+ All Categories
Home > Documents > Germany’s External Relations: Context and PolicyToward theEast Carnegie Endowment Klaus Segbers...

Germany’s External Relations: Context and PolicyToward theEast Carnegie Endowment Klaus Segbers...

Date post: 22-Dec-2015
Category:
Upload: jack-walsh
View: 218 times
Download: 2 times
Share this document with a friend
33
Germany’s External Relations: Context and PolicyToward theEast Carnegie Endowment Klaus Segbers Free University of Berlin Washington, November 24, 2003
Transcript

Germany’s External Relations:Context and PolicyToward theEast

Carnegie Endowment

Klaus Segbers

Free University of Berlin

Washington, November 24, 2003

Content

1 National and Global Contexts of Germany’s FP

2 Germany‘s Political Agenda

3 Germany and Russia: An Axis Reactivated?

4 Lessons from Slipping into a War

1.1 National Context: Structures

„Zivilmacht“ (civilian power concept)

Corporatism (politics as bargaining and mediation of conflict regulation)

„Handelsstaat“ (trading state; dependency on importing energy)

Social and non-state actors and dimensions

Germany's Dependence on Energy Import

98%

82%

55%

Mineral Oil Natural Gas Coal

75% of energy consumption have to be imported

Source: Verbundnetz Gas AG

Growing Dependency on Natural Gas Imports

70

30

76

24

81

19

83

17

86

14

87

13

88

12

1980 1990 2000 2005 2010 2015 2020

German Extraction

Imports

Share in %Projection

Source: Verbundnetz Gas AG

1.2 Global Context

Post-Westphalian system (globalization)Post-Cold War systemPost-bipolar systemMore actors, more levels, more games, more (and conflicting) rulesPost-WW 2 agenda is changingLess sovereigntyDecreasing consistency

1.3 National Context: History

Historical Contingencies

Unification of 1991

Normalization and pragmatization of Germany‘s foreign relations

Foreign Deployments of German Forces

ca. 300

ca. 1.820

ca. 430

ca. 40

12

ca. 1.320

ca. 3.350

11

7.300 Bundeswehr soldiers are involved in global conflict resolution

1.4 Foreign Policy Outcome

Pursuing own interests via

Politics of integration

Politics of institution building

Not necessarily siding with U.S. on all matters (since 1998)

Greater relevance of EU

1.5 FP’s Conditioning Variables

• Permanent media exposure

• Permanent elections

• Changing domestic and European coalitions

• Continuing multi-level games

2.1 Priority Issues: Domestic Problems

Domestic issues are by far more important than external questions.Germany is in a process of deep changes of employment, health, pension, education and tax policies.In general, there is not yet a break-through, despite “Agenda 2010”.

2.2 Topics and Issues: The External Agenda

Europe: Institutional reforms

Europe: Enlargement

Europe: Stability pact (still…)

Europe: rebuilding GASP/ CFSP

2.3 Topics and Interests: the Agenda

Maintaining and developing effective institutions and regimesFuture role of U.S.A.: balancing, interlocking, or inclusion?Demographic trends: regulating migration

2.4 Issues and Problems of Transatlantic Relations

How to achieve an equilibrium of global asymmetric configurations of actors? Is it possible to institutionalize the U.S. in a global world?How to modernize and stabilize the Near and Middle East?How – if at all – make political Islam and (post)modernity compatible?How to control WMD‘s?Can the CFSP be re-build, re-activated?What to do with the East-EU spaces in Europe?What are relevant macro-tendencies b/w anarchy; institutionalization; selective stability?

3.1 Germany and Russia: Problems?

No significant bilateral problems:

Emigration – controlledDebts – managedEconomies – cooperating (though unevenly)Restitution - symbolic

3.2 Germany and Russia: Tasks

EU – RF (economics, after „Kaliningrad“)

EU- RF (security, NATO-enlargement, after Iraq)

EU – RF (societies, Chechnya, Media, etc.)

3.3 Germany and Russia: Dependencies?

Neither way.Russia is good in balancing, vertically and horizontally (you also may call it inconsistency). D. is important, but not a gatekeeper to the EU.Germany is partly dependent on energy imports and on repayments. But not crucially.

Germany:The Main Mineral Oil Supply Countries

Origins of mineral oil imports to Germany in 2001

(in % of total 104.632.000t)

Russian Federation

29%

Norway19%Great Britain

15%

Libya9%

Syria7%

Others21%

Source: Statistisches Bundesamt, 2002

Germany's Foreign Trade Partners: Imports

(shares in % of total 522.062 mill. €)

Netherlands8%

United States8%

Great Britain6%

Others51%

France10%

Italy6%Russian

Federation2%

Austria4%

Belgium5%

Russia ranks 15th (2002)

Source: Statistisches Bundesamt, 2003

Germany's Foreign Trade Partners: Exports

(shares in % of total 648.306 mill. €)

France11%

Netherlands10%

United States8%

Others46%

Italy6%

Austria5%

Russian Federation

2%Belgium

5%

Great Britain7%

Russia ranks 15th (2002)

Source: Statistisches Bundesamt, 2003

3.4 Germany and Russia – Allies?

No.In global times there are no Metternich-type alliances.Germany is deeply embedded in European institutions; Russia is not (yet?).The fabric of good relations is, to a large extent, social, i.e. „beneath“ politics.D: Economic exchange, cultural images, language competences are overwhelmingly directed elsewhere.

4.1 Where are we now?

Substantial differences between European and U.S. politics – reflected in Europe and in the U.S. - toward...... Iraq: What is the mission? WMDs? Fighting Al Quaeda? Regime change? Transforming the regional landscape? Oil? Relight the last war?... reconstruction: no mission, no concept. What is the roadmap for re-building Iraq? What commitments are there? ... future options for the Near and Middle East – politically and socially ... trade-offs b/w effective counter-terrorism and civil liberties and rights... the future role of the U.S.A. (preemption).

4.2 Is it only politics?

Fortunately, the economic and social relations b/w Europe and the U.S. are not affected so far.But we see effects of new security requirements, visa rules etc.Also, in our societies there are partly diverging views and even significant differences in outlooks on how to address global problems.

Germans on U.S. Leadership in World Affairs

55

5027

4568

neither or bothequally

not desirable

desirable

How desirable is it that U.S. exert strong leadership in World Affairs?

2002

2003

(Source:Transatlantic Trends 2003)

4.3 Lessons ... from Slipping into another War

Either give the U.S. a wild card, assuming benign hegemon behavior, or build and maintain effective institutions.To become effective, institutions – including U.N. - must be modified.Rethink election cycles.Reflect media influence on modi operandi.

The end...

http://userpage.fu-berlin.de/~segbers

Germans and Americans on the Role of U.N. in World Affairs

2

4

18

26

80

70

Don´tknow

No

Yes

United Nations needs to be strengthened or not?

U.S.

Germany

3

5

59

38

38

57

Don´t know

No

Yes

When vital interests of our country are involved, it is justified to bypass the UN.

(Source:Transatlantic Trends 2003)

3.1 Germany‘s foreign policy since 2002:Phase 1 (Summer 2002)

• Tactical mission: winning elections.

• Excessive statements ...• ...led to self-constraints of

the governing coalition: parties and society as constraints.

• „Zivilmacht“ by default, not design...

3.2 Germany‘s foreign behavior since 2002:Constraints, phase 2 (Winter 2002/03)

• Attempts to avoid isolation; cooperation with France and Russia, China

• Non-communication with U.S.A.

• Mutual dependency b/w; pressure and need for domestic reforms and foreign behavior

3.3 Germany’s externals behavior since 2002: Activism, phase 3 (Spring 2003)

• Later, attempts to build a win-position >>>

• … succeeded: no legitimation for a unfounded campaign;

• ... failed: U.S.A. would act no matter what: costs of non-action too high; corresponds to national security strategy/ ideology; geo-political (“democratization”) and geo-economic motivations (oil, Saudi Arabia); group thinking.

3.4 Germany’s Policy Since the War:Maneuvering and Balancing,

Indifference

• Differences toward U.S. government remain substantial (on what drives politics, institutions, and many policy issues)

• Formally repairing relations with U.S. – back to courtesy

• Reducing symbolism re. the tripartite axis - while continuing attempts to strengthen the EU – CSFP

• Focus on domestic affairs is dominant

• Stressing Germany’s active role in international crises (now including Iraq)

Foreign direct investments in Russian industry

FDI in Russian industry from major investor countries in jan-sept 2002 $mln

Cyprus13%

Switzerland10%

Germany10%

Britain10%

Netherlands10%

France8%

Finland7%

United States6%

Others26%

direct portfolio otherIndustry 4950 100 1202 92 3656

Cyprus 647 13,1 139 8 500Switzerland 516 10,4 18 0.2 498Germany 502 10,1 140 0.4 362Britain 494 10,0 184 3 307Netherlands 481 9,7 151 - 330France 396 8,0 4 - 392Finland 346 7,0 103 - 243U.S. 286 5,8 160 1 125Others 1282 25,9

Total

As % of industry results

of which

Source: State Statistics Committee


Recommended