Global Investment Views Global Investment Committee ... · 6 September 25 October Start of the...

European perspectivesCEMLA XIII Meeting on International Reserves Management

Monica Defend

Chief Strategist at Amundi

September 2019

The views expressed in this presentation are those of the Global Investment Committee and are subject to change at any time. These views

should not be relied upon as investment advice, as securities recommendations, or as an indication of trading intent on behalf of any of

Amundi’s strategies.

Contents

1. Latest developments in Europe

2. European Central Bank under the spotlight

3. Implications for fixed income and FX

CEMLA XIII Meeting on International Reserves Management 2

01Latest developments in Europe


What is new for Europe? Central bank at the forefront

Source: Amundi, as of 29 August 2019. CBs = Central Banks. ECB: European Central Bank. EM = Emerging Markets.

Economy & geopolitics Financial markets

CEMLA XIII Meeting on International Reserves Management

Growth: slowdown continued with Germany

facing recession, manufacturing activity

decelerating

Central banks: Fed cut rates, but markets

and Trump expect more. ECB also moving

towards an even more dovish stance

Trade war: escalation followed by China

retaliation. Conversations should restart, but

trade-talk clouds remain

Italy: PM Conte resigned. Italian president

gave mandate to form new government

Brexit: the UK Parliament will be suspended

ahead of Brexit deadline. No-deal’s chances

have increased.

Volatility is back: both in equity, bonds and

FX, amid greater geopolitical uncertainty

Core bonds even lower: US Treasury down

at 1.5 and German Bund yields become

negative up to 30Y

Italian assets very volatile, amid political

risk

FX: risk of currency war on the rise – EUR

driven by sudden and strong repricing of

expected rate cuts from the ECB. GBP

continues to weaken in the face of rising

tensions on the Brexit negotiations.

Oil: crude oil prices in trading range, with

movements correlated to the trade war

dynamics

4

Markets remains resilient year-to-date


Legend

2019 Min

2019 Max

● 2019 Return YTD

Source: Bloomberg, analysis by Amundi on 26 asset classes (and FX). Data as of 3 September 2019. Index providers: Cash, Government bonds and EM Bond indexes are from

JPMorgan. Corporate bond indexes are from BofA Merrill Lynch. Equity indexes and EM currency index are from MSCI. Commodities indexes are from Bloomberg Barclays. All

indices used to represent asset classes are in local currency. Past performance is no guarantee of future results.

5

-10%

0%

10%

20%

30%

40%

50%

Jap

an

GE

M

Ch

ina

Pa

cif

ic e

x J

p

Eu

rop

e

No

rth

Am

eri

ca

Eu

ro C

ash

3m

US

Cash

3m

Jap

an

Go

vie

s

US

Go

vie

s

EM

U G

ovie

s

UK

Go

vie

s

Eu

ro IG

Eu

ro H

Y

EM

Go

vie

s L

C

US

HY

EM

Go

vie

s H

C

US

IG

Co

mm

od

itie

s

Oil W

TI

Go

ld

GB

P S

po

t

Eu

ro S

po

t

Jap

. Y

en

Sp

ot

EM

Cu

r in

US

D

US

D T

rad

e W

gt

EQUITIES CASH & DM GOVIES CREDIT & EM BOND COMMODITIES CURRENCIES

YTD performance of different asset classes

Equities MM & DM Govies Credit & EM Bond Commodities Currencies

Eurozone: limited upside for growth

Growth divergence masks different domestic conditions, trade openness, vulnerabilities. On the domestic side,

our outlook relies on consumer resilience and deployment of some fiscal support for 2019 On the external side, a

gradual stabilization of the trade flows at global level.

Source: Amundi Research forecast, Bloomberg. Data as of 30 August 2019. Source: Amundi, Bloomberg. Data as of 30 August 2019.

2.0% 1.9%

2.6%

1.9%

1.0% 1.0%

-1.0%

-0.5%

0.0%

0.5%

1.0%

1.5%

2.0%

2.5%

3.0%

2015 2016 2017 2018 E 2019 E 2020 E

EMU GDP Contributions, annual average

PERS. CONS. EXP. GOV. CONS. EXP.

INVESTMENTS NET TRADE

INV. CHANGES GDP

Shrinking trade

contribution ..

..yet resilient

domestic

contribution


0.0

0.5

1.0

1.5

2.0

2.5

3.0

Eurozone Germany France Italy Spain

% (

yo

y)

Real GDP growth by country

2018 2019 2020

Growth under pressure from protracted weakness in manufacturing

Weak growth Manufacturing-intensive economies take most of the pain. Negative German growth in Q2 trigger

recession fears. Q3 brought little respite: further deterioration in business confidence indicators; problematic

newsflow (new Trump tariff threats, rising hard-Brexit risk, new Italian government crisis,…)


20

25

30

35

40

45

50

55

60

65

70

19

98

19

99

20

00

20

01

20

02

20

03

20

04

20

05

20

06

20

07

20

08

20

09

20

10

20

11

20

12

20

13

20

14

20

15

20

16

20

17

20

18

20

19

Ind

ex L

ev

el

Eurozone Manufacturing PMI

France Germany Italy Spain

Source: Datastream, Amundi. Data as of 3 September 2019.

-5%

-4%

-3%

-2%

-1%

0%

1%

2%

3%

4%

40

45

50

55

60

2016 2017 2018 2019

Ind

ex L

ev

el

Eurozone: Services vs. manufacturing

Eurozone Manufacturing PMI

Eurozone Services PMI

German factory orders 3M/3M (rhs)

PMI contraction line


… and from unabated trade tensions

The Eurozone is more exposed to international trade than the US. Exposure varies a lot across countries (Germany

and Italy more vulnerable than France and Spain). A Material Risk: protectionist measures against Europe (US tariffs

on cars) and/or a no-deal Brexit would bring additional damage.


0%

5%

10%

15%

20%

25%

30%

35%

40%

Eurozone Germany France Italy Spain USA

Share of exports in goods and manufacturing in each economy

Exports in goods Manufacturing

Source: OECD, Amundi Research. As of 3 September 2019.

0.0%

0.5%

1.0%

1.5%

2.0%

2.5%

3.0%

3.5%

Cy

pru

s

Gre

ece

Lu

xe

mb

ou

rg

Sp

ain

Ma

lta

Latv

ia

Slo

ven

ia

Po

rtu

gal

Fra

nce

Ne

the

rlan

ds

Esto

nia

Fin

lan

d

Italy

Au

str

ia

Be

lgiu

m

Lit

hu

an

ia

Slo

vak

ia

Germ

an

y

Eu

rozo

ne

Exports of goods to the US (% of GDP)

Car industry Other goods

Source: International Trade Center, Amundi Research. As of 3 September 2019.

Fixed Investments lost momentum


-1.0%

0.0%

1.0%

2.0%

3.0%

4.0%

5.0%

6.0%

2016 2017 2018 2019 2020

Fixed Investments (YoY average growth rate)

Eurozone Italy Germany France

99.6

99.8

100.0

100.2

100.4

100.6

100.8

101.0

101.2

Gross Fixed Capital Formation, 2013=100

Italy Spain Eurozone Germany France

9

Source: Amundi Research forecast, Bloomberg. Data as of 30 August 2019. Source: Amundi Research forecast, Bloomberg. Data as of 30 August 2019.

We expect further weakness in fixed investments for 2019 and 2020 across G4 EA countries, particularly in Italy and

Germany. Likewise, the flattening of the gross fixed capital formation is particularly evident for Germany and Italy (the

countries more hit by trade uncertainty and manufacturing weakness).

A bright spot: supportive factors for domestic demand

Household real disposable income remains supported by rising employment and wages and subdued inflation (Oil

prices lower than in 1 year ago). Already significant fiscal support (for different reasons) in the 4 largest countries

(approx. 0.5% of GDP), while more could come due to the broad-based weakness in the economic environment.



-3%

-2%

-1%

0%

1%

2%

3%

4%

20

00

20

01

20

02

20

03

20

04

20

05

20

06

20

07

20

08

20

09

20

10

20

11

20

12

20

13

20

14

20

15

20

16

20

17

20

18

20

19

Real disposable income and consumption

Disposable income, deflated by CPI

Real household consumption

Source: DG ECFIN, Amundi Research. Data as of 3 September 2019.

-3

-2

-1

0

1

2

3

4

5

20

10

20

11

20

12

20

13

20

14

20

15

20

16

20

17

20

18

20

19

20

20

Yo

Y C

han

ge

Fiscal stance adjustment(cyclically-adjusted primary deficit)

Germany France Italy Spain Euro area

Policy uncertainty set to move higher


Source: http://www.policyuncertainty.com/europe_monthly.html, as of July 2019

-

200

400

600

800

1,000

1,200

2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017 2018 2019

Economic Policy Uncertainty Index

Eurozone Germany Italy UK France Spain

11

Global policy uncertainty increased overall due to political uncertainty and increased risks. Global trade disputes,

tensions in Gulf Area, European fragmentation are some of the geopolitical risks in the spotlight.

http://www.policyuncertainty.com/europe_monthly.html

Italy: a very volatile political news flow


Last day for the

appointment

of an Italian

European

Commissioner

26 August

(some more

days given

to Italy)

First budget law

draft to be submitted

to Parliament

Mid September

Currently

BBB - Outlook Negative

Currently

Baa3 - Outlook Stable

6 September 25 October

Start of the

review of the

budget law for

2020 to be

submitted by 15

October to the

EC and approved

by year end

27September

Italy – Political and credit ratings timeline

0%

20%

40%

60%

80%

100%

Euro-fixed income assets by yield buckets

negative 0% - 0.5% 0.5% - 1.0%

1.0% - 1.5% 1.5% - 2.0% >2%

Source: Bloomberg and Amundi Research, as of 29 August 2019.

Success in coalition talks has been supportive of Italian bonds, previously favoured by a positive technical backdrop (the Italian

Treasury has already placed 68% of the yearly scheduled new issuance) as Italy’s bond market offers relatively attractive yields in

Europe.

12

UK: the economy is gearing up for a no-deal scenario

Source: Amundi Research. Data as at 26 August 2019.


ScenarioRatified deal

before Oct. 31

Further

extension

beyond Oct. 31

No-deal Brexit

Probability 20% 50% 30%

GBP/USD (range) 1.35 – 1.40 1.28 – 1.33 1.10 – 1.20

Stocks Up – outperform

Flat – in line with

other markets,

higher volatility

Down in the short

term with limited

downside; possibly

up in the long term

10Yr GiltsLower yields from

dovish BoE

Yields following

global trend; BoE

incapable to act

Higher yields as

weak currency

does not allow

BoE to cut rates &

possible

downgrade

2-10 Curve SteepeningFollowing global

trendSteepening

Corporate spread No impact Small widening

Widening in € and

£; UK consumer &

auto worst from FX

Sep 3: UK Parliament reconvenes

Sep 11 (tbc): Parliament is suspended for the

Parties’ conferences

Sep 14 – Oct 3: Conferences of the 3 major

mainstream Parties (Tories, Labour, LibDem)

Oct 14 (tbc): UK Parliament reconvene

Oct 17-18: EU Council meeting

Oct 31: Art. 50 current deadline

TIMETABLE

BREXIT SCENARIOS AND IMPLICATIONS

intention to deliver Brexit on 31 October, whatever

happens

belief that the EU may agree to renegotiate in the end

(i.e. first and foremost on the Irish backstop) provided

the UK threat of a no-deal Brexit is kept credible

willingness to do everything possible to prevent

Parliament from blocking no-deal before 31 October,

including going for early elections

This very hawkish attitude was confirmed on 28 Aug.

by his decision to reduce the number of days

Parliament would sit before Brexit

The EU continues to state that the Withdrawal

Agreement is not open for renegotiation

However, on Aug. 21, A. Merkel gave B. Johnson 30

days to propose a solution on the “Irish backstop”

New PM B. Johnson has continued to

state his:

13

02European Central Bank under the spotlight


Eurozone economies are still at different stages of their post-crisis recovery, in terms of growth and labor market.

ECB headache #1 Many economies

0%

5%

10%

15%

20%

25%

30%

199

9

200

0

200

1

200

2

200

3

200

4

200

5

200

6

200

7

200

8

200

9

201

0

201

1

201

2

201

3

201

4

201

5

201

6

201

7

201

8

201

9

Unemployment rates

Italy Germany France

Spain Eurozone EC NAWRU


Source: Bloomberg, Amundi. Data as at 26 August 2019.

88

90

92

94

96

98

100

102

104

106

108

110

112

114

116

Base 1

00 a

t Q

1 2

008

Real GDP growth

Germany France ItalySpain Eurozone

Source: Bloomberg, Amundi. Data as at 26 August 2019.

ECB headache #2 Core inflation still unmoved and new lows in LT inflation expectations

Core inflation retreated to 1.0% in July, still no convincing evidence of an upward trend. Powerful long lasting

disinflationary factors are at play (probably related to structural changes in the organization of labour, product and

services markets). Long term inflation expectations raising new de-anchoring fears.


Source: ECB survey of professional forecasters (SPF), Amundi. As at 3 September 2019.

0.6%

0.8%

1.0%

1.2%

1.4%

1.6%

1.8%

2.0%

2.2%

2.4%

19

99 Q

1

20

00 Q

1

20

01 Q

1

20

02 Q

1

20

03 Q

1

20

04 Q

1

20

05 Q

1

20

06 Q

1

20

07 Q

1

20

08 Q

1

20

09 Q

1

20

10 Q

1

20

11 Q

1

20

12 Q

1

20

13 Q

1

20

14 Q

1

20

15 Q

1

20

16 Q

1

20

17 Q

1

20

18 Q

1

20

19 Q

1

Eurozone inflation expectations

1 year ahead 2 years ahead 5 years ahead

Source: Bloomberg, ECB forecasts, Amundi. As at 3 September 2019.

-1.0%

0.0%

1.0%

2.0%

3.0%

4.0%

5.0%

20

00

20

01

20

02

20

03

20

04

20

05

20

06

20

07

20

08

20

09

20

10

20

11

20

12

20

13

20

14

20

15

20

16

20

17

20

18

20

19

20

20

20

21

Eurozone inflation (YoY, %)

Headline Core ECB Target

ECB headache #2bisTransmission mechanism from wages not as usual

Source: Amundi Research, as of August 2019


Source: Amundi Research, as of August 2019

While lower unemployment translates into upside pressure on wages and unit labor costs (ULC) this is not translated

into inflationary pressures.

0.0%

1.0%

2.0%

3.0%

4.0%

5.0%0.0%

0.5%

1.0%

1.5%

2.0%

2.5%

3.0%

Q3 2

010

Q1 2

011

Q3 2

011

Q1 2

012

Q3 2

012

Q1 2

013

Q3 2

013

Q1 2

014

Q3 2

014

Q1 2

015

Q3 2

015

Q1 2

016

Q3 2

016

Q1 2

017

Q3 2

017

Q1 2

018

Q3 2

018

Q1 2

019

Lower unemployment leading to higher compensations and ULC

Labour compensation per employee (%YOY) - SADJ

Hourly labour cost (%YOY) - NADJ

Unemployment Gap vs NAIRU (rhs)

0.0%

0.5%

1.0%

1.5%

2.0%

2.5%

3.0%

Q3 2

010

Q1 2

011

Q3 2

011

Q1 2

012

Q3 2

012

Q1 2

013

Q3 2

013

Q1 2

014

Q3 2

014

Q1 2

015

Q3 2

015

Q1 2

016

Q3 2

016

Q1 2

017

Q3 2

017

Q1 2

018

Q3 2

018

Q1 2

019

...but higher compensations and ULC are not passed-through to inflation

Hourly labour cost (%YOY) - NADJ

Core CPI (standardized) - SADJ

Labour compensation per employee (%YOY) - SADJ

ECB QE2Three major approaches at ECB disposal for QE2

1. A “soft” approach, small-size scale, aimed at using all remaining available space left within QE1 set, without

changing major self-imposed limits and without including new asset classes in the programme;

2. A “mixed” approach, potentially mid-size scale, keeping the focus on asset classes targeted in QE1, but

combining some of the existing parameters with the revision of some self-imposed limits;

3. A sort of “Bazooka” package, combining a large-scale programme with the introduction of new asset classes (ie,

equities or bank bonds) and a significant revision of existing parameters.

All the three approaches above obviously come with pros and cons:

the first one would probably meet more consensus among ECB hawkish members and looks easier to agree

upon as a way to restart QE, but has the evident cons to show limited effectiveness in keeping easy financial

conditions;

the third approach on the opposite, is likely to produce a strong easing of financial conditions, but it looks

unlikely to meet a large consensus and would probably exhaust most of still available ammunition in the Central

Bank’s toolkit, raising also some questions about legal aspects regarding the inclusion of new asset classes;

the second approach looks like a better mix than the two extreme scenarios in terms of combined effectiveness

& credibility on one side and not too strong hurdles for its delivery.


Source: Amundi Research, as of September 2019

03Implications for fixed income and FX


Market implications from different ECB policy packages

What are the likely reactions to the different options at ECB disposal?

1. The soft approach would likely disappoint market expectations, due to its limited headroom, leading to a possible

initial sell-off and curve steepening in bond markets, widening periphery spreads and neutral to slightly negative

effects on credit (the reopening of CSPP and higher reinvestments in 2020, should anyway offer some support to

the asset class)

2. The “Bazooka” package, on the contrary, would likely produce the most supportive effects on risky assets (both

credit and equities), on financials and periphery govies, while supporting as well to a lower extent core govies,

with a moderate flattening as remaining spaces are limited.

3. The intermediate, mid-size scale approach, which is likelier in our view, is already at least partially discounted by

bond markets, but depending also on its design (the combination of monthly size and number of monthly

purchases) it could keep the trend towards some moderate flattening in core govies, and would likely support

linkers, corporate bonds and periphery govies.

4. The rise in APP reinvestments in 2020, especially in some programmes (PSPP and CSPP) would contribute to

make more effective the eventual reopening of net purchases and to support both govies and credit markets.

5. Surprises on the rate cut move would produce their impacts mainly on financials and the currency. A 10bp cut is

consensual, while a more aggressive 20 bp cut (from -40 to -60) of the depo rate is likely to negatively impact

both credit and equity financials, unless a strong further easing of TLTROs conditions and/or an effective tiering

system are not put in place.


Source: Amundi Research, as of September 2019

Reopening of CSPP among the “easiest” ECB options


0

100

200

300

400

500

600

700

800

900

1000

20

19

20

18

20

17

20

16

20

15

Plenty of space for the ECB to re-open CSPP

CSPP Eligible universe (in EUR bn) ECB holdings (in EUR bn)

Estimated ECB holdings in % of eligible universe vs

limits

ECB holdings ECB issue/r limit

Sovereign / Sov.

like bonds*25% 33%

Supra 39% 50%

Covered Bonds 40% 70%

Corporate Bonds 20% 70%

ECB holds €177bn of corporate bonds, close to 20% of the eligible universe, the lowest proportion among ECB QE

programmes. Holdings in Supra and Covered bonds are already double the holdings in corporate bonds in % on the

correspondent universe. Overall holdings of sovereign bonds are at 25%, but due to the capital key rule and market

size of each sovereign debt, holdings in some core countries are already close to the 33% limit.Source: ECB, Amundi Research, as of August 2019

* for Germany and Finland > 30% and close to 33% limit.

0

5000

10000

15000

20000

25000

30000

35000

40000

01/0

2/2

017

01/0

4/2

017

01/0

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017

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8/2

017

01/1

0/2

017

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2/2

017

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2/2

018

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018

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018

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019

01/0

2/2

020

01/0

4/2

020

01/0

6/2

020

PSPP CSPPCovered ABSPSPP forthcoming CSPP forthcomingCovered forthcoming ABS forthcoming

ECB reinvestments are on the rise in 2020: PSPP forthcoming redemptions published by the ECB point to roughly EUR 190 in the next

11 months, vs EUR 150 of the last 12-months and vs just EUR 86 bn of the same period last year.

3-month monthly averages of APP (the four programmes altogether) redemptions reached EUR 16 bn, to rise to

EUR 23 bn by H1 2020 (chart bottom left).

Estimated overall redemptions next year point to an increase of roughly EUR 40 bn vs 2019 (see chart bottom right)

APP reinvestments to increase their support in 2020…

Source: Bloomberg, Amundi Research

0

5000

10000

15000

20000

25000

04-1

7

06-1

7

08-1

7

10-1

7

12-1

7

02-1

8

04-1

8

06-1

8

08-1

8

10-1

8

12-1

8

02-1

9

04-1

9

06-1

9

08-1

9

10-1

9

12-1

9

02-2

0

04-2

0

06-2

0

APP 3-mo avg monthly redemptions

APP 3-mo avg monthly redemptions forthcoming


Source: Bloomberg, Amundi Research

… And corporate reinvestments to rise the most on a relative basis

0

500

1000

1500

2000

2500

3000

3500

10

/16

12

/16

02

/17

04

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06

/17

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/17

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/17

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/17

02

/18

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/18

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02

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04

/19

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/19

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12

/19

02

/20

04

/20

06

/20

CSPP Monthly ReinvestmentsCSPP Forthcoming Monthly Reinvestments3-month Avg3-month Avg (Forthcoming)

0

10000

20000

30000

40000

50000

60000

2017 2018 2019 2020(Estimated)

ECB QE Private Programmes Reinvestments

CSPP Covered ABS


According to our expected purchases of reinvestments in ECB QE private programmes in 2020 (vs past volumes), the

strongest acceleration in reinvestments will take place in corporate bonds, probably reaching roughly €18bn vs €6bn in

2019 and €4bn in 2018. Monthly reinvestments will rise significantly in 2020, from a €400mn monthly 3-month avg to a

3 times higher volume next year.

ECB Monthly Reinvestments

Euro fixed income and the “desert of yield”


0%

10%

20%

30%

40%

50%

60%

70%

80%

90%

100%

Euro-fixed income assets by yield buckets

negative 0% - 0.5% 0.5% - 1.0%1.0% - 1.5% 1.5% - 2.0% >2%

-5%

5%

15%

25%

35%

45%

55%

65%

neg

ati

ve

0%

- 0

.5%

0.5

% -

1.0

%

1.0

% -

1.5

%

1.5

% -

2.0

%

>2%

Yields by euro-fixed income assets

HY BBB IG corp less BBB

Italy Periphery ex Italy Covered

Quasi Govt Core Govt

Source: Bloomberg, Amundi Research, as of August 30, 2019.

BBBs, Italy and HY debt are the only segments still offering yield above 1.5%. Almost all debt of core govies, quasi

govies and covered bonds debt is in negative or flat territory. Recently, also the weight of periphery ex Italy and

non-BBB corp. in negative territory increased to significant levels, both to 54%.

Source: Bloomberg, Amundi Research, as of August 30, 2019.

Euro CurrencyValuations and political risk

Source: Amundi Research analysis on Bloomberg data. As of 29 August 2019.


-22.2%-20.5%

-17.2%

-12.6%-11.2% -11.0%

-9.2%

-6.0%

0.4%

-25%

-20%

-15%

-10%

-5%

0%

5%

Sw

ed

en

Kro

na

Bri

tish

Po

un

d

No

rwe

gia

n K

ron

e

Ja

pan

es

e Y

en

Ca

na

dia

n D

oll

ar

Eu

ro

Au

str

alia

n D

ollar

Ne

w Z

eala

nd

Do

llar

Sw

iss F

ran

c

G10 FX valuations vs USD

Undervaluation

Overvaluation

25

120

135

150

165

180

195

210

225

240

255

2701.00

1.05

1.10

1.15

1.20

1.25

1.30

1.35

1.40

1.45

1.50

2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017 2018 2019

Rev

ers

e s

cale

EUR/USD and political risk

EUR/USD (lhs)

European policy uncertainty index - trend (rhs)

The USD is overvalued vs the entire G10 universe (with the only exception of the CHF), but it showed some signs of

weakening on Fed cut expectations.

Source: Bloomberg, Amundi Research. As of 29 August 2019.

DisclaimerUnless otherwise stated, all information contained in this document is from Amundi Asset Management and is as of 3 September 2019.

Diversification does not guarantee a profit or protect against a loss.

Duration: a measure of the sensitivity of the price (the value of principal) of a fixed income investment to a change in interest rates, expressed as a number of

years.

The views expressed regarding market and economic trends are those of the author and not necessarily Amundi, and are subject to change at any time. These

views should not be relied upon as investment advice, as securities recommendations, or as an indication of trading on behalf of any Amundi product. There is

no guarantee that market forecasts discussed will be realised or that these trends will continue.

These views are subject to change at any time based on market and other conditions and there can be no assurances that countries, markets or sectors will

perform as expected. Investments involve certain risks, including political and currency risks. Investment return and principal value may go down as well as up

and could result in the loss of all capital invested.

Indices are unmanaged and their returns assume reinvestment of dividends, and unlike actual portfolio returns, do not reflect any fees or expenses. It is not

possible to invest directly in an index.

Country flags by www.nordicfactory.com.

This material does not constitute an offer to buy or a solicitation to sell any units of any investment fund or any service. Amundi is a trading name of the Amundi

Asset Management S.A. group of companies.

Date of First Use: 4 September 2019.


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