=2 • 41

•11 May 1951.

Gifford Lectures.40Lecture 3. The Necessi t.v Aif Philosophy.

(c) The Validation of Social Lore.

1. The integral part which I have ascribed to emotionsin all intellectuel performances lis a clear challenge to the ideallof dispassionate reason. lIt stands in sharp conflict to the--aim of criticel philosophy to eliminate all emotive elements

.... ....;..:0::. .. -_.---of thought which inevitebly interfere with its objectivity •.,...;u....._

y ~} /~The contemporery school of lingUist~c~~has to someextent recognised this situation/by P'tg;i,>1t>lJ7;i,pg'theemotional

J -e-r-e- I

content of langUage/as pert of its meaningful messege. How-ever, a dispassionat~ scrutiny of our pass:ons;!inevitablY reducesthem toa merely sUbjective status, and thus debars us from

-' -giving ourselves io those p~ssions which alone cen carry our

• t_

own convictions. ~~ lhe next step of our survey should convinceus that this attitude is untenab~e) and thAt a philosophy whichwould strive for such detachment JOUld necessarily renounceits proper and indeed indispensable services.- --

2. I have listed before three classes of interpersonalarticulation,~~~"--~-r~-ar~anged-se~u~Bee - m~_be-d~scrrbeda's-:f'oilows. (1) communication concerning objects (2) directconvivial exchanges. .(3) communication concerning persons.These three elementary forms underlie three vast regions ofintellectual life which are brought into view by recalling thecollective character of all articulation. The common acceptanceof an idiom by a group which transmits its usage from generationto generation makes possible the development and continuedcultivation through the centuries of complex systems of articu-fation. I shall describe this cultural heritage as 'social Lore'

R#,4h,wn..~a<and classify certain forms of this lore. ~ t~de?-S$?8dkng

2. 41 iGifford Lectures.

11 May 1951.

40Lecture 3. The Necessity Af Philosophy.

(c) The Validation of Social Lore,

1. The integral part which I have ascribed to emotions

in all intellectual performances is a clear challenge to the ideal

of dispassionate reason. It stands in sharp conflict to the

aim of critical philosophy to eliminate all emotive elements

of

)ÿThthought which inevitably interfere with its objectivity.

e contemporary school of linguistic analysis has to some

extent recognised this situation by Jgggisterlng the emotional

content of language as part of its meaningful message. How¬

ever, a dispassionate scrutiny of our passions inevitably reduces

them to a merely subjective status and thus debars us from

giving ourselves to those passions which alone can carry our

own convictions. "fhe next step of our survey should convince

us that this attitude is untenable and that a philosophy which

would strive for such detachment would necessarily renounceits proper and indeed indispensable services.

2. I have listed before three classes of interpersonal

articulation, which- - in re-arranged sequence - may be described

as follows. (1) communication concerning objects (2) direct

convivial exchanges. (3) communication concerning persons.

These three elementary forms underlie three vast regions of

intellectual life which are brought into view by recalling the

collective character of all articulation. The common acceptance

of an idiom by a group which transmits its usage from generation

to generation makes possible the development and continued

cultivation through the centuries of complex systems of articu¬

lation. I shall describe this cultural heritage as 'social lore'J? ** 4r>

and classify certain forms of this lore, wa*fch -the uinderstjan.dyig

1M

412 ••

A~'a:.£ ~ tJ..-r r I ••••that each section of~~ is malntained by approprlate lnstltutlO?S •~d.. I st..4HI ~ 4>« tU4. 1:;; cf..e.,sav:b£. ~tL Vk- .u..1 .. • e..a'llQ leo,re'I'-:'OT-g:ani-sa:tions..I "Ji~shthe se-to be kept--in'mindthOttgh"-I'sha'U be 'abl'eto mention them-only in a~13rild and .rather.cursory manner"

3. The first section of social lore, which is based onco~~unication about objects, has already been dealt with previouslyunder the heading of object-directed intellectual performances,expressed in an articulate form. We may recall its three sub-divisions: Observation, which included empirical science;-Invention,

-e="<'"containingcomprising all practical arts, and Interpretation,-- -the deductive sciences, as well as pictorial and

m$'1

musical art. While for the purposes of analysis all these mental-activities have been previously described as the performances of~ ~llvid~al, they are now brought into this survey of social

cs><- a...~lore lily taking BetiEle of the obvious fact that they form great,systems vastly exceeding what any man can produce by himself,-- -or everiget to know and master completely.- --We may recall that the amplification of our original list ofobject-directed articulate intellectual performances by theiremotional components has much attenuated the denotative character- -of the articulation involved in them. Having recognised the

- a. ~L- vf-constitutive part played by intellectual beauty within mathematics

A, _ __I\>....I expanded the object-directed field to include pictorial and-musical art, which made it clear that it possesses throughout a

.--='"

manner of justification derived from internal evidence rather-- ..P- - ..

than from re~erence to objects beyond itself. While this type.~.. -_ .... -of intelligence constitutes a wide range of straigh~orward

rl"'I - It relations,and to this extent is cognitive ~ mani-a4 vI. «s-« - -pUlative, its I-It duality istcontracted in mathematics, painting

,;;e:- --- --and - most completely - in music,/into the unity of an exis-JlI .:.t......>.I ... ""- -tential act. I shall a110w for this, however imperfectly, by

replacing the heading 'object directed' by the tenm 'eogniti¥e',to describe the whole range of social lore which does not

.... "..,f-,...t. IA. V. o: ,...~ 1a;.~"J of.~.

2. 41AertiioJL Jto+Hjj

that each section of//W Is maintained by appropriate institutionsX nruvj— aJrLt_ cL&ACrUbc. n*.

asad-looser organisations. I wish these to be kept in mind

though I shall be able to mention thorn only in a brief and rather

cursory manner»

3* The first section of social lore, which is based on

communication about objects, has already been dealt with previously

under the heading of object-directed intellectual performances,

expressed in an articulate form. We may recall its three sub¬

divisions: Observation, which included empirical science;

Invention, comprising all practical arts, and Interpretation,

containing the deductive sciences, as well as pictorial and

musical art. While for the purposes of analysis all these mental

activities have been previously described as the performances of

aHjIhdlvidual, they are now brought into this survey of socialCTH.

lore by taking notioc of the obvious fact that they form great

systems vastly exceeding what any man can produce by himself,

or even get to know and master completely.

We may recall that the amplification of our original list of

object-directed articulate intellectual performances by their

emotional components has much attenuated the denotative character

Having recognised theof the articulation involved in them.‘ CL A l, vf-

constitutive part played by intellectual beauty within mathematics

I expanded the object-directed field to include pictorial and

musicalÿart, which made it clear that it possesses throughout a

manner of justification derived from internal evidence rather

than from reference to objects beyond itself. While this type

of intelligence constitutes a wide range of strsight>forward<rt-

I - It relations,and to this extent is cognitive £&& mani------- 04 U- ~m

pulative, its I-It duality isÿcontracted in mathematics, painting

and - most completely - in music,/ into the unity of an exis-* --SU~=7 ——*tential act. I shall allow for this, however imperfectly, by

replacing the heading 'object directed' by the term 'cognitive',

to describe the whole range of social lore which does not

dJU tf, B

((

r;

('

4. 43

--,,

42

refer to persons; or perhaps more precisely, not to personsas persons.

In its cognitive lore society includes at all timesa fund of information considered to be true. In our own days

~5uthis fund is enormous and ~~ what is accepted as scientificknowledge. In every society there are established a number of orga-

Drocesses by which information is thought to be reliably acquired,~among which we may include the transmission of the currently

accepted fund of information to the succeeding generation~. ;I."""" .. f

These processes and the information derived from them, differprofoundly from one society to another and there are discrepancieseven within a single group of people inhabiting the same territory

t -'Sharply distinct----and forming in most respects a single society.!

ive beliefs concerning the proper sources and valid content of.information are held for example today in England by certaincompact mi~orities ~ike astr~l~~ers/or members of the CommunistParty. 4' In spite of similar divisions of artistic appreciation,a society at any particular time may be said to possess a pictorialand a musical art.

4. I pass on to the part of social lore based on the kindof articulation which I have covered by the name of 'directconvivial exchanges'. This comprises the whole interplay ofgive and take which essentially constitutes social life. There

,------=-- 1/~-is not a stage of our existence/Krom the instant of our birthto the last span of conscious e'ssbefore our extinctio~hn whkch~- ~ 7we do not make claims on others or submit to their claims on us.-~-,- -.A society may be said to possess ill, order, and thus be truelycalled a society,to the extent to which it possesses a bindingsystem of proprieties, regulating these interpersonal claims----and counter-claims. There exists in such a society a system of

rS'

3.

43

42

refer to persons; or perhaps more precisely, not to persons

as persons,

In its cognitive lore society includes at all times

a fund of information considered to be true* In our own daysC-O'W-fVtc.’s*-*

this fund is enormous and jmclud cieÿ what is accepted ss scientific

knowledge. In every society there are established a number of orga-

d processes by which information is thought to be reliably acquired,

jj among which we may include the transmission of the currently

accepted fund of information to the succeeding generations.These processes and the information derived from them, differ

profoundly from one society to another and there are discrepancies

even within a single group of people inhabiting the same territory1 — I f ■ m i ii v vjawc— —and forming in most respects a single society. Sharply distinct¬

ive beliefs concerning the proper sources and valid content of.

information are held for example today in England by certain

i

compact minorities like astrologers (or members of the CommunistParty. In spite of similar divisions of artistic appreciation,

a society at any particular time may be said to possess a pictorial

and a musical art.

4. I pass on to the part of social lore based on the kind

of articulation which I have covered by the name of 'direct

convivial exchanges*. This comprises the whole interplay of

give and take which essentially constitutes social life. There

is not a stage of our existence i'rom the instant of our birth

to the last span of consciousness before our extinction in which

we do not make claims on others or submit to their claims on us.A society may be said to possess an order, and thus be truely

called a society to the extent to which it possesses a binding

system of proprieties, regulating these interpersonal claims

and counter-claims. There exists in such a society a system of

4. 43

mores, in the form of preponderantly accepted manners, customsIand law; including certain agreed modes of enforcing these,

mores on defauI~e!s and diss:~ters'lrand of bringing up ;h~ :oungto respect them. / There ~ also exist an organis:,d process by

which the exi~tirtg sYste~_of~~letcan be legitimately amP:::::dor amended. /The code of behavio r in society is inter\vovenwith i;s CO~itive lore and particularly with its technology;

~ -"'="".~

it is also profoundly affected by religious beliefs and no less-_._.. '-by the current conception of man and human affairs, neither of

f thA~ 1/which I have yet aea±t-w~th.II Strictly speaking, I ought toinclude religious worship among social lore based on directconvivia~9han~~/ For God is a p;;~n'!fnd worship is our'Ivayof addressing God and submitting to his guidance. / But Iwill not elaborate on this perspective as I wish to appeal mainly

I

to the secular outlook and to retain fherefore philosophy as my-- .,..

main subject. / To the social lore from which society derives its{ -interpretation of man and human affairs I shall turn in a moment.-,- -

But before passing on to this I must secure a suitable term bywhich to refer back to the area of social lore based on directconvivial exchanges, that is the mores of a society, theirenforcement, transmission and any accepted processes for theiramendment. I think that in contrast to the cognitive area this

~ ....

may be called the practical field of social lore. The word'practical' should of course refer here to interpersonal practices,while the rules of object-directed practicality are comprisedalready by cognitive lore.

5. Lastly, we have social lore embodying communicationconcerning persons.-~social heritage constituting a modern civilisation. A massivepiece of it is h::~~~. h ~Dother great section of it is formedby the drama, the epic and the novel, and by all the other

~\Olo .....",.. ~ ~

litera~"arts. r Religion, so far as it is history and literaturefalls" clearly within this scope. )TheOIOgy a:-;he analYSi~ a

This again comprises a large part of the

person, namely God, ought properly to be included as well, but•for reasons explained be/fore its inclusion will again be passed

4. 43mores, in the form of preponderantly accepted manners, customs

and law; including certain agreed modes of enforcing these

mores on defaulters and dissenters, and of bringing up the young

to respect them. There may also exist an organised process by

which the existing system of rules/can be legitimately amplified

or amended. The code of behaviour in society is interwoven

with its cognitive lore and particularly with its technology;

it is also profoundly affected by religious beliefs and no less

by the current conception of man and human affairs, neither of

which I have yet dealt -with. ■, Strictly speaking, I ought toinclude religious worship among social lore based on direct

convivial exchanges. For God is a person, dnd worship is ourway of addressing God and submitting to his guidance. But I

will not elaborate on this perspective as I wish to appeal mainly

to the secular outlook and to retain therefore philosophy as my

main subject. , To the social lore from which society derives its

interpretation of man and human affairs I shall turn in a moment.But before passing on to this I must secure a suitable term by

which to refer back to the area of social lore based on direct

convivial exchanges, that is the mores of a society, their

enforcement, transmission and any accepted processes for their

amendment. I think that in contrast to the cognitive area this

may be called the practical field of social lore. The word

'practical' should of course refer here to interpersonal practices.

while the rules of object-directed practicality are comprised

already by cognitive lore.

5. Lastly, we have social lore embodying communication

coneerningjDersons. This again comprises a large part of the

social heritage constituting a modern civilisation. A massive

piece of it is history. Another great section of it is formed

by the drama, the epic and the novel, and by all the otherTSSr

literary arts. j Religion, so far as it is history and literature

falls clearly within this scope. Theology as the analysis of a

person, namely God, ought properly to be included as well, but

for reasons explained be/fore its inclusion will again be passed ij

.I

5. 44over. ~o history and the literary arts we may add politicaloratory and - in modern times - journalism, films and broadcasts,as further articulate, forms cultivating the understanding of menand human~fairs.TBut there are so~;~ concerning manIf J ~ /J..4 !>/4tz.and society which cannot be either included or excluded he?e,

of-.o.~~~'t-he~e,nG-;bu.S:LGns-.()f, he ar gumel'l.t..whi.eh

Take economic theoryor social anthropology, as two of a who l,e group of social sciences;and take any particular PSYChOlOg'iVSQ.Y PSYCho-a..YlalYSiSfs"""":instance of the study of man by the methods of natural science.

_iirc~ -~

fiothese deal 1:Tith persons as persons? I think not, and wouldtherefore include them among cognitive lore. But this impliesthat there is an ~spect of man which eludes any such studies,and this I cannot try to prove here but must leave open till later.

To sum up then ~~~m=Zi1i~"~d~1.provisionally:•

I intend to classhere all social lore which emanates from our capacity to knowpersons as persons and to make articulate our understanding of-~' - ~such.~ersons(for pr~sentati~_t~_f::~,-members of our society.This is the study of man in the tradition of humanism. I shallcall it the Interpretative section of social lore, rememberingonce more that this excludes object-directed Interpretation which""'~ .""""""', .. _..... _ ..we have already classed ,,,ithinthe cognitive area.- InterpersonalInterpretation to whd ch I am referring here, should now be clearlydistinguishable from this area.

6. The three main classes of social lore - the Cognitive,the Practical and the Interpretative - lend support to three great

ouA-consti tuents of 4.c. civilisation, which are by no means 1:Thollyarticulate. Indeed, very much of knovrledge, custom and under-standing, belonging - in this sequence - to the three main partsof our social heritage, are transmitted by the mere force of..........~~Bil"'&i_l example. '.Lheyare Lar ge.Ly enfolded in the implications,..of behaviour and can never be fully expressed by articulateprecepts. This follows already from the fact that all articulate

3

4

44add politicalover. xo history and the literary arts

oratory and - in modern times - journalism, films

as further articulate forms cultivating the understanding

and humanjaf fairs•T.broadcasts.

of men

But there are some studies concerning mandJ (Lc« s/Zfja.

and society which cannot be either included or excluded hererwithout -•anticipating the -conclusions -of the argument which

this HSUTTey • is-intended to introduce- Take economic theory

or social anthropology, as two of a whole group of social sciences;

and take any particular psychology.* say psycho-analysis an

instance of the study of man by the methods of natural science.

Do these deal with persons as persons? I think not, and would

therefore include them among cognitive lore. But this implies

that there is an aspect of man which eludes any such studies,

and this I cannot try to prove here but must leave open till later.

To sum up then <ÿ>» ............provisionally: I intend to class

here all social lore which emanates from our capacity to know

persons as persons and to make articulate our understanding of

such persons for presentation to fellow-members of our society.

This is the study of man in the tradition of humanism. I shall

call it the Interpretative section of social lore, remembering

once more that this excludes object-directed Interpretation which

we have already classed within the cognitive area. Interpersonal

Interpretation to which I am referring here, should now be clearly

distinguishable from this area.

6. The three main classes of social lore - the Cognitive,

the Practical and the Interpretative - lend support to three greatoust-

constituents of civilisation, which are by no means wholly

articulate. Indeed, very much of knowledge, custom and under¬

standing, belonging - in this sequence - to the three main parts

of our social heritage, are transmitted by the mere force of

praotieal example. xhey are largely enfolded in the implicationsfa"

of behaviour and can never be fully expressed by articulate

precepts. This follows already from the fact that all articulate

•

6. 45

performances of intelligence are based on inarticulate performances•Thus the inarticulate processes by which the ~~ements of speech-~are taught to succeeding generations transmit the idiom of a~-

civilisation, which largely determines the scope and significance~. ------of all its articulately formulated superstructure. The contents....

of inarticulate tradition are of course vastly enhanced by the_ ~!M"!.;;=r'~~growth of a great articulate heritage by which it is sustained...and of which - in reverse - it forms the ultimate ~terpretation.

-'t-': ~tt.- -" """-...yo-( a \ th f" =~~ h " "t "t"f"J.. e grow 0 sci.ence ~~""""'v~e as gaven ri se 0 a seaen l lC_ .... ~ "ll'

.~

tradition which, in its turn, supplies the ultimate ~nterpretation...... 'N ..-of scientific terms, as well as of the methods of scientific~ ~~

• observation and scientific inference.--7. We are now at the very threshold of our argument forthe necessity of philosophy; but before entering on it we musttake stock for a moment of the emotional forces that are arousedby the collectivisation of articulate interperson~ intelligence

to 'i; J H .....

and which make social lore convincing to each member of acommunity, just because it is accepted by the others. A commonintellectual heritage tendsthe conviviality of men/and

,,".<~'

to intensify and helps to organise~- ~the ensuing consensus of minds forms

#'*f ..._~""7lt

Ithe indispensable vehicle for the continued transmission of acomplex system ~ticulations,/tOgether with their inarticulate

~"·"7 -- -accompaniments.

~hink of the elementary force of inarticulate conviviality,florAe. If ~..u-.> Iamong a ~1]P of ben-S, feeding together, (among chimpanzees vitalised

by each others' companionship; I think of the heart-grippingresponses between dogs and men/or babes and mothers. ~f,~jOi~t forms Of_~iVing/sUbsist on the most slender m~s ofcommunication. I Vast new opportunities of common ~fe are offeredby the artiaulation of common knowledge, of common usages andof a COlnrnonli:eratu;:. if/Indeed, apart from its mater~l ends,human society seems to be constituted for the mutual participation

...... - tof individuals in the same cultural heritage. The unsparing•

performances of intelligence are based on inarticulate performances

Thus the inarticulate processes by which the 'elements of speech

are taught to succeeding generations transmit the idiom of a

civilisation, which largely determines the scope and significance

The contentsof all its articulately formulated superstructure.

of inarticulate tradition are of course vastly enhanced by the

growth of a great articulate heritage by which it is sustained

and of which - in reverse - it forms the ultimate interpretation'Xirf e J

£

growth of science far--e*sfflpie has given rise to a scientific

tradition which, in its turn, supplies the ultimate interpretation

of scientific terms, as well as of the methods of scientific

observation and scientific inference.

7. We are now at the very threshold of our argument for

the necessity of philosophy; but before entering on it we must

take stock for a moment of the emotional forces that are aroused

by the collectivisation of articulate interpersonal intelligencei- 1

and which make social lore convincing to each member of a

community, just because it is accepted by the others. A common

intellectual heritage tends to intensify and helps to organise

the conviviality of men and the ensuing consensus of minds forms

the indispensable vehicle for the continued transmission of a

complex system of articulations, together with their inarticulate

accompaniments. x— 7$hink of the elementary force of inarticulate conviviality,

daJc f}.l a group of ben-sÿ feeding

by each others' companionship;

VX UJLXVV

doAc f}- famong a group nf bpn-sÿ feeding together , /among chimpanzees vitalised

think of the heart-gripping

responses between dogs and men, or babes and mothers. Stteaa

joint forms of living subsist on the most slender means of

communication. Vast new opportunities of common life are offered

by the articulation of common knowledge, of common usages and

of a common literature. Indeed, apart from its material ends,Jf I —r-

human society seems to be constituted for the mutual participationrwnEH1,1uw MP'11-***

of individuals in the same cultural heritage. The unsparing

.1

)

•

7· 46identification of individuals with the fellow members of thesame social group/strikes the observer as curious if he ishimself in nor~ involved in it. Anthropologists have oftenwondered how completely (the primitive individual identifies

\mat happens.himself with fellow members of the same group.----to one member of a social unit happens to all and for the deed

- held equally'res;onsible.l£#', of one member the rest are This:~'-"~ ~- -• identification is taken so literally that it excludes the

•

iJ,;'J<eJ>

l!:.I'",J.,Q.,;..e,,;;,(

punishment of fratricide OD parricide, for in such cases the~--~' I

murderer }~2:mselfwould have to ask ~~compensation'l To avoidthe issue, death from such murder is always considered_~cidental'1

-~he withdrawal. of convivial.affectiol!bY the group to which heI so closely belOnged/has correspondin~lY severe effects on anf r", fW" "",,"-J. 'V<.- 1'r,b... ", -individual deprived of it. "In individual formally expelled

l'.-

from his group by ritual scolding, may vollmtarily languish to-' - ..death -or otherwise commit suicide. This deep rootedness of the

individual's vitality in his participation in a group is a result- ~of his adherence to the mores and general outlook'of the group.Being moulded by his edu~ation to conform with the organised

•.-opinion of the group, his self-respect and self-assertion abandon- .4 f/W>'U 1- ~ -- - "'~k..tt ,him once these sj:lpinggsfiJi: vitality are no longer confJrmeEl, but1A~ -~ :& 'u ~~a,.,;. .....tIkJ"'!PwL,v/.. ~ r t· (-are Mfli se j" oM f" ~~~;lY the group ';Ii=: !iCt'?:\ x:: is ..k.:..

,/.."lJu .. t;= t~.."".c *l dI .'~.IJ~iBeapablo sf F6fH::l:8:iatiBg.. ~ ..,.__ tL-The adherence of modern Western people to their cultural

heritage is no less complete than that of priniitive people, butthis is less conspfueuous to us, for we are ourselves modern

...-- -- - ..-Western people and therofore accept our heritage without anysense of conforming to an orthodoxy.----------------- -_.----- ....:...._---

'7

1. Levy Brlihl, The Soul of the Primi tive, p .105. quotingR. Karsten,"Blood Revenge, War·and.Victory-Feasts among theJibaro Indians of Eastern Eacuador", Bureau of AmericanEthnology Bulletin, ixxix, pp.11-12 (1923).

7-

identification of individuals with the fellow members of the

same social groupj strikes the observer as curious if he is

himself in notway involved in it. Anthropologists have often

wondered how completely the primitive individual identifies

himself with fellow members of the same group. What happens

to one member of a social unit happens to all and for the deed

of one member the rest are held equally responsible This

identification is taken so literally that it excludes the

punishment of fratricide or parricide, for in such cases the

murderer himself would have to ask for compensation. To avoid

the issue, death from such murder is always considered accidental

The withdrawal of convivial affection by the group to which he• **“ /

so closely belonged has correspondingly severe effects on anj Xi* t/Vtre .mi.irM—

individual deprived of it. in individual formally expelled

from his group by ritual scolding, may voluntarily languish to

death or otherwise commit suicide. This deep rootedness of the/-• —individual's vitality in his participation in a group is a result

of his adherence to the mores and general outlook of the group.

Being moulded by his education to conform with the organised

opinion of the group, his self-respect and self-assertion abandonA<JWI.C£S4 "fos ,

him once these springo of vitality are no longer confirmed*, buti&cAU. W ***>' 'UJ*

are denied just!ficjufeoegyÿpy the group

//

4*1 ' <L *riatingÿ. / .inoapablo ef repudiating.

The adherence of modern Western people to their cultural

heritage is no less complete than that of primitive people, but

this is less conspicuous to us, for we are ourselves modern

Western people and therefore accept our heritage without any

sense of conforming to an orthodoxy.

1. Levy Brhhl, The Soul of the Primitive, p.10?. quotingR. Karsten,"Blood Revenge, War and Victory-Feasts among theJibaro Indians of Eastern Eacuador", Bureau of AmericanEthnology Bulletin, ixxix, pp.11-12 (1923).

)

•

8. 47~d.u-Aetually, the enormous range of modern science, law and

literature - to take only a few instances of cognitive, practicalcap/. of 1"-<.

and interpretative lore,~ requires for its cultivation andtransmission a great n~mber of SpeCialists,!'each of whom canperform his function only by accepting on the whole unquestioninglythe much greater part of our cultural heritage which lies outside----his own special field. The.kO a-;fk'r.~~,

; cJ:J ar.;,tdveri Ad., and yet

existence in our society of a cultuEef'undamerrt a'l.Ly coherent, is therefore

~a-l~regard to its f1:rel,I1~~e?in itself proof of a general consensus in~

to which we all implicitly adhere.Until the Revolutions of the twentieth century our acceptance

of this consensus had gone virtually unchallenged, but since thenour holding of certain distinctive beliefs has become ~ncreasingly

'1 -. • .•.

,10nsPicu~ and our support of them has become more e~i t!in~he measure~s it could no longer be taken for granted. Theattem~~f totalitarian disse~r:-to discredi;-these beliefs~r

at any rate some formulations of these beliefs/jhas caused sgarpwecw./\ 1/1

land angry divisions within o~p eu'llsociety, leading to irreeon-- -

ciliable conflicts of loyalty in ~tsmidst.To this issue I shall yet return. For the moment I

only wish to car~y forward the Observation/that the existence of8rticula~10re/greatlY ampli~ convivial affections withinhuman society(and th~t this engenders a persuasive passion whichseeks to secure the continued adherence of all members of a groupto a joint cultural heritage. Social lore cannot exist outside a

- -" - Lw"/~..A .w~group of convinced adhe~s/and no conviction is ever heI~ ~

~ /

cultivated and transmitteCQ~~~~~~~~ ;eIYing)on theforce of persuasive passion$,

8. This completes my survey of intelligent performances-and leads up to the point whence we shall recognise that the termsin which intelligence was hitherto considered are insufficient,and must be extensively amended, in order that they may enableus to characterise a feat of intelligence as a true feat of

44 ~ _

intelligence, .ddst Lnot from a specious performance or an alto-gether meaningless behaviour.-

8. >. 47CxrnsxC>dLt<Actually., the enormous range of modern science, law and

literature - to take only a few instances of cognitive, practical£CLC&. °f

and interpretative lore, requires for its cultivation and

transmission a great number of specialists, each of whom can

perform his function only by accepting on the whole unquestioningly

the much greater part of our cultural heritage which lies outside

his#own special field. The existence in our society of a culturei jljLsrtÿusCicJCLat ,

%- rich and vari prj., and yet fundamentally coherent, is therefore

in itself proof of a general consensus in regard to its ppemi-gooqfT'''ÿse vi

to which we all implicitly adhere.

Until the Revolutions of the twentieth century our acceptance

of this consensus had gone virtually unchallenged, but since then

our holding of certain distinctive beliefs has become increasingly

ionspicuous and our support of them has become more explicit/inthe measure it could no longer be taken for granted. The

attempt of totalitarian dissenters to discredit these beliefs,/’or

at any rate some formulations of these beliefs, has caused sharp

and angry divisions within cmr own society, leading to irrecon-

ciliable conflicts of loyalty in <£&S midst.

To this issue I shall yet return. For the moment I

only wish to carry forward the observation/that the existence of/

articulate lore greatly amplifies convivial affections within

human society,and that this engenders a persuasive passion which

seeks to secure the continued adherence of all members of a group

to a joint cultural heritage. Social lore cannot exist outside a

group of convinced adherents and no conviction is ever~PieTÿ"(41smitted)/ wcultivated and transmitted)/ mif.hnnf, arnn.a4ng ana- relying on the

force of persuasive passionS,

8. This completes my survey of intelligent performances

and leads up to the point whence we shall recognise that the termsin which intelligence was hitherto considered are insufficientand must be extensively amended , in order that they may enableus to characterise a feat of intelligence as a true feat ofcu

intelligence, distinct from a specious performance or an alto¬

gether meaningless behaviour.

9. 48)

necessar'~fail-'to its validity.

:\I think these terms have f'af.Led - and must/ // \ /to refer ~~qUately' to the validity of tha;/which the describe,

by the m~e fact that they describe it. 'When I~scribesome~g this implies thay the things ~escrib d (in this caset~intellectual achiev~ments) are there for me to observe~hem,/ ' I /lin the relationship of tne It, and are not' something in which I

~ exi.stentially participate; not something like ~6~TIdesireor my o.m pain fn which I am essentially an agepX or a sufferer.

~ /This remains true, as I have/already hinted in my criticism/ - /of the linguistic method, even,~hough I include a description/ \ /

of the emotional colouring which animates the intellectual, \' (performance in question and lends it the force of conviction.

I

For so long as I upho}d the descripttve attitude of Me detached/ \I" •;from an It in which such a persu~sive emotion is included, I./ ,I \

remain as its describer, necessarily unaffected by it and cannot/express my share in it, if I shared it. Hence~ I suggest,

/ . ,

descriptive references to feats of intellig ~e must ignore the/ '

main yssue raised by any such feat and in ee can never legitimately

(

~ ~_e~~~ as a true feat of intelligence as distinct froma-specious performance of an alto'gettter-meariinglessbehaviour.I~shall now try to substantiate this argument and its_conclusionsby~~lustpating them"with reference to some of the principal'se~"tionsof social lore. '/, ~.JJ,..,., ~ ~. ,;;.hJ:I ~'1UL'" '-~.... I~/0"""" 2~ I:t:L~1Ilis(2g mii4& :;,p1~ to every stageof(intellEi/ctualperformancef, from the lowest grade upwardsi-A

'GtM-C'l- ~e-vt.. W(. r"""'s~ it-~~~h'l!me"f~P-"~ ",,~I ""ro~a pe~formane~anQ.4i.ltrough

~iIl *Jr.ll:<~(we ~ open up[problems ,,J • 11 e of a philosophiccharacter. Yet I have preferred to postpone this until the-. -I' 'present juncture, partly because I wished to complete my

-- fi -preliminary survey of mental operations before embarking on a-,,

philosophic critique of the process by whlch the survey was being~ ----<-

conducted,tbut mainly perhaps because the problems raised by such-~ ~ c'>:, .

...

)

>

i

C

<

<

■

9- 48

’to its validity.

I think these terms have failed - and must necessarily fail-

to refer adequately to the validity of that which they describe,

by the mbre fact that they describe it. When I

something this implies that the things described (in this case

the intellectual achievements) are there for me to observe them,

the relationship of the It, and are not something in which I

existentially participate; not something like my own desire

or my own pain in which I am essentially an agent or a sufferer.

This remains true, as I have already hinted in my criticism

of the linguistic method, even though I include a description

of the emotional colouring which animates the intellectual

performance in question and lends it the force of conviction.

For so long as I uphold the descriptive attitude of Me detached

from an It in which such a persuasive emotion is included, I

remain as its describer, necessarily unaffected by it and cannot

express my share in it, if I shared it. Hence, I suggest,

descriptive references to feats of intelligence must ignore the

main issue raised by any such feat and indeed can never legitimately

characterise-4b as a true feat of intelligence as distinct from

a specious performance of an altogether meaningless behaviour.

I shall now try to substantiate this argument and its. conclusions

by illustrating them with reference to some of the principal

sections of social W frrÿCi*A yr

.applicsTbixs. to every stageOWL AUMMey Ofjof/intellectual performanceÿ,from the lowest grade upwardsÿ—£%•Owt-OL UyruUcCv-tSL. Lrt. YCL* i£.aaa--W ;Xai;aedÿh«neve?ÿ"V.ÿÿssÿrt/oertrsoeh & performanee -and through

r

ra4ci£i#-4?t /we open up'ÿproblems yrhi-rh nrca of a philosophic

character. Yet I have preferred to postpone this until the

present juncture, partly because I wished to complete my

preliminary survey of mental operations before embarking on a

philosophic critique of the process by which the survey was being

conducted, but mainly perhaps because the problems raised by such— # jgssr

)

•

)

•

(,

a critique becomen~gleet~ once weheritage. Indeed, as we shall see, these problems belong to theburning questions of our time, forced upon us by our immediate

""'"'-~ Mfr"ftAvtAr ~ """G<- ~ ~~ s-.4civic,responsibilities. ~ I '61n:rtI!:'6ha1;,!;\OIu;ingrscarted~ reflect----ions at the top end of the intellectual SCale,!it should be easierto appreciate later their bearing on the lower levels,!the rathermore delic~;e_ and academic problems of Wh~'Ch/'ill then be recognised-as the prototypes of the great questions of life and death,

. --- -~ .._-~encountered at the upper levels.-- --

10.~ "",j{I shall itOlP'l; ~ the cognitive area of social lore. I,.---~

that the methods by which information is acquired varieshave said(I greatly from one society to another and that we find corresponding

divergences in regard to what is accepted by different groups astheir fund of knowledge.ambiguity.

This manner of speaking conceals anFor words like 'knowledge', 'information I or 'cognition.'.--have a different meaning .to those who believe in the reality of

•the intellectual achievements referred to by such words than those.. _- ----who do no f . It is an ancientTake the example of astrology.-

(

and elaborate Pi~~ of ,co~itive lore, which originated in Assyriaabout the thi~~C. and has been since v~dely upheld asvalid within the regions surrounding the Mediterranean for nearly2000 years. To believers in astrology, it represents the art ofpredicting a person's lifelong destiny from the position of the-stars at the moment of his birth. this would form a tremendous-intellectual achievement,(rather similar to that claimed by some...-schools of psycho-analysis which make predictions of a similarrange - at least in retrospect - from the pre-natal experiences,the natal shock or the earliest infantile conflicts of a person. I

. /To me on the contrary, astrology sighifies merely an outmodedsuperstition void of any intellectual achievement. 1"5 appea:cs_

cognUivg,.,ae-t)-w6-'ar-eJ:eav±ng the question apen..whe;ther~th acj;-, ,~.,....

•

.P .

„ _ 49

a critique become more conspicuous /and dfce more difficult -tp fce

nogleetad; once we to the major contents of our own cultural

heritage. Indeed, as we shall see, these problems belong to the

burning questions of our time, forced upon us by our immediateMcrfesO'Sc*.r hyt

civic responsibilities. I thamk-that, having/lTtarted reflect¬

ions at the top end of the intellectual scale, it should be easier

to appreciate later their bearing on the lower levels, the rather

more delicate and academic problems of which will then be recognised

as the prototypes of the great questions of life and death,

encountered at the upper levels.

hyc/ÿ-10. I shall &£&¥%--©«* the cognitive area of social lore. I

have said that the methods by which information is acquired varies

greatly from one society to another and that we find corresponding

divergences in regard to what is accepted by different groups as

their fund of knowledge. This manner of speaking conceals an

ambiguity. For words like 'knowledge’, 'information' or 'cognition.

have a different meaning to those who believe in the reality of

the intellectual achievements referred to by such words than those

who do not'. Take the example of astrology. It is an ancient

and elaborate piqce of cognitive lore, which originated in Assyria

about the third cenjury B.C. and has been since widely upheld as

valid within the regions surrounding the Mediterranean for nearly

2000 years. T0 believers in astrology, it represents the art of

predicting a person's lifelong destiny from the position of the

stars at the moment of his birth. This would form a tremendous

intellectual achievement, rather similar to that claimed by someIf

schools of psycho-analysis which make predictions of a similar

range - at least in retrospect - from the pre-natal experiences,

the natal shock or the earliest infantile conflicts of a person.

To me on the contrary, astrology sighifies merely an outmoded

superstition void of any intellectual achievement. Pt-appear-s—..

therefore that'if'-the- easting'of•horos'eO'per is--deseribed -as a

cognitive act, we are leaving the question open whether- the act

)

)

)

(

•

J

=

12. 51.,-

apiece attached to its rim. For we do not believe that the

11.50

1/>1. llu '1'K..e~3 1 I~ 4v-., a..Skd-o"t'1This ambiguity{can be ~~;;~~ avoided only if people who b~evein astrology will use aLdifferent language from those who don't.Only astrologers should speak of ast~IO?Y and hO~O~C~!es,~as ~speak of this bla~~ard/or of the mUltiP~tio~~ble, whereasI,~~Uld be barred from using the same terms as th:y _do/and r/..-./I{

speak instead of 'astrology' and 'horoscopes' 'in quotation marks.-- _.-Similarly, only the Christian believer should speak of miracles.........in referring to supernatural ~ents alleged b:th: Gospels,fwhilenon-Christians should always use the word 'miracles' in quotationmarks/~hen referring to the ~ame_topic. In general, every timewe speak of knowledge,'1nformation or cognition, we should have- -to'make it clear whether we really mean knowledge, information,-cognition, etc., or merely 'knowledge', 'information','cognition'in quotation marks,-Let me illustrate the point mo)e particdlarly inrespect to science, When we speak of a scientific discovery,--we mean something different from

~ false claim to a discovery. It is impossible to write a history•-of science without distinguishing between the two.. We do not--speak of the discove.r;,Yof Phlo}~stSlnA~~ahl;

lit r~ 'ltA-p :7 -11l - ~ "Zf the~.:.:yS by Blo~dlot. c Nov, '~t'"any r;te, unless we believethat these things exist. J Soviet scientists are logically correct,

or of the discovery

in speaking of the discovery of vegetative hybridisation by Michurinand Lysenko, ~ut no Weste~n geneticist re;:;s to the observation~--

.,.,.. /- ~~ 1; f11~ •in question as discoveries. ISimilarly~ ~e do not spt~of the

- -! "-invention of a machine of perpetual motion by the Marquis ofWorcester in 1663, when in his Century of Invention he gave adetailed description of his construction of such a machine in theform of a wheel of 14 feet in diameter, with 40 weights of 50 pounds

•!II

c.

12- •*. 51

apiece attached to its rim. For we do not believe that the

l/yt lb smut.Osnsts* <rf lb, a,S /rcrCc‘jsyThis ambiguity can be strictly avoided only if people who believe

in astrology will use aÿdifferent language from those who don't.

Only astrologers should speak of astrology and horoscopes, I

speak of this blackboard or of the multiplication table, whereas

I should be barred from using the same terms as they do and shrH/A.speak instead of 'astrology' and 'horoscopes' in quotation marks.

Similarly, only the Christian believer should speak of miracles

in referring to supernatural events alleged by the Gospels,/'while

non-Christians should always use the word 'miracles' in quotation

marks when referring to the same topic. In general, every time

we speak of knowledge, information or cognition, we should have

to* make it clear whether we really mesn knowledge, information,

cognition, etc., or merely 'knowledge','information','cognition'

in quotation marks.

Let me illustrate the point moÿe particularly in

respect to science. When we speak of a scientific discovery,

we mean something different from

a false claim to a discovery. It is impossible to write a history

of science without distinguishing between the two.

speak of the discovery of phloÿistgrÿ bÿStahl;vf f.hp W-T’SV.C: hv ondl rvh NmT. at. anv T'ata.

We do not

or of the discovery

qf the N-rays by Blondlot. Noo, at any rate, unless we believe, —- Cthat these things exist. Soviet scientists are logically correct

in speaking of the discovery of vegetative hybridisation by Michurin

and Lysenko, but no Western geneticist refers to the observationstu/trubff io

in question as discoveries. Similarly we do not speak of the

invention of a machine of perpetual motion by the Marquis of

Worcester in 1663, when in his Century of Invention he gave a

detailed description of his construction of such a machine in the

form of a wheel of 14 feet in diameter, with 40 weights of 50 pounds

.. c JJI

)

•

• ....- --

12. 51....... '.

apiece attached to its rim. For we do not believe that themachine worked. Until it was decided whether hypnosis does workor not, it was also undec Lded whethar anyone could be credited---with its discovery.---If an~writer tried to avoid the necessity of taking a standin respect to the truth or falsehood of discoveries, by writinga hist~_r.:..of scientific~2:egations jor of ~leg:..~ science I hewould (while undertaking an impossible task) certainly not producea history of science. Any reference to science, technology,

~ ---- ~-mathematics,Jin the proper sense of these terms should imply that"""'_ I .~

Iwhat is so aesignated is believed to be valid by him who thus... _--designates it • Such designation implies the act of underwriting.'-

that which is designated and is charged with an emotional partici-_.- - -- --pation in its designate. Any usage which leaves this point

any usage which implies the possibility of\unclear is ambiguous;rkr~ a-.d --L~mpersonal reference to an intellectual achievement like science_...- .......--

or matheroat~cs.is deceptiveland in fact contradict~its true import,which is to cow~t the speaker to acceptance of that which he is

~--

._ ... ~- - --describing as science, etc.-11. It appears then that the terms in which I have hitherto

described cognitive lore must be amended so as to make it clear-;..~ ."",..,.".-.

whether they are meant to designate true knowledge or merely...........,l...~ -

anege~knOWledgd'.. j9e:w;r9i'~~elY alle~,ed. This discrliJminationdoes not ~riJ~e the great philosophic problems ofepist6mology. It might be attempted within the scope of cognitive--performances of the same kind which we have listed in our survey...... -A journalist checking up on a rumour, or a judge deciding what...testimony should be accepted in evidence, tries to distinguish

~~ ..-between knowledge and falsely alleged knowledge. So does a textbook

~ -,--..

writer, critically sifting published papers. We might conceivably...-

subject in a similar manner each item of alleged science, technology,. -mathematics etc. to a new scrutiny ~~d include in our survey only. ,., .... -"""" ....

those which stand the test of such critical reconsideration. We

12. 51

apiece attached to its rim. For we do not believe that the

machine worked. Until it was decided whether hypnosis does work

or not, it was also undecided whether anyone could be credited

with its discovery.

If anj* writer tried to avoid the necessity of taking a stand

in respect to the truth or falsehood of discoveries, by writing

a history of scientific allegations lor of alleged science, he

would (while undertaking an impossible task) certainly not produce

a history of science. Any reference to science, technology,Zssiumanss? ■—

mathematics,/in the proper sense of these terms should imply that

what is so designated is believed to be valid by him who thus

designates it. Such designation implies the act of underwriting

that which is designated and is charged with an emotional partici¬

pation in its designate.

unclear is ambiguous;as*.d.

Any usage which leaves this point

any usage which implies the possibility of

n

A -Impersonal reference to an intellectual achievement like science

or mathematics is deceptive and in fact contradicts its true import,

which is to commit the speaker to acceptance of that which he is

describing as science, etc.

11. It appears then that the terms in which I have hitherto

described cognitive lore must be amended so as to make it clearm9tesacm -

whether they are meant to designate true knowledge or merely

alleged knowledgeÿ, —1 y alleged. This discrimination

does not rvÿrTanari the great philosophic problems of

epistemology. It might be attempted within the scope of cognitive

performances of the same kind which we have listed in our survey.

A journalist checking up on a rumour, or a judge deciding what

testimony should be accepted in evidence, tries to distinguish

between knowledge and falsely alleged knowledge. So does a textbook

writer, critically sifting published papers. We might conceivably

subject in a similar manner each item of alleged science, technology,

mathematics etc. to a new scrutiny and include in our survey only

those which stand the test of such critical reconsideration. We

>-~I

13. 52•might then conclude by such procedure that Milliken's determination

of the electron's charge is true/While Ehrenhaft's observation of--.-1

smaller charges which he attributed to a 'sub-electron' is false,-and then class the former as a scientific measurement and the--latter as an unscientific allegation; The term 'science' wouldthen be taken to designate a particular group of true allegations,. --each of which we have verified separately.--But this would actually be impracticable and, even if practicablwould be insufficient. We cannot talk about science without

~referring to innumerable allegations of which we have no detailedknOWledge/and about th;-:~idity of which we could neve; venture...-,- _._--to form an opinion of our own . /To limit ourselves to such knowledgewould be practically to ignore science as a body of systematic--•knowledge. And this would still remain true in an important senseif by a superhuman feat of industry and intelligence we could

~-.iIIl!" ....

actually check up on every single claim of science. For it woul.d•

give us no opportunity to examine science as a whole. We could-not analyse the scientific method nor try to justify our beliefin its validity or define the range of its bearing....... We could not--even verify whether there is any justification in collecting a-,-particular set of true'science,.l1~t-' "J' 0."

statements under the common heading of£-~ .rf eM""'''"''''- ~",.['-I." uJ'J-.l ,,~~ ~),

I 0 I'

Now it could be argued that these questions are unnecessary.That scientists carryon their researches withou~ a~guing aboutthe methods of science and have no use for the services of philos-.-ophers who would offer their advice in the matter. Thi s woul.d be

..untrue i!'.,J:aQtfor the discoveries o'::":::~ernPhYSic=:-are known to •. . ,

have received important stimulus from the philosophic phenomenalismof the late 19th century. The outstanding example of this wasEinstein's theory of relativity which had its roots in Mach's-philosophic critique of Newtonian mechanics.--discovery of quantummechanics in 1924 was guided by the same

~ .- ~

Heisenberg's-philosophic assumptions, which in 1928 were formulated as

.-'Operationalism' by P.W. Bridgman. In other instances Mach's

J c

c

13. 52

might then conclude by such procedure that Millikan's determination

of the electron's charge is true while Ehrenhaft's observation of§

smaller charges which he attributed to a 'sub-electron' is false,

and then class the former as a scientific measurement and the

latter as an unscientific allegation. The term 'science' would

then be taken to designate a particular group of true allegations,

each of which we have verified separately.

But this would actually be impracticable and, even if practicable

would be insufficient. We cannot talk about science without

referring to innumerable allegations of which we have no detailed

knowledge and about the validity of which we could never venture

to form an opinion of our own. /To limit ourselves to such knowledge

would be practically to ignore science as a body of systematic

knowledge. And this would still remain true in an important sense

if by a superhuman feat of industry and intelligence we couldMo-.r-r—

actually check up on every single claim of science. For it would

give us no opportunity to examine science as a whole. We could

not analyse the scientific method nor try to justify our belief

in its validity or define the range of its bearing. We could not •

even verify whether there is any justification in collecting a

particular set of true statements under the common heading of

'science'. A. I*$%&-***- <r| •

Now it could be argued that these questions are unnecessary.

That scientists carry on their researches without arguing about

the methods of science and have no use for the services of philos¬

ophers who would offer their advice in the matter. This would be

untrue in fact for the discoveries of modern physics are known to*.have received important stimulus from the philosophic phenomenalism

1\

of the late 19th century. The outstanding example of this was

Einstein's theory of relativity which had its roots in Mach's

philosophic critique of Newtonian mechanics. Heisenberg's

discovery of quantummechanics in 1924 was guided by the same

philosophic assumptions, which in 1928 were formulated as*l"l iin.kÿjhh

'Operational!sm' by P.W. Bridgman. In other instances Mach's

M

)

)

)

(Wt.; l.lL ;... .Jv. s l:t-n e- I

S IAm\ -'" I~c;\ ~

--( 5314.

phenomenalism had an adverse effect on the progress of science,~-as it seriously discouraged atomistic speculations and retardedthe recognitionit proved to be

of the kinetic theory of gases; but even in this.... -releva~t to the work of the scientist. A major

development of contemporaneous mathematics took its origin from a......--.philosophic temper closely akin to phenomenalism. In 1900 David.......... ~Hilbert undertook to reduce mathematics altogether to the practiceof operating certain sy~bols according to conventional rules •........Though this programme was eventually defeated, its pursuit and theresponse which it evoked has made contributions to mathematics foralmost half a century. The development of psychology in the20th century has been decisively affected by the psychologists'conception of science. Of this there is emphatic testimony in

\

•the works of Freud, Pavlov, Clark L. Hull and indeed throughoutmodern psychological literature. r More-over,the claims which thestudy of man by psychology or social anthropology may make in viewof its conception of its own scope may conflict with the claims ofother references to man and society, in literature, history orjurisprudence. I have mentioned points of such conflicts before.

~n my survey of social lore I have included pictorial art withinthe cognitive area, placing it next to mathematics, within theInterpretative section of object-directed intelligence. It iscurious how deeply the progress of painting has been guided, or at

7

\\ Ever since 1860 when the Impressionists opened their campaign, the

)

any rate supported, by changing views about the functions of painting.

painters of successive schools have argued as much as they have. .."

It' '....In the first·painted, and each held its own theory of painting.half of this century the most influential programme was similar tothat which Hilbert gave about the same time to mathematics. It wasthe view of the Fauves which regarded a picture as an array of twodimensional coloured patches which had to be arranged in a signifi-cant pattern regardless of their representative meaning. Thismovement had its parallel also in poetry and literary criticism

14. 53

phenomenalism had an adverse effect on the progress of science,

as it seriously discouraged atomistic speculations and retarded

the recognition of the kinetic theory of gases; but even in this

it proved to be relevant to the work of the scientist. A major

development of contemporaneous mathematics took its origin from a

philosophic temper closely akin to phenomenalism. In 1900 David

Hilbert undertook to reduce mathematics altogether to the practice

of operating certain symbols according to conventional rules.

Though this programme was eventually defeated, its pursuit and the

response which it evoked has made contributions to mathematics for

almost half a century. The development of psychology in the

20th century has been decisively affected by the psychologists*

conception of science. Of this there is emphatic testimony in

the works of Freud, Pavlov, Clark L. Hull and indeed throughout

modern psychological literature. Moreover, the claims which the

study of man by psychology or social anthropology may make in view

of its conception of its own scope may conflict with the claims of

other references to man and society, in literature, history or

jurisprudence. I have mentioned points of such conflicts before.

my survey of social lore I have included pictorial art within

the cognitive area, placing it next to mathematics, within the

Interpretative section of object-directed intelligence. It is

curious how deeply the progress of painting has been guided, or at

any rate supported, by changing views about the functions of painting.

Ever since i860 when the Impressionists opened their campaign, the

painters of successive schools have argued as much as they have

painted, and each held its own theory of painting. In the first

half of this century the most influential programme was similar to

that which Hilbert gave about the same time to mathematics. It was

the view of the Fauves which regarded a picture as an array of two

dimensional coloured patches which had to be arranged in a signifi¬

cant pattern regardless of their representative meaning. This

movement had its parallel also in poetry and literary criticism

--15. \.~..' . 54

which were both animated by the view that a literary text wasessentially a pattern of words. The person and work ofI.A. Richards links this theory of literature conspicuously tothe intention fostered at the time by formal logic of reducing allscience and indeed all mental activities to strictly formalisedoperations.

12. These instances in which the validity of science as a')

whole as well as that of other object~directed intellectual processes,was re-assessed and these processes were re-directed accordingly,are but lesser examples of the influence exercised by philosophicself-consciousness on the entire range of mental activities. Inour o\~ time these influences have culminated in a sharp conflict,

A- roughly corresponding to the political division between East andf'S'J,i

West, of different philosophies defining differently the validityof science, law, literature and indeed of all manner of cognitive,practical and interpretative lore.

Western science is based on the assumption of its own univers-ality; we are shocked if the Soviet Government affirms on the

'f'11'W>~.t

contrary, that all science is class science and rejects on these~as bourgeois science much of what is accepted as science in theWest. This attack calls in question the continued existence ofscience as understood in the West and challenges the West to affirmthe grounds on which it would uphold its conception of science.As we value our scientific life we must henceforth defend itphilosophically.

Other, perhaps even more vital philosophic issues are forcedupon us in the great practical fields of law and government. Wemay again trace these back to problems raised originally in thecourse of theoretical studies. Even as writers about sciencecannot avoid considering the grounds on which they distinguish

,between science and allegations falsely claimi.ng scientific .recognition, so writers on law will be unable to consider theirsubject as a whol,ewithout trying to characterise it, by distinguish-ing in the first place between what are lawful and what unlawflu

15. I... •• 54

e:

«

which were both animated by the view that a literary text was

essentially a pattern of words. The person and work of

I.A. Richards links this theory of literature conspicuously tothe intention fostered at the time by formal logic of reducing all

science and indeed all mental activities to strictly formalised

operations.12. These instances in which the validity of science as a

nwhole as well as that of other object-directed intellectual processes,

was re-assessed and these processes were re-directed accordingly,

are but lesser examples of the influence exercised by philosophic

self-consciousness on the entire range of mental activities. Inour own time these influences have culminated in a sharp conflict,

roughly corresponding to the political division between East and

West, of different philosophies defining differently the validity

of science, law, literature and indeed of all manner of cognitive,

practical and interpretative lore.

Western science is based on the assumption of its own univers¬

ality; we are shocked if the Soviet Government affirms on theCL* -$

contrary, that all science is class science and rejects on these A

as bourgeois science much of what is accepted as science in the

West. This attack calls in question the continued existence of

science as understood in the West and challenges the West to affirm

the grounds on which it would uphold its conception of science.

As we value our scientific life we must henceforth defend it

philosophically.

Other, perhaps even more vital philosophic issues are forced

upon us in the great practical fields of law and government. We

may again trace these back to problems raised originally in the

course of theoretical studies. Even as writers about science

cannot avoid considering the grounds on which they distinguish

between science and allegations falsely claiming scientific

recognition, so writers on law will be unable to consider their

subject as a whole without trying to characterise it, by distinguish¬

ing in the first place between what are lawful and what unlawful

I

, 5516. -;

commands. All jurisprudence must make affirmations of what isand what is not the law, and it could avoid this only by notwriting' about law as having force of law, which would not be law.Hence the long-standing discussions on the nature of right lawwhich has thrown up a number of rival definitions of it. Whilethese divergent conceptions of the law have necessarily affectedthe direction .inwhlch the development of the law wa s guided bythe writings of jurists and the interpretative tendencies whichthey induced in the law courts, no far-reaching conflicts wereraised by these philosophic differences. Adherents of the "commandtheory' co-operated smoothly with believers in the reality ofnatural law, and a judge like Jerome FranUk who in his writingstended towards a purely empirical conception of legal behaviour,carried on his judicial functions to the universal respect of aprofession predominantly professing an ideal of law which he hadcondemned as empty claptrap. But issues of legal philosophybecome vital when they embody a political conflict, as when theGommon Lawyers of the 17th century upheld against the Crownthe theory that the King was under the law and could not evensit in a court administering the Law in his name; or when atNuremberg, contrary to all precedent,the leaders of a defeated~" 'power were brought to trial and sentenced to.prison by the victors,on the charge of launching an aggressive war; or again when in1947 Kurt Tillessen, one of the men who murdered Rathenauin 1923, was acquitted by a German 60urt on the grounds that theamnesty which Hitler had granted to such criminals was legallyvalid.

Far more sweeping, however, and indeed all-embracingare again the philosophic conflicts which divide totalitarianismfrom the Western world. The jurisprudence of Fascism and Communismwhich denies any independent statusup seriously the philo~hic defence

to the law, forces us to takeof law. When a great and

heavily armed power supported by fanatical followers allover theworLd , fosters and..foments a bitter contempt for our rule of law;denouncing it as a mere instrument of force used for keeping

•

o

commands. All jurisprudence must make affirmations of what is

and what is not the law, and it could avoid this only by not

writing' about law as having force of law, which would not be law.

Hence the long-standing discussions on the nature of right law

which has thrown up a number of rival definitions of it. While

these divergent conceptions of the law have necessarily affected

the direction in which the development of the law was guided by

the writings of jurists and the interpretative t4ndencies which

they induced in the law courts, no far-reaching conflicts were

raised by these philosophic differences. Adherents of the "command

theory" co-operated smoothly with believers in the reality of

natural law, and a judge like Jerome Franck who in his writings

tended towards a purely empirical conception of legal behaviour,

carried on his judicial functions to the universal respect of a

profession predominantly professing an ideal of law which he had

condemned as empty claptrap. But issues of legal philosophy

become vital when they embody a political conflict, as when the

Qommon Lawyers of the 17th century upheld against the Crown

the theory that the King was under the law and could not even

sit in a court administering the law in his name; or when at

Nuremberg, contrary to all precedent, the leaders of a defeatedr'

power were brought to trial and sentenced toÿprison by the victors,

on the charge of launching an aggressive war; or again when in

1947 Kurt Tillessen, one of the men who murdered Rathenau

in 1923, was acquitted by a German 6ourt on the grounds that the

amnesty which Hitler had granted to such criminals was legally

valid o

Far more sweeping, however, and indeed all-embracing

are again the philosophic conflicts which divide totalitarianism

from the Western world* The jurisprudence of Fascism and Communism

which denies any independent status to the law, forces us to take

up seriously the philoÿ)hic defence of law<> When a great and

heavily armed power supported by fanatical followers all over the

world, fosters and.-foments a bitter contempt for our rule of law;denouncing it as a mere instrument of force used for keeping

r

• )

/)

tvl ; \ 0 sz(

•

•

17. 56the workers in submission, and when the utmost sacrificesmay be required to defend our legal order from destruction bysuch a power, then it seems indispensable that we should have someway of justifying our adherence to it. against such shatteringcriticism.

13. Yet the doctrines that all science is class-scienceand that law is but the will of the stronger are but thederivatives of a deeper philosophic conviction concerning thenature of man and society. The fundamental division between mentoday lies in the discrepancy of their beliefs concerning thereal forces that move men in public affairs. Communists andeven Fascists are addicted to violence primarily not from crueltyor lust for power, but from love of truth and ccrntempt for deceit.Man has an irresistible craving to grasp something on which he canfirmly rely. He ~st have some indisputable terms in which he canunderstand what is happening to him and plan his future actions.Hedemands a steady framework within which to build his hopes,grant his loyalty and mark down his enemy. Once he has becomefirmly convinced, be it by upbringing or conversion, that manis inescapably subject to the drives of self interest, he willentrust himself to these explanatory terms with every fibre ofhis being. His love of truth will then express itself indenying that a desire for truth can be a mainspring of humanaction. His moral sentiments will be expressed in a hatred ofall moral sentiments, as sheer hypocrisy in the exploiter andenfeebling emotionalism in the exploited. The more intense hispassion for truth and justice, the more virulently will he despiseany conception of human affairs which would rely on other people'spassion for truth and justice. 1 Hence such theories as that all

----science is class science and that all law mere violence, and hencealso the practice of conducting scientific discussions in termsof political invective and of using fictitious legal proceedingsto destroy persons of whose loyalty the Government is doubtful.Within this I'ramevor-k,.history also becomes I~-aweapon in the

struggle of classes" m:d IlIUstbe written in accordance to thisrequirement. Indeed, once the appetitive interpretation of man

the workers in submission, and when the utmost sacrifices

may be required to defend our legal order from destruction by

such a power, then it seems indispensable that we should have some

way of justifying our adherence to it.against such shattering

criticism,

13• Yet the doctrines that all science is class-science

and that law is but the will of the stronger are but the

derivatives of a deeper philosophic conviction concerning the

nature of man and society. The fundamental division between men

today lies in the discrepancy of their beliefs concerning the

real forces that move men in public affairs* Communists and

even Fascists are addicted to violence primarily not from cruelty

or lust for power, but from love of truth and contempt for deceit*

Man has an irresistible craving to grasp something on which he can

firmly rely. He jjust have some indisputable terms in which he can

understand what is happening to him and plan his future actions.

Hsdemands a steady framework within which to build his hopes,

grant his loyalty and mark down his enemy* Once he has become

firmly convinced, be it by upbringing or conversion, that man

is inescapably subject to the drives of self interest, he will

entrust himself to these explanatory terms with every fibre of

his being. His love of truth will then express itself in

denying that a desire for truth can be a mainspring of human

action* 1 His moral sentiments will be expressed in a hatred of

all moral sentiments, as sheer hypocrisy in the exploiter and

enfeebling emotionalism in the exploited. The more intense his

passion for truth and justice, the more virulently will he despise

any conception of human affairs which would rely on other people’s

passion for truth and justice. |Hence such theories as that all

science is class science and that all law mere violence, and hence

also the practice of conducting scientific discussions in terms

of political invective and of using fictitious legal proceedings

to destroy persons of whose loyalty the Government is doubtful.

Within this framework, history also becomes u-a weapon in the

struggle of classes" and must be written in accordance to thisrequirement. Indeed, once the appetitive interpretation of man

)(, 18. 57

in public affairs is firmly accepted as the basic reality, anunceasing struggle must ensue for a complete assimilation of allactions of any social significance to this framework.

The philosophic challenge of our time thus spreads over ourentire horizon and deepens to the utmost grounds of reality.There is not an idiom of our cultural heritage that ~e can

,{_+rIO ~~pr-onounce today without t;s.Und-...s at bRa !! i PI!! L iI vd.L..,sharp-fanged philosophic objections. Here lies a new necessity ofphilosophy to which I shall try to respond in these pages •

• 14. I shall not enquire here.why such philosophic issueswere raised so decisively in our particular age. But I want toreconsider briefly their position in respect to my previoussurvey of intellectual achievement. Animals can solve problems

r~ of the kind which on a higher level belong to science, technology"- ·f

and geometry; but they are inarticulate. By an articulateaffirmation a person emotionally identifies himself with thevalidity of that which is affirmed. This produces a newsituation. Once we have accepted spoken or written texts, maps,calculations, poems, pieces of music, law~ prescriptions, etc.,which we believe to be true,valid, binding or in any way wellestablished, a curious new object has come into existence whichspeaks with the voice of our conviction and yet can be pickedup and held up for examination to find out how it works.Articulation makes it possible and eventually inevitable thatwe should crit~ally reflect on the acts of our intelligence; andJ.

that is philosophy.I agree therefore with the linguistic school in attributing

all our'philosophic problems to the use of language and even share.uP to a point their hopes of dispelling these discontents byeradicating some mystifying usages. But in view of the factrevealed by this survey, that the articulate must always remainrooted in the inarticulate, I should not expect any truephilosophy to claim more than to be consistent with the ultimatelyunspecifiable nature of its own meaning.

18* 57in public affairs is firmly accepted as the basic reality, an

unceasing struggle must ensue for a complete assimilation of all

actions of any social significance to this framework.

The philosophic challenge of our time thus spreads over our

entire horizon and deepens to the utmost grounds of reality.

There is not an idiom of our cultural heritage that we can.i»m i"-*— '5ut , stifnriifrg aA i hrrydpronounce today without awdÿsharp-

fanged philosophic objections. Here lies a new necessity of

philosophy to which I shall try to respond in these pages.

14. I shall not enquire here why such philosophic issues

were raised so decisively in our particular age. But I want to

reconsider briefly their position in respect to my previous

survey of intellectual achievement. Animals can solve problems

of the kind which on a higher level belong to science, technology

and geometry; but they are inarticulate. By an articulate

affirmation a person emotionally identifies himself with the

validity of that which is affirmed. This produces a new

situation. Once we have accepted spoken or written texts, maps,

calculations, poems, pieces of music, law% prescriptions, etc.,

which we believe to be true, valid, binding or in any way well

established, a curious new object has come into existence which

speaks with the voice of our conviction and yet can be picked

up and held up for examination to find out how it works.

Articulation makes it possible and eventually inevitable that

we should critically reflect on the acts of our intelligence; and

that is philosophy.

I agree therefore with the linguistic school in attributing

all our philosophic problems to the use of language and even share

up to a point their hopes of dispelling these discontents by

eradicating some mystifying usages. But in view of the f act

revealed by this survey, that the articulate must always remain

rooted in the inarticulate, I should not expect any true

philosophy to claim more than to be consistent with the ultimately

unspecifiable nature of its own meaning.