Admiral Guven Erkaya (1938-2000):A Turkish Sailor, A Hero in War and Peace.

By Dr. Gregory D. Younggyoung@colorado.edu

Department of Political ScienceUniversity of Colorado, Boulder

Paper presented at the 2007 Naval History Symposium, United States Naval Academy, Annapolis, Maryland, September 2007

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Admiral Guven Erkaya (1938-2000): A Turkish Sailor, A Hero in War and Peace.

In George Packer’s 2005 book, Assassin’s Gate, he chronicles the rise of the Neo-

conservative agenda and their ascendance within the Bush administration foreign policy

hierarchy. Policymakers like Richard Perle and Paul Wolfowitz argued that the United

States had entered a “unipolar moment” when America had not only an opportunity, but

an obligation, to promote superior American values overseas. Given their acceptance of

the “Democratic Peace Theory” as the closest thing to a law in international relations,

they advocated the invasion to create a secular democracy in Saddam Hussein’s Islamic

Iraq as the way to create peace in the Middle East. This would not only rid the world of a

serious thug, but create democratic norms which would cascade throughout the rest of the

Islamic world.

Whether democracy can be installed from above at the point of a gun is beyond

the subject of this research. However, many believe a secular democracy already exists in

a Middle Eastern Islamic country. The Turkish democracy has deepened from a

patrimonial one-party state to a full-fledged multi-party system with very competitive

free elections. If there is a Western criticism of the Turkish democracy, it generally

centers on the almost-every-decade interventions in the democratic process by the

Turkish military (1960, 1971 & 1980). Despite immediate return to civilian leadership, in

marked contrast to Latin American military coups , where generals remain in power,

these interventions by the Turkish military still run counter to western concepts of proper

democratic civil-military relations. The Turkish military has long devoted itself to the

secular values of Turkey’s first president, Mustafa Kemal, Ataturk. They see themselves

as the protectors of the Turkish secular constitution. This view is echoed by the great

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majority of the citizenry as well. Of more dramatic importance of late, this perceived

excessive military power vis-à-vis the elected civilian leadership is also a negative factor

in Turkish accession into the European Union.

The United States has only recently failed to bolster the Turkish democracy.

U.S/Turkish relations have suffered as a result of Turkish failure to allow the invasion of

Iraq from Turkish soil and the reelection of the quasi Islamist AK party to control the

Turkish parliament. One particular naval officer has been the personification of the

Turkish military values that promote a secular democracy in an Islamic country. This

hero is largely unknown outside his home country.

I. Admiral Guven Erkaya

The late Admiral Guven Erkaya graduated from the Turkish Naval Academy in

1957. He rose through the ranks in Operations Department billets on three different

destroyers before he became Executive Officer of T.C.G. (Turkiye Cumhuriyet Gemesi)

Gaziantep. Shore duty included staff jobs with the Turkish General Staff in Ankara and

attendance at the Royal Naval Staff College in London. Commander Erkaya took

command of the Turkish warship T.C.G. Kocatepe in early 1974. The World War II era

ex-USS Harwood, Gearing Class FRAM I destroyer, had been transferred to the Turkish

Navy three years previously in 1971.

Upon assuming command, Kocatepe was undergoing overhaul in the yards at the

naval base at Golcuk in the Sea of Marmaris, Erkaya devoted himself to emergency

procedures training and abandon ship drills for the crew. The most basic evolutions, like

how to tie a life jacket were emphasized. He had learned in his naval career that most of

the conscripts or askers could not neither read nor swim. He also eschewed spit and

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polish on the decks for intense AAW and ASW training. The Gearing class ship had no

real air defense capability the 5”38 and 3”50 gun mounts could no longer track a modern

high-speed aircraft at their sixteen-shell-per-minute rate of fire. The crew, hoping to get

more time off during overhaul were not necessarily pleased with the additional training

that the new captain was requiring. These skills, however, would come in handy sooner

than they had expected. In the summer of 74, right out of the yards, Kocatepe was

selected to carry the Commander of the Turkish Navy and escort the President of the

Republic on a “show-the-flag” exercise around the Turkish islands in the Aegean Sea,

through newly-declared territorial waters of several Greek Islands. Although somewhat

brazen in its inception, the exercise was not expected to provoke a violent reaction from

the Greek military junta. A war would originate from another source yet unknown to the

exercise participants.

II. War in Cyprus 1974

In the summer of 1974, July 15th to be more exact, the independent Cypriot

government of Archbishop Makarios III was overthrown by a military coup led by a

Lieutenant Colonel in the Cypriot National Guard, Nikos Sampson. Sampson had a

checkered past of abuses of the Turkish civilian population and was known to favor

enosis or the union of Cyprus with the Greek mainland. It has now been confirmed that

Sampson had been both encouraged and supported by the Military Junta of Major

General Dimtrios Ioannides, ruling in Athens at the time. The division within the Greek

armed forces over the support for the coup in Cyprus and the impending war with Turkey

ultimately brought down the junta and restored civilian democratic rule to Greece, but at

the early stages, forces within Greece were mobilizing for war to support Sampson.

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Turkey initially appealed to the United Kingdom, who was, by treaty, the

guarantor of the longstanding Cypriot peace agreement, to restore the status quo. British

Prime Minister Harold Wilson urged calm and restraint, but did very little. U.S. Secretary

of State Henry Kissinger dispatched special envoy Joseph Sisco to the region to engage in

shuttle diplomacy to avert a war between the two NATO allies. Turkish Prime Minister

Bulent Ecevit, after flying to Britain and getting no satisfaction from the British

government, consulted with military and civilian advisors and felt further waiting could

only lead to a Greek consolidation of power on the island. The only alternative was to

land Turkish military forces to protect Turkish citizens on the island. Sisco’s intervention

failed to change his mind. Fifty years of proud Turkish peace was to be shattered.

III. Tragedy in the Med

Saturday 20 July 1974 (All times local)

06:30 - The first frogmen of the Cypriot invasion force go ashore near Girne (Kyrenia)

after a feigned assault further east. As THK (Turk Hava Kuvetleri or Turkish Air Force)

aircraft bombed targets near Nicosia, and Turkish naval destroyer provide fire support,

elements of the 6th Marine Regiment go ashore from 31 different ships. The landing is

unopposed. Ecevit orders troops not to fire unless fired upon, “they are in Cyprus for

peace not War” (Birand; p.21). A Turkish bridgehead is established and forces begin to

meet opposition from the Cypriot National Guard as they fan out over the Northern

portion of the island. Fighting intensifies and casualties mount, as Turkish forces now

encounter both the Greek regular forces permanently stationed on the island and more

newly-mobilized Greek Cypriot National Guard forces.

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Midday - The UN Security Council passes Resolution 353 calling for an immediate

cease fire and withdrawal of all foreign troops, both Greek and Turkish. The incredible

speed with which the UN acted was due to the rare convergence of opinion of both the

United States and the Soviet Union. Turkish army and marines expand their control of the

northern portion of Cyprus.

18:30 - Prime Minister Bulent Ecevit is shown a message from Ozer Turk, Governor of

Mugla region in southwestern Turkey. Reports from local Gendarmerie stated, “the

Greeks are assembling a large convoy of ships off of Rhodes. A TDK (Turk Deniz

Kuvetleri or Turkish Navy) S-2 Tracker reconnaissance plane is sent by Southern Area

Command to investigate, but the plane arrives on scene after dark and cannot confirm

ship type, nationality or cargo, only radar contact of several ships. The Turkish General

Staff (TGS) tells Prime Minister Ecevit that, as a precaution, they intend to divert

warships from the landing area to intercept the convoy. The Destroyers Adatepe,

Kocatepe and F.V. Cakmak, on their way back to Mersin to escort more troops to Cyprus,

are ordered back to Girne (Kyrenia).

Sunday 21 July 1974

06:20 – An S-2 reconnaissance aircraft on dawn patrol reports that at least 8 and possibly

11 ships are heading for Cyprus at 10 knots, confirmed again only on radar due to fog in

the area. The information is passed to Prime Minister Ecevit; the assumption is that they

must be the Greek convoy that had been sighted the previous day by the land watch.

08:30 – American envoy Joseph Sisco arrives to meet with Ecevit. He warns the Prime

Minister that Greece is prepared for war and Turkish troops should stop their advance at

their current positions on Cyprus. Ecevit tells him about the purported Greek invasion

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force and “if the Greek invasion force headed for Cyprus continues, it will be war”.

During this meeting further reports are received from THK assets on scene that report “I

have some ships in sight and in my opinion they are simply a chance collection of

merchantmen” (Birand; p. 34).

09:44 – Fleet Commander Vice Admiral Nejat Tumer orders three destroyers from the 2nd

Destroyer Flotilla under Commodore Irfan Tinaz to proceed to intercept and attack the

Greek convoy. Destroyers Adatepe, Kocatepe and Fevzi V. Cakmak are detached from

the area of the amphibious landing.

09:54 – The three destroyers are underway from Girne (Kyrenia) heading towards Paphos

at flank speed. Ecevit orders the ships to establish the nationality of the approaching ships

and if they prove to be Greek, they should be warned that they would be fired upon

unless they turned back.

11:08 – A different S-2 report is received at Naval HQ in Ankara that the ships of the

Greek convoy continue heading towards Cyprus. The Convoy is now reported to consist

of nine ships. The pilot, for defensive reasons, is flying too high to visually identify the

ships, but the pilot said: “I can see a number of destroyers similar to ours”. Of course

both the Greek and Turkish navies were recipients of American Foreign Military

Assistance (FMA) and sailed in identical Gearing class FRAM I and II destroyers

(Boytok; p.117).

11: 33 – A new update reports the Greek convoy is 53 miles away from the western tip of

Cyprus. The three TDK ships are given the order to attack all ships flying the Greek Flag

which enter prohibited area around Cyprus.

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11:45 – Now having flown to Athens, American envoy Joseph Sisco at the behest of

Prime Minister Ecevit, warns Greek strongman Ioannides that the invasion convoy should

turn back or face war. Concurrent American inquiries with the US 6th fleet reveal no

information about the existence any Greek convoy. Ioannides informs Sisco (passed to

Ecevit from Henry Kissinger on the phone) that “if the Turks can find such a convoy,

they are at liberty to sink it” (Birand; p.39).

12:00 - The TGS and the Defense Minister decide an air attack should be launched on the

Greek ships and destroyers at 15:00. This information is passed to naval HQ, but not to

the Area South Command controlling the TDK destroyers. The order to Air Forces HQ in

Adana reads: “Instructions are hereby issued for an air attack on a convoy of 11 landing

craft and transport ships escorted by five destroyers which is now 15 miles off of the

Paphos coast. The following units will take part, the 181st squadron from Antalya, the

141st Squadron from Murted and the 111th Squadron from Eskisehir. Any landing craft

will be attacked first” (Birand; p.40). Echoing what Captain Guven Erkaya had stated

regarding Gearing Class air defense capability, the order continued, “The Greek

destroyers lack adequate anti-aircraft defenses. The THK F-100 and F-104 aircraft were

due to attack at 15:00 hours.

12:35 – The three Turkish destroyers round Cape Arnauti of Northern Cyprus and are

attacked by three Greek Cypriot Gunboats. Due to the rules of engagement from Ankara,

the ships must wait to be fired upon before returning fire. In an exchange that last thirty

minutes, two gunboats are sunk by naval gunfire (5” 38) and one flees. There is no

damage to the three destroyers. Commodore Tinaz reports the engagement and their

position to Ankara and continues towards Paphos. A Soviet AGI (Intelligence collection

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ship) is nearby and observes this action, but then returns to the areas north of Cyprus near

the site of the initial beach landing (Bakalbasioglu Interview). Erkaya later stated that he

thought the AGI could have interfered with the radar signals received in the

reconnaissance aircraft, but had no evidence to support that claim (Boytok; p. 118).

14:00 – The Turkish media begins to warn the Turkish people for the first time, that war

with Greece was to be expected.

14:00 – After arriving searching the area of the last reported convoy position in

conjunction with a recon aircraft, Commodore Tinaz reports to Naval HQ that there is no

Greek convoy, only two merchant ships sighted, one Yugoslav and one Italian of the

Messina Lines. Erkaya relayed to Tinaz, “There are no, repeat, no, other ships in sight”

(Boytok; p. 122). There is now clearly something wrong. This report did not sync with

any of the previous reports. This latest report, however, did not reach the THK HQ.

14:15 – The crew is eating rations on deck at General Quarters. Chief Engineer Metin

Sulus inquires of Captain Erkaya, “My Captain, can Greek aircraft reach us here?”

Erkaya replied: “Greek planes would not come here; I am more worried about ‘trigger-

happy” Turkish planes.” That warning proved prophetic. Almost before he had finished

those words, radar reporting numerous aircraft inbound from the Turkish mainland.

14:35 - A new reconnaissance plane arrives overhead and issues the new daily challenge:

“Senlik basladi mi?” (Have the rejoicings begun?) The new password had not yet made it

to the three destroyers. Word was quickly passed to the Communications office, but no

new password had been received. Erkaya responded to the aircraft in the negative. An

epiphany now came to Erkaya: “We are the convoy!” (Bakalbasioglu interview)

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15:05 - The Air Attack begins, diving at max speed, the fighter aircraft unload their

bombs. The first two bombs splash beside Kocatepe. Erkaya orders an attempt to call the

aircraft rather than return fire, but Commodore Tinaz orders otherwise. In self-defense,

the destroyers return fire with five inch and three inch guns. Cakmak radios Ankara that

they are being attacked by enemy planes and request air support. Erkaya knew they were

Turkish aircraft, but initially many thought they were Greek. The crew of Kocatepe is not

so lucky with bombs three and four. The third bomb hits the after gun mount and the

fourth goes right down the stack and explodes near the CIC, the Combat Information

Center, knocking out all radar and automatic fire control. The strike aft has also damaged

the rudder. The two other destroyers steamed north in order to escape the onslaught.

Kocatepe could not follow and is left to fend for herself. The THK aircraft now used

2.75” rockets on their return to attack the crippled ship.

Several fires are burning out of control, below decks areas are full of smoke, the

ship is taking on water and is down at the stern and the electrical power has failed. The

Damage Control Officer (Y/S Subayi) reports they cannot keep up with the water coming

in. Erkaya orders him to “deal with the fire, when the time comes, I will give the order to

abandon ship” (Boytok, p. 122). Erkaya worries about assembling the men on deck in

orange life jackets, since they would be easy targets for a resumed attack. The fire is now

approaching the main magazine, which, if ignited, could trigger a catastrophic explosion.

16:00 – The initial attack planes depart. Given the dangerous considerations, after the

departure of the first attack wave, Erkaya gives the order to abandon ship. Many of the

crew had already jumped into the water to escape the inferno raging in the after part of

the ship. Many of the wounded were in areas impossible to reach. Equal chaos continued

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in the water. Many rafts had been shot full of holes and the Captain’s gig was gone,

destroyed in the attack. There were not enough rafts for all the crew. Those who couldn’t

get into rafts, clung to their sides. Erkaya stated that “all the rules are broken when

combat begins.” Erkaya remained on the bridge. With the Captain are the officer of the

deck (OOD), and the Weapons Officer (Topcu Subayi). The Gunnery Officer and the

crew necessary to maintain the one operating gun should aircraft return, also stay. Under

orders from Captain Erkaya, the Weapons Officer, Ercan Dincol, then went around the

whole ship ensuring that all surviving personnel had left successfully. He removed the

food packages from the damaged rafts and threw them into the floating rafts nearby.

Dincol took small arms and ammunition from the weapons locker and distributed them to

rafts as well. Erkaya now orders the gun crews and OOD into the rafts. Erkaya, Necat

Gurkaya, the Gunnery officer and the Weapons officer share a crumpled up cigarette

from his pocket. Erkaya with tears in his eyes, from either smoke or emotion, gives the

final order to abandon Kocatepe (Bakalbasioglu interview). As the ship to settles in the

stern, Erkaya, Gurkaya and Dincol jump overboard towards a raft on the starboard side.

Erkaya and Dincol make the raft, Gurkaya is never seen again. Either his life jacket never

inflated or he became entangled in the debris in the water. Now, strong winds have begun

to disperse the rafts. Contact among survivors cannot be maintained.

18:30 – The Second Air Attack Begins. Frantic sailors cut the ropes that tied many of the

rafts together, fearing that they were a bigger target for returning aircraft. Many jumped

out of rafts in fear. Erkaya estimates that at least five more sailors perished this way. The

THK aircraft did not attack any of the rafts or the men in the water however. Cakmak has

reversed course in an attempt to assist Kocatepe survivors, but retreated under the

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fusillade of the second attack wave. However, most of the aircraft focused their rockets

on the burning hull of Kocatepe. The ship finally sinks around 21:00 after a massive

explosion. Celebration begins in the corridors of the Prime Minister’s office in Ankara at

the report of the sinking of the convoy. In the Naval headquarters, there was a deathly

silence as people began to piece together what had actually happened. The death toll: is

three officers, fourteen NCOs and 37 seamen. As for the real Greek convoy, it never

existed.

Now in the dark, the survivors see the explosion from various distances. Captain

Erkaya was only able to maintain control in the four rafts connected to his own. The

separated rafts drift apart for most of the night. Twenty-five crewmen died in the attack

or failed to get into a life raft. Rescue of the survivors does not come until more than 24

hours in the water. A small number of the crew is picked up by a Libyan freighter. A

British naval vessel, The Berg, dispatched a helicopter to pick up survivors that ended up

the furthest north. Captain Erkaya and the 41 survivors that he kept tied together were

rescued by the school ship from the Israeli Merchant Marine Academy. Erkaya

subsequently stated that most were in fairly good shape and were able to get out of the

rafts under their own power. Erkaya immediately asked if his uniform could be washed

and ironed, so the crew would know he was in good shape and still in command. He

refused to reveal the reason to the Captain of the Israeli ship the circumstances of why he

and his crew had abandoned their ship (Benmayor). The ship and the Kocatepe survivors

returned to Haifa, Israel the next morning where they were met with great ceremony by

the Turkish ambassador to Israel and the media. Erkaya refused to discuss anything with

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the media, allowed no photos and hustled the other 41 member of the crew with him onto

a waiting bus.

The Turkish Press failed to report the incident as fratricide even after it had

appeared as so in print in the New York Times four days after the sinking (Robertson,

1974). The Turkish newspaper Milliyet on the 26th of July, reported interviews with two

petty officers from Kocatepe’s crew that detailed the sinking. These two sailors cited the

heroism of the crew, but identified the cause of the ship’s demise to be the Greek Cypriot

patrol boats that the Kocatepe had actually sunk on the 20th of July. “A lucky shot had

ignited the ammunition magazine and split the ship into two pieces,” one stated. Also

interesting, is their statement that they were picked up by a Lebanese rather than an

Israeli ship and that they were returned to Ankara, Turkey from Beirut, Lebanon rather

than form Haifa, Israel, as actually happened (“We Fought Until Our Ship Sunk”). It was

not until more than twenty years later that the truth of both the sinking and the rescues

were revealed in the mainstream Turkish media.

IV. Peace: The February 28 Process 1997

The heroic actions and difficult decisions of Commander Erkaya undoubtedly

saved the lives of many of his sailors in the 1974 tragedy, but it was the actions of the

now-Admiral Erkaya that saved the Turkish republic from militant Islam 23 years later.

In 1997 he kept his homeland on the road to membership in the European Union by also

averting a military coup in the process. He had risen to be commander of the Turkish

Navy and a member of the National Security Council (MGK). Erkaya was to be

instrumental in engineering the removal of Turkey’s first Islamist premier in 1997.

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Alarmed by political changes that Prime Minister Necmettin Erbakan of the Refah

(Welfare) party had begun to impose, the TGS publicly asserted that the “reactionary”

Islamist danger to Turkey was growing. Erbakan had attempted to increase public support

for Islamic schools, he had allowed the Islamic headscarf to reappear for women, and he

had tried to move Turkey’s foreign policy away from NATO, to a new alliance of

moderate Islamist states. Erbakan himself added fuel to the fire when he stated that

“There will be change in Turkey. The question is whether it will be bloody or not”

(Celik; p.70). For the feast marking the end of Ramadan in 1996, Erbakan invited

religious leaders and leaders of the major Islamic sects to his official residence. This was

noted with anger by leading secularists. At a subsequent official government reception at

the Erbakan residence, Admiral Erkaya discovered that in deference to Islamic tradition,

no alcohol was being served. “Go and get me some raki1, my son,” he was quoted as

telling the young waiter. “At the prime minister’s residence of a secular republic no-one

can impose their preferences.” In a direct public affront to Islamist leader Erbakan, the

Admiral sent out for the traditional Turkish liquor.

In the conservative Ankara suburb of Sincan in February 1997, Refah supported

demonstrations celebrated the purported success of the Palestinian Intifadah with

“Jerusalem Night”. The celebration included rock throwing youths accompanied by

verbal insults from the Refah town mayor directed at Palestinian leader, Yasir Arafat, for

“selling out to the Israelis” (Shmuelevitz; p. 19). He then called for the “foundation of

Sharia law to be laid in Turkey”. The guest of honor was none other than the Iranian

ambassador to Turkey. The TGS response was immediate. The next morning, the army

rolled into Sincan with twenty tanks and an impressive array of armored personnel

1 Raki is a traditional Turkish anise-based drink similar the Greek drink ouzo.

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carriers. The message was clear: any threat to the secular order would not be tolerated.

The Mayor was arrested, the Iranian ambassador was sent packing along with a note of

diplomatic protest.

The General Staff had evidently gone too far. Protests in Ankara condemned both

the Mayor’s discussion of Sharia law, but also the army’s crackdown as well. EU leaders

condemned the Turkish military action as a blatant disregard for civilian rule of the

military necessary for EU admission. A new tactic by the army was required in these new

times. Guven Erkaya was to be the designer of the required tactic.

Erkaya was the architect of the working group within the NSC that oversaw the

purge of political Islam. Just as extremist NAZI parties are outlawed in Germany, Erkaya

ensured that extremist Islamist parties would be illegal in their secular republic. Erkaya

used non-traditional means to carry this out. Erkaya in a sophisticated public relations

campaign used the military as he said “as an NGO”. In an alliance with media, trade

unions, the secular parties and finally, women’s groups, Erkaya mobilized these

“unarmed forces” in a public campaign against the Islamic moves of Erbakan and Refah.

Erkaya used the courts to reverse many Erbakan proposals. In another directive, the

working group under Erkaya’s leadership weakened Islamist schools by directing

mandatory increases in the required years of public education to eight, thereby seriously

blunting gains given to Islamic schools.

In the famous directive of February 28th, which now names the event (The

February Process), the NSC under Erkaya’s direction, declared Erbakan’s government in

conflict with the Turkish state. They claimed the secular constitution was under serious

threat. This directive ultimately caused the Erbakan government to step down without

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further military intervention. Erkaya had led Turkey’s first “soft coup” with the February

28th movement. The public campaign against the Refah party was called the first “post-

modern coup” by many analysts. Erkaya had convinced his colleagues on the General

Staff that the costs of military intervention were too great, but he taught them how to

achieve the same results without taking over the government.

It is unlikely that Erbakan stepped down because he feared he might suffer the

same fate as Prime Minister Menderes in the 1960 coup (Menderes was hung in the

downtown area of Ankara known as Kizili). Clearly, however, the military media

campaign had convinced him that he lost the mandate of the electorate and would no

longer be able to govern effectively.

The Turkish military is unlikely to surrender their traditional role as the ultimate

guarantor of the Western secular state founded by Mustafa Kemal, Ataturk from the ashes

of the theocratic Ottoman Empire in 1920. In this they have always had the support of

many Turkish citizens fearing the advance of an Iran-style fundamentalist regime. The

succession of military coups in Turkey in 1960, 71 and 1980, condemned by the liberal

West as evidence of the weakness of Turkish democracy, have often be praised by the

citizenry as restoring their democracy to even keel from extremism after always

surrendering power immediately. In today’s world the Turkish military had to resort to

new tactics to maintain Turkey on the road to integration with Europe and maintain the

continued support of the Turkish citizenry.

In death, Erkaya generated almost as much controversy as he did at the end of his

life. The secular press lauded him in 2000 as the “savior of the Turkish Republic. “We

have lost a man who saved Turkey from darkness,” declared the mass-circulation daily

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Hurriyet in more than two full pages of praise for the Admiral (Cevik). While the press

loyal to the more Islamic political parties, called Erkaya the equivalent of “the great

Satan”.

The current American government, talks at length about the importance of the

alliance with Turkey. Many policy analysts believe, however, that the current

administration underestimates the value that the secular Turkish democracy could provide

to the U.S. in the war on terror to win the hearts and minds of citizens throughout the

Muslim world.

V. What did you do in the war Daddy?

Dressed in my tropical white Navy uniform on the way to work one morning in

1991, my seven-year-old son inquired about the four rows of ribbons that adorned my

chest that he had always previously ignored (possibly that he had just become more

aware of due to the ongoing First Gulf War). Clearly, he was hoping to hear multiple

tales of his father’s heroic exploits in armed combat protecting truth, justice and the

American way of life. He was disappointed to learn the MSM, Navy Commendation,

Oversea’s Service ribbon and so on were for things considerably less heroic. During my

24 years of active duty Navy and flying P-3s, not a shot was fired in anger. I always felt

that I earned my National Defense ribbon for the verbal epithets and paint balloons hurled

at the short-haired, uniformed me on my way to ROTC drill at the height of the Vietnam

conflict. In an effort to regain my former stature in his eyes, I said,” Let me tell you about

the summer of 74 son.”

The only thing in my career remotely close to real combat came as a midshipman

one year prior to my commissioning. My two years of Turkish language instruction in

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high school while my Air Force Dad was stationed in Turkey in the late sixties, ensured

my selection for a foreign exchange cruise with the Turkish Navy in the summer of 1974.

Arriving with two Academy mids, John Brown and Mike Engler, we were assigned to

three different old ex-U.S. Navy destroyers. I was assigned to T.C.G. Kocatepe sitting in

dry-dock at the Golcuk naval base.

After four weeks being the only American onboard, learning a great deal more

Turkish language, the Kocatepe steamed into Mersin on the Mediterranean Sea after

completion of a ten-day exercise with the bulk of the Turkish fleet to “show-the-flag”

among the Aegean islands with the Turkish president embarked. I was reunited with the

other two Americans and was delighted to get to speak some English and get away from

the incredibly generous hosting from the Turkish naval officers, competing to out do each

other showing me a good time. The three of us had escaped to an outdoor disco nestled

among the trees on a Mediterranean hillside (Remember, it was the seventies). At

midnight, sirens in the port city sounded and shore patrol showed up to escort everyone

back to their respective ships. Captain Guven Erkaya who always liked to practice his

English with me told me that a coup had occurred in Cyprus, killing Archbishop

Markarios and inserting a government which favored union with Greece and was

therefore antithetical to the Turkish Republic. He said he didn’t’ know what might

happen, but all ships were putting to sea.

For the next four days he did not talk to me, but I could obviously see what was

going on. We learned Makarios was not dead, but still in exile. We steamed down the

coast and began to take on provisions, from our anchorage in Mersin I could see troop

ships being loaded on other ships in the harbor. No one was allowed liberty and only

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essential personnel could go ashore (which clearly wasn’t me). On the evening of the 19th

we sailed. I therefore assumed that I was going to get to see an invasion of Cyprus, “up-

close and personal”. However, that evening in the middle of the Mediterranean Sea, in

about twelve to fifteen foot swells, I was transferred first to a launch and then to the old

destroyer tender, Donatan. Offloaded with the Admiral’s dishes, the TV set from the

wardroom, and other detritus deemed unnecessary for war, I was reunited with the other

two American midshipmen. They had equally exciting tales to tell of the past week.

After a night sailing on Donatan, the three of us were taken and semi-literally

dumped on the pier in the city of Izmir in southeastern Turkey. Following that night in

“blacked-out” Izmir, we hitched a ride with a Turkish Chief Petty Officer who was taking

a chaplain and some supplies back overland to the Turkish Naval Base at Golcuk, where

we had all spent the first month of our stay in Turkey. The country was clearly in a state

of war. The car radio only played the National Anthem over and over with updates of the

invasion force on Cyprus. Arriving at Golcuk after a ten-hour drive, we no longer had the

necessary clearance to be allowed on the Turkish naval base. There was an American

Naval Security Group Detachment at a small base about sixty miles away, so with no

other alternatives, we schlepped are overstuffed luggage and hitchhiked to the base at

Karamursel.

At the base main gate, the USAF guard asked for our IDs. After showing them to

him, a look of major surprise appeared on his face, he said that the entire American

military establishment in Turkey had been looking for us for five days and that we should

immediately call the Naval Attaché from the base headquarters. He sent for a car to get us

to the phone as expeditiously as possible. The Turkish Navy, it seems, due to the need to

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protect the secrecy surrounding the invasion, had refused to divulge our location, despite

numerous American inquiries. It had been learned that on the previous evening, my home

for the past month, the TDK destroyer, TCG Kocatepe had been sunk. Needless to say

there was some consternation by my father all the way to Henry Kissinger’s office as to

my whereabouts and my safety. The three of us sat out the war working on melanoma by

the base swimming pool. Three American midshipmen did not have the clearance

necessary to get through the front door of the Naval Security Group Detachment.

To my son, I was still able to admit that I have still never fired that shot in anger

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Works Cited

Aydinli, Ersel, Nihat Ali Ozcan & Dogan Akyaz (2006), “The Turkish Military’s March Toward Europe.” Foreign Affairs, Vol. 85, No. 1 (Jan/Feb), pp. 77-90.

Benmayor, Gila (1998), “42 Denizcimizi Kurtaran Gizli Dost (The Secret Friend Who Saved Our 42 Sailors)”, Hurriyet, March 22, 1998. Accessed 23 May, 2006 at http://arsic.hurriyetim.com.tr/tatilpazar/latin/98/03/22/eklhav/38ekl.htm.

Birand, Mehmet Ali (1985), 30 Hot Days. London: K. Rustem & Brother Pub.

Baytok, Taner, Dogan Kitapcilik & Guven Erkaya (2001), Bir Asker Bir Diplomat: Guven Erkaya – Taner Baytok Soylesi. Istanbul, Turkey: Nisan Pub.

Celik, Omer (2003), “Turkey and the Fate of Political Islam” in Morton Abramowitz (Ed.), The United States and Turkey: Allies in Need. New York & Washington DC: The Century Foundation Press, pp. 61-84.

Cevik, Ilnur (2000), “Ugly Debate Over Erkaya’s Demise.” Turkish Daily News, July 2, 2000.

“Erkaya mourned as pro-Islamic press remains unmoved.” Turkish Daily News. June 26, 2000, p1.

Karasapan, Omer (1989), “Turkey and US Strategy in the Age of Glasnost.” Middle East Report, No. 160 (Sep/Oct), pp. 4-10 & 22.

“Kocatepeyi Kaybettik (Kocatepe Lost)” Milliyet, July 25, 1974. p.1

“Kocatepe victims’ rescuer Captain McKechnie dies.” Turkish Daily News, June 14, 2003.

Kutluhan, Bora (2004), “Bir Gemi ve Bir Komutanin Hikayesi: TCG Maresal Fevzi Cakmak (A Ship and a Commander)” Savunma ve Havacilik, No. 100 (March), pp. 108-116.

Packer, George (2005), Assassin’s Gate: America in Iraq. New York: Farrar, Strauss & Giroux Pub.

Robertson, Nan (1974), “Turks Admit They Sank Own Vessel Off Cyprus.” New York Times, July 25, 1974, p. 13

Sayfada, Yazisi (1974), “Kocatepe Muhribini kaybettigimiz aciklandi (Kocatepe destroyer lost during engagement)” Hurriyet, July 21, 1974, p.1.

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Shmuelevitz, Aryeh (1999), “Turkey’s Experiment in Islamist Government, 1996-1997.” Data and Analysis, (May), The Moshe Dayan Center for Middle Eastern and African Studies, Tel Aviv University.

“We fought until our ship sunk (Gemimiz batancaya kadar butun gucumuzle savastik)” Milliyet, July 26, 1974, p.1.

Interviews

Bakkalbasioglu, Ozhan, Lieutenant onboard TCG Kocatepe at the time of the sinking. Interviewed in Istanbul, Turkey, July 2003.

Gumuscagliyan, Zuhtu, Ensign onboard TCG Kocatepe at the time of the sinking. Interviewed in Ankara, Turkey, July 2003.

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