Get Your Free Copy at: ™s been arranged at Landmark Aviation. The car is waiting. The car is...

22000099VVeerrssiioonn 22

CCaauuttiioonn,, WWaakkee TTuurrbbuulleennccee!!LLiivvee ttoo FFllyy AAnnootthheerr DDaayy……

Get Your Free Copy at: www.apstraining.com/ebook

AAuutthhoorrss::

PPaauull BBJJ RRaannssbbuurryy

JJ.. CCllaarrkkee MMccNNeeaaccee

Caution, Wake Turbulence! 2009 Version 2

2 Copyright © 2009. APS Emergency Maneuver Training. All Rights Reserved. www.apstraining.com (V2)

Foreword The global nature of business and personal travel make aircraft an indispensible part of modern life. Aviation today is one of the safest forms of transportation ever invented. Yet every so often an airplane accident occurs. Investigators methodically examine every aspect of the ill fated flight to learn what happened and prevent reoccurrence. Over time fewer and fewer accidents occur but the leading cause remains the same. Loss of Control – in flight, is the number one cause of aircraft accidents. Technology has mitigated many types of accidents. Only top quality pilot training can mitigate Loss of Control – in flight. Pilots need academic, simulator, and on‐aircraft practical training to have the ability to maintain or regain control during upsets. Whether caused by wake turbulence, thunderstorms, aircraft malfunctions, or pilot error, today’s pilots must be able fly the aircraft successfully out of the upset. With increasing use of automation pilots must be system managers while maintaining handling skills. The balance is difficult to maintain but is essential to modern aviation. Avoiding becoming digitally dependant is necessary to successfully recover from an upset. Professional training dedicated to helping pilots acquire the skills necessary to cope with an unexpected upset is essential. Having flown with APS it is clear that their training meets the need. By blending academic, simulation, and flight training into an effective syllabus I firmly believe APS has one of the best, if not the best, programs for upset recovery training in the world. The more pilots that are effectively trained to recover from upsets the lower the accident rate will be. Aviation’s focus has to be on better pilot training if we are to lower the number of Loss of Control – in flight accidents, which are the leading cause of fatalities and hull losses in the worldwide commercial aviation industry.

Captain John M. Cox, President & CEO Safety Operating Systems Executive Air Safety Chairman, Air Line Pilots Association (2001‐2004) International Air Transport Association Trained Airline Auditor (IOSA)

After 25 years as a Captain for a Major US airline John retired to become Chief Executive Officer of Safety Operating Systems, a Washington, DC aviation safety consulting firm. Captain Cox was the 2007 recipient of the Sir James Martin Award for aviation safety and is a Liveryman of the Guild of Air Pilots and Air Navigators. A veteran of almost 40 years in aviation, Captain Cox now works with regulators, airlines, business flight operations and manufacturers improving all aspects of aviation. As a certified safety auditor, he has performed safety audits on airlines and flight operations worldwide. In 2007, the Royal Aeronautical Society published the Specialist Document “Smoke and Fire in Transport Aircraft” which he authored. As a well know expert, he is a frequent speaker at international forums and in the media promoting improving flight safety. He is a Fellow of the Royal Aeronautical Society and a member of the Flight Operations Group. In 2004 the Guild of Air Pilots and Air Navigators awarded him the Master Air Pilots Award. He has been a member of the International Society of Air Safety Investigators since 1991 and has been involved with thirteen major accident investigations. US Airways presented Captain Cox with their Air Safety Award in 1999. The Airline Pilots Association awarded him the Annual Air Safety Award in 1998.



How to Use this E‐Book

There is a lot of very valuable information in this e‐book. Although we would love for you to lock yourself in a room and read it from cover to cover, that’s simply not realistic. Here’s our recommendation:

1. First sitting … read the Personal Messages (20 minutes)

2. Second sitting … read APS Training and the Loss of Control In‐Flight Threat

3. Third and subsequent sittings … read the resources in the following order:

a. The All‐Attitude Upset Recovery Checklist.

b. What’s the Big Deal with Angle of Attack?

c. Spinning Normal Category Aircraft – What’ the Risk?

We sincerely hope you enjoy the e‐book we’ve put together. At the end of the day, you really must have practical hands‐on training delivered by upset recovery experts to be protected as much as possible from the loss of control in‐flight threat. However, awareness and understanding of the issues are an important first step. This e‐book is a great start to becoming a safer pilot each and every day you fly … enjoy!

Table of Contents

Personal Message from the APS President .......................................................................................... 4

Personal Message from the APS VP Flight Training ...................................................................... 15

APS Training and the Loss of Control InFlight (LOCI) Threat ................................................. 17 Current Efforts to Address LOCI Threat ........................................................................................................ 18 Summary of Leading Providers of Upset Recovery Education ............................................................... 20 LOCI Mitigation Summary .................................................................................................................................. 25 Integrated Solutions to LOCI ............................................................................................................................. 25

The AllAttitude Upset Recovery Technique Checklist ................................................................ 31 What is the All‐Attitude Upset Recovery Technique? ........................................................................................ 32 History .......................................................................................................................................................................... 35 Detailing the Steps of the All‐Attitude Upset RecoveryTM Technique Checklist ............................................ 39

What’s the Big Deal with Angle of Attack? ........................................................................................ 47

Spinning Normal Category Aircraft – What’s the Risk? ................................................................ 64

Personal Message from the APS President

By: Paul “BJ” Ransbury, President APS Emergency Maneuver Training www.apstraining.com

Part 141 Chief Flight Instructor Master CFI‐Aerobatic / CFI / CFII / MEI / AGI Airbus A320 Pilot, F/A‐18 Hornet Fighter Pilot Cirrus Standardized Instructor Fighter Weapons Instructor ICAS Certified Air Show Performer

I can hardly contain my excitement over the opportunity to share this e‐booklet with you. My personal commitment is to deliver a clear message of genuine concern over your safety and the safety of those you fly with. To accomplish my goal, this booklet contains two main components:

1. Personal messages from myself and our VP Flight Training, and 2. Resource documents for your own continued education and reference.

To convey the passion I have for the critical importance of upset recovery training, I’m going to make it personal and about you. I know this is an unusual strategy but I really am talking directly to you one‐on‐one with this booklet so let’s give it a try. The following story is about a hypothetical “you” in a situation that could occur any day but doesn’t have to end the way it does. This particular “you” is a very experienced pilot who owns his own personal Cessna Citation and is a man (sorry ladies but I had to pick one or the other). He flies for the airlines as a veteran 737 captain and makes all the right decisions up to a certain point. It is important not to be discouraged at this point if you have significantly less experience than this pilot or, conversely, you have much more experience. As you’ll see, the story applies to all pilots, regardless of experience level, who are not familiar with the unusual attitude environment. Unfortunately, that encompasses is the vast majority of aviators flying both private and commercial aircraft throughout the world. Don’t despair, like modern DVD movies the story you are about to read has alternate endings depending upon what you do with the information we’re providing and your actions (or in‐actions) with respect to our presented ‘Roadmap to Safety” at the end of my personal message…

LET’S BEGIN …

In my mind’s eye, I hold fast in my thoughts a picture of a routine leisurely flight with this “theoretical you” at the controls with your wife and daughter talking excitedly about the recent issue of House Beautiful Magazine in the backseat. Your 4‐year old granddaughter and son‐in‐law are finishing up their 48th round of Peek‐A‐Boo as you announce to everyone in the back of your Citation it’s time for descent. As expected from your flight planning preparations, the weather is turning a little sour as you prepare for approach. Things are busied as usual at LAX (Los Angeles International Airport). Fortunately, you’re ahead of the weather and know the area well. You’ve already opted for the vectored visual approach with the ILS loaded and ready as

http://www.apstraining.com/presidents-page.htm

http://www.apstraining.com/



backup. After all, although you’re 2‐days earlier than expected, you’ve personally flown the family to LAX to see your parents in Santa Monica over the holiday season for as long as you can remember. Being early is going to be a wonderful surprise for everyone. Your mind wanders as you try to recall whether or not the rental car had been arranged. “Yes”, you think “here’s the confirmation sticking out of my flight bag” as you glance down. Everything’s been arranged at Landmark Aviation. The car is waiting.

“Citation 123AB, turn left to a heading of 120, descend and maintain 9,500” announces the ground controller, easing your mind back to the task at hand. As you continue to be vectored on approach amidst the ever‐increasing radio traffic, Air Traffic Control announces your position several miles behind Airbus A330 traffic crossing your approach path to a parallel runway. Sure enough, your next interaction on the radio includes the obligatory advisory “Caution, Wake Turbulence!” from the controller. No worries, you’ve heard it 1000 times before in your day‐job as a Boeing 737 captain. Besides, your traffic separation looks fine on TCAS (Traffic Alert and Collision Avoidance System)…

… Before we progress the story further, it is important to understand an airplane upset, unusual attitude or stall/spin event is not necessarily preceded with such ominous meteorological developments and concerned radio announcements. In fact, most airplane upsets occur with little or no warning at all despite our very best decision‐making and airmanship to minimize the risk of occurrence.

This is an important point. Airplane upsets are a surprise. They can be violent. They almost always require immediate, correct response to avert disaster. Lots of flight hours under your belt does not equate to lots of protection in an upset. In an airplane upset, your adrenalin‐charged body chemistry and psychological state of mind are instantaneously propelled into a condition of emergency. You are not the same person you were just a few seconds prior. Although a heightened sense of awareness is common, your ability to take effective action has been dramatically reduced. This is especially true when combined with facing flight conditions beyond your everyday experience level. Typically, for a professional pilot, “everyday experience level” falls into the categories of; unstalled flight, less than 25 degrees of pitch and less than 60 degrees of bank.

… Continuing our story … WHAM! In a flash of motion and violent rotation (putting charts, dolls and sodas all over the cockpit), you and your family are upside down. Yep, a full 120 degrees of bank staring at the ground out the front windshield with the attitude indicator showing 25 degrees nose low and getting worse rapidly.

Your body and mind are screaming “Fix It” and “Fix It Now”!

So just “fix it”, right? What’s the first step? Does it depend? If so, what does it depend on?

In the meantime, while your brain eats up all of two seconds scouring it’s memory banks for the article on aerobatics you read last year, dive angle is getting steeper at more than 10° per second and now passing 45° nose low at a near inverted flight attitude. Airspeed is approaching maximum with a digitally displayed descent rate of over 15,000’ per minute!

“I need to climb!” races your mind but feel your body instinctually yanking on the control column yearning to pull the nose up into the blue and out of trouble. “Damn!” you criticize, “Of all things, why did I do that?” Finally, a mere five seconds after the turbulence encounter, you’ve decided you’ve got it figured out. “I



better get the power back and start rolling this thing upright … geez, why is this thing rolling so slowly! “ as you unconsciously continue to hold the column instinctively aft with close to maximum aileron deflection and heavy rudder application in the direction of roll not realizing most of your inputs are slowing the recovery and increasing overall altitude loss.

Like a glass of ice water thrown in your face as the ground fills the windscreen, a squeal from behind pierces the chaos “Fix It Grandpa!” screams your granddaughter … the scream expressing her last thought and your

family’s last request for your protection as it becomes clear you’re not going to make it. Ω

The preceding storyline was modeled around the common theme of seemingly countless fatal crash investigations dramatized by the realities of my first‐hand in‐cockpit experience training 1000s of pilots of all experience levels to develop upset recovery techniques in real aircraft. If I stirred up a few emotions with this brief story, please keep in mind the intent was to get your attention, to encourage you to take affirmative action in becoming a more prepared and safer pilot each and every day. A few questions for you as we continue …

Was the decision‐making leading up to the accident flawed?

No, not necessarily. This type of situation happens 1000s of times every day around the world without incident and without an upset even occurring at all.

Why did he wait so long to take action after the upset?

A 2‐second reaction time is, in fact, very fast. You can expect the typical reaction time to be somewhat longer.

Can wake turbulence really be that severe by delaying response by just 2 seconds?

Yes, it can. According to the Transport Canada Aeronautical Information Publicationi, “…vortex cores can produce a roll rate of 80° per second…”.

Are you thinking you’d never react the way this pilot did?

Unfortunately, unless you have very specialized all‐attitude flight experience (estimated at less than 2% of the pilot population), statistics and accident research do not support your belief you would react differently.

So how do we change the ending of this story?

Make a commitment to seek‐out a few days of specialized upset recovery training by industry experts.

With each new loss of control fatal accident in the press each month, often weekly, I am empowered more and more each day to serve my calling as an educator and entrepreneur in this unique field of aviation



safety. The unnecessary loss of our fellow man is one of life’s greatest tragedies. To be clear, APS does not pretend to have all the answers to every possible situation that can arise. However, with that disclaimer said, the ‘piloting tools or skills’ our training provides truly does arm you with the skill necessary to be a much safer pilot.

Before I summarize exciting developments proven to mitigate the loss of control in‐flight threat, I would like to accomplish the following:

1. Provide a brief outline of my personal background and experience, 2. Summarize the results of formal investigation performed by APS Emergency Maneuver Training to

demonstrate training effectiveness, and 3. Outline a ‘Roadmap to Safety’ for you to follow to improve your personal proficiency level as a pilot.

A LITTLE ABOUT ME …

Although joining the military in 1984 as a pilot, I didn’t start my civilian aerobatic instructional career until 1996 after 12 years as fighter pilot and a few years under my belt as an airline pilot. I was fortunate enough to have had 7‐years of flying the F/A‐18 Hornet as my last assignment in the service, immediately followed by jumping into the right seat of an Airbus A320 just three weeks after leaving the military. My flying was off to a great start and I was excited to learn more about civilian flight operations.

After a couple of years flying with the airlines, it became clear flying was just a job to me. It was fun and a great life‐long learning experience but it was just something I did so I could do ‘other things’. After a few years wondering why those ‘other things’ couldn’t just BE my job, I left the airline to start an aerial adventure and training company in Canada where we took people up to have fun flying aerobatics and to let folks pretend to be fighter pilot for a few hours. Simultaneously, this aerobatic company offered a basic level of emergency maneuver training to licensed pilots. After a few years of successful operations, I headed up the establishment of the company’s headquarters in Arizona, USA in November 2000. Soon after being established in the United States in early 2001, the US organization became more and more active in upset recovery training.

In 2006, I had the opportunity to change focus and launch a new company that was centered on saving pilots, passengers and loved ones from loss of control in‐flight (LOC‐I). This all‐new refocused company, Aviation Performance Solutions LLC dba APS Emergency Maneuver Training, had the primary mission of developing resources and training programs to ultimately give every pilot in the world an opportunity (in one form or another) to receive training to mitigate the LOC‐I threat.

Without exaggeration, I can honestly say flying with our clients, teaching upset recovery skills and developing professional and personal relationships with aviation‐safety leaders around the world are all tremendous passions for me ‐ passions that grow stronger each day. I just can’t get enough. The reward of witnessing pilots of all skill levels rapidly developing life‐savings abilities that will literally save their lives is overwhelming. I’m sure that sounds a little strong but it’s absolutely true and how I feel every day. The primary reason I have such a strong passion is a direct result of the rewarding experiences I’ve had as an upset recovery instructor in the cockpit with pilots just like you.



Unfortunately, I didn’t start‐out with the same dedication and life‐long passion I have now. To explain, let me come clean with you on how the “old me” saw things … it’s likely not what you, or anyone who knows me today, would expect …

Stepping 13 years into the past, I’m ashamed to admit, I was both ignorant and arrogant when I left the military. I had not yet been exposed to situations that demonstrated the aviation industry’s dire need of loss of control training for every pilot. I fell into the trap of “assuming”. That’s right, the root word “ass‐u‐me”. It should have tipped me off but it didn’t at the time. I had “assumed” all pilots were trained the same as I had been trained in the military as a fighter pilot and “assumed” all pilots understood all‐attitude maneuvering as I had been taught to understand. A fighter pilot you essentially live, work and fight inside the definition of what the rest of the world calls unusual attitudes. “Come on”, I would say in genuine disbelief to anyone who cared to listen to me in the cockpit of the Airbus, “What pilot would ever really need ‘upset training’. Just fix it and keep on going. It’s simple. Give me 5 minutes in an aerobatic airplane with any pilot and they’ll get it and be done with it.” … Ugh! What an idiot I was back then. I cringe just writing that quotation but it was the truth of how I felt before starting on this long journey of humility and enlightenment. Read “ass‐me” … hmmm, did I forget the “u”? Yep.

I’ve provided this rather short and uncomplimentary history of myself to be honest with you. I want you to know without question the pages that follow in this e‐Book are just as honest as I express my views on the dire need of upset recovery training at all levels of aviation. When I recall my opinions, thoughts and conclusions those many years ago … I really had no idea how wrong I was. That’s now almost 15 years in the past. I can truly say not a single aspect of those opinions or assumptions continue to linger in my mind and have no place or presence whatsoever in the breakthrough training programs we’ve developed at APS.

So what changed? What launched the beginning of my life‐long reality‐check was the very first group of professional pilots I had an opportunity to fly with who retained our company’s services way back in 1997. This group sought out specialized training to “hone” their upset recovery skills. In my mind, the word “hone” implied some level of prior proficiency so I prepared myself for an experience that would re‐affirm my “nobody really needs upset training” conclusion. Well, after sitting through a week’s worth of flights watching the nose of the aircraft being consistently buried into a severe dive from a over‐banked flight attitude, riding through high‐g asymmetric rolling maneuvers (often with the rudder wildly shoved in), being buried in the stall from nose‐high unusual attitudes and witnessing the mental incapacitation of pilots due to shear fear, I was completely baffled. My assumptions and conclusions were shattered. What is going on? We didn’t teach them do any of this so who did?

As it turns out, nobody was to blame – especially not the pilots. It was not their fault for the severe mistakes they were making and it’s not your fault either if you don’t feel prepared to deal with an extreme airplane upset. As licensed civilian pilots, we are a product of the regulatory agencies developing and certifying our

What was going on? We didn’t teach them to do any of this so who did?

“Come on! What pilot would ever really need ‘upset training’? Just f ix i t and keep on going. I t ’s s imple . Just 5 minutes instruction in an aerobatic airplane with any pilot and they’ l l get i t and be done with i t . ”… Ugh! I cringe just writ ing those words …



flight training as acceptable, comprehensive and safe. We count on “the system” to give us the right tools to get the job done. I trust the system, you trust it and most every passenger on every airplane that gets airborne around the world trusts it too. Unfortunately, when it comes to loss of control in‐flight, if a flight condition is allowed to develop into a full blown upset, not only are pilots not given the right tools to deal with the situation, pilots often don’t even know the right tools exist. Don’t get me wrong, there are several tremendous resources available in the industry that have been reviewed and approved by the regulators and we’ll discuss these more a little later. What I’m talking about are the piloting skills (i.e. tools) licensed pilots are armed with based on the current Practical Test Standard in relation to stalls, spins and unusual attitudes.

As I’ve alluded to, the piloting skills (or tools) developed to deal with the flight conditions within the bounds of the PTS are often the wrong tools for pilots to use in an upset significantly beyond the established limitations experienced during training. Regrettably, these “wrong tools” are reinforced day‐in day‐out and encompass the flight attitudes, envelopes and aviation experience you’ve gained NOT being out of your everyday unstalled non‐extreme flight condition. Simply put, the typical 20,000‐hour seasoned airline pilot often has more than 19,990 hours of experience using and engraining tools (i.e. pilots skills) that don’t work in a severe airplane upset. Compounding the issue is the aviation training market’s attempts to convince pilots the “wrong tools” are the right ones by limiting a pilot’s training to a maximum flight envelope divergence from straight and level flight to less than 60 degrees of bank and 30 degrees of pitch. As an air carrier or business jet operator, these parameters reduce to just 45 degrees of bank and 25 degrees of pitch.

Time and again, I read articles by well‐intentioned instructor pilots and aviation consultants trying to explain how to use the wrong tools to make up for an enduring oversight by the flight training system to provide all‐attitude training to licensed pilots (i.e. all 360 degrees of roll and all 360 degrees of pitch). These authors correctly cite pre‐establish training limitations and give sound advice in an attempt to prepare pilots for an encounter with a loss of control situation. Often they will say something like; “As a conscientious pilot, if you just know what to look for and how to recognize the development of an upset situation, you can then take action within the confines of your trained flight envelope”. Yes, that’s correct but it’s only about 10% of the whole picture. Listen, all I’m saying is there is more to it. I’m not saying the industry is wrong. However, it’s time to evolve our training strategy. The accident statistics are screaming very loudly. It’s time for the aviation community to listen and take action.

For example, how long did it take the pilot in our story opening this chapter to end up at 120 degrees of bank? That’s right, just two seconds. So what does a pilot do when they are human and actually take a couple of seconds to react to a situation? They end up outside their experience envelope and almost universally do the exact wrong thing since upset recovery techniques are often counter‐intuitive. Meaning, the actions that are totally correct day‐to‐day are 100% wrong such as pulling to try to climb (leading to a split s), using cyclic rudder to control roll (American 587 tail coming off) or rolling the aircraft while still loaded (the rolling pull) in an overbank situation.

Unfortunately, due to a lack of all‐attitude recognition, avoidance and recovery training, LOC‐I has been, and continues to be, established as the most lethal threat to pilots of any fixed wing airplane. To lighten the



attack on aviation regulators (if you are one, I would hope you don’t read my commentary as an attack at all), in their defense, there are only a few resources in the industry offering comprehensive training to develop the “right tools”. If fact, to my knowledge, APS Emergency Maneuver Training is one of just a few reputable providers around the world proving this education and the only provider diversified into the integration of online, in‐airplane and advanced full flight simulator LOC‐I curriculums.

The Right Tools

“So BJ”, you are likely thinking, “after all those high sounding words, what are the ‘right tools’ then?”

That’s an excellent question. In a nutshell, the “right tools” are right in front of you in the cockpit but they are more than just “the controls”. You, as the pilot, are an integral part of the “right tools”. We’ll be covering this integration later in the section on the All‐Attitude Upset Recovery Technique Checklist. Before doing that, however, the most important thing you need to know right now is what the “right tools” are going to specifically address– remember, to say it once again; the “right tools” include you, the pilot.

The overall objectives of using the “right tools” in a fully comprehensive upset recovery training course are to improve your personal performance in the following areas of LOC‐I situations:

1. Awareness, 2. Recognition, 3. Avoidance, and 4. Recovery

With just a few hours of the right kind of training with the right kind of instructors teaching the right stuff with sufficient hands‐on repetition to proficiency, you will have a dramatically increased awareness of threatening situations and be armed with the “right tools” to effectively solve just about any upset. But most importantly, you will know how, when and why to use the “right tools” to recognize, avoid and, if necessary, recover from an airplane upset.

Instructional Techniques and Course Construction

Assuming you arrive for upset training with an open mind, you need to be indoctrinated into a comprehensive curriculum focusing on the core elements of upset recovery. This is necessary to develop your awareness and hands‐on skill to a safe level within just a few days of training. The instructor is a crucial element of this process. From my preceding discussion on military training, one may get the impression that grabbing any highly experienced aerobatic pilot, test pilot school graduate or military fighter pilot will suffice. I can tell you from firsthand experience, the training methodologies and techniques required to take a pilot trainee with essentially no all‐attitude awareness (irrespective of flight hours) and instill in them a lasting fully‐comprehensive upset recovery skill set cannot be done “on the fly”. At APS, it took us almost a decade to fine‐tune the “fast track” molding process of developing a safe upset recovery pilot in just a few



days. Even now, after 13 years of delivering these services, it takes one of our new instructors (with minimum previous experience requirements of 2‐tours of duty as a military fighter pilot and formal course instructor with 2 years of full‐time airline experience) an entire month of instructional technique training just to be able to fly the training missions with a customer. This newly minted APS specialty instructor then requires an additional 3‐months of full‐time student instruction before they can then be considered by management to possibly teach ground training. And finally, nearly 2‐years later, these instructors can be considered for upgrade as an APS Platinum‐Seal Upset Recovery Instructor Pilot. It’s a long process and not training they have ever received anywhere else. The challenge for these APS specialty instructors is not learning how to recover an aircraft or fly the course maneuvers. They know how to recover an airplane from an upset already. However, these instructors often have very little know‐how teaching pilots with next to zero all‐attitude flight experience. It is important to teach the exact things inexperienced pilots need to know, when they need to know them. And then, the instructor must understand how to optimize the integration of syllabus, theory, practice and review to assure optimum results. For you military folks out there, a word of caution: “Teaching civilians is not at all the same as teaching cookie‐cutter military pilots”.

Finally, and this is very important, upset recovery training is nothing at all the same as aerobatics training so don’t be mislead by organizations putting out an “upset recovery training” shingle just because they have an aerobatic aircraft or an aerobatic instructor on staff. If the organization (or more specifically, their instructor pilots) can’t tell you why aerobatics and upset recovery training are not the same, then they are years from understanding why and even longer before they’ll be truly prepared to teach an effective program to mitigate LOC‐I. By the way, just because an instructor pilot can recover an aerobatic airplane or a fighter jet, does not necessarily mean then know how to recover a normal category light GA piston aircraft or a transport category airliner giving due consideration to all pertinent factors.

Enough said. Let’s bring this opening message to a close by briefly looking at the high‐level LOC‐I threat and the results you can expect from participating in upset recovery training at APS…

The Loss of Control InFlight (LOCI) Threat

In a report issued by The Boeing Company in July 2008ii, Loss of Control In‐Flight represents the most severe cause factor in commercial aviation over the past 10 years, resulting in the most crash‐related fatalities from 1998 through 2007. Indisputably, LOC‐I is a killer at all levels of aviation. Traditional flight training simply does not provide pilots with any significant level of skill to resolve a severe airplane upset. The worst side of that entire discussion is that most pilots are convinced they actually “do” have the skill and “don’t” need upset recovery training. The lack of specialized airplane upset recovery training, as supported and admonished by regulatory agencies throughout the world, has established LOC‐I as the most deadly threat to aviation safety.



Effectiveness of APS Training Techniques

Often we are asked: “So, how effective is the training taught by APS?”

That’s a great question and it is addressed in detail in the section on APS Training and the Loss of Control Threat a little later in the e‐Book. As a quick summary of information provided in that section, our formal investigation of more than 100 commercial pilots participating in APS upset training courses during a 3‐month period starting in late 2007 yielded the following results:

Table 1: Pilot Performance in Upset Recovery Skill Development Training

TRAINEE PERFORMANCE EVALUATION TRAINEE’S ABILITY TO RECOVER

Upset Scenario Assessed* Before Training After Training Over-Bank Nose Low Upset 34.8% 97.9% Cross-Controlled Stall to Over-bank 41.9% 100.0% Severe Wake Turbulence Encounter 42.9% 97.8% Nose High Upset / Pitch Mis-Trim 47.8% 100.0% Control Failure: Rudder Hard-Over 40.6% 92.3%

AVERAGE SUCCESS RATE 41.6% 97.6% * Scenarios are designed to reflect statistically life-threatening conditions; typically flight attitudes beyond 60 degrees angle of bank and/or 30 degrees of pitch. (Note: Many more scenarios than those listed in this chart are taught during the course. These particular maneuvers are evaluated to give representative indications of training effectiveness.)

Duration: Training Courses in the study averaged out to 4.4 training missions per course Retention of Skill: Of the overall test group of 115 pilots, 35 pilots were repeat customers attending a recurrent

upset recovery course at APS. Recurrent participants demonstrated 76.4% retention of skill returning after an average of 19 months between Initial and Recurrent Training programs.

Road Map to Safety How Do You Get Started?

Getting started by taking tour first step is critical. If you haven’t done so already, then I encourage you to sign‐up for our 20 Free Videos on Frequently Asked Questions at APS. You can choose how often you receive the videos to your email (typically 1 per day or 1 per week is selected). Each video is less than 3 minutes in length and gets right to the point. It is a great way of keeping upset recovery training as a priority over a period long enough for you to make an informed decision. The free videos can be found at:

www.apstraining.com/faqs

You need to know most pilots who do not pursue upset recovery training are reluctant primarily due to apprehension of the unknown. Defining a roadmap of how to get started is important and I don’t want it to be hidden in a paragraph so let’s show it to you as presented in the figure below.

http://www.apstraining.com/faqs

http://www.apstraining.com/faqs



Unless you are a military fighter pilot, test pilot school graduate or have in excess of 100 hours of dedicated formal aerobatic flight experience in a competitive environment (and remain current), here’s your upset recovery training road map:

Figure: Road Map to Safety

What you need to do as soon as you finish this e‐book (or before) is to get setup with Stage 1: Academic Training. There are a number of resources available to you. Unfortunately, the expertise required to teach these academics is unlikely available at your flying club, the local flight school or deliverable by a recurrent simulator training provider. Our general recommendation to all pilots to ensure they start on the right foot is to participate in our web‐based training program at: www.apstraining.com/cbt .

What’s Right for You?

When it comes to Hands‐On Training, you need to get practical training that is complimentary to the training received during Stage 1. Academic training on its own will not develop the skills you need to be safe from loss of control in‐flight. Ground training is a good way to start. Practical hands‐on experience is crucial. Be sure to check into the school, the experience of the instructors, the design of the program and, most importantly, the feedback of satisfied clients.

In closing, I hope you enjoy the booklet we’ve prepared for you. Every single pilot can be given the “right tools” to have maximum protection against LOC‐I. Unfortunately, without proper preparation outside the framework of conventional flight training, a loss of control situation can be lethal.

Stage 3: Recurrent Training Every 2‐years(Full Course if > 2‐years)

Typically Every 2‐ years or Less 1 ‐ 3 Days with 2 ‐ 4 Flight Hours

Stage 2: Hands‐On Training in a Training Device(Aerobatic Aircraft or Advanced Full Flight Simulator)

2 ‐ 4 Days with

3 ‐ 6 Flight Hours

Basic and Advanced Stalls

Unusual Attitudes

Wake Turbulence

Basic Aerobatics

Instrument Recoveries

Spin Exposure Training

Stage 1: Academic Training(Web‐Based or Instructor‐Lead)

Awareness of the

LOC‐I Threat

Understand Fundamental Upset

Recovery Aerodynamics

Exposure to Core

Upset Recovery Techniques

www.apstraining.com/cbt

www.apstraining.com/programs

www.apstraining.com/recurrent



At APS, we stand ready to integrate life‐saving capabilities into your piloting skill set. Whether you’re a brand new 60‐hour pilot or a veteran airline captain, all we ask of you is to get yourself through our door with an open mind. We’ll take care of the rest.

Sincerely,

Paul BJ Ransbury, President APS Emergency Maneuver Training

About the Author: Mr. Ransbury's flight experience spans a wide spectrum from general aviation advanced flight instruction to hard‐charging unlimited category air show aerobatic displays to scheduled airlines to military fighter operations. Throughout his career as a professional pilot, author and business entrepreneur, Mr. Ransbury has been keenly interested in the development of programs that bring high‐performance aviation into the hands of the general public and to aviators of all skill levels. Driven by a responsibility to improve safety of flight to save lives in the aviation industry, he has been developing innovative training techniques and advanced flight training courses for individual pilots, corporate flight departments, government agencies and aircraft manufacturers for more than a decade. While insisting on being in the cockpit with APS clients as often as possible, Mr. Ransbury's primary focus has been to assess the continually changing need for advanced flight training in aviation worldwide. As one of only twenty Master CFIs in the nation holding an aerobatic accreditation, his on‐going analysis of program effectiveness in relation to market demands keeps APS on the leading edge of providing training solutions to a wide variety of operators. His friendly demeanor, combined with an in‐depth expertise in edge‐of‐the‐envelope aerodynamics and recovery techniques, uniquely bridges the gap between advanced training curriculums and a prospective company's corporate training objectives and flight safety needs through a one‐on‐one hands‐on approach to customized course development.

Personal Message from the APS VP Flight Training

By: J. Clarke McNeace, VP of Operations & Flight Training APS Emergency Maneuver Training www.apstraining.com

Part 141 Assistant Chief Flight Instructor Master CFI‐Aerobatic / CFI / CFII / MEI / AGI Boeing 737 Airline Captain, F/A‐18 Hornet Fighter Pilot 12,000+ Flight Hours Fighter Weapons Instructor FAAST Team Lead Representative

As I lay stretched out on the beautiful green grass of a small California airport, I watched a Cessna 152 lift off from the runway. It got thirty feet in the air and I noticed something was gravely wrong. I stared intently at the soon‐to‐be stricken aircraft not knowing exactly what the problem was. I could not put my finger on it because the airplane was generating full power with takeoff flaps set. It had a slight climb going but just as it occurred to me that the airplane was too slow, it suddenly pitched forward and rolled left. Before I could take my next breath, it crashed pointing straight down. I jumped to my feet and ran toward the airplane not knowing if the pilot could still be alive trapped in the now silent crash site with the airplane’s tail pointing straight up like a sickening monument of death.

The above account is true and is forever etched in my mind. It happened to me while I was in the US Navy as an instructor flying fighters. That day began my journey into understanding why and how pilots crash airplanes. Having experienced numerous self‐imposed near‐accidents myself in the previous fourteen years of my flying, I began to see major holes in the training and knowledge of pilots from all walks of life. “Why do excellent, well‐intentioned pilots lose control of their aircraft when the aircraft has been certified to be very stable and controllable in all parts of its normal flight envelope?” In spite of all my Navy safety courses, this question loomed for several more years until another incident occurred to me while I was a co‐pilot at a major airline.

I had just completed my first‐year checkride in the simulator. My simulator partner was a senior 18‐year airline captain getting his 6‐month checkride concurrently. The instructor told us we had a few minutes left in the simulator and asked us if there was anything we desired to do. Having obviously never done an aileron roll in a Boeing 737 before, I said I would like to try it for fun. With the instructor’s nod of approval, I pulled the nose up slightly (we were still airborne at 250 knots), unloaded the airplane and then did a maximum performance aileron roll. The airliner certainly did not roll fast but it completed the roll with a slight nose‐down wings‐level attitude with no problems. My simulator partner, the senior captain, said he would like to try one as well but during his attempt, he pulled us into a high‐speed spiral dive that crashed the simulator. With total surprise on his face, he remarked “there must be something wrong with the simulator.” As a pilot that was exposed to every kind of unusual attitude an aircraft could obtain, I knew full well there was nothing wrong with the simulator but the captain’s embarrassment did not allow him to ask my opinion.

Over the next several years at the airline, I flew with pilots of all kinds: civilian‐trained, military‐trained, good sticks, bad sticks, confident leaders, inconsiderate hotheads, know‐it‐alls, and the average good‐natured pilot. In

http://www.apstraining.com/pilots.htm#otter




my many aerodynamic discussions in th t know what they do not know. It finally dawned on me that if t pilot’s normal flight envelope and attitude, there was very little to no understanding. Not only that, many pilots had little understanding of what could lead to flight outside the normal envelope and the subsequent appropriate recovery. In fact, I am now convinced that if that senior captain (my former simulator partner) had been forced into a real‐life over‐banked, near‐inverted flight attitude from wake turbulence, he would have killed himself and all of his passengers with his “normal” reaction. How could this be? How does an airline captain crash a simulator from 4000 feet above the ground? How does a Cessna pilot crash thirty feet above the runway while flying a fully functioning aircraft? Please understand that since I have been teaching upset recovery to professional pilots for the past five years, I have seen what proper training can do for a pilot’s situational awareness and recovery ability. Passing on some of my “normal” experience from the Navy to pilots that consider it “abnormal” has benefited many professionals with little exposure. It was not that I had found some “holy grail” but I had training and experience beyond a normal pilot’s training. I left the Navy thinking that all pilots knew what I knew and could handle (probably better in many cases) what I thought I could handle. I was mistaken!

e cockpit, I finally realized that many pilots do nohe discussion pertained to anything outside of the

I am now passionate about upset recovery training! I am convinced every pilot taking command of an airplane should have comprehensive standardized training in all parts of his aircraft’s flight envelope. It must be provided in a safe aircraft with a highly competent instructor giving easily understood techniques that can be recalled in a time‐critical pressure situation. However, the real value of upset recovery training is recognition and avoidance by increasing a pilot’s situational awareness. A properly trained pilot will know to avoid many typical loss‐of‐control scenarios but should an upset occur, he will have proven confidence he can safely and effectively recover the airplane.

A pilot may never have to recover his aircraft from an upset during a typical flying career, but is that an excuse for not getting proper training? Try justifying it to my family who lost a close family friend (a retired 35 year airline captain) to a skidded turn stall in the traffic pattern while flying his Luscombe. No amount of cost savings in training can ever bring back the life of a friend, a family member, or even YOU!

Sincerely,

Clarke “Otter” McNeace, VP Flight Training APS Emergency Maneuver Training

The author’s first aircraft command began on his fourteenth birthday soloing a glider paving the path of thirty‐years in aviation. From tailwheel bush flying to flying Navy fighters as a combat‐decorated carrier pilot to the command of Boeing aircraft for a Major US airline, Captain McNeace is passionate about relating to pilots of all levels the importance of effective upset recovery training. As one of only twenty Master CFIs in the nation holding an aerobatic accreditation, his last five years have been dedicated to training hundreds of professional pilots while developing an in‐depth curriculum designed to accelerate a pilot’s skill‐level in all parts of the flight envelope. His most comfortable position is instructing while upside down in a wake‐turbulence training scenario.



APS Training and the Loss of Control In‐Flight (LOC‐I) Threat Consistently over the past 49 years of statistically analyzed accident history in commercial aviation, Loss of Control In‐Flight (LOC‐I) is indisputably one of the leading causes of airplane crashes and crash‐related fatalities worldwideiii. Rivaled only by Controlled Flight Into Terrain (CFIT) in magnitude and persistence, LOC‐I presents a unique challenge to professional aviation as it highlights a serious deficiency in the pilot’s ability to deal with a variety of unusual flight attitudes and flight envelope excursions. Regrettably, current pilot training curricula, standards and certification requirements perpetuate this pilot‐skill deficiency.

In a report issued by The Boeing Company in July 2008iv, LOC‐I represents the most severe cause factor in commercial aviation over the past 10 years, resulting in the most crash‐related fatalities from 1998 through 2007.

Aviation safety organizations, accident investigators and legislating agencies continue to accurately identify the lethality and severity of the LOC‐I threat. Unfortunately, without any demonstrated ability to identify or implement an effective solution as evidenced by the data in Figure 1, commercial aviation will likely continue to be affected by high rates of LOC‐I fatalities until an effective solution is found.

LLoossss ooff CCoonnttrrooll IInn‐‐FFlliigghhtt



Current Efforts to Address LOCI Threat Efforts to reduce the LOC‐I fatality rate over the decades have been relatively ineffective. As will be discussed below, the solution to LOC‐I does not seem to lie within the capabilities of the current flight training system. At least an industry‐accepted solution isn’t there yet. Although several excellent academic reference resources are now available to pilots and an increasing number of upset scenarios are being addressed in simulator training, the hands‐on pilot skill‐development necessary to effectively deal with LOC‐I is not readily available to pilots.

Part 61/141 Flight School Training When considering the persistent threat of LOC‐I and its high lethality index reported in every commercial aviation accident analysis over the past 50 years, a look at the established flight training system is in order. Unfortunately, consideration should be given to data indicating this system may not be structured or equipped to deal with this threat. If so, then neither are the pilots the system produces.

In reviewing the current training system’s loss of control capabilities, history reveals seeking a solution to even stall/spin training (just a component of LOC‐I training) through the traditional Part 61/141 network of flight training providers has demonstrated unattractive statistics. For example, over the period 1991 – 2000, 91% of fatal stall/spin accidents investigated by the AOPA had a Certified Flight Instructor onboard the aircraftv. In stark contrast, well‐known training providers listed in the Directory of Aerobatic Schools by the

**IMPORTANT NOTE: We Need Your Help** This entire section is dedicated to giving perspective on the current status of industry resources

**IMPORTANT NOTE: We Need Your Help**

available to pilots to mitigate the Loss of Control In‐flight threat (LOC‐I).

If you feel some other area of aviation needs included, or do not agree with something in this resource, then let us know. Our intent at APS is always to inform, not attack or undermine any aspect of aviation training resources. Remember, we all want to be more competent pilots to keep our families, friends and passengers safe at all times. Our APS Mission Statement mandates our positioning as a trusted industry resource, however, it doesn’t mean we know everything nor do we have the answer to every question. Let’s work together as an aviation community to save lives. If you do have a comment for us, here’s what we’d like to get from you:

• mail and phone number). Your Contact Information (be sure to includ

•

e an e• What information should be added or amended?

• List the citations supporting your analysis.

• ning.com). How does your information specifically address LOC‐I? Send your input directly to the editor (paul.ransbury@apstrai

• Expect a response confirming receipt within 2 business days.



International Aerobatic Club (IAC) had not recorded a single stall/spin accident during any phase of flight where the primary objective was spin or aerobatic training. The surveyed IAC schools totaled over 130,000 hours of spin and aerobatic instruction having completed an estimated 250,000 spins with students onboardvi.

Further evidence of the established flight training system lacking knowledge, skill and experience to deal with LOC‐I is readily available. Numerous studies over the past 30 years have revealed that the typical Part 61/141 Certified Flight Instructor is ill equipped to teach stall/spin training. In a 1993 transportation research project “Re‐Examination of Stall/Spin Prevention Training”, 513 civilian flight instructors and 28 designated examiners were surveyed at various flight schools and FAA Aviation Safety Seminarsvii. Five aviation professionals – all flight instructors with college education in aerodynamics, processed the surveys. NASA research, journal literature, and the textbook "Aerodynamics for Naval Aviators" were used as references. Several of the shocking results of surveying this group of Certified Flight Instructors and Designated Examiners are listed below:

94% relied primarily on popular literature for "stall spin" information (ie. aviation magazines) 96% additionally relied heavily on their own instructors 95% failed to ever receive training in either spin dynamics or the likely conditions preceding an

inadvertent spin 94% did not understand spin certification requirements nor the limitations imposed as a result 98% indicated that their formal spin training consisted of no ground instruction and a mere two

spins ‐ one in each direction

Despite the above statistics, all these instructors readily received logbook endorsements meeting the standards of the modern flight training system certifying they were competent to teach spins. The same study revealed marginal understanding by surveyed CFIs in; stall aerodynamics, effects of control deflection on the stall, airfoil stall development, planform effects on stall behavior and spanwise flow effects, stall warning signs and secondary effects of flight controls, roll control at high angles of attack, pro‐ and anti‐spin forces, spin phases and spin modes, effects of the controls on spin motion and recovery, and even common student errors and the resulting effects on aircraft motion. All these issues are fundamental aerodynamic factors in teaching techniques and procedures to effectively recover from spins and a variety of LOC‐I scenarios.

In the same survey, these instructors and examiners self‐assessed their understanding of "stall/spin" dynamics as "Excellent". Although the participants considered themselves to be experts, the survey results clearly indicate those charged with the task of teaching and testing new pilots possess a marginal understanding of "stall/spin" phenomena.

A recent 2005 Stall/Spin Study by Embry‐Riddle Aeronautical Universityviii through an Internet based questionnaire evaluated 468 flight instructors on spin training, spin experience and their individual "stall spin" knowledge. The survey highlighted data showing the following; 56% had received 1 hour or less of ground instruction prior to receiving endorsements certifying them as spin instructors, 38% had not practiced spins since becoming an instructor, 47% incorrectly believed the slip/skid ball would help identify



opposite rudder in a disorienting spin and a full 44% did not understand that spin direction would be in the same direction as yaw at the stall.

Following this data into commercial aviation, an investigation might be in order to assess the knowledge and experience level of the instructors teaching loss of control scenarios and profiles in the flight simulator. Reasonable questions could be as follows;

1) Are current simulator instructors pulled from the same skill‐pool as the Part 61/141 instructors, 2) If so, have these instructors received specialized training to develop the skills and knowledge

necessary to teach procedures, academics and techniques to resolve LOC‐I scenarios, and 3) If not, are they then teaching recovery techniques based on experience gained within the training

system that has perpetuated the high lethality index of LOC‐I over the past 50 years?

In the interest of flight safety and dramatically reducing the LOC‐I threat, provision of a robust LOC‐I flight training solution must be developed and conducted by recognized industry experts having extensive experience in all of the following topics; GA and turbo jet aerobatics, upset recovery, stall/spin, flight training program development, transport category aircraft performance & handling characteristic knowledge and a practical understanding of related airline competency requirements.

Simulator Training Simulator‐based training is a tremendous resource that has improved safety in aviation dramatically. Several LOC‐I scenarios, if recognized early, remain within the programmed normal flight envelope that has been precisely mapped. The high fidelity flight‐modeling characteristics of modern simulators very effectively represent the performance and handling characteristics of most every flight situation that could be experienced by flight crew during normal operations. Unfortunately, a significant portion of LOC‐I flight conditions exist outside the programmed flight envelope of modern simulators. As summarized by Capt. Larry Rockcliff, Vice President of the Airbus Training Center in Miami, Florida, “The use of a simulator has some tremendous deficiencies or limitations for unusual, out‐of‐the‐ordinary type flying … specifically, the forces the pilot would experience in terms of increased weight … the actual fidelity – the actual copy of the aircraft … is a relatively narrow band as compared to what an aggressive upset could actually cause upon a pilot.”ix

Despite the inherent limitations of simulator‐based LOC‐I training, the integration of redesigned simulator flight profiles and enhanced aircraft‐specific ground training during initial and recurrent simulator training is a key component of an integrated LOC‐I solution. Historically, in‐aircraft LOC‐I recovery techniques have been taught independently of upset scenarios presented in the simulator. An integrated solution to LOC‐I should instate complimentary flight training and simulator scenario‐based training profiles and transferable recovery techniques. This integration will be discussed in more detail later in this document.

Summary of Leading Providers of Upset Recovery Education The aviation marketplace has not been idle in making efforts to deal with LOC‐I. Many reputable organizations have made major advances in developing effective recovery procedures and identifying



underlying contributing factors to the LOC‐I threat such as spatial disorientation and high‐altitude physiology.

Airplane Upset Recovery Training Aid – Revision 2 In 1998, the commercial aviation industry published the Airplane Upset Recovery Training Aid (URTA). The goal of the training aid was to increase a pilot's ability to recognize and avoid situations that can lead to an airplane upset and improve the pilot's ability to regain control of an airplane that has exceeded the normal flight regime. This goal would be accomplished by increasing awareness of potential upset situations and knowledge of flight dynamics, and by applying this knowledge to simulator training scenarios. The training aid consists of an overview for airline management, pilot guide to upset recovery, an example of an upset recovery training program, references for additional information, and a video. The training aid was revised in August 2004 to address characteristics, limitations, and procedures involving components of transport category airplanes such as rudder, vertical stabilizer and others. The most current version of the document (November 2008) is the URTA – Revision 2. (APS offers an online course based on this document at www.apstraining.com/cbt)

The URTA is an excellent document that provides key information to airline pilots of the techniques and philosophy necessary to recovery a transport category aircraft from a variety of unusual attitudes. Regrettably, the URTA has gone relatively unnoticed by the airline industry with no mandate to integrate the recommend scenarios, training techniques or academic courses of study. The URTA is a tremendous resource that is one of the key components to an integrated LOC‐I solution. However, on its own as a resource document lacking practical implementation by the industry, the URTA has had very little impact on reducing the lethality of LOC‐I in commercial operationsx.

Part 61/141 Training Providers of Upset Recovery Training The vast majority of providers dealing with unusual attitude and stall/spin training are general aviation organizations using aerobatic aircraft and low‐time FAA certified flight instructors or commercial pilots. Although exceptions do exist, most training companies offering to provide upset recovery training in its various forms, integrate instructors that have very little, if any, experience in airline transport category aircraft and minimal aerobatic flight experience while remaining uniquely focused on the GA marketplace. Typically these programs are valuable services to general aviation pilots and focus on stall/spin recognition, avoidance and recovery using widely varying techniques and limited aerodynamic academic study. Although this type of training has some characteristics valuable in the development of an integrated solution for airlines, this group of providers does not usually employ instructors each having a specialized combination of both jet and GA aircraft aerobatic knowledge and airline transport category experience integrating the FAA Airplane Upset Recovery Training Aid – Revision 1 strategies and procedures. The courseware available from this class of providers varies from non‐existent to Part 141‐compliant Training Course Outlines.

Flight School and Private Operator Efforts in Upset Recovery Training The vast majority of providers dealing with unusual attitude and stall/spin training are general aviation organizations using aerobatic piston or jet aircraft and low‐time FAA certified flight instructors or higher



time commercial pilots. Although exceptions do exist, most training companies offering to provide upset recovery training in its various forms, integrate instructors that have very little, if any, experience in airline transport category aircraft and minimal aerobatic flight experience while remaining uniquely focused on the GA marketplace. Typically these programs are valuable services to general aviation pilots with focus on stall/spin recognition, avoidance and recovery using widely varying techniques and limited aerodynamic academic study. Although this type of training has some characteristics valuable in the development of an integrated solution for airlines, this group of providers does not usually employ instructors each having a specialized combination of both jet and GA aircraft aerobatic knowledge and airline transport category experience integrating the Airplane Upset Recovery Training Aid – Revision 2 strategies and procedures. The courseware available from this class of providers varies from non‐existent to regulatory‐compliant Training Course Outlines (TCOs).

NASA: RefusetoCrash and SelfHealing Aircraft Officially announced just a few years ago, NASA has been working on several research projects with the hope of developing aircraft technology capable of detecting and resolving LOC‐I. Specifically, the programs coined “Refuse to Crash” (RTC) and “Self‐Healing Aircraft” (SHA) are multilayered, proactive safety nets designed to identify failed components or systems and reconfigure an aircraft to fly properly. At some point in the future NASA hopes to go further, giving pilots a visual display that tells them how to fly a wayward aircraft or even a “panic button” that would automatically untangle the vehicle from a tumble or upset.

This technology is highly experimental and hinges on the yet‐to‐be‐achieved ability to accurately model the all‐attitude, all‐envelope flight characteristics of various transport category aircraft and then integrate artificial intelligence to solve a variety of unusual attitude flight conditions. Assuming the accurate flight modeling was effectively integrated into the onboard artificial intelligence programming, the system would either direct the pilot how to recover the aircraft or take control of the aircraft completely. A version of RTC was presented by President Bush on Sep. 27, 2001, as a possible anti‐terrorist solution to fly a hi‐jacked aircraft to a safe landing (not recover an aircraft from a LOC‐I situation). The FAA Office of Aviation Research refused the technology at that time due to the limited number of Fly‐By‐Wire (FBW) aircraft capable of integrating such a system and the “horrific” expense of retrofitting non‐FBW aircraftxi.

NASA High Angle of Attack Research Of interest, NASA has been conducting high angle of attack research with the goal of producing algorithms that can be adopted by advanced FTD and FFS devices already in service. The primary benefit of the algorithms is to expand the fidelity envelope of the current training devices, without core programming changes, to more accurately model high angle of attack and high slip angle flight conditions.

Of additional interest is NASA’s current research to develop a full motion simulator that will allow both g‐loading and physiological effects to be replicated. (More will be presented in this section as information on NASTAR becomes available).



CALSPAN1 General Overview: Calspan’s Advanced Maneuver & Upset Recovery Trainingxii is a 2‐½ day program integrating classroom instruction with one flight in each of an Aerobatic‐Certified Beech Bonanza and an In‐Flight Simulation Learjet totaling approximately 2.5 flight hours. The longest portion of the flight training in the Learjet is administered as one session approximately 1.5 hours in duration including a 45‐minute training session followed by a 45‐minute evaluation session. The classroom instruction includes a review of the accident data to learn about the types of Jet Upsets that have caused Loss‐of‐Control accidents. The provider promotes transport aircraft aerodynamics being presented in an easily understood manner with recovery techniques emphasizing both primary and alternate control strategies and the appropriate use of automation.

Calspan Study: Representing the only formal government study on LOC‐I, supported by the NASA Aviation Safety Program, Calspan was funded by the FAA over a 5‐year period from 2002 with the intention to test 2,000 airline pilots to assess upset recovery training effectiveness. The intention of the FAA‐funded research project was to formally evaluate the effectiveness of its airplane upset recovery training program in relation to the experience level of the participating pilots related to previous aerobatic and upset‐recovery experience. Due to cost and time constraints, the study was limited to 40 new‐hire airline pilots without military flight experiencexiii. The results of the research generally supported the value of upset recovery training but were inconclusive in some areas proposing recommended topics of investigation in future studies.

The study’s evaluators highlighted most pilots had difficulty transitioning to alternative control techniquesxivwhen confronted with ineffective response from the normal controls and pilots who failed to recover control of the aircraft generally displayed confusion and other stress reactions. Pilots being evaluated in the Calspan Study who had difficulty resolving the various flight conditions tended to freeze on the controls or rapidly move control surfaces and/or switches haphazardly and ineffectively. Researchers concluded these typical stress responses highlighted the need for upset recovery training to put more emphasis on strategies to deal with surprise during the initial indications of upsets in addition to emphasizing the specifics of the recovery technique itselfxv. Additional conclusions of the Calspan research identified several unanswered questions and the evaluators recommended upset recovery techniques to be capable of handling a number of classes of upsets instead of unique procedures for each individual case. Unanswered questions in the report’s conclusion included enquiries related to; how extensively must pilots practice recovery maneuvers to be proficient, how often must a pilot maintain proficiency, to what extent does generic training enable pilots to recover from a wide variety of upset scenarios, what is the best way to address the factor of surprise in actual upsets, and what degree of fidelity is required in simulators to transfer skills appropriately to pilot performance in actual upset situations?xvi

As evidenced by the researchers’ unanswered questions at the conclusion of the study, a variety of components considered key indicators in the evaluation of upset‐recovery training effectiveness needed

1 Calspan was previously held by the Veridian Corporation then subsequently acquired by General Dynamics in 2003



further investigation. Calspan continues its research with focus on developing alternative control strategies for pilots when primary control response is ineffective.

Upset Domain Training Institute The fundamental premise of the Upset Domain Training Institute (UDTI) evolved from its management’s assessment that realistic training for very dynamic and disorienting LOC‐I events is difficult because current simulators do not reproduce the angular and G accelerations or the disorientations of the actual eventxvii. Training in transport or normal category aircraft cannot be safely done because the upset environment will take the aircraft and crew close to their limits. UDTI asserts training done in aerobatic aircraft, while helpful, does not duplicate the skill set needed to recover a large aircraft and, in some cases, may transfer the wrong impression of the skills needed. Under these assumptions, UDTI is committed to the development of a multi‐axis rotational simulator to integrate g‐forces and vestibular illusions into a ground‐based full‐motion simulation device.

The simulation of g‐forces in a simulator device is fairly unique to this proposed UDTI development. NASA has also developed a g‐simulation device and is under‐going testing. Of important note is that rotation‐based simulation devices are currently available to provide pilot training on vestibular illusions such as the Environmental Tectonics Corporation’s2 own GAT II General Aviation Trainerxviii. Spatial disorientation training is a key component of an integrated upset recovery training solution and will be discussed more later.

Author’s Note: To our knowledge, at the time of this writing, the integration of g‐forces into a ground‐based UDTI simulation device does not currently address the inherent deficiency of ground‐based simulators to accurately replicate aircraft handling characteristics outside the narrow margin of realistic flight envelope data for various air carrier aircraftxix. As we learn more on this exciting technology development by UDTI, we will update this section. APS has submitted an enquiry to UDTI for updates as they are released.

APS Emergency Maneuver Training General Overview: APS Emergency Maneuver Training, an FAA‐approved 141 Flight School specializing in Upset Recovery, Spin Training and Instrument Recovery courses, offers what has been coined the "Master's Degree Program in Upset Recovery Training". The APS staff of instructors are all former military formal‐course instructor pilots with extensive general aviation and airline experience to ensure the recovery techniques taught are directly applicable and customizable to all categories of fixed wing aircraft. APS uses web‐based delivery of the Airplane Upset Recovery Training Aid, Level D Full Flight Simulator devices and the German‐built Extra 300L unlimited category aerobatic aircraft separately or in combination to provide a variety of levels of mitigation to LOC‐I. More details on the advancements developed by this provider will be presented later in this chapter.

2 The Environmental Tectonics Corporation is also the parent company to UDTI



LOCI Mitigation Summary Without question, LOC‐I is a clear and present danger to pilots at every level of aviation. A variety of providers, representing a diverse cross‐section of aviation analysts, researchers, industry regulators and flight training organizations, have made valuable contributions to the development of an overall effective training solution. Despite these tremendous contributions, the industry continues to be plagued with a high LOC‐I lethality index.

Persisting Deficiencies within Available Market Solutions A valid question at this stage of our discussion is: “Does an effective LOC‐I solution exist given the current state of effectiveness from a wide variety of reputable providers?” The answer is “yes” and it is cost‐effective, simple and combines a variety of innovative technologies utilizing resources available right now in the marketplace.

Market research conducted by APS in 2007 identified several significant deficiencies persistent in the training industry related to upset recovery skill development:

1. Ground‐based simulators, although excellent training devices for the vast majority of commercial jet operations and many LOC‐I scenarios, have limited envelope modeling fidelity to accurately reflect the response of actual aircraft in statistically‐significant LOC‐I flight conditions beyond the simulator’s demonstrated performance envelope.

2. Readily available advanced simulators do not currently provide the pilot feedback on g‐forces, visual illusions or the high‐stress mental state provoked by flight in real aircraft in real upsets. Ground‐based simulators that do provide g‐force feedback and visual illusions are similarly limited by the lack of computer modeling to accurately represent the performance and responses of a real aircraft in unusual attitude flight conditions.

3. The evaluators of a FAA funded study through Calspan identified several key research recommendations in techniques, methodology and training allotments:

a. The complexity and variety of recoveries (compounded by some participants’ inability to implement alternative control strategies) lead researchers to suggest consideration be given to the development of generalized recovery procedures effective in resolving classes of upsets.

b. Upset recovery training providers should focus on developing strategies to deal with mental factors such as surprise and confusion during training in addition to focusing on recovery techniques.

4. Flight Schools are generally ill‐equipped to deal with stall/spin training, which represents only a portion of a thorough upset recovery training program. In addition, flight schools commonly employ low‐time instructor pilots with very little practical transport category flight experience.

Integrated Solutions to LOCI Based on extensive market research and over a decade of firsthand experience teaching pilots upset recovery techniques, APS Emergency Maneuver Training addressed each the above deficiencies in the



development of its training regime resulting in outstanding performance results. The following section provides detailed descriptions and summary analyses of two APS studies on Loss of Control In‐Flight:

1. APS Informal Study: 2001 – 2007 2. APS Formal Study: LOC‐I Upset Recovery Effectiveness Study 2008

1. APS Informal Study: 2001 – 2007 Over a 6‐year period, APS informally monitored the ability of an estimated 1200 pilots of all ratings, experience and skill levels to effectively deal with an over‐banked flight condition to evaluate APS training effectiveness. This particular exercise was selected as a benchmark to assess skill development throughout the APS courses of training. For the purposes of this evaluation, the over‐banked flight condition was created from a cross‐controlled skidded turn traffic pattern stall resulting in a rapid over‐bank to beyond 120 degrees. Despite having had 4 hours of ground training, 1 hour preparatory aerobatic flight training with APS where participating pilots were given first‐hand experience with both over‐banked and inverted flight, as well as being provided with a demonstration of the proper recovery technique immediately prior to their first attempt, a full 80% of pilots (irrespective of ratings or flight experience) still pulled aggressively back on the yoke as a panic response. This panicked surprise‐induced instinctual response dramatically increased dive angle, airspeed gain and altitude loss which, when combined, significantly increase the severity of the flight condition. This is a particularly devastating result when considering, for example, that more than half of large commercial jet accidents in 2002 occurred at low altitude during approach and landingxx. During the initial years of the APS Informal Study from 2001 through 2003, less than 20% of evaluated pilots responded with the instinctual “pull” response after completing an intensive 3‐Day 5‐Mission upset recovery training program. With the integration of refined building‐block curricula and teaching methodology over the next 5 years through until the end of 2006, the graduate performance statistics improved steadily to less than 10% of graduates reacting inappropriately in an over‐bank stalled flight condition with as little as 2 ½ days and 4 training missions.

The 6‐year‐long APS Informal Study clearly identified the instinctual over‐banked recovery response programmed into the majority of pilots as a result of typical regulatory‐compliant flight training was catastrophic, especially if at low altitude. When faced with this LOC‐I scenario during initial evaluation, the common instinctual response was wholly incorrect; “Pulling in an Over‐Bank”.

The APS Informal Study confirmed the need to integrate several critical developments:

1. Considering the initial evaluation during the Informal Study occurred after extensive ground training (4 hours) and after an entire hour of flight training, the key to LOC‐I skill development was extensive practice. Academic training alone, even when combined with a flight training session lasting an hour, was ineffective at instilling any persistent recovery capability. In response, training effectiveness was enhanced using multiple training sorties of short duration emphasizing repetition‐to‐proficiency methodology to maximize effective skill development and long‐term retention. 4 to 5 short training sessions (typically 1 hour or less) over a minimum of 3 days produced the best results.

2. Stress‐management effectiveness was enhanced through the integration of an intervention technology to deal with the pilot’s natural tendency to panic and respond instinctuallyxxi. This



amalgamation of memorized verbal commands to force a trained physical response in a task‐saturated life‐threatening environment increased the trainee’s confidence and dramatically improved the accuracy of recovery technique implementation.

3. Accelerated skill‐development and long‐term retention was enhanced through the simplification of recovery techniques to deal with a wide variety of LOC‐I scenarios effectively. The simplified recovery technique was directly transferable to all commercial fixed‐wing aircraft and effective in a wide variety and classes of airplane upset situations.

4. On March 13, 2007, APS published the All‐Attitude Upset Recovery Checklistxxii (AAURC). The AAURC hallmark development was founded on proven proprietary teaching methodology developed over 12 years of full‐time specialization in upset recovery training. The AAURC integrated and simplified several LOC‐I recovery techniques complimenting industry resources from the FAA, US Military and Airline Industry. Refined into a simple highly effective procedure that could be easily recalled in the cockpit, the AAURC could be effectively implemented in time‐critical life‐threatening upset scenarios.

APS Formal Study: LOCI Upset Recovery Effectiveness Study 20072008 From November 2007 through March 2008, APS launched the APS Formal Study to officially assess its program’s ability to effectively and efficiently train pilots of varying experience levels to a safe level of proficiency and competency in a spectrum of LOC‐I scenarios. A prime motivator in formalizing the LOC‐I Upset Recovery Training Effectiveness Study was to evaluate the effectiveness of APS training programs to provide a solution to the LOC‐I threat and ensure the training experience was practically valuable to pilots in the cockpit and that it developed operationally useful recognition, avoidance and recovery skills. The data analyzed for the purpose of this study included 115 data points, each representing a participating pilot.

DATA GATHERING: APS Formal Study participants completed questionnaires prior to commencing flight training and then again after the training was completed. Following stringent published performance parameters; APS Instructor Pilots evaluated candidates during both their first and last flights to assess competence in recovering from five key upset recovery scenarios. The pilot tracked these results by filling out the data form immediately after the completion of the evaluation flight. The combined questionnaires and proficiency evaluation forms have been included in Annex A.

The APS Formal Study expands upon the scope of previous Informal Study. Formal Study participants were evaluated during their first flight after aircraft‐specific familiarization training, prior to participating in any formal LOC‐I flight training and the initial evaluation terminated on the first instance of the participant demonstrating an unsafe recovery. The initial evaluation was intentionally limited to the minimum amount of evaluations necessary to demonstrate either competence or incompetence. In a situation of incompetent recoveries (the majority) during the first flight, the pre‐training evaluation was terminated. Due to the nature of the evaluation exercises, evaluations were terminated to avoid scaring or intimidating trainees. It was decided by the evaluation staff continuing beyond the first occurrence of an incompetent recovery, could have a negative influence on the participant’s confidence, ability and willingness to learn throughout the remainder of the program. Training received prior to the initial in‐aircraft evaluation was limited to 2‐hours of ground training (no flight training other than the above described aircraft familiarization) on



fundamental aerodynamic concepts and an in depth academic study of the All‐Attitude Upset Recovery Technique.

The final evaluation included in‐flight competency testing in all 5 LOC‐I recovery scenarios3 as follows;

1. Over‐Bank Nose Low Unusual Attitude 2. Cross‐Controlled Traffic Pattern Stall 3. Wake Turbulence Upset 4. Nose High Unusual Attitude 5. Rudder Hard‐Over Control Failure

Although many more LOC‐I scenarios are covered with equal attention in the course of training, these five benchmark situations were used to provide a measurement of training effectiveness and pilot competency.

APS Formal Study – Data Analysis

Research Start Date: November 2007 through March 2008 Total Number of Data Points (Pilots Trained at APS) Included in Research: 115 Pilots Data Filtered Below Includes All Pilots Meeting the Following Criteria:

• Pilots Flying Turbo Prop and/or Turbo Jet Aircraft (total of 75 pilots) Group Demographic of Professional Pilots Evaluated (Including Initial and Recurrent Participants):

• 88.0 % had greater than 1500 hours of flight experience • 91.6 % were between the ages of 25 and 59 years of age • 51.4 % were certified flight instructors • 81.3 % had less than 10 hours of aerobatic experience

Formal Study Results: Pilot Performance Before and After APS Training

Participant Recovery Performance Evaluation for Initial Courses (Before Training versus After Training):

TRAINEE PERFORMANCE EVALUATION TRAINEE’S ABILITY TO RECOVER

Upset Scenario Assessed* Before Training After Training

Over‐bank Nose Low Upset 34.8% 97.9% Cross‐Controlled Stall to Over‐bank 41.9% 100.0% Severe Wake Turbulence Encounter 42.9% 97.8% Nose High Upset / Pitch Mis‐Trim 47.8% 100.0% Control Failure: Rudder Hard‐Over 40.6% 92.3%

AVERAGE SUCCESS RATE 41.6% 97.6%

* Scenarios are designed to reflect statistically life‐threatening conditions; typically flight attitudes beyond 60 degrees angle of bank and/or 30 degrees of pitch. (Note: Many more

3 Occasionally during the 2-Day 3-Mission training programs, the participating pilots’ proficiency and learning curve did not allow for all the LOC-I scenarios to be addressed. In those instances, only the scenarios trained were evaluated. The 3-Day 5-Mission program consistently allowed their participants to receive formal training in all 5 of the evaluation exercises.



scenarios than those listed in this chart are taught during the course. These particular maneuvers are evaluated to give representative indications of training effectiveness.)

Training Courses in the study averaged out to 4.4 training missions per course Retention of Skill: Of the overall test group of 115 pilots, 35 pilots were repeat customers attending a

recurrent upset recovery course at APS. Recurrent participants demonstrated 76.4% retention of skill returning after an average of 19 months between Initial and Recurrent Training programs. Skills are expected to atrophy at a greater rate the longer pilots delay time between Recurrent training courses.

PARTICIPANT FEEDBACK ‐ BY PROFESSIONAL PILOTS AFTER COMPLETING TRAINING

Course components were evaluated as follows:

Ground Training 90.7% Excellent 9.3% Above Average Flight Training 97.3% Excellent 2.7% Above Average Recovery Technique Effectiveness 98.7% Excellent 1.3% Above Average Quality of Instructors 100.0% Excellent

VALUE TO PILOTS: 100% of the participants indicated that LOC‐I training as provided by APS was valuable to all pilots with 64.0 % of those votes indicating that APS LOC‐I training should be mandatory in pilot certification.

SKILL AND KNOWLEDGE: 100% indicated they learned quite a bit and developed life‐saving skills with 76.0% of those votes indicating their understanding and pilot skill‐set related to upset recovery training had grown dramatically.

AIRCRAFT: 89.3% evaluated the Extra 300L training aircraft as being EXCELLENT with the remainder of the votes indicating it was ABOVE AVERAGE.

FACILITY: 73.3% evaluated the APS facility as EXCELLENT with an additional 25.0% assessing the APS Facility as ABOVE AVERAGE.

OVERALL EXPERIENCE: 96.0% of the participants evaluated the overall experience as EXCELLENT with the remainder indicating it was ABOVE AVERAGE.

MANUAL: 68.0% of participants rated the APS Training Manual as EXCELLENT with an additional 26.7% ranking the manual as ABOVE AVERAGE.

SIMULATOR TRAINING: 100% of participants indicated that upset recovery training in a real aircraft develops life‐saving piloting skills and awareness that cannot be taught in a simulator. Participants identified the following factors as the primary critical training areas that cannot be duplicated in the simulator:

98.6% ‐ G Loading Awareness & Management 91.8% ‐ Angle of Attack Management 89.0% ‐ Spatial Disorientation & Mental Capacity 90.4% ‐ Experiential Errors & Learning 95.9% ‐ Flight Beyond Critical Angle of Attack



SOLUTION TO LOSS‐OF‐CONTROL IN‐FLIGHT: 100% of participants indicated that the solution to dramatically reducing the risk of Loss‐of‐Control In‐Flight must include specialized upset recovery training in real aircraft as provided by APS Emergency Maneuver Training. 61.8% of those votes indicated a full solution should also include extensively updated and redesigned simulator training profiles and curricula.


The All‐Attitude Upset Recovery Technique Checklist

Author: Paul “BJ” Ransbury, President APS Emergency Maneuver Training www.apstraining.com

Part 141 Chief Flight Instructor Master CFI-Aerobatic / CFI / CFII / MEI / AGI Airbus A320 Pilot, F/A-18 Hornet Fighter Pilot Cirrus Standardized Instructor Fighter Weapons Instructor ICAS Certified Air Show Performer

The intent of this article is to provide pilots of all skill and experience levels an opportunity to review the general concepts of the All‐Attitude Upset RecoveryTM Technique. The recovery is designed as a single procedure checklist to address both stalls and unusual attitudes in a wide variety of fixed wing aircraft to include general aviation, business jet and airline transport airplanes. As a checklist, its successful application is significantly improved if the pilot has completed a comprehensive upset recovery training course. As with all in‐flight procedures, the pilot implementing the recovery is expected to have aircraft‐specific knowledge related to their aircraft’s performance and flight characteristics. Our mission at APS Emergency Maneuver Training is to provide pilots with a turnkey resource in the provision of expert knowledge and practical hands‐on training so they can be prepared for upset recovery scenarios in the real world. This article is not intended to be a single resource that provides the reader with all the information needed to be thoroughly trained in upset recovery techniques. We do hope this article gives pilots valuable insight into the combined importance of knowledge and practical skill when faced with a high‐pressure time‐critical, and possibly life‐threatening, flight condition. The training provided by APS Emergency Maneuver Training is unique in that we present our training services as being directly complimentary to recovery procedures implemented in all categories of fixed‐wing aircraft. An Upset Recovery Training course is of marginal value if the techniques learned and knowledge gained during training is not directly transferable back to the participating pilot’s own aircraft.

INTRODUCTION For more than a decade APS Emergency Maneuver Training (APS) has been developing and teaching upset recovery, emergency maneuver, instrument recovery and spin recovery programs to thousands of pilots flying just about every certified fixed‐wing aircraft type in existence. Keeping in touch with the growing market demand for an effective, practical, comprehensive upset recovery program has been our primary focus each and every day for over 10,000 hours of in‐flight instruction. At APS Emergency Maneuver Training we are blessed with a staff of expert aviators whose






experience spans the spectrum of aviation to include the US Navy, US Air Force and Canadian Armed Forces, and all having extensive professional experience flying commercial aircraft and most are experienced airline pilots. Additionally, each APS instructor has thousands of hours of aerobatic experience in both general aviation and turbojet aircraft. The primary reason I’m starting my discussion with a background summary is to testify to the fact that the field of upset recovery training has been thoroughly investigated. There simply aren’t any secrets in what action needs to be taken to recognize, avoid and recover from unusual attitude scenarios and stalled flight conditions in every category of certified fixed‐wing aircraft. Focusing this valuable information into a cockpit‐friendly format is the essence of this article. Knowing "what to do" is a critical first step but is rendered useless without hands‐on practical experience actually flying recoveries. Additionally, “knowing” and “doing” must be combined with an engrained pilot skill‐set that can be drawn upon immediately and accurately by the pilot in an emergency situation. At APS, our team of instructors has had the unique opportunity of studying, practicing and operationally implementing upset recovery and stall procedures that are based on exhaustively researched expert guidance produced by the world’s foremost authorities, to include;

• US / Canadian Military

• Federal Aviation Administration / Transport Canada

• Commercial Aircraft Manufacturers

• General Aviation Community: based on reference to published works, and personal dialogues, by highly acclaimed reputable experts such as Rich Stowell, Sammy Mason, Patty Wagstaff, Bill Kerschner and many more.

During our research we found each of the industry publications issued by the military, aircraft manufacturers and government regulating agencies to be thorough, accurate and tremendously valuable resources to pilots seeking further information on upset recovery. A short list of “must read” publications for anyone seeking expert insight into upset recovery technologies are as follows:

Professional Pilots / Commercial Pilots / Airline Pilots:∙ FAA Airplane Upset Recovery Training Aid – Revision 1 Private / GA Pilots: ∙ The Light Airplane Pilots Guide to Stall/Spin Awareness ∙ FAA Airplane Flying Handbook

What is the All‐Attitude Upset Recovery Technique?

The All‐Attitude Upset RecoveryTM Technique Checklist is a logical single‐procedure checklist that, when combined with proper knowledge and skill, effectively deals with wide variety of stalls, upsets, wake turbulence encounters and unusual attitudes (UAs) encountered in fixed wing aircraft.

In the process of reviewing industry guidance, it became apparent that each organization that researched and produced upset recovery procedures had developed remarkably similar procedures. These procedures addressed aerodynamic factors in pretty much the same order regardless of whether the procedure was designed to recover the aircraft from a stall or from an unusual attitude. To be clear, this statement is not meant to over‐simplify upset

http://www.apstraining.com/pilots.htm

http://www.apstraining.com/upset_recovery_safeopsys_1.htm

http://www.apstraining.com/stall-spin-awareness.htm



recovery procedures. In the execution of a proper recovery there are many aerodynamic and situation factors to consider that require an in‐depth understanding of the associated flight envelope and each aircraft’s unique performance characteristics. Having said that, there are fundamental elements that must be considered in a logical order to deal with each upset recovery scenario. It is the commonalities between references and complimentary logical patterns of the published recovery procedures that lead APS Emergency Maneuver Training to the development of the All‐Attitude Upset RecoveryTM Technique checklist (see Table 3). In short, the All‐Attitude Upset RecoveryTM Technique Checklist is a proven process that gives the pilot a procedure that is short, comprehensive, and most importantly, a procedure that can be easily memorized and effectively applied during an emergency flight condition. By their very nature, emergency flight conditions do not afford the pilot time to reference a complex recovery procedure displayed on the electronic checklist or as published in the aircraft’s operating instructions. As a result, pilots must have a memorized pro‐active procedure available to them in a crisis. Many of the recovery procedures detailed in training aids and aircraft operating instructions are flushed out as lengthy narratives that address each recovery individually and tend to present the pilot with a separate recovery for each of the following flight conditions:

• Power off/on stalls

• Accelerated stalls

• Cross‐controlled stalls

• Vmc stalls

• Nose low UAs

• Nose low overbank UAs

• Nose high UAs

• Nose high overbank UAs

• Wake turbulence upsets

It is true that lengthy descriptions are absolutely necessary to ensure the pilot has insight into the particulars of their aircraft related to specific flight conditions. Typically, each of the scenarios listed above demand more attention on certain stages of the recovery checklist than others. In following the All‐Attitude Upset RecoveryTM Technique Checklist thoroughly, combined with experience gained through a dedicated upset recovery training course, pilots understanding the risk and attention factors required for each upset scenario in their particular aircraft can effectively recover from airplane upsets when the recovery is accomplished in an accurate and timely manner. Note that the All‐Attitude Upset RecoveryTM Technique checklist accommodates aircraft‐specific exceptions. This means that the action taken during a certain step in the checklist may require a completely different action based on the type of aircraft being recovered. Here’s an example:

Aircraft‐specific Example of a Procedural Exception: In the Power‐Off Stall most stall recovery procedures recommend the application of full power in the stall recovery. There are exceptions to this general guidance based on aircraft design and configuration. Exceptions to applying full power (or full thrust) in a stall situation include situations such as; Vmc (a failed engine) stall in a multi‐engine aircraft, high‐powered single‐engine propeller aircraft where the manufacturer cautions the torque rolling effect as being excessive in slow‐speed high‐AOA flight conditions, and in large jet aircraft where the manufacturer may require the reduction of power in the stall recovery because of excessive nose‐up moments at full power in low‐speed high‐AOA situations when the engines are mounted under the wing.

Needless to say, each aircraft can have characteristics that require customized attention by the pilot. It is the pilot’s job to know what these are and how they must be considered in an upset recovery scenario.



WHAT IT'S NOT ...

The All‐Attitude Upset RecoveryTM Technique is NOT a spin recovery technique. For spin recovery training, APS continues to teach the NASA Standard Spin Recovery Technique, or P.A.R.E. Technique as coined by master flight instructor and author, Rich Stowell.

The All‐Attitude Upset RecoveryTM Technique is NOT a revolutionary magic procedure that pretends to have the answer for every aircraft in every situation. It simply provides a logical process for the pilot to address the stalled and/or unusual attitude situation in an order that will maximize the pilot’s ability to recover the aircraft successfully in an environment that is typically counter‐intuitive.

DISCUSSION

As with any comprehensive upset recovery training program, the course’s overall focus must rest squarely on awareness training, both on the ground and in the air, for the pilot to be able to recognize and avoid flight envelope and/or flight attitude excursions that are beyond those experienced during typical day‐to‐day flight operations. The FAA Airplane Upset Recovery Training Aid ‐ Revision 1 defines an aircraft upset is follows:

AIRPLANE UPSET

Pitch Attitude � Greater than 25 degrees, nose up � Greater than 10 degrees, nose down

Bank Angle � Greater than 45 degrees of bank

Airspeed � Within the above parameters but at airspeeds inappropriate for the conditions

Historically, upset recovery techniques and checklists have been developed to deal with three major categories of upset scenarios:

Unusual Attitudes:

In this discussion an Unusual Attitude is defined as an unstalled flight condition where pitch exceeds 25 degrees nose‐up and/or 10 degrees nose‐down and/or bank attitudes exceeding 45 degrees. An Unusual Attitude differs from a Stall in that an Unusual Attitude is commonly understood as being a flight condition where the wing is not at a stalled angle of attack (AOA). Certainly, an unusual attitude can be combined with a stall, however in this discussion, unusual attitudes will be considered as unstalled conditions. Rest assured, a stalled Unusual Attitude is very effectively resolved by following the All‐Attitude Upset RecoveryTM Technique checklist.

In our discussion an Unusual Attitude additionally includes any pitch or bank combination as being “unusual” if the pilot is either uncomfortable for any reason (including disorientation and/or confusion) or is presented



with an adverse situation unexpectedly such as in wake turbulence encounters causing rapid changes in both pitch and bank which may or may not exceed the FAA definition of an Airplane Upset.

Stalls:

The stall is directly related to angle of attack and is not a function of airspeed or flight attitude. Valid recovery techniques must deal directly with the stall prior to any attempt being made to resolve the flight attitude. This is critically important, as the physics of flight beyond critical angle of attack do not, for the most part, accommodate traditional use of flight controls to affect a complete recovery. Stalls, including overbanked stalls, are comprehensively addressed by the All‐Attitude Upset RecoveryTM Technique.

Spins:

A spin is not just a stall despite the fact that the only path to a developed spin is through the stall, specifically, a prolonged uncoordinated stall. A spin has significantly different characteristics than a stall ‐ so much so, that

it is considered to be a completely different flight condition. In the spin, the aircraft’s wings (both of them*) are at stalled angles of attack scribing a helical descending flight path while the aircraft is established in a stabilized yaw‐driven auto‐rotation that may, or may not, be recoverable. Certified aircraft designs that are flight‐tested to recover from developed spins are single‐engine aerobatic aircraft and some single‐engine utility aircraft when flown within the proper weight and balance limitations prescribed for intentional spinning flight. A thoroughly presented upset recovery training program should detail the certification limitations related to the participating pilot’s aircraft related to spin recovery. More often than not, aircraft other than those listed above have not been certified, or even flight‐tested, to recover from spins. Every reputable spin recovery training program must educate pilots on this fact and emphasize the best spin recovery is to recognize and avoid the stall before it starts. If a stall does occur, execute a proper stall recovery before yaw is allowed to couple with stalled angle of attack long enough to move the aircraft into the potentially unrecoverable developed‐spin regime of flight.

* Both wings stalled in a spin is a widely accepted description of spinning flight. Following the release of this article, NASA Test Pilot James M.

Patton Jr. wrote in providing expert insight that during spin testing they found that some aircraft did not necessarily always have both wings completely stalled in a stabilized spin. The Cessna 172 was an example he provided.

History

Until the implementation of the All‐Attitude Upset RecoveryTM Technique, APS Emergency Maneuver Training taught stall recovery as a distinct and separate recovery from the unusual attitude recovery. We did this as they are recoveries addressing markedly different flight conditions requiring sequential focus on successive aerodynamic factors to lead the pilot to a successful recovery.

Below is a summary of the APS recovery techniques prior to the integration of the All‐Attitude Upset RecoveryTM

Technique.



TABLE 1: ESTABLISHED APS RECOVERY TECHNIQUES AND PHILOSOPHY Stall Recovery Unusual Attitude Recovery NASA Standard Spin Recovery

PRESSURE POWER RUDDER LEVEL CLIMB

POWERPUSH ROLL

POWERAILERONS RUDDER ELEVATOR

Flight Conditions Flight Conditions Flight Conditions (if recoverable)Power off/on Stall Accelerated Stall Cross‐controlled Stalls Slipping Stalls Skidding Stalls Incipient Spin

Spiral DiveUnusual Attitudes Over‐banks Wake Turbulence Rolling Upsets

SpinIncipient Spin Aggravated Spins Flat Spin Accelerated Spins

The overall objective of an upset recovery training program should be to recognize and avoid a threatening flight condition and to immediately return the aircraft to a normal flight attitude under positive control within the operating limits of the aircraft. However, if the situation cannot be avoided due to its unintentional nature: either being a surprise (such as wake turbulence), or being created by the pilot due to inappropriate control inputs, then the pilot needs to implement a mental process integrated with a physical pro‐active series of actions on the flight controls to accomplish the following recovery objectives:

UPSET RECOVERY TRAINING OBJECTIVES:

1. Regain control of the aircraft if in a stalled flight condition regardless of flight attitude, then 2. Maintain control of the aircraft while taking action to correct the flight attitude, then 3. Minimize altitude loss. In most every case, this ultimately requires the aircraft to established in a full‐power Vy

climb away from the ground prior to considering the recovery fully complete.

Proficiency in effecting successful upset recovery maneuvers is developed through the implementation of the following mental processes:

UPSET RECOVERY TRAINING PROFICIENCY:

1. Immediately centralize the controls while methodically analyzing the situation 2. Expediently identify the flight condition, then 3. Sequentially apply the applicable recovery technique to effect recovery.

Pilots completing APS courses of training are provided with extensive academic training and practical instruction on the effective integration of flight envelope analysis to correctly recognize and successfully apply a methodical recovery. A core component of upset recovery training involves the deprogramming of instinctive pilot response (usually a reactionary “pull” on the control column in an attempt to bring the nose‐up when over‐banked or in an unrecognizable flight condition), which tends to make bad situations almost always worse. In fact, the instinctive Pull‐Response is exactly the wrong thing to do when faced with a stall of any kind, an over‐banked unusual attitude or any nose‐high unusual attitude.



All‐Attitude Upset Recovery ChecklistTM Technique

The recoveries in Table 1 are each valid and consider the proper actions to take in the proper order to deal with the related flight condition. After several days of extensive training in all‐attitude all‐envelope recovery training, pilots can safely identify and action the appropriate recovery.

The genesis of the All‐Attitude Upset RecoveryTM Technique was inspired by the need to create a single‐procedure checklist that would deal with both stalls and unusual attitudes while remaining efficient, practical and effective in all categories of fixed wing aircraft, regardless of technological advancement of the aircraft.

TABLE 2: RECOVERY PROCEDURE EVOLUTION AND INTEGRATION

APS RECOVERIES PRIOR TO INTEGRATION INTEGRATED METHOD*

Stall Recovery Unusual Attitude Recovery All‐Attitude Upset Recovery

PRESSURE POWER RUDDER

POWER PUSH

PUSHPOWER RUDDER

Stall Recovery Unusual Attitude Recovery All‐Attitude Upset Recovery

LEVEL CLIMB

ROLL ROLLCLIMB

* All‐Attitude Upset RecoveryTM Technique Checklist

There are no mysteries to the individual steps of the all‐attitude recovery, however as previously emphasized, the practical application of the technique requires a thorough academic understanding of each aircraft’s aerodynamic characteristics and responsiveness in the applicable flight regime.

The All‐Attitude Upset RecoveryTM Technique Checklist is the logical combination of APS’s previously established recoveries and has been integrated in such a way that it directly compliments and complies with General Aviation, Business Aviation and Commercial Airline Training technologies. Additionally, the recovery complies with unusual attitude recovery techniques taught to military pilots, is in direct compliance with the FAA Airplane Upset Recovery Training Aid – Revision 1, and also deals with the stalled flight.



TABLE 3: ALL‐ATTITUDE UPSET RECOVERYTM TECHNIQUE CHECKLIST

1. CENTRALIZE / ANALYZE (Recognize and Confirm the Situation)

2. DISCONNECT AUTO‐PILOT / AUTO‐THROTTLE* (If Equipped)

3. RECOVER

PUSH* POWER RUDDER ROLL CLIMB

* Detailed Checklist Considerations * This checklist is to organize pilot considerations in an airplane upset. It does not supersede the aircraft's operating instructions issued by the manufacturer or established recovery procedures.

Over the course of two days, the most basic APS courses of training dedicate a minimum of six hours of ground training and three hours of flight training to instill pilot participants with the academic understanding and practical skill necessary to properly implement the fundamentals of the All‐Attitude Upset RecoveryTM Technique Checklist in a time‐critical emergency situation. IMMEDICACY OF "CORRECT" ACTION This is such an important issue in upset recovery and spin training. Due to physiological factors (such as spatial disorientation among others) and psychological factors (such as panic and shear fear, among others), this action‐factor on its own highlights the critical importance of practical hands‐on experience of recognizing and flying recoveries. As we start upset recovery and/or spin training at APS, our clients seem to fall into either the instinctual‐response categories of “Freeze on the controls” or “Flail on the controls”. From this shaky beginning we start the process of deprogramming instinctual responses and engraining trained responses. Neither of these instinctual responses serves to benefit effective recoveries as both can quickly lead to aggravating the situation towards an uncontrollable flight condition or massive altitude loss. Simply put: the longer the adverse flight condition proceeds, the less chance there is of a positive outcome. Freeze on the Controls Regrettably, the majority of upset recovery scenarios, such as cross‐controlled stalls for example, are caused by the pilot mismanaging control inputs to the point where they’ve put themselves in harms way. “Freeze on the Controls” is not at all the same as “Centralize the Controls” which many pilots seem to think is what they are doing. Freezing has a tendency to perpetuate the situation and will, in the example of the cross‐controlled stall as with most others, potentially lead to continuing the incipient spin (aggravated stall in yaw), developing the condition into a spin or, at best, an over‐banked nose‐low spiraling flight condition. Combined with a low altitude scenario, life‐saving recovery proficiency mandates moving to “immediate correct action” almost instantly. Rarely does “Freeze on the Controls” result in anything beneficial. Fix: Practical training.



Flail on the Controls Unless overcome by Spatial Disorientation (SD) or panic leading to “Freeze on the Controls”, most pilots are aware that immediate action is required to implement an effective and timely recovery. The problem with that particular uneducated philosophy is that they missed a critical component of the “Immediacy of Correct Action”. Clearly the missed component is "CORRECT" action. No amount of study or academic knowledge prepares a pilot for the practical procedure of effectively recovering an aircraft. To be clear, academic knowledge is extremely important but it’s only part of the full equation. Fix: Practical training complemented by extensive correct academic preparation. The importance of immediate correct action is one of primary reasons why APS moved away from having three separate recovery procedures for stall, unusual attitudes and spin recoveries. Although each of the three recoveries were effective, we found the process for pilots to recognize the flight condition, make a decision on which recovery to use and then take recovery action could unnecessarily delay the implementation of the recovery. With proper training at APS, the All‐Attitude Upset Recovery procedure eliminates the one step of deciding on whether to use a stall recovery or an unusual attitude recovery shortening the recovery process. Understandably, pilots who haven’t attended an APS course take a look at the All‐Attitude Upset Recovery checklist and get the impression that the recovery procedure is long process. That is absolutely not the case at all. It simply includes the mental process of analyzing the situation to recognize the flight condition prior to taking immediate “correct” action. In summary of this section, Immediacy of Correct Action is a far cry from Immediate Action or No Action. Regardless of the recovery procedure used the pilot must be trained on flight condition recognition and this doesn’t come easily for most pilots. After several days of training, the average pilot realizes that the process of recognition, SD self‐evaluation, disconnecting the auto‐pilot if equipped and initiating the physical action steps of the recovery should ideally occur the instant the adverse flight condition is noticed. Action without accurate flight condition recognition can be disastrous. To further emphasize "Correct" action, we teach pilots in the recovery steps to program themselves to consciously take action during the recovery using what we call the Say & Do Method where they mechanically state the procedural step and immediately move the control surface to accomplish the action based on the particular flight condition. The Say & Do Method is tremendously successful in breaking the pilot out of the instinctual inappropriate mental defense mechanisms of either "Freeze on the Controls" or "Flail on the Controls". This method, combined with proper training and practice, forces a successful recovery while simultaneously programming desired trained responses.

Detailing the Steps of the All‐Attitude Upset RecoveryTM Technique Checklist The listing below is an outline highlighting the meaning and importance of each step of the recovery in relation to various recovery scenarios. This detailing is "food for thought" and is not intended to be all‐inclusive nor is it an attempt to provide all solutions for all aircraft in all situations.

1. CENTRALIZE / ANALYZE:

Recognize the flight condition

� It is important to determine the aircraft’s flight envelope status, flight attitude and the pilot’s state of mind.



CENTRALIZE

� Auto‐Pilot Engaged: leave the autopilot engaged and immediately move to ANALYZE

� Hand Flying or No Auto‐Pilot: centralize all the flight controls and move to ANALYZE

ANALYZE

� As the pilot in command, assess your mental state to determine if you are disoriented and if that disorientation is combined with an undesirable flight attitude or flight condition.

i. If, for example, the pilot determines that he/she is suffering from misleading “seat of the pants” spatial disorientation but the analysis of the flight parameters reveals the aircraft is in a normal flight attitude, then the pilot’s primary objective should be to establish visual dominance to suppress vestibular “seat of the pants” misdirection while keeping the aircraft under control.

ii. However, if the pilot determines that the aircraft is in an unusual attitude or stalled flight condition, regardless of his or her disoriented status, then they must establish visual dominance and continue with the recovery. In a multi‐crew situation, consideration should be given to passing control to the other pilot under the assumption the other crew member is not also disoriented.

� AM I STALLED? – Assess aircraft response. A stall can be identified by any of the following:

i. Significant airframe and/or control surface buffet at speeds below Va

ii. Lack of, or Reversal of, Pitch Authority

iii. Lack of, or Reversal of, Roll Authority

iv. Continuous aural or visual stall warning

� AM I IN AN UNUSUAL ATTITUDE? – Evaluate primary data to determine flight attitude:

i. Nose High

1. Altitude Increasing

2. Airspeed Decreasing

ii. Nose Low

1. Altitude Decreasing



2. Airspeed Increasing

2. DISCONNECT: Auto‐Pilot and Auto‐Throttles (if equipped)

3. RECOVER: Verbalize and Sequentially Apply the Recovery:

“PUSH”

Push forward on the control column while physically over‐riding any opposing trim forces while confirming the Autopilot has been disconnected (if equipped). Regardless of the recovery being implemented, it is very important that the pilot not unload the aircraft to zero or negative G at any point during the recovery. Geometrically speaking, a push to zero or negative G does have some benefit in reducing dive angle during an overbanked nose low recovery, however, the practical consequences of potentially starving the engine(s) of fuel leading to an engine failure, as well as the adverse impact on passengers and cargo, is considered over riding. In consideration of all factors related to the safe and effective recovery of the aircraft, a positive G loading of ¼ to ½ G is considered ideal while keeping the wing at low angle of attack when bank angle is above 45 degrees. Note that the unloaded flight condition should remain until the final “CLIMB” step of the checklist is initiated.

It is important to note that the pilot should not confuse the "push" as direction to bury the nose towards the ground in a low‐altitude close‐to‐wings‐level stall or go‐around. In the traditional approach‐to‐landing stall or power‐off stall when the bank angle is not extreme (less than 45 degrees), the pilot should only push (unload) enough to ensure the angle of attack is below critical yet optimizing lift to minimize altitude loss.

i. Stall

1. Aggressively unload the aircraft through a purposeful “Push” straightforward on the control column to reduce the angle (AOA) of attack of the wing to below critical AOA. The amount of elevator movement and control pressure may vary from a simple release of control column pressure to a distinct push of 20‐30 lbs or more in a nose‐high autopilot trimmed power‐on stall condition in a transport category aircraft. In a stall where the wings are close to level (less than 45 degrees), the angle of attack should only be reduced enough to get out of the stall yet not so much so as to unnecessarily induce a significant amount of altitude loss.

ii. Unusual Attitude

1. Nose‐Low & Nose‐Low Overbank

Push forward on the control column to reduce G‐loading. If over‐banked, the aircraft should be unloaded to approximately ¼ to ½ positive G loading. The benefits when overbanked are:



i. Minimizes asymmetric loading ii. Optimizes roll rate to minimize the amount of time the aircraft

is in an overbank flight attitude, and iii. Minimizes the resulting dive angle, which directly affects

airspeed gain and the altitude loss in the dive recovery.

2. Nose‐High & Nose‐High Overbank

Push forward on the control column to establish a g‐loading of ¼ to ½ positive Gs. The benefits are:

a. Protects from the nose‐high stall by expanding the flight envelope

b. Reduces drag by keeping a higher airspeed on the aircraft throughout the maneuver thus allowing more controllability

c. Increases aileron effectiveness

“POWER”

Physically over‐ride any opposing throttle resistance while confirming the Auto‐throttle has been disconnected (if equipped). The selection of power setting is outlined below.

i. Stall

1. In a stall recovery, the power is typically selected to full power with some exceptions that are discussed in detail during upset recovery ground training

ii. Unusual Attitude

Power selection in an usual attitude is based on current or anticipated airspeed during the recovery in relation to Va. This action step is to increase controllability nose high (unless prohibited by the flight manual) and to minimize altitude loss nose low. A generalized rule of thumb is; nose‐up power‐up, nose‐down power‐down. There are several exceptions to this general rule that are taught during the course.

1. Nose High & Nose High Overbank

a. Select full power to keep as much airspeed as possible unless prohibited by the specific aircraft’s flight manual. Combined with the aircraft being unloaded to minimize drag, full power/thrust will maximize the kinetic energy state of aircraft and improve controllability in the “Roll” step later in the recovery.

2. Nose Low & Nose Low Overbank



a. Power to idle unless well below Va (such as a stall recovery) and there no risk of exceeding Va during the ensuing dive.

b. If above Va, or there is a risk of exceeding Va during the dive recovery, consideration should also be given to the use of speed brakes and/or spoilers to minimize airspeed gain above Va. Minimizing airspeed gain above Va will have a dramatic effect on minimizing the turn radius during the dive recovery. In a wings‐level dive recovery, turn radius is directly related to the resulting altitude loss.

“RUDDER”

In all recoveries, apply a firm single application of rudder to cancel yaw to attain coordinated flight or, if the aircraft still stalled at this point, to visually arrest the yaw/roll couple to minimize the risk of a spin. It is important to emphasize that rudder is NOT used to roll the aircraft unless judiciously and properly combined with aileron input in the “ROLL” step (next). This recovery DOES NOT advocate the “Step on the Sky” technique as it unnecessarily uncoordinates the aircraft, significantly increases drag, may overstress the rudder assembly (especially when above Va and/or the rudder is cycled) and has marginal secondary roll response in comparison the proper use of aileron as detailed in the next step.

NOTE: "Inappropriate over‐use of rudder" not "under‐use of rudder" is a widespread common error during skill development in upset recovery training. This is especially prevalent in pilots operating business class and transport category aircraft.

“ROLL”

Now that the aircraft has been successfully recovered from the stall and configured properly to increase recovery performance (as accomplished by following PUSH – POWER – RUDDER), the pilot must use ailerons to roll the aircraft’s lift vector to the desired attitude:

i. Still stalled? You shouldn’t be:

1. Prior to initiating the “Roll” step, the aircraft must be recovered from the stall. A very common error is for pilot to have not properly reduced the angle of attack in the earlier “Push” step resulting in the aircraft remaining in the stall. If at this stage of the recovery the aircraft is still at stalled angle of attack the pilot has most likely instinctively pulled back on the control column. The only recourse is to restart the procedure at the “Push” step.

2. Warning: Time is of the essence. If the pilot has been randomly moving the flight controls instinctively and not strictly following the All‐Attitude Upset RecoveryTM

Technique Checklist in a timely manner, there is a possibility that the aircraft has transitioned through the aggravated‐stall / incipient‐spin phase into a developed spin. If so, the pilot should take the appropriate actions for spin recovery as stated in the



aircraft operating instructions or, lacking a published spin recovery, apply the NASA Standard Spin Recovery as outlined in Table 4. Unfortunately, recovery from the developed spin may or may not be possible.

ii. Unusual Attitudes

1. Nose High & Nose High Overbank

a. When in an unusual attitude nose‐up greater than 25 degrees it is recommended to roll the aircraft to a flight attitude of 45 – 60 degrees of bank to get the nose of the aircraft back to the horizon. By keeping the aircraft unloaded below critical angle of attack during the nose‐high roll, the aircraft will be protected from the stall, be at an AOA that increases aileron effectiveness and be subjected to less drag thus keeping higher kinetic energy (airspeed) on the aircraft. Additionally, the unloaded roll to 45 ‐ 60 degrees of bank orients the aircraft's lift vector in a manner that significantly reduces the vertical component of lift allowing the nose to move towards the horizon sooner while maximizing controllability.

b. As the nose passes the horizon in the 45 – 60 bank in a low AOA flight condition, the pilot can initiate a roll to wings level while keeping the aircraft unloaded. Prior to proceeding to the “Climb” step, the pilot must crosscheck the airspeed to ensure airspeed is increasing above the basic stall speed prior to increasing angle of attack to effect recovery

2. Nose Low & Nose Low Overbank

a. The lift vector must be immediately rolled to a wings‐level flight attitude. In situations where the aircraft flight attitude is beyond 90 degrees of bank, this can be ambiguous. In nose low overbanks beyond 90 degrees of bank, the lift vector must be rolled in the direction of nearest horizon through to a wings level flight attitude while keeping the aircraft unloaded at low angle of attack under positive G. Up to full control deflection must be initiated to achieve the desired wings level flight attitude in minimum time.

b. The steps of the All‐Attitude Upset RecoveryTM Technique leading to the “Roll” step have prepared the aircraft for optimum recovery. The unloaded flight condition is particularly important when the aircraft is overbanked. As previously detailed, the unloaded roll has the following benefits in an overbank recovery scenario:

i.Minimizes asymmetric loading ii.Optimizes roll rate to minimize the amount of time the aircraft is in an

overbank flight attitude, and



iii.Minimizes the resulting dive angle, which directly affects airspeed gain and the altitude loss in the dive recovery.

“CLIMB” i. With the lift vector oriented in a wings‐level flight attitude (within 30 degrees of level is the maximum error tolerance), the pilot should now initiate an aggressive pull on the control column to attain a climbing Vy pitch attitude. Pilots must necessarily manage AOA‐onset to avoid the secondary stall when below Va and manage G‐onset to avoid exceeding the aircraft’s limit‐load when above Va.

ii. Note that pulling on the control column is the LAST step in a proper recovery whereas the most common error in upset recovery is a pilot’s instinctive, and immediate, “pull response” as the first first step.

The bold face quotations should be announced verbally by the Pilot Flying (PF) while the PF immediately takes physical action to accomplish the verbally indicated stage of the recovery.

SUMMARY The key to being properly prepared to deal with an aircraft upset is no different than any other specialized flying skill; study, instruction, understanding, integration, application, error analysis and practice, practice, practice. In our experience, pilots with average piloting ability typically require two days to develop a safe level of fundamental All‐Attitude Recovery skill and an additional day or two of dedicated upset recovery training to attain a safe level of proficiency in upset recovery techniques to deal with any recoverable upset situation in both VMC and IMC conditions. For a full course, pilots should plan on three to four days of full‐time training during their initial upset recovery program. For pilots seeking comprehensive upset recovery training we recommend the following programs:

VFR Private, Recreational or Sport Pilot:� 2‐Day 3‐Mission Upset Recovery Training � 3‐Day 5‐Mission Emergency Maneuver Training Professional Pilot or Private Pilot with an Instrument Rating: � 3‐Day 5‐Mission Professional Pilot Upset Recovery Training � 4‐Day 6‐Mission Enhanced Emergency Maneuver Training

Table 4 below outlines the recovery procedures and flight conditions investigated and taught during training courses delivered at APS Emergency Maneuver Training.

http://www.apstraining.com/mission_details_urt.htm

http://www.apstraining.com/mission_details_emt.htm

http://www.apstraining.com/mission_details_professional_pilot_urt.htm

http://www.apstraining.com/mission_details_enhanced_emt.htm



TABLE 4: UPGRADED RECOVERY TECHNIQUE MATRIX

All‐Attitude Upset RecoveryTM Technique NASA Standard Spin Recovery CENTRALIZE / ANALYSE DISCONNECT AUTO‐PILOT / AUTO‐THROTTLE* RECOVER

PUSH* POWER* RUDDER ROLL CLIMB

POWER AILERONS RUDDER ELEVATOR

Flight Conditions Flight Conditions (if recoverable) Power off/on Stall Accelerated Stall Cross‐controlled Stalls Slipping Stalls Skidding Stalls Incipient Spin

Spiral Dive Unusual Attitudes Over‐banks Wake Turbulence Rolling Upsets

Spin Incipient Spin Aggravated Spins Flat Spin Accelerated Spins

It is clear that knowledge must be combined with practical experience and study. At APS Emergency Maneuver Training we customize each training flight to be practically applicable to the participating pilot’s particular category of aircraft and experience level. Completing any of our multi‐day courses of training will provide each pilot with the confidence, knowledge and practical skill to recognize, avoid and, when necessary, maximize their ability to recover from airplane upsets.

In addition to being some of the very best safety training available to pilots, upset recovery training should be fun and educational. The likelihood of rapid learning can often be increased significantly if the student is enjoying themselves. Someday, in an unplanned time‐critical emergency situation requiring immediate action, your life may depend upon the integration of the knowledge and skills offered by APS Emergency Maneuver Training. Be prepared.



What’s the Big Deal with Angle of Attack?



Table of Figures

Figure 1: All-Attitude Upset Recovery Checklist ....................................................................................... 48

Figure 2: Airfoil at Angle of Attack ......................................................................................................... 50

Figure 3: Lift at Angle of Attack ............................................................................................................. 50

Figure 4: Pitch Attitude, Flight Path Angle and Angle of Attack ................................................................. 51

Figure 5: Several Pitch Attitudes at Stall Angle of Attack .......................................................................... 52

Figure 6: Negative Roll Damping / Wally World (Red Region) ................................................................... 54

Figure 7: Effects of Left Yaw Input during Normal Flight .......................................................................... 55

Figure 8: Effects of Left Yaw Input during Stalled Flight .......................................................................... 56

Figure 9: Effectives of Unloading or "PUSHing" in a Nose High Recovery ................................................... 57

Figure 10: Unload ("PUSH") to Optimize Recoverability and Minimize Altitude Loss .................................... 58

Figure 11: Lift Equation ........................................................................................................................ 59

Figure 12: Coefficient of Lift (and Drag) with Varying AOA ....................................................................... 60





Introduction How exactly do you put your finger on the single most important aerodynamic component or practice related to upset recovery training? That’s a tough question and, quite honestly, the answer varies depending upon the situation being addressed. As opposed to picking “one” aerodynamic component as “the” critical factor in upset recoveries, a thorough discussion of recovery techniques must focus on the order in which control loss issues are addressed for a generalized recovery to be effective in a wide variety of instances. In Figure 1, the All‐Attitude Upset Recovery checklist developed by APS Emergency Maneuver Training addresses the mental processes and order in which a loss of control situation should be managed by the pilot.

Figure 1: All-Attitude Upset Recovery Checklist

1. Centralize / Analyze (Recognize and Confirm the Situation) 2. Disconnect auto‐pilot and auto‐throttle* (If Equipped)

3. Recover:

PUSH*

POWER*

RUDDER

ROLL

CLIMB

* This checklist is to organize pilot considerations in an airplane upset. It does not supersede the aircraft's operating instructions issued by the manufacturer or established recovery procedures.

In this article we are going to focus on the first action step “PUSH” of the recovery and the critical importance of Angle of Attack Management as a top priority in a generalized recovery philosophy.

There really are only five major aspects of flight that pilots have direct control over while airborne in a time‐critical upset emergency flight condition. They are (in no particular order):

1. Pitch 2. Roll 3. Yaw 4. Power, and 5. Configuration

Although a seemingly simple list of items to be managed, not only are they usually mismanaged in an emergency unusual attitude scenario, but they are also typically addressed in the wrong order and in the opposite direction assuming the ultimate goal is an effective, efficient and successful recovery. This is why when you’re reading articles on stall/spin, unusual attitude or upset recovery training techniques, you’ll hear the author state time and again that the recovery is counter‐intuitive.

Readers: For an in‐depth discussion of the full HAll‐

Attitude Upset RecoveryH procedure explaining

the integration and order of the recovery stages, please visit the apstraining.com website or read the previous section.

Recoverability Statistics: APS research indicates that an alarming 90% of pilots without proper upset recovery training skill development are unable to effectively recover from scenario‐based upset situations during initial evaluation. After only three days, these same pilots demonstrate dramatic improvement with less than a 10% failure rate. After four days, it drops to less than 3%.



Our formal research at APS Emergency Maneuver Training indicates an alarming 90% of pilots without previous upset recovery experience “pull” when faced with an overbank situation beyond 90 degrees of bank. Let’s not let breeze by the significance of this statistic … that means without training a full 9 out of 10 pilots, regardless of experience level from PPL to ATP, will most likely pull into the ground in a wake turbulence upset or cross‐controlled stall when faced with the situation for the first time. This intimidating statistic might be even worse in the non‐training environment! In our formal research, the pilots being evaluated have recently received (within 24 hours) a full two hours of ground training explaining the proper all‐attitude recovery and have been told specifically not to pull in an overbank. This should affirm to all pilots that reliable piloting capability to recover from an in‐flight upset or unusual attitude can only be gained through extensive hands‐on practical experience in real aircraft complimented by highly specialized ground training. Simply put, no amount of academic training can prepare a pilot to consistently and effectively deal with an in‐flight upset situation beyond their normal experience.

How about simulator training – does that have value? Absolutely. However, as any simulator manufacturer will tell you, the simulator has a narrow high‐fidelity flight envelope that will accurately represent what the real aircraft will do or how it will respond in flight. For operations within the envelope modeled by the simulator, the simulator is close to flawless. Outside the envelope encompassing the pilot’s “normal experience” flight parameters and the simulator’s programming, the simulator is just guessing and is, to date, unable to accurately model stalled flight and stall recovery effectiveness. Simulator training is invaluable, however one must recognize that the vast majority of aircraft upsets and stalled flight conditions occur beyond the simulator’s programmed high‐fidelity envelope.

For the purposes of this discussion, we define “normal experience” as flight attitudes of less than 30 degrees of pitch relative to the horizon and within 60 degrees of bank for GA pilots. By the way, to all my fellow ATPs and airline pilots out there, don’t scoff too heartily at this seemingly insignificant “normal experience” margin for GA pilots. For you, an upset as defined in the FAA Airplane Upset Recovery Training Aid – Revision 1 is even smaller: 25 degrees nose‐up, 10 degrees nose down and less than 45 degrees of bank. Why? Because if you’re like the vast majority of professional pilots, more than 99.999% of your professional air carrier flight experience is within these even narrower flight attitude margins.

A perspective building question at this point to open our minds is: “How many hours have you personally logged in actual stalled flight or physically beyond 60 degrees of bank in a real aircraft?”. We’re not talking about the hours you’ve logged on flights related to stall recovery and so on, we’re talking about the ACTUAL time spent in these extreme conditions. The answer to this question expresses a pilot’s true experience level in dealing with aircraft upsets and unusual attitudes. Unfortunately, the instinctual piloting skills learned and mastered in normal flight are not reliably transferable to the unusual attitude flight regime. Most 20,000 hour pilots will respond having somewhere between 3 and 10 minutes of actual time spent in these extreme flight regimes. Sometimes it’s as low as 30 seconds to a minute. Most would agree there is an enormous difference

How Many Hours Do You Really Have? We’re not talking about the total hours in your logbook nor even the hours you’ve logged on flights related to stall recovery and so on. We’re talking about the ACTUAL time in minutes you’ve spent in actual stall flight or beyond 60 degrees of bank. The answer to this question expresses your true experience level in dealing with aircraft upsets and unusual attitudes.



between 10 minutes and 20,000 hours. If not, just think how competent a pilot is in landing an aircraft after 10 minutes of flight instruction. Scary, isn’t it? Ok, let’s start the learning process with a discussion on Angle of Attack and its significance in upset recovery training.

What is Angle of Attack? Angle of Attack or “AOA” as we like to call it in pilot techno‐speak, is a very straightforward concept that each and every one of us learned during basic flight training. Simply put, the AOA of a wing is the angle between the relative wind and a reference line, typically the chord line of the airfoil. The AOA reference line can be the wing’s overall average chord line or a line relative to or parallel to the aircraft’s longitudinal axis or fuselage boreline. Regardless of the line used, the AOA is the angle between the designated reference line and the relative wind or velocity vector representing the aircraft’s trajectory through the air. Pictorially, they are represented below:

Figure 2: Airfoil at Angle of Attackxxiii

Figure 3: Lift at Angle of Attackxxiv

By definition, Critical AOA (AOAC) occurs at the peak of the lift curve in Figure 2. This peak additionally represents the angle of attack producing the maximum coefficient of lift (CL). As we go beyond this aerodynamic limit and into stalled flight characterized by boundary layer separation from the wing, the physics of flight change as the trend of the lift curve reverses to a negative gradient beyond critical angle of attack (more on this later in the section titled “Beyond Critical AOA”). The significance of the reversal of the lift curve remains under emphasized in traditional flight training. This simple reversal dramatically changes



the flight characteristics of the aircraft beyond this point resulting in aircraft handling characteristics that are completely different from those we are accustom in the normal flight envelope (ie. AOA less than Critical AOA). Bottom line, the physics of flight change beyond AOAC.

With all that said, the concept of AOA is simple with no mysteries. Unfortunately, AOA is one of the most mismanaged and misunderstood aspects of aerodynamics, especially in an unusual attitude situation. In the world of upset recovery paradigms, we all need to understand that “AOA is Life”. With only a few exceptions, in all non‐spin upset scenarios we must first and foremost effectively manage angle of attack to optimize our survivability regardless of our airspeed, angle of attack or flight attitude. If we ignore AOA management during any stage of the recovery, we can potentially find ourselves in a world governed by different aerodynamic characteristics.

Significance of AOA in Upset Recovery Situations Angle of attack is often erroneously paired with “Pitch Angle” in hangar talk. Although Pitch can be defined as “movement about the lateral axis”xxv, a high nose‐up Pitch attitude is not necessarily related to the aircraft’s angle of attack. Following this logic, if we define the Pitch Attitude as the angle between the longitudinal axis of the aircraft and the horizon, then it is important to emphasize that AOA is NOT the same as our Pitch Attitude nor is it the same as the aircraft’s Deck Angle in airline‐speak. As we can see from Figure 4 below, our angle of attack is smaller in this case.

Figure 4: Pitch Attitude, Flight Path Angle and Angle of Attackxxvi

Although seemingly similar in day‐to‐day flight operations, in an upset situation (especially in a stall), we must clearly understand that our angle of attack, which should be demanding immediate pilot attention, is a function of what we as the pilot or the autopilot/autotrim system is doing with the elevator control in the cockpit. It is not related to airspeed nor is it related to our flight attitude.

Exceeding Critical Angle of Attack When an aircraft exceeds critical angle of attack the wing is stalled and no longer creating lift efficiently. Erroneously, pilots equate this condition with the published 1‐G stall speed. Exceeding critical angle of attack and stalling the aircraft can h d d fl h d



Figure 5: Several Pitch Attitudes at Stall Angle of Attackxxvii

For clarification, Figure 5 above clearly shows that stalled AOA can occur in any flight attitude. In an unexpected stall near the ground, the fatal instinctual response of the panicking pilot is commonly an aggressive pull back on the control column to try to gain altitude even when inverted. This instinctual pull perpetuates the out‐of‐control situation and could, if left unchecked, progress quickly from the stall into the incipient spin and finally, if sufficient altitude exists, an unrecoverable fully developed spin.

Scenarios: The panic “pull” response can be disastrous in a nose‐low stall on approach, a wake turbulence upset, any overbank or even from an uncoordinated stalled turn in the traffic pattern. Is that surprising that a common pilot response in these situations is to pull back? It might seem surprising as we leisurely read this article, however, keep in mind that 99.999% of the time: “pulling” equals “up”, right? Right – but not in this situation. As outlined in the introduction, statistically over 90% pilots without proper upset recovery training when faced with their first scenario‐based overbank situation beyond 90 degrees. “Scenario‐based” simply means that the situation is introduced in an real‐life scenario when the pilot’s mind is on another task like flying a simulated approach or performing a simulated turn in the traffic pattern while trying to tighten their turn radius to a centerline overshoot from base‐to‐final.

The significance of AOA remaining beyond Critical AOA is that, generally speaking, the longer an aircraft remains in a stall, or worse, the stall is allowed to couple with uncorrected yaw, the more likely the development of an unrecoverable spin. This is especially true in large aircraft with wing‐mounted or fuselage mounted engines. For more information on the Risk of Spinning Normal Category Aircraft, please refer to the next chapter of this e‐book or visit the apstraining.com website.

If you want to go up, pull back on the yoke. If you want to go down, pull back a little more. If you want to go down real fast and spin around and around and around, just keep pulling back.

—Aviation Proverb



The key to success in avoiding the spin is stall recognition and avoidance. Let’s be more precise with this statement: The key to success in avoiding a stall/spin accident is Angle of Attack Awareness. Aircraft don’t spin on their own, pilots spin aircraft. The path to a developed spin is not passive. It requires aft elevator input from the pilot, or autopilot, combined with yaw to get there.

Beyond Critical Angle of Attack In stalled flight, we simply cannot do anything else effectively until we first regain control of the aircraft by reducing angle of attack back to the normal flight envelope. Remember we talked about the number of hours the typical pilot has logged in stalled flight? Keep in mind that despite hundreds, thousands or even 10s of thousands of hours of normal flight envelope experience, we are now operating in a regime where the physics of flight beyond Critical Angle of Attack are different. For those readers who have had the chilling opportunity to listen to the cockpit voice recorder from a fatal stall/spin accident, quite often the pilots will be discussing what is wrong with the aircraft’s handling characteristics. Barring an actual control failure or uncommanded deflection of a control surface (which is quite rare in loss of control incidents), the handling difficulty being experienced in these situations is simply the aircraft acting in accordance with the aerodynamics of the current flight condition. Unfortunately, the current flight condition is stalled flight and the simple physics of put‐the‐stick‐left to roll left along with an aircraft’s inherent positive stability go out the window. At APS, we call the region beyond Critical AOA “Wally World” where the laws of physics based on our “normal experience” don’t apply anymore and will be clarified later in this article. How’s that for a wakeup call? Not only is the pilot close to the ground in a life‐threatening situation, but he is also experiencing a flight regime where the simple process of rolling with ailerons, climbing by pulling back and positive stability aren’t working at all the way they are used to. In fact, if anything, they all seem backward. Welcome to Wally World and the regime of the stall/spin fatality statistic. Simply put, we do not want to be in this regime of flight and need to exit Wally World as soon as possible. Unfortunately, the only way to accomplish a successful exit is to push forward to reduce AOA below critical. That is a very tall order and, as evidenced by fatal stall/spin statistics, is not easily accomplished even when the crew’s lives are on the line. Wally World Wally World is “in‐house” instructor‐student lingo at APS Emergency Maneuver Training representing the physics of flight governing aerodynamics beyond Critical AOA (red area to the right of the Stall line in the figure below). The technical term for this region of flight is called Negative Roll Damping generated by the reversal of the lift curve from a positive gradient when less than AOAC to a negative gradient with AOA increasing beyond AOAC.

Wally World? What the heck is that! Wally World is APS’s term for the aerodynamics of flight beyond critical angle of attack. Stalls and spins of any kind occur in this regime. Technically, this region is called Negative Roll Damping and exists to the right of the Stall line in Figure 6 below. Aircraft involved in stall/spin accidents are almost always in this regime of flight because of the pilot’s panic response of pulling aft on the elevator in an attempt to stay away from the ground or reduce rate of descent. Pulling in Wally World does not help preserve altitude or reduce rate of descent



Figure 6: Negative Roll Damping / Wally World (Red Region)

Wally World is the path to the developed spin (auto‐rotation) that represents one of the flight conditions that are an exception to the discussion presented in this article. The primary reason the developed spin is an exception is that the stalled flight condition has be mishandled long enough that auto‐rotation has been allowed to develop due to the yaw/roll couple within the region of negative roll dampening coined “Wally World”. Readers should note this article is focused on the importance of AOA Awareness in upset recovery training to develop piloting skills to completely avoid the developed spin. Refer to the All‐Attitude Upset Recovery checklist in Figure 1 and note the “Rudder” step directly addresses “yaw” but a little later in the procedure. The importance of “Yaw Management” in stall recovery, a key element to stall/spin awareness training, is beyond the scope of this particular presentation. A developed spin requires a completely different recovery process and is sometimes referred to as the NASA Standard Spin Recovery or P.A.R.E. Spin Recovery Checklist as developed by Master Instructor Rich Stowell. To understand Negative Roll Damping further let’s first look at Positive Roll Damping that we take for granted in day‐to‐day flight operations. The next section Spin Dynamics, written by Rich Stowell, very aptly describes this phenomenon. Spin Dynamics4 by Rich Stowell, Author, Master Instructor & 2006 CFI of the Year, Two ingredients must be present in order for an airplane to spin: stall and yaw. Neither stalling alone (e.g., a coordinated, power‐off stall), nor yawing alone (e.g., a normal slip) can generate a spin. But if stall and sufficient yaw coexist, the airplane has no choice but to commence spinning. Stalling and yawing always precipitate spinning. This is true regardless of our attitude or our airspeed. To illustrate this dynamic, let's start in Normal Flight with our wings level. Observe what happens if we induce yaw by applying left rudder: the rudder input yaws the airplane to the left, increasing airflow over the right wing and decreasing it on the left. The difference in airflow causes a discrepancy in the Lift generated. A left roll ensues, indelibly coupled with the left yaw input. The yaw‐induced left roll influences the relative wind presented to each wing as well. The relative wind associated with rolling now must be added to the relative wind associated with our forward progress. Picture long pieces of yarn attached to each wing tip. If the airplane only moves forward, yarn on each wing tip points aft toward the tail. If the airplane only rolls left, yarn on the left wing tip points upward, while yarn on the right wing tip points downward. The combination of forward motion and rolling motion results in the

4 Sub-segment titled “Spin Dynamics” has been excerpted with permission from: Rich Stowell, The Light Airplane Pilot’s Guide to Stall/Spin Awareness; Rich Stowell Consulting, Ventura, CA, 2007. 227 – 229.



net relative wind meeting the left wing at a slightly higher angle attack. Similarly, the net relative wind on the right wing strikes it at a slightly lower angle of attack. In Normal Flight, increasing the left wing's angle of attack yields a higher coefficient of lift. Decreasing the right wing's angle of attack reduces its coefficient of lift. Consequently, the airplane tends to roll back to level flight, disrupting the yaw/roll couple caused by our left rudder input. This is known as positive damping in roll. Also, the relatively small increase in Drag on the left wing is offset by the adverse yaw effect accompanying the secondary roll (even though the ailerons are still neutral, adverse yaw is present nonetheless as the wings move in roll). These elements combine to have a stabilizing effect against spinning; hence, the Normal Flight regime is characteristically anti‐spin.

Figure 7: Effects of Left Yaw Input during Normal Flightxxviii

Let's now move into the Stalled Flight regime. Imagine performing a routine, wings‐level, one‐g stall in a perfectly rigged airplane loaded within its approved limits. Assume we reach critical angle of attack configured as follows: Power at idle, ailerons held neutral, no flaps, excess yaw proactively cancelled, elevator control held fully aft. At the stall, aerodynamic forces and moments try to pitch the nose forward, but no net yawing or rolling is present since we're perfectly coordinated. Using rudder inputs to remain coordinated throughout the stall compels the left and right wings to remain at identical angles of attack. Consequently, each wing generates equal amounts of Lift and Drag even though they're both stalled. Stabilizing forces are at work to return the airplane to Normal Flight in this case, and no pro‐spin yaw/roll couple is present yet. Now picture yourself performing another stall similar to the one above, except that we enter Stalled Flight while uncoordinated. In fact, let's exaggerate matters by intentionally yawing the airplane with full left rudder as the nose pitches forward. As we saw in the Normal Flight example, the airplane yaws left, inducing a left roll. The net relative winds are affected the same as in the Normal Flight example as well, resulting in a greater angle of attack on the left wing and a lower angle of attack on the right. The outcome in the Stalled Flight regime, however, is quite different from that in the Normal Flight regime. In the Stalled Flight regime, the left wing now experiences a lower coefficient of lift than the right wing; hence, the airplane rolls even farther to the left. This is known as negative damping in roll. A significant differential in Drag to the left exists as well, overpowering any adverse yaw from the roll and contributing additional left yaw. A pro‐spin yaw/roll couple forms, spawned by the uncoordinated flight while stalled. Although stalling is a necessary prerequisite to the development of the spin, it clearly is not the prime mover behind it. Excess yaw coupling with roll is the real culprit. Proper coordination, therefore, is paramount for spin prevention and must be a cornerstone of stall/spin awareness.



Figure 8: Effects of Left Yaw Input during Stalled Flightxxix

*** End of Excerpt by Rich Stowell: The Light Airplane Pilot’s Guide to Stall/Spin Awareness

AOA Management in ALL Upsets The importance of AOA management in a stall is obvious to most pilots despite the typical panic response of pulling and making things even worse when close to the ground. However, in nearly every single upset scenario, with the exception of the developed spin and perhaps a nose low dive with wings within 45 degrees of level, AOA is arguably the most time‐critical aspect of an effective recovery and must be placed at the very top of the list. Many readers will understandably start shaking their head at this point asserting that sometimes power is first or perhaps stating a configuration change is sometimes the best first step. Let’s address recovery thought processes as we investigate the role of AOA in the delivery of a life‐saving upset recovery training course.

What is the biggest threat to survival in the following Case Studies?

Case 1: Any Stall (Includes; Power-On, Power-Off, Cross-Controlled, Uncoordinated, Slip, Skid, Incipient Spin)

Threat – The stall is the threat. If uncorrected, the stall sustains the aircraft in an out of control flight condition and could quickly lead to an unrecoverable spin if not addressed immediately.

Correction – “PUSH” to reduce AOA (regardless of altitude or attitude) to regain positive normal control of all axis of the aircraft. When AOA is below critical, continue with the All‐Attitude Upset Recovery procedure (Table 1).

http://www.apstraining.com/article-all-attitude-upset-recovery-technique-checklist.htm



Scenario: Aircraft Stalled PUSH (arrow) to Reduce below AOAC Unstalled – Positive Roll Damping

Case 2: Nose High and Nose High Overbank Unusual Attitude (unstalled, airspeed decreasing)

Threat – The nose needs to come down. However, the biggest threat in a nose high flight condition is avoiding a nose‐high stall while getting the nose down. An inadvertent stall from a nose‐high flight attitude can very quickly lead to the coupling of the stall with the inertial yaw of the nose dropping. Whether we push or pull when nose high, the nose will be coming down. The real question is: “Do you want to be in control as the nose drops or not?”

Correction – “PUSH” to keep AOA well below critical expanding the normal operating envelope of the aircraft, reducing drag, preserving airspeed and optimizing controllability. There is a general misconception in nose‐high unusual attitude recoveries that as long as the nose is coming down then there’s nothing to worry about. Keep in mind that whether the pilot is pushing or pulling on the control column, the nose will be coming down (assuming the aircraft does not have sufficient energy to bring the nose over‐the‐top such as a looping maneuver). The difference is that if the pilot is pulling as the nose drops, the aircraft is most likely stalled and NOT under control. If the pilot is pushing to keep the aircraft’s AOA below critical throughout the recovery then the pilot will always have positive control of the aircraft. When AOA has been reduced with a firm push to a “light in the seat” feeling, continue with the All‐Attitude Upset Recovery procedure (Table 1).

Situation: Decreasing Airspeed due to Nose‐High Attitude with Increasing AOA

The “PUSH” reduces AOA thus reducing G‐loading which effectively reduces Stall Speed for the Unloaded Flight Condition VU (Circle)

Figure 9: Effectives of Unloading or "PUSHing" in a Nose High Recovery

Case 3: Nose Low and Nose Low Overbank/Inverted (unstalled, airspeed increasing - excluding nose-low within 45 degrees of wings level)

Threat – The dive angle continues increasing in an overbank (conceptually think of an inverted flight attitude generated from a severe wake turbulence encounter). There is an immediate requirement to maximize roll

“PUSH”

Slowing Trend

VU




rate to get wings level in minimum time. Each second of delay results in dramatic airspeed gain and altitude loss.

Correction – “PUSH” to reduce AOA to:

1. Minimize the overbanked aircraft’s contribution to the ever‐increasing dive angle,

2. Maximize roll rate, and

3. Simultaneously eliminate the risk of an inefficient rolling pull that could potentially cause structural damage due to asymmetric loading on the aircraft.

When AOA has been reduced with a firm push to a “light in the seat” feeling, continue with the All‐Attitude Upset Recovery procedure (Table 1).

Situation: Overbanked Nose Low. High positive AOA is increasing dive angle by turning the

aircraft towards the ground Add: Gravity + Vertical Component of Lift

Unload the Aircraft by “PUSHing” to a “Light in the Seat” feeling. Target ¼ to ½ Positive G Loading. This minimizes the generation of Lift thus reducing Vertical

Component of Lift contributing to Dive Angle generation. Simplified: The “PUSH” reduces lift towards the ground during the recovery

Figure 10: Unload ("PUSH") to Optimize Recoverability and Minimize Altitude Loss

How Can We Ensure AOA Remains Below Critical Now that we’ve spent several minutes discussing the importance of managing AOA in all upset situations in addition to stalled flight, an understandable question at this point would be simply “How”? As pilots we are all familiar with stall warning devices that tell us we are getting close to critical angle of attack but AOA indicators are not commonplace in certified aircraft. In fact, we can assume over 99% of certified aircraft DO NOT have AOA indicators.

This presents a problem when our learned advice states “lower the angle of attack”. The importance of lowering angle of attack cannot be under‐emphasized.

In summary, the benefits of lowering AOA are:

Stalled flight is eliminated when lowered below critical AOA, hence, the risk of a spin is also eliminated,

All controls become more effective (especially ailerons),

Gravit

Lift

Vertical Component of Lift

“PUSH”





Roll rate using ailerons is maximized,

The flight envelope is expanded. Meaning the actual stall speed is well below the published stall speed by keeping AOA below critical assuring positive aircraft control in a low‐speed recovery such as in an extreme nose high flight condition,

In an overbank beyond 90 degrees to inverted, dive angle in the subsequent recovery is minimized, and

Asymmetric loading during the rolling recovery is minimized.

So how do we lower AOA?

The first step in the All‐Attitude Upset Recovery procedure is “Push”. How much? How long? How much push is too much?

SVCLift L ×××= 2

2ρ

Figure 11: Lift Equation

CL = Coefficient of Lift (a function of AOA – see Figure 12) Relative Air Density =م

V = True Airspeed of the Aircraft S = Surface Area of the Wing

As we can see from the lift equation in Figure 11 above, the amount of lift generated by the wing at any time is a function of aircraft velocity, wing area, relative air density and coefficient of lift (a function of AOA as shown in Figure 12). In a time‐critical emergency situation like an airplane upset, the only factor we can instantly affect is the coefficient of lift (CL) through the positioning of the elevator control in the cockpit. Directly manipulating the value of CL is the key to effecting the proper “PUSH” in an upset recovery.



Figure 12: Coefficient of Lift (and Drag) with Varying AOA

Our goal in the “PUSH” step of the All‐Attitude Upset Recovery is to optimize the coefficient of lift to effectively manage AOA below critical in a stall, optimize roll rate in a nose‐low overbank and to expand the flight envelope when nose high. The essence of the issue, however, is being able to practically do it in the airplane. This brings us back to the reality that these types of skills can only be developed through practical experience in a real aircraft with repetition to proficiency. At APS we have several excellent exercises that teach this ability during the initial portion of training. Once the pilot has a feel for how to do it, we then have them implement this technique in a wide variety of scenario‐based airplane upset situations. How Push the elevator forward until a light positive‐G feeling of ¼ to ½ G can be sustained by referencing “seat of the pants”. The amount of forward pressure required to accomplish the proper “PUSH” can vary from a couple of pounds to 20 – 30 pounds of control pressure in a transport category aircraft. Once your butt is calibrated, you now have a tool that can transfer to any fixed wing aircraft.

How Much PUSH is Too Much? Here’s a simple answer: If your tie is in your face, your pencil is floating off the seat in the aircraft or you’re feeling any pressure on your straps getting pushed off your seat, then you are pushing too much. The target is a light “positive G” not zero‐G or negative‐G.

“PUSH” Technique: Push the elevator forward until a light positive‐G feeling of ¼ to ½ G can be sustained by referencing “seat of the pants”. The amount of forward pressure required to accomplish the proper “PUSH” can vary from a couple of pounds to 20 – 30 pounds of control pressure in a transport category aircraft. Once your butt is calibrated, you now have a tool that can transfer to any fixed wing aircraft.

PUSH



Stall Warning Devices Clearly we do not have an instrument in the cockpit that will tell us when we’ve unloaded to the proper AOA to optimize recovery from unstalled unusual attitudes. Without a device such as an AOA Gauge the proper technique of AOA management can only be learned by practical in‐aircraft experience. Having said that, as a military fighter pilot (fighter’s are equipped with AOA gauges) the technique of unloading had to be an engrained instinct. Unloading usually occurred without reference to the AOA gauge while keeping site of the adversary aircraft (i.e. not looking in the cockpit) was the top priority during aggressive flight attitude and plane of motion changes. Sorry folks – it seems no matter how the aircraft is equipped, we need practice, practice, and more practice to be competent in the management of AOA in the all‐attitude environment. This is true even for aircraft that have an AOA gauge.

With that said, stall warning devices are critical to the safe operation of an aircraft in the high AOA (typically low airspeed but not always) environment. Every FAA certified aircraft requires some type of device to give the pilot a warning of the approaching stall. Moreover, as we’ve discussed at length, the pilot’s “awareness” of AOA is the crux of the issue. Unfortunately, with the exception of military fighter aircraft, the vast majority of GA and commercial aircraft are not equipped with any direct method of reading the aircraft’s AOA at any given time. We’re typically limited to whatever stall warning device the manufacturer decides to install.

For ease of reference, below is a list of common wing‐design features and stall‐warning indicators that are intended to improve aircraft controllability and AOA awareness in high AOA flight.

Excerpted from the Internetxxx:

Airplanes can be equipped with a variety of devices to prevent or postpone a stall or to make it less (or in some cases more) severe, or to make recovery easier.

An aerodynamic twist can be introduced to the wing with the leading edge near the wing tip twisted downward. This is called washout and causes the wing root to stall before the wing tip. This makes the stall gentle and progressive. Since the stall is delayed at the wing tips, where the ailerons are, roll control is maintained when the stall begins.

A stall strip is a small sharp‐edged device which, when attached to the leading edge of a wing, encourages the stall to start there in preference to any other location on the wing. If attached close to the wing root it makes the stall gentle and progressive; if attached near the wing tip it encourages the aircraft to either drop a wing when stalling or act as an aerodynamic barrier to the stall propagation along the inner portion of the wing typically at higher angle of attack.

Vortex generators, tiny strips of metal or plastic placed on top of the wing near the leading edge that protrude past the boundary layer into the free stream. As the name implies they energize the boundary layer by mixing free stream airflow with boundary layer flow thereby creating vortices, this increases the inertia of the boundary layer. By increasing the inertia of the boundary layer airflow separation and the resulting stall may be delayed.

An anti‐stall strake is a wing extension at the root leading edge which generates a vortex on the wing upper surface to postpone the stall.



A stick pusher is a mechanical device that prevents the pilot from stalling an airplane by pushing the controls forwards as the stall is approached.

A stick shaker is a mechanical device that "shakes the pilot's controls" to warn of the onset of stall.

A stall warning is an electronic or mechanical device that sounds an audible warning as the stall speed is approached. The majority of aircraft contain some form of this device that warns the pilot of an impending stall. The simplest such device is a 'stall warning horn', which consists of either a pressure sensor or a movable metal tab that actuates a switch, and produces an audible warning in response.

An angle of attack limiter or an "alpha" limiter is a flight computer that automatically prevents pilot input from causing the plane to rise over the stall angle. Some alpha limiters can be disabled by the pilot.

If a forward canard is used for pitch control, rather than an aft tail, the canard is designed to meet the airflow at a slightly greater angle of attack than the wing. Therefore, when the aircraft pitch increases abnormally, the canard will usually stall first, causing the nose to drop and so preventing the wing from reaching its critical AOA. Thus the wing virtually never stalls.

If an aft tail is used, the wing is designed to stall before the tail. In this case, the wing can be flown at higher lift coefficient (closer to stall) to produce more overall lift.

Stall warning devices such as stall lights, horns and shakers give the pilot a stall warning ~5 kts or 5% above the CAS stall speed, whichever is greater. Typically this assumes an approach‐to‐stall airspeed reduction of one knot per second or less. Other conditions exist based on aircraft design and category but the concept is to allow the pilot to respond with a reasonable delay of a few seconds and still recover the aircraft prior to reaching the actual aerodynamic stall.

End of Excerpt

Recovery Technique Development Our primary concern at APS Emergency Maneuver Training is to ensure the academics and recovery techniques we teach are directly transferable to a wide variety of fixed wing aircraft from the Cessna 172 to Boeing and Airbus transport category aircraft. That is a tall order. With this mandate in place, we ensure each member of our check airman staff has first‐hand experience in each major category of aviation that assures a thoroughly rounded knowledge in all of; general aviation aircraft handling, recreational aerobatics, high performance military jet aircraft all‐attitude maneuvering and transport category aircraft performance characteristics. We can’t over‐emphasize the critical importance of ensuring that experts with rounded experience in all these fields quarterback the development of recovery techniques.

With that being said, are we trying to say pilots can’t learn effective recovery techniques unless they have all this varied aircraft experience under our belts? “NO” we are not saying that at all. Every single pilot, regardless of experience level, can be taught effective recovery techniques that can be engrained into their pilot skill set in a matter of days. Using safe aerobatic aircraft while being instructed by highly experienced upset recovery instructors are the keys to obtaining proper recovery skills as a pilot.



Keep in mind: Upset recovery piloting skills are perishable and there is no substitute for hands‐on experience in real aircraft recovering from extreme upset scenarios. Recurrent training is important on an annual basis to ensure recovery techniques are readily accessible in a time critical situation. Proper academic and practical training combined with a healthy dose of de‐programming to get rid of ineffective recovery habits produces pilots capable of dealing with just about any possible upset the environment can throw at them.

Safe journeys to all!



Spinning Normal Category Aircraft – What’s the Risk?



The Certified Flight Instructor (CFI) plays a critical role in ensuring every pilot being instructed and evaluated by them is ultimately safe and safety conscious. As CFIs, our assessment of a pilot’s proficiency status comprehends a wide spectrum including: flight preparation, aeronautical knowledge, recency of experience, regulatory awareness and compliance, system management, stick and rudder skill, aeronautical decision‐making and mental attitude. In General Aviation, the CFI commonly represents the measuring stick by which most pilots compare their piloting capability to the ideal. This is a tremendous responsibility that CFIs should not take lightly. Having said those high sounding words, does that mean every CFI knows everything all the time? No, and they are not expected to. However, they must be firmly grounded in all skills and knowledge requirements of the PTS as well as be familiar with how to find information on any topic within their professional domain. In this article I would like to address one specific aspect of a CFI’s range of safety‐evaluation responsibilities – Regulatory Compliance. Specifically, we are going to investigate why performing spin training in a normal category single‐engine certified aircraft is an unsafe practice. Additionally, we’ll highlight some of the reasoning behind established regulations related to "stall spin" awareness.

Hangar Talk: Aside from aircraft certification requirements that normal category single‐engine aircraft be fully recoverable within a one‐turn spin, what really is the risk of doing spins in them?

Spin Training Regulations Pilots well versed in AC 61‐67C, or have recently read the placards posted in plain view in their normal or utility category aircraft, may wonder why this topic is coming up.





COCKPIT PLACARDS

Normal Category: "No acrobatic maneuvers, including spins, approved."

Utility Category Not Meeting Acrobatic Certification: “Spins Prohibited” (Note: Not all utility category aircraft are spins‐approved)

So what’s the issue? If the posted placards and published maneuvering limitations of the normal category aircraft say don’t do spins, then don’t do them right? Right. That is 100% correct. You’ve passed this short regulatory compliance exam. Simply put; don’t intentionally spin airplanes that aren’t approved for spins. If you passed the test then you can stop reading here. If you didn't pass then please keep reading and keep in mind that this article is intended to inform as well as offer food for thought in relation to your actions and teachings related to both stall and spin training.

Statistics on "Stall/Spin" Knowledge and Recovery Over the years there have been many diligent efforts made to ascertain the average instructor's knowledge level related to "stall spin" dynamics, regulations and recoveries. The results of a few are listed below. If you find yourself falling into a statistic that indicates a possible shortcoming in "stall spin" knowledge, resist the temptation to feel reassured that many others are in the same situation. When it comes to "stall spin" awareness, "comfort in groups" or "but I know other people who do the same thing I do", is not an answer you should be contented with. Regrettably, we are all a product of our training and opinions. To a certain extent, how we were trained is not our fault ‐ however, when it comes to safety and regulatory compliance "not knowing" or "being unaware" of the rules and regulations is not an acceptable explanation for violating them unintentionally or otherwise. Neither the FAA nor insurance companies have much tolerance during an accident investigation in the area of published safe flying regulations and practices. 1976 General Aviation Pilot Stall Awareness Training Study* Survey of 75 CFIs attending a Flight Instructor Refresher Clinic revealed that only 30% of the instructors present would not spin a Normal category aircraft despite intentional spins being prohibited in Normal category airplanes. 1993 Transportation Research: Re‐Examination of Stall/Spin Prevention Training* Questionnaires were distributed in CFIs at 43 flight schools in Tennessee, Mississippi, California and Utah as well as to instructors who attended seven FAA safety seminars and three Flight Instructor Refresher clinics. In total, 513 civilian flight instructors and 28 designated examiners participated. The surveys were processed by five aviation professionals ‐ all flight instructors with college education in aerodynamics. NASA research, journal literature, and the textbook "Aerodynamics for Naval Aviators" were used as references: Results of surveying this Certified Flight Instructors and Designated Examiners are listed below:

• 94% relied primarily on popular literature for "stall spin" information (ie. aviation magazines)



• 96% additionally relied heavily on their own instructors • 95% failed to ever receive training in either spin dynamics or the likely conditions preceding an

inadvertent spin • 94% did not understand spin certification requirements nor the limitations imposed as a result • 98% indicated that their formal spin training consisted of no ground instruction and a mere two

spins ‐ one in each direction Despite the above statistics, all these instructors readily received logbook endorsements certifying they were competent to teach spins. The same study revealed the following general conclusions:

• Marginal understanding by surveyed CFIs in the following subjects: o stall aerodynamics o effects of control deflection on the stall o airfoil stall development, planform effects on stall behavior and spanwise flow effects o stall warning signs and secondary effects of flight controls, and o roll control at high angles of attack

• Unsatisfactory understanding of these critical items: o pro‐ and anti‐spin forces o autorotation o spin phases and spin modes o effects of the controls on spin motion and recovery, and o common student errors and the effects on aircraft motion

In the same survey, these instructors and examiners self‐assessed their understanding of "stall spin" dynamics as "Excellent". The survey results clearly indicate that those charged with the task of teaching and testing new pilots possess a marginal understanding of "stall spin" phenomena. 2005 Stall/Spin Study by Embry‐Riddle Aeronautical University* An internet based questionnaire evaluated 468 flight instructors on spin training, spin experience and their individual "stall spin" knowledge. The conclusions broke down as follows:

• Spin Experience o 56% had received 1 hour or less of ground instruction prior to receiving spin endorsements o 36% performed 4 or less spin entries prior to receiving their spin endorsement o 59% had hands‐on spin experience in only 1 or 2 different models of airplanes o 38% had not practiced spins since becoming an instructor

• "stall spin" Knowledge o 47% incorrectly believed the slip/skid ball would help identify opposite rudder in a

disorienting spin o 44% did not understand that spin direction would be in the same direction as yaw at the

stall * Reference: The Light Airplane Pilot’s Guide to Stall/Spin Awareness, Chapter 7: Who's Spinning In




Spin Training Versus Stall Training The thought process for some pilots, and even Certified Flight Instructors, who make the decision to push beyond approved stall training and into the regime of spin training lies within their interpretation of the normal category spin certification description. Assuming the aircraft in question does not fall under the classification of being Spin Resistant or meets Equivalent Level of Safety (ELOS) criteria to meet certification, those familiar with certification requirements are aware that a normal category single‐engine aircraft is spin‐tested to be recoverable from up to a one‐turn or 3‐second spin (whichever takes longer). As stated clearly in AC 61‐67C Chapter 4 (below), this is not permission or authorization for any pilot or CFI to perform intentional spins in those aircraft.

AC 61‐67C: Chapter 4: Airworthiness Standards 400. Operating Limitations. a. Normal Category. Normal category airplanes are not approved for the performance of acrobatic maneuvers, including spins, and are placarded against intentional spins. However, to provide a margin of safety when recovery from a stall is delayed, normal category airplanes are tested during certification and must be able to recover from a one turn spin or a 3‐second spin, whichever takes longer, in not more than one additional turn with the controls used in the manner normally used for recovery or demonstrate the airplanes resistance to spins… [emphasis added] NOTE: Since airplanes certificated in the normal category have not been tested for more than a one turn or 3‐second spin, their performance characteristics beyond these limits are unknown. This is the reason they are placarded against intentional spins. [emphasis added]

Sample CFI Question: So what’s the big deal? If the aircraft is recoverable from a one‐turn spin then why, as a CFI, can’t I do one‐turn spins with my students? Afterall, the aircraft is certified to be recoverable and I really think it’s important for my students to be current on spin recovery. We don’t have access to an aerobatic aircraft locally and traveling to find one is expensive and inconvenient. Although this instructor’s interest (above) in providing spin awareness training to himself and his students is admirable, he or she really needs to understand the intent of requiring the normal category aircraft to be recoverable form a one‐turn spin. The reasoning is discussed in the AC 61‐67C Chapter 4, Para 400a (above). The intent of the one‐turn spin recovery certification is solely “to provide a margin of safety when recovery from a stall is delayed”. This is not referring to spin training and the delay from the stall during training should not be intentional. This margin of safety is there for both students AND instructors.

AC 61‐67C: Chapter 1: Para 105: Stall Recovery … At the first indication of a stall, the aircraft AOA must be decreased to allow the wings to regain lift. [emphasis added]

http://www.apstraining.com/mission_details_spin.htm




In properly administered stall training in any aircraft, recovery should be initiated at the first indication of the stall. Any intentional decision by the pilot (who is about to become a Test Pilot) to continue a stall, especially an uncoordinated stall, beyond the first indication is moving themselves out of stall training, into spin training and rapidly reducing the guaranteed margin of error provided by certification of their normal category aircraft. In stall training the CFI must be on his toes as the amount of time for an uncoordinated stall to proceed beyond the one‐turn recoverable certification limit can be in as little as 3‐seconds and usually not more than 4 seconds. When considering the GA training environment, a window of only 3 or 4 seconds should be considered minimum. Assuming a cooperative student in an ideal training environment where a typical proper transfer of control takes approximately 2 seconds from an uncoordinated stall, that leaves the CFI with as little as a 1‐2 second buffer zone to deal with any number of irregularities such as; continued student control input, incorrect stall recovery technique, miscommunication, panic and fear responses. Any Delay: The design margin of error quickly becomes minimal to zero.

A Spin is Just a Turning Stall, Right? A spin is not just a stall despite the fact that the only path to a developed spin is through the stall, specifically, a prolonged uncoordinated stall. A spin has significantly different characteristics than a stall ‐ so much so, that it is considered to be a completely different flight condition and has a completely different recovery procedure. In the spin, the aircraft’s wings are at stalled angles of attack scribing a helical descending flight path while the aircraft is established in a stabilized yaw‐driven auto‐rotation that may, or may not, be recoverable. Despite their best intentions, CFI’s presenting spin recovery as simply being stall recovery from a prolonged stall with yaw are providing a disservice to their students. Although it is true that a stall recovery is effective in an uncoordinated stall when applied at its first indication of occurrence, the longer the application of stall recovery is delayed, the more unlikely it will be effective. As a pilot moves out of the world of single‐engine certified normal category aircraft into the world of light twin, very light jet and bigger non‐GA aircraft flying, the risk of putting themselves in harm’s way from delaying immediate stall recovery grows rapidly. The stall recovery techniques we teach in general aviation in accordance with AC 61‐67C are fundamental to stall recovery considerations in all fixed‐wing aircraft. Immediacy of Correct Action in stall recovery should always be emphasized by the CFI. Certified aircraft designs that are flight‐tested to recover from developed spins are single‐engine aerobatic aircraft and some single‐engine utility aircraft when flown within the proper weight and balance limitations prescribed for intentional spinning flight. More often than not, aircraft other than those listed above have not been certified, or even flight‐tested, to recover from spins. Every reputable spin recovery training program and instructor must educate pilots on this fact and emphasize the best spin recovery is to recognize and avoid the stall before it starts. If a stall does occur, immediately execute a proper stall recovery before yaw is allowed to couple with stalled angle of attack long enough to move the aircraft into the potentially unrecoverable developed‐spin regime of flight.


http://www.apstraining.com/article-all-attitude-upset-recovery-technique-checklist.htm#Immediacy_of_Action



Defining an Inadvertent Spin When doing our approved stall training and the PTS calls for employing a cross‐controlled stall, the decision on whether the aircraft has transitioned into an inadvertent spin is sometimes ambiguous and can vary significantly between aircraft types. The definition below, provided by the Council on Unusual Attitude Training & Education, can be considered for use by CFIs.

Inadvertent Spin: An unintentional departure from controlled flight that involves simultaneously stalling and yawing, and that involves a change in bank angle of 60 degrees or a change in heading greater than 30 degrees1 with an accompanying rate of change in bank angle or heading of at least 90 degrees per second.2 Furthermore, an intentional spin evolves into an unintentional spin the moment the pilot becomes disoriented, or the moment the pilot’s mind becomes disengaged from the physical actions taken by the pilot’s body, or the moment the pilot decides to abort the spin attempt, or the moment the spin proceeds beyond the point the pilot had intended. Sources: 1 FAA General Aviation Pilot Stall Awareness Training Study (1976), p. 6. 2 14 CFR Part 23 (1993), Section 23.221(a)(2)(ii), p. 165.

Stall Recovery The proper stall recovery for your aircraft should be published in the Aircraft Operating Instructions. The fundamental sequence of actions taken in a stall recovery are common to most fixed wing aircraft (See: All‐Attitude Upset Recovery Checklist). As this article highlights, when faced with an impending stall the sooner correct recovery action is taken the more likely that a successful recovery will occur. Preferably the stall should be avoided through the recognition of developing symptoms rather than waiting until an actual stall occurs. However, if faced with a stalled flight scenario, a stall can be identified by any of the following:

• Significant airframe and/or control surface buffet at speeds below Va • Lack of, or Reversal of, Pitch Authority • Lack of, or Reversal of, Roll Authority • Continuous aural or visual stall warning

CFI's must make an extra effort to be thoroughly educated on stall recovery and ensure every stage of the recovery is fully understood by their students. Generalized actions to be taken in the stall recovery can be summarized as follows:

1. PUSH ‐ Reduce Angle of Attack: Aggressively unload the aircraft through a purposeful “Push” straightforward on the control column to reduce the angle of attack of the wing to below critical AOA to eliminate this critical aerodynamic spin‐risk component*. The amount of elevator movement and control pressure may vary from a simple release of control column pressure to a distinct push of





20‐30 lbs or more in a nose‐high autopilot trimmed power‐on stall condition in a transport category aircraft. In a stall where the wings are close to level (less than 45 degrees), the angle of attack should only be reduced enough to get out of the stall yet not so much so as to unnecessarily induce a significant amount of altitude loss.

2. POWER ‐ Make a Power Selection: The power is typically selected to full thrust. There are exceptions to this general guidance based on aircraft design and configuration. Exceptions to applying full power (or full thrust) in a stall situation include situations such as; Vmc (a failed engine) stall in a multi‐engine aircraft, high‐powered single‐engine propeller aircraft where the manufacturer cautions the torque rolling effect as being excessive in slow‐speed high‐AOA flight conditions, and in large jet aircraft where the manufacturer may require the reduction of power in the stall recovery because of excessive nose‐up moments at full power in low‐speed high‐AOA situations when the engines are mounted under the wing.

3. RUDDER ‐ Cancel Yaw with Rudder: Apply a firm single application of rudder to cancel yaw to attain coordinated flight. Remember, if the aircraft is in a stall, the ball in the turn coordinator is not reliable. Visually arrest the yaw/roll couple to eliminate this critical aerodynamic spin‐risk component*. It is important to emphasize that rudder is NOT used to roll the aircraft unless judiciously and properly combined with aileron input in the “ROLL” step (next). This recommended stall recovery DOES NOT advocate the “Step on the Sky” technique as it unnecessarily uncoordinates the aircraft, significantly increases drag, may overstress the rudder assembly (especially when above Va and/or the rudder is cycled) and has marginal secondary roll response in comparison the proper use of aileron as detailed in the next step.

4. ROLL ‐ Re‐orient the Lift Vector to the Nearest Horizon: Using aileron, the lift vector must be rolled to nearest horizon immediately. In an overbanked scenario (above 45 degrees), the roll must be accomplished while keeping the aircraft unloaded at low angle of attack under positive G. Up to full control deflection must be initiated to achieve the desired wings level flight attitude in minimum time.

5. CLIMB ‐ Initiate an Immediate Climb: With the lift vector oriented in a wings‐level flight attitude, the pilot should now initiate an aggressive pull on the control column to attain a climbing Vy pitch attitude. Pilots must necessarily manage AOA‐onset to avoid the secondary stall when below Va and manage G‐onset to avoid exceeding the aircraft’s limit‐load when above Va.

* NOTE: Two critical aerodynamic factors must be present for an aircraft to enter a spin: 1) AOA above critical (see PUSH above), and 2) Continuous yaw (see RUDDER above). Without both of these components present simultaneously, an aircraft can not spin. A proper stall recovery must aggressively resolve both factors.

Role of the CFI in Relation to "STALL Spin" Training In short; the role of the CFI out in the field is spin‐awareness and avoidance instruction through thorough academic examination of the student’s aeronautical knowledge and providing regulatory‐compliant stall training in accordance with AC 61‐67C. Additionally, the CFI should be educating each student on the risk of



incorrect stall recovery and the importance of maneuvering each aircraft flown within its approved operating envelope. In all that we do as pilots and instructors, insisting on a margin of safety must always be integrated into practical operations and personal training. Venturing into the regime of spin training by implementing intentional spins with a normal category aircraft is in violation of the aircraft’s approved operating limitations. This practice puts the instructor, and all aboard, in a scenario that has very little, or no margin of safety. Become a Referral Expert: As a minimum, encourage your students and other pilots you influence to participate in a spin training course in approved aircraft given by expert instructors. A list of established schools can be found on the IAC website. Keep in mind that spin training is part of the story but not all‐inclusive when it comes to the all‐attitude all‐envelope flight environment. The best recommendation you can provide is to seek out an Emergency Maneuver Training course founded on; thorough "stall spin" awareness academics, upset recovery, a wide variety of stall recovery, spin recovery and, if recommending an instrument rated pilot, instrument recovery training. A comprehensive Emergency Maneuver Training course will additionally include integrated aerobatic training with strong focus on developing recovery skills in a crisis and extensive flight envelope awareness. An aerobatics course alone is not at all the same as, or equivalent to, a properly delivered Emergency Maneuver Training or Upset Recovery Training program. Prior to sending students to any particular provider, be sure to call them to discuss their instructor's experience level, aircraft used, depth of instruction and demonstrated results.

Comments from Other Aerobatic Master CFIs Rich Stowell, MCFI‐A, 2006 National CFI of the Year Author: Emergency Maneuver Training: Controlling Your Airplane in a Crisis Author: The Light Airplane Pilot’s Guide to Stall/Spin Awareness When asked to comment on the subject of this article Rich submitted the following excerpt from his most recent book: THE LIGHT AIRPLANE PILOT'S GUIDE TO STALL/SPIN AWARENESS Chapter 23: Taking Charge of Your Education – Risk Management … “Strive to give yourself as great a margin of safety as possible when flying, too. For example, one frequently asked question is: can a Normal category airplane be spun?? Yet another is: can a Normal category airplane be rolled?? The truthful answer to both is yes, of course the airplane can be. But the real question is should it be spun, or rolled, or anything else if the airplane isn’t approved for it?? It’s not about what happens if everything goes according to plan, but what happens if something goes wrong. In the case of spins, the difference in the margin of safety is one turn in the Normal category versus up to six turns in the Acrobatic category; unproven spin recovery capability beyond one turn versus proven recovery capability. From a structural standpoint, the Normal category airplane is limited to +3.8 g’s before metal


http://www.iac.org/begin/schools.html




might start to bend, whereas the Acrobatic category airplane might have a +6.0 g limit. Thus a botched maneuver in a Normal category airplane (perhaps resulting from an unapproved roll) risks structural problems much sooner compared to the Acrobatic category airplane. “Eating into our margin of safety increases risk; conversely, as our margin of safety increases, risk decreases. It is of little value to have plenty of altitude and possess the skills to apply the correct recovery inputs if we’re going to intentionally spin airplanes not approved for spins. It is likewise also of little value to spin a spins‐approved airplane with insufficient altitude for recovery, or given enough altitude and a recoverable airplane, to lack the necessary recovery skills. Our margin of safety is tied to the Trinity: altitude, airplane capability, piloting skills. Acknowledging this and acting to achieve a balance among these elements will improve the safety of each flight operation.” Rich adds: “There is ZERO margin for error when spinning a Normal category airplane. Plus, the experience may be instilling a false sense of security in pilots doing it. What's to stop someone who adopts that mindset from loading up a Cessna 182 with four people and baggage for a cross country, and along the way saying, ‘hey, watch this!’” ‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐

Importance of Stall Recoveries in Other Aircraft As a CFI we must always be cognizant of the various Laws of Learning during the instruction and evaluation of other pilots. For example, the Law of Primacy often creates the most lasting impression as first impressions are persistent ones. Additionally, following the Law of Recency, pilots tend to do things the way they’ve done them recently. Wrapping it up with one more, pilots in the long‐term tend to do things in accordance with the Law of Exercise that asserts what we do most often is usually the best learned. Having said that, think about the students you are teaching. What are they learning about "stall spin" training first, most recently and most often? Can what you teach be looked up in an official aviation training publication of some kind? If not, it should be. The nice thing about stall training in accordance with AC 61‐67C is that the general recovery principles remain consistent across the spectrum of fixed wing aircraft including GA, large, business jet and airline category machines. General philosophy; reduce angle of attack, make a power decision, cancel yaw with rudder, re‐orient the lift‐vector towards the sky and initiate a climb. In each and every aircraft you fly, every CFI or authorized instructor must be emphasizing recognition, avoidance and, if necessary, immediate stall recovery. Note the repeated emphasis on “immediate”. So what about the pilot moving up from the single‐engine GA aircraft where they make the potentially fatal thought “You know, I really need to be sure I’m safe from spinning my new Cessna 421, so I think I’m going to go do some one‐turn spin recoveries”. Is that a thought that could occur? Although very wrong and potentially deadly that type of thinking does happen. Too often. If they erroneously learned Spins‐Prohibited equals One‐Turn Spins‐Approved, why would their thinking change? Having trained thousands of pilots in unusual attitude and spin recovery training, you’d be surprised how many pilots make a similar initial call to



our office saying; “I’m concerned about safety when flying my family around so I think it’s really important that I learn how to recovery from spins in my Beech Baron (or a similar light twin). I used to do one‐turn spins with my instructor in my Piper Arrow but I’d like to have an instructor with me in my new aircraft before I try it on my own”. How thankful we are when these pilots call as they’ve taken the first step on the road to safety and education. It is calls like these that affirm the importance of "stall spin" awareness and recovery training by approved highly‐qualified experts. Twin engine airplanes are not evaluated for spin recoverability during testing for certification. The only requirement as stated in the Flight Test Guide AC 23‐8A is that twin engine airplanes cannot display an "undue tendency" to spin from an unaccelerated, wings level stall with the critical engine failed. It is common practice during stalls in multi‐engine aircraft in this configuration to select power to idle in the recovery. For example: In response to a number of flat spin accidents in the Beech Baron, the US Army spin tested the airplane in 1974. One of the most noteworthy published findings was that it took less than one second for the airplane to spin following a single‐engine stall. Immediate recovery action was needed to avoid spinning. In 1998 and 2002 the Raytheon Aircraft Company published safety communiqués reporting the results of 229 spins in Baron Models 58 and 58P. With the wind milling left engine idle with max continuous power on the right engine throughout the stall, entry to beyond 270 degrees of rotation, the spin was unrecoverable requiring the deployment of the spin chute. Part of Raytheon's published recommendations was:

• "During single‐engine operation (actual or simulated), at the first indication of approach to stall (the stall warning horn, buffeting, or both) stall recovery must be initiated immediately ... if this instruction is not followed, a stall will occur and a dangerous spin is likely to occur"

Conclusion The simple answer is that intentional spins in Normal category aircraft are not approved. As a professional CFI, this statement alone should keep us from ever even considering doing an intentional spin in a normal category aircraft, or worse, recommending that others do it. The fact that a normal category aircraft is certified to be recoverable from a one‐turn (or 3‐second) spin is most definitely not an authorization to violate the “Spins Prohibited” maneuvering limitation of these aircraft. The one‐turn spin recoverability is only to add a margin of safety in regulatory compliant stall recovery training. Following the same philosophy it should be obvious that training to prepare pilots to effectively recovery from a one‐turn spin (the absolute maximum certified limit of recoverability in a normal category aircraft) should ONLY be done in aircraft that offer a margin of error. Spins‐approved Utility category and Aerobatic category aircraft within their spins‐approved certified weight and balance limits are the only aircraft that should be used for spin training of any kind. There is a reason why CFIs, Designated Examiners and FAA Examiners do not evaluate CFI candidates in their ability to recovery from spins in a Normal category aircraft. The reason: Intentional spins are prohibited.

AC 61‐67C: Chapter 3: Flight Training: Spins



300. Spin Training

a. Spin Training must be accomplished in an aircraft that is approved for spins. c. Spin Avoidance Training … Performance is considered unsatisfactory if it becomes necessary for the instructor to take control of the aircraft to avoid a fully developed spin.

For CFIs still not convinced to stop spin training in Normal category aircraft, let's step it up a notch on behalf of your future students and passengers who don't know better … First, I strongly urge you to stop this practice. Secondly, despite the fact the regulations tell you not to do it, it is a prohibited maneuver, I'm telling you not to do it, every reputable CFI spin instructor is telling you not to do it, every Master CFI‐Aerobatic is telling you not to do it, the FAA & Designated Pilot Examiners won’t do it … there are still some among you that will still say “I am going to do it”. Consider this: However you justify doing what your doing when spinning a normal category aircraft, be certain to use some other reason than being in the name of safety of flight. You are free to risk your own life by violating regulation and may have even found that you’ve been successful in the past based on your skill and familiarity with your specific aircraft. Regulations and approved maneuver limitations comprehend information and safety practices that may not be readily apparent to all pilots or CFIs. The only way to ensure your safety is to know and comply with the limitations published for your aircraft. Final Question: Can you spin a Normal category aircraft? As Master Flight Instructor Rich Stowell explains nicely (above); Yes. But you cannot do it legally, not for more than one turn, not without zero margin of error and not without counting on flawless spin recovery techniques. Following the practice of offering spin training in a normal category aircraft puts yourself, and those with you, at grave risk both during your intentional spin in violation of regulation and even more so when your student or fellow CFI is out by himself, or with friends, practicing one‐turn spin recovery based on your recommendation to do so. Maybe your spin recovery technique is perfect but what about others you teach to do the same, is their technique perfect? I can tell you personally from training thousands of pilots in spin avoidance and recovery that their technique is not perfect (far from it), neither is yours nor is mine. In closing, we all need a margin of safety in "stall spin" avoidance and recovery training, so be sure you have one. Emphasize immediate recovery in all stall training and ensure you, as well as all pilots you influence, seek quality spin training in a spins‐approved aircraft provided by qualified spin instructors. Fly safe and be prepared.




END NOTES i Government of Canada, Transport Canada Aeronautical Information Publication, http://www.tc.gc.ca/CivilAviation/publications/tp14371/AIR/2-0.htm#2-9-1, (31 March 2009) ii Aviation Safety - Boeing Commercial Airplanes, Statistical Summary of Commercial Jet Airplane Accidents - Worldwide Operations 1959 - 2007, The Boeing Company, http://www.boeing.com/news/techissues/pdf/statsum.pdf, 22, (Oct. 23, 2008). [Original Source: CAST/ICAO Common Taxonomy Team (CICTT), http://www.intlaviationstandards.org/] iii Motevalli and Salmon, 1. iv Aviation Safety - Boeing Commercial Airplanes, Statistical Summary of Commercial Jet Airplane Accidents - Worldwide Operations 1959 - 2007, The Boeing Company, http://www.boeing.com/news/techissues/pdf/statsum.pdf, 22, (Oct. 23, 2008). [Original Source: CAST/ICAO Common Taxonomy Team (CICTT), http://www.intlaviationstandards.org/] v Rich Stowell, The Light Airplanes Pilot’s Guide to Stall/Spin Awareness, (Ventura: Rich Stowell Consulting, 2007), 7. vi Stowell, 393. vii Patrick R. Veillette, Re-Examination of Stall/Spin Prevention Training, Transportation Research Record, No. 1379, National Research Council, Transportation Research Board, 1993. viii Stowell, 85 – 86. ix Robert L. Sumwalt III, Airplane Upset Recovery Training: A Line Pilot's Perspective, Flight Safety Digest, July - August 2003, http://www.flightsafety.org/fsd/fsd_jul-aug03.pdf (Oct. 23, 2007), 3. x Airbus, Airbus, Boeing Distribute Updated Training Aid to Airlines, The Boeing Company, http://www.boeing.com/news/releases/2004/q4/nr_041021h.html (Oct. 23, 2007). [Original Source: Boeing / Airbus Press Release: Airbus, Boeing Distribute Updated Training Aid to Airlines (Seattle, Oct. 21, 2004)] xi Air Safety Week, Refuse-to-Crash Concept to Foil Terrorists Rejected, Feb 4, 2002. FindArticles.com. 23 Oct. 2007. http://findarticles.com/p/articles/mi_m0UBT/is_5_16/ai_82493544 (Oct. 23, 2007) xii Calspan, Calspan Flight Research Group - Advanced Maneuver & Upset Recovery Training, http://www.calspan.com/upset.htm (Oct. 23, 2007) xiii Valerie J. Gawron, Ph. D. et al., New Airline Pilots May Note Receive Sufficient Training to Cope With Airplane Upsets, Flight Safety Digest, July - August 2003, http://www.flightsafety.org/fsd/fsd_jul-aug03.pdf (Oct. 23, 2007), 20. xiv Gawron, 29. xv Gawron, 30. xvi Gawron, 30. xvii Donald W. Baggett, Training for Aircraft Upsets: The Upset Domain Training Institute (UDTI) Approach, Environmental Tectonics Corporation, http://www.etcupsetrecovery.com/udti_training.pdf (Oct. 23, 2007), 1. xviii Environmental Tectonics Corporation, GAT-II - Fixed Wing, http://www.etcaircrewtraining.com/gat2/fixedmain.php (Oct. 24, 2007) xix Sumwalt, 3. xx Flight Safety Foundation Editorial Staff, More Than Half of Large Commercial Jet Accidents in 2002 Occurred During Approach and Landing, Flight Safety Digest, July - August 2003, http://www.flightsafety.org/fsd/fsd_jul-aug03.pdf (Oct. 24, 2007), 33. xxi J. Clarke McNeace, The Say & Do Technique, APS Emergency Maneuver Training, http://www.apstraining.com/article-training-say-and-do-technique.htm (Oct. 25, 2007) xxii Paul W. Ransbury, The All-Attitude Upset Recovery Checklist, APS Emergency Maneuver Training, http://www.apstraining.com/article-all-attitude-upset-recovery-technique-checklist.htm (Oct. 24, 2007) xxiii Dave Carbaugh and Larry Rockliff, FAA Airplane Upset Recovery Training Aid – Revision 1, Federal Aviation Administration, August 2004, 2.18 xxiv Carbaugh and Rockliff, 2.18 xxv Carbaugh and Rockliff, pg ix xxvi Carbaugh and Rockliff, 2.19 xxvii Carbaugh and Rockliff, 2.20 xxviii Rich Stowell, The Light Airplanes Pilot’s Guide to Stall/Spin Awareness, (Ventura: Rich Stowell Consulting, 2007), 228.



xxix Stowell, 229. xxx Wikipedia: Stall (Flight), http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Stall_(flight)#Stall_warning_and_safety_devices (5 Jan 08)

Date post:	04-Apr-2018
Category:	Documents
Upload:	dangkhue
View:	215 times
Download:	2 times

Get Your Free Copy at: ™s been arranged at Landmark Aviation. The car is waiting. The car is...

Documents