GREEN LIGHT LTD.AVIATION SECURITY TRAINING & CONSULTANCY

CHRISTMAS DAY 2009: IMPLICATIONS FOR AIRCREW

PRESENTED BY: PHILIP BAUMWATS/SCSI, ORLANDO: 28 APRIL 2010

WHICH WERE THE MOST SIGNIFICANT ATTACKS POST-

9/11? DEC 2001: RICHARD REID (FAIL/AIRCREW) NOV 2002: ARKIA (LUCK) MAY 2003: DAVID MARK ROBINSON

(AIRCREW) AUG 2004: DOMODEDOVO BOMBINGS

(FAIL) SEP 2004: KATO AIR (AIRCREW) OCT 2006: TIRANA HIJACK (AIRCREW) JUN 2007: GLASGOW AIRPORT (FAIL/LUCK) FEB 2008: EAGLE AIR (AIRCREW) MAR 2008: CHINA SOUTHERN (AIRCREW) SEP 2009: AEROMEXICO (FAIL/AIRCREW) DEC 2009: ABDULMUTALLAB

(FAIL/AIRCREW) FEB 2010: AUSTIN (FAIL)

SCREENING METHODOLOGIES

DESPITE THIS…

COMPARE THE HUGE EXPENDITURE IN SCREENING TECHNOLOGIES vs. INVESTMENT IN AIRCREW TRAINING

SCREENING METHODOLOGIES

PROBLEM

PROBLEM→SOLUTION

PROBLEM →METHOD →SOLUTION

SCREENING METHODOLOGIES

SOLUTION FAILS?

YOU DIDN’T UNDERSTAND THE PROBLEM

YOU MISUSED THE METHOD

YOU USED THE WRONG METHOD

YOU USED THE WRONG PEOPLE TO USE THE METHOD

25 DECEMBER 2009

A “SYSTEMIC FAILURE”…

TO IDENTIFY THE LIKES OF ABDULMUTALLAB

WE DIDN’T UNDERSTAND THE PROBLEM

WE USED THE WRONG METHOD

= POOR RISK MANAGEMENT

REACTIVE SECURITY

UMAR FAROUK ABDULMUTALLAB →

- BODY SCANNERS

- INFLIGHT RESTRICTIONS

- BLACKLISTING CERTAIN COUNTRIES

FAILURE TO IMPLEMENT 9/11 COMMISSION

RECOMMENDATIONS Recommendation:

The TSA and the Congress must give priority attention to improving the ability of screening checkpoints to detect explosives on passengers. As a start, each individual selected for special screening should be screened for explosives. [emphasis added] (p. 393)

METAL DETECTION vs. WHOLE BODY IMAGING

COST: AMD: between $5,000 and $20,000Millimetre Wave: around $150,000Backscatter X-ray: between $100k and $200kTransmission: $200,000

THROUGHPUT RATE:AMD: max. 500 pax per hour (no baggage)MMV/Backscatter: approx. 200 per hourTransmission: 150 per hour

CHECKPOINT COST

TO PROCESS 10,000 PAX PER HOUR

AMD: requires 20 systems, using average equipment

COST: $220,000

In comparison:

MMV/Backscatter: requires 50 systems @ cost of $7,500,000

TRANSMISSION:requires 67 systems @ cost of approx. $15,000,000

BODY SCANNING: BACKSCATTER X-RAY

BODY SCANNING: BACKSCATTER X-RAY

BODY SCANNING: MILLIMETRE WAVE

BODY SCANNING: TRANSMISSION X-RAY

RADIATION COMPARISON

GROUND LEVEL: 2.4mSv per annum background radiation

FLIGHT:Depends upon altitude and latitude; higher at higher altitudes and closer to the Poles.

Concorde, 12-15 µSv (microsieverts) p/h; Long haul aircraft, 5 µSv (microsieverts) p/h; Short haul aircraft, 1-3 µSv p/h (BA)

RADIATION COMPARISON

LIMITS:

20mSv per annum (on average) for Aircrew

1mSv per annum for general public = 200 hours flying per year on subsonic trans-equatorial routes.

AS&E (backscatter) reports 0.09 μSv per scan; the dose for a six hour flight is 200 to 400 times larger at 20 μSv.

1 x SOTER RS (transmission) scan is less than 3 μSv. This is approximately equivalent to a one hour subsonic flight at 10,000 m.

TRANSMISSION X-RAY COMPARISON

According to a Radiation Metrology Report published in the United Kingdom by the Health Protection Agency’s Radiation Protection Division

Assuming 1 Conpass LD scan = approximately 0.25 μSv

  0.25 μSv = 30 minutes of exposure to

naturally occurring background radiation in Cornwall in the UK or Denver, Colorado in the USA = I Conpass LD scan

  0.25 μSv = 4g of Brazil nuts ~

consumption of one Brazil nut = 1 Conpass LD scan

  5 μSv single dental X-ray = 20 Conpass LD

scans

BE VERY AFRAID!!!

BODY SCANNING?

IF NOT FOR ALL…

THEN FOR WHO?

WHAT IS PROFILING?

A RISK ANALYSIS OF PASSENGERS & SITUATIONS

THROUGH A REASONED APPROACH TO SCREENING

PERFORMED BY A TRAINED STREETWISE WORKFORCE

DISTURBING FACT

Every day, immigration and customs officials around the world identify people carrying out illegal acts…AFTER they have got off an aircraft.

If we can identify people at that stage, why can’t we do it before they board?

DRUG TRAFFICKERS

CONCEALEMENT EXERCISE:JULY 2009

PROJECT MANAGEMENT:- Green Light Ltd., London, UK

SCREENING TECHNOLOGY:- OD Security, The Netherlands

SCREENING PROPS:- Finnish Security Projects, Helsinki- Quelltex Ltd., UK

SAUDI SUICIDE BOMBER:27TH AUGUST 2009

Abdullah Hassan al-Aseeri

Assassination attempt on a Saudi Prince during Ramadan

Flown in to attend meeting with Prince

Fully searched

Internal device detonated by mobile phone

WHAT IS PASSENGER PROFILING?

APPEARANCE & BEHAVIOUR+

PASSPORT+

ITINERARY+

INTELLIGENCE

+ + +

WHAT IS PROFILING?

WE ARE BASELINING...

...and the move towards centralised screening is an impediment to our ability to profile effectively.

OBJECTIONS

DISCRIMINATORYSolution: Training

SLOWSolution: It’s not! It’s quicker!

INVASION OF PRIVACYSolution: A necessary evil, just like traffic wardens!

IMPERSONATORSSolution: Far easier to plan to circumvent current checkpoint than pretend to be ‘normal’

OBJECTIONS

BUT THE REAL HURDLE TO OVERCOME IS THE REGULATOR...

A REGULATORY NIGHTMARE

XMAS DAY 2009:BASIC PROFILING

PAID CASH

TICKET BOUGHT IN GHANA; JOURNEY STARTED IN NIGERIA

ALTERED TICKET ONCE PURCHASED

VISA ISSUED IN UK; UK NOT ON ITINERARY

NO LUGGAGE

PREVIOUS TRAVEL TO YEMEN

XMAS DAY 2009:WHAT WENT WRONG?

INTELLIGENCE KNOWN…NOT SUFFICIENTLY ANALYSED

FAMILY CUT-OFF (AND FATHERS REPORT)… NOT LINKED TO TRAVEL HISTORY

OLD VISA IN PLACE…NOT REVOKED

SCREENERS DON’T HAVE ACCESS TO PAX DATA

US AGENTS ON GROUND IN AMSTERDAM… NEVER EVEN SPOKE WITH PASSENGER

SCHEDULED FOR INTERVIEW IN DETROIT

BOTTOM LINE:IMPLICATIONS FOR

AIRCREW WILL BE LEFT TO RESPOND TO NEXT ATTACK AS GROUND APPROACH FAILS AGAIN

MORE FRUSTRATED PASSENGERS GOING THROUGH “SILLY SECURITY”

GREATER PROPENSITY FOR AIR RAGE

GREATER FOR PROPENSITY FOR OTHER PASSENGERS TAKING THE LAW INTO THEIR OWN HANDS…AND PARANOID AIRCREW!

AIRCREW BEING REPEATEDLY BODY SCANNED

BOTTOM LINE:WHAT DO WE NEED TO DO?

PROVIDE BETTER TRAINING

ALERT CREW TO LATEST THREATS/DEVICES

VALUE THEIR OPINION & ENCOURAGE A REPORTING CULTURE

REMEMBER IT WILL BE DIFFERENT NEXT TIME

ANNEX 6: DOC 9811GUIDANCE NOTES: CHEM/BIO

“…distinction between the handling of an IED and a chemical/biological weapon.”

“…familiarise crew members with such weaponry.”

“Unexpected exposure to an activated chemical/biological weapon within the confines of an aircraft cabin will require quick identification,clear thinking and swift response.” Is this possible without training?

ANNEX 6: DOC 9811 2.6.21GUIDANCE NOTES: CHEM/BIO

“Perhaps the most important single factor in assuring a successful outcome to a

CBW incident is for each crew member to consider in advance how he or she would deal with a genuine CHEM/BIO threat in

the airplane.”

JUST TO MAKE IT CLEAR...

PROFILING WOULD HAVE IDENTIFIED THIS PASSENGER…BUT NOT ON GROUNDS OF RACE, RELIGION, GENDER, OR COLOUR OF SKIN

NIGERIANS (AND OTHER COUNTRIES) SHOULD NOT BE SET ASIDE FOR SCREENING BECAUSE OF THEIR PASSPORT

…RICHARD REID WAS BRITISH…SO PERHAPS I SHOULD BE SCRENED SPECIALLY!

GREEN LIGHT LTD.AVIATION SECURITY TRAINING & CONSULTANCY

CHRISTMAS DAY 2009: IMPLICATIONS FOR AIRCREW

PRESENTED BY: PHILIP BAUMWATS/SCSI, ORLANDO: 28 APRIL 2010

GREEN LIGHT LTD.AVIATION SECURITY TRAINING & CONSULTANCY

PHILIP BAUM

MANAGING DIRECTOR, GREEN LIGHT LTD.

EDITOR@AVSEC.COM