Gordon T Long - MMC Euro Results Are in Results) 2011.10.11

8/3/2019 Gordon T Long - MMC Euro Results Are in Results) 2011.10.11

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October 2011 Edition Restricted

Copyright 2011 Gordon T. Long All Rights Reserved [email protected]

EURO EXPERIMENT: TEST RESULTS ARE INCan Global Central Bankers Save the Euro?

The results of the Euro Experiment are now in and it can be shown to have been a failure as originally

formulated. It is clearly evident that Monetary and Fiscal Policy cannot be separated for a sustained period of

time within a single currency regime. The EU and Euro will survive the current sovereign and financial crisis,

however, the underlying structural problems are potentially fatal, if not addressed. It is not yet clear how in

fact the structural problems can be addressed. Though the Euro will survive to fight another day, the EU's

days as a 17 member union are numbered.

Gordon T Long

10/8/2011


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EURO EXPERIMENT: TEST RESULTS ARE INCan Global Central Bankers Save the Euro?

OCTOBER MONTHLY MARKET COMMENTARY

SHORT TERM MARKET HIGHLIGHTS - WHAT THE TECHNICALS ARE TELLING US. .............................................. 4

CURRENT MACRO EXPECTATIONS ............................................................................................................ 5

THE CENTRAL ISSUE WITH THE EU - SIGNIFICANT PRODUCTIVITY DIFFERENTIALS!.......................................... 6

WHAT IS EVERYONE SO SCARED ABOUT? ...................................................................................................................................... 6FINANCIAL HANDCUFFS......................................................................................................................................................................... 7LABOR COSTS........................................................................................................................................................................................... 9CAPITAL FLIGHT: Getting out of Dodge ............................................................................................................................................... 11

WHO WILL PAY? - IS "SCHMUK" GERMAN FOR SUCKER?........................................................................... 11

WHO WILL GO FIRST? - Only a Matter of Time.................................................................................................................................. 13DEXIA - Tip of an Iceberg that was both predictable and inescapable ............................................................................................. 15EURO : YEN CROSS - A Forced Yen Carry Trade Unwind ............................................................................................................... 17

ITS GETING UGLY FAST - MOUNTING PRESSURES FOR COORDINATED GLOBAL ACTION.................................. 19

BANK RECAPITALIZATION - Can it Be Financed? ............................................................................................................................ 18

CONCLUSION....................................................................................................................................... 23

ELEVATED RISK...................................................................................................................................................................................... 24SHORT TERM........................................................................................................................................................................................... 25TARGETS.................................................................................................................................................................................................. 25


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MONTHLY PROCESS OF ABSTRACTION

The Monthly Market Commentary Service is an integral part of our monthly Process of Abstraction

research methodology. The process begins monthly from the Tipping Points and completes with a final

Synthesis. The sequence is optimized to align with the established Macro Economic Data releases.

Plan Release

Date

Service Focus Coverage

III. 3rd Saturday

of the Month

Global Macro Tipping Points

(GMTP)

Tipping Points

Abstraction

Abstraction

Tipping Points

Global Macro

US Economy

IV. 1st Day of the

Month

Market Analytics & Technical

Analysis (MTA)

Technical Analysis

Market Analytics

Market Analytics

Technical Analysis

Fundamental Analysis

Risk Analysis

II. Day Following

Monthly Labor

Report

(~ 1st Saturday)

Monthly Market Commentary

(MMC)

Synthesis Commentary

Synthesis

Thesis

Commentary

Conclusions


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OCTOBER MARKET COMMENTARY

SHORT TERM MARKET HIGHLIGHTS - What The Technicals Are Telling Us.

The market action since March 2009 is a bear market counter rally that has completed the classic ending 5 Wave3-3-3-3-3 diagonal pattern we have been predicting since March 2009. The Bear Market, which started in 2000, willresume in full force once a broad 'rounded top' formation is completed with cascading weakness across multiplemarkets presently being clearly evident. The rounded top formation is not yet completed.

We are now in the midst of a Global 'rolling top'. We are seeing broad based weakening analytics and cascadingwarning signals. This behavior is typically seen near major reversals. It is all part of a final topping formation anda long term right shoulder technical construction pattern. I expect the rounded top to be shown to have beencentered on the markets June 17th Quadruple Witch. It will take a further 1-2 months to complete.

Rounded Top patterns are extremely difficult to trade as trading reversals are significant and frequent with highvolatility. This adds to the confusion about market direction. The market behavior should be viewed as the market

forces being in the process of systemically changing balance. It is very typical of major reversals.They are protracted affairs.

Highlighted examples of continuing weakening analytics and warning signals are as follows:

CONSUMERS

-Consumer and small business sentiment remains at levels associated with other recent recessions. Thetrend in sentiment since the Financial Crisis lows has been one of slow improvement. The recent finalnumbers from the Michigan survey are consistent with deep recessions.- The University of Michigan Consumer Sentiment Index has plunged from 77.5 in February to 59.4 inSeptember. There was a similar large drop in August 1990, another in September 2001, and a third one inOctober 2008. All three were associated with recessions and turned out to be big sell signals for the stockmarket.


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- The Consumer Confidence numbers after totally collapsing in August and falling to 44.5, werebasically flat in September at 45.4. The Present Situation however fell to 32.5 from 34.3. Twice asmany respondents thought that business conditions would worsen as improve.- What continues to stand out to me is that against comparable prints taken at financial crises andtragedies of the past, such as the October 1987 market crash, Desert Storm, LTCM, the dot com collapse,September 11, Katrina, and Lehman, they are substantially WORSE and getting worse fast!

INVESTORS

- The NFIB Small Business Optimism Index stands at 88.1, well below 100 and continues to deteriorate.- The National Association of Active Investment Managers (NAAIM) shows that on average they areextremely bearish at 22.19%, having plummeted from last quarter's average of 66.99%.- The American Association of Independent Investors shows that we now have more Bears than Bulls. Thisis what we would expect as the Secular Market resumes. However we are reaching levels which ofteninitiate counter rallies.- The National Association of Active Investment Managers (NAAIM) shows that on average they areextremely bearish at 4.18%, having plummeted from last quarter's average of 66.99%.- The Smart Money is now beginning to buy while the Emotional money is now selling. Significantly, forthe first time since the fall of 2009 the Smart Money Index broke above its 200 DMA.-With approximately 10% of the S&P 500 above their 200 DMA we have an over-sold market. With only10% of the S&P 500 above their 50 DMA we have a moderately over-sold market which is nearingsupport levels. The market is now looking for a support base to launch a short term relief rally.-Markets can and often fall the greatest during periods considered as being oversold. The sell-off fromoverbought levels was not unexpected. A bounce from the current oversold levels, likewise should not beunexpected. Look for divergence to occur between falling prices and a higher oversold low. This shouldindicate a short to intermediate, tradable low is in.-The McClellan Oscillator has dropped significantly and is now looking for support. Markets can fall furtherlooking for support, however the 21 Day suggests it is near at hand since it seldom reaches this low alevel.- The Surprise Index measures the divergence between actual data and economists' forecasts, and istherefore another form of sentiment or expectations index. Economists are at a near record divergenceagainst the reality of the data, and net bullish market sentiment is also at a near record divergence to howthe data is coming outversus expectations. This ishighly unusual and shouldbe considered a marketwarning.

CURRENT MACRO EXPECTATIONS

OUR CURRENT MACROEXPECTATIONS FOR FINANCIAL

EQUITY MARKETS

The following schematic bestrepresents the US S&P 500 Stock

Index

We still consider ourselves to be

WITHIN the Rounded "M" Top.

We will need to put in the right

side 'external strength' of the

"M" pattern later this fall.

HOWEVER, the bottom of the "V"

is not yet in - Early fall will be

scary


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THE CENTRAL ISSUE WITH THE EU - Significant Productivity Differentials!

WHAT IS EVERYONE SO SCARED ABOUT?

I just returned from nearly a month in Europe. Amongst otherthings I wanted to see and hear firsthand what the real situation

was.

It wasn't pretty!

Though on the surface everything might appear fine, underneaththere is a strong and growing sense of dissatisfaction. Frustrationis the order of the day. At the root is a mixture of Economic,Political and Financial concerns but all come together when 'theEuro' is brought up in a conversation.

Whether correctly or incorrectly, the Euro is perceived to be thecause of the inflation pressures everyone is experiencing.Collapsing real disposable income is forcing changes to lifestylesand expectations across Europe. People recent it and are worriedabout the direction they see ahead.

As bad as the 2008 financial crisis was in America and worldwide,the current situation in Euro is worse. The US was primarily abanking crisis based on an out of control US Mortgage finance industry. Euro is both a banking crisis based onover-leveraged banks and a sovereign debt crisis. It potentially is orders of magnitude worse.

There appears to be little that the peripheral countries (GIIPS: Greece, Ireland, Italy, Portugal, Spain) can do about

their current problems and little the core countries can agree upon as solutions to the Euro mess. The Euro

Experiment which I have written about since early 2010 is coming to a conclusion. The verdict is the EU was

inevitably going to end up at this point of being faced with impossible choices.

At the core are two fundamental problems:

1- Short Term: 1 to 2 Trillion of mal-investments, bad debt and non performing loans that can never realistically

be paid off that someone must absorb. No one, as might be expected, wants the onus to fall on them. As a


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consequence, until this is resolved, we have fears and reactions to

expectations of who will eventual pay.

2- Longer Term: The cause of the bad debts is at its core a structural problem

which shows itself as productivity differentials that force poorer countries into

deeper and deeper holes and the richer countries having to finance throughtransfer payments, the funding of these differentials.

We will delve into both of these problems in this month's Market Commentary

and draw conclusions on the Euro Experiment.

FINANCIAL HANDCUFFS

The EU Sovereign bad debt is a result of a multitude of bad public policydecisions, but most simply could be summarized:

GREECE: Debt to Finance nearly 750,000 Civil servants, or 1 in 5residents of the country.

SPAIN: Excessive and bad real estate developmentsIRELAND: Excessive and bad real estate developments

ITALY: Municipal and Local expenditures (graft) that financedinfrastructures such as roads, bridges and other excuses forthe incursion of debt.

This money has arguably been wasted, but certainly is neither going to pay for itself nor be absorbed by currentrevenue streams. So who pays?

The worry over this has resulted in a dramatic drop in European financial market capitalizations (as reflected

below) and a flight to safety, since European banks don't trust other banks to remain solvent if this problem forcesbanks to take higher levels of write-downs than agreed at the July 21st EU Summit. This is reflected above inbanks deposits at the ECB and the US Federal Reserve.

Banks, Financial institutions, Pensions Funds etc. have kept sovereign debt at book value and have taken little, orat least insufficient actions, to reflect the reality of current market prices. They are held hostage to a recovery orgovernment bailouts.

The reality of the situation is there are threealternatives to who will eventually take theloses:

1- The banks or bondholders whoaccepted the risk of the loans,

2- The Countries rich enough and withtax payers with sufficiently deep enoughpockets to absorb the losses of thosecountries who incurred the excessive andunfundable debt,

3- The European Central Bank whichthrough accepting bad collateralfacilitated the lending in the first placeand who have the ability to print moremoney to pay for the bad debt.

All three point the finger at the other.

All three come with penalties.

So how will this decision play out?


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There are three spheres of influence operating in the EU political arena that have sufficient power and credibility todictate the likely outcome:

1. German Government2. German Bundesbank3. French Government - Civil Service.

The most high probability developments goingforward will be:

Greece will default and thebondholders will be penalized,

The ECB will be forced to monetizethe debt of the remainder the GIIPS.

The EU cannot sustain theproductivity and labor differentialsand therefore eventually the richcountries will be dragged downattempting to support the worseningpositions of the weaker countries.

If this were to happen then the results wouldbe:

GREECE DEFAULTING

A Greek default would be a surprise to no one, The default would likely be managed, orderly and generally thought out, Unlike Lehman the EU has a TARP in the form of the EFSF already in place sufficiently large to handle a

Greek default, Unlike the delays in the US, the ECB is likely soon to have the financial firepower capable of buying up

bonds of the other GIIPS to counter the fallout and stop spreading contagion. A Greek default is now baked in. It is likely that when it does occur it will be much less of an event than

currently anticipated.

ECB MONETIZATION

The ECB Monetization of the bad, unpayable debt comes with a likely weakening in the Euro, A weakening Euro means inflation in Europe rises further and creates more stress on disposable incomes, A weakening Euro means the accelerated unwinding of the Yen Carry Trade financed with Euros. This has

been a major source of funding for the European debt growth, Rising inflation likely means forced interest rate increases in response, further aggravating an already

tight credit environment.


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STRUCTURAL PROBLEM

This is where the real problem lies that

few are discussing and certainly no one

is tabling a solution to,

This is the problem that dictates thefuture of the EU,

This is the imponderable question that

suggests the EU is a failed experiment.

Let's examine the central issue of the structural

problem further.

LABOR COSTS

Prior to the introduction of the EU there was awell know and understood difference inindustrial capabilities between Germany, France

and the GIPS.

The general perception was that northernEurope was industrial and productive, whilesouthern Europe was primarily agrarian andunproductive.

So why would the introduction of a commonmarket and the Euro be expected to changethis?

The simple answer was investment.

It was argued that financial investment wouldallow industrial expansion in the south due tocheap financing (previously unavailable) and an abundant, cheaper labor force.

Unfortunately this didn't occur. It didn't happen for a number of reasons but most significantly because evencheaper labor was found in the newly emerging areas of Central and Eastern Europe (CEE).

The CEE region has been aggressively seekingexpansion and willing to offer attractive taxadvantages to an overly taxed Western Europe.

Existing corporations either targeted theirexpansion plans for, or simply moved to, Centraland Eastern Europe. Even this didn't last longbefore cheaper Asian countries offered further costadvantages.

As the chart to the right reflects, since 1999 and

the advent of the EU, the problem of unit laborcosts has gotten worse at a significant rate.

Unfortunately, the Euro itself further aggravatesthe problem because the tested solution to laggingproductivity is currency devaluation.

Not only is this not an option in a single currency

regime, but in fact the single currency works tomake a lagging country fall further behind inproductivity gains due to rising costs.


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The problem with the EU and Euro is a structural problem.

It is not because none of this could be foreseen. The chart below shows the levels of financing prior to the Euro,then the dramatic improvements in financing that countries received with the introduction of the Euro.

Unfortunately, the cheap financing was used to primarily finance unproductive infrastructure, social programs, a

blotted civil service and government expansion.

Terrible populist public policy has resulted in the surge in financing costs as shown on the right side of the chart.


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CAPITAL FLIGHT: Getting out of Dodge

If one of the objectives of the EU was to foster financial investment in the poorer peripheral countries, then thequestion it begs is why has the Current Account deficit grown at 2-3 times the rate of the Fiscal deficit since 2000?

The consistent pattern of all the GIIPS in the chart below is a negative Current Account balance growth rate since

2000.

Is there the possibility that in reality, Greece (as only one example) was just a proxy for European Money and

Credit creation?

The growth of Greek debt allowed the banks to significantly leverage their lending capabilities which was not usedto finance Greek investment butrather was cheap money that flowedout of Greece and into Romania, theBalkans, Hungary etc.

Each of the GIIPS comes with adifferent scenario but the end result isthat money found a better homeoutside of the GIIPS.

More recently, we have seen bankdeposits dramatically reduced as a'flight-to-safety' has taken hold.

The outcome of the Euro Experimentwas pre-ordained and in the cardsbefore the first Euro card was dealt.

WHO WILL PAY? - Is "Schmuk"German for Sucker?


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The question is who will now be expected to pay for this failedexperiment?

Typically, the bulk of the financial obligation will be shouldered by thosewho have the most to loss, or those with the most to gain. Especially

when the others are incapable of contributing.

GERMANY

From an industrial standpoint, Germany is very dependent on the Eurozone as its primary export market. Problems in the EU and specifically theGIIPS, results in the industrial German machine slowing. We have seenthis in recent German industrial and GDP statistics.

Germany may not yet politically have the will to step in to save the GIIPS,but the realities of its economy depends on a strong EU.

FRANCE

Form a financial standpoint French banks are the biggest losers if asatisfactory solution to the GIIPS sovereign debt crisis is not found.

French bank assets are an unusually high percentage of the French GDPcompared to all other EU members. France cannot afford the possibility ofa banking crisis that the failing GIIPS are threatening to cause.

France has no choice but to step in with a solution.

What we have is the GIIPS incapable of fixing their insolvency due to a single currency regime, and the strongercountries completely dependent on the financial powers the Euro has afforded it.

The Euro Experiment is a failure, but this doesn't mean that everything won't be done to save it, even if the actionstaken only delay the inevitable outcome.

Eventually, the rich countries will become weaker and weaker until the citizens of Germany, France and theScandinavian countries likely demand a new currency and leave the Euro to those trapped within it.

The fact that the


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GIIPS are so heavily dependent on outside financing, in itself almost guarantees a bad outcome for the EuroExperiment. Eventually, no one will want to finance a country with low and insufficient wealth generationcapabilities.

WHO WILL GO FIRST? - Only a Matter of Time

How will things unfold? Likely, EU governments will do everything possible to 'kick-the-can-down-the road' untilsomething breaks, a crisis unfolds and then the public is willing to accept any solution in an attempt to stabilize the

situation. So what will break first?


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Our conclusions (as outlined over the last few months on our 3 times weekly Global Insights audio program) iseither a Spanish bank, Unicredit (Italy), Dexia (Belgium) or one of the three major French banks will fail.


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DEXIA - Tip of an Iceberg that was both predictable and inescapable

Well, the verdict is in and the first failure and nationalization was Dexia!

Dexia is the first wholesale bank to fail. As a bank without a large depositor base it was dependent on borrowingshort term money (from Money Market Funds) and lending it out long term.

This strategy worked as long as lending sources were liquid, operating and reasonably priced. All three criteriasuddenly and abruptly dried up for Dexia. How many more banks have a similarly flawed business model?


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Dexia is the first and certainly not the last.


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EURO : YEN CROSS - A Forced Yen Carry Trade Unwind

One of the developments that is not being followed close enough inthe media is the Euro : Yen cross and its impact.

For years, Europe as well as the US has used the Japanese Carry

Trade to finance growth.

Global Banks and Financial Institutions would borrow heavily inJapan, taking full advantage of Japan's Zero Interest Rate Policy(ZIRP) and Quantitative Easing. These same institutions would thenbuy sovereign debt paying significantly higher yields.

The yield differential (even unleveraged) was a license to printmoney. Which they effectively did in Europe with wild abandon.

This game works fine as long as the currency you borrow incontinues to be weaker than the currency you lend in. In otherwords the YEN must weaken relative to a stronger Euro. This iswhat we had.

As the chart to the right shows this has dramatically changed.

What this now means is that not only have a significant erosion ineffective spread but in fact the carry may have went negative.

Forced unwinding of the trade is required. This unwinding is acting effectively as a negative liquidity pump in theEU.

Further weakening in the Euro must be stopped at all cost. It is forcing banks to curtail lending and in factexamine closely 'roll-over' funding.

The problem is rapidly 'going critical'.

With the plummeting capitalization value of European banks, it is forcing financial institutions who hold theseequities to reduce the book values. Couple this with plunging GIIPS' bond prices and you have a cascading liquidityproblem.


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BANK RECAPITALIZATION - Can it Be Financed?

The newly appointed IMF Director Christine Lagarde stunned the audience at the August Monetary Conference inJackson Hole, Wyoming when she suggested that European banks needed urgent re-capitalization of 200B. Onlya few weeks earlier (when she was then French Finance Minister) the second broadly taunted EU Bank Stress Testsindicated everything was apparently fine. As an insider, Madam Lagarde obviously knew differently.

Now, in early October, we have urgent European meetings taking place to work the details of a 200 - 400banking capital insertion and the nationalization of Dexia (which passed the same tests with no warning signs).

Reuters, which created the EU Stress Test model shown above, may have been a little optimistic, for the simplereason that assuming a scenario that sees 100% write-downs on all PIIGS bonds, and assuming a 2% Tier 1 capitaltarget, sees just 46 banks failing the "test" with a 257 billion capital deficiency. This matches the currentrecapitalization expectations.

Unfortunately, Reuters fails the simplest sniff test, as somehow the apocalypse scenario of a complete pan-European wipeout sees just a quarter of a trillion in capital needed, when in reality every bank in Europe would becompletely insolvent.

The reason? Off balance sheet SIV's are not accounted for.


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ITS GETING UGLY FAST - Mounting Pressures for Coordinated Global Action

The problems in Europe are clearly tenuous.

What happens if the Global economy starts to rapidly slow?

Equity values will fall and therefore financial asset book values will be impaired,

Sovereigns and Corporations will see resulting weakness in sales & receipts and therefore creditratings will be reduced, increasing funding costs and impairing book values,

Collateral will weaken and then must be shored up,

Unfortunately, this is exactly what is now happening because the Global Economy is rapidly slowing.


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Global statistics were recently published by the Financial Times in London which shows the global slowdown is nowconfirmed.


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The US ECRI Leading Index is suggesting the slowdown borders on being more violent and abrupt than anythingsince the 2008 collapse.

Consumer Credit in the US startled analysts on October 7th with a negative 9.5B decline on expectations of $8Bincrease. Both Revolving Credit fell -3.4% as did non-revolving credit at a stunning -5.4%.


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The coincident to lagging ratio (shown below) has proved to be an incredible leading indicator.

When an expansion is nearing its final stages both sets of indicators will be rising, but the increase for thecoincident will be slower than the lagging, hence the ratio will fall.

As of 8/31 data, this ratio has now fallen for FIVE months in a row. As the chart shows, a pretty high correlation

(~93%) exists between this ratio and stock prices.

If we then consider the following Earnings Momentum chart, we have yet another indication that we should expect

further ongoing weakness in the equity markets.


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CONCLUSION

The Euro Experiment was a failure. In its original incarnation it was flawed. It doesn't mean however that it won'tbe reformed and restructured.

Monetary and Fiscal Policy cannot be separated for a sustained period of time within a singlecurrency regime.

It is going to be a very difficult eighteen months for the EU and we can expect significant change ahead.

In its current tenuous position the EU is exposed to an external shock that maydestabilizing!

NOW FOR A GLOBAL SHOCK

If things weren't bad enough for the Euro Experiment it now likely faces this global shock. A de-accelerating GlobalEconomy will give the EU another solid body punch at exactly the wrong time.

Bloomberg put out the following chart in August which MKM Partners have recently updated to reflect the USMarket decline since early August. The eerie similarity to Japan is now clearly evident.

2012 is going to be real test for the EU and the Euro even if it soon successfully inserts 200 - 400B ofadded bank recapitalization. We are in the early rounds of an expanding crisis in Europe.


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ELEVATED RISK

As we stated at the beginning of this report, the market action since March 2009 is a bear market counter rally thathas completed the classic ending 5 Wave 3-3-3-3-3 diagonal pattern we have been predicting since March 2009.The Bear Market, which started in 2000, will resume in full force once a broad 'rounded top' formation is completed

with cascading weakness across multiple markets presently being clearly evident. The rounded top formation isnot yet completed.

We are now in the midst of a Global 'rolling top'. We are seeing broad based weakening analytics and cascadingwarning signals. This behavior is typically seen near major reversals. It is all part of a final topping formation anda long term right shoulder technical construction pattern. I expect the rounded top to be shown to have beencentered on the markets June 17th Quadruple Witch. It will take a further 1-2 months to complete.

Rounded Top patterns are extremely difficult to trade as trading reversals are significant and frequent with highvolatility. This adds to the confusion about market direction. The market behavior should be viewed as the market

forces being in the process of systemically changing balance. It is very typical of major reversals.They are protracted affairs.


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SHORT TERM

We are presently completing Wave four of a five wave set down.

TARGETS

We expect the five wave set down to find support around 1075 with the possibility of 1030


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Gordon T LongPublisher & [email protected]

Gordon T Long is not a registered advisor and does not give investment advice. His comments are an expression of opinion only and shouldnot be construed in any manner whatsoever as recommendations to buy or sell a stock, option, future, bond, commodity or any o ther

financial instrument at any time. While he believes his statements to be true, they always depend on the reliability of his own crediblesources. Of course, he recommends that you consult with a qualified investment advisor, one licensed by appropriate regulatory agencies inyour legal jurisdiction, before making any investment decisions, and barring that you are encouraged to confirm the facts on your own beforemaking important investment commitments.

Copyright 2011 Gordon T Long. The information herein was obtained from sources which Mr. Long believes reliable, but he does notguarantee its accuracy. None of the information, advertisements, website links, or any opinions expressed constitutes a solicitation of thepurchase or sale of any securities or commodities. Please note that Mr. Long may already have invested or may from time to time invest insecurities that are recommended or otherwise covered on this website. Mr. Long does not intend to disclose the extent of any currentholdings or future transactions with respect to any particular security. You should consider this possibility before investing in any securitybased upon statements and information contained in any report, post, comment or suggestions you receive from him.
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Gordon T Long - MMC Euro Results Are in Results) 2011.10.11

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