Graham_The Recovery of Illocutionary Force

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The Recovery of Illocutionary Force Author(s): Keith Graham Source: The Philosophical Quarterly, Vol. 30, No. 119 (Apr., 1980), pp. 141-148Published by: on behalf of the and the Oxford University Press Scots Philosophical Association

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141

DISCUSSION THE RECOVERY OF ILLOCUTIONARY FORCE

BY KEITH GRAHAM

I In How To Do Things With Words J. L. Austin argued that, with minor

exceptions, the issuing of any linguistic utterance is at one and the same time some form of action: that to say something is almost always eo ipso to do something, or to perform what Austin christened an illocutionary act. If this claim is correct, it is likely to have interesting consequences for theories of action. After all, it is very easy to counterpose action and "mere" speech, but if speech is action this may lead to a revision of our ideas about the concept of action itself. Again, if there is anything peculiar or distinctive about illocutionary acts this may affect our views on what is necessary or possible by way of explanation of (this kind of) behaviour.

Such issues, to do with the impact of theories of illocutionary force on our understanding and explanation of behaviour, have been explored in a series of papers by Quentin Skinner'; and in his recently-published Founda- tions of Modern Political Thought he has sought to apply his conception of illocutions to the actual business of interpreting the extended speech acts which constitute historical texts (cf. 1978b, pp. x-xiv). From his method- ological papers it is possible to reconstruct (i) an analysis of the concept of an illocutionary act; (ii) a theory of how we are able to recover the illocutionary force of particular utterances; and (iii) a set of claims about the consequences of all this for theories of explanation. It is with (ii) that I am con- cerned here, and I shall mention only sufficient of Skinner's analysis to make intelligible his theory of the recovery of illocutionary force. The further question of what implications follow from Austin's thesis for theories of behaviour in general is a matter for a separate occasion.

The starting point for Skinner is the view he ascribes to Austin that "to issue any serious utterance is always to speak not only with a certain meaning but also with a certain intended force, corresponding to what Austin dubbed the "illocutionary" act being performed by the agent in issuing his given utterance" (1972b, p. 141). That is, my utterance itself may have a meaning, but I may also mean something by uttering it, and this is to be identified with the illocutionary force of my utterance (1970, p. 120). For example, a policeman says to a skater, "The ice over there is very thin". What he says has a meaning, but in addition he may in saying it be performing the illocutionary act of warning.

Presumably the rough idea of an illocutionary act so introduced can be further clarified by reference to the original examples of illocutionary acts which Austin gave when he first coined the term (Austin 1975, pp. 98-9), as well as the much longer lists at the end of his lectures (pp. 153-64). The chief means of clarification, however, is through a philosophical analysis of the concept of an illocutionary act, and here Skinner follows the procedure, originated by Strawson (1974) and Searle (1975), of elucidating the concept

1See bibliography. Citations of Skinner's writings are by date alone.


142 KEITH GRAHAM

by reference to Gricean intentions. To understand what illocutionary act was performed on a given occasion is equivalent to understanding what the utterer non-naturally meant by uttering what he did (1972b, p. 142). Alter- natively put, it is to understand "that agent's primary intentions in issuing that particular utterance" (1972a, p. 402; Skinner's italics). In non-Gricean terminology, it is to understand what the utterer meant his utterance as (p. 404). Illocutionary force corresponds to "what the agent saw himself as doing in issuing that particular utterance" (1975, p. 212).

A number of doubts might be raised about whether the story so far will yield a conception of illocutions which is adequate either as an exegesis of Austin's ideas or, leaving that aside, on its own feet. I have argued elsewhere that any attempt to analyse illocutionary force by reference to some single factor such as intention or convention is unlikely to be successful (Graham 1977, pp. 107-8). Analyses in terms of complex intentions of a Gricean kind are particularly widespread, but seem to represent a departure from Austin's own ideas (p. 106), as well as raising problems about the possibility of illocutionary acts which the agent may perform unintention- ally (cf. Cohen 1974, pp. 184-6). Let us assume, however, that the story is adequate. Then Skinner introduces an important extension. Illocutionary force, as so defined, will attach not merely to linguistic utterances but also to a whole range of non-linguistic voluntary actions. It will become appropriate to speak of the illocutionary force of both ritual and non-ritual social actions, such as the habit amongst the Yoruba of carrying about boxes covered with cowrie shells which they treat with reverence, or compulsive reading in an adolescent girl (1972b, pp. 142-5).

In so extending the application of the concept of illocutionary force, Skinner refers to "Austin's own claim . . . that certain illocutionary acts are invariably performed non-verbally" (1972b, p. 142; Austin 1975, pp. 119- 20). The passage in question is difficult but Austin does not appear to make such a claim. Rather, he suggests that certain illocutionary acts are some- times performed non-verbally. That is to say, for some illocutionary act types, such as warning or protesting, there will be non-verbal tokens (I may warn by swinging a big stick). To regard these particular tokens as instances of illocutionary acts would in fact conflict with Austin's original equation of the performance of an illocutionary act with the performance of an act in saying something (Austin 1975, p. 99), unless we allow the notion of saying something to range over cases of non-verbal communication. That, indeed, may be one of the points Austin is making in the passage cited by Skinner. Elsewhere Austin says that ". .. to perform an illocutionary act is neces- sarily to perform a locutionary act" (1975, p. 114). He also says, when discussing the distinction between illocutionary and perlocutionary acts, that both "can be performed-or, more accurately, acts called by the same name (for example, acts equivalent to the illocutionary act of warning or the perlocutionary act of convincing)-can be brought off non-verbally" (1975, p. 121).

However that may be, the problem of the decoding or recovery of illocutionary force may now be posed. Someone issues the utterance U, which expresses some proposition p. (Or, if Skinner is right, someone simply does something.) But in addition the utterance constitutes the illocutionary act of warning, promising, ordering, threatening, etc. How do we know which of these it is? The answer, I have allowed, is logically determined by the utterer's Gricean intentions. But people do not wear their intentions (cer- tainly not their Gricean intentions) on their sleeves, so what is required is


THE RECOVERY OF ILLOCUTIONARY FORCE 143

some kind of recipe for decoding what is immediately given, a string of noises (or marks), not merely into a coherent message but into one with a definite force. After all, it is not as though we never had any problems with decoding, even in apparently straightforward and transparent cases. (Com- pare the narrator of Joseph Heller's novel Something Happened, who com- plains "I could never say "I'm sorry" to my wife. She'd think I was apolo- gizing".) Moreover, for an historian the problems are multiplied by con- siderations of time and space. Questions like "What is the illocutionary force of Machiavelli's dictum that princes must learn how and when not to be virtuous?", or "What is the illocutionary force of the complex statement made in Locke's Two Treatises?", are beset by more than merely local difficulties. So even leaving aside any hyperbolic doubts about whether we can ever be sure of the illocutionary force of an utterance, there are still good reasons for reflecting on what enables us to work this out. As we shall see in a moment, the two crucial factors for Skinner are convention and belief.

No doubt certain factors will help us in the matter in a comparatively obvious and uncontroversial way. These will include the content of the utterance itself as well as the circumstances of utterance (defined in some way or other). Thus, the fact that what I said was 'What time is it?' will be germane and helpful2 in determining whether I was asking a question or pronouncing sentence. Similarly where we know that the words 'You will go to prison for life' were spoken by a judge at the conclusion of a trial, and not by an exasperated bankrobber sitting in a getaway car which his accomplice had failed to fill with enough petrol.

However, Skinner argues that, even where the content and circumstances of an utterance are appropriate for the ascription of a given illocutionary force, a further question remains "whether there exists any mutually recognized convention" such that the issuing of that utterance in those circumstances is capable of being taken as having that force (1970, p. 131). My intention to perform a particular illocutionary act could not be recognized in the absence of moderately clear and strong social conventions of the required kind (p. 133), and indeed what I myself can intend is similarly limited (1972a, p. 406; 1978a, p. 58). This has clear implications for the process of recovering illocutionary force: "The suggestion [is] that at least this element of social convention is omnipresent in illocutionary acts, and so a further necessary condition for their understanding . ." (1970, p. 131). "It must follow that one of the necessary conditions for understanding in any situation what it is that S in uttering X must be doing to A must be some understanding of what it is that people in general, when behaving in a conventional manner, are usually doing in that society and in that situation in uttering such utterances" (p. 133).

The claim is, therefore, that a scrutiny of prevailing conventions will enable us to decode the illocutionary force of an utterance and, if Skinner's extension is legitimate, of a non-verbal action. In the case of either utterance or action we should begin with the conventions rather than the individual utterance or action. We can then attempt "to decode the agent's intentions by aligning his given social action with a more general awareness of the conventional standards which are generally found to apply to such types of social action within a given social situation" (1972b, p. 154).

Finally, belief enters crucially into the determination of illocutionary

2No more than that, and things here are not as obvious or easy as might be thought. (For some of the complications, cf. 1970, p. 122; and Graham 1977, p. 103.)


144 KEITH GRAHAM

force, since the agent's beliefs limit the range and nature of intentions which it makes sense to ascribe to him (1972b, pp. 149-50). Hence in our effort to decode his intentions we must focus both on his social context and on his mental world, "the world of his empirical beliefs" (1972a, pp. 406-7). Taking account of these limits, we can rule out the ascription of certain illocutionary forces to a given utterance, a point which Skinner illustrates (ibid.) with the philosophically and historically important example of the illocutionary force ascribed by C. B. Macpherson (1962) to Locke's utterances in the Two Treatises. For it to be true that the text constitutes a defence of unlimited capital accumulation, Skinner suggests, it is necessary that Locke should have believed that such a defence was required and that it was appropriate for him to provide it; but there is evidence to suggest that he did not hold such beliefs.

I have now reconstructed from Skinner's arguments a picture of the recipe which I believe he recommends for decoding illocutionary force, in respect of social action in general and of the historical texts which are his particular concern. I think there is much which is helpful in Skinner's picture, not least his reminder that historical texts (including philosophical ones) do have an illocutionary dimension. When one's primary concern is with the content of a text it is easy to overlook this. But if we are to treat a philosophical text as a distinctly human and historical product, and not merely as a string of propositions, it is essential to locate it in its intellectual context, and Skinner is surely right to castigate those who believe that the whole significance of such a text can be recovered merely by reading the words on the page (1972b, p. 155). I do not think his picture is free from difficulty, however, and in the remainder of my discussion I shall outline two problems which it raises. In one respect his recipe seems to me in- complete; more seriously, I perceive the threat of a circularity in his recom mended procedure.

II At one point Skinner incautiously speaks as though a study of the con-

ventions surrounding an utterance would itself amount to a recovery of the speaker's intentions and hence of the illocutionary force of his utterance. "To know the answer to this further question [what it conventionally means to utter an utterance with a given meaning] is to know how the speaker intended his utterance to be taken" (1971, p. 14). It would be ungenerous to take that as his considered opinion, however, for as he immediately goes on to point out, recovery of illocutionary force "is not merely a matter of citing the convention that to utter a particular utterance can count in suit- able circumstances as a case of warning someone. It is a matter of citing this convention and of assuming that the speaker both knew of this convention and intended to follow it in the given case" (ibid.; Skinner's italics). But now the incompleteness begins to emerge. Knowledge of the appropriate conventions, it seems, will carry us only as far as possible illocutionary force; and if what is on offer is a method for recovering illocutionary, i.e., intentional, force, it will not do to ask us to make an assumption about the agent's intentions. We want a recipe for deciding what they are, and it is not properly speaking a recipe to say "Assume you know what they are on the basis of what they can be". It is true, of course, that we may move some distance further by investigating the utterer's beliefs. But not far enough, for the evidence provided by them is likely to be negative and inconclusive. We know that an agent cannot have a given intention if he does not have



a certain set of beliefs; but if he does have that set of beliefs it by no means follows that he must or even does have the given intention.

It might, I suppose, be replied that once we have narrowed down the field of possibilities by attending to convention and the agent's beliefs we can in principle just ask him what his intentions are. I imagine this suggestion would be unwelcome to Skinner, and for more than one reason. It is an option which for historians is often not a real one at all; it would besides be a fallible guide to an agent's intentions unless we assumed he himself had incorrigible knowledge of them, a position which Skinner (correctly, in my view) does not hold (1972a, p. 405); and if asking the agent were a possibility at this stage, there seems no reason why we should not ask him in the first place and save ourselves the bother of looking at the conventions, for we know in any case that the agent can only intend in a particular utterance what it makes sense for him, in his own context, to intend.

An alternative tack might be to say that once we have narrowed things down by reference to convention and belief we should feel justified in ascrib- ing the appropriate intention to the agent unless we have some positive reason for supposing he did not have it. In other words, the recipe is sufficient to enable us to make, so to speak, defeasible ascriptions of intention. But this will not do for another reason, and that is that attending to conventions will often not narrow things down enough, as Skinner realizes. As he puts it, we must first delineate "the whole range of communications which could have been conventionally performed on the given occasion by the utterance of the given utterance" and then trace the relations between the utterance and this wider linguistic context in order to decode the agent's intentions (1969, p. 49, my italics; cf. 1972a, p. 406). Attending to conventions will typically leave us with a range of possible illocutionary forces, and we cannot therefore make one defeasible ascription, for as yet we have been given no procedure for making a choice. My point is not the erroneous one that we should budget for only one illocutionary act, and therefore only one intention, per utterance, a position which Skinner rightly rejects (1975, p. 220). Even if illocutionary forces come in clusters, however, we need a principle for choosing one cluster rather than another. Here too attention to the agent's beliefs will not give sufficient help except in those cases (if any there be) where his total set of beliefs is consistent with only one set of intentions and therefore only one of the clusters. I take it that the difficulties in doing history of ideas (not to mention understanding human beings) provide ample evidence that this is not often the case. In other words, the standard situation is one where there is more than one possible intentional explanation for a given action or utterance. The incompleteness remains, then, over how we trace the relations between the utterance and the conventional context in which we have located it, and so how we decode intention. Skinner suggests that we may do so "by a combination of infer- ence and scholarship" (1972b, p. 155). But this is clearly inadequate as a description of the prescribed methodology until we are told what principles govern our inferences.

Leaving aside these problems, I now turn to the threat of circularity in Skinner's account.3 For this, we must scrutinize more closely that earlier stage we have so far taken for granted, in which we arrive at the range of illocutionary acts conventionally performable by the utterance or action in question in the context in question. Skinner, it might be noted, says com-

sFor some related difficulties cf. Hollis 1978, pp. 47 ff.


146 KEITH GRAHAM

paratively little to clarify the concept of convention (cf. Schochet 1974, p. 275 n. 18), and this is a significant omission. As we have seen, he claims it is in virtue of conventions governing what is to count as an act of, say, warning that I am able to perform that action in a given utterance. But in the absence of such clarification we should be entitled to regard "convention" merely as the name given to whatever it is in virtue of which I am able to perform that illocutionary act on a given occasion. However, I shall assume that this lacuna can be suitably filled (perhaps a la Lewis), and I should stress that the difficulty I pose does not concern a circular analysis, whether of convention or of anything else.

The problem, rather, is this. As we have seen, the procedure for recovering the illocutionary force of a voluntary action is to concentrate initially not on it but on the conventions governing the performance of actions of the given type (1972b, p. 154); and what applies to ordinary actions applies equally to utterances (1970, p. 133). But how can we suppose at this stage that we are capable of classifying into a type at all? It is surely the recovery of illocutionary force which enables us to do so; we can therefore hardly assume the prior capacity to classify into a type as a means of recovering illocutionary force. To spell this out in connexion with utterances. Typically, we are confronted with the relatively brute fact that an agent uttered certain noises, and the relatively less brute fact that the noises as uttered carried a particular sense and reference. In addition we have at our disposal some undifferentiated data about "circumstances of utterance". We then wish to go beyond this to a description of the act which the utterer was performing in issuing the utterance-say, the act of warning. This is logically determined, for Skinner, by the speaker's intentions, and the way to get at these is to focus first on conventions. But now it looks as though the process of discovery can never start. To decode intentions we must do our work on conventions, we must see what standards apply for an act of warning, or whatever it may be, to be counted as such. But to suppose we know that what we are dealing with is an act of warning and not something else is to suppose that we already have an illocutionary description available, and hence that the utterer's intentions have already been revealed. The circularity therefore consists in the fact that we must assume the kind of knowledge which the recipe is supposed to provide us with as a pre- condition of operating the recipe in the first place.

Consider now a possible rejoinder. It might be said that what truth there is in my objection is harmless in the case of voluntary actions and inapplicable in the case of utterances. We are entitled to assume that we already have an action description (and therefore a type classification) at our disposal in the former case, since that is, as it were, the form in which the problem comes at us. The initial description might be of someone "burying herself in books", but though that is an action description it is not an illocutionary act description, which becomes available only when we recover the intention, say, to "register a protest" (1972b, p. 144). Hence there is nothing circular, in the case of actions, in supposing that we can initially classify them into a type, for the type in question is not an illocutionary type. On the other hand, it might be said that we need not presuppose the initial availability of any action description in the case of utterances: ". .. one of the necessary conditions for understanding in any situation what it is that S in uttering utterance X must be doing to A must be some understanding of what it is that people in general, when behaving in a conventional manner, are usually doing in that society and in that



situation in uttering such utterances" (1970, p. 133; my italics). Here there is no necessity to assume that the utterances can be classified into an illocutionary type in advance of employing the recipe. Hence, it might be con- cluded, we do not here need to presuppose knowledge of what the recipe is designed to recover: there is no circularity.

For a number of reasons it is difficult to deal decisively with the first part of this rejoinder. For one thing, the Gricean analysis of illocution leaves some uncertainty about the precise range of illocutionary act descrip- tions. (Does the range consist of all and only those values of 'p' for which it makes sense for an agent to have a Gricean intention to cp? What if I cp but not with a Gricean intention? Do I then not perform an illocutionary act?) For another, it is not clear to me that we need begin only with a non-illocutionary act description. That is, in the example cited, I am not sure that we shall be able to apply the recipe and arrive at the illocutionary act if we attend to conventions governing the act of burying oneself in books, as opposed to the conventions governing acts of registering a protest. More generally, doubts may in any case be raised about extending the idea of illocutionary force to cover non-verbal acts. Since my chief concern is with application of the recipe to the original and central cases of verbal utterance, the simplest course is to leave in abeyance my claim as it relates to cases of voluntary action. With regard to utterances, however, I believe it can be reformulated so as to meet the second part of the rejoinder.

How are we to construe the last quotation from Skinner? It says, I suppose, that if I am to understand the illocutionary force of a given utterance, I must know the range of possible forces which it can carry, or else that I must know what force it would generally carry. This may be true, even logically true. But the point will not help me, in the first instance, to recover actual illocutionary force when I am confronted only with the utterance in an undifferentiated "context". It requires me already to have some more general information about its (possible) illocutionary force, but does not give any clue how I am to arrive at that more general information. It also requires-and this is important-that I have some means of deciding what that situation is, i.e., what features of the context of the utterance are relevant for the determination of its illocutionary force, and such information is not immediately given to us, any more than Gricean intentions are.4 On the contrary, the whole point in asking for a recipe is so that we may be guided in this matter. Taking 'context' sufficiently generously we know it must be true that we are able to recover illocutionary force from a considera- tion of utterance and context, since they exhaust the relevant universe; but we need something less general and obviously true than this if we are to understand the mechanisms involved in that recovery. Finally, it also requires that I must be in possession of a criterion for determining what are relevantly similar utterances, for "such utterances" is unlikely to refer to utterances of exactly the same words on other occasions, in view of the frequent uniqueness of sentences uttered. But presumably "relevantly similar" means "similar from the point of view of illocutionary force". If so, the same problem re-emerges, that I am required already to be in possession of just that knowledge which the recipe is supposed to provide before I am in a position to apply it.

I therefore conclude that, even if in everyday life we are generally capable 4As Gellner points out in a parallel connexion ". . . there is nothing in the nature

of things or societies to dictate visibly just how much context is relevant to any given utterance, or how that context should be described" (1970, p. 33).


148 KEITH GRAHAM

of correctly construing the illocutionary force of utterances we encounter, and even though Skinner himself has provided a wealth of information on the far more recondite illocutionary forces of historical texts, we still lack a complete account of how it is that such decoding can take place.

It remains to add one point, and that is that Skinner himself appears in one place to recognize some of the problems I have raised. In discussing hermeneutics and literary interpretation he notes that before we can pin- point the context which will help to disclose the meaning of a literary work we have to know what contexts to investigate, and he remarks "The relation- ship between a text and its appropriate context is in short an instance of the hermeneutic circle, not a means of breaking out of it" (1975, p. 227; cf. pp. 210-11). His awareness of these difficulties makes one hope that Skinner may himself yet have more to say by way of resolution of them.5

University of Bristol

BIBLIOGRAPHY J. L. Austin [1975] How To Do Things With Words, second edition, edd. J. O. Urmson

and M. Sbisl; Oxford University Press. L. J. Cohen [1974] "Speech Acts", in Current Trends in Linguistics, Vol. 12, ed. T. A.

Sebeok. E. Gellner [1970] "Concepts and Society", in Rationality, ed. B. Wilson; Blackwell. K. Graham [1977] J. L. Austin: A Critique of Ordinary Language; Harvester Press. M. Hollis [1978] "Action and Context", Supplementary Proceedings of the Aristotelian

Society, Vol. 52. C. B. Macpherson [1962] The Political Theory of Possessive Individualism; Oxford Uni-

versity Press. G. Schochet [1974] "Quentin Skinner's Method", Political Theory, Vol. 2. J. R. Searle [1975] "What is a Speech Act?", in Philosophy in America, ed. M. Black. Q. Skinner [1969] "Meaning and Understanding in the History of Ideas", History and

Theory, Vol. 8. [1970] "Conventions and the Understanding of Speech Acts", Phil. Quar-

terly, Vol. 20. [1971] "On Performing and Explaining Linguistic Actions", Phil. Quarterly,

Vol. 21. [1972a] "Motives, Intentions and the Interpretation of Texts", New Literary

History, Vol. 3. [1972b] "Social Meaning" and the Explanation of Social Action", in Philo-

sophy, Politics and Society, fourth series, edd. P. Laslett, W. G. Runciman and Q. Skinner; Blackwell.

[1975] "Hermeneutics and the Role of History", New Literary History, Vol. 7.

[1978a] "Action and Context", Supplementary Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, Vol. 52.

[1978b] Foundations of Modern Political Thought; Cambridge University Press.

P. F. Strawson [1964] "Intention and Convention in Speech Acts", Phil. Review, Vol. 73.

sI am grateful to Alison Assiter, G. A. Cohen and Trevor Pateman for helpful comments on my argument, which originally formed part of a paper given to the Bristol Philosophy of Mind Workshop, 1978.


Article Contentsp. 141p. 142p. 143p. 144p. 145p. 146p. 147p. 148

Issue Table of ContentsThe Philosophical Quarterly, Vol. 30, No. 119 (Apr., 1980) pp. 97-192Front Matter [pp. ]Subjectivism and Seriousness [pp. 97-107]Tasks [pp. 108-116]States and Performances: Aristotle's Test [pp. 117-130]Comparative and Non-Comparative Justice [pp. 131-140]DiscussionThe Recovery of Illocutionary Force [pp. 141-148]

Book ReviewsReview: untitled [pp. 149-150]Review: untitled [pp. 150-152]Review: untitled [pp. 152-153]Review: untitled [pp. 153-155]Review: untitled [pp. 155-156]Review: untitled [pp. 156-158]Review: untitled [pp. 158-159]Review: untitled [pp. 159-161]Review: untitled [pp. 161-163]Review: untitled [pp. 164-166]Review: untitled [pp. 166-168]Review: untitled [pp. 168-169]Review: untitled [pp. 169-172]Review: untitled [pp. 172-174]Review: untitled [pp. 174-176]Review: untitled [pp. 176-178]Review: untitled [pp. 178-180]Review: untitled [pp. 180-181]Review: untitled [pp. 181-183]Review: untitled [pp. 183-184]Review: untitled [pp. 185-186]Review: untitled [pp. 187-188]Review: untitled [pp. 188-189]

Books Received [pp. 190-192]Back Matter [pp. ]

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