of 22
8/13/2019 Gizem Cakmak Greek -Turkish Relations in the Post Helsinki Period
1/22
Greek -Turkish Relations in the post Helsinki Period: Is Europe a framework providing
dtente?
Gizem akmak
Abstract
This paper aims to examine the role of European Union in Greek-Turkish relations while
asking the question: Is Europe a framework providing dtente in Greek-Turkish relations?
Since 1996, with the efforts of Simitis government, there has been acceleration in
Europeanization of Greek Foreign Policy. Greece has shifted her position towards Turkey
from conditional sanctions to conditional rewards. The aim was to transfer the conflicts
of Greek-Turkish relations under the umbrella of European Union and make them the issuesof European Union. In 1999, Turkey and Greece were faced with successive earthquakes
which led to the mutual sympathy between Turkish and Greek societies and created the
atmosphere of friendship. Thanks to the euphoria of rapprochement and shift in the Greek
foreign Policy, Greece has lifted her historic opposition for Turkeys EU membership in
Helsinki Summit. Turkey, who became an associate member in 1963, had has the longest
association period among the candidate countries. Turkey was left outside in 1997 at
Luxembourg Summit, where Cyprus was accepted as an official candidate. Thus, Helsinki
Summit can be regarded as a turning point in both Greek-Turkish and EU relations.
This paper argues that the European Union used to be a framework providing dtente in
Greek-Turkish relations. However, the accession of Cyprus to the Union without reaching a
solution in the island stands as an obstacle on Turkish accession. From the thirty five chapters
that are subject to negotiations, eight chapters are frozen due to the Turkeys obligation to
fully implement the Additional Protocol which means opening her ports and airports to
Cyprus. Since 2005, no significant progress was made in the negotiations. Also, the form of
membership and the deadline for Turkish accession seems uncertain. Currently, Greece is
fighting with the debt crisis which also shakes the Euro-zone. On the other hand, Turkey with
the growing self-confidence in her foreign policy made effort to increase her role in the region
by focusing less on the EU and to accession process. It can be stated that The European Union
has lost its significance on the Greek-Turkish Relations as a framework providing dtente.
8/13/2019 Gizem Cakmak Greek -Turkish Relations in the Post Helsinki Period
2/22
Br ief H istory of Turk ish-Greek Relations
Turkish- Greek relations remained problematic and conflicting until 1999. The relations
between Greeks and Turks were characterized by mistrust, suspicion and threat perception.
Mutual suspicion and the threat perception associated with the other side have grown day to
day. The national education system in Greece as well as Turkey, and the media played a
significant role in establishing mutual suspicion and prejudices among societies.
Only the short periods of interaction and cooperation in the beginning of the 1930s and after
the World War II were experienced. A spirit of reconciliation was reached in the beginning of
the 1930s, thanks to the efforts of Ataturk and Venizelos. This period was followed by thedtente period after the World War II when the two countries became the members of the
NATO, namely the Western Alliance. In those dtente periods, there was a common
perceived threat which led to the rapprochement; Italy and the Soviet Union respectively.
Under the patronage of the US, Greece and Turkey became the important actors in
containment of the Soviet Union with their strategic location in the Southeastern Europe.
Greece and Turkey were enjoying the funds coming from the United States in the name of
Marshall Aid. The past rivalries were set aside under the umbrella of NATO until the
emergence of Cyprus issue in the middle of the 1950s.
Cyprus had been occupied by Britain since 1878 and formally became a colony in 1925.
Growing nationalism in the island, especially among the Greek Cypriots created a new
demand for the union (enosis) of the island with Greece. According to Coulombis, The first
part of the 20thcentury was an age of fierce nationalism and Cyprus was not left unaffected.
Nationalism as a powerful mobilizing political and psychological forces began to spill over
from the Turkish and Greek main-lands into the Greek and Turkish communities in Cyprus.1
The Cyprus conflict has turned into an issue between Greece and Turkey in the middle of the
1950s. In 1960 Cyprus was announced as an independent state according to an agreement
signed between the guarantor powers of Great Britain, Greece, and Turkey. However, the
inter-communal violence between 1963 and 1967 had reached to the peak level. In 1974,
Turkey by using its rights from the guarantor agreement intervened to the island in the name
1Theodore A. Couloumbis, The United States, Greece and Turkey: A Troubled Triangle (New York: Praeger
Publishers, 1983), 27.
8/13/2019 Gizem Cakmak Greek -Turkish Relations in the Post Helsinki Period
3/22
of protecting Turkish Cypriots from the violence. This led to the partition of the island and
Greeces withdrawal from the NATOs military flank. The military junta in Greece has come
to an end and the power passed to the civilian politicians.
Since then, numbers of initiatives by the United Nations were failed and the Cyprus problem
remained unsolved and reached a deadlock. Thanks to the nationalist foreign policies in
Turkey and Greece, the Cyprus issue remained as the main obstacle on reconciliation between
the two countries.For most of the 20th century, relations between Greece and Turkey were
defined by the high politics, where the national security interests dominate the agenda of the
foreign policies such as Cyprus and the Aegean disputes.
Cyprus issue together with the continuing dispute over competing rights in the Aegean Region
opened the era of cold war in Greek-Turkish relations. Since the early 1970s, the most
important issues concerning the Aegean Sea were the delimitation of continental shelf and
territorial waters in the Aegean Sea, the control of airspace, and the militarization of the
Aegean Islands. The two countries could not reach any solution concerning the Aegean
dispute over thirty years of conflict. Even the proposed ways of solving the dispute differ
from one country to the other. Greece wants to carry the mutual conflicts into the
International Court of Justice (ICJ) where Turkey is in favor of bilateral negotiations and
talks.
There was a military takeover in Turkey in 1980, all the political parties were banned and the
military took the power in their hands until 1983. Only after 1983, the free elections could be
held and civilian government could be formed. Thanks to the high pressure from NATO,
military government in Turkey lifted Turkeys veto on Greeces return to NATOs military
flank. In return, bilateral negotiations on the Aegean Disputes were to be held between the
two countries. Relying on the verbal soldier promise of General Rogers, Kenan Evren, the
head of military junta lifted the veto and Greece returned to the military wing of NATO after
six years. In the 1980s, despite the a short-lived rapprochement period between Papandreou
and zal, the Cyprus issue and Aegean disputes remained unsolved and occupied the agenda
of Greece as well as Turkey.
The era between 1974 and 1996 as the Cold War Years between Greece and Turkey, which
carried the potential for an armed conflict between the two countries2Also, especially the last
2Alexis Heraclides, Yunanistan ve Doudan Gelen TehlikeTrkiye: Trk-Yunan likilerinde kmazlar ve zm
Yollar, (stanbul: letiim Yaynlar, 2002), 29. [Ellada kai Eks Anatolon Kindinos]
8/13/2019 Gizem Cakmak Greek -Turkish Relations in the Post Helsinki Period
4/22
decade of the 20th
century has been a problematic and conflicting period in Turkish-Greek
relations. The sovereignty question over the Kardak / Imia islets brought Turkey and Greece
to the brink of war in 1996. The confrontation over the Russian S-300 surface-to-air missiles
in Cyprus, the opposition of Greece to Turkeys European Union application, and the calan
affair in 1999, among other events, made the 1990s a particularly turbulent period. In 1990s,
with the emerging new world order, the minority rights issue became prominent in
international platforms. By benefiting from this international sensibility, the Greek Orthodox
Minority in Istanbul and the Turkish / Muslim Minority in Greece started to raise their voices
in international arenas.
In 1999, Turkey experienced a disastrous earthquake in the Marmara Region (the cities of
zmit, stanbul, Sakarya and Yalova) which cost 20.000 lives. Greece was the first among the
countries which went for aid with well-equipped rescue teams, doctors, foods and medical
supplies. The ruined cities after the disaster were broadcasted in Greek televisions, and those
views together with the cries and screams of the victims led the Greek public to grow more
empathy towards the Turkish people. For many years, Turks were taught and screened as
barbaric nation and national enemy in Greece and regarded as rude warriors and
uncivilized invaders.3This time the picture of the Turk was totally different who was crying
in front of the ruins hopelessly. They were normal human beings suffering. Thus, for the first
time, the image of the Turk became blurred and the Greeks, instead of celebrating the
Turkish disasters (as one would have expected given the level of enmity), they lent them their
support.4The image of Greeks in Turkey was not better. This aid surprised the Turks who
have believed for many years that the Greeks hate Turks and wanted to harm Turks whenever
it is possible. Normally the Greeks were perceived as unfaithful, unreliable, cunning, and
insatiableand the spoiled children of the West.5
In only a month, in September 1999, this time Athens was hit by an earthquake. This time
Turkish rescue team- AKUT went to Athens immediately and their services were appreciated
3 See: Hercules Millas, National Perception of the Other and the Persistence of Some Images, in Turkish-
Greek Relations: The Security Dilemma in the Aegean eds Mustafa Aydn and Kostas Ifantis (London: Routledge,
2004).4Alexis Heraclides. 2011. The Essence of the Greek-Turkish Rivalry: National Narrative and Identity,Hellenic
Observatory Papers on Greece and Southeast Europe, GreeSE Paper 51: 25
http://www2.lse.ac.uk/europeanInstitute/research/hellenicObservatory/pdf/GreeSE/GreeSE51.pdf (accessed
January 13, 2012)5
Millas, Hercules, National Perceptions of the Other and the Persistence of Some Images in Ayidin Mustafa &Kostas Ifantis (eds), Turkish-Greek Relations: The Security Dilemma in the Aegean, (London, Routledge, 2004),
pp. 54
8/13/2019 Gizem Cakmak Greek -Turkish Relations in the Post Helsinki Period
5/22
by Greeks. The mutual sympathy that emerged between the societies after the earthquake in
Turkey was reinforced.
This exchange of sympathy and improved relations with the public support was called
earthquake diplomacy between Greece and Turkey.6 The earthquake diplomacy provided
the public support which is vital for long-term reconciliation in Greek-Turkish relations.
However, at governmental level the reconciliation had already been started when George
Papandreou was assigned as the Greek Foreign Minister and when he had found himself a
moderate counterpart, Turkish Foreign Minister smail Cem. This time, with a public support
in Greece as well as Turkey, there has been acceleration in the cooperation among non-
governmental organizations, universities, and municipalities. There has also been a significant
increase in the volume of business transactions and businessmen on both sides who have been
seeking new opportunities and ways of expanding trade activities. Rather than focusing on
traditional, historical conflicts of High Politics such as Aegean Disputes, the Cyprus Issue,
and Issues of Minorities which are regarded as national problems, both countries decided to
cooperate in low politics. Those issues of low politics were culture, tourism, cooperation on
crime, human trafficking, and illegal immigration.
The most significant step in Greek Foreign Policy regarding Turkey was taken at the
Helsinki Summit on December 1999. The historic Greek veto over Turkeys membership was
lifted and Turkey was accepted as an official EU candidate. Since 1999, Turkey and Greece
enjoy the rapprochement period while improving their relations at the societal level as well as
the governmental level.
Turkey, Greece and the EEC/EU
In Turkey, the roots of Westernization can be traced back to the late Ottoman Period. Among
the Turkish political elites, westernization was regarded as synonymous with modernization,
and as reaching the highest point of civilization. Republic of Turkey, from the very beginning
of its emergence, turned its face to the West and westernization was declared as an official
6For the term Earthquake or Sismic Diplomacy See: Erik Siegl, Greek-Turkish Relations- Continuity or
Change?, Perspectives: Central European Review of International Affairs, no.18 (2002): 40-52. Dimitris Keridis,
"Earthquakes, Diplomacy and New Thinking in Foreign Policy," The Fletcher Forum of World Affairs, no.30(2006):1, and Bahar Rumelili, The European Unions Impact on the Greek-Turkish Conflict: A Review of the
Literature, Working Papers Series in EU Border Conflicts Studies,No.6 (January 2004).
8/13/2019 Gizem Cakmak Greek -Turkish Relations in the Post Helsinki Period
6/22
state ideology. Thus, joining the family of Europe has been the major objective of Turkish
political elites among decades.
Turkey applied for membership to the European Economic Community in July 1959, shortly
after the creation of the ECC and the Greeces application. The Agreement Creating an
Association between the Republic of Turkey and the European Economic Community (the
"Ankara Agreement") was signed on 12 September 1963. This agreement, which entered into
force on 1 December 1964, aimed at securing Turkey's full membership in the EEC through
the establishment in three phases of a customs union which would serve as an instrument to
bring about integration between the EEC and Turkey.7Turkey was the second country to sign
a European association agreement, normally seen as a prelude to membership.8An Additional
Protocol was signed in November 1970 and the conditions for Turkeys prospective customs
union with the ECC were presented.
The years between 1973 and 1980 cannot be used efficiently by Turkey due to the domestic
political problems.Turkey, instead of being in search of closer ties with Europe to balance
Greek application in 1975, preffered to move away from the relationship.In October 1978, the
Ecevit government imposed a unilateral freeze on the Association, reneging on the
commitment to proceed to the next round of tariff cuts.9 Since Greeces application for
membership in 1975 until the date it became officially a member of the Community in 1981,
five different governments were formed in Turkey. Those governments were not powerful
enough to take a huge step about EEC membership during the heavy unstable political
conditions in Turkey. There was a widespread belied among the governments that the
association with the European Community could damage Turkeys economy.
In 1980, the military intervened in politics and in 1982 the Association was suspended by the
European Community. The newly imposed constitiution was much more restrictive than the
previous constitiution and was not in line with the European democracy standards. The
interpretations and the application of this constitution created problems between Turkey and
the European Union in the 1990s and the 2000s.
7 Turkish Ministry of EU Affairs, History of Turkey and the EU Relations,
http://www.abgs.gov.tr/index.php?p=111&l=2( accessed April 14, 2012)8Murat Metin Hakk, Turkey and the EU: Past Challenges and Important Issues Lying Ahead, Turkish Studies
7, no. 3 (2006): 4519Susannah Verney, National identity and political change on Turkeys road to EU membership, Journal of
Southern Europe and the Balkans 9, no. 3 (2007):214
http://www.abgs.gov.tr/index.php?p=111&l=2http://www.abgs.gov.tr/index.php?p=111&l=2http://www.abgs.gov.tr/index.php?p=111&l=28/13/2019 Gizem Cakmak Greek -Turkish Relations in the Post Helsinki Period
7/22
Turkey could return to the democracy in 1983 and the multi-party elections were held.
Another three years were to pass before the Association Agreement began to operate again,
with an Association Council meeting held at ambassadorial level in 1986. 10 Thus, Turkey
could apply for full membership in 1987, on the basis of the EEC Treaty's article 237 which
gave any European country the right to do so.11
The Prime Minister zal played significant role on Turkeys application as he was different
from the traditional former politicians and wanted to bring new openings in Turkeys political
and economic relations with the world. Being the member of the European Economic
Community was regarded as a necessity for Turkey politically as well as economically.
Turkeys application was forwarded to the Commission; this confirmed the Turkish eligibility
for membership and recognition as a European country. 12In 1989 Turkeys application was
rejected by the European Commission. The Commission while rejecting the Turkeys
application claimed that there is a substantial economic and development gap between Turkey
and the Community, and cited Turkeys disputes with Greece, the Cyprus issue and the level
of democracy.
To appease Turkeys discontent for the polite rejection of its EEC membership application in
1989, the European Commission initiated a renewed effort to accomplish a customs union
between Turkey and the European Economic Community.13 The European Community
regarded Turkey as a startegic huge market and wanted to improve economic cooperation.
However, the funds provided from the Community to Turkey were blocked by Greece again.
10Ibid.
11Turkish Ministry of EU Affairs, History of Turkey and the EU Relations,
http://www.abgs.gov.tr/index.php?p=111&l=2( accessed April 14, 2012)12
The Council forwarded Turkey's application to the Commission for the preparation of an Opinion. This has
reconfirmed Turkey's eligibility, given that a similar application by Morocco was turned down by the Council on
the grounds that Morocco is not a European country.13
Ioannis N. Grigoriadis, The Changing Role of the EU Factor in Greek-Turkish Relations (Symposium Paper,London School Of Economics And Political Science, Hellenic Observatory, 1st PhD Symposium on Modern
Greece: Current Social Science Research on Greece, London, 21-06-2003):2.
http://www.abgs.gov.tr/index.php?p=111&l=2http://www.abgs.gov.tr/index.php?p=111&l=2http://www.abgs.gov.tr/index.php?p=111&l=28/13/2019 Gizem Cakmak Greek -Turkish Relations in the Post Helsinki Period
8/22
Greece applied for accession to the newly established European Economic Community
in June 1959, and signed an Association Agreement with the EEC as early as 1961. The
Athens Agreement was aiming Greeces accession to ECC within the 22 years. The
agreement was frozen between 1967 and 1974 due to the existence of military junta in
Greece. With the restoration of democracy in 1974, European welcomed Greece back, and in
early 1975 Greece applied for full membership.
The Turkish government regarded the Greek accession application as a political act aimed at
getting a new international platform against Turkey.14 Stephanou and Tsardines claimed that
Turkey by sending a survey ship to explore the east Aegean continental shelf in mid-July
1976 was trying to provoke a crisis between Greece and Turkey. By this way, Turkey could
make visible the dangers of accepting Greece as a member state to the Community. 15
European Community was not in favor of being sided or involved in Greek-Turkish disputes
before the Greek entry.
Greeces desire for being a full member to the European Community was mainly security
driven, and a need for protection against the Turkish threat. NATO, due to its pro-Turkish
stance in the Cyprus crisis, lost its credibility among Greeks. Thus, Greece started to look for
the alliance alternatives. Prime Minister Karamanlis made effort to convince European leaders
for Greek membership. The commission regarded the Greek application as primarily political,
and as a guarantee of safeguarding democracy in Greece. As such, for the EC, the admission
of Greece was a political responsibility which we cannot refuse, except at the price of
denying the principles on which it is itself grounded. 16According to Pettifer, in the minds of
most European leaders, there was a substantial element of Philhellenism. Greece was seen by
these committed Philhellenists as the source of most civilization in Europe at an intellectual
level, and deserving privileged treatment within the union in its drive to re-establish
democracy.17Soon in 1981, Greece joined the EEC as its tenth member.
14 The Economist, 21 June 1975 quoted in Susannah Verney, National identity and political change on Turkeys
road to EU membership,Journal of Southern Europe and the Balkans 9, no. 3 (2007):21415
Constantine Stephanou and Charalambos Tsardines, The EC and Greece-Turkey-Cyprus in The Greek-
Turksh Conflict in the 1990s: Domestic and External Influences, ed. Dimitri Constas ( London: MacmillianPublishing, 1991),209.16
European Commission 1978, quoted in Susannah Verney, Greece and European Community, 261.
*Philhellenism refers to the Love of the Greek culture.17
James Pettifer, Greek Political Culture and Foreign Policyin Greece in a Changing Europe: Between
European Integration and Balkan disintegration? eds. Kevin Featherstone and Kostas Ifantis (Manchester:Manchester University Press, 1996), 18.
Philhellenism refers to the Love of the Greek culture.
8/13/2019 Gizem Cakmak Greek -Turkish Relations in the Post Helsinki Period
9/22
Greeces accession to the European Economic Community in 1981 negatively affected
Turkeys relations with the Community and later with the European Union. The rule of
unanimity in the EEC decision-making process provided Greece with leverage in influencing
Turkey-EEC relations.18Greece succeeded to prevent and block the financial aid for Turkey
provided from the community. The period between 1987 and 1995 can be marked as the
period of Greeces isolationist policies towards Turkish membership.
According to Yannas, since becoming a full member of the EEC in 1981, Greece tried to
persuade the other EEC member states that the upgrading and / normalization of EEC- Turkey
relations cannot proceed without substantial progress being made on issues that are of vital
importance to Greece, that is, settlement of Greek Turkish disputes over the air space and
continental shelf of the Aegean Sea and the resolution of the Cyprus problem. 19 The veto
power that Greece had with the membership and the unanimous nature of the Community
decisions turned to a situation that Turkeys way to Europe passes through Athens. Greece
started to impose the policy of conditionality towards Turkey and strengthened her
bargaining power. Greece managed to transfer the Turkish- Greek issues to the Community-
wide concern and succeeded to internationalize the Cyprus issue. Also, she was successful in
receiving the Communitys solid support for her position in Cyprus.20
In the beginning of the 1990s, dissolution of Soviet Union and the collapse of the communist
systems brought significant challenges for Greece as well as Turkey. Especially, Greece was
affected from dissolution of Yugoslavia rather than the Soviet Union because the new states
emerged in Balkans and created instability. The name dispute over Macedonia with
FYROM, the problems with Albania and the bloddy war in Bosnia put Greece in a troubled
position within the European Union. Greek pro-Serb stance over the Bosnian war was harshly
criticized by the Europeans and her insistence over the name issue with FYROM could never
been understood by the European partners. Greece by blocking the consensus within the
Union and by using arbitrary vetos was labeled as the black sheep and awkard squard by
the other European member states.
18Ioannis N. Grigoriadis, The Changing Role of the EU Factor in Greek-Turkish Relations (Symposium Paper,
London School Of Economics And Political Science, Hellenic Observatory, 1st PhD Symposium on Modern
Greece: Current Social Science Research on Greece, London, 21-06-2003):2.
http://www2.lse.ac.uk/europeanInstitute/research/hellenicObservatory/pdf/1st_Symposium/GrigoriadisIoanni
s.pdf (accessed April 1, 2012)19
Prodromos Yannas, The Greek Factor in EC- Turkey Relations in Greece and EC Membership Evaluated,eds. Panos Kazakos and Panagiotis C. Ioakimidis ( London:Pinter Publishers, 1994), 215.20
Ibid, 216.
http://www2.lse.ac.uk/europeanInstitute/research/hellenicObservatory/pdf/1st_Symposium/GrigoriadisIoannis.pdfhttp://www2.lse.ac.uk/europeanInstitute/research/hellenicObservatory/pdf/1st_Symposium/GrigoriadisIoannis.pdfhttp://www2.lse.ac.uk/europeanInstitute/research/hellenicObservatory/pdf/1st_Symposium/GrigoriadisIoannis.pdfhttp://www2.lse.ac.uk/europeanInstitute/research/hellenicObservatory/pdf/1st_Symposium/GrigoriadisIoannis.pdfhttp://www2.lse.ac.uk/europeanInstitute/research/hellenicObservatory/pdf/1st_Symposium/GrigoriadisIoannis.pdf8/13/2019 Gizem Cakmak Greek -Turkish Relations in the Post Helsinki Period
10/22
Turkey, contrary to the expectations, did not loose its strategic importance with the end of the
Cold War. The Gulf War and the new international challenges which the United States
involves, kept Turkeys position as an important player in the region. After the collapse of
the Soviet regimes, the Turkic World which was under the Soviet domination has opened up
as a new focus of attention to the Turkish policy makers. zal saw Central Asia as a new
opportunity to expand Turkeys influence which could enhance the Turkeys strategic
importance. Thus, the problematic relations with Europe could be balanced. This move was
perceived as a threat by Greece as sounds expansionist and as an aim targeted greater Turkish
influence.
The 1990s were also important years in terms of both deepening and widening of the
European Community. The European Union officially came into being on 1 November 1993,
when the Maastricht Treaty entered into force. It was a big step taken by the Community on
the way of political union in addition to economic and monetary integration. The Maastricht
Treaty created a European Union composed of three pillars: The European Community, the
Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP), and the Justice and Home Affairs (JHA) which
meant judicial cooperation between states in criminal matters. 21The Treaty of Maastricht
represented a new stage in European integration since it opened the way to political
integration. The Treaty introduced the concept of European citizenship, reinforced the powers
of the European Parliament and launched the economic and monetary union (EMU).
Moreover, the EEC became the European Community (EC). 22
In 1993, the Copenhagen criteria which set the conditions for EU membership were resumed
in the EUs Cophenagen Summit. According to the Presidency Conclusion of the Summit;
Membership requires that the candidate country has achievedstability of institutions guaranteeing democracy, the rule of law,
human rights and respect for and protection of minorities, the
existence of a functioning market economy as well as the capacity to
cope with competitive pressure and market forces within the Union.
Membership presupposes the candidate's ability to take on the
21 Karen E. Smith, European Union Foreign Policy in a Changing World (Cambridge: Polity Press, 2007), 26.
22The Summaries of EU legislation, The Treaty of Maastricht accessed June 12, 2011.
http://europa.eu/legislation_summaries/economic_and_monetary_affairs/institutional_and_economic_framework/treaties_maastricht_en.htm
http://europa.eu/legislation_summaries/economic_and_monetary_affairs/institutional_and_economic_framework/treaties_maastricht_en.htmhttp://europa.eu/legislation_summaries/economic_and_monetary_affairs/institutional_and_economic_framework/treaties_maastricht_en.htmhttp://europa.eu/legislation_summaries/economic_and_monetary_affairs/institutional_and_economic_framework/treaties_maastricht_en.htmhttp://europa.eu/legislation_summaries/economic_and_monetary_affairs/institutional_and_economic_framework/treaties_maastricht_en.htmhttp://europa.eu/legislation_summaries/economic_and_monetary_affairs/institutional_and_economic_framework/treaties_maastricht_en.htm8/13/2019 Gizem Cakmak Greek -Turkish Relations in the Post Helsinki Period
11/22
obligations of membership including adherence to the aims of
political, economic and monetary union.23
Turkey, in order to be the member, had to fulfill the political accession criteria by
democratization and institutional reforms. The European Union was in favor of further
economic integration with Turkey by realizing the Custom Union Agrrement. Due to the
Greek veto it could only be achieved on 6 March 1995 when Greece lifted its veto against the
Turkey-EU customs union agreement and the release of EU funds for Turkey provided for by
the Fourth Additional Protocol.24Greece while opening the way for Turkeys custom union
aggrement put the precondition that the accession negotiations between Cyprus and the
European Union would be guaranteed. This Greek move can be regarded as a milestone or U
Turn in Greek Foreign Policy towards Turkish accession. However, it can also be stated thatthe shift was a product of traditional conditionality policy of Greece; guaranting Cyprus
membership in exchange for lifting her veto over Turkeys custom union aggrement.
The customs union agreement between Turkey and the European Union came into force on 1
January 1996. In Turkey, it was regarded as the first step for further political integration and
the membership of the European Union. It was commonly believed that economically, the
customs union aggrement would bring stability and increase the foreign investments and the
competition with the European companies.
Following the customs union aggrement of the EU with Turkey, Turkish-Greek relations
became tense again due to the sovereignty conflict over Kardak / Imia islets in the Aegean
Sea. Two countries almost came to the brink of an armed conflict which could only prevented
by the US intervention. It paved the way for the 1997 Madrid Declaration where the two
states committed themselves not to use violence and undertake unilateral actions. 25
The Simitis government in Greece put modernization and Europeanization as the priorities in
their agenda and wanted to transfer Greece into the core of Europe from being a peripherial
country within the EU. Simitis was in favor of developing closer relations with Turkey and
used the Ocalan incident to rectify the nationalist-populist figures that involved this incident
23Presidency Conclusions, Copenhagen European Council 1993, 7.A.iii
http://www.europarl.europa.eu/enlargement/ec/pdf/cop_en.pdf( accessed April 11, 2012)24
Grigoriadis, The Changing Role of the EU Factor, 3. 25Bahar Rumelili, The European Unions Impact on the Greek-Turkish Conflict, Working Papers Series
in EU Border Conflicts Studies, no.6 (2004): 4
http://www.europarl.europa.eu/enlargement/ec/pdf/cop_en.pdfhttp://www.europarl.europa.eu/enlargement/ec/pdf/cop_en.pdfhttp://www.europarl.europa.eu/enlargement/ec/pdf/cop_en.pdf8/13/2019 Gizem Cakmak Greek -Turkish Relations in the Post Helsinki Period
12/22
from the government and opened the way for the modernization.26
In 1999, Greece lifted her
historic veto over Turkeys EU membership by realizing that the Europeanization of the
Greek-Turkish disputes would serve better Greek interests. A Turkey on the path to Europe
would be more inclined to accept Greeces conditions than a Turkey which was not politically
engaged with Europe. Greeks believed that the EU would play a transformative role in
bilateral relations than to keep Turkey out of the Union, which would leave Greece with an
erratic, unpredictable but still powerful neighbor.27 EU accession process would transform
Turkey to a less threatening country and would lessen the power of the military. The mutual
conflicts between Turkey and Greece will be transferred to the European Union framework
and would be solved during the accession negoatiations.
It can be stated that until 1999, the European Community / Union failed to have a positive
impact on the Turkish-Greek conflicts and could not succeed to create detente between
Turkey and Greece. Before Greeces accession to European Community, during the Cyprus
crisis in 1974, Karamanlis who was aware of conflict with Turkey would hamper Greeces
membership of the EEC, settled a policy of deterrence against Turkey. Also, in the 1976 crisis
over the Aegean continental shelf, Karamanlis chose to deal with the crisis by taking the issue
to the United Nations Security Council and the International Court of Justice, rather than by
military means.28
The second crisis over the Aegean continental shelf in 1987 was restrained, this time due to
the Turkeys application to the European Community. Prime Minister of Turkey zal was
aware that improved relations with Greece were necessary to prevent a Greek veto and to
strengthen Turkeys membership prospects in the EC.29He made effort to open the way for
dialogue with his Greek counterpart Papandreou hoping that the spirit of dialogue would led
Greece to lift her veto on Turkeys membership. All those policy formations considering theEuropean Union necessities, remained very limited. The EU could not be a framework for
providing Turkish- Greek detente.
26Turkeys public enemy number one and the head of the PKK, which had been waging a separatist
insurgency against Turkey since 1984, Turkeys public enemy number one was apprehended by Turkey afterspending a week as a guest at the Greek Embassy in Kenya.27
James Ker-Lindsay, The Policies of Greece and Cyprus towards Turkeys EU Accession, Turkish Studies 8, no.
1(2007):73.28Rumelili, The European Unions Impact, 6.
29Ibid, 7.
8/13/2019 Gizem Cakmak Greek -Turkish Relations in the Post Helsinki Period
13/22
Following the crisis in 1987, Papandreou and zal met in World Economic Forum in Davos
in 1988. However, this sprit of dialogue remained short lived and resultless as there was no
public support for the rapprochement. Greece by putting forward the Cyprus dispute vetoed
Turkeys accession to the Community.
In the 1990s, the European Union emerged as a more active player in the international
relations and left its abstaining position in conflict resolutions. Conflicts between Turkey and
Greece were expected to mediate by the NATO or the US involvement. Kardak / Imia crisis
can be regarded as an example to the American involvement in which the conflict was ended
with the personal involvement and efforts of the US President Bill Clinton.
In the 1990s, as Greece has already been a member, the European Union only could use its
sanction mechanisms on Turkey to resolve the Turkish-Greek disputes. Also, with Greeces
membership, the EC has technically lost its third party capacity in Greek-Turkish disputes.30
In 1999, when Turkey was given the candidacy, Cyprus accession was already guaranteed by
2004 and unilateral pressures were putted on Turkey as a condition. Muftuler Bac states that
Greece, which opposed Turkeys candidacy in Luxembourg, gave in at the 1999 Helsinki
summit partly because the EU inserted in the Helsinki conclusions that Cypruss membership
did not necessitate a settlement over the division of the island.31 The conclusions of the
Helsinki summit put some conditions on Turkey with articles 4 and 9 emphasizing the fact
that Turkeys eligibility for EU membership after Helsinki depended on resolving two issues:
its border conflict with Greece, and the Cyprus dispute. Article 4 states that The European
Council will review the situation relating to any outstanding disputes, in particular concerning
the repercussions on the accession process and in order to promote their settlement through
the International Court of Justice, at the latest by the end of 2004.32According to Article 9 (a)
of the Helsinki Conclusion,
The European Council welcomes the launch of the talks aimed at a
comprehensive settlement of the Cyprus problem on 3 December in
30Ibid,9.
31Meltem Mftler Ba and Aylin Gney, The European Union and the Cyprus Problem 19612003,Middle
Eastern Studies 41, no.2 (March 2005): 289.32
Council Of The European Union, Helsinki Summit Conclusions Article 4,http://www.consilium.europa.eu/uedocs/cms_data/docs/pressdata/en/ec/ACFA4C.htm(accessed January 7,
2012)
http://www.consilium.europa.eu/uedocs/cms_data/docs/pressdata/en/ec/ACFA4C.htm%20%20(accessed%20January%2011http://www.consilium.europa.eu/uedocs/cms_data/docs/pressdata/en/ec/ACFA4C.htm%20%20(accessed%20January%2011http://www.consilium.europa.eu/uedocs/cms_data/docs/pressdata/en/ec/ACFA4C.htm%20%20(accessed%20January%20118/13/2019 Gizem Cakmak Greek -Turkish Relations in the Post Helsinki Period
14/22
New York and expresses its strong support for the UN Secretary-
Generals efforts to bring the process to a successful conclusion.33
On 12-13 December, during the Copenhagen Summit, Greece was among the few members of
the European Union who supported and pushed to give an early date to Turkey to begin
accession negotiations. Greece, acting together with Italy and Spain, argued that the
European Union should reconsider Turkeys progress in the implementation of the
Copenhagen criteria within 2003, so that Turkeys EU accession negotiations could start in
2004.34This support was a product of the shift in Greek foreign policy from the exclusion of
Turkey from the European Union to the belief that Turkey inside the Union constituted a
lesser threat for Greece. Also, at the Copenhagen Summit, it was declared that the
negotiations with Cyprus had come to an end, and Cyprus would be a full member by 1 May
2004.35This led Turkey to accelerate efforts to reach a solution regarding the Cyprus issue.
The conservative and pro-European governments of the Justice and Development Party and
its leader Tayyip Erdogan, together with other senior members of the government, have
encouraged Turkish Cypriot Leader Denkta to strive to reach a settlement before Cyprus is
admitted as an EU member in May 2004.36It was a move to secure Turkish accession to the
EU by removing Cyprus as a possible obstacle to Turkeys membership.
In the post-2002 era, with the Europeanization efforts of the Justice and Development Party
government in Turkey, some steps were taken to make the necessary reforms for the EU
membership. According to ni, Justice and Development Partys Europeanization efforts
33Council Of The European Union, Helsinki Summit Conclusions Article 9 (a),
http://www.consilium.europa.eu/uedocs/cms_data/docs/pressdata/en/ec/ACFA4C.htm (accessed January 11,
2012)34
Ioannis N. Grigoriadis, The Changing Role of the EU Factor in Greek-Turkish Relations (Symposium Paper,London School Of Economics And Political Science, Hellenic Observatory, 1st PhD Symposium on Modern
Greece: Current Social Science Research on Greece, London, 21-06-2003):5.
http://www2.lse.ac.uk/europeanInstitute/research/hellenicObservatory/pdf/1st_Symposium/GrigoriadisIoanni
s.pdf (accessed February 1, 2012)35
See Article 1 of Copenhagen European Council Presidency Conclusions: The European Council in Copenhagen
in 1993 launched an ambitious process to overcome the legacy of conflict and division in Europe. Today marks
an unprecedented and historic milestone in completing this process with the conclusion of accession
negotiations with Cyprus, the Czech Republic, Estonia, Hungary, Latvia, Lithuania, Malta, Poland, the Slovak
Republic and Slovenia. The Union now looks forward to welcoming these States as members from 1 May 2004.
http://ec.europa.eu/research/era/docs/en/council-eu-27.pdf (accessed January 14, 2012)36
Tzn Baheli, Turning a New Page in Turkeys Relations with Greece? The Challenge of Reconciling Vital
Interests, in Turkish-Greek Relations: The Security Dilemma in the Aegean, eds. Mustafa Aydn and KostasIfantis (London: Routledge, 2004), 115.
http://www2.lse.ac.uk/europeanInstitute/research/hellenicObservatory/pdf/1st_Symposium/GrigoriadisIoannis.pdfhttp://www2.lse.ac.uk/europeanInstitute/research/hellenicObservatory/pdf/1st_Symposium/GrigoriadisIoannis.pdfhttp://www2.lse.ac.uk/europeanInstitute/research/hellenicObservatory/pdf/1st_Symposium/GrigoriadisIoannis.pdfhttp://ec.europa.eu/research/era/docs/en/council-eu-27.pdfhttp://ec.europa.eu/research/era/docs/en/council-eu-27.pdfhttp://ec.europa.eu/research/era/docs/en/council-eu-27.pdfhttp://www2.lse.ac.uk/europeanInstitute/research/hellenicObservatory/pdf/1st_Symposium/GrigoriadisIoannis.pdfhttp://www2.lse.ac.uk/europeanInstitute/research/hellenicObservatory/pdf/1st_Symposium/GrigoriadisIoannis.pdf8/13/2019 Gizem Cakmak Greek -Turkish Relations in the Post Helsinki Period
15/22
were aiming to protect religious conservatives from the pressures of the secular state elites.
Similarly, secularists have conceived of EU membership as a means of protecting and
consolidating the secular, Western-oriented character of Turkey, hence, as a medium of
preventing further Islamization of Turkish.37
The period between the summer of 2002 until October 2005 (marking the formal opening up
accession negotiations) can be marked as the golden age period when the passage of dramatic
reform package from the Parliament.38 The Justice and Development Party government, in
spite of the initial reservations when their Islamist background is concerned, acted as a reform
oriented party during the golden age. The Brussels decision of 2004 clearly underlined the
pace of transformation and reform that Turkey had experienced during this golden age
period.39
During this period Turkey and Greece have enjoyed the dtente and spririt of reconciliation
due to the Europeanization efforts in both countries and the high public support for the
rapprochement. The civil society dialogue has increased since 1999 with the mutual
sympathy emerged as the product of the earthquakes in Turkey and Greece. This time the
demand for rapprochement came from the societal level and civil society actors started to play
important and independent role in Turkish-Greek relations. The European Union has apositive impact in this dialogue by promoting democratisation and civil society activity in
Greece and in Turkey.40The EU has begun to have a more direct connecting role through the
Civil Society Development Program (CSDP) initiated by the Representation of the European
Commission to Turkey. The CSDP has a special Turkish-Greek Civic Dialogue component,
where the aim is to strengthen dialogue, networking, and partnerships specifically between
civil society initiatives in Greece and in Turkey.41
With the sprit of Europeanization in Turkey and Greece, cooperation between the Turkish and
the Greek NGOs has risen dramatically. Also, there have been important attempts in both
countries to change the historical perception of other by cleaning up humiliating and
nationalist discourse from the schoolbooks. For many years, Greeks were regarded as
37Ziya ni, Contesting for Turkeys Political Centre: Domestic Politics, Identity Conflicts and the Controversy
over EU Membership, Journal of Contemporary European Studies 18, no. 3(2010):36138
Ibid, 363.39
Ibid.40Rumelili, The European Unions Impact, 17.
41Ibid.
8/13/2019 Gizem Cakmak Greek -Turkish Relations in the Post Helsinki Period
16/22
unfaitfull, unreliable and spoiled while Turks were presented as barbaric, uncivilized and
expansionist warriors.
In spite of the fact that the EU remained ineffective in resolving Turkish- Greek disputes, it
played a significant role on promoting the civil society and by pressurring both Greece and
Turkey it provided improvement in minority rights, especially in Greece.42
For many decades the Lausanne minorities ( Greeks in Istanbul and the Muslim / Turks of
Greece who were excluded from the compulsary exhange of population) were regarded as the
Trojen Horse of their kin states and faced with numeorus human right violati ons. In the
1990s, with the changing world order, and the growing sensitivity about the minority issues
led Greece to take positive step on improvement the conditions of Muslim / Turkish minority
in Greece. This liberalization process from the beginning of 1990s and continuing to the
present directly linked up with the growing activism of European institutions around human
rights and minority protection.
In 1998, the racist and discriminative article of Greek citizenship was removed. 43 The
Council and Europe and the European Union played significant role on this removal. Removal
of Article 19 also does not mean that there would be no automatic restitution of Greek
citizenship for the more than 60,000 people who had been stripped of it on the grounds of
Article 19. A person who wanted to get his / her citizenship back was given the chance to
apply for citizenship through the normal, long and unpredictable naturalization process.
Greece needs further improvements for providing the regaining citizenship for Article 19
victims.
Turkeys human right violation record has been one of the most examined and debatable issue
in Turkish- EU relations. The improvement in minority rights in Turkey only could be
provided since 1999 with the European Union candidacy. Until 1999, with the repressive
policies of the governments, a high percentage of the non-Muslim minorities of Lausanne
treaty have left the country. The Copenhagen Criteria in 1993 pointed out that respect for
minority rights is a prerequisite for the EU membership. Since 1999, many reforms were
42By bounding the scope of this paper, only the Lausanne Minorities ( Greeks in Istanbul and Muslim/ Turks in
Northern Greece) were mentioned.43Article 19 of the Citizenship Code that gave state authorities the discretion to rescind Greek citizenship from
non-ethnic Greeks who left the country with no intention of returning.
8/13/2019 Gizem Cakmak Greek -Turkish Relations in the Post Helsinki Period
17/22
achieved for improving the minority rights. However, it can be stated that as in the Greek
case, further improvements are vital for reaching the European standards in minority rights.
As a product of Europeanization of minority rights in Turkey, the Constitution was amended
in the direction of expanding fundamental rights and freedoms including minority rights.
Seven reform packages attempted to achieve Turkeys convergence with the Copenhagen
Criteria. In 2002 the right of non-Muslim foundations to own immovable properties and to
dispose of them freely was recognized, and in 2003 the right of non-Muslim communities to
build places of worship subject to the approval of the competent administrative authorities
was recognized. Teaching as well as broadcasting of Kurdish and other minority languages
was also allowed.44
The years 1999 and 2005 can be regarded as the period when Europe had been a framework
providing dtente between Turkey and Greece. The europeanization efforts in both countries
triggered the rapprochement and several improvements in the low politics were reached as a
product of the europeanization. Cooperation between the non-governmental organizations,
improvement in minority rights, avoiding further conflicts in the governmental level can be
counted as the positive improvements. From the Greek side, Europe was regarded as a
framework that would make Turkey more liberal, less threatening and aggresive. Turkey, with
a desire of the full membership implemented some important reforms. As a result of these
reform packages, the European Commission in its Progress Report on Turkey in October 2004
noted that Turkey was sufficiently fulfilling the political aspects of the Copenhagen
criteria and accession negotiations could commence with Turkey.45
The year 2004 was a critical year in Turkey and the EU relations. The UN imposed Annan
unification plan was rejected by the Greek Cypriots, who had already been guaranteed EU
membership by 1st May. 76% of Greek Cypriot voters rejected the Plan, while 65% of
Turkish Cypriot voters accepted it.46 The Annan Plan required the emergence of a United
Cyprus Republic which would be an independent state in the form of an indissoluble
44Ioannis Grigoriadis, On the Europeanization of Minority Rights Protection: Comparing the Cases of Greece
and Turkey, Mediterranean Politics 13, no.1 (2008):36.45
The Council on 3 October 2005 decided to open accession negotiations with Turkey unanimously.
Meltem Mftler Ba, Turkeys Accession to the European Union: The Impact of the EUs Internal Dynamics,
International Studies Perspectives 9 (2008): 207.46Carol Migdalovitz, Cyprus: Status of U.N. Negotiations and Related Issues, CRS Report for Congress (2007)
http://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/row/RL33497.pdf(accessed January 14, 2012)
http://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/row/RL33497.pdfhttp://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/row/RL33497.pdfhttp://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/row/RL33497.pdf8/13/2019 Gizem Cakmak Greek -Turkish Relations in the Post Helsinki Period
18/22
partnership, with a federal government and two equal constituent states, the Greek Cypriot
State and the Turkish Cypriot State.47
Turkish and Greek government actively supported the Annan Plan despite the strong
nationalist criticism in the domestic sphere. However, Greek Cypriots who had already
guaranteed the EU membership voted against the plan and by 1stMay 2004, they became a
member of the European Union.
Since 2004, the Cyprus issue has become the issue of the European Union rather than being a
dispute between Greece and Turkey. The accession process of Turkey is stucked because of
Cypruss efforts to put more sanctions on Turkey, and Turkeys insistence on refusing to open
ports to Cyprus which is not recognized by Turkey. Greek Cypriots are no more in need of
Greeces international advocacy of the Cyprus issue. As an EU member, they can advocate
their own national interests independently. However, despite the support they gave to the
Annan Plan and their efforts to reach a settlement, the international isolation of the Turkish-
Cypriots is still continuing. According to ni, The EUs failure to deal with the Cyprus
conflict problem on an equitable basis was increasingly interpreted even among key members
of the pro-EU, pro-reform coalition in Turkey as yet another case of unfair treatment.48
The Cyprus problem is still the most important obstacle on Turkeys membership. Before
opening the accession negotiations, Turkey accepted the EU demand to extend its Customs
Union Agreement to the new members. Thus, Turkey signed a legal document that would
open its ports and harbors to vessels from Cyprus in July 2005. 49 Instead of the removal of
occupation forces from Cyprus and recognition of the Republic of Cyprus, the only condition
the EU imposed on Ankara was that it had to sign a protocol extending the customs union
with the EU to the ten new member states prior to 3 October 2005. In August 2005, the
Turkish government signed the protocol by emphasizing that formal recognition of Cyprus
would only be possible after a political settlement on the island. Turkey refused to recognize
the Republic of Cyprus, which does not represent the whole population of Cyprus. Turkey is
insisting that unless the EU lifts the isolations to Northern part of the island, the protocol
would not be implemented.
47 See: Annan Plan, Foundation Agreement Article 2 (a), (2004)
http://www.hri.org/docs/annan/Annan_Plan_April2004.pdf(accessed January 14, 2012)48ni, Contesting for Turkeys Political Centre,365.
49Mftler Ba, Turkeys Accession to the European Union,208.
http://www.hri.org/docs/annan/Annan_Plan_April2004.pdfhttp://www.hri.org/docs/annan/Annan_Plan_April2004.pdfhttp://www.hri.org/docs/annan/Annan_Plan_April2004.pdf8/13/2019 Gizem Cakmak Greek -Turkish Relations in the Post Helsinki Period
19/22
In order to conclude the negotiations, 35 chapters has to be closed. Chapters of the acquis can
only be opened and closed with the approval of all member states, and chapters provisionally
closed may be reopened. The Turkish side is being asked to solve the Cyprus issue in order to
unfreeze the eight chapters frozen due to the Additional Protocol crisis. The EUs passive
policy after the Annan Plan referendum on Cyprus further exacerbated the problem since it
left the Turkish side deeply disappointed.50No new chapters of the aquis were opened in 2011
and very little progress appears to have been achieved within the chapters already under
negotiation.51
Also, the stance of France and Germany concerning the Turkish accession created discontent
in Turkish government and the public. Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdogan said there is a
black campaign led by France and Germany to destroy Turkish determination to become a
member of the European Union.52European credentials particularly in the core EU countries
such as France and Germany has helped to create a serious nationalistic backlash in Turkey
and strengthened the hands of anti-EU, anti-reform groups both within the state and the
society at large.53 The proposed privelaged partnership rather than full membership
triggered the Euroskepticism in Turkey, this debate has taken a new turn with the French
President Nicholas Sarkozys declaration that Turkeys place is not in Europe.54
This
stance reinforced the widespread belief in Turkey that the EU is a Christian Club and there is
no place in Turkey within the EU. The Euroskeptics in Turkey believe that there is an unfair
threatment against Turkey and due to this unfairness the country will never be able to
become a full member of the Union.
50 Muzaffer Vatansever, Turkish-Greek relations: One step forward, two steps back, Hurriyet Daily News,
http://www.hurriyetdailynews.com/default.aspx?pageid=438&n=turkish-greek-relations-one-step-forward-
two-steps-back-2011-05-01(accessed April 12, 2012)
51Vincent Morelli, European Union Enlargement: A Status Report on Turkeys Accession Negotiations, CRS
Report for Congress: Prepared for Members and Committees of Congress ( 2011): 10
http://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/row/RS22517.pdf( accessed March 8, 2012)52
France and Germany accused of Black campaign against Turkeys EU bid, Hurriyet Daily News, May 12,
2011.53
ni, Contesting for Turkeys Political Centre,364.
54Mftler Ba, Turkeys Accession to the European Union, 201.
http://www.hurriyetdailynews.com/default.aspx?pageid=438&n=turkish-greek-relations-one-step-forward-two-steps-back-2011-05-01http://www.hurriyetdailynews.com/default.aspx?pageid=438&n=turkish-greek-relations-one-step-forward-two-steps-back-2011-05-01http://www.hurriyetdailynews.com/default.aspx?pageid=438&n=turkish-greek-relations-one-step-forward-two-steps-back-2011-05-01http://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/row/RS22517.pdfhttp://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/row/RS22517.pdfhttp://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/row/RS22517.pdfhttp://www.hurriyetdailynews.com/default.aspx?pageid=438&n=turkish-greek-relations-one-step-forward-two-steps-back-2011-05-01http://www.hurriyetdailynews.com/default.aspx?pageid=438&n=turkish-greek-relations-one-step-forward-two-steps-back-2011-05-018/13/2019 Gizem Cakmak Greek -Turkish Relations in the Post Helsinki Period
20/22
In Greek side, Greek Foreign Policy has been shadowed by the debt crisis since 2008. Since
then, Greek governments gave all their focus to overcoming the crisis. Greeces relationship
with the European Union has regressed to an unequal economic partnership, with the EU as
the lender and Greece as the borrower.
According to Economides, today, Greece is in need of a foreign policy. In effect it does not
have one.55 The main issues of Greek Foreign Policy remained the same for the decades;
Turkey, Cyprus and FYROM. However, there has been no significant improvement in those
issues that have benefited Greek interests. The hard security issues with Turkey remained the
same, the FYROM name dispute could not be solved, even though Cyprus become a member
of the European Union, the de facto partition of the island and the presence of the Turkish
military in Cyprus continues.
Economides states that the EU, which has, to some extent, shielded Greek interests from
being undermined by these issues, has also not proved a strong enough incentive for those
three states to be more amenable to a long-term accommodation with Greece. Thus, contrary
to Greek expectations, the European Union could not provide a solution ground for the
Cyprus issue, resolving Aegean disputes with Turkey, and the name dispute with FYROM
and Greece could not reach the desired outcomes.56There is also growing Euroskepticism in
Greece due to the EU and IMF imposed austerity measures. Many discussions have gained
momentum since the breakout of the Euro Debt crisis in Greece. People in Europe have
started to question the future of European integration, especially the Euro zone. Henkel claims
that, students in Athens, the unemployed in Lisbon and protesters in Madrid not only
complain about national austerity measures, but also protest against Angela Merkel. 57In their
view, instead of uniting Europe, the Euro increases friction by making a powerful country
more powerful while small countries get weaker day by day without a national monetary
policy.
55Sypros Economides, Greece Needs but does not have a Foreign Policy, Cambridge Papers in Modern Greek,
No. 18 (2011)
http://blogs.lse.ac.uk/greeceatlse/2011/10/13/greece-needs-but-does-not-have-a-foreign-policy/(accessed
April 13, 2012)
56Ibid.
57
Hans Olaf Henkel, A Skeptics Solution: Breakaway Currency, The Financial Times, August 29, 2001.http://www.ft.com/cms/s/0/6cf3e4f0-cf40-11e0-b6d4-00144feabdc0.html#axzz1dz9LcyGl (accessed
November 16, 2011)
http://blogs.lse.ac.uk/greeceatlse/2011/10/13/greece-needs-but-does-not-have-a-foreign-policy/http://blogs.lse.ac.uk/greeceatlse/2011/10/13/greece-needs-but-does-not-have-a-foreign-policy/http://www.ft.com/cms/s/0/6cf3e4f0-cf40-11e0-b6d4-00144feabdc0.html#axzz1dz9LcyGlhttp://www.ft.com/cms/s/0/6cf3e4f0-cf40-11e0-b6d4-00144feabdc0.html#axzz1dz9LcyGlhttp://www.ft.com/cms/s/0/6cf3e4f0-cf40-11e0-b6d4-00144feabdc0.html#axzz1dz9LcyGlhttp://blogs.lse.ac.uk/greeceatlse/2011/10/13/greece-needs-but-does-not-have-a-foreign-policy/8/13/2019 Gizem Cakmak Greek -Turkish Relations in the Post Helsinki Period
21/22
On the other hand, while Europe is in recession, Turkey became one of the fastest growing
economy in the world. Politically, Turkeys role as a regional power is increasing as Turkey
started to mediate the conflicts in the Middle east. There is a widespread belief that Turkeys
need for the European Union is decreasing and also with the growing Euro-scepticism the EU
started to be seen as an unattractive, crisis-ridden Project.58
The frustration of Turkish society and the political elites resulting from the unfair treatment
of the EU, has turned to be a self-esteem that place the European Union as dispensable for
Turkey. However, the Minister of EU Affairs Egemen Ba emphasized the significance of
the EU membership by stating;
Turkeys position is not driven by economic interests, we never saw
the EU in this way. For us, Europe is the most extensive project for
peace in all of human history. When we look at the member countries
of the European Union, we find that peoples who have waged war for
centuries now live in peace within the EU.
The fact is due to the economic crisis, Europes international image and ability to attract other
countries to its own economic and political model is deeply damaged.59 According to
Tapnar, as Turkish people see the mess in Europe and the relative stability of their own
economy, the Turkish public opinions already low level of enthusiasm for EU membership is
now probably going even lower.60The crisis is not the only factor in this Euroskepticism in
Turkey, also the exclusionary policies of France and Germany (Sarkozy and Merkel) played
significant role. According to surveys, public support in Turkey for EU membership has
declined almost 30 percent and the majority of people think Turkey will never be accepted as
an EU member. This dismal projection inevitably undermines the role of the EU in the
Turkish foreign-policy-making agenda.61The European Unions contribution to the deadlockin Cyprus by accepting it as a full member before reaching settlement and also the Unions
58ni, Contesting for Turkeys Political Centre,364.
59mer Tapnar, The end of the EUs soft power?, Todays Zaman, May 17, 2010.
http://www.todayszaman.com/columnist-210375-the-end-of-the-eus-soft-power.html( accessed April 14,
2012)
60Ibid.
61Ibid.
http://www.todayszaman.com/columnist-210375-the-end-of-the-eus-soft-power.htmlhttp://www.todayszaman.com/columnist-210375-the-end-of-the-eus-soft-power.htmlhttp://www.todayszaman.com/columnist-210375-the-end-of-the-eus-soft-power.html8/13/2019 Gizem Cakmak Greek -Turkish Relations in the Post Helsinki Period
22/22
failure to realize its commitments to Turkish Cypriots created discontent in the Turkish
public.
Especially since 2008, the EU lost its impact on Turkish- Greek relations. This study
suggests that the EU should open the way to the frozen negotiations with Turkey, being aware
of the fact that the negotiation process will benefit further democratization in Turkey. The
Union should provide objective grounds for Turkish accession process and made effort to
reach a solution in Cyprus by not only putting conditions on Turkey, also wholeheartedly
contributing to the process. The EU also should benefit from Turkeys cultural and religious
links with the Middle Eastern countries to become more influential actor in world politics.
Turkey also should reconsider that the European Union is a political integration project and
could not be reduced to an economic community. It is the most successful peace project in
history, and is indispensable for Turkeys future.
Greece and Turkey should improve governmental and societal dialogue by creating new areas
of cooperation. The task groups should be established or better served to find solutions to the
issues of high politics such as the Aegean disputes. The EU which aims to be more effective
in international problems should play more significant role on resolving the disputes between
Greece and Turkey.