Governance, The State and Politics of Development

8/3/2019 Governance, The State and Politics of Development

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Governance, the State andthe Politics of DevelopmentAdrian Leftwich

ABSTRACTCurrent western aid and development policy aims to promote good gover-nance in the third world. Few would deny that competent, open and fairadministration s both a worthy aim and a self-evident requirement of develop-ment. However, the current orthodoxy clearly illustrates the technicist fallacy,which is implicit in the following quotation from Pope, that the effectiveadministration or management of development is essentially a technical orpractical matter. This article argues that development is fundamentally apolitical matter and that it is illusory to conceive of good governance asindependent of the forms of politics and type of state which alone can gener-ate, sustain and protect it.

For Forms of Government, let fools contest;Whateer is best administered, is best.

(Pope, 1734: Bk 3, lines 303-4).INTRODUCTIONThree majorfeatures define contemporary western aid and overseas develop-ment policy. The first is the use of aid to promote open, market friendly andcompetitive economies (World Bank, 1991: 1). This objective was embodiedin the new conditionality of structural adjustment lending developed in the1980s (Mosley et al., 1991: ch. 1). Two further (and sometimes related)features have been added to the policy in the 1990s. These are support fordemocratization and the improvement of human rights records, on the onehand, and insistence on what has come to be called good governance on theother. Put simply, the overall thrust of this new development orthodoxy isthat societies characterized by these features- ssentially, capitalist democ-racies- romote both peace and prosperity because they generate economicgrowth and do not go to war with each other (Doyle, 1983: Hurd, 1990).

With regard to structural adjustment, however, there is plenty of evidenceto show that where it has taken place, it has not always been an immediate orsufficient guarantee that economies will prosper and development occur: therecord has been very patchy (Mosley et al., 1991: ch. 10; Nelson, 1990~:21-4; World Bank, 1990:2), especially in Africa (Financial Times, 1993:3).I am grateful to David Held, John Peterson, Geoffrey Hawthorn, Peter Larmour andanonymous reviewers for constructive comments on earlier drafts of this paper. I alone,however, am responsible for the arguments developed here.Developmen! and Change Vol. 25 (1994), 363-386.0 Instituteof Social Studies 1994.Publishedby Blackwell Publishers, 108 Cowley Rd, Oxford OX4 lJF, U K .


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364 Adrian Left wichMoreover, adjustment has often had destabilizing effects by imposing heavyburdens on the poor who have responded in predictable ways, as the surge infood riots in the 1980s has shown (Walton and Seddon, 1994: ch. 1).

As for the promotion of democracy, there are powerful theoreticalgrounds for doubting that democratization- specially when premature-can universally provide the appropriate political forms for either goodgovernance or sustained economic development. As Przeworski has argued,social and economic conservatism may be the necessary price for democ-racy (1988: 80). Yet effective development has often required that some quiteradical steps are taken early on in a developmentalcycle. These might includeland reform or wage restraint, which are precisely the kind of measures whichmay alienate major socio-economic groups whose consent is necessary forstable democracy. There is also abundant empirical evidence to show thatmany of the successful examples of late development since the mid-nineteenth century, as in Germany, Japan, Korea or Thailand, have occurredunder conditions which have not remotely approximated competitive democ-racy (Amsden, 1991; Fukui, 1992; Gerschenkron, 1962; Girling, 198 l),though some have moved or are now moving in a democratic direction, as inIndonesia or Korea (Liddle, 1992; Chung-in Moon, 1988). As I have arguedelsewhere (Leftwich, 1993: 610-1 5 ) , democratization in the socio-politicaland economic conditions which prevail in much of the third world andelsewhere is likely to engender political turbulence and also blow stablemarket friendly development strategies wildly off course. As the 1990sunfold, therefore, it seems likely that we shall see a period of democraticreversal, not consolidation, in much of the developing world and parts ofeastern Europe.

But what of good governance? What are its implications for develop-ment? While it can hardly be doubted that this is an essential feature of anysuccessful development process, I argue that the current preoccupation withgood governance is naive and simplistic. It is part of the technicist illusion,illustrated by Popes quotation at the start of this article, which holds thatthere is always an administrative or managerial fix in the normally difficultaffairs of human societies and organizations, and that this also applies to thefield of development. This is especially noticeable in the World Banksapproach which presents governance almost as if it were an autonomousadministrative capacity, detached from the turbulent world of politics andthe structure and purpose of the state. Where good governance is presentedas part of a wider conception of democratic governance (as in the case ofmajor western governments), there appears to be little awareness of how fewdemocracy-sustainingconditions may be found in many third world societies(Gills and Rocamora, 1992: 50411).1. This is part of a wider argument about the centrality o f politics in development (Leftwich,

1994).


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The Politics of Development 365Against this approach I shall argue that an effective public capacity for

promoting development is not a function of good governance, as currentlyunderstood, but of the kind of politics and state that can alone generate,sustain and protect it. As the empirical evidence shows, it has been theexistence of effective developmental states (whether democratic or not)which has accounted for the most successful records of economic develop-ment in the third world over the last thirty years. Unattractive as many ofthese states may be from a liberal or socialist point of view, they have beenhighly effective in raising the material welfare of the majority of their citizenswithin a generation. Understanding the institutional structures and politicsof these states is a contribution which the discipline of Politics can uniquelymake. I shall thus also be arguing the more general case for bringing Politicsback centrally into Development Studies, from where it has been excludedfor too long.Before doing so, however, let me define briefly the conception of politicsused here (Leftwich, 1983: ch. 1). I start from the assumption that humansocieties are characterized by a diversity of interests, preferences, values andideas. Each of these constitutes or directly involves resources, or ways ofdoing things with resources, which individuals or groups seek to promote orprotect. In general, people prefer to get their way: but they also have to livetogether and cooperate if they are to prosper, and so constant war andoutright victory in dispute is not a viable long-term solution to the problemof diversity of interests, although it often happens. With one possibleexceptioq2 the human species is the only one to have evolved a set ofconscious processes for trying to sort out or resolve these differences. Theseprocesses are what I call politics, which I define as all the activities of conflict,cooperation and negotiation involved in the use, production and distributionof resources, whether material or ideal, and whether at local, national orinternational levels. It will be clear from this definition why all developmentis so inescapably political, for at any point in any developmental sequencewhat is crucially at issue is how resources are to be used and distributed innew ways and the inevitable disputes arising from calculations about whowill win and who will lose as a result.ORIGINS OF THE CONCERN WITH GOVERNANCE3In contemporary usage, the concept of good governance has two mainmeanings. The first and more limited meaning is associated with the WorldBank (see below) which interprets it in primarily administrative and mana-gerial terms. The second meaning, associated with western governments, is

2. The best account of this may be found in de Waals classic study of Chimpanzee Politics(1982).3. In this and the next section, I have drawn on my Governance, Democracy andDevelopment in the Third World (Leftwich, 1993).


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366 Adrian Leftwichmore political. While it involves a concern for sound administration, it alsoincludes an insistence on competitive democratic politics as well. The twomeanings are often confused with each other, and sometimes overlap, butthey need to be kept distinct. For the purposes of this paper, I concentrate onthe first and narrower administrative meaning since the second and widerversion is much more concerned with the relationship of democracy anddevelopment, which I have dealt with elsewhere (Leftwich, 1993).

It also needs to be said that insistence on good governance and democracyas a condition of aid is not altogether new in the history of western aid policy.Such conditionality, for instance, lay at the heart of President Kennedysdoomed Alliance for Progress initiative in Latin America in the 1960s(Robinson, 1993: 58-9). However, concern to promote good governance (inLatin America and elsewhere) was in practice regularly eclipsed by foreignpolicy considerations or overseas economic interests. Indeed, by their owncurrent criteria, western governments and the major internationa: institu-tions, the World Bank and the International Monetary Fund, regularlysupported bad governance and cruelly authoritarian regimes. For instance,forbidden by its Articles of Agreement from using explicitly politicalcriteriain its lending operations (IBRD, 1989: 8), the World Bank has loaned to bothdemocratic and non-democratic member governments, whether military orcivil. Western governments regularly provided systematic economic, politicaland military aid for authoritarian regimes such as Argentina, Chile underPinochet, Iran and South Korea, as well as some of the least liberal, mostcorrupt or straightforwardly incompetent governments, such as Iraq, Zaire,Haiti and much of sub-Saharan Africa (Barya, 1993: 18).

Why did all this change? Why did western governments begin to take aserious interest in good governance and democracy from the late 1980s? Ithink there have been four main influences: the experience of structuraladjustment lending, the dominance of official neo-liberalism (or neo-conservatism) in the west, the collapse of official communist regimes and therise of pro-democracy movements in the developing world and elsewhere.

The experience of structural adjustment in the 1980sStructural adjustment is the generic term used to describe a package ofeconomic and institutional measures which the IMF, the World Bank andindividual western aid donors- ometimes singly, but more often in concert- ought to persuade many developing countries to adopt during the 1980sin return for a new wave of policy-oriented loans (Cammack et al., 1993: 11-13; Mosley et al., 1991: ch. 1). The aim of adjustment lending was to shatterthe dominant post-war state-led development paradigm and overcome theproblems of developmental stagnation by promoting open and free competi-tive market economies, supervised by minimal states. The general pattern ofadjustment packages usually involved two main stages, stabilization and


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The P olitics of Development 367adjustment. Stabilization normally meant immediate devaluation and oftenquite drastic public expenditure cuts. Adjustment followed and sought totransform economic structures and institutions through varying doses ofderegulation, privatization, dismantling or diminishing allegedly over-sizedand rambling public bureaucracies, reducing subsidies and encouragingrealistic prices to emerge as a stimulus to greater productivity, especially forexport (Mosley and Toye, 1988: 403-41; Nelson, 1990a: 2-5).

When people change the way they use resources, however, they changetheir relations with each other (Stretton, 1976: 3). Structural adjustment inthe economies of developing countries certainly involved profound change inthe use, production and distribution of resources. This has inevitably givenrise to both winners and losers (Haggard and Kaufmann, 1989b), as inGhana, Zambia and Nigeria (Callaghy, 1990), and in some new democra-cies (Haggard and Kaufmann, 1989a). Those who stood to lose oftenincluded bureaucrats, public sector workers, party officials, farmers andmanufacturers. They all had something to fear from reduction in the size ofthe public service, diminution of the power of the party-state, more compe-tition, withdrawal of subsidies and freer trade. But the poor also lost, for theyoften experienced sharp increases in basic food prices as well as medical andeducation services (Bienen and Waterbury, 1989; Demery and Addison,1987; Glewwe and de Tray, 1988;R.H. Green, 1986,1988; Longhurst et al.,1988).

These are some of the reasons why adjustment has been so political(Nelson, 1989), for no significant change occurs in society without destabiliz-ing some status quo, without decoupling some coalition and buildinganother, without challenging some interests and promoting others. Thuswhat became clear in the course of the 1980s was that the ability to plan andimplement adjustment was largely a consequence of both political commit-ment, capacity and skill, as well as bureaucratic competence, independenceand probity (Healey and Robinson, 1992: 91, 155).4

However those who stood to lose from adjustment were often located in,or closely associated with, the state apparatus; hence they could use theirinfluence to curtail or dilute the programmes, and often did. Paradoxically,therefore, effective adjustment in practice has required a strong, determinedand relatively autonomous state, whether democratic or not (Nelson, 1989:9-10; Whitaker, 1991: 345). This had been the case in Ghana (Callaghy,1990), Chile (Stallings, 1990), Costa Rica (Nelson, 1990b), Turkey (Mosley etal., 1991: ch. 10) and Indonesia (Soesastro, 1989); but not in Zambia

4. John W aterbury (1989: 39, 5 9 , amongst others , has made the crucial point that effectiveadjustment involves the careful management of a regimes basic support coalition, even inauthoritarian systems. This only serves to highlight the centrality of politics in all forms ofchange and development, especially where radical shifts in resource use and distributionare entailed.


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368 Adrian Leftwich(Gulhati, 1989), India (Kohli, 1989), the Philippines (Haggard, 1990a),Jamaica (Nelson, 1990b) or Zaire (Callaghy, 1989). The significance of astrong state seems to have been lost on the prevailing orthodoxy which aims,in part, to reduce the scope and scale of state power through both economicand political reform.The experience with adjustment confronted the international institutionsand bilateral donors with the reality of incompetent and often corruptgovernment in m any developing countries (Lancaster, 1993: 9; World Bank,1991: 128-47). This was especially true of sub-Saharan A frica and it was thistha t had , in part, led the B ank to identify poo r governance as a major sourceof the African crisis in its major report on the continent, From Crisis toSustainable Growth (World Bank, 1989). There was some limited acknowl-edgem ent of the political causes and context of this crisis of governance in thereport but in practice it said little about the state or the politics ofdevelopment. Instead it focused single-mindedly on managerial and adminis-trative issues, as became clear in its formal statement on Governance andDevelopment (World Bank, 1992b). In this and o ther Bank publications (suchas the influential World Development Report, 1991), the Bank committeditself to the seemingly more apolitical and largely technical strategy ofimproving governance. Even this was something of a sleight of hand, for theapparently politically-neutral recommendations presupposed profoundpolitical change and represented not simply an economic vision but also apolitical one. Fo r what was advocated was a slim but efficient adm inistrativestate, detached from its prior pervasive involvement in economic matters.While such a state might undertake basic investment in, and management of,essential physical and social infrastructure, its central role was to encouragethe free and fair play of market forces in an im partial, open an d accountablemanner (W orld Bank, 1991: 4-1 1).

The political influence of the neo-classical counter-revohtionThe Bank and the IM F have a remarkable operational autonomy and areoften independent sources of important development ideas and policy.Politically, however, they are ultimately the creatures of the ir mem bers. Thestructure of vo ting power in these institutions is such that the influence of theUSA, Japan, Germany, the United Kingdom and France is overwhelming(World Bank , 1992c: 237). Fo r this reason the new orthodoxy in Bank andIM F policy came to reflect the emerging neo-liberal ascendancy in economictheory and public policy from the late 1970s in these countries (Killick, 1989:9-20; Toye, 1987: ch. 2). However, neo-liberalism is not only an economicdoctrine but a political one as well, involving strong normative and func-tionalist theories of politics and the state.In norm ative terms neo-liberal theory celebrates individual economic andpolitical freedom as representing the good life itself. Beyond the preserva tion


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The P olitics of Development 369of peace and order, it is hostile to state limitation on the rights of individuals,irrespective of race, sex or creed. Neo-liberals, especially rightwing liber-tarians such as Nozick (1974), also argue that state intervention in the econ-omy or official discrimination imposes constraints on the inalienable rightsand liberties of individuals, interferes with freedom of choice, distorts thefree play of markets and thus harms economic development (D . C. Green,1986: 82-90; Olsen, 1982: ch. 6).

In functional terms, neo-liberal political theory asserts that democraticpolitics and a slim, efficient and accountable public bureaucracy are notsimply desirable but also necessary for a thriving free market economy, andvice versa, for the two are inextricably implicated with each other (Friedmanand Friedman, 1980: 21). Neo-liberals thus regard an obese state apparatuswith a large stake in economic life as being both inefficient from anadministrative point of view and also incompatible with an independent andvibrant civil society which is held to be the basis of effective democracy.Hence neo-liberal developmentalists often argue that poor developmentrecords and adjustment failures have been a direct consequence of authori-tarian rule and deficient governance, all arising from excessive concentrationof both economic and political power in the hands of the state (Lal, 1983:103-9), which is incompatible with accountable and responsive good gover-nance in a free economy. This concentration of power also explains regimereluctance or inability to institute political liberalization and bureaucraticcontraction. For all these reasons, resurgent neo-liberal theory from the endof the 1970s spurred western governments and international institutions togo on from promoting economic liberalization to making good governance(and democracy) a condition of development assistance.

The collapse of communismThe collapse of Eastern European communist regimes was an importantstrategic factor which helped to shape the emergence of western interest inpromoting good governance. The new international circumstances whichprevailed after 1990 meant that the west could now attach explicit politicaland institutional conditions to its aid without fear of losing its third worldallies or clients to communism. The fate of twentieth-century communismalso served to confirm neo-liberal theory that bureaucratically sclerotic, non-democratic collectivist systems were both unable to produce sustainedeconomic growth and unable to change. Corruption, economic mismanage-ment, inefficiency and stagnation all flowed directly from their grotesquebureaucracies and lack of popular democratic participation. Political liberal-ization, administrative decentralization, reducing bureaucratic controls andthe promotion of good governance on the essentially western model wereseen as necessary conditions for economic liberalization and growth (WorldBank, 1991: 20).


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370 Adrian LeftwichThis explicit linkage of economic and political liberalism in the theory and

practice of good governaiice is nowhere better illustrated than in the Articlesof Agreement of the new European Bank for Reconstruction and Develop-ment (EBRD), established in 1991 to help restructure the Eastern Europeanand former Soviet economies. Unlike the World Bank, it has typically neo-liberal economic and political objectives which are to promote multi-partydemocracy, pluralism and market economics (EBRD, 1991: Article 1).

The impact of the prodemocracy movementsFinally, the pro-democracy movements in Latin America, the Philippinesand latterly Eastern Europe in the 1980s stimulated similar movementselsewhere (Huntington, 1991: ch. 1). In Africa, between 1989 and 1992,internal and external pressures prompted steps in the direction of democrati-zation in a host of countries, from Nigeria to Zaire and Guinea to Angola,though seldom without profound resistance from incumbent regimes (Riley,1991: 17-21). Democratization in Asia - hough stalled in China andMyanmar, for example- as advanced in the Philippines, South Korea,Taiwan, Bangladesh and even Nepal. The west drew legitimacy for its pro-democracy policies from these movements and can thus be said to besupporting popular and intellectual demands for good governance in thosesocieties (Ake, 1991).While the west may thus be said to be demonstrating its genuine preferencefor liberal democracy (other things being equal), some theorists are inclinedto see the contemporary orthodoxy as the most recent manifestation of theonward march of global capitalism, which had been delayed by the bipolarworld (Barya, 1993: 1617; Gills and Rocamora, 1992: 506). What stepsmarked the emergence of this new concern for good governance, and whatdoes it mean in practice?

GOOD GOVERNANCE EMERGENCE AND MEANINGS

EmergenceThe first official appearance of the contemporary notion of good governancecame in the 1989 World Bank report on Africa, which argued that Underly-ing the litany of Africas development problems is a crisis of governance, bywhich was meant the exercise of political power to manage a nations affairs(World Bank, 1989: 60). This report was followed, between 1989 and 1991,by a steady flow of pronouncements on governance, democracy and develop-ment from a variety of sources. These included the OECD (1 989); the NordicMinisters of Development (1990); the US, British and French governments


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The Politics of D evelopment 371(Africa Conjidentiul, 1990; Chalker, 1991; Cohen, 1991; House ofCommons, 1990; Hurd, 1990); the Commission of the European Communi-ties (CEC, 1991); the World Bank and the United Nations DevelopmentProgramme (UNDP, 1991; World Bank, 1991, 1992b). The promotion ofgood governance and democracy was in turn supported by many inter-governmental and regional organizations such as the Organization forAfrican Unity (OAU), The European Council and the CommonwealthHeads of Government ( IDS Bulletin, 1993:7).

The views of these organizations on the relationship between governance,the state and development were not identical. While some stressed democ-racy or the protection of human rights, others emphasized sound adminis-tration or, in the Bank's terms, management, as key causal factors indevelopment. All, however, failed to explore the kind of politics or statewhich might be necessary for housing good governance. Nonetheless, despitethese differences and omissions, the underlying shape of the concept of goodgovernance soon became clear.

Meaning of good governanceGood governance can be said to have three main levels of meaning whichmay be defined as systemic, political and administrative. First, from a broadsystemic point of view, the concept of governance is wider than that ofgovernment which conventionally refers to the formal institutional structureand location of authoritative decision-making in the modern state. Govern-ance, on the other hand, refers to a looser and wider distribution of bothinternal and external political andeconomic power (Lofchie, 1989: 121-2). Inthis broad sense, governance denotes the structures of political and, crucially,economic relationships and rules by which the productive and distributive lifeof a society is governed. In short, it refers to a system of political and socio-economic relations or, more loosely, a regime. In current usage there can beno doubt that good governance in this systemic sense means a democraticcapitalist regime presided over by a minimal state which is part of the widergovernance of the new world order (Chalker, 1991: 2-3; House of Commons,1990: Cols. 1235-1299).

The second, more limited and obviously political sense of good governanceclearly presupposes such a regime. But it also explicitly means a stateenjoying legitimacy and authority, derived from a democratic mandate andbuilt on the traditional liberal notion of a clear separation of legislative,executive and judicial powers. Whether presidential or parliamentary, thispresupposesa pluralist polity with a freely and regularly elected representa-tive legislature, with the capacity at least to influence and check executivepower. This is the position of most western governments.

Finally, from a narrow administrative point of view, good governancemeans an efficient, independent, accountable and open public service. This is.


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312 Adrian Leftwichthe World Banks position which is fully outlined in its latest definitivestatement on Governance and Development which treats good governance assynonymous with sound development management(World Bank, 1992b: 1).This policy document focuses on four main areas of public administration ingeneral and public sector management in particular, which it considers fallwithin its mandate.(i) Accountability, which in essence means holding officials responsible fortheir actions.(ii) A legal framewo rk fo r development, which means a structure of rules andlaws which provide clarity, predictability and stability for the private sector,which are impartially and fairly applied to all, and which provide the basisfor conflict resolution through an independent judicial system.(iii) Information, by which is meant that information about economicconditions, budgets, markets and government intentions is reliable andaccessible to all, something which is crucial for private sector calculations.(iv) Finally, insistence on transparency is basically a call for open govern-ment, to enhance accountability, limit corruption and stimulate consultativeprocesses between government and private interests over policy develop-ment.

It should be clear, then, that in its most extensive form the idea of goodgovernance is not simply a new technical answer to the difficult problems ofdevelopment. Good governance is best understood as an intimate part of theemerging politics of the new world order. Clearly, the barely submergedstructural model and ideal of politics, economics and society on which thenotion of good governance rests is nothing less than that of western liberal(or social) democracy- he focal concern and teleological terminus of muchmodernization theory.

Whatever the merits and limitations of that world view, who couldpossibly be against good governance, at least in its limited administrativesense, as presented by the World Bank? For is it not the case that any society- hether liberal or socialist- ust be better offwith a public service thatis both efficient and honest, open and accountable, and with a judicial systemthat is independent and fair? In this sense, at least, the World Banksconception of good governance is unexceptional: it re-identifies precisely theprinciples of administration that have long been argued as being of benefit todeveloping countries. They are impeccably Weberian in spirit, if not letter(Weber, 1964: 329-41). Even in the most unpromising third world circum-stances, good governance in this limited adminstrative sense must be betterfor development than its opposite, bad governance.

However, the Banks prescription for good governance is naive, whereasWebers was not (Beetham, 1974: ch.4), because it fails to recognize thatgood governance is a function of state character and capacity which is inturn a function of politics. In short, the failure to engage with the history,practice and theory of the state as an agent in the developmental process is


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The Politics of Development 373the major shortcoming of the contemporary preoccupation with governancein development. For it has become clear that, at least in its critical earlystages, sustained economic growth in late developers (whether marketfriendly or not) is the product of patterns of politics which tend toconcentrate in the state both the political will and the bureaucratic com-petence to establish a developmental momentum in a competitively hostileinternational environment. It is these characteristics which distinguish devel-opmental states from the general pattern of incompetent and often cruelstatism in the third world, as I will elaborate later. The fact that few states indeveloping countries have had those capacities is entirely beside the point.The point is that without such developmental states, the economic prospectsof most poor societies will remain bleak. This is precisely why the conceptionof good governance, presented as the necessary administrative capacity fordevelopment, is no substitute for a conception of the developmental state inwhich the role of politics and the state is paramount. It is to this that I nowturn.

THEIDEA OF THE DEVELOPMENTAL STATE

Meaning and backgroundThe idea that the government should have a role in promoting developmentis not new. However, in almost every context in which this issue has beenaddressed, from Germany in the 1840s to Botswana in the 197Os, it hasalways been profoundly political in origin and explicitly statist in focus.

In modern times, the idea may be traced back to Friedrich Lists classiccritique (1885) of Quesnay and Smith, where he argued that the lessadvanced nations first required artificial means to catch up with theadvanced nations. It was the task of national political economy, and hencethe state, to accomplish the economical development of the nation and toprepare it for admission into the universal society of the future (List, 1885:175). Explicitly (and presciently, remembering Japan and Korea in thetwentieth century), List claimed that a perfectly developed manufacturingindustry, an important mercantile marine, and foreign trade on a really largescale, can only be attained by means of the interposition of the power of theState (1885: 178).

Marx too (in the second of his two main theories of the state) hinted atsomething recognizable as a rudimentary developmental state (Marx,1852: 238) when he referred to the completely autonomous position of thestate in France under Louis Bonaparte. This state arose as a result of abalance of class forces in society, and so was not the captive of any, butnonetheless acted to further the interests of capitalism in general. In Elstersopinion this version of the autonomous capitalist state was the cornerstone


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374 Adrian Leftwichof Marxs theory after 1850 (Elster, 1985: 426), and was later developed byEuropean Marxists, such as Poulantzas (1973). Moreover, Elster argues, thistheory corresponds well with the actual historical development of thecapitalist state in European development as an active, autonomous agentfrom the sixteenth century onwards, pursuing its own interests by harnessingthose of others to its purposes (Elster, 1985: 426) .

In the twentieth century, the idea of the state as an agent of developmentcame to be part of the official policy of western colonial powers in the inter-war years. However little they may have done in practice, colonial govern-ments came to believe that they had a special role in promoting the socio-economic progress of the colonies and their people. Interestingly, in the lightof current official theory on the relationship of democracy and development,the explicitly non-democratic corollary of this view was that politicaladvancement for the colonial peoples would (one day, perhaps) follow. Allthis was based on a theory of politics and the state which held thatdemocratic self-governance was a consequence of economic developmentand that premature democratization was dangerous. These ideas wereexplicit, for instance, in British colonial policy, especially after the rise ofcolonial development and welfare provisions in the 1930s (Lee, 1967), andwere also embodied in the idea of the beamptenstaut (official state) in DutchIndonesia (McVey, 1982).

At the same time, in the heart of Europe, driven by the fiercely competitivepolitics of nationalism and implemented by a centralizing, integrative andmanagerial state, was the developmental dictatorship of Italian fascism(Gregor, 1979: 303). Regimes of this kind were not based on the Weberianvision of a minimal state and a detached bureaucracy setting a frameworkand impartially applying rules for private economic actors. On the contrary,the whole purpose and structure of this kind of developmental drive involveda dynamic, interventionist and hegemonic state (Gregor, 1979: 314) whichwould smash the old order and bring about the progressive victory ofmodern capitalist industrialization. In short, it was a developmental statestructure based on the political energies of nationalism with industrialmodernization in its sights.

The notion that the state has much more than a minimal supervisory rolehas been central to development theory and practice, especially in the post-war era, and has also been an article of faith of economic planners anddevelopment economists (Roberston, 1984: 7-68). But it was only whenpolitical scientists began to look at some of the political characteristics of theeconomically more successful developing countries that preliminary ideasabout the provenance, structure and purposes of developmental states beganto form.An early example of this was the concept of the bureaucratic polity,initially developed by Fred Riggs to explain the structure of the Thai state,arising from its nationalist political origins and purposes after the revolu-tion against the absolute monarchy in 1932 (Riggs, 1966). In the 1970s this


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The Politics of Development 375notion of the bureaucratic polity was adapted to explain the particular formsand features of the Indonesian state under Soehartos New Order after 1966,which has been very successful developmentally but bears no relationship toany contemporary model of good governance. The bureaucratic polity innon-democratic Indonesia has been described as a political system in whichpower and participation in national decisions are limited almost entirely tothe employees of the state, particularly the officer corps and the highest levelsof the bureaucracy, including especially the highly trained specialists knownas the technocrats (Jackson, 1978: 3). The military apart, this has also beentrue for some of the successful developmentaldemocracies, such as Botswanaand Singapore, sometimes described as administrative states (Crouch,1984: 11; Picard, 1987: 220). The political importance of bureaucratic politieswas stressed, too, by S. P.Huntington in the 1960s. He emphasized thecritical developmental significance of concentrating political power in amodernizing and innovative state. Such power was essential for the develop-mental success of such states, especially in order to undertake the politicaldestruction of those existing social forces, interests, customs and institu-tions. ..which have held back development and which continue to opposemodernization (Huntington, 1968: 141-2).

Based on his work in South Asia (and India in particular), Gunnar Myrdal(1970: 229) drew the elementary distinction between soft and strong statesin the third world. He was seeking to explain what he saw as the feebledevelopmental record of a weak Indian state, paralysed by the grip of specialinterests and enervated by the societys lack of social discipline. What wasneeded if Indian poverty was to be overcome was not a minimal state but astrong state, which could break free of the clamour and especially theinfluence of the special interests.

Despite these important contributions, it is only in the last fifteen years orso that political scientists have begun to look more closely and comparativelyat the political causes and conditions which have enabled some states to becapable of effective developmental action but not others (Nordlinger, 1987;ODonnell, 1979; Stepan, 1978). An interesting example was Ellen Trim-bergers political explanation of how autonomous and developmentallyprogressive bureaucratic states have emerged in the third world. Focusingcomparatively on Japan, Turkey, Egypt and Peru, she argued that thebureaucratic state apparatus achieved its relative autonomy when, first, thoseholding high military or civil office were not drawn from dominant landed,commercial or industrial classes; and, second, where they did not immedi-ately form close relations with these classes after achieving power (Trim-berger, 1978: 4). Despite its limitations, her account offered insights intosome of the political and structural characteristics of strong states.In none of these early arguments was the term developmental stateexplicitly used, nor was there much effort to specify either the preconditionsor characteristics of this type of state. As in much development economics onleft and right (Gillis et al., 1992:25;Green, 1974: 15@, the state was assigned a


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376 Adrian Leftwichmajor role, but the po litical conditions for its effective discharge of tha t rolewere never identified. Indeed, and significantly, it had been the failure bypolitical scientists to analyse the political anatomy of contemporary andhistorical developm ental states that, in part, allowed anti-statist theorists toberate all state developmentalism, rather than discriminate between thesuccessful and the unsuccessful. It was only w ith the pub lication of ChalmersJohnsons seminal work on Japan (1982) that the phrase developmentalstate made its formal debut and that a serious attempt was made toconcep tualize it.Crucially, Johnson distinguished the developmental orientation of such astate from the Soviet-type command economy state, on the one hand, a nd theregulatory orientation of the typical liberal-democratic state, on the otherhand, which is the state ideal tha t lies a t the heart of the contemporary theoryof good governance. He argued that while it was dedicated to the marketeconomy, the Japanese developmental state had nonetheless been pre-eminent in setting . . . substantive social and economic goals (Johnson,1982: 19) for market agents. The conventional regulatory state, by contrast(as in good governance theory), merely established the legal and institutionalframew ork in which the private sector was left entirely free to set goals foritself. A further feature of the developmental state was the power andautonom y of its elite bureaucracy which, in the Japanese case, was centred incertain key ministries, notably the Ministry of International Trade andIndustry (MITI). The state in Japan sought and maintained intimaterelations with major actors in the private sector and sought their cooper-ation. But it was dominant in setting and gaining agreement about far-reaching national policy goals, which were largely determined by thebureaucratic elite, the ep icentre of decision-making for much of this century(Fukui, 1992: 200-7). Johnson finally stressed tha t the Japanese developm en-tal state must always be understood politically. He argued that the prove-nance of the Japanese developmental state lay essentially in the urgentpolitical and nationalist objectives of the late developer, concerned to protectand promote itself in a hostile world. It arises from a desire to assume fullhuman status by taking part in an industrial civilization, participation inwhich alone enables a nation or a n individual to com pel others to treat it asan equal (Johnson, 1982: 25). In this respect Johnson echoes the argum entmade by List about G ermany in the 1840s; by M ussolini about Italy in theinter-war years (Gregor, 1979); by Stalin in 1931 (Deutscher, 1966: 328); bythe leadership of the Chinese Communist Party after 1949 (White, 1985:208); and by P resident Park Chung-hee in Korea in 1963 (Lim, 1986: 73).There have been a variety of contributions to the theory and practice ofdevelopm ental states since then: by Gordon White in relation to socialiststates (1984, 1985); by White, Robert Wade, F. C. Deyo and others inrelation to East Asia (Deyo, 1987; White an d W ade, 1985) and m ost recentlyby Ro bert W ade in relation to Taiwan, under the revealing title Managing theMarket (Wade, 1990).


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The Politics of Development 377,Table 1. Selected average annual rates of growth of GNP per capita: 1965to 1990 (%)

~~

A Democratic Regimes:JamaicaTrinidad and TobagoVenezuelaSenegalIndiaSri LankaMalaysiaCosta R i aBotswanaMauritiusSingapore

- 1.30.0- 1.0- .61.92.94.01.48.43.26.5

B Non-democratic Regimes:Zaire - .2Zambia - 1.9Libya - .0Nigeria 0.1South KoreaTaiwanIndonesiaBrazilChinaAlgeriaThailand

7.17.04.53.35.82.44.4

~~ ~~ ~ ~~~

Sources: Council for Economic Planning and Development (1992); World Bank (1992a).

However, the important point to make about this body of work on thestate and the politics of development is that, unlike current theories ofgovernance, it has never sought to depoliticize the necessarily politicalprocesses of development by emphasizing apparently technical bureaucraticfactors (Whateer is best administered is best). Nor has it sought to deflectattention from the character, structure and purposes of the state which alonecan both provide the developmental will and also enable good governance tohappen. Contrary to Popes view on the matter, contestation about forms ofgovernment is not a fools contest: it is a contest between different interestsabout power and the institutions which distribute it (Przeworski, 1988: 64;Rueschemeyer et al., 1992: 77). As the studies I have referred to above allshow, the form and distribution of power, and the manner of its use in andthrough the state, are critical for development. Comparative empiricalevidence both illustrates and sustains this point, as the next section shows.DEVELOPMENTALTATESTable 1 shows that both democratic and non-democratic states haveachieved high average rates of growth since 1965.From these data one may isolate a small group of eight states which havehad average rates of growth in excess of 4 per cent per annum: Malaysia,Botswana, Singapore, Taiwan, Korea, Indonesia, China and Thailand. Inmost respects they could not be more different. Apart from most being foundin East or South-east Asia, they differ profoundly with respect to size,population, natural endowments, history, regime type, social and culturalstructure, religion and even economic policy. Yet, by any standard, they have


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37 8 Adrian Leftwichall achieved remarkable developmental records. What then do they have incommon that might explain their achievements?I suggest that it is the natureof their politics (and especially the character of the states which these politicshave generated) that is central, not their modes of governance. A number ofcommon features which these states share suggesta preliminary model of theeffective developmental state, which is very different to the model of goodgovernance.

(i) Whether democratic or not, developmental states have all been de factoor de jure one-party states for much of the past thirty years, although ingeneral the democratic group (Botswana, Singapore and Malaysia) have hadbetter human rights ratings than the non-democratic group (Thailand,Indonesia, Taiwan, Korea and China) (Humana, 1987:xiv-xv). Whereas thenon-democratic group has been ruled by military-backed authoritarianregimes (Thailand has had short democratic interludes), the democraticstates have been ruled either by a single party (the BDP in Botswana and thePAP in Singapore) or, as in Malaysia, by a coalition in which a single party(UMNO) has dominated. The effect has been to concentrate very consider-able and unchallenged political power at the top in these states, thus usuallyenhancing political stability and continuity in policy.

(ii) These states have been dominated by purposeful and determineddevelopmental Clites, which have also been relatively uncorrupt, at least bycomparison with Haiti, Zaire and the Philippines under Marcos. As in Japan(Muramatsu and Krauss, 1984), these states have also been characterized bya well-documented and intimate linkage between political leaders and topbureaucrats (Crouch, 1979: 576;Egedy, 1988:6 1 ; Liddle, 1992: 448; Puthu-cheary, 1978: 40). The solidity of these Clites has been enhanced by a densetraffic between the top levels of the civil and military bureaucracy and highpolitical office, something which is very rare in western liberal democraciesand entirely alien to the contemporary philosophy and specificationsof goodgovernance theory. For instance, in 1984 almost half of the eleven cabinetmembers in Botswana were former civil servants (Charlton, 1991: 273), ashas also been the case in Soehartos Indonesia (Crouch, 1979: 576). Whilethese Clites have regularly experienced internal differences, they all appear tohave been united by a determined national developmental objective, alwaysfuelled by varying combinations of political, ideological and nationalistconsiderations, as well as internal and external security threats. The obviousexamples are South Koreas and Taiwans fierce competition with NorthKorea and China respectively, Thailands fear of regional communistthreats, Botswanas anxiety for maximum economic development, given thepower and threat of South Africa, and Singapores concern about itsposition, sandwiched between Islamic Indonesia and Malaysia.(iii) A further shared characteristic of the greatest importance has been therelative autonomy of the developmental Clites and the state institutions whichthey command. By this is meant that the state (or its leadership) has beenable to achieve relative independence from the demands of special interests


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The Politics of Development 379and could, and did, over-ride them in the putative national interest (Crouch,1984: 13,32,75; Haggard, 1990b: 264; Holm, 1988: 187;Johnson, 1987: 156-8;Liddle, 1991; Nordlinger, 1987: 369-71; Wade, 1990: 375-6). As with otheraspects of these states, this again is best explained politically with respect tothe routes by which the regimes came to power or retained it: either byrevolution, conquest or coup by modernizing elites (e.g. Thailand from 1923,China from 1949, Korea from 1960, Taiwan from 1949, Indonesia from1966), or by an electoral process that has nonetheless consistently yielded onedominant party of government (as in Botswana, Malaysia and Singapore).The combinedpoliticul strength and continuity of these developmental states,whether democratic or not, has clearly differentiated them from others, suchas Jamaica, Sri Lanka, Nigeria or India.

(iv) Elite determination and the relative autonomy of the state has helpedto shape very powerful, highly competent and insulated economic bureaucra-cies with authority in directing and managing economic and social develop-ment. The template for this might be thought of as MITI in Japan (asJohnson pointed out) but examples may be found as far afield as the Ministryof Finance and Development Planning in Botswana (Holm, 1988: 187-97),the Economic Planning Board in Korea (Luedde-Neurath, 1985: 196) andthe considerable policy autonomy of the Economic Development Board inSingapore (Haggard, 1990b: 113-14). What differentiates these economichigh commands (or pilot agencies in Johnsons language) in developmentalstates from the generality of planning institutions in so many developingcountries is their real power, authority, technical competence and insulationin shaping development policy. Their existence, form and function, onceagain, needs to be understood as a consequence of the politically-drivenurgency for development and the politics of a strong state, and not as anattribute of the principles of good governance. Indeed, the idea of anauthoritative economic bureaucracy shaping the goals and strategy ofdevelopment policy fundamentally contradicts the contemporary theory of,and prescription for, good governance.

(v) In all developmental states, civil society has experienced weakness,flattening or control at the hands of the state. The institutions of civil society(non-governmental organizations) have, at least until relatively recently,been smashed, penetrated, dominated or come to be financed by the state. Italmost seems as if this has been a condition for the emergence andconsolidation of the developmental state. This is most evident in the harsherauthoritarian developmental states, such as China or Indonesia (Gold,1990: 18-25; Sundhaussen, 1989: 462-3), but it has also been the case indemocratic developmental states, such as Botswana (Molutsi and Holm,1990: 327). This has enhanced state power in ways that have been develop-mentally useful, as the next point indicates.

(vi) The power, authority and relative autonomy of these states wereestablished at an early point in their modern developmental history, wellbefore national or foreign capital became important or potentialiy influen-


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380 Adrian Leftwichtial. This, coupled with the weakness of civil society, or its domination by thestate, has been significant in enhancing their capacities vis Ci vis privateeconomic interests, internal or external. It has given them much power indetermining the role which both foreign and national capital has played inthe developmental process. This has been especially obvious in the battery ofinstruments which, say, the Korean state assembled to bend national andforeign capital to its developmentalpurposes (Johnson, 1987: 160-4; Mardon,1990: 136). But it is more or less true for all the others, as in Malaysia (Bowie,1991: ch.4). As Robert Wade has pointed out for Taiwan, this has led to thesesocieties being described as corporatist in which the leadership role of thestate in economic matters has been far more important than its followershiprole (Wade, 1990: 295). Unlike Latin America, where powerful landedinterests, an emerging bourgeoisie and foreign capital have been deeplyembedded in political and economic life, developmental states in thesesocieties have for long been the most powerful players in town.

(vii) Finally, there can be little doubt that, whether democratic or not,these have not been particularly pleasant states by either liberal or socialiststandards. They have frowned on dissent, handed out rough and sometimesbrutal treatment to student, labour, political and religious organizationswhich have opposed them, and have used a variety of internal securitymeasures to suppress, banish or eliminate opposition. Although it is notor-iously hard to measure legitimacy, especially under these conditions, it istherefore surprising that even some of the toughest of these regimes, as inIndonesia, appear to have been genuinely popular (Liddle, 1992: 450). Thisis not to say that there have been no protests. On the contrary, these havesometimes been bloody as in the Korean and Taiwanese labour struggles inthe 1980s (Bello and Rosenfeld, 1992: ch. l,13) or the regular student protestsin Bangkok or more recently in Tiananmen Square. But it is at least worthhypothesising that the endurance of this strange mixture of repression andlegitimacy in the politics of these societies is best explained by the generallypositive overall effects of the rapid growth which it has helped to deliver, atleast as measured by the Human Development Index (HDI). On keyindicators of improvement such as per capita income, life expectancy andeducational attainment, these developmental states have delivered the goods.Of 160 countries ranked on a world basis, Korea, Singapore and Malaysiaare in the top 30 per cent, with the others in the top 60 per cent (UNDP,1992:20), way ahead of India, Pakistan, Vietnam, Egypt, Kenya and Bolivia,for instance.

The distinguishing characteristic of developmental states, then, has beenthat their institutional structures (especially their economic bureaucracies)and political objectives have been developmentally-driven, while their devel-opmental purposes have been politically-driven. In short, fundamentallypolitical factors have shaped the thrust and pace of their developmentalstrategies through the structures of the state. These factors have normallyincluded nationalism, ideology, a wish to catch up with the west, as well as


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The Politics of Development 38 1defensive and security/military concerns, all commonly fuelled by regionalcompetition and, sometimes, hostility.

CONCLUSIONSIt is important to welcome the belated interest that international develop-ment institutions like the World Bank have begun to take in questions ofgovernance, but I have tried to show that their current approaches are naiveand limited in their failure to recognize the centrality of politics and the statein development, Good governance is not simply a function of institution-building or heavy doses of training (World Bank, 1991: 234-s), desirable asthey may be. Moreover, good governance, in its limited current conception,is not likely to generate much development on its own. Neither sophisticatedinstitutional innovations nor the best-trained or best-motivated publicservice will be able to withstand the withering effects of corruption or resistthe developmentally-enervating pulls of special or favoured interests if thepolitics and authority of the state do not sustain and protect them. To expectthat stern conditionality will yield good governance and hence developmentin, say, Haiti, Zaire or Myanmar, without recognizing the enormity of thepolitical change that is required for it to happen, is to commit the ultimatetechnicist error.

If overcoming the continuing offence of poverty, ignorance and disease isthe real objective, then calling weakly for good governance in states whichcannot sustain it is not likely to help much in many parts of the developingworld. For the remarkable achievements of the societies discussed have notbeen a function of the kind of depoliticized governance now being urged onother developing societies. On the contrary, their growth has been master-minded by developmental states (both democratic and non-democratic); thatis, states whose politics have concentrated sufficient power, probity, auton-omy and competence at the centre to shape, pursue and encourage theachievement of explicit and nationally-determined developmental objectives,whether by establishing and promoting the conditions of economic growth,by organizing it directly, or by a varying combination of both. It has onlybeen on the basis of their success that some are now beginning to extend orimplement democratic processes.

At almost every point, then, the models of good governance and thedevelopmental state are in conflict. Current official theories of good govern-ance eulogize the minimal state, a Weberian-type bureaucracy, rigorousrespect for human rights, a rich and diverse civil society, political pluralismand a sharp separation of economic and political life. Uncomfortable as itmay be to acknowledge it, the model of the developmental state, on the otherhand, whether democratic or not, entailsa strong and determined state whichprotects a powerful and competent bureaucracy that largely shapes anddirects development policy, a dubious (and sometimes appalling) civil and


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382 Adrian Leftwichhuman rights record, the suppression or control of civil society and a fusion- t least at the top- f the political direction of economic power. Aboveall, both the idea and practice of developmental states illustrate not simplythe importance, but the primacy of politics and the state in development,whereas the somehow lifeless notion of good governance has been evac-uated from them. For all these reasons, in both the analysis and promotionof development, it is time to bring politics back in.

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Adrian Leftwich is Senior Lecturer in Politics at the University of York(Heslington, York YO1 5DD), where he specializes in the politics ofdevelopment. He is currently working on a comparative study ofdevelopmental states. Amongst his publications are Redefining Politics:People, Resources and Power (Methuen, 1983) and States of Develop-ment (Polity, forthcom ing 1994).

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Governance, The State and Politics of Development

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