

remembered itmainly foroppressionandextortion.But foraperiodofacenturyandahalf, the Mongol conquerors and their successors had brought together regions of theEurasiancontinent thathadneverpreviouslyhadanyknowledgeofeachother,andhadpresided over the flowering of science and trade that ensued. Chinese inventions likegunpowder and printing percolated through to theWest during theMongol period, notperhapsasaresultofdeliberateMongolpolicies,butasaresultoftheadmittedlyuneasypeacethattheybrought.AstheMuslimwriterAbu’lGhaziconceded,‘UnderthereignofGenghisKhan,allthecountrybetweenIranandthelandoftheTurksenjoyedsuchpeacethat amanmight have journeyed from the land of sunrise to the land of sunsetwith agoldenplatteruponhisheadwithoutsufferingtheleastviolencefromanyone.’

TheDeathToll

Anyone who would like to admire Genghis Khan as an empire-builder and militarycommander,however,isforcedsoonerorlatertoconfronttheissuewhichhasdefinedhisreputation in thewest for at least the last century. Every book on the subject seems todevote a section to the atrocitieswhich are alleged to have accompaniedhis conquests,and in particular to the mass slaughter of the inhabitants of captured cities in theKhwarizmianEmpire.ThiscontinuestobethebasisforthechargethatGenghiswasnotanempire-builderatall,butmerelyadestroyer;thatheandhisfollowerswereattractedbythewealthofsettledsocietiesbutdidnotunderstandhowtheyworked;andthattheyweremotivatedbyaracistcontemptfornon-Mongols,orperhapsnon-nomads,whichledthemto kill farmers and traders as if they were so many vermin occupying what shouldrightfullyhavebeenMongolpasture lands.Part of the evidence for this charge is near-contemporary,basedon theworksofchroniclers likeJuvainiandJuzjani,butalsooftencited is the contrast between the fabulouswealth of regions likeKhwarizmia, northernAfghanistan and the Hsi Hsia territories in northwest China, as described bymedievalobservers,andthedepressedconditionofthesameregionsinmorerecenttimes.NotonlydidGenghisinflictunparalleledsufferingonhisvictims,weareaskedtoconclude,butheactuallysucceededinannihilatingwholecivilisationsandblightingtheirlandsformostofthenextmillennium.

Itwould be hard to argue that theMongol conquests did not cause a great deal ofcollateral damage, aswewould call it nowadays. It was common practice inmedievalwarfare to plunder captured towns, and if they had resisted calls to surrender it wasconsidered justified to put the inhabitants to the sword. Genghis possessed the mosteffectivearmiesoftheperiod,conqueredthelargestareaandcapturedthebiggestcities,soinevitablyhewasimplicatedinthegreatestlossoflife.Butitdoesnotfollowfromthisthathewasdeliberatelysettingouttoeliminatesettledcivilisation.Theslenderevidenceforsuchapolicy isbasedon twoeventswhich tookplace inChina.TheSecretHistory

reportsthatafterthesecondconquestofHsiHsiain1227theKhan,exasperatedbytheirtreachery,orderedtheentireTangutpeopletobedestroyed.AccordingtoChinesesourcescitedbyMartin,however,thisorderwasnotactuallycarriedout.Anunusualconjunctionoffiveconstellations(orplanets?)appearedinthesky,andtakingthisasanomenGenghisreversed the policy, ordering his men to refrain from killing non-combatants in future.Probablythisexcusewasconcoctedasawayofrepudiatingarashthreatmadeintheheatof themomentwithout theKhan losing face. The SecretHistory tends to confirm thatmany of the supposed victims survived, because it describes how after Genghis’ death‘manyoftheTangutpeople[whomwehavejustbeentoldwere‘destroyed’]weregiventoYisui-qatun’.ItcouldevenbearguedthattheKhan’swordsquotedintheHistory–‘Letussay“Thatwastheend,theyarenomore”’–mightrefertothelossoftheirpoliticalandcultural identity rather than to their physical extermination. The Chinese biography ofYeh-lu Ch’u-ts’ai also tells how the Khitan minister learned of a proposal from someMongolofficerstokillofftheentirepeasantryofnorthChinasothattheirfarmlandcouldbeusedforgrazing.Yeh-luimmediatelywenttoGenghisandarguedthatthetaxrevenuesfromathrivingagriculturalsectorfaroutweighedtheadvantagesoftheextrapasture.Hisarguments won the day and the Khan ordered that the peasants should not be harmedunnecessarily, but this source is of course concerned to show its subject in the bestpossible light, and there is no reason to believe that the massacre was ever seriouslyconsideredasofficialpolicy.

Certainly therewasgreat lossof life inChina,but it fell far shortofgenocide.WehaveseeninChapter4how,duringatemporarypeacewiththeChinin1214,GenghisisallegedtohavekilledallhisprisonersattheChu-yungPassratherthantakethembacktoMongolia.ButMartin,whorelatedthisstory,didnotbelieveit,andalthoughhegivesnoreasonstheyarefairlyobvious.TheMongolarmyatthistimewasincreasinglyreliantonChineseauxiliaries,andevenifGenghiswaspreparedtosabotagethepeacesosoonafterithadbeenconcluded,hewouldhardlyhaveorderedsuchawasteofmanpower.Juzjanisays that the Khwarizmian embassy which reached Chung-tu after its capture saw theevidence of the slaughter of many thousands of the inhabitants, but his figures areobviouslyexaggerated,andweknowfromothersources,suchas theaccountofCh’angCh’un’sjourneytomeetGenghisin1220,thatthecitycontinuedtofunction.InfacttheMeng-wu-erhShihclaimsthatthefirstactoftheconquerorswastotakestepstofeedthestarving population. The biography of the Chinese general Shih T’ien-ni in the samesource tells us that in 1219 its protagonist persuadedMukhali to restrain hismen fromkilling and plundering in order to reconcile the population toMongol rule rather thanantagonisingthem.Inmoregeneralterms,acomparisonhasoftenbeenmadebetweenthecensusreturnsforChinabeforetheMongolconquest,whichlistabout100millionpeople,

andthoseforthe1290s,whichsuggestadeclineto70million.ButitisnotpossiblefromthistoconcludethattheinvadingMongolsmusthavekilledthemissing30million.TheiradministrationwasnotasefficientornecessarilyaspopularasthoseoftheSungandChin,andlargenumbersofpeoplemayhaveevadedthecensustoescapetaxation,whileevenifthereductionisgenuineitcouldhaveowedmoretofamine,diseaseandsocialdisruptionthantooutrightmurder.

MostoftheevidencefortheexceptionaldestructivenessofGenghis’conquestscomesfrom theKhwarizimianEmpire.Here, chroniclers including Juvaini, Juzjani andRashidud-Dinall relate essentially the same storyofmass slaughter, especially in the citiesofKhorasan, in the southern part of the empire. Juvaini’s comment on the results is oftenquoted: ‘even though there be generation and increase until the Resurrection thepopulation will not attain to a tenth part of what it was before.’ Unfortunately thisquotationisjustasoftentakenoutofcontext.InfactJuvainiwasemphasisingthecontrastbetween the core regions which had suffered no more than an initial conquest by theMongols, and those further south and west in Khorasan and Iraq. At Bokhara andSamarkand,hesays,therehadbeennogeneralmassacre,andtheMongolshadappointedgovernorstooverseereconstruction,sothat‘atthepresenttime’(aroundtheyear1260),theyand theirsurroundingdistrictswereasprosperousas theyhadeverbeen. Infact inanotherpassagecriticisingtherapacityofalatergovernor,JuvainidescribestheMongolconquesteveninpartsofKhorasanasrelativelycompassionate:‘whenadistrictorvillagesurrenderedtheMongolswouldbesatisfiedwithonlyalittlefodderandtenellsoflinen,oratmostahundred,accordingtothesizeoftheplace…evenwhentheytookavillagebyforceofarmstheywould,itistrue,carryoffallthecattleandclothingtheycouldlaytheirhandson,butsuchashadbeensparedbytheswordtheydidnottormentwithtortureandmutilation.’TheSecretHistory recordshowwhenToquchardisobeyedordersnot toplunderthecountrysideduringhismarchacrossKhurasanin1220,Genghiswassoangrythathe threatened toexecutehim. Itwas in the frontier regions,whichhadbeen foughtover ever since andwhere every town had been sacked several times, andwhichwerefurthermore prone to outbreaks of fever, that the demographic disaster described abovehadtakenplace.Inalaterpassage,JuvainiattributesmuchofthedamagenottoMongolarmiesatall,buttolocalwarlordstakingadvantageofthepowervacuumaftertheflightof the Shah: ‘there was no peace in that region. An emir would suddenly appear in adistrictandbuildacastleonahilltop.Thatmanwouldattackthis,andthismanseizeandkillthat.’

On theotherhandevenJuvaini,whoon thewhole isanapologist forMongol rule,citessomeapparentlydamningevidenceofmassmurder.Theworstof thesecomefromtheperiodafterthefallofSamarkand,whenGenghis’armieswerepushingsouthandwest

intoterritorywhereKhwarizmianforceswerestillinthefieldundertheleadershipofJalalud-Din, and hence it was more than ever necessary to remove the threat of a hostilepopulationintheirrear.ThenotoriousmassacresatMervandNishapurareattributablenottotheKhanhimselfbuttohisyoungersonTolui,whomayormaynothavebeenactingunderorders.Itisquitepossiblethatinhisyouthandinexperienceheactedwithexcessiveseverity out of fear of letting his father down by failing to suppress all resistance. ButGenghis was in command in person at Tirmiz, where the people were not onlyslaughtered,butcutopeninthehopeoffindingjewelswhichtheyhadswallowed,andatBalkh, whose inhabitants were brought out onto the plain on the pretext of holding acensusandthenmassacred.Juvainiexplainsthatthiswasdoneforfearofrebellion,butasfarasweknowBalkhhadputuplittleifanyresistance,andinfacthadprovidedJebeiandSubotei with supplies when they passed by in the pursuit of the Shah. Nevertheless,Genghis appears to have had some reason to distrust the inhabitants, becausewhen hepassedby againonhis return from the campaignhe found survivorsholdingout in theruins and ordered a second massacre, this time leaving not a single wall standing.Bamiyanalsosufferedbadly,butheretherewasapersonalmotiveforthereprisalsinthedeathofGenghis’grandson.

Occasionally amid the rhetoric we have what at first sight appears to beincontrovertibleevidenceforthescaleofthekilling.JuvainisaysthatafterthemassacreatMerv the ‘sayyid’ Izz ad-Din Nassaba, ‘with some other persons’, spent thirteen dayscountingthedead.‘Takingintoaccountonlythosethatwereplaintoseeandleavingasidethosethathadbeenkilledinholesandcavitiesandinthevillagesanddeserts,theyarrivedatafigureofmorethanonemillionthreehundredthousand.’Andyetithasnotescapedobservant scholars that figures of this magnitude cannot be literally correct. Morganconcluded from his own visits to the sites of Herat and Balkh that themedieval wallscould not physically have contained asmany people as are alleged to have been killedthere,even if thepopulationwasswelledbyrefugeesfromthesurroundingcountryside.Theactualmechanicsoftheallegedslaughterarealsodifficult tocomprehend.AtMerv(whereincidentallyJuvainiaccuses thelocalcountrypeopleof joiningin themassacre),eachMongolsoldier issaid tohavekilledbetween300and400victims.Yet theycouldhardlyallhavebeenboundfirstwithoutarousingtheirsuspicions,evenifenoughropetotie upmore than amillion people hadbeen readily available.Neither could they easilyhavebeensearchedforweapons.Sodidnoneofthemattempttoescape,ortooverpowertheir assailants? Did they simply wait patiently while the throats of their relatives andneighbourswerebeingslit?AmoreplausiblescenariomightbethatthecitizensoftownslikeMerv – numbering in the tens of thousands, if not the rumoured millions – wereassembledoutside thewallswhile their conquerorsplundered theirhomesand searched

forfugitivesoldiers.TheirnumbersandhostiledemeanourmightthenhavecausedalarmamongtheoutnumberedMongols,whowerethenorderedtoridedownanddispersethecrowds.The latterwouldhave scattered in all directions andmany if notmost of themwould have made their escape, but being on foot and poorly armed they would havesuffered heavy losses to the bows, swords and lances of their enemies. The populationwould then have been ‘destroyed’ as a coherent group in the sameway as the Tangutswere,leavingthecountrysidelitteredwiththousandsofdeadbodiesliketheaftermathofamajorbattle.Thiswouldsurelybeenoughtofuelrumoursofmassexterminationamongthosewholaterpassedbythetemporarilyabandonedcity.Infactweoftenhaveevidencethatthecitieswhosepopulationswereallegedlyannihilatedcontinuedtothrivethereafter.So after recounting the slaughter at Merv, Juvaini adds that one of the citizens wasappointedgovernor‘ofthosethatreassembledoutofnooksandcrannies’,andthat‘manypersons’survivedtobekilledlaterbyMongolpatrolsactingwithoutordersinsearchofloot.DespitethistherewerestillenoughcitizenslefttoattemptarebellioninNovember1221,whenarumourspreadthatJalalud-Dinwasapproaching.

Juvainiheldhighoffice asGovernorofBaghdadunderGenghis’grandsonHulegu,anditisevidentfromhisworkthathewasonthewholeanadmireroftheMongolempire,andofitsfounder.Tothemodernmindthemassslaughterswhichhechroniclesareveryseriouscrimes,anditisinconceivablethathewouldrelatethem,stilllessexaggeratetheirextent,withoutoverwhelmingevidencetosupportthecharges.ButJuvainiwasconvincedthat the Mongol invasion had been instigated by God to punish a sinful world, withGenghis as His conscious instrument. He makes this quite explicit in his account ofGenghis’arrivalinBokhara,andinhisreportofthewordswithwhichtheKhanissaidtohave addressed his enemies. He never used threats, we are told, but only the standardformula:‘Ifyesubmitnot,norsurrender,whatknowwe?TheAncientGod,Heknoweth.’In this context it seems less unlikely that Juvani would give credence to fantasticallyinflateddeathtolls,andhemighthaveseennoconflictbetweenhisloyaltytotheMongolregimeandhisreportingofthem.Inanycase,thoughthetotalnumbersofdeathsreportedwereexceptional, theslaughterofthosewhomwewouldconsidertobenon-combatantswasaroutinepartofmedievalwarfare,especiallyinthecaseofatowntakenbyassault.Martin,forexample,comparestheMongolmassacreswiththe15,000citizensoftheSungtownofTsao-chiaPaokilledbytheChinin1218,andthe30,000HindusslaughteredbytheMuslimconquerorAlaud-DinKhiljiatChitorin1303.Manyotherexamplescouldbeadded. Juvaini says that ShahMuhammad had once killed 10,000 of his own subjectswhilesuppressingarebellionatSamarkand.TheconductofEuropeanarmieswasscarcelymore restrained. The siege of Jerusalem during the First Crusade ended in a notoriousbloodbath,asdidthatofLimogesbytheBlackPrincein1369,duringtheHundredYears

War. The brutality of the sack of Limoges evoked the sympathy of the contemporarychroniclerJeanFroissart,wholamentedthatthePrince‘wassoinflamedwithpassionandrevenge thathe listened tonone,but allwereput to the sword,wherever theycouldbefound,eventhosewhowerenotguilty;forIknownotwhythepoorwerenotspared,whocouldnothavehadanypart in this treason’.Andyet theperpetratorsof theseatrocitieshaveremainedinpopularestimationheroesofchivalry.

It is hard to avoid the conclusion that some commentators, at the time and morerecently, have been willing to believe the worst of the Mongols simply because theirappearance and lifestyle appeared alien to them.Often quoted is the description by thePersianpoetAmirKhuzruofMongolprisonerswhomhesawinDelhiduringthereignoftheSultanGhiyasud-DinBalban(1266–87):‘Theireyesweresonarrowandpiercingthattheymighthaveboredaholeinabrazenvessel,andtheirstenchwasmorehorriblethantheircolour…Theirnostrilsresembledrottinggraves,andfromthemthehairdescendedasfarasthelips…Theydevoureddogsandpigs…TheSultanmarvelledattheirbeastlycountenancesandsaidthatGodhadcreatedthemoutofhellfire.’Evenallowingforthefact that prisonersofwar are likely to appearunkempt and their demeanourunfriendly,this can hardly be regarded as an objective description, though it has sometimes beenquoted as if itwas.Martin rightly calls it ‘a caricature, further illustrating the fear andhorrorinspiredbytheMongols’.Itwasnot,however,unique.InalettertoPopeHonorius,KingGeorgiIVofGeorgia’ssuccessorQueenRusudanreferredthemas‘asavagepeople,hellishofaspect’.AndFriarJordanofGiano,writinginBohemia,describedtheMongolsas‘inhumanandofthenatureofbeasts,rathertobecalledmonstersthanmen,thirstingafteranddrinkingblood,andtearinganddevouringthefleshofdogsandhumanbeings’.

Itissometimesalleged–ratherhypocriticallyinviewoftheaboveaccounts–thattheMongols had a racist contempt for all other peoples, and even when not consciouslycontemplatinggenocidehadnorealplaceforthemintheirworldview.Inreality,likeallrulersuntilveryrecenttimes,theyseemtohaveregardedthepopulationoftheirrealmasan asset to be maximised where possible.With the exception of the Tartars, the otherMongoliantribesconqueredbyGenghiswereincorporatedintohisgrowingnationratherthanslaughtered,andevenintheTartarcasethewomenandchildrenwerespared.Evensettledagriculturalpeopleswereon thewhole judgedon their individualmerits.OneofJuvani’sstoriesillustratesthispoint.HesaysthatOgodei,whenhebecameKhan,sentfora famous wrestler to perform at his court. This man was a Tajik, from the formerKhwarizmian Empire, and one of the ethnic group which had suffered most severelyduring the conquest. The Khan was impressed with his skills and rewarded him bypresentinghimwithanattractivewife.SometimelaterOgodeimetthisgirlandaskedher–withanudgeandawinknodoubt,asthesexualprowessoftheTajikswasastanding

jokeoftheperiod–howshewasenjoyingmarriedlife.Shecomplainedthatherhusbandwasneglectingher, soOgodei summonedhim for anexplanation. It turnedout that theTajiksbelievedthatsexualactivityweakenedthem,andthat thewrestlerwasanxioustobeontopformtofightinfrontoftheKhan.Ogodeiimmediatelyorderedhimtogiveupwrestling,explainingthatwhathereallywantedwasforthecoupletoproducechildren.

There has also been a rather uncritical willingness to believe that the economicdeclineofpartsofCentralAsiamusthavebeenduetotheMongolinvasions.Thecontrastbetween the fertile, populous land described by early medieval writers, and the arid,poverty-stricken backwater which it had become by the beginning of the twentiethcentury, iscertainlydramatic.Butrecentscholarshiphasshownthatmostof thedeclinecanbeattributedtoamuchlaterperiod,andinfactinsomerespectsitisstillcontinuingtoday.TheAralSea,forexample,wasonceborderedbyfertileagriculturallandaswellassupporting a thriving fishing industry, but the saline desert which now surrounds it islargelytheresultofmassiveevaporationcausedbyill-conceivedtwentieth-centurySovietirrigation projects. The location of thirteenth-century Samarkand has long beenabandoned,andthecityhasbeenrebuiltatleasttwiceondifferentsites,butitsdeclinecanhardlybelaidatGenghis’door,sincewehaveJuvaini’stestimonythatitwasthrivinginthe1260s.ThecityagainbecamethecapitalofagreatempireundertheTimuridsinthefifteenth century, and only entered an irreversible decline after that. More plausibleexplanations exist than the brief Mongol destruction as an explanation for theimpoverishmentofthisandtheothercitiesoftheSilkRoad:amongthosethatmusthavecontributed were the gradual replacement of overland trade by sea routes after thePortuguesenavigatorscircumnavigatedAfricaattheendofthefifteenthcentury,andlateronthemilitaryconquestofCentralAsiabyunsympatheticregimesinRussiaandChina.TheagriculturalproductivityofPersiaandneighbouringCentralAsiaalsodeclined,andthishasoftenbeenattributedtoMongolneglectofthecomplexirrigationsystemsandthedeaths of the farmerswhose job itwas tomaintain them, but again ifGenghis is to beblamedforthiswemustexplainwhyinthe1260sJuvainiwasstillextollingthefertilityoftheSamarkandregion–whichwasfirmlyunderMongolcontrol–incomparisonwiththedamagedoneinthefrontierzones.InHsiHsiathecitieswerenotrebuiltandthefertilityoftheirrigatedfarmlandalongtheYellowRiverseemsnevertohavebeenfullyrestored,butthisisaregionoflightandeasilyexhaustedsoils,andtheviabilityofthesettledwayoflifewasalwaysmarginal.Nodoubttheinitialinvasionsofanycountryledtodamagetocropsandfarmersaswellascities,buttherapidrecoveryofmostareasundertheensuingMongolgovernmentsuggeststhattheycouldnothavebeenashostiletosettledlifeasissometimesassumed.

Chapter8

Genghis–TheVerdict

How oldGenghis waswhen he died is uncertain. Rashid ud-Din says that it waswellknown that he lived for seventy-two years, which would place his birth around 1155.However, theevidenceof theSecretHistorysuggests thathewasbornsomeyears later,about 1162, and this is theofficially accepteddate inMongolia,where for examplehis840thanniversarywascelebratedin2002.Eventhislaterdatemeansthatatleastuntilhismid-sixties he continued to lead his armies on campaign – an unimaginably hard life,requiringhimtotravelimmensedistancesonhorseback,exposedtoallweathers.Evenifhenolongerfoughtinperson,heremainedaddictedtotheenergeticanddangeroussportofhunting.ThesageCh’angCh’unhadtriedunsuccessfullytopersuadehimtogiveitup,explaining that although he could not confer immortality, he did know some ways inwhichhe could improve theKhan’s life expectancy.Another vicewhichCh’angCh’unwarnedagainstwasexcessivesexualactivity,butGenghishadignoredthisadviceaswell;Juvainirecordsthatinthe1260shealreadyhadmorethan20,000livingdescendants.TheKhan’shealthandvigour,untilhislastillness,wereclearlyexceptional.Juzjani,whomusthaveknownpeoplewhohadseenhimduringthewarinKhwarizmia,whenhewasinhismid-fifties, describes the Khan in fairly conventional terms as tall, vigorous, of strongconstitution, his hair not yet grey. Only his eyes were remarkable; they remindedobserversofacat.

TheportraitofGenghiswhichweseeintheSecretHistory,however,isnotoneofaherointhetraditionalmould,whosereputationdependedonhispersonalfeatsofarmsinthestyleofanAlexandertheGreatoraRichardtheLionheart.Infactsomepassagesinit–liketheabductionofBorte,discussedinChapter2–seemtocastdoubtonhiscourage.Onotheroccasionsalsohe took refuge in the forestswhilehiscompanionswere left tohold off a pursuing enemy. According to the Secret History’s account of the Khan’sshowdownwith the shaman Teb Tengri, when the latter’s six brothers entered his tentGenghiswas‘afraidofbeinghemmedin’andleftthetenttojoinhisguards,whogatheredround to protect him. But in all these cases hewas temporarily outnumbered, and hadgoodreasontofearanattemptonhislife.Toretreatfromdangerinthesecircumstancescouldbeseenaspragmaticrather thancowardly.Another interpretationofhisactions is

thathegenuinelybelievedinhisdivinemissiontounitehispeople,andsoconsideredthepreservationofhisownlifeasofparamountimportance.Whenthecauserequiredthatheexpose himself to danger, for example in decisive battles, he did so without apparenthesitation,asthehorsehehadkilledunderhimatKoyitenin1201andtheseriouswoundhesufferedsoonafterwards,bearwitness.TheSecretHistory’saccountofhismissiontorecovertheeightstolenhorsesalsoshowshimactingdecisivelyinanemergency,withoutundueregardforhisownsafety.AccordingtoRashidud-Din,inlaterlifeGenghisusedtorecountotherstoriesofhisadventurousyouth,inoneofwhichhewasonceambushedbysixassailants.Hechargedthemwithhisswordwhiletheyshotarrowsathim,cutthemalldown,androdeonunscathed.Onhisreturnjourneyhefoundtheirhorsesstillwanderingloose and rounded them all up.Whether a story like this can be taken at face value isquestionable,butitdoessuggestthattheKhanwasawareoftheneedtoplaytheheroattimesifhewastoretaintherespectofhiswarlikefollowers.

Genghis’personalabilityasamilitarycommanderhasbeenmuchdiscussed,buttheconsensushasalwaysbeenthatheratesamongthegreatest inhistory.Theextentofhisconquestsandthenumberofhisvictoriesalonewouldguaranteethataccolade.Itseemsunlikelythatheintroducedanymajortacticalinnovations;hisarmiescontinuedtofightinasimilarstyle to thatwhichwesee inuseamongbothfriendsandenemies in theearlycampaigns in Mongolia – a style which may have been inherited from their Khitanpredecessors. But the almost unbroken success of the Mongol armies against a widevarietyofopponentsshowshowlittleneedtherewasforinnovation.Healreadypossessedthebestcavalryintheworld,andhewasnodoubtwisenot totrytochangeit.Hemayhave regularised and improved their organisation and discipline, but it is less theadministrativedetailsofhisachievement that impresses thanthescopeofhisvision.Heledhisarmiesonoperationsofunprecedentedscale,coordinatingtheirmovementsacrossvast distances with a sureness which reminds us of the young Napoleon. He had anextraordinary grasp of the importance of intelligence and reconnaissance, and of thestrategic relationship between widely-separated regions – what we would now callgeopolitics.Forexample,hewasabletoplanarendezvousbetweenhissonJochiandthewesternexpeditionofJebeiandSuboteinorthoftheCaspianSea–aregionthousandsofmilesfromMongolia,wherenoMongolsoldierhadyetsetfoot.JuvainisaysthatonhisexpeditionintoIndiaheconsideredreturninghomebywayofHsiHsia,morethan2,000miles to the northeast. He abandoned the planwhen local informants assured him thatthere was no road – he was presumably unaware of the existence of the Himalayasbetweenhimandhisgoal–but the fact thathecouldcontemplate suchamarchacrosscompletelyunknownterrain,andknewtheprecisedirectionitshouldtake,isatributetohisstrategicawareness.

Anequally importantqualitywashis ability to selectmenof talent, and to employtheminareastowhichtheirparticularskillswerebestsuited.Genghisdidnot,however,sufferfromthedelusioncommonamongautocrats thatwillpoweralonecouldovercomeall obstacles. One of the sayings which has survived among his ‘biligs’ or ‘maxims’,quotedbyMartin,concernedanofficernamedYisunBeg.Genghisadmittedthathewastalentedandbrave,andcapableofenduringgreathardships,butconsideredhimunfit tocommandanarmybecausehedidnotappreciatethatothermencouldnotdowhathedid.‘Onlyamanwhofeelshungerandthirst,andbythisestimatesthefeelingsofothers,isfittobeacommander,ashewillseethathiswarriorsdonotsufferfromhungerandthirstandthatthefour-footedbeastsdonotstarve.Themeaningofthisisthatthecampaignanditshardshipsmustbeinproportiontothestrengthofitsweakestwarriors.’

There have been suggestions that he was sometimes unduly suspicious, and gavecredencetorumoursthathismosteminentfollowerswereplottingagainsthim.Accordingto the Secret History he accepted Teb Tengri’s malicious claim that a prophecy hadforetold that Qasar would replace him, and even had his brother arrested. Qasar wasreleasedonlyaftertheirmotherHo’elunhadintervened,andeventhenwasnotrestoredtohisformerrank.It isnoteworthythatTebTengri’snextattempt tospreaddissension,bysubvertingthefollowersofGenghis’youngerbrotherTemuge,wasalsoforestalledbyoneof thewomenof theKhan’shousehold– in thiscasehiswifeBorte. IthasbeenarguedthatthewayinwhichtheSecretHistorydepictsGenghisasinfluencedbywomenwaspartofasubtlecampaigntodiscredithim.Ontheotherhand,toamodernobserveritcouldbeseenasevidenceofhisopen-mindedness.WhenQulanQatunof theMerkitswasbeingbroughtbyherfathertopresenthertothekhan,theywerebrieflydetainedbyanofficernamedNaya’a-noyan,whoinsistedonescortingthem.GenghisaccusedNaya’aofhavingheld the girl for his own nefarious purposes, but when Qulan Qatun spoke up in hisdefenceheacceptedherargumentsandrewardedtheman.Hecouldalsobeswayedbythecounselofhisofficers,aswhenherescindedhisordertoexecutehisuncleDa’aritai,whohad fought against him in the Kerait war, when Bo’orchu, Mukhali and Shigi-qutuquintercededonhisbehalf.Comparedtomanyothermedievalmonarchs–andindeedtohisownsuccessors–Genghisseemstohavebeenrelativelyimmunetothesortofinsecuritythatledthemtoremoveorevenmurdertheirrelativesandmostableservants.Infacthiswillingnesstolistentoreasonedcriticismandmoderatehissometimeshastyangeristoamodern observer one of his most attractive characteristics. The picture in the SecretHistory,oftheruthlessconquerorhumblysubmittingtoatelling-offfromhismotherandconfessing ‘I was afraid… I was ashamed’, goes some way towards explaining why,amonghisownpeopleatleast,hewasasmuchlovedasfeared.

Another example of the Khan’s open-mindedness was his treatment of his former

opponent Jebei. In 1218, according to Juvaini, Jebei fell under suspicion after hissuccessful pursuit of Kuchluq and conquest of Qara-Khitai. Genghis seems to havethought–orlistenedtothosewhowantedhimtothink–thathisgeneralmightsethimselfup as an independent ruler in the newly-conquered territory, and so he sent amessagewarninghimnot tobe too ambitious. In fact the accusationwasquite incredible.Apartfrom the fact that Jebei had never shown any sign of disloyalty, Qara-Khitai wasstrategically indefensible, sandwiched as it was between theMongol andKhwarizmianEmpires,andwithbordersopentothesteppeonthreesides.AndofallpeopleJebei,whohad just conquered it, would have known this. Nevertheless, he resorted to a dramaticgesturetoallayhismaster’ssuspicion.Manyyearsbefore,attheBattleofKoyiten,hehadkilledGenghis’favouritehorse,whichtheSecretHistorydescribesasyellowwithawhitemuzzle.Now,fromtheteemingherdsofQara-Khitai,heroundedupathousandhorsesofsimilarcolouringandsentthemasapresenttotheKhan.This,saysJuvaini,fullyrestoredGenghis’ trust in him.Why itwould necessarily do so, though, is not entirely clear.Agenuinelyparanoidmonarchmusthaveappreciatedthatsuchanextravagant‘gift’wouldenhance Jebei’s reputation more than that of the recipient, especially as Genghis wasalwaysinsistentthatthebootyfromwarbelongedtohimuntilhehaddistributedit,sothattechnically the horses had never been Jebei’s to give.We should perhaps seeGenghis’reactionasthatofanoldcomrade,genuinelymovedbythereminderofsharedhardships,rather than of a tyrant mollified by the offer of a few horses. The successes of othersubordinates, perhaps better placed to cause trouble than Jebei had been, seem to haveattractednothingbutpraise.ThebiographyofSuboteiintheYuanOfficialHistoryquotesthe Khan’s verdict on the Uriangqat general: ‘Subotei has slept on his shield, he hasprevailed in bloody battles and has exposed himself for our house, and we are deeplygratified.’Mukhali,whoofallGenghis’commanderswouldhavehadthebestopportunitytobecomeindependentattheheadofthearmyinChina,retainedhistrustuntiltheendofhislife.

ItcouldbearguedthatfromthebeginningGenghiswasasluckyinhisopponentsashewasinhissupporters.OfhisearlyrivalsinMongolia,Jamuqalackeddiplomaticskillsandfailedtoinspireloyalty;ToghrilwasindecisiveandhissonSenggumtoohasty;whileTayangKhanoftheNaimanswaseasilydemoralised.Tayang’ssonKuchluqsoalienatedhisownpower-baseinQara-Khitaithathewasovercomewithoutafight.Rashidud-Dinquotes the observations of a chief named Sorkat of the Baya’ut clan on the variouscontendersforpowerineasternMongoliainthe1190s.Jamuqa,hesaid,wasanintriguerwhosetpeopleagainsteachother insteadof inspiring themtowork towardsacommongoal.Alak-uduoftheMerkitshaddignityandauthority,butdidnothaveTemujin’sabilitytogovern.Thelatter’sbrotherQasarwasadmiredforhisstrengthandhisprowessasan

archer,butlackedleadershipskills.OnlythefutureGenghisKhan,Sorkatconcluded,hadthecombinationofqualitiesneededtounitetheMongolnation.AmonghisopponentsinChina, theTanguts ofHsiHsia seem to have lacked any tactical sophistication and theheadlongchargesoftheircavalrywereeasilydefeated,whiletheirroyalmastersvacillatedconstantlybetweenappeasing theMongolsandfighting them.TheChinwereweakenedby infighting,andsomeof theirbest troops, theKhitans,preferred theMongols to theirJurchenmasters.Genghis’oneenemyofrealstaturewasJalalud-Din,butbythetimehetook command of theKhwarizmian army the empire had been fatallyweakened by hisfather’s failures.However, just as hemade his own luck in thematter of choosing hisgenerals,Genghisshouldalsobegivencreditforseizingtheopportunitiesprovidedbyhisopponents.

Thepicturewhichemergesfromouradmittedlypatchyandbiasedsourcesisofamanof enormous vision and ability, able to inspire both loyalty and fear, often ruthless andvengeful, but not gratuitously sadistic, and lacking the paranoia towhich lessermen inpositionsofauthorityareprone.Hemaynothavebeenthedemi-godportrayedbysomeofhismodernadmirers,butneitherwashe themonsterof the traditionalwesternview.Heleft behind not just ruined cities and piles of skulls, but the nearest thing to politicalstability that thewar-torn regions ofCentralAsia had ever seen.Perhaps it is Juvaini’sfinalverdictonGenghiswhichbestsumsupthecomplexityofhischaracter,aswellastheambivalencewithwhichpeoplehavealwaysregardedit.Thechroniclerpaystributetohis‘great energy, discernment, genius and understanding’, but in his view Genghis wasneverthelessultimatelyawarrior:‘anoverthrowerofenemies,intrepid,sanguinary,cruel.Ajust,resolutebutcher.’ItisnotajudgementofwhichtheKhanhimselfislikelytohaveentirelydisapproved.

SourceNotes

Introduction

TheeditionsIhaveusedforthemainsourceslistedhereare:

Onon,U.(ed.andtrans.),TheSecretHistoryoftheMongols,NewYork,2001.

Rashidud-Din,TheSuccessorsofGenghisKhan,trans.Boyle,J.,NewYorkandLondon,1971.

AtaMalik Juvaini, The History of the World Conqueror, trans. Boyle, J., Manchester,1958.

Waley,A.,TravelsofanAlchemist,London,1931.

DeRachewiltz,I.,PapalEnvoystotheGreatKhans,London,1971.

MarcoPolo,TheTravels,trans.Latham,R.E.Harmondsworth,Middlesex,1958.

ForJuzjaniandNasawiIhavehadtorelyonextractsinotherworks,principallyBarthold,W.,TurkestanDownto theMongol Invasion,London,1977.ThenumerousuntranslatedChinese records are discussed in Martin, H. D., The Rise of Chingis Khan and hisConquest of North China, Baltimore, 1950. A valuable general overview of thecontemporary sources appears in Morgan, D., The Mongols, Oxford, 1986. Man, J.,Genghis Khan, Life, Death and Resurrection, London, 2011, discusses the present day‘cult’ofGenghisKhaninMongoliaandChina.

Chapter1:Genghis’World

The ethnography of pre-Genghis Mongolia is discussed in Ratchnevsky, P., GenghisKhan:HisLifeandLegacy,Oxford,1991,andDeHartog,L.,GenghisKhan,ConqueroroftheWorld,London,1989.Thelatterisalsothemainsourceforgeographyandclimaticconditions. For new research on rainfall variations see Scientific American, 12 March2014(www.scientificamerican.com-HistoryofScience-Climatewire).

The beginnings of steppe warfare are discussed in Anthony, D., The Horse, TheWheelandLanguage,Princeton,2007.BothAnthonyandDiCosmo,N.,AncientChinaand itsEnemies:TheRise ofNomadicPower inEastAsianHistory, Cambridge, 2002,alsopresentevidencefortheself-sufficiencyofsteppeeconomies.FortheSilkRoadseeFranck,I.,andBrownstone,D.,TheSilkRoad,aHistory,NewYork,1986.Theargument

forthenomadsasvictimsappearsinBeckwith,C.,Empiresof theSilkRoad,Princeton,2009.ForeventsinChinaseeTheCambridgeHistoryofChina,Vol.6:AlienRegimesandBorderStates,907–1368,Cambridge,1994.

Chapter2:WarontheSteppes

ThisaccountisbasedprincipallyontheSecretHistory.JuvainiandtheChinesesourcesinMartin (1950) discuss the Baljuna Covenant; Martin is also the main source for theKirghizcampaign.FortheroleoftheMuslimmerchantsseeRatchnevsky.

Chapter3:TheKhan’sArmies

TheSecretHistory is themain source for theorganisationofGenghis’ armies.SeealsoRashid ud-Din, Marco Polo, and Atwood, C. P., Encyclopedia of Mongolia and theMongolEmpire,NewYork,2004.Onthequestionofnumbers,seeBarthold,DeHartog,andMorgan (1986).Morganalsodiscusses thedevelopmentof the ‘tamma’armies.FortheYuandynastytheprincipalsourceisHsiao,C.C.,TheMilitaryEstablishmentof theYuanDynasty,Cambridge,Massachusetts,1978.CarpiniisquotedinDeRachewiltz.ForHaithonseeBretschneider,E.(trans.),‘TheJourneyofHaithon,KingofLittleArmenia,toMongoliaandBack’,MedievalResearchesVol.1,London,1888.

Anthony,andKarasulas,A.,MountedArchersoftheSteppe,600BC–AD1300,OspreyEliteSeries120,Oxford,2004,discusstheoriginsofthecompositebow.Modernresearchinto the properties of theMongol bow is to be found in Karasulas, andMcEwen, E.,Miller,R.andBergman,C., ‘EarlyBowDesignandConstruction’,Scientific American,June 1991. Also useful, though devoted mainly to European archery, are Hardy, R.,Longbow, Sparkford, Somerset, 1992, and Roth, E.,With a Bended Bow – Archery inMedieval and Renaissance Europe, Stroud,Gloucestershire, 2012. The classification ofmethodsofarrowrelease,widelyquoted inmodernbooksbutseldomacknowledged, isdue toMorse,E., ‘AncientandModernMethodsofArrow-Release’,Proceedingsof theEssexInstitute,1885.ForHenryVIII’slongbowsseeStrickland,M.,andHardy,R.,TheGreatWarbow,Stroud,Gloucestershire,2005.Thelimitof85lbsforatypicalarcher,andthepenetration tests againstmail, are fromRoth.T’angdynasty archery is discussed inRanitzsch,K.H.,TheArmyofTangChina,Stockport,1995,andthatoftheManchusinVonEssen,M.F.,EightBannersandGreenFlag:TheArmyoftheManchuEmpireandQing China, 1600–1850, The Pike and Shot Society, Farnham, Surrey, 2009. Theeffectivenessofrelativelylightbowsisdiscussed,thoughinanearlierhistoricalcontext,by Godehardt et al, ‘The Reconstruction of Scythian Bows’, in Molloy, B. (ed.), TheCuttingEdge:Studies inAncientandMedievalCombat,Stroud,2007.Theauthorsalsomakethepointthatcumulativedamagetoarmourandshieldsbyrepeatedhitsmaybeassignificantasasinglepowerfulpenetratingstrike.ForthearchaeologyofMongolarrows

and other weapons, and poisoned arrows, see Nicolle, D., and Shpakovsky, V.,KalkaRiver 1223, Osprey Campaign Series 98, Oxford, 2001. The quotes from Fakhr-iMudabbir are taken from Digby, S.,War-Horse and Elephant in the Delhi Sultanate,Oxford,1971.

ArcherytacticsarediscussedinTurnbull,S.,MongolWarrior,OspreyWarriorSeries84,Oxford,2003.Thefourteenth-centuryMamlukmanualisquotedinAmitai-Preiss,R.,MongolsandMamluks–TheMamluk-IlkhanidWar, 1260–1281,Cambridge,1995.TheviewsofProfessorJ.M.Smithhavebeenputforwardinseveralpublicationsdealingwiththe Mongol-Mamluk wars: Smith, J. M., Jr., ‘Ain Jalut: Mamluk Success or MongolFailure?’,Harvard Journal of Asiatic Studies No. 44, 1984. Smith, J.M., Jr., ‘MongolArmiesandIndianCampaigns’,HarvardJournalofAsiaticStudies44:2,1984.Smith,J.M., Jr., ‘Mongol Society and Military in the Middle East’, in Lev, Y. (ed.),War andSocietyintheEasternMediterranean,Leiden,1997.Smith,J.M.,Jr.,‘NomadsonPoniesversusSlavesonHorses’,JournaloftheAmericanOrientalSociety,1998.

TheKhitanmilitarysystemisdiscussedinWittfogel,K.A.andFeng,C.,HistoryofChinese Society: Liao, Philadelphia, 1949. For the wider influence of the Khitans seeMorgan(1986).ThesourceforearlierManchurian innovations isDien,A., ‘TheStirrupanditsEffectonChineseMilitaryHistory’,ArsOrientalisXVI,UniversityofMichigan,1986. ThePolitical andMilitary Institutes of Tamerlane are quoted in Zaman,M. K.,MughalArtillery,Delhi,1983.Amitai-Preisscites theEgyptianaccountof theBattleofHims. Witsen is quoted in Karasulas, and Marbot in Haythornthwaite, P., NapoleonicLight Cavalry Tactics, Osprey Elite Series 196, Oxford, 2013. For other Napoleonicparallels,seeNosworthy,B.,BattleTacticsofNapoleonandhisEnemies,London,1995.

ForAnnaComnenaseeSewter,E.(trans.),TheAlexiadofAnnaComnena,London,1969.OtheraccountsofTurkishtacticsappearinSmail,R.,CrusadingWarfare,1097to1193,Cambridge,1995,andStricklandandHardy.TaybughaisquotedinLatham,J.,andPatterson,W.,SaracenArchery,London,1970.ForTurkishandMamlukarchery,seealsoNicolle,D.,Saladinand theSaracens,OspreyMen-at-ArmsSeries 171,London, 1986,and for Mamluk military exercises Smith, G. R.,Medieval Muslim Horsemanship: AFourteenth-CenturyArabicCavalryManual,London,1979.

For Yuan dynasty armour see Anon, Ancient Chinese Armour, Shanghai ClassicsPublishingHouse,1996(Chinesetext).NicolleandShpakovskydiscussexcavatedswordsandarmour.ThecarryingcapacityofMongolhorsesisdiscussedinSmith(1998).MengHung’saccountofMongolshieldsisquotedinMartin.ForPersianshieldsseeHeath,I.,ArmiesoftheMiddleAges,Vol.2,Worthing,Sussex,1984.IbnBattutaisquotedinDigby.Smith(1998)discussesseatedarchers.SiegeweaponsarecoveredinTurnbull,S.,Siege

WeaponsoftheFarEast1,OspreyNewVanguardSeries43,Oxford,2001.Fortrebuchetssee Hansen, P. V.,Experimental Reconstructionof aMedieval Trebuchet, Copenhagen,1992,andforgunpowderweaponsNeedham,J.,ScienceandCivilisationinChinaVol.5,Part7:TheGunpowderEpic,Cambridge,1989.

Thedebateabout the influenceofpastureon theextentof theMongolconquests isdiscussedinMorgan,D.,‘TheMongolsinSyria,1260–1300’,inEdbury,P.W.,CrusadeandSettlement,Cardiff,1985.SeealsoSmith,J.M.,Jr., ‘AinJalut:MamlukSuccessorMongol Failure?’,Harvard Journal of Asiatic Studies No. 44, 1984; Smith, J.M., Jr.,‘MongolArmiesandIndianCampaigns’,HarvardJournalofAsiaticStudies44:2,1984;andSinor,D.,‘TheMongolsintheWest’,JournalofAsianHistoryVol.33,No.1,1999.AcontraryargumentisputforwardbyAmitai-Preiss.

Chapter4:TheFirstCampaignsintheEast

Thenarrativeof thecampaigns isbasedmainlyonMartin.For theTangutarmyand itswarswith theSungseeKycanov,E. I., ‘LesGuerresEntre lesSungduNordet leHsi-Hsia’,inÉtudesSongSeries1Vol.2,Evreux,1971.GunpowderweaponsarediscussedinNeedham. For the Jurchen army and the defences of theChin empire see: Tao, J.,TheJurcheninTwelfth-CenturyChina:AStudyofSinicization,Washington,1976;Lovell,J.,TheGreatWall, London, 2006; and Turnbull, S.,ChineseWalled Cities, 221 BC to AD1644,OspreyFortressSeries84,Oxford,2012.

Chapter5:WarintheWest

Juvainiisthemainsourcefortheeventsinthischapter,supplementedbyRashidud-Dinand Juzjani. Also valuable is The Cambridge History of Iran, Vol. 5: The Saljuq andMongolPeriods,Cambridge,1968.MartindealswiththeconquestofQara-Khitaiandthestrategic situation on the eve of theKhwarizmianwar. For theKhwarizmian army seeNicolle(1986).

TheBlackSeacampaignisneglectedbyJuvainibuthasbeenwellcoveredbyseveralmodernwriters.SeeDeHartog,Sinor,Saunders,J.,TheHistoryoftheMongolConquests,London,1971,andespeciallyNicolle,D.,andShpakovsky,V.,KalkaRiver1223,OspreyCampaignSeries98,Oxford,2001.

Chapter6:TheFallofNorthChina

Themain source here isMartin.TheSecretHistory also relates themain events of thefinalcampaigninHsiHsia.SeeManforadiscussionofthedeathandburialofGenghis.

Chapter7:AMongolEmpire?

Morgan(1986)andRatchnevskydiscusstheadministrationoftheempireandthecareers

ofGenghis’ successors.The theoryofGenghis’grandstrategicplan is inLattimore,O.,‘The Geography of Chingis Khan’, Geographical Journal 129/1, 1963. See alsoSchamiloglu,U.,‘TheQaraciBeysoftheLaterGoldenHorde:NotesontheOrganisationoftheMongolWorldEmpire’,ArchivumEurasiaeMediiAevi4,1984.

Themain sources for themassacres are Juvaini and Juzjani.Morgan,Manand (forChina) Martin all attempt to put the allegations into context, but the main counter-argument is provided by Juvaini himself, in passages often ignored by sensationalistwriters.Beckwith argues that the decline in the economy ofCentralAsia postdates theMongolera.

Chapter8:Genghis–theVerdict.

LiddellHart,B.H.,GreatCaptainsUnveiled,London,1927,hasbeenveryinfluentialinpresentingGenghis as amilitary genius.Ratchnevsky argues for the viewof theSecretHistoryasunsympathetictoGenghis.

SourcesandRecommendedReading

PrimarySourcesinTranslation

AtaMalik Juvaini, The History of the World Conqueror, trans. Boyle, J., Manchester,1958.

Bretschneider,E.(trans.),‘TheJourneyofHaithon,KingofLittleArmenia,toMongoliaandBack’,MedievalResearchesVol.1,London,1888.

MarcoPolo,TheTravels,trans.Latham,R.E.,Harmondsworth,Middlesex,1958.

Onon,U.(ed.andtrans.),TheSecretHistoryoftheMongols,NewYork,2001.

Rashidud-Din,TheSuccessorsofGenghisKhan,trans.Boyle,J.,NewYorkandLondon,1971.

Waley,A.,TravelsofanAlchemist,London,1931.

SecondarySources

Anon,AncientChineseArmour,ShanghaiClassicsPublishingHouse,1996(Chinesetext).

Amitai-Preiss, R., Mongols and Mamluks – The Mamluk-Ilkhanid War, 1260–1281,Cambridge,1995.

Anthony,D.,TheHorse,TheWheelandLanguage,Princeton,2007.

Atwood,C.P.,EncyclopediaofMongoliaandtheMongolEmpire,NewYork,2004.

Beckwith,C.,EmpiresoftheSilkRoad,Princeton,2009.

TheCambridgeHistory of China, Vol. 6: Alien Regimes and Border States, 907–1368,Cambridge,1994.

TheCambridgeHistoryofIran,Vol.5:TheSaljuqandMongolPeriods,Cambridge,1968.

DeHartog,L.,GenghisKhan,ConqueroroftheWorld,London,1989.

DiCosmo,N.,AncientChinaanditsEnemies:TheRiseofNomadicPowerinEastAsianHistory,Cambridge,2002.

Dien,A., ‘TheStirrup and itsEffect onChineseMilitaryHistory’,ArsOrientalis XVI,UniversityofMichigan,1986.

Digby,S.,War-HorseandElephantintheDelhiSultanate,Oxford,1971.

Franck,I.,andBrownstone,D.,TheSilkRoad,aHistory,NewYork,1986.

Hansen,P.V.,ExperimentalReconstructionofaMedievalTrebuchet,Copenhagen,1992.

Hardy,R.,Longbow,Sparkford,Somerset,1992.

Haythornthwaite,P.,NapoleonicLightCavalryTactics,OspreyEliteSeries196,Oxford,2013.

Heath,I.,ArmiesoftheMiddleAges,Vol.2,Worthing,Sussex,1984.

Hsiao,C.C.,TheMilitaryEstablishmentoftheYuanDynasty,Cambridge,Massachusetts,1978.

Karasulas,A.,MountedArchersoftheSteppe,600BC–AD1300,OspreyEliteSeries120,Oxford,2004.

Kycanov,E.I.,‘LesGuerresEntrelesSungduNordetleHsi-Hsia’,inÉtudesSongSeries1Vol.2,Evreux,1971.

Latham,J.,andPatterson,W.,SaracenArchery,London,1970.

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Needham, J., Science and Civilisation in China Vol. 5, Part 7: The Gunpowder Epic,Cambridge,1989.

Nicolle,D.,SaladinandtheSaracens,OspreyMen-at-ArmsSeries171,London,1986.

–––––,TheMongolWarlords,Poole,Dorset,1990.

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–––––,andShpakovsky,V.,KalkaRiver1223,OspreyCampaignSeries98,Oxford,2001.

Nosworthy,B.,BattleTacticsofNapoleonandhisEnemies,London,1995.

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Schamiloglu,U.,‘TheQaraciBeysoftheLaterGoldenHorde:NotesontheOrganisationoftheMongolWorldEmpire’,ArchivumEurasiaeMediiAevi4,1984.

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