Sér
iePa
rtena
riats
Global Public Goods
Directorate-General for Development andInternational Cooperation,
Ministry of Foreign Affairs
Treasury Directorate,Ministry of the Economy, Finance and Industry
We express our thanks to the Agence Française de Développement,
CERED, GEMDEV and Solagral for their help in producing this document together
with the Ministry of Foreign Affairs
and the Ministry of the Economy, Finance and Industry.
FOREWORD 3
1. THE NEW CHALLENGES FOR OFFICIAL DEVELOPMENT ASSISTANCE 5
1.1 The traditional bases for aid under attack 5
1.2 The market alone will not solve all of our planet’s problems 6
1.3 The emergence of global issues 6
1.4 Inadequacy of existing decision-making mechanisms 7
2. CAN GLOBAL PUBLIC GOODS PROVIDE A NEW BASIS FOR DEVELOPMENT
ASSISTANCE? 10
2.1 Public goods: definitions and approaches 10
2.2 Global public goods 12
2.3 The GPG approach: a new paradigm for aid? 14
2.4 Global public goods and poverty reduction 17
3. WHAT CONSEQUENCES DO GLOBAL PUBLIC GOODS HAVE FOR FRENCH
INTERNATIONAL COOPERATION POLICY? 19
3.1 Sector versus geographic vision 19
3.2 Bilateral versus global vision 20
3.3 Principles for action 20
3.4 French international cooperation priorities in the global public
goods sphere 21
3.5 Consequences for French ODA (in terms of volumes and organisation) 22
3.6 Avenues for further exploration 23
4. FORMULATING A FRENCH POSITION 25
4.1 The global public goods approach and ODA funding 25
4.2 The governance of global public goods and the role of democracy
in setting international ground rules 26
4.3 Global public goods to the advantage of developing countries 27Con
ten
ts
At a time when official development assistance isin deep crisis, partly as a result of the relativedecline in geopolitical motivation since the fall ofthe Berlin wall, the concept of global publicgoods provides development cooperation withnew avenues for analysis and action.
This economic concept is a response to the im-balances at world level revealed by analysis of theglobalisation of production and trade, long sinceidentified by economic theory at the national level.At neither level can the market provide enough ofthe goods and services necessary for the activityand well-being of all social actors.
These market failures are remedied in various waysby the regulatory functions of the State. The globalpublic goods approach proposes to implement,on a world scale, policies aimed at correctingmarket deficiencies and at securing for all actorsin the global economy access to such public goods asenvironmental quality, peace and security, or againprotection against major endemic diseases, or thestable functioning of international financial sys-tems. The definition of these global public goods isa matter for debate, a debate that ought to continueuntil consensus has been reached, failing which it isimpossible to imagine a concerted internationalpolicy approach.The most original feature of the global public goodsapproach probably resides in the fact that it is an
economic concept which calls for global eco-nomic answers. This approach leads to a preferencefor sector-based approaches rather than the tradi-tional geographical approaches to developmentissues. It also entails giving priority to multilateralsolutions—implying the search for multilateralagreements—and seeking to overcome the classicalbilateral framework. This raises the question ofwhich methods to use in search of such agreements,and the need to identify which actors ought to beinvolved (governmental or non-governmental).
This global approach is of direct—though notexclusive—relevance to North-South relations,and creates a new frame of reference for officialdevelopment assistance. That is because officialdevelopment assistance may be viewed as a tool forthe management of North-South issues related tothe globalisation process. In that sense, it takes ona political as well as an economic dimension, inas-much as it is contributing to the emergence of newrelations between industrialised and developingcountries. In this sense, official development assis-tance is the rightful contribution of Northern coun-tries to the production of global public goods by thedeveloping countries.
The adoption of the global public goods approachthus implies establishing a new partnership be-tween North and South and seeking new sourcesof financing commensurate with the problems
Foreword
facing the planet—at a time when volumes of tradi-tional official development assistance are in decline.This approach therefore opens up new perspectivesfor development assistance.
The global public goods approach has severalconsequences for France’s development assistancepolicy:
• first we need to define our priorities (environ-ment, health, food security, regional economic inte-gration, international financial stability, researchfor development, cultural and linguistic pluralism)and confront them with the priorities of our part-ners from both North and South, in order to formgenuine partnerships;
• we should further define our position on thegovernance of global public goods. Identifyingpublic goods, determining the relevant regime andhow they should be managed, are all decisions of apolitical nature. It is important that they be madeby authorities seen as legitimate by Northern andSouthern countries alike.
• finally, we need to define how public goods areto be financed worldwide. This in turn involvesplacing our international cooperation practicemore firmly within a multilateral framework, startingwith Europe.
The Monterrey conference, which will concentrateon the question of development financing, shouldprovide an opportunity for concrete progress onthis score. It is essential to find new and additional
sources of development financing. The current exa-mination of possible new forms of internationaltaxation should be continued. Generally speaking,the concept of international taxation is well adaptedto the increasing interdependence of our economiesand the aim of balance in sharing the financing ofworld issues. France favours a system of interna-tional taxation compatible with each individualgovernment’s capacity to contribute. How shouldthis tax be calculated and on what basis? There areseveral options here: a levy on international capi-tal movements, on carbon emissions (as suggestedby the Zedillo report) or on the arms trade. Ourtwin objectives, as we progress towards a definitionof these new financing mechanisms, should be toregulate globalisation, and to finance develop-ment.
This note is an initial summary of the work of a
reflection group set up by the French Ministry of
Foreign Affairs, and covers four points:
• The new challenges for official development
assistance;
• Can global public goods provide a new basis for
development assistance?
• What consequences do global public goods have
for French international cooperation policy?
• Formulating a French position on global public
goods.
1.1
1
1.1 The traditional
bases for aid under
attack
The fall of the Berlin wall dispelled one of the geo-strategicmotives for aid: Western countriesno longer had an incentive to pro-vide financial help to the govern-ments of developing countries inorder to ensure their support inthe East-West confrontation.
There has also been a questioningof the instruments of internationalaid, whose strictly financial approachhas revealed its limitations.Implementation of aid on theground has not always producedthe intended results. Structuraladjustment programmes have had
major social and human costs,involving a worrying degree ofexclusion.
This led to so-called “aidfatigue”, as people began to question aid’s effectiveness.Together with the desire of donorStates to contain public spending,this crisis brought about a steepdrop in official development assistance. The very notion ofdevelopment suffered a loss of credibility both in public eyes andamong some development actors.
The fact that aid went on decliningeven in a climate of economicgrowth was highly significant.Given that the large share of aidthat goes to refinance debt viaadjustment is due to disappearunder the HIPC initiative, ODAmay very well fall to 0.2% of developed countries' GDP.
This is one reason why the WorldBank today prefers to talk moreabout “poverty reduction” thanabout development. The Bank’s1999 annual report states that“nearly 70 percent of adjustmentlending in 1999 was poverty-focused”. This language comesclose to that of the humanitarianorganisations, which expandedconsiderably in the 1980s.
The new challengesfor official developmentassistance
1.2
1.3Nowadays, this would appear tobe the only language acceptableto public opinion, with limited success, however.
Apparently, then, we are seeing a radical change, in which development assistance is graduallybeing replaced by the market, tosurvive only in its reduced role aspoverty reduction, at the risk ofbecoming an essentially charitableapproach.
In this restricted sense, povertyreduction may be seen as supportingstrategies to strengthen marketmechanisms, so as to manage the social consequences of adjustment processes and economicliberalisation.
1.2 The market
alone will not solve
all of our planet’s
problems
Yet the idea that the marketalone will not solve all of this planet’s problems has slowly gainedground over the last decade.
The 1980s saw a new awarenessof the dangers purely market thinking represents for the envi-ronment. The Rio Summit in 1992
was an initial attempt to reconcilethe economy with social and envi-ronmental aspects, without chal-lenging the primacy of economics.
The scene has changed greatlysince that time. The Marrakechagreement did not keep all its promises, especially from the developing countries’ point ofview, and imposed furtherconstraints on them rather thanoffering opportunities for growthand integration in the globalisa-tion process. Major financial crisesin Asia and Latin America havedemonstrated the chronic instabilityof markets. Negotiations overinternational agreements on theenvironment (especially on theBiodiversity Convention and theBiosafety Protocol) have revealedrifts between the WTO’s preferredfree trade and the measures needed in order to preserve biodiversity and safety in trade in GMOs.
More generally, the idea thatthe extension of the sphere ofinfluence of the market impingeson societal choices, and that itshould not be allowed to developblindly or in a uniform manner, isnow being expressed more clearlyboth among political leaders, especially in the developing countries, and within civil society.Examples of societal choices include the role of public services,food quality, the application of the precautionary principle, andthe reduction of exclusion and
inequality both within societiesand between them.
1.3 The emergence
of global issues
After two decades of structuraladjustment in developing coun-tries, the most pressing concernsare with market failures. In mostdeveloping or transition countries,a number of public functions areno longer provided, or are increas-ingly poorly provided. No one anylonger seriously postulates that themarket and economic growthalone can solve all of the problemsof welfare and equity.
Economic liberalisation, theexpansion of trade and increasingvolumes of foreign direct invest-ment have allowed globalisationto progress, to the point wherethe concept of “globalisation” has come to designate this newperiod of the world economy. The retreat of the State, lowertariff and non-tariff barriers, drastically decreased sectoral andnational protections, have givenrise to a new situation in whicheconomies and societies competewith each other and are told toadapt to the imperatives of globalmarkets.
1.4One unexpected, albeit logical,
effect of this globalisation hasbeen the rise of the “anti-globali-sation” movement, which moreprecisely opposes free-market globalisation. Since the market isglobal, its failures and externalities(especially the negative ones) mustin turn be considered to be global.
The pursuit of economic policieson an international scale thusnaturally raises global questions. It is logical that these questionsshould be raised by those whosimultaneously question the workings of the market and theway the state operates.
Environmental questions havealso fundamentally modified perceptions of global questions.The response to these concerns(air, climate, biodiversity, pollution,etc.) requires cooperative solutionson a world scale.
This also applies to questions of international security, financialstability, eradication of epidemics,and the dissemination and sharingof knowledge.
Such issues can be solved neitherby State regulation nor by the invisible hand of the market. Acomplex international architectureof conventions, agreements andso-called “virtuous” coalitions hastherefore been established in anattempt to preserve these collectivegoods, bringing together govern-mental and non-governmental
actors, local government at variouslevels, business, etc., within so-calledsystems of “governance”. It isaround these new mechanismsthat the question of collectivegoods arises, and around them toothat people are seeking solutions.
1.4 Inadequacy of
existing decision-
making mechanisms
Global questions need to bedealt with globally. But as of today no global institution has thelegitimacy to treat these questions.The only comparable institution is the WTO in the field of interna-tional trade. The IMF and WorldBank do have a global mandate,but their mission is basically eco-nomic and so they are dependenton shareholders whose cloutreflects their contribution to the ins-titutions' share capital, and theydeal with national governments:Most World Bank financing, forinstance, may only go to governments. Such a vision is too narrow to takeaccount of all regional or globalproblems such as peace, inequalityreduction, climate change, deserti-fication, and so forth.
And yet,• global problems are currently
holding centre-stage;• their study and treatment couldbecome the chief justification forthe multilateral development insti-tutions, including the World Bank,as well as bilateral cooperationpolicies.
Environmental problems—or atleast some of them—are coveredby international agreements. But these agreements generally do not stipulate observancemechanisms, and their secretariatsare ill-equipped to follow up andmonitor compliance. This situationmay change, but we are still farfrom the World Authority somecountries, including France, are calling for.
In the social field, similarly, theInternational Labour Organisationproduces conventions that flowfrom consensus between repre-sentatives of business, employees and governments. But theseconventions lack any compulsorycharacter. The idea of including asocial clause in WTO’s internationaltrade agreements, therefore, couldbe one way of strengthening thelegal value of these texts, but doesnot as yet enjoy an internationalconsensus.
The specialist remit of thesevarious institutions and agree-ments prevents them from tacklingin an integrated fashion the globalquestions they are responsible forat a truly global level. Conflicts ofstandards and jurisdiction emerge.
Moreover, the way in which decisions are reached within theseforums often appears to rely on asmall number of governmentalactors.
Given the economic and financialpurpose of the IMF and the WorldBank, their Boards are dominatedby rich State representatives. It istrue that at the United Nationsprocedures allow more room for less advanced countries (onecountry, one vote). But developingcountries have difficulty makingtheir voices heard in discussionswhere the concerns of the strongestare naturally dominant.This situation nevertheless evolvedconsiderably during the nineties:for instance, in the negotiationsleading to the BiodiversityConvention and its BiosafetyProtocol, Southern countries wereable to push through their pointof view on some issues (as on sui generis intellectual propertyrights, and the precautionary principle in GMO trade), often by striking alliances with theEuropean Union. On the negativeside, the failure of the Seattleministerial conference illustratedthe refusal of the Southern coun-tries merely to sit on the sidelinesas spectators in the confrontationbetween Europe and America inthe new WTO round.
So, at the dawn of the new millennium, there is a growingfeeling that global questionscannot be settled through agree-
ments between the most powerfulcountries only, but that they require a minimum internationalconsensus among all of the world’scountries.
In this respect, the case of standards is highly significant.Globalisation demands moreextensive standards, massively as in the field of trade (where they are replacing tariff barriers),and in the environment (eco-labelling, emissions and waste disposal standards, etc.), as well as in the social sphere (e.g., childand prison labour), etc. Even thestandards on safety and qualityare mainly designed by Northerncountries. Southern countries, lacking the experience and expertiseto take part in the debate, thusfind themselves with highly res-trictive and expensive obligationsplaced upon them. However, thenecessary transfers of technologyand funding from the industrialisedcountries fall short of the needs of the developing countries whoare obliged to implement all thestandards. The only alternativeopen to the developing countriesin such debates is, well, to refuseto debate. This is why, fearing yet another trap, they prefer toshun negotiations linking economicand environmental questions(in the climate change convention,for instance) or trade and socialaspects. This means that one of themost important issues relating toglobalisation today concerns theinvolvement of Southern countries
alternative policies. Everyone sees,moreover, that inter-governmentalconfrontation is not a very satis-factory way to handle global questions. Finally, everyone nowrealises that governments are ill-equipped to formulate solutionswhile negotiating these solutions,setting conditions and overseeingtheir implementation. It is thereforevital that the institutions andgovernments in charge of globalquestions devise mechanisms forintegrating into the negotiationprocess the proposals, claims, orideas for further consideration put forward by alternative movements
in the standard-setting process.Linked to this issue is the problemof devising mechanisms wherebyNorthern countries might be pre-pared to shoulder part of the costof adjustment to standards incurredby the Southern countries.
Developing countries must takea greater part in dealing with glo-bal issues and defining rules.Similarly, negotiations to achieveconsensus on these issues mustinclude representatives of non-governmental sectors (e.g., tradeunions, local governments, researchbodies, civic groups, non-profitorganisations, etc.) in negotiations.Equally, national parliamentsshould also be involved.Admittedly, official negotiatorsalready take the opinion and advice of associations, research in-stitutes, parliamentary commissionsand so forth, from their respectivecountries. Advocacy organisationsand especially industry representa-tives have the know-how to lobbyeffectively. But the present situationlacks transparency, is disorganisedand often anarchic: it is not satis-factory. We must devise more formal modes of participation bynon-governmental actors in thenegotiations on global questions.
This question is crucial for civilsociety movements, which roughlymeans those attending the PortoAlegre forum. Everyone now seesthe legitimacy of such movements,especially when they express notonly protest but also the search for
If both conditions are fully satisfied, the public goods are saidto be pure. If only one is satisfied,they are said to be impure:• the non-rivalry principle ceases to obtain when consumptionmoves towards saturation (e.g.,urban highways in the rush hour);• the non-excludability principlemay be violated by imposition of aright to access (e.g., toll highways).
A major problem raised by publicgoods is that private markets aregenerally unable to supply themoptimally. In this respect, the pro-duction of a public good such as amalaria vaccine differs significantlyfrom that of a consumer good.Effective production of publicgoods requires collective action tocircumvent the inability of privateinitiative to earn a profit from amalaria treatment. These sourcesof ineffectiveness are even greaterin the case of global public goods,whose advantages are widely dispersed in time and space.
Public goods are often equatedwith common goods, a term originating from the field of natural resources managementand referred to nowadays by
2Can global publicgoods provide a newbasis for developmentassistance?
2.12.1 Public goods:
definitions and
approaches
Although there exists a classicaldefinition of public or collectivegoods, it has been variously interpreted.
The classical definition is as follows: public goods are goods,services or resources that are available for all, involving non-rivalry (the consumption of thisgood by one individual does notprevent its consumption by another)and non-excludability (nobody can be excluded from consumingthis good). Examples are air quali-ty, control of epidemic diseases.
covered by the persons in chargeof this activity (e.g., pollutantemission). When this externalityaffects a public good, it leads tothe underproduction of the givengood (e.g., water or air quality).
Negative externalities may tradi-tionally be corrected by bilateralnegotiation between the perpetra-tor and the victim of the externality,or by intervention by the ommunity (local institution, non-profit organisation, government,supranational authority, etc.) torestore the proper working of the market, introduce regulationsor set up funds to indemnify thevictim. In most cases, solutionscan be reached only if all the
stakeholders cooperate together,which in turn implies that theyrenounce their claims and acceptan end-result less favourable thanthey could have achieved by pursuing only their own interest.
Although the definition of publicgoods is well established in stan-dard economic theory, it is less soin political economy, because whata given society chooses to regardas public goods depends on its collective values, and these may change over time. The twoapproaches may indeed be opposed:the first lies within a free-marketperspective, referring to marketfailure and collective ways ofremedying it. The second, which isespoused by international politicaleconomy, emphasises commonheritage, the balance of powers
environmentalists. But the notionof “common pool resources” inprinciple applies only to resourcesavailable to one given human group(e.g., pond, communal meadow),generally excluding other users.
Public goods and common goodsmay be local (e.g., noise controlnear an airport), regional (waterquality in a river basin), national(control of toxic waste), multina-tional (control of acid rains) or global (curbing climate change).This serves to characterise the geographical area where the behaviours of economic agents are interdependent with regard to this good. But the appropriatelevel for the management of alocal public good (e.g., local reduc-tion of greenhouse gas emissions)may be situated at a higher level.Thus, the only way to reduce alocal emission of greenhouse gasesefficiently is by treating it at theglobal level. Consequently, publicgoods are characterised by theirappropriate management level.
Interdependency may also referto the effect of present behaviouron future generations: this leads to the notion of intergenerationalpublic goods (e.g., our naturalresources heritage).
Negative externalities are another form of market failure,referring to the nuisances genera-ted by an economic activity, thecost of which must be paid for bythe community because it is not
and international imbalances, nd holds that the task of definingthe general and collective interestsrests with the stakeholders them-selves. Under the first conception,public goods may be defined byeconomic criteria, and internationalcooperation may be improvedwithout upsetting the existingbalance of power. Under thesecond, the questions concern theprocedures and decision-makingprocesses allowing us to prioritisepublic goods, to produce themand fund them by setting up normative frameworks and atransnational tax system. Behindthis lies the question of an emer-ging transnational sovereignty,global citizenship and a newinternational architecture. Thissecond vision places politicalchoices right at the centre of policymaking in the realm ofinternational cooperation.
More research is needed to definethe scope of the public goodsconcept with greater precision,both in theoretical terms and forits potential contribution towardidentifying new instruments ofeconomic policy. One line ofresearch seeks a more positivedefinition of public goods, onethat differs from the classical onein terms of non-rivalry and non-excludability and integrates thecontribution of international poli-tical economy. Such an approachhas recently been proposed byUNDP.
case of global warming, the effectof greenhouse gases dependsmore on their past and futureaccumulation in the atmospherethan on the current flow of emis-sions. Conversely, noise pollutionor road congestion are “flowexternalities”, since they dependon the flow of noise or traffic.
This stock externality feature of global public goods makesthem different. By their nature,these stocks are an accumulation,sometimes a slow one, and it maybe hard to identify a problem orachieve a scientific consensusbefore it is too late to react.Furthermore, since they accumulateslowly, stock externalities have lasting and irreversible conse-quences. One example is theextinction of a species, which is anirreversible loss for a biologicalsystem. Because of this time-lag,these externalities may have animpact far in the future, making itessential to introduce a long-termperspective into problem-solving.
Global public goods also revealthe political, economic, and cogni-tive interdependencies that existbetween actors. It is because theseinterdependencies are more andmore evident and identifiable thatthe question of the provision ofglobal public goods is increasinglyunder discussion in the internationalarena. Indeed, the existence of interdependencies, both geographically bound (intra-generational) and time-bound
(inter-generational), is limitingthe capacity of actors to ensurethe provision of various globalpublic goods they acknowledgeto be essential. Coordination istherefore necessary, on a win-winbasis.
The ideal way of managing a global public good would be a cooperative regime, in whichnations would negotiate bindingagreements to achieve an effectivesupply of that public good.Although perfect cooperationdoes not exist in the real world,the World Trade Organisation orthe Montreal Protocol come fairlyclose to this ideal by promoting,in the first case, rule-based freetrade, or in the second, the removal of chemical substancesthat threaten the ozone layer. A cooperative regime of the sortused for CFCs would need to setan objective for the effective supply of the global public good,include the largest countries in anagreement, set up arrangementto monitor compliance, and create strong incentives for the signatories to comply.
Is there at present a consensuson what is meant by the term“global public goods”? The answeris not totally positive. While noone disputes that it includespeace and world security, interna-tional financial stability, or fightingthe global pandemic of HIV/AIDS,there is more debate over whether to include
1 Kaul, Inge; Grunberg, Isabelle), and Stern, Marc A.. Global Public Goods: InternationalCooperation in the 21st Century- New York,Oxford University Press for UNDP, 1999.
2.22.2 Global public
goods
Global public goods (GPGs) arecurrently the subject of most activeresearch, because the globalisationof markets and the emergence ofglobal questions have given newmeaning to the concept. The firstgeneral work on the subject,published by UNDP in 1999 underthe title “Global public works”,1
has become a general reference.UNDP is working on a secondbook on the subject. Many otherorganisations, together with uni-versities and development coope-ration administrations, are activelyworking on this theme. A keydirection of current work concernsinternational cooperation, andthis was indeed mentioned in thesubtitle of the first UNDP publica-tion (“International cooperation in the 21st century”).
A distinctive aspect of globalpublic goods is that they are“stock externalities”. This meansthat the impact or damage involveddepends on a stock of capital,knowledge or pollution accumula-ting over a long period. In the
free-market globalisation. Itmight therefore be tempting toequate GPGs with fundamentalrights. But doing so runs the risk of increasing the confusion inthis still highly-imprecise field ofglobal public goods. It may bepreferable, in the field of technicalcooperation, to consider thatthere are several integratingconcepts such as poverty andinequalities reduction, globalpublic goods, and fundamentalrights, which coexist side-by-side.Each of these concepts grows outof certain ethical, economic andpolitical choices; each defines aview of cooperation and fields of application that partly overlapwithout being identical. It shouldbe noted, in passing, that whilethe theme of poverty reductionhas already been broadly investi-gated and has inspired severalprogrammes, the theme of GPGsis more embryonic. The theme of fundamental rights, meanwhile,is still largely at the stage ofdeclarations, notably that in theUnited Nations Covenant of 1966.It plays only a minor role in inter-national political cooperation andstill less in economic cooperation.It deserves at least as much atten-tion, in the years to come, as iscurrently accorded to GPGs.
international political stability(supporters of change opposesupporters of the status quo),food security for countries withfood shortages (exporting coun-tries feel the market can solve theproblem), or social protection forindividuals. These examples showthat the identification of whatare regarded as global publicgoods results from societal choicesthat are not necessarily universal.They are “social constructs” (touse the UNDP term) that expressethical or political values. Thisimplies that the notion of globalpublic good is necessarily changing,depending as it does on changinginternational and national values.This also implies the risk thatinternational discussions may givegreater weight to those globalpublic goods that the mostinfluential countries considermost important, based on theirown value systems. This in turnwould mean these values came to be imposed on other countries.
Another currently debatedquestion relating to GPGsconcerns whether issues such asthe right to health, to housing, tofood, women’s rights, minorities’rights, etc. ought to be countedas fundamental human rights?In fact these are civil and politicalrights, as well as economic, socialand cultural rights, as adopted bythe United Nations. But at a morecollective level, we may also inclu-de the right to food sovereignty,as claimed by the opponents of
2.32.3 The GPG
approach: a new
paradigm for aid?
Southern countries shouldcontribute more to the produc-tion of GPGs, since they are alsobeneficiaries of them. Should this objective serve as a basis for redirecting all—or a substan-tial portion of —official development assistance? We can give a positive answer to this question, based on a numberof arguments.
A first line of reasoning arguesthat the free play of marketforces should lead to convergenceof per capita incomes betweenrich and poor countries. Thisconvergence is hindered bymarket failure, especially by theobstacles standing in the way of capital and labour movements.These obstacles, indeed, canactually generate increasingdivergence.
These failures are especiallyrelevant to the local markets ofdeveloping countries, which operate poorly or are even sometimes hardly instituted. These failures prevent global growthand entail risks for world stability.
On the other hand, global market failure (as in the case offinancial market instability, for instance, or in international traderules, which penalise some coun-tries) has a negative impact ondevelopment in the countries ofthe South.
In this sense, official developmentassistance (ODA) can play a centralrole in remedying these failures,both at the local level in developingcountries, and at the global level.This type of reasoning gives newlegitimacy to ODA, by rooting it inpurely economic arguments. Thisalso strengthens considerations ofethics or international solidarity in justifying aid to the least advantaged.
More simply, in addition toarguments based on divergentworld incomes or market failure, it is worth noting that many ofthe issues (old and new) connectedwith the present trend towardglobalisation, whether theyconcern international trade, preserving biodiversity, fightingclimate change, promoting inter-national financial stability, or fighting AIDS, etc., are now viewed in terms of GPGs.
Most of these questions directlyinvolve North-South relations.Enabling the developing countriesto contribute to the production ofthese GPGs thus represents a newgoal for North-South cooperation.Actions in pursuit of this new
objective are possibly now beingadded to more traditional development aid concerns. At thesame time, however, they are profoundly transforming our view of some of these traditionalquestions. This applies to AIDS or desertification, as well as to “deficient public goods”(roughly, public goods and services for which governmentsmake little or inadequate provi-sion, essentially in the develo-ping and transition countries).Whereas the free-market approachemphasises the strengthening ofmarket mechanisms and privateinitiative, the reference to publicgoods justifies the role of Statesand support for their capacitiesfor regulation. The existence at central and local level of sufficiently robust institutions is therefore one of the precondi-tions for tackling the productionof public goods of benefit to all, at both national and interna-tional level.
ODA thus has a new mission: as the instrument—or an instru-ment—for tackling North-Southissues associated with the globali-sation process. Not all questionsrelated to globalisation involveNorth-South relations, of course.Conversely, not all North-Southquestions impinge on the GPGsdebate. But we can at least saythat this new mission for ODA isradically renewing the politicalNorth-South dialogue, once againplacing international cooperation
at the heart of the ongoing globalisation process.
This new perspective impliesthat cooperation actors ought toplay an active role in discussionson GPGs. Aid agencies and ministerial departments in chargeof cooperation have a role to playin formulating their respectivecountry’s position in negotiations,by advocating the concerns of the South. Among the questionsthey could raise are: which GPGsshould top the agenda (tradebefore climate? climate beforebiodiversity?); how to make ruleselaborated in the negotiationprocess more responsive to developing countries’ needs?which standards should take precedence over other standards?in particular, are trade standardsmore important than environ-mental standards? how shouldinternational cooperation dealwith countries that behaveuncooperatively and act as “freeriders” (the countries of the North are not blameless in this respect)? In other words, cooperation actors have animportant part to play inconstructing the new North-South political relations impliedby globalisation.
Bilateral and multilateral orga-nisations also need to support the process of building nationalcompromises in the South. In particular they should take part in the debate on tools and
methods for implementing GPGs.From a more operational point of view, the global public goodsperspective implies that coopera-tion should focus more on providing support for (national or regional) economic policies in sectors affected by globalisa-tion. Naturally this does not mean abandoning action connectedwith development projects. But priorities must be defined in a context of declining ODAbudgets. We should also take into account that the prolifera-tion of projects has so far failedto produce the desired effects interms of development, and thatits effects in terms of GPGs canonly be indirect and relativelymarginal.
An aid agency or ministerialdepartment that decides to workon GPGs can also work on regio-nal or national public goods.But while it is relatively easy toinitiate cooperation with regardto global public goods, for whichthere is generally a cooperationframework in place already (i.e.the relevant international conven-tion), together with an institutionto enforce compliance, matterstend to be much more complica-ted when it comes to regionalpublic goods. The latter generallylack both a regional agreementand an institution responsible for overseeing its proper manage-ment. Take, for example, the case of a river that flows throughseveral countries, or a marine
fishing zone bordering on severalcountries (as in the Indian Ocean):in situations of this kind, coopera-tion agencies could help frameregional agreements to governthe administration of the publicgood concerned, and to establishthe requisite regional institutionalframework.
Again in operational terms,with GPGs in mind, cooperationprogrammes need to give absolutepriority to institutional capacitybuilding in the Southern countries.Such a conclusion is now gaininggeneral acceptance, regardless ofone’s perspective, e.g., sustainabledevelopment2, economic or political democracy, poverty andinequality reduction, and so forth.In the field of GPGs, capacity building strives simultaneously to ensure active and effective participation by the countries of the South in internationalnegotiations, to enable nationalauthorities to link global issues to national perspectives, and toenable them to pursue their chosen policies, notably with the aim of fulfilling that country’scommitments made in internatio-nal negotiations.
In the financial sphere, howdoes the GPGs perspective affectthe ODA volumes needed? It is
2 see for instance: Laurence Tubiana,“Environment and development. What is at stakefor France?“. (in French), La DocumentationFrançaise, Paris, 2000.
worth recalling the view expressedby the World Bank and the ZedilloReport, calling for doubling the flow of ODA in order to movetowards achieving the developmentobjectives the international community set itself for the millennium.
Adopting a point of view moredirectly in line with the GPGs per-spective, we find that the currentagreements and conventions, inthe fields of climate change, biodi-versity, AIDS, international tradestandards, etc., often make provi-sion for or envisage the necessaryfinancial transfers from richercountries to Southern countries,to enable the latter to meet their(more or less active or voluntary)obligations under these agreementsor conventions. Such transfers may be considerable. For theClimate convention alone, it isestimated that the tradable emission rights that could be allocated to Southern countriescould, under certain conditions,equal or exceed present ODAvolumes.
By extrapolation, it is evenconceivable that, were GPGs tobecome a major principle in international relations, the transfersenvisaged under the agreementsand conventions could replace traditional ODA. But since theEarth Summit of 1992, Northerncountries have shown little willingness to fulfil their commitmentsregarding financial transfers to
the South. In all probability, there-fore, ODA will continue to be thegeneral instrument for financingNorth-South public cooperation,and this may be preferable to a proliferation of trust funds ascalled for under the agreementsand conventions.
The notion of GPGs thus hasimportant practical implicationsfor aid agencies, in terms of thesubstance of cooperation pro-grammes, of modalities for implementation, and of fundingvolumes. But the GPGs perspectivehas another implication for theglobal policies of bilateral donors,since it requires them to maketheir national practices consistentwith their international commit-ments. Concerning efforts to combat the greenhouse effect, for instance, it is not enough toadvocate cutting greenhouse gasemissions in the multilateral arena:countries must also make choicesin terms of national energy poli-cies. This, by the way, could sparkfresh interest in internationalcooperation within the nationalcommunity, in both civil societyand Parliament. But we could go a step further: we could imaginethat developed countries’ initialnegotiating positions in the multi-lateral arena go beyond merelyprotecting their strict nationalinterests and envisage some formof North-South cooperation rightfrom the outset. Agricultural questions exemplify this need for broader negotiating positions.
2.4This of course falls within thegeneral competence of govern-ment, but aid agencies anddepartments in charge of international cooperation can add their voices too.
We cannot conclude this pres-entation of GPGs without provi-ding a tentative list of the themesthis notion embraces where ODAis concerned. Based on the UNDP[1999] book, but after excludingfrom the list those goods and services that correspond more toexternalities or to market failuresthan to public goods, and retai-ning only those fields wheregenuine global interdependenciesobtain, we suggest the followinglist:• international financial
stability;• environmental issues;• combating AIDS;• managing specific animal
diseases;• knowledge creation and
dissemination.
Food security may be added to this list, although it belongsequally to the realm of humanrights as to that of GPGs or poverty reduction.
But once a country has made its choices, it must not onlyallocate resources to them but
also publicise them and, whennecessary, advocate them vis-à-visits international cooperation partners.
2.4 Global public
goods and poverty
reduction
Although the idea of GPGs isentering the debate, develop-ment cooperation strategiesremain dominated by povertyreduction which France has accepted and added to it thereduction of inequalities,understood as “inequality ofaccess to income-generating andsocial relationships-generatingresources”3.
Although poverty reductionremains the priority objectivefor development aid policy, theadvocacy of GPGs as a new para-digm strengthening the bases forofficial development assistancemight seem to some to reducethe primacy of poverty reduction.Other advantages of this newconcept are its convincing natureand the rigour of its economicanalysis.
Is there any contradiction between the concept of GPGs and
the goal of poverty reduction?Caricaturing positions somewhat,supporters of poverty reductionpoint to the vague, “catch-all”nature of the GPG concept. They view it as too technocratic to be of much help to the cause of development, especially thecause of the poorest of theSouthern countries. Those infavour of GPGs argue that youcannot make sound economic policy based on sentiment, especially when the problemsconcerned are largely dependenton global policies.
These contradictions are largelyartificial, of course. The twoconcepts do not overlap, do notserve the same objectives, andimply distinctly different modes of operation. Simplifying again,we can say that poverty andinequality reduction is justifiedsolely by the concern to help thepoor and the excluded escapetheir condition, on moral groundsof course, but also for all of theeconomic reasons that makepoverty an impediment to deve-lopment. From the public goodsperspective, we help the poorbecause we need them to supplythe environmental, agricultural,economic, etc. goods and servicesthey alone are capable of sup-plying, and which benefit all of us, at the national, regional andglobal levels. The two approachesconverge in that they considerpoverty and inequalities to bethe ultimate systemic risk.
3 Cf. Attacking poverty, inequality and exclusion.Informing the debate. French Ministry ofForeign Affairs. Directorate General forDevelopment and International Cooperation,july 2001, série repères.
Concerning modes of operation,it is worth noting that:• poverty reduction depends onanalysis of conditions in the field,where geographic aspects predominate;• GPGs, on the other hand, have aplanetary dimension, and restoresector-based policies to their rightful place.
If the GPG approach were toprevail, that does not necessarilymean poverty reduction would bemoved to the back burner, forpoverty and inequality pose athreat to regional and globalequilibria, whose preservation isthe central objective of the GPGapproach.
At a more political level, wouldit be correct to regard the GPGapproach as a neutral, unpoliticalone, and the poverty and inequali-ty reduction approach, aimed at restoring the rights of theexcluded, as being more political?
While the aim of poverty andinequality reduction undeniablyhas political aspects, politicalconsiderations are not totallyabsent from the notion of GPGseither, based as it is on the questfor global equilibria. After all, the balance of power within theinternational negotiating forumsare generally highly unfavourableto the weak. By giving fresh legitimacy to the need for publicregulatory intervention, the GPGapproach also seeks to bring
about an equitable production of GPGs and to restore the rightsof the weakest to access to thesegoods. In that sense, the GPGapproach represents a neutralmeans of restoring some form of equality of opportunity—i.e.equality of opportunity of gain for the different participants in ainternational negotiating round.
Consequently, the concepts ofpoverty and inequality reductionand GPGs are highly complemen-tary. They partially overlap, butare driven by different rationales.
3.1French international cooperation
policy joined in the debate onGPGs from the moment theconcept made its appearancein international forums, notablyby broaching the negotiations on environmental issues in thelight of the new concept. Franceintends to pursue and deepen itsongoing thinking on this subject,and to play an active role in furthering international debate on this theme.
3.1 Sector versus
geographic vision
The geographic vision is essential in formulating andimplementing poverty andinequality reduction programmes:poverty takes a huge variety offorms, but it is always associatedwith highly specific local andnational conditions. What is truefor situations of poverty is to alarge extent also for situations ofinequality, even if the latter, andin particular North-South inequali-ties, are to some extent governedby global rules, mechanisms andphenomena.
Sector-based policies, and moregenerally cross-disciplinary theme-based analyses, are key instru-ments for the design and imple-mentation of GPGs at the natio-nal, regional and global levels.
Any development actor thatchooses to invest in the supply ofa given GPG must concentrate itsattention on those countries inwhich this GPG is lacking, and on those countries where these
3What consequencesdo global publicgoods have forFrench internationalcooperation policy?
3.33.2
deficiencies are generating seriousglobal consequences. These considerations may imply revisingthe distribution of partner coun-tries if, as is the case for France, it is mainly determined by povertycriteria. On the other hand, France'sapproach emphasises geographicalproximity in its selection of coun-tries for its priority solidarity zone,and is consistent with the produc-tion of regional public goods(one such regional good being theFranc Zone).
At all events, just as the povertyand inequality reduction and GPGapproaches are complementary,one may consider that thegeographical vision and sectoralpolicy are not mutually exclusive.
3.2 Bilateral versus
global vision
Although GPGs are primarily amatter for multilateral discussions,they are not necessarily a mono-poly of the multilateral arena.Every country in the world,developed and developing alike,has a role to play in implementingGPGs, just as they do in multilateraldiscussions. Nor should governmentsalone be involved: other publicauthorities and actors in civil society and the private sector
ought to take part in the debate,as well as in the process of defi-ning and implementing policiesacknowledged to be necessary.
The international community,and in particular the countries of the North, thus has a specialresponsibility for:• guaranteeing the multilateralcharacter of negotiations;• creating the conditions for theinvolvement of non-governmentalactors in inter-governmentaldebates;• achieving a better, fairer balanceof power within the negotiatingforums. This is a sine qua non ifthe countries of the South are notto regard decisions and standardsadopted in these forums as yetanother manifestation of theNorthern countries self-appointedright to intervene.
The developing countries havejust experienced two decades ofpublic policies often perceived asbeing imposed on them from theoutside, throughout the entireperiod of structural adjustment.The aid donors proposed thetheme of poverty reduction partlyas a means of legitimising ODA,and partly as offering the benefi-ciary countries an opportunity to exercise greater “ownership” of their public policies. Thisownership is made particularlyexplicit in Poverty ReductionStrategy Papers, which civil societyis invited to help formulate. The GPG perspective, meanwhile,
presupposes a certain number ofrules formulated in multilateralforums where the voice of thedeveloping countries was notdominant. Any extension of thisperspective must not deprivethese countries of the benefits ofthis new ownership.
3.3 Principles for
action
In theory, a country that decidesto formulate all or part of its inter-national cooperation policy withina GPG perspective should start byselecting its priority areas. It shouldalso make its various internationalcooperation programmes in thesesectors consistent. Relevant actionsshould cover:• contributing to internationalnegotiations and the positionsadopted by the country in thosenegotiations;• bilateral development coopera-tion programmes;• participating in multilateraldonors' programmes, and in particular financial transfers tothese programmes, regardless of whether the transfers carry no strings, are jointly administeredby the donor and the multilateralagency (as in the case of trustfunds), or are tied to specific operations.
3.4By participating in the emergenceand the production of GPGs, bila-teral aid donors should find them-selves contributing more to thefunding of multilateral pro-grammes: the priority in the waron AIDS should be to contribute toregional and national programmesfunded by international aid, andthe recently created Global HealthFund. Although this transfer of aidfunding in favour of multilateralprogrammes is essential, it doesnot preclude bilateral programmesin support of the public goodsselected. Cooperation programmesconcerning GPGs will continue togrow out of joint action by all aiddonors, bilateral and multilateralalike. What is central to the newvision, however, is the imperativeneed to coordinate all these diffe-rent actions. This of course raisesthe question of who is to provideleadership in coordinating theseactions, an issue far more crucialthan in the case of more traditio-nal approaches.
As for the modalities of bilateralaid, the GPG rationale can be usedto renew them in favour of secto-ral approaches. These are perfectlycompatible with poverty reductionobjectives and the promotion ofbasic human rights. The sectoralapproach does not contradict theproject approach and cannot fullyreplace it, although the projectapproach needs to adapt in orderto integrate its action into the framework of national strategicpriorities recognised by donors.
Bilateral donors' cooperationprogrammes will need to beconsistent with donors' positionson the international cooperationstage, and more generally with alltheir external actions in North-South relations—i.e. the positionsthey adopt in forums devoted tointernational cooperation anddevelopment financing, theirconduct of bilateral relations with its State partners, and theirpositions in regional bodies towhich they belong. The issue offood security is a good example of obstacles to consistency:European Union Member-Statesneed to argue consistently on this issue at the WTO, with theSahel countries, the Mercosurcountries and the SouthernMediterranean countries, as wellas with countries discussing anagricultural sector adjustment programme.
3.4 French interna-
tional cooperation
priorities in the
global public goods
sphere
French international coopera-tion policy priorities in the sphereof GPGs will depend on the following criteria:• Emphasise those aid areas inwhich France and the EuropeanUnion have a specific message to convey (support for regionalintegration, biodiversity, etc.)• Concentrate on areas that havereceived scant attention from existing international institutions.Apart from the Franc Zone, inter-national financial stability is alreadybeing addressed multilaterally, as is peacekeeping, which is onlyindirectly related to ODA.
An initial selection might includethe following seven areas:• the global environment, withparticular attention to those fieldsin which the major conventionsare still relatively inoperative (e.g.,climate change, biodiversity anddesertification), or non-existent(forests) and water;• health, with particular emphasison combating AIDS in Africa;• food security, a major focus ofEuropean cooperation policy;• support for regional economicintegration as a basis for producing
3.5
regional and global public goods;• development-centred research;• promoting cultural and linguisticpluralism as the indispensablecounterweight to globalisation,and economically justifiable withinthe GPG perspective.
This list includes a number ofpublic goods that are not strictlyglobal (water, and health otherthan AIDS), and it needs to beextended and spelled out in detail.It quite reasonably reflects Frenchconcerns, but could in due course be complemented by other public goods for whichpartners of our internationalcooperation policy show a markedinterest. It is clear that publicgoods reflect the values andoptions peculiar to each society.An African list might be quite different from the one suggested.But for that, the particular Africansociety would need to be able to express its GPG priorities, whichpresupposes the existence of institutions that canexpress prefer-ences, relate them to internationalnegotiations, and formulate themas negotiating positions. This point reveals yet again theimportance of having a many-faceted, GPG-oriented institutionalcooperation policy.
Some of the above fields arescheduled for discussion in inter-national gatherings or conferencesfor multilateral agreements, in thecoming months. France will graspthe opportunities thus afforded to
deepen its thinking on the GPGsin question. This would apply tothe various environmental agree-ments, as well as to food security,which will be the subject of fiercedebate—it is a matter of vitalimportance to the countries of theSouth—at the upcoming FAOFood Summit and in negotiationsfor the WTO agricultural agreement.
3.5 Consequences
for French ODA
(in terms of volumes
and organisation)
France will deepen, with all itspartners, the reflection on globalODA needs. The preparation ofthe next United Nations conferenceon Financing for Development isan excellent opportunity for thatpurpose. France has the necessarycapacity and international legiti-macy to support a position aimingat a substantial increase in ODA,and a major redesign of itscontents. It has done so consistentlywithin the G7. The next UN WorldSummit onSustainable Development(Rio +10), scheduled for September2002 in Johannesburg, will beanother opportunity to developthis perspective.
3.6ODA does not have to financeall development needs, since some of these may also be coveredby the new financial mechanismsdesigned to finance GPG produc-tion (for instance, credits derivedfrom multilateral environmentagreements). But these newmechanisms should be really additional with respect to ODA.The French Global EnvironmentFacility (FGEF) is a good exampleof this additionality.
Such a global public goods policy must, of course, be compa-tible with the major contributionthe private sector (and economicgrowth in general) can make topoverty and inequality reduction.This stress on GPGs is intendedboth to have a leveraging effectand to regulate the development of private flows,making them more effective, moresustainable and more respectful of human rights.
The GPG approach entails giving priority to financing sectoral policies and advocating an increase in the multilateraldimension of international cooperation programmes. This double requirement could be an opportunity to take a new view of increasing the European dimension of cooperation programmes of member States, at least as far as questions relating to global and regional public goods areconcerned.
3.6. Avenues for
further exploration
A more thorough examinationcould usefully combine the spheresof research and non-governmentalcooperation, not only at a concep-tual level, but also in more prag-matic terms, so that whenever projects or programmes are formulated or evaluated they mayset out their point of view on the integration of GPGs in the proposed operations.
This means:a) Confronting discussions
on GPGs, poverty reduction andimplementation of fundamentalrights.French cooperation services arehelping to review thinking on poverty reduction, by speciallyinsisting on the reduction ofinequalities and exclusion. It isimportant to identify the comple-mentarities and possible contradic-tions between the variousapproaches: emphasising GPGsshould not lead to confusing the objectives and messages ofinternational cooperation, whichgive primacy to poverty andinequality reduction.
This is also the case for the fundamental rights issue, which partly overlaps with the preceding
ones, but which is inspired by another approach, that of theUnited Nations economic, socialand cultural rights, which ismore political
b) Further investigating “institutional gap” issues in GPGproduction.
“Institutional gap” refers to theabsence of a global authority in charge of caring for the production of GPGs—which pre-cisely makes these goods globalrather than national or local, inwhich case governments or a local authority might intervene.
The institutional dimension is a relatively weak point in thedebate on GPGs. This should startwith international standards: whodefines them, who negotiatesthem, who pays a high price forimplementing them, who monitorsand evaluates their implementa-tion, who applies sanctions? This question has become a centralone for developing countries,which see in it a new form ofNorthern imperialism. It is crucialto conduct a non-partisan debateon this issue and to derive practicalconsequences with respect to the contents and modalities ofinternational negotiations.
c) Assessing environmental andtrade negotiations over the lasttwo years in terms of global publicgoods
French cooperation services have undertaken this study, as a
concrete illustration of the prac-tices, power struggles and conflictsbehind the efforts toward animproved management of globalpublic goods. The negotiations in point would include Seattle(WTO), Nairobi (biodiversity), The Hague and Bonn (climatechange), Montreal andMontpellier (biosecurity), Bonn (desertification).
d) Establishing a link betweenglobal public goods and ourposition on cultural diversity.
The public good character ofcultural production has been recognised since at least AdamSmith. Public intervention onbehalf of the arts may be to someextent legitimised by economicarguments about market failure in this particular sector. Withoutreducing everything to economics,this could be a useful way forwardfor strengthening our position infavour of cultural diversity.
e) Seeking the most rapid econo-mic growth possible within theregulation process required forGPGs
Creating a favourable environ-ment, maintaining financial andmonetary stability, ensuring effec-tive healthcare systems and foodsecurity for ordinary people, are allfactors that ultimately favour eco-nomic development, attract invest-ment and stimulate activity.
The production of global publicgoods can thus be a catalyst indeveloping the market and non-market sector, recognised ascrucial for the sustainable develop-ment of Southern countries.
4.1Three points at stake, closely
linked, appear especially important:• the global public goods approachand the financing of official development assistance;• the governance of global publicgoods, and democracy in settingup the rules of the internationalgame;• support from developing countries for the GPG approach.
4.1 The global
public goods
approach and ODA
funding
Two broad approaches are possible to remedy market failurewith respect to global publicgoods, both of them based on the“internalisation of externalities”:• creating a market for rights of use or quotas;• setting up taxes on an appro-priate basis.
The first modality is well suitedto “summation” public goods,defined by UNDP as the effect of adding various contributions of equal importance for an overallobjective, such as reducing greenhouse gases or restrictingthe use of CFCs. This has been thebasis for the flexibility mechanismsof the Kyoto Protocol on ClimateChange (tradeable permits, cleandevelopment mechanism—CDM).The recent Bonn negotiation hasshown that Southern countriessaw in the CDM a suitable
4Formulating aFrench position
4.24.2 The governance
of global public
goods and the role
of democracy in set-
ting international
ground rules
As already mentioned, the iden-tification of a good as a publicgood is a political decision. Whenthis good is a global good, twoissues arise:• who decides whether it is to beregarded as a global public good?• who sets the rules for producingthis good (the so-called “interna-tional regime” for this good)?
The legitimacy of these deci-sions, and therefore the likeli-hood of their effective implemen-tation, depend strongly on the democratic nature of theauthorities making them and the effectiveness of their operating modes.
To reconcile these ambitiousobjectives, France makes two proposals:• creation of a WorldEnvironmental Organisation(WEO) to provide a consistent
development tool to ensure theirenergy requirements. Bonn alsoshowed that this type of mecha-nism may be implemented even ifall countries do not endorse it.
On the other hand, for “weakestlink” goods, where the productionof the good is limited by theefforts of the weakest partner(eradication of AIDS, peace andsecurity, financial stability), “tax”type solutions–the most famous ofwhich is the “Tobin tax”–are moreappropriate; but these solutionsare politically difficult to adopt.They will be effective only if theyare implemented by all countries,since the “free rider” effect infavour of the countries whowould not implement them wouldcreate unacceptable distortions.
Other types of internationaltaxation currently envisaged include taxes on arms exports.Some parties express reservationshere but none appear to beconclusive. If the European Union were to show the way, even symbolically, the burden ofthe argument would be reversed.Other analysts propose a tax oncarbon emissions. This is an attractive idea, and will one daybe implemented. Global warmingis too dangerous for it not to be.
The success of such taxes wouldappear to depend on certainconditions:• determination of tax level, normally very low;
• tax collection by national authorities;• allocation of some or all of the proceeds of the tax to the production of “weakest link” type of public goods such as fighting AIDS, etc.• possibility for the countries that implement the tax to includein their ODA contribution theamount used to the advantage of Southern countries.
Adoption of such taxes, earmarked to fund an agreed list ofGPGs, would bring ODA close tothe 0.7% objective, on an impar-tial basis agreed upon by all.
France has argued for the intro-duction of such a tax mechanismbased on States' ability to contribute that would regulate theexcesses of globalisation and fundthe production of global publicgoods, to the advantage of thedeveloping countries in particular.This country has not so far com-mented on the practical issues,such as the tax rate and tax basis,but wants the international com-munity to open a debate on thisquestion.
4.3
focus for a topic that at presentlacks it;• creation of Security Council foreconomic and social affairs, toarbitrate between competing mul-tilateral rules. France will be sub-mitting a motion on this topic tothe next General Assembly of theUnited Nations, in order to definepractical ways of creating such aCouncil.
4.3 Global public
goods to the advan-
tage of developing
countries
Recent debates in the AfricanPrepcom of the World Summit on Sustainable Development haveclearly shown that for Africandeveloping countries only the“economic and social” pillars ofsustainable development matter,whereas environmental aspectscome far behind in their concerns.More generally, many globalpublic goods may not be perceivedas such by Southern countries. Thisentails an obvious risk of converginginterests between some Northerncountries favouring unfetteredfree-market economics free of anyregulation and some G77 countrieswhich may not perceive the relevance for them
of the GPG debate, thus blockingany chance of evolution.
It is therefore essential, to suc-ceed in implementing the globalpublic goods approach, to be ableto prove to Southern countries the relevance for them of thisapproach.
The European Union has shown,during recent conferences, thatit had a good capacity to propose
middle-of-the-road solutionsacceptable to both developed anddeveloping countries. We shouldtherefore resort preferably toEuropean channels to disseminatethese ideas on GPGs.
Last but not least, it is importantto rely also on the capacity ofNGOs for reflection and mobilisa-tion. Specific actions aimed atcommon discussion and communi-cation, and preparing internatio-nal conferences should be conduc-ted with advocacy NGOs. WithinFrance, the High Council forInternational Cooperation is one forum where such debate ispossible.
Promoting development meansfirst and foremost putting the casefor ideas and values that expressthe view we have of the world. Forthat reason it is essential to clarifyconcepts that are bandied about indevelopment circles, without theirpresuppositions or practical conse-quences always being understood.
That has been the purpose ofthis paper: to define more clearlywhat global public goods are, togive a sharper idea of the commongood at global level, and to specifythe operational consequences thatfollow, particularly for implemen-ting the regulation of globalisa-tion that France wishes to see.
It is true that global public goodsare a recent idea. They arouse surprise and interest. They haveyet to be adopted by everyone,whether donors or countries of the South. Only a collective endeavour to argue this case willenable us to manage in concertour mutual interdependencies.
** *
ISBN : 2-11-092966-9
February 2002
MINISTRY OF FOREIGN AFFAIRSDirectorate-General for Development and International Cooperation
244, bd Saint-Germain 75303 Paris 07 SPhttp://www.diplomatie.gouv.fr
MINISTRY OF THE ECONOMY, FINANCE AND INDUSTRYTreasury Directorate
139, rue de Bercy 75572 Paris cedex 12http://www.minefi.gouv.fr
