· FOREWORD HE American people realize in a general way what wonderful work was done by the Ameri...

OUR

1 10 DAYS’FIGHTING

BY

ARTHUR W. PAGE

Witk M any M cap: in Text

(And Two Large M ap: at the Back)

GARDEN CITY NEW YORK

DOUBLEDAY, PAGE 8: COM PANY

1 920

COPYRIGHT, 1 9 19, 1 920 , BYDOUBLEDAY , PAGE COM PANY

ALL RIGHTS RESERVED, INCLUDING THAT orTRANSLATION INTO FOREIGN LANGUAGES,INCLUDING THE SCANDINAVIAN

MAR | 8 I920

! 0LA5 6 5 23 9

M O

TO

M Y FATHER

WHO SACRIFICED HIS LIFE TO THE ENDTHAT AMERICA SHOULD DO ITS PARTIN TH E D EF EN S E OF C IV IL IZATION

FOREWORD

HE American people realize in a general waywhat wonderful work was done by the Ameri

can Expedit ionary Forces in the great war. Theyscarcely realize

,however, to any extent, that this

work was done in the face of difficulties all but insurmountable

,or that General Pershing and those

under him accompl ished miracles in overcomingadverse conditions that sprang from many causes

,

most of them going back to our lack of preparationfor war, some of them inseparable from war

,and

,

therefore, unavoidable .The country may well be proud of the fact

,in

spite of our general lack of preparation forwar,that

in the great Meuse-Argonne battle- which provedthe decis ive battl e of 1 9 1 8, and which lasted fromSeptember 26th to November n th—the quality ofour leadership and plans were such that our part ially trained troops were able to drive back thepicked tr0 0 ps of the German Army from Verdunto Sedan .

In the course of these operat ions, three stronglyprepared defens ive l ines, in a terrain wh ich in itselfafforded great natural obstacles, were captured fromthe enemy

,in sp ite of the effort of the enemy to

hold these lines at all cost to prevent the ruin of hi sarmies on the Western Front .

viii FOREWORD

They can further be proud of the fact that ourleadership

,plans, and the devotion of our men were

such that this great victory was won with a totalloss on our side of approximately less thanthat inflicted on the enemy .

What the American Expeditionary Forces aecomplished in France forms a grand p icture that compels the admirat ion of the patrioticAmerican . Thesmall-souled critic may pick up a magnifying glassand apply it to the picture in an endeavour to bringout prominently small flaws that

,in the distorted

view of the glass,may appear great, but when seen

in correct perspective and relation to the remainderof the picture

,do not affect in any way its

grandeur .Those of us who were called upon to hold moreor less responsible positions in the Ama ican Expe

ditionary Forces in France, and who are, therefore,acquainted with the facts

,feel that Mr . Page in

his book,Our 1 1 0 Days’Fighting,

” has rendereda dist inct public service in giving a splendid vistaof the organizat ion of the American Armies inFrance

,and of the period of fighting that began

with Cantigny and ended with Sedan .

Apart from the official reports, wh ich are to comeout later

,noth ing can appear that Will have greater

immediate interest than Mr . Page’s book. Itforms a brief

,readable

,and concise account of the

part the American troops played in Europe. In

this necessarily brief record we get only a glimpseof the principal difficult ies that confronted General

FOREWORD ix

Pershing and his staff in France . It would takehundreds of volumes to recite them all, little andgreat

,and in the detail necessary to a clear under

standing of their importance to all our operations .

The soldiers,whose devotion to duty has set a

new standard in our army, and their leaders fromGeneral Pershing down

,including the staffs who

directed operations in the American ExpeditionaryForces ; who spent days and nights ofheart-breakinganx iety and labour in struggling with untoward conditions ; whose motto was,

“ GET RESULTS,

”

under any and all circumstances, and who finallypresented to their country a victorious army—aresatisfied to rest their case with the Nation

,feeling

sure of a just verdict .

J . W. MCANDREW,

Major General U . S . Army.

Chief of Staff, A . E . FMay 6, 1 9 1 8, to May 26, 1 9 1 9 .

CONTENTS

FOREWORD BY M AJOR GENERAL M cANDREW

CflAfl ER

I . Our Training and Our Plan ofCampaign

II . A Little Battle That Proved a GreatPoint and Made Men

III . Our S ixtyDays Under the French

IV. The Triumph and Humour of St . Mihiel 62

V. The Campaign of the Argonne-Meuse

VI . With the Allies

Stat istics of the First Army

LIST OF MAPS

PAGE

The American Army’s Supply System

Seicheprey and the Fixed Trench System

Artillery Plan for the Cantigny Attack

The Plan of the First American Attack

Cantigny and the Trenches of the War ofMovement .

Chateau-Thierry and Belleau WoodLudendorff’s First Effort to Widen the MarneSalient

Ludendorff’s Second Effort to Widen the MarneSalient

Where the Tide ofWeirChangedAmerica’s Part in Clearing the Marne Salient

The Topography of the St . Mihiel Salient

The Official Plan of the St . Mihiel Attack .

The Lane of the 42nd’s Advance at St . Mihiel

The Allied Advance

The Woods of the Argonne-M euse BattlefieldThe Roads of the Argonne-Meuse

The Official Plan of the Argonne-Meuse Attack

LIST OF MAPS

Looking from the American Positions,Septem

PAGE

ber 26th 1 06

Relief Map of Montfaucon Area 1 0 7

The German Defence Lines 1 1 5

The Verdun Hills and the Woevre Plain 1 34

The Last Battle 1 36

Where We Cut the German Communications 1 37

Two Detail Maps ofthe Argonne-Meuse . Supplement

OUR 1 10 DAYS’ FIGHTING

Our 1 10 Days’Fighting

CHAPTER I

OUR TRAINING AND OUR PLAN OF CAMPAIGN

HE first independent Offensive action by theAmerican Army in Europe

,the taking of Can

tigny,took place only five and a half months before

the war ended .

The first American division to take over an activesector of l ine did so only in April

,six months before

the war ended .

And the American First Army,formed on the 20 th

of July,had its first action at St . Mihiel, September

l ath, just two months before the war came to an end .

The active fighting of any large bodies ofAmericantroops was confined to two main periods—fromChateau-Thierry to the Vesle

,some sixty days, in

which eight of our divisions took part ; and theArgonne-Meuse battle

,forty-seven days

,in which

twenty-two divisions took part . There were twoor three days’fighting at St . Mihiel in between thesetwo times . There were also several other notableactions

,as those of the 27th and 3oth divisions with

the British,but none involving more than two

divisions .

4 OUR 1 10 DAYS’FIGHTING

In other words,our army just barely got in at

the finish,and to do that it had to fight before either

its training or equipment was ready. But if it hadnot gone in

,ready or unready, and had not paid the

price when it did,the war would not have ended on

November r1 th. The war ended then because theGermans were beaten—defeated in the military sense .

Let there be no mistake about that . And the American Army in its hundred—odd days of fighting provided one of the vital elements of this defeat.If the Marines of the 2nd Division at Belleau

Wood, and the 3rd Division machine gunners at

Chateau-Thierry,provided a dramatic entrance of

our army into the main struggle,the moral decisions

that placed them there were no less dramatic . If

the six green divisions that went over the top in theArgonne-Meuse battle on September 26th performedheroic deeds

,the moral courage to set them at such a

task was no less remarkable,and far back of that

,the

moral courage to train them for open warfare wasworth a great victory in itself. Most battles are lostor won before the first shot is fired . With this inmind it is worth studying the American Army’saction in France

,for it is ful l Of brave, human en

deavour, ofmoral and physical courage at many timesand places that are still little known .

The short period in which our forces were actuallyengaged has tended to obscure somewhat the factthat when the war ended General Pershing commanded the largest force in American history,whichhad fought and won one Of the great battles of all

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6 OUR 1 10 DAYS FIGHTING

in,

quiet sectors of the front-line trenches as part oftheir training.

It is worth while for every American who takespride in what the army accomplished to contemplate carefully this conception of training—twoth irds for Open warfare, one third for trench warfare .This conception was decided upon in the summer of1 9 1 7, when there had been no war of movementon the Western Front for nearly three years . Asprosaic as it looks on paper, this decision was moreimportant than most battles, for it made our partin the final battle possible. It had this significance :Continued trench fighting almost inevitably meant astalemate. A war of movement meant a decisionone way or the other. The American Army was builtfor offensive, for victory. It is probably fair to saythat the bulk of military opinion on the Allied sidedid not agree with General Pershing

,and his decision

was,therefore, a very bold one . But seldom has

sound thinking and courage been better rewarded .

A good many thousand American soldie rs are alivenow who would have died had his decision beenthe reverse . He expected to vindicate his belief inopen warfare in the spring of 1 9 1 9 . It was vindicated, most opportunely, six months earlier.The position on the front, ultimately to be takenby the group ofAmerican armies being planned

,was

practically fixed by the only possible remaining lineof supply. The British had all the northern ports,and their lines covered everything from the battlearea to the sea, as far south as Havre . The French

THE AMERICAN ARMY’S SUPPLY SYSTEMTh is map shows in general the area occupied by Brit ish and French supply

systems into whi ch we could not go Wi thout confusion, and the lines of thesupply we organized for our army. This only available line of supply ch ieflyd ictated our posrtron on the front .

8 O UR 1 10 DAYS ’FIGHTING

supply lines took in all the Paris area and a broadbelt running eastward from the capital . A supplysystem south of the French belt, from the sea to thebattle line

,between Verdun and Belfort, was about

all that was left . Therefore Chaumont becameheadquarters, and the neighbourhood ofNeufchateau andSaint-Dizier became our main advanced base .

The first place selected by the American staff forattack was the St . Mihiel salient, and the staff wasworking on this project many months before therewas any American force ready even for a minorengagement, not to mention the taking of thisposition . To make a purely American army

,trained

for open warfare, with the first attack to be made atSt . Mihiel—such were the plans .By March

,1 9 1 7,

' there were four American divisions which had finished their training and weretheoreticallyready for battle . Still, they had neverbeen seriously engaged and no one knew how theywould compare with first-class veteran troops in theordeal of battle .The first division which arrived after GeneralPershing in the spring of 1 91 7 went into the trenchesfor training for the first time in October of that year.Three other divisions had followed it

,the zud made

up of two regiments of regulars (mostly recruits),the 91h and 23 rd, and two regiments of Marines ; the26th Division

,made up of the New England Na

tional Guard ; and the42nd, the Rainbow Division,made up ofguard units from many states . But noneof these divisions had yet been tested under fire. They

OUR 1 10 DAYS ’FIGHTING 9

had had trench practice in quiet sectors,some patrol

work, and had been subjected to a few Germanraids . Until March, 1 9 1 8, . no American unit hadever made a raid itself. The first one planned was totake place at one o’clock on the morning of March4th. It was to be carried out by a detachment of1 50 men from the 1 st Division then in line on thesouthern side of the St . Mihiel sector. There wasa good deal of suppressed excitement over this firstoffensive action, even if it was a small one . Thewhole division would have volunteered for the duty .

The Commander-in-Chief himself was present .Nearly everyone stayed up, so as not to miss anything.

The plan was for the engineers to crawl out overNo Man’s Land

,and put Bengalore torpedoes under

the German wire, so arranged that they could be setoff from a safe distance . At the appointed time thewire was to be blown up

,the box barrage was to sur

round entirely the point to be attacked,and the

raiders were to rush across, capture as many of theenemy as possible, and come back before the Germans could retaliate . The infantry

,artillery

,and

engineer watches had been exactly synchronized,so

that everything should work in harmony. To thesecond, on the appointed time, a wonderfully preciseand accurate barrage surrounded the point of attack .

The hundred and fifty raiders hurried out of theirtrenches . But the German wire remained intact .The attacking party was ordered back again . Andthen

,about th is time, the missing engineers turned

OUR 1 10 DAYS’FIGHTING

up . They had not been out preparing to blow upthe German wire . They had been lost !The miscarriage of this plan killed no one on thisoccasion

,as such miscarriages Often do. To train

an army,especially a very new one, so that every

thing will happen correctly, and on time, is a taskwh ich is very difficult, and hard even to conceivein its true proportions . And if any one is disposedto laugh at the engineers for getting lost

,let him take

a map and go forth in the trenches in that sector inbroad daylight

,with no enemy to bother him

,and

see how rapidly he can get to any given point .Trenches are very crooked, puzzling, and slow andslippery lanes of travel .The largest action in which American troops ap

peared before Cantigny was the so-called“battle of

Seicheprey.

” It, too, occurred on the southern sideof the St. Mihiel salient, and it, too, was unfortunate,if judged by immediate results .This “battle” of Seicheprey was in reality a largeraid . The Germans intended to cross the twoAmerican trenches between their lines and the village

,

clean it up,and then withdraw to the S ibille trench

immediately north of the town . If they were not tooheavily attacked, they meant to hold this position .

And,in a general way, they carried out this mission

successfully.

In the early morning of April 20 th there were noAmericans in the foremost trench . The second

,

the S ibille trench,was occupied by three companies

of the 1 0 2nd Infantry, each minus one platoon.

OUR 1 10 DAYS ’FIGHTING 1 1

They had orders to hold this trench if attacked .

They also had been instructed by the French to haveno outposts more than ten meters in front of thetrench . Behind these trenches in the village was oneplatoon and the battalion headquarters .About four o’clock in the morning of the 20 th

the German artillery became active . Later it quieteddown

,and then again

,at about a quarter past five

,

it fell heavily on the village of Seicheprey and onparts of the Sibille trench in front . The Americanmajor in command

,in the village

,asked for a return

artillery fire, which was given ; but he got no wordof any kind from his troops in the trenches, untilabout six o’clock a few of them retreated into thetown with the Germans close behind them . Withthese men and the platoon that made up the town’sgarrison the major retreated to the southern edgeof the village. The Germans cleaned up most of thetown

,destroyed the dugouts

,kitchen

,and first-aid

station,captured the battalion headquarters and all

its papers,and on an appointed signal withdrew to

the cemetery that they held as a kind of advancedpost in front of the Sibille trench

,which they now

organized for defence . It was discovered laterthat the Germans had come in three parties fromthe northeast

,north

,and northwest of Seicheprey

,

all arriving at the town at about the same time,

and all having overcome the resistance of the Americans in the trenches . Most of our 40 0 or 50 0 lossesin killed

,missing

,wounded

,and prisoners occurred

in the fighting in the Sibille trench . But the Ger

SE ICHEPREY AND THE FIX ED TRENCH SYSTEMThe heavier black lines show the Franco-American trenches. The lighterblack l ines the German trenches. The lines of xxxx indicate wire . TheGermans who attacked Seicheprey came from the direct ion ofRichecourt, fromLahayville, and through the Bois de Remiéres.

1 2


14 OUR 1 10 DAYS ’FIGHTING

practised enemy. Even our successes in the training period were sometimes rather high priced . Apart of the sth Division in August

,1 9 1 8, under French

orders attacked and captured the town of Frapelle inthe Vosges near St. Die . The account of this in oneof the New York papers was as follows

The brilliant work of the American troops on Saturday inlow ground bordering the litt le River Fave, east of St . Die, in

the Vosges, has scarcely, perhaps, received the attention itdeserves . It may be taken for granted that the affair must

have been pretty serious for the enemy, otherwise Ludendorffwould not have allowed himself in an official report to state that

the Germans advanced posts had “yielded to an enemy localthrust .

”

What Ludendorff omitted to add was that very few of the

defenders of these advanced posts succeeded in falling back,as nearly the whole lot were killed or made prisoner. The

American attack, according to accounts which reached here today, was carried out with extraordinary dash. Charging withthe bayonet on the village of Frapelle from two sides, theAmericans carried the machine gun nests with a s ingle rush,cleaning out the trenches and shelters with grenades as theywent . The German garrison was pract ically wiped out .

There is nothing so far to indicate whether Saturday’s affair

may be regarded as the precursor of other operations on that

part of the front, which has been for many months regardedby both sides as exceptionally quiet . Frapelle, however, is thefirst stage on the very important road from St . Die to Strass

burg, via the Col de Saales . It lies in a river bottom, betweenfive and six miles from the Col de Saales, from the crest ofwhichthe run down into Alsace is rapid and easy.

Th is was all true . But it was also true that thegarrison consisted of four men, one an idiot, and that,

OUR 1 10 DAYS ’ FIGHTING 15

while it cost us nothing to take the town, the Germanartillery caused us a good many casualties before wewithdrew from the village again .

Seicheprey and Frapelle and various other raidsand minor activities taught us much . After Seicheprey battalion headquarters were not again putwhere the Germans were l ikely to get the papers .The men at Frapelle learned the cost of holding badpositions . Our artillery became surer of itself.We were not so likely to carry on a n ight battle between two parts of our own trenches if they happenedto be very crooked . We were getting on in our training . And in recounting these instances

,it is not

intended to imply that we were not getting on verywell . We were . But merely to give the bright sideof the picture

,which was all that came to the papers

at the time,does not give a fair estimate of the

situation . Without the less victorious side therecord takes on an air of precision and assurancewhich the actual progress of events often lacked .

Suddenly,in March

,our army was forced to give

up its orderly plan of training and growth . In asense

,General Persh ing was a sufferer from his own

principal theory. The German General Staff alsobelieved that the only way to win the war was to getout of the trenches and start a war of movement .The Germans had evolved a theory for accomplishing this end

,and General Von Hutier pract ised it on

the Russians near R iga . From this it became knownas the Riga attack

,or the Von Hutier method . In

stead of concentrating troops on a front some days


before an attack, which usually resulted in detectionby the enemy

,they brought them up from many

directions and had them arrive practically at thetime of offence. The numbers and effect of surprisedue to this system enabled them to break through thetrench lines . They provided their infantry withl ight artillery

,which it could take along in the ad

vance,and which gave the troops power to keep up

their progress even after they had left behind theirfield guns and heavy artillery, whose range hadhitherto set the limit for any continuing attack .

Using this system,the Germans broke through the

British Fifth Army,and in five days had gone twenty

five miles to within artillery range of Amiens andthe main lateral railway behind the British lines .In the face of this crisis, General Pershing immediately gave up (for the time) the plans on which hehad been working so hard for a separate Americanforce .The Secretary of War was in France . At a con

ference in Paris,General Pershing and Mr. Baker

decided that we should turn over our forces toGeneral Foch . The President approved by cable . Onthe 28th of March, General Pershing attended ameeting of the Allied commanders . As he came intothe room he walked straight up to General Foch andsaid in French :

“I have come to tell you that the American people

would consider it a great honour for our troops to beengaged in the present battle ; I ask you for this intheir name and my own .


Infantry, artillery, aviation, all that we have, isyours ; use it as you wish . More will come

,in num

bers equal to requirements .“ I have come especially to tell you that the Ameri

can people will be p roud to take part in the greatestand finest battle of history.

”

At that time there were four trained Americandivisions in France—a few more than combatant troops, enough to make the first corps thefirst step in General Pershing’s original hopes .General Foch accepted the offer. The I st Divisionwas sent to the line Opposite Montdidier—a stillactive sector. The 26th went in the line at St .Mihiel . We had entered the war on the firing line .

The four divisions wh ich were to have constitutedthe first American corps to take over the first American sector were scattered across France . TheAmerican plan had been surrendered in the face ofthe Allied crisis .In the meanwhile

,affairs had proceeded from bad

to worse . On the 9th of April,the Germans broke

through the Portuguese at Armentiéres,and pushed

their advantage until another great wedge wasdriven into the British l ine and the Channel portswere threatened The diffi culties of transportation

,caused by the Amiens line being under fire,

made it very hard to get French reinforcementsas far north as the fighting at Kemmel Hill in timeto be of assistance . On April 1 2th S ir DouglasHaig had issued his famous communique in whichhe said

18 OUR 1 10 DAYS ’ FIGHTING

Every position must be held to the last man . There must beno retirement . With our backs to the wall, and believing in thejustice Of our cause, each one of us must

’

fight to the end. The

safety of our homes and the freedom of mankind depend alikeupon the conduct of each one of us at this critical moment .

With the help of French reinforcements the frontheld . The Belgian army repulsed a German drivenorth of Ypres— an important contribution to thewhole situation of which l ittle has been said . By themiddle ofMay

,the lines were again stabilized . When

the storm had broken on the Allied lines in March,

the High Commissioners of Great Britain and Francehad gone to the Arnerican Government in Washington and asked that we send every available man toFrance

,no matter how much training he had or how

much he lacked .

The British cut down communications with theircolonies and again cut down the imports into England

,

combed their merchant marine for ships,and gave us

the tonnage to bring our men in a hurry. Ten of

our divisions were to go into their area to be ready tohelp stern another German attack there . The otherswere to go into various French armies to build uptheir reserves . In actuality

,there had not been much

to Foch’s famous strategic reserve army, and whatthere had been was exhausted . Nor, as history willshow

,did the Generalissimo have the power with

which the public was wont to credit him . He wasfaced with a somewhat desperate situation . On May1 st the Germans could count on rifleson the Western Front against the rifles

OUR 1 10 DAYS’FIGHTING 19

of the Allies . If America was coming at all, it wastime to start . In April and May the men beganto pour into France . American divisions were arriving back of the British lines, some via Englandand some via the French ports, and other Americandivisions were coming into a training area behindthe French armies . In the ten months prior toApril we had sent men to France . In April

,

troops of all kinds embarked . In May,

the numbers rose to The papers were fullof the great troop movements, but, although we hadbeen at war for more than a year

,and our I st

Division had been in France for most of that year,

American troops had engaged in no real fighting .

Yet American help was the main feature of any programme of bettering the Allied fortunes . By themiddle of May there was no fear that great numbers would not arrive

,but how would they fight?

They were brave enough,admittedly

,but

brave men might be a mob and not a division Offighting troops . The officers were of good characterand intelligence

,but these qualities do not necessarily

imply military knowledge and leadership . The divisions manmuvred well in training

,but what would

they do in battle? That was a vital question toAmerica

,to the Allies

,and to Germany

,in May

,

1 9 1 8 .

The German press belittled the possibility of ourfighting well . Our press and the Allied press tooksuccess for granted . Neither side was quite sure .

The stage was set for the trial .

CHAPTER II

CANTIGNY A LITTLE BATTLE THAT PROVED A GREATPO INT AND MADE M EN

HE trial was at Cantigny. It was,naturally,

planned some time in advance,but in the march

of events a thing happened the day before the Cantigny attack which more than ever made the demonstration of American fighting ability necessary.

Our attack was to begin on the morning ofMay 28th .

On the morning of May 27th, a great mass of German troops suddenly pushed across the Ailette

,up

over the strong position of the Chemin des Dames,

and before the day was over the French lines werecompletely broken

,and the Germans had crossed the

Vesle on their way south to the Marne . The communiques that reached Paris on the night of the 28thtold of the rap id and continuous German progress .But there came also that night another piece of

news . The American Army had at last activelyentered the war. The I st Division shed a brightlittle ray of light on the otherwise dismal p i cture .

And this ray of light was of great significance,for if

the Americans could successfully meet the Germans,the Allies were assured an effective force big enoughto win the war—the Americans were then arriving atthe rate of a month . If the Americans could

20


ARTILLERY PLAN FOR THE CANTIGNY ATTACKThe lines marked H-

5 to H, etC., show the posit ion of the barrage from fiveminutes before the H hour, themoment ofattack, unt il 42 minutes after the Hhour. Th is movement of the barrage was calculated to synchronize with thespeed of the attack.

THE PLAN OF THE FIRST AMERICAN ATTACKThe first posit ions Of the companies of the three battalions of the a8th Regi

ment (I st Division) are shown by squares marked AI , A2, A3, A4 for thepanics Of one battalion and so forth . The ir advance is shown by dotted lines.The advance was actually made exactly “

according to plan.

”

23


particularly well defended by machine guns . Backof it

,in various woods, were the German reserves and

artillery. The American infantry, which was to takethe town

,was to be supported by three French tank

battalions containing ten tanks . There were alsoa French platoon of flame throwers and 1 50 men of

the 1 st Engineers .A day or two before the 1 st Division preparedtwo trenches in front of its position

,which would

appear on any airplane photograph as a strong defensive system . One of these trenches was a fake .

The other was to act as a jumping-off place for ourattack.

After an hour’s artillery preparation,the infantry

started at A .M . The barrage started at fiveminutes to the zero hour of and from the zerohour moved forward 1 0 0 meters every two minutesfor the first 30 0 meters (3 yards) . Then it heldits fire for four minutes to give the infantry time toget up

,if it had fallen behind

,and then it rolled for

ward again ; then another stop occurred, and so on,until it finally covered its allotted task. The barrage covered two kilometers in forty-two minutes .The infantry reached its destination right behind itforty minutes after the zero hour

,so the report of

the battle stated . This meant that they passed allobstacles

,overcame the German defences

,captured

or killed the defenders,and proceeded meters

yards) at‘

about the rate a person would strollover the ground now with nothing to bother him .

"But as the troops went forward on May 28th, the


French tanks lumbered alongside, the bursting shellsof the barrage fell in front of them,

beyond whichthe heavy artillery concentration burst on the woods

,

where otherwise assistance might come to the helpof the town’s defenders .The commander of the French tanks

,in reporting

his own Operations,gives a picture of the soldiers of

the 28th in action wh ich is good evidence that alldoubts of the skill and courage of the AmericanArmy to meet successfully the Germans could besafely discarded .

One paragraph of his report read

Aside from the evidence of spirit and courage which arousedadmiration on the part of all members ofTank Battalion NO . 5the American infantry showed a remarkable knowledge of how

to use tank assistance, following them closely without allowingthemselves to be held up by them, and sticking close to theirbarrage .

The tanks destroyed,or helped to destroy

,fifteen

or twenty machine guns in the village,and north and

east of it . With their help and the barrage, the townwas taken without a great deal of loss, and, at theend of forty minutes, the troops had reached theirobjectives and were even pressing on . Two hundred and fifty prisoners also had been picked up .

Five minutes later came the first German reaction .

A small counter attack was launched against Fontaine Wood, south of where the 28th had advanced .

It failed . Following th is came intermittent heavyartillery fire on th is part of the line . Toward noon,

OUR 1 10 DAYS ’FIGHTING

enemy planes came over,and

,very shortly after

,

Cantigny and the lines that our men had establishedin front of it were violently shelled . At about thistime the French corps artillery, which was to dothe counter battery work on the German guns

,was

taken out and sent south to the Marne battle . Thisleft the German artillery with a free hand .

At ten minutes past five a heavy counter attackcame against the western edge of Framecourt Woods .This was broken up by American artillery. Atanother attack in waves came from due east towardCantigny. Rifle and machine gun fire broke up thefirst wave, and the artillery attended to the rest .All the next day theGermans kept up their attempts toregain the town, but, as they lost many men and gotnothing

,at the end of the second n ight they ceased .

The American casualties were 3 50 men and twentyfive

' offi cers of the 28th Regiment,and twenty-five

men of the I st Engineers . Including the loss fromartillery and the counter attacks on the second day

,

the losses were probably 60 0 . The French tankbattalion lost two officers and oneman . The Germancasualties in the actual taking of the position wereestimated at 350 men besides the 250 prisoners . Intheir counter attack they suffered many more .

1 . The American soldiers had shown bravery,

and energy—that had been pretty well taken forgranted .

2 . They showed trained intelligence in using thehelp

,

of the tanks in following the barrage, and in

establishing defensive positions after their attack

CANTIGNY AND THE TRENCHES OF THE WAR OF MOVEMENTThe

'

American (regular line with points) and"

the German (irregular line)trenches after our taking of Cant igny, a great contrast to the four~year~oldsystems around Seicheprey. These two maps are copies Of the G. 2 maps madefrom airplane photographs and all other sources of information and kep t up todate by frequent new edit ions.


had succeeded—this was the real test of their training. They were not only brave men but brave and

intelligent soldiers . This information was worth muchto the Allied command .

Our soldiers were,however

,not skilled veterans .

They showed this in an unnecessary and somewhatcostly contempt for danger. After taking Cantigny

,

some of them walked round in the streets,as if they

were invisible and invulnerable,although they were

neither. This caused General Bullard,then in

command of the division,to say in his telegraphic

report : The losses sustained,caused in part by

lack of experience,will be a lesson which only per

sonal experience could have given .

”

General Debeny, commanding the French FirstArmy

,reported that the operation was well prepared

and vigorously executed,

“wh ich will serve to give theAmericans

,and others

,a realization of the offensive

valour of our Allies .”

A realization of the offensive valour of the Americantroops amounted to adding four large divisions tothe All ied forces . The I st, 2nd, 26th

,and 42nd

had finished their training and were ready for battle,

and,as the I st Division had just shown, when ready

for battle on paper they were also prepared in fact .The 3zud, 3rd, and 5th were also on hand, but notso far advanced . Behind the British front, trainingunder British tutelage, were ten newly arrived divisions

,the 3 5th, 82nd, 3 3rd, 27th, 4th, 28th, 8oth,

3oth, 77th, and 78th . In the supply area was the41 st, already being broken up for replacements.



driven the French to call on them if Cantigny had

not occurred. But without Cantigny,they could

not called on them with the same confidence .It is fair to say that Cantigny added men

,

or about the equivalent of eight French divisions,

at one of the most critical moments of the war.

CHAPTER III

OUR S IX TY DAY S UNDER THE FRENCH

HE actual fighting of the American Army inFrance can be divided into two main periods '

:

The first period included chiefly the battle of

Cantigny,the fighting in the Chfiteau—Thierry area

and on the Marne,and the Marne-Vesle campaign

some sixty days’ fighting under French command .

During this period we had nine divisions engaged.

This does not include the operations of the 27th

and 3oth divisions which performed all their veryremarkable service with the British Army. This firstperiod is the period of French command .

The second period,under American command

,

includes the battle of St . Mihiel beginning on September 1 2th

,and the forty-seven days of the Argonne

Meuse battle, from September 26th to November 1 1 th-about fifty days’fighting in which all of our combat troops were engaged . The zud, 36th, 27th, 3oth,37th, and 9 1 st served either all or part of this periodwith either the French

,British, or Belgians . But the

second period is essentially the period of Americancommand.

To get a fair picture of what happened duringthe first period one must turn his mind back to theconditions at the end of May, 1 9 1 8 . The Germans

3 1


had just broken the French line on the Chemin desDames

,as they had previously broken the British

w

lines at St. Quentin . They were rap idly advancingtoward the Marne. In all

‘

men’s minds were twoquestions : Can this advance be stopped now?And if it is

,is there any way to stop the Germans

from succeeding in a third drive as they have alreadyin two? There was no army of manmuvre and notenough for either French or British reserves . Suchwas the situation on May 29th. There were, however

,considerable reserves of Americans in various

stage s of training, and two days previously one regiment of the American 1 st Division had demonstrated its skill and ability in taking the town of

Cantigny.

On the morning of May 29th, the Chief-Of-Staff,Major-General M cAndrew

,had a visit from General

Ragueneau, then chief of the French mission to ourheadquarters at Chaumont . He told General McAndrew of the desperate condition of the Frenchforces north of the Marne

,and the possibility of

German cavalry getting through and raiding southof the river. General Pershing was at Cantignyand in his absence General M cAndrew promisedthat the 3rd Division would be ready to move by6 o’clock that evening.

In consequence General Dickman,then command

ing the 3rd Divi sion, received a sudden change inorders . He was on a tour

,inspecting a quiet sector

of the line to which he was to take his division forits first trench training. He was overtaken by orders


to hurry back to his command and put them in motion with all speed for Chateau-Thierry. Thezud D ivision had a Similar experience. Frenchofficers are among the least excitable people in theworld

,and having been in the war a long time

they did not allow it to d isturb their comforts anymore than was absolutely necessary. Consequentlythe arrival of a French officer at five in the morning(May 30 th) at the headquarters of the American 2ndDivision was a sure proof that something unusualwas afoot . The zud Division was then under ordersto move up to the Beauvais district for further training. The orders which this early-morning caller fromFrench Headquarters gave to General Bundy wereto put his whole division on trucks and move withall speed to Meaux. This meant that the trainingperiod was over and that the 2mdwas going into battle IThese orders to the 3 rd and 2md d ivisions markeda vital decision in the conduct of the war. Fromfive O’clock in the morning ofMay 3oth to the end ofthe war American troops were always headed towardthe fighting front . The l ittle battle of Cantigny hadproved that the Americans could be used withoutfurther test

,and the German successes made it Clear

that they would have to be used without further delay. SO the 3rd and zud received their historic ordersand started for the battle .The first American unit to meet the German offensive was the 7th Machine Gun Battalion of the3rd Division . It was a motorized unit and rolledOff to Condé-en—Brie to join the French

,and then


on to Chfiteau-Thierry. The men rode up praetically to the battle line and immediately went intoaction . After being more than twenty-four hours onthe road

,two companies reached Chateau-Thierry

on the afternoon of May 3 1 st . They helped theFrench Colonials

,who were there to stop a fierce

effort of the Germans to cross the river,and from that

time until the Germans retreated, more than a monthlater, there were machine gunners of the 3rd D ivisionhold ing the crossing at Chateau-Thierry.

The rest of the divis ion came up l ittle by little .Its transportation had been disarranged in the confusion caused by the German advance

,and part

of the troops had to march the thirty-five miles fromProvins to the Marne . As they came in they werescattered amongst the French troops on the southside of the river. The conduct of this division 1sparticularly interesting because it had not had itstrench training

,had never been’under any kind of fire,

and had not even been together as a unit since it leftAmerica until some days after it went into action,when its artillery came up . Its first troop s went intoaction on May 3 1 st . It was relieved on the Ourcqon July 29th.

The 2md Division came into the battle area insomewhat the same hurried way but it had timeto get together before it was actually engaged .

Motor transport to Meaux and an' all-night march

brought its leading troops,early on the 1 st of June,

into a support position covering the Paris road at LeThiolet . By that night the whole division was in


posrtron behind the French troops on a twelve-milefront.The confidence born of the appearance of thishelp stiffened the resistance of the French troopsholding this part of the line and they maintainedthemselves with the help of small American reinforcements until the night of the 3rd of June. During this night the zud Division relieved them, andon the morning of the 4th the zud Division was faceto face with the Germans on a twelve-mile front .The Germans opposite them held a position including Belleau Wood and Boureseches village, whichgave them protection and cover either for defenceor concentration for another attack. The Americans set to work to push them out of the woods .The tactical and strategic reasons for advancing ourl ine there at that time were of little consequence incomparison with the moral reason . Cantigny had

,

after all, been but a small experiment . A bigger demonstration was needed to establish the proper Confidence in our army and in the minds of our Allies

,

and to explode the myth which the German com

manders circulated among their troops that even ifAmericans got to France they would not be trainedenough to fight . The Germans sent two pickeddivisions for the particular purpose of inflicting adefeat on our troops that would seriously discountthe effect of all American military aid . As Americanmilitary aid was the greatest hope of the Allies andthe greatest fear of the Germans

,its test was a matter

of supreme significance to each s ide .



slowing down which long service causes in the besttroops

,and the great value of the freshness of our

forces .From the 4th of June until the end of the month

,

the Marine brigade, with minor reliefs, worked itsway through the woods . At the end it held Belleau(now M arine) Wood and the other brigade (regulars)of the division, which had been doing its part also,topped off the proceedings on July 1 st by brilliantlytaking the village of Vaux with 50 0 prisoners .This action also marked the first appearance of theAmerican Air Service in an active sector. The 1 stObservation and 1 st Pursu it Groups had been transferred to this area on June 28th and the PursuitGroups’task on July 1 st was to keep enemy airplanes from crossing“ the lines between daylight andeight P .M .

,which was successfully accomplished.

The fighting Of the 2nd D ivision and the scatteredunits of the 3rd Divi sion on the south bank of theMarne confirmed the Cantigny verdict that therewas no discount on our , troops . On the Allied sidethe question ceased to be how much more trainingthey needed

,but how fast they could be moved into

the line . With the Germans the question was : Whatcould be accomplished before large numbers of

Americans got into action?The necessity for a quick decision more than everpressed upon the German High Command, and withamazing rap idity and persistence they continued theirattacks . When they finally decided that the road toParis via Chateau-Thierry was barred

,they planned


a great offensive to widen their Marne salient on thewestern side . This offensive is best explained by theaccompanying map . Its ultimate object was tojoin the Montdidier and Marne salients thereby notonly threatening Paris

,but the communications be

tween the British and French armies as well . Onthe 91h of June the attack began . _ Ir made someprogress, and heavy fighting continued for severalweeks . But strategically it was a failure . When itwas over the Marne salient was still dangerously narrow between Soissons and Rheims

,and the Germans

had derived no advantage from their operations .Having failed on this side of the salient

,they deter

mined upon a similar operation on the other side .This

,as planned

,would cut the lines at Chalons and

Epernay and threaten the French communications .The main second attack was to be against GeneralGouraud

’s army In the Champagne . But the cen

tral idea behind both these attacks was the destruction of the French army. By various means

,Gen

eral Gouraud discovered not only that this secondattack was to be launched against him

,but exactly

the day,hour

,and minute on which it would start

,

and he made his plans accordingly.

The Germans counted upon massing both men andartillery in secret

,and launching their infantry ar

tack where they would have a great preponderanceof both . These advantages

,coupled with the effect

of surprise,were to give them a third such victory

as those of March 2 1 st and May 27th. But Gouraud, knowing their plans, prepared his men and his


artillery likewise,and as he knew what they were

going to do and they did not know what he was goingto do

,the effect of surprise was all against the Ger

mans . The German artillery barrage was ruined bythe French, and the Germans, massed for the attack,were subject to bombardment . The attackingwaves

,

poorly protected by their own artillery,were ter

ribly lacerated by the French . Besides the ordinarykinds of shelling they were even subjected to thepoint-blank fire from batteries of 75

’s especially

arranged to meet their attack. These guns werewith the French infantry

,which had been with

drawn from the front lines so that the Germanswould have to pass a wide and withering zone of firebefore reaching any one to fight . When they didreach the French lines they were met first with allthe kinds of small arms fire and then with the bayonet. July 1 5, 1 9 1 8, was probably the worst singleday the Germans ever had . This last desperateattack in the Champagne was a terrible catastrophefor them . It took their last “offensive” reserve .They never attacked again .

The 42nd, the Rainbow Division, had the honourof holding a small part of Gouraud’s front line onthat momentous day. Two battalions of the 1 65thInfantry (the old Fighting” 69th, New York)were in the line near Somme-Py, and the rest of thedivision was disposed in the rear to handle any Gersmans that might break through . There was no breakthrough

,but the two battalions in the line handled

themselves in a way to receive the praise and con


gratulations of General Gouraud . In France this istaken to mean that the reward was fully merited .

While this was going on, the Germans started theircorollary attack across the Marne intending topush south and east . South of Dormans the attackcaught some companies of the 28th D ivision— thePennsylvania Guard . They were not enough to hold

,

and had their nerves been worn out, or perhaps, iftheir experience had been longer

,they would have

retired to the main force . As it was,they stopped

the advance until most of them were killed or wounded . A few only trickled back .

A little farther west,the German attack ran into

the same spirit,backed by somewhat larger numbers .

The 3rd Division held the south bank of the Marnefrom Chateau-Th ierry, where their machine guns hadcome on May 3 1 st, to M ézy, five miles (eight kilometers) eastward . East ofMezy the Germans wereacross the river

,so that the right flank of the 3rdD ivi

sion, the 38th Regiment, was already under fire whenthe battle commenced . The German artillery turneda stream of shells on M ézy to drive the 3 8th into itsdugouts

,and then

,under cover of a smoke screen

,

the German troops started to cross the river inboats . It is a little stream

,and if the German fire

had kept the Americans underground,the passage

would have been quickly ach ieved . The 3 8th realil ed this as well as the Germans

,and taking the

barrage as it came,they remained in the open

,and

with rifle fire and machine guns fired through thesmoke screen at the German boats . Our artillery


also,although this was its first action, got the range

of the Germans waiting to cross and those crossing .

In a few minutes broken boats and dead Germanswere floating down the river. One boat got across,but there was a sergeant hiding in the bushes waitingfor it . AS it touched the shore he told the Germanswith the particular vigour and implications of armylanguage that they were the people he had beenwaiting for and Simultaneously threw a hand grenade in the boat . There was no landing there . Buteast of the village, where a point of land jutted out ,the German cross fire kept the defenders from preventing a

’

landing. However,after they had crossed

the river the Germans were little better off. Theywere met by the same machine gun and rifle fi re;and General Pershing had made a specialty of

marksmanship in the A.E .P. As they pressed on,

they came into contact with bombs and bayonets .In the defence one platoon of the 38th Infantry wasannihilated . A second was nea rly so, but the thirdcame in and continued the fight . As the fourthfinally came into action

,the Germans surrendered .

With veritable devils in front of them,and the river

behind, 40 0 men of the 6th Grenadiers gave them

selves up to about half their number. And while allthis was going on the 38th had been subjected tofire from every possible direction, for they were surrounded ou three sides .This is why General Pershing called this actionone of the most brilliant pages in our militaryannals .” By this time the 2nd

, 3rd, and parts of



well as the Germans . The available American troopswere al so in need of rest. There was a great dangerthat temporary stalemate might give the Germanstime to recover. Instead, Foch had the moralcourage to call on his tired forces

,French and Ameri

can,to renew the struggle ; and Americans can take

pride in the fact that Pershing urged it,insisting that

the Americans,tired and depleted as they were, could

and should be used . There is a l ine in the “ BattleHymn of the Republic that carries the Spirit of theFranco-American attack of July 1 8th, for certainly onthat day “

there rounded forth the trumpeif that nevercalled retreat.

” The year 1 9 1 8 had seen no Allied advance of any size before July 1 8th . From that timeto the end of the war there were nothing but Alliedadvances .The orders to start for this historic battle caught

the 1 st D ivision on the road to its rest area . Theycaught the 2nd Division resting after its month’sfighting at Vaux and Belleau Wood . Both wereordered to make all speed

,for once the decision had

been made, no time was to be lost, lest the psychological moment should slip away.

Accordingly,the 1 st Division received orders to

join the French XX Corps,Tenth Army—General

Mangin— southwest of Soissons . The infantry, engineers, and even the field artillery of the I st Divisionwere taken by truck to their area, and by the night ofthe 1 7th, by hard marching and long hours, the I st wasin position for attack the next morning

,although the

artillery had to spend all night getting up ammunition.


The 2nd D ivision likewise had a difficult time . Theplan of its attack was made on the night of the 1 6th .

By superhuman efforts the infantry of the d ivisionwas gotten to the line in time to make the attack al

though part of the 23 rd Infantry and the 5th Marineshad to double-time to get there . The machine guns,however

,did not get into the fight until about 1 0

o’clock,some five hours after the battle Opened .

The object of the attack was to push forward dueeast and capture the heights south of Soissons, andcut the road from Soissons to Chateau-Thierrywhich was one of the vital supply lines to the Germans in the Marne salient . From north to souththe attack was to be del ivered by the French 1 53 rdInfantry Division

,the 1 st American, the I st Mo

roccan, and the 2nd American .

At on the 1 8th the battle opened . Therewas no previous artillery preparation to warn theenemy. The infantry started with the first 1 0 11 ofthe barrage . Except for the fact that the men werevery tired from hard travel

,and that the French

tanks moving into action had cut all the groundtelephone wires to d ivision headquarters

,the 1 st

went into the fight in shape . The 2nd,l ikewise tired

,

was without its machine guns . But even if the attack occurred before some of our units were ready

,

the situation was even worse for the Germans . Itcaught them by surprise . One German officer wascaught still in his pajamas . Their artillery was accordinglyweak at first . By six O

’clock prisoners werecoming in, and all reports from the front were good .


The whole line moved the one and a quarter miles(two kilometers) past the first Objective in good order.Before reaching the second objective the Frenchon the left of the 1 st Division were held up and theleft flank of the I st, slowing down to keep in touch,finally stopped about its second objective in front ofthe Missy Ravine which was stoutly held by Germanmachine guns . The right of the division reachedthe third objective in l iaison with the neighbouringMoroccans . On the other side of the Moroccansthe zud Division had also reached its third objective .At four the next morning the attack was resumed .

The 2nd Division, which had reached the outskirtsof Vierzy the night before, cleared this place and bythe night of the 1 9th , when it was relieved, hadreached a position that commanded the SoissonsChateau-Thierry road . The losses had been veryheavy and the gains very important .The 23rd Regiment began the battle withmen and ninety-nine ofli cers . It came out with

men and thirty-seven officers . It had gonefive miles (eight kilometers) in the first day

,and

captured men and seventy-five officers .The I st Division, meanwhile, pressed on . Ahead

of it a tank attack almost reached Ploisy,but this

was about the end of the tanks’assistance for theywere pretty well destroyed . In the afternoon

,at

the left wing again attacked and this time didreach Ploisy, evening up both flanks and presentinga straight front .This day cost the division about casualties

,


making a total of for the two days’fighting.

The prisoners amounted to about on the firstday and on the second

,when the resistance

stiffened .

The French command then honoured the divisionby assigning it part of the 1 53 rd

’s Objective—thevillage of Berzy-lo-Sec—for the next day. Hardfighting all that day

,however

,did not capture the

village,although south of it an advance was made

But another toll of a thousand casualties came.After this third day the 1 53rd on the left of the1 st was reinforced

,the Moroccan Division on the

right was relieved . The previous night the 2nd hadbeen relieved . Of the original attacking force onlythe I st Division remained as it entered the fight .In company

,then

,with fresh troops on either side

,

the I st attacked again at four o’clock on the morningof the fourth day

,July 2 1 st . The casualties were

‘again heavy,especially on account of the fire from

the north,but Berzy and the heights beyond were

reached and the whole division front was in line .'

While this fighting was going on, General Summerallwas notified that the rel ief promised for thatwould not reach the line . The relief was thetish 1 5th Division which had been previously 1to Foch by Haig. So the 1 st was scheduled to haveanother day of it . The meagre resources withWhichFoch was attacking is significantly shown In thelength of time the 1 st Division kept up its attack andthe distance from which its relief came .

When the division finally came out of the line

OUR 1 10 DAYS ’ FIGHTING 5 1

it had lost more than men, mostly In the ihfantry. The full complement of infantry in a d ivision is Five days’ constant and successfulattack after a long march ; an advance of more thans ix and a quarter miles (ten kilometers) ; losses ofnearly 50 per cent . of the infantry engaged ; keepingpace with the famous Moroccan division and staying longer in the fight—all this had demonstratedthat the 1 st D ivision could stand in any company .

Moreover,the last days had been the hardest . The

element of surprise had disappeared and the Germans were stiffening their l ine

,for it meant a catas

trophe for them if this attack continued to gain .

As it was,the success of the whole operation ne

cessitated the beginning of a German retreat thatended in the armistice .

The records of some of the un its of the 1 st D ivisiongive a good indication of the severity of the

.

fighting .

The 1 6th and 1 8th Infantry each lost all officersabove the rank of captain except the commandingofficers

,while the 26th lost them all and came out

commanded by a captain of less than two years’

experience . About 60 per cent . of all infantry Officerswere h it .This battle south of Soissons is a fair sample of

Open warfare as compared with the previous trenchfighting . The front had not been stab il ized longenough at that point formuch if any trench construction . But this does not mean that troops remainedin the Open as in the Civil War. Modern artillerynecessitates the use of dugouts

,caves

,cellars

,or


burrowing of some kind . In the Civil War it wouldnot have been normal to catch 60 0 men in a cave, asthe Americans did near Soissons . In this war catchingmen underground was not unusual . These particular Germans had been kept in the cave by artilleryfire and their escape had been prevented by the rapidapproach of the infantry. Nevertheless, they re

fused to surrender and kept up a fire out of the cave’smouth . The Americans called for the help of a tank,which waddled up and turned its one-pounder intothe cave’s mouth . But the German garrison stillresisted

,and the German art illery, spotting the tank,

drove it away. About this time someone discovereda vent from the cave and had the happy idea of

dropp ing a gas bomb down it . As there were none onhand, messengers were sent to the Moroccans toborrow some . The first bomb produced the desiredresult . After it had been dropped into the cave

,the

Germans surrendered and to the great surprise of thelittle cleaning-up party of Americans, instead of asquad or two

,there were 60 0 of them who ' came

marching out .At another place an American sergeant led anattack against a dugout . It was beaten off and hewas wounded and captured . The Germans dressedhis wounds . While this was going on, he convincedthem that the Americans would treat them well andthat they had better surrender. They let him go toarrange the matter, and he found a lieutenant whopaused to receive the surrender before he went onwith the fight . The wounded sergeant brought the



and 4th. divi sions In smaller units brigaded with theFrench were in the line chiefly along the south sideof the sal ient .The a6th pushed forward its left a little on the 1 8thto keep in touch with the fighting farther north .

On the 2oth, the attack in which the 1 st and 2nd

d ivisions were engaged south of Soissons having progressed far enough, the whole line from there toChateau-Thierry advanced .

The Germans now steadied the sides of the salientand retreated north out of it . They had recrossedthe Marne on the 1 8th

,with elements of the 3rd, 4th,

and 28th among the troops in pursuit . The 4thInfantry of the 3rd Division were the first troopsover the river . The enemy fought only a rear-guardaction on the 2 1 st

,but on the next two days they

tried hard to hold the ridges around Epieds . Theyneeded this time to get their material out beh indthem . Once the Allied attack started, everyone with amap looked eagerly at the pocket in which the Germans were trapped, and scanned the headlines for thenews that would foretell their cutting off and capture .

To look at the map such a result looked possible .But the map did not show the lack of reserves . Evenwith the terrain in our favour, men were needed, andthey were still scarce . The relief for the 26th Divis ion

,on July 25th, for example, was obtained by

pulling the i42nd D ivision out of Its position withGouraud and sending it all the way around to theother side of the Marne salient .As they neared the l ine of the Ourcq River, the


Germans were being pushed faster than they couldwithdraw their supplies and decided to make a firmstand to gain time . The front having now becomenarrower

,the American 3rd Division had been te

lieved,some French divisions had fallen out of l ine

,

and two American divisions,the 42md and 28th

(by July 27th this dIV ISIonwas all together) , were sideby side .

A report of the 1 st Army Corps, .covering the Operation of the 42nd division, gives this p icture of thesituation !

“To halt our too-rap id advance,fresh

(German) divisions were thrown into l ine, and it wasalong the Ourcq that the most stubborn fightingalong our corps’front

,during the entire operation

,

occurred . On the yellow wheat fields that graduallympe eastward from M eurcy Farm ; on the heightsOf Hill NO . 1 84,which dominated Fére-en—Tardenois,remained innumerable evidences of the stubbornnessof the fighting. The bodies of our men often lay inrows not twenty yards from the German fox holes ;the Opposing lines were often within a stone’s throwof each other

,and the bodies of the German and

American dead in the same machine gun nests werea further testimony of the mutual stubbornness of theconflicts . On the right of the 42nd, under a Frenchcorps

,the 32nd, which was for the first time in com

bat,was having similar hard fighting in front of

Cierges .When the Germans gave up the Ourcq line

,they

retreated to the Vesle . On August 3rd the 4thDivision

,which in small units had been doing good


fighting with the French,making its first appearance

as a division, relieved the 42nd. With l ittle oppositionit reached the Vesle the next day. Two days laterit crossed the river and reached Bazoches . On the1 2th, after this campaign had really come to a standstill

,still another new division came into line

,the

77th relieving the 4th . The 4th, 26th, 42nd, and

3and had all seen hard fighting during the fortydays from June 2oth to August 1 st .

The Americans had broken the German line at theOurcq . Yet the enemy had conducted a skilfu l andsuccessful retreat

,losing comparatively few men and

guns . The Allies—French, American, British, andItalians—had not been able to force their retreat intodisorder.But a great change had come over the war and it wasdue in large part toGeneral Pershing and his army. Forhe had produced the men to change the scale againstthe Germans . The odds were now with the Allies .On May 27th there had been only one Americandivision

,the I st

,that had ever even held an active

sector of l ine . By the middle of August there werenine divisions with battle experiences :

I st Division, Cantigny—Soissonsand Division, B elleau Wood—Vaux—Soirronr3rd Division, Cha

‘

tean-Thierry—M ezy

—Crorring of M arne

4th Division, Crorring of Ves le26th Division, B elleau Wcod—Hill 20 428th Division, Dormant—Pars ing of Ourcq3 2ndDivision, Pars ing of the Ourcq4zud Division, Champagne—Parring of the Ourcq77th Division, B azoches Sector


These divisions had met the Germans in attack,in

defence,in b itterly contested actions

,and in rear

guard fighting. They had met Prussian Guard andLandwehr divisions

,all kinds of Germans in all con

ditions ofwarfare,and all were keen to meet the Ger

man again . They had finished “ second best innone of the encounters . Their confidence in themselves was high . Their Commander-in-Chief believed in them even more than before . Their Al liesaccepted them completely. And last, but not least,the Germans had acquired a genuine respect forthem. About a month after the Vesle was crossed

,

the German Intelligence wrote from this Marne campaign experience that the 1 st

,2nd

,and 3rd were

first-class attacking divisions and that the 42nd and

26th were good fighting divisions . This reportdid not cover the other divis ions engaged in theMarne

,but this is enough to show that enemy

Op inion of us—the safest judgment to follow—wasrising rap idly.

The time had now come to go back to GeneralPershing’s fundamental purpose and create a greatAmerican army to fight under its own leaders

,sub

ject only to the All ied High Command . With theend of the Marne-Vesle campaign ended also theperiod of French command . In that campaign theAmerican I Corps

,under General Hunter Liggett

,had

functioned as a part of the French . Sixth Army.

But‘

most of the time it directed only one Americand ivision . Th is was the first time that we had hada corps organization in tactical command of troops


e ither in practice or in action since the Civil War .

With the exception of this corps all higher staffs wereFrench .

The creation and moulding of corps and armystaffs that are as highly trained as they should be isproperly a twenty-year task . There was

,therefore

,

much more doubt about our abil ity to make workingstaff organizations in two years than of our abilityto create fighting divisions in that time . Neverthe

less,doubt or no doubt, it was necessary to do it

both because it would have been ridiculous for anation l ike the United States to put two or threemillion men in the field under foreign generals

,and

also because ourmen wanted to fight under Americanleadersh ip and would fight better that way. Anapprenticeship they gladly and thankfully served ,but we could not naturally accept permanent tutelage . The fact that we d id succeed in organizingeffective staffs is due ch iefly to the teaching of theFort Leavenworth schools from 1 90 1 on and the permeation of that teach ing through the army.

By the end of July,then

,the time had come to

organize the American First Army. There was nopressing emergency calling our troops to the front fora l ittle while . The Germans had not recovered fromtheir reverses at Soissons

,the Champagne

,and the

Marne,and the British had launched an offensive

against the Amiens salient on the north,seconded by a

French attack on the south . The British and Frenchthen were giving the enemy no rest . The task forus was to organize our army and get into action


again as soon as possible . We practIcally withdrewfrom active fighting for th irty days .On the 27th of July the American First Army

was organized . General Pershing became Commander of the F irst Army acting underhimself asCommander-in-Chief of the A . E . F . Orders wouldgo from General Headquarters at Chaumont Signedby command ofGeneral J . J . Pershing, Commanderin-Chief

,James W. M cAndrew, Chief-of-Staff,

”to

General J . J . Pershing,Commanding the First Army

,

who, it is recorded, was duly obedient to his superior.Our General Staff then began to direct the active

Operations of our troops,which

,except in the training

areas, had been done by the French . The FirstArmy staff and the corps staffs began to function . Atypical case will show what the organizing of highercommands meant in responsib ility to American ofi‘i

cers .Joseph T . Dickman was a Lieutenant-Colonel in

1 9 1 5, that is, second in command of a regiment whichthen consisted of 80 0 men . He went to France as aMajor-General in command of a d ivision of

men, and in quick succession rose to be a corps commander with responsibility for some men,and then to the command of an army which meansany number from to 2 From thepeace-time care of 80 0 men to the war-time directionof 2 is a bIg Increase in responsibility in threeyears .During August we collected our scattered divisions

from the French and brought down to our own area


CHAPTER IV

THE TRIUMPH AND HUMOUR OF ST. MIHIEL

HEN the Germans took the St ; M ih iel salientin 1 9 14 they established their line with an eye

for advantageous positions which must evoke admiration from any one who sees them . In the pointof the salient they held all the h igh ground and theFrench lines opposite were all below them . TheGermans could see practically every time a Frenchsoldier moved

,and their artillery could fire from

direct observation . Almost the only low ground theGermans themselves had at the point of the salientwas the town of St . Mihiel, and they kept part of thecivil population in St . Mihiel so that the Frenchwould not disturb the troops there by shelling . The

side of the salient running north from St . Mihielcrosses a range of hills where it joins the main battleline . On these hills the Germans were in a strongposition

,but as

‘the French were also on the hillsthe German advantage here was not so marked . TheGerman line on the side of the salient east from St .Mihiel ran along a completely commanding line ofhills terminating in the isolated peak of Mont Sec .From there they crossed an open valley and thenran into the hills again near Pont-a-Mousson . TheFrench positions in the valley would not have been so

62


bad if it had not been for Mont Sec. Ask anyAmerican who was there

,and he will tell you that

you could not wink your eye without the Germanobservers on that cursed mountain seeing you .

Every American who ever served on that part ofthe line has a clear picture ofMont Sec in his mind .

A report of the Intelligence Section (G—2) of the1 st Corps gives a vivid p icture of the St . Mihielsalient :

The strength of the enemy positions had for four years seemedimpregnable, and had withstood in 1 9 1 4 and 1 9 1 5 the bloodyattacks of the French at Les Eparges, Apremont, and the Boisle Prétre . Such names in the early part Of the war had viedin notoriety with Mons, Ypres, Louvain, Tahur, Vauquois,and Verdun. They were symbolic of the days of trench warfare, in which Opposing trenches were often no farther apart

than ten meters ; and in which mining and underground warfareplayed a principal part . They typified campaigns in which

lives were sacrificed to push back a trench line a few

hundred meters .

But by the fall of 1 9 1 8 conditions at St . Mihielhad changed . It was a qu iet sector. The salientwas held by nine German divisions

,perhaps

men . Six out of the nine d ivisions were secondor third-class troops

,made up of reserve, Landwehr,

or Austro-Hungarian regiments . Nevertheless, under the new system of elastic defence the line wassupposed to be so strong that these troops could holdit against attack

,certainly until reinforcements

should reach them from Metz . Gouraud’s defence

in the Champagne on July 1 sth had been a good dem


onstration of what a well-organized, elastic defencecould do

,and Gouraud had no such advantages of

position as the Germans had at St . Mihiel . Machine guns

,trenches, and lines of wire—the whole

system several meters deep, supported by artillery,was considered as strong as the trenches filled withinfantry used to be, and muchmore sparing of men.

From August zrst to September 1 2th Americanpreparations for attack were ordered to be made in allsecrecy. The troops were moved in at night andhidden in the woods . Traffic on the roads was orderedlimited to the normal amount . The artillery and theair service were forbidden to show any unusual activity. The heavy art illery that was brought upwas not even allowed to fire any registration shots .However

,it seems certain that the front-line troops

of the Germans and their lower staffs expected an at

tack,but that the higher staffs

,particularly the army

staff,did not believe a n attack was impending until

too late to serve a useful purpose . That they did notknow the date set for the attack is shown by the factthat on September I rth

,less than twenty-four hours

before our attack was launched,the army command

issued the order for the evacuation of the salient,an

operation which would require at best several days .Considering the dominating observation points inthe hands of the enemy it was practically impossiblefor our own army to make preparations unnoticed .

The Germans were,however

,a good deal puzzled

by the whole business . An officer on the staff of theGerman General told an American officer after the


armistice that our preparations had been so easilydetected that the German Staff had decided thatthey were a feint until almost the time of the battle .

They then ordered the troops to hold the lines if artacked, but they seemed to have made little preparation for this

,and as they began removing their

heavy artillery they undoubtedly weakened themorale of their troops . They seemed to have expected a smaller and lighter attack that they couldhold off while they evacuated the sal ient, wh ich theythen planned to do. In the meanwhile, they werebusily engaged finishing a main defence line in therear.The American plan of battle was to send the mainattack north into the only part of the German linenot on dominating hills . This was the -valley of theRupt de Mad . However

,this valley is not wide

enough for the planned attack,so that the troops on

the right and left of the main attack would have tocover harder country. But it was not necessary forthem to go so far as the divis ions in the centre .The map will make plain the fact that, if the firstand second days’fighting in the Rupt de Mad valleywent as planned

,the Germans would have to give

up the whole salient,although this attack covered

less than half of the sal ient itself. A smaller offensive on the other side of the salient was to be made tonarrow even further the German outlet from ‘ St .Mihiel

,and the two forces were to join at the town

of Vigneulles .The main attack was to be made by the IV Corps.


The I Corps,'

on its right,was to advance enough to

keep in touch and maintain enough activity to keepthe Germans opposite them busy. On the otherside of the IV Corps

,the French Colonial I I Corps

was to do likewise . This corps was acting as partof our First Army

,just as our I Corps had served

as part of the French Sixth Army between Chateau?Thierry and the Vesle .

This French corps held a long sector around bothsides of the salient

,but its main duty was to follow

the Germans when their retreat began . On each endof the sector

,however

,they were to join somewhat

in the advance . The American V Corps was tomake an offensive in the h illy country opposIte Its

lines. If everything went as planned the Germansbetween the V and IV

,Corps, attacked on both sides,

would have to retreat,and those in the nose of the

salient would be caught .Unless it was General Allenby

’s capture of the

Turkish Army in Palestine,no large Operation in the

war worked out in practice so exactly “according toplan .

” It rained hard on the night of the 1 1 th of

September. It had been raining hard for a day ortwo . Slimy mud was f everywhere . At one in themorning the Germans were awakened by a terriblecrash of artillery. For four hours the shells droppedon their trenches and dugouts

,on their roads and

battery positions,and

,for that matter, everywhere

else . Particular attention was paid to Mont See.

It was deluged with smoke shells so that its observerscould not see what was going on . Then at five



where resistance should have developed,the artillery

had done so well that,in most places

,there was not

i

much there, either. Many Germans came out of

their dugouts merely in time to surrender.For example

,on the front of the 42nd Division,

which was a typ ical one,the first German trench

system consisted of two trenches with various connections

,on the average about 20 0 yards apart with '

wire in front of both . About half a mile behind thesecond trench was a third also protected by wire

,

and a mile back of that a fourth and more wire . Tothe unpractised eye it looked as if there were linesof wire wandering aimlessly all over these differentpositions . It was very heavy in the front of our mainattack

,and had given our staffs many anx ious mo

ments . Between the th ird and fourth trenches weremost of the German light batteries . Holding thesedefences was the German I oth Division

,recently

brought down from Flanders . Contained in it wasthe 6th Grenadier Regiment, which had tried tocross the river at Mezy against the 3rd Division inJuly. This German Ioth Division was one of thebest in the salient and yet the general commandingthe 42nd reported after the battle :

The operat ion was unusual in its nature because of the smallamount of resistance encountered, and it is not felt that its experience should be made the basis of general deductions for usein other operations .

The 4zud was in the van of our attack against oneof the few good German d ivisions in the salient, and


its losses in the whole operation were 70 2 . Comparing this with two days’ losses for the 1 st

Division at Soissons, shows very plainly that theSt . Mihiel defence was not made of very stern stuff .

However, even with the dash of our main attackand the paralysis of the German defence

,it is doubt

ful if we should have made the big haul of prisonersif it had not been for one of the most extraordinarymovements in the whole war

,which occurred at the

point of our secondary attack on the other side of thesalient . The French 1 5th D ivision and our 26th

,

the New England Guard D ivision,were to attack

there . In front of the French in their first day’sobjective were three hills

,Les Eparges

,famous in

1 9 1 5 , being the first . As they advanced,their left

flank was exposed,which made progress somewhat

difficult . However, they pushed steadily forwardin their cautious

,skilful manner

,not going very fast

but making their gains with l ittle loss .To their right the 26th Division also was retardedby mach ine gun fire in the woods and hills southof St . Remy. When nightfall came they were stilldeployed in the woods about halfway to their firstday’s objective with the German machine guns infront of them . Now

,according to the usual practice

,

fighting stops at dark except for artillery. But someone in or over the 1 0 2nd Regiment of infantry had adifferent idea . Some time after dark that regimentwas collected from its lines in the woods

,assembled

in column on the high road named La Grand Tranchee de Calonne

,leading straight into the German


lines . This sol id formation marched boldly down themain highway six miles through the German lines toVigneulles

,arriving there at in the morning

and absolutely closing the retreat of any Germansin the nose of the salient . Although there were stillsome Germans in the woods as the ro2nd passedthrough

,the march of the adventurous regiment was

unopposed .

To a methodical and scientific minded fightingman like the German this proceeding must haveseemed as outrageous a breach of the rules of waras any of his atrocities have appeared to us . Sometime later in the morning the leading troops of the1 st D ivision came into Vigneulles from the south

,

also somewhat ahead of their schedule, but havingachieved their advance in a more normal manner

,

and greatly to their surpri se found the town full ofAmericans . But even despite the phenomenal speedof our troops in reaching Vigneulles the Germans hadmoved so promptly that much of their artillery es

caped .

St . Mihiel introduced four new divisions to activewarfare . The 82nd D ivision, draft men from Georgiaunder Major-General George P. Duncan, was on theextreme right of the line . It had no advance tomake but carried out what is called a holding attack

,

designed to keep the enemy Opposite from sendinghelp elsewhere . Next to the 82nd was another newdivision, the 90 th from Texas and Oklahoma, underMajor-General Henry T . Allen . It did participatein the attack, and accomplished in good style the small


mission it was given by four in the afternoonof thefirst day. The 5th, a new regular division, did itssomewhat larger task in similar manner.These three new divisions were all together on theright of the line . Nearly in the middle of theattack was the Missouri and Kansas draft divisions

,

trained by General Wood at Camp Funston . It keptabreast of the fast company on either side of it—the4zud (the Rainbow) under Major-General M enoher

,

and the 2nd,the regular and Marine divisions of

Chateau-Th ierry and Soissons fame . It was the regular infantry brigade of the and that did the attacking at St . Mihiel . Its task was to cover almost sixmiles to the hills beyond Thiaucourt on the firstday -a much longer advance than that of the s thDivision on its right. It was not so far as the 89thadvance on the other side, but it was the only longadvance required of any division over hilly and difficult country. The other long advances had theadvantage of the Rupt de Mad valley. The brigade of the zudwent its six miles in eight and one halfhours

,collected more than prisoners and much

material,including five railroad trains . The com

mander of the brigade reported that had the advancebeen two hours slower

,half these results would not

have been ach ieved . This was evidently true allalong the line . The speed of the American attackcaught material and men which the German command had every reason to expect would escape

,con

sidering the promptness With which their retreatcommenced .


The 1 st Division did its part as usual . It performed in such manner that for the second time itscommanding general left it to become a corps commander. It had given General Bullard to the IIICorps after Cantigny, and General Charles P. Summerall to the V Corps during the Meuse—Argonnebattle .

From the morning of the second day the sal ientwas blotted out . From then on the French 26th

Division bagged the prisoners who were trappedand our l ines were pushed forward after the retreating Germans until we were ordered to halt in frontof the solidly held, previously fortified line which theGermans had made behind the salient .This was the first battle under American command—certainly a most ausp icious beginning. Ourtotal casualties (including the French troops involved) were about The German prisonersnumbered with 443 guns . The extraordinarysuccess of both new and Old divisions and the fulfilment of the staff plans did not mean that we hadmade a perfectly working army. In the first place

,

to stage the artillery fire on the scale planned we hadto borrow a lot of French guns .Likewise the rather unusual concentration of aircraft made under the command of Brigadier-GeneralWilliam Mitchell was possible only by the use of

French planes by Americans as well as by the loan ofFrench squadrons complete .

At St . Mihiel there was a total of 46 squadronsand 20 balloon companies divided as follows


ObservationPursuitBombingNight Reconnaissance

Balloons

Moreover, there were many indications that wehad still much to learn of the refinements of modernwar. In the line of supply back of the 26th Division

,

for instance,on the morning of the attack a road in

plain view of German observation and within easyartillery range was filled with every known militaryvehicle all bl issfully rolling along toward the front .For a seemingly incredible wh ile the Germans letthis go on . But finally they registered on a piece ofthe road and began shelling. The procession stoppedbehind the spot . But every once in a while a motorcyclist would get through the stalled transport tothe edge of the shelled area, wave h is hat at the waiting audience

,turn on full Speed

,and run for it .

Mounted men would do the same and go gallopingthrough the shelled area . Even a Ford or two tried it .Running the gauntlet became a regular game . Thereis something fascinatingly American about this performance

,but it cannot be classed as scientific war.

At St .M ihiel the infantry, especially in the mainattack

,were equipped with coloured panels with

which to signal to the airplanes overhead who theywere

,so that the airplanes could report it back quickly.

They failed to do It . The plans for the artillery and


transport to follow the advance were not particularlywell handled by the military police

,and traffic jams

occurred . The power behind this young and fresharmy was so great that

,despite the rough edges of its

performance, it succeeded in an extraordinary way.

But the seeming brilliance Of the performance didnot blind the divisional and corps commanders to thelack of technique in the fine points of modern war.Their reports of the engagement are made up almostentirely of analyses of defects in their organizations,and suggested remedies .In contrast to these inside judgments is a very

interesting description of the American performanceas seen from the outside . On September 25th theIntelligence Ofli cer of the High Military Commandof the German Army, reporting on St . Mihiel, wrote

The artillery preparat ion prior to the attack was well carriedout . Their object ives were bombarded with good effect and

they were able to switch from one target to another in the

minimum time and with remarkable accuracy. The coOrdi

nat ion between the infantry and the artillery was fault less.If the infantry ran up against a machine gun nest they wouldimmediately fall back, and very soon new artillery preparat ion would be directed on that point . A great many tanks

were ' in readiness for the attack, but they were only used invery small numbers, as the masses of infantry accomplishedthe victory.

The word victory is interesting in comparison withsome of the German High Command’s descriptionsof retiring from St . Mihiel “according to plan.

”

The amusement which the Germans had at our ex



pense about Seicheprey,one little spot in the sal ient

,

we could now enjoy at their expense concerning thewhole salient . And it no doubt particularly pleasedthe 26th Division to have participated .

Just as the German offensIve had called the 2mdand 3rd divisions to Chateau-Thierry and a strategical Opportunity had called seven other divisions,most of them with training unfinished

,into the

Marne-Vesle campaign,so now grand, strategy called

loudly for the American Army to hit with all itsstrength . The active battle line from the sea to St .Mihiel was shaped very much l ike that famous salient .General Foch’s strategy was much the same as General Pershing’s plan at St . Mihiel . The British wereto push a point in on one side and the Americans andFrench on the other. They were to get as near tomeeting as possible, and the French, in the nose of thesalient

,were to keep the Germans opposite them busy

and not let them get away while the pincers wereclosing in 0 11 them .

On the 8th of August,after a surprising recovery

from their spring disasters, the British had begun .

their end of the p inching process . On the 2 1 st of

August they struck again . From August 8th on,

as a matter of fact, they kept up one continual andterrible push against the German lines . On the 22ndof September they broke the Queant-Drocourt line

,

the outer line of defence of the Germans . By the26th of September they were solid in front of themain Hindenburg Line at Le Catelet, ready to strikethe main defence on which the Germans relied.


This being the case on the northern end of thesalient, it was time also for us to see ifwe could gothrough the Hindenburg Line on the south side of thesalient, and, between the two attacks, catch the German armies so that they could not escape . Whetherwe were ready for our part of the task or not we hadto try it. The French had not sufficient reservesavailable for this and the war would not wait . Suchan Opportunity, once lost, was hardly likely to comeagain .

The problem facing the Commander-in-Chief andour General Staff was altogether different from St .Mihiel . That was a flank attack of l imited durationan isolated operation . The new problem was afrontal attack on a series of prepared positions thatwere vital to the Germans

,and the Operation had to

be continuous . Its future could only be limited byexhaustion or the end of the war.To prepare th is General Pershing had a generalstaff that had the experience of one operation—St .

Mihiel,an army staff with the same experience

,corps

staffs few ofwhich had had more,and divisional staffs

whose experience ranged from four months to nothing of active fighting . By their own previous schedule

,the American Army should have been ready

to undertake such a battle in the late spring of 1 9 1 9 .

The new British armies had gone into their firstmajor offensive, the Somme, twenty-three monthsafter England entered the war, somewhat hurriedby the pressure on the French at Verdun . Oppor

tunity called loudly for us to make our first major


offensive eighteen months after we declared wara great deal hurried by the course of events.It was not to be reasonably expected that ournewly created staff could function (to use a pet staffword) like the long-practised French ones . It wasnot unreasonable to fear some blunder that would precipitate a tragedy like Gallipoli or Loos, especiallywith such impetuous and reckless fighters as our menhad shown themselves to be . With this situationahead of them

,G . H . Q .

” did not waste much timecelebrating St . Mihiel . The greatest ' strength of theAm erican soldier

,and of his regimental and platoon

commanders,next to their own character, was the

sound nature of their training . In most cases therewas not enough of it

,but what there was fitted them

for the kind of warfare they had to meetThe same was true of the staffs . They did nothave time to be thoroughly trained nor to sift thoroughly their personnel . But the organization of thecommand of the A . E . F. was sound. For the firsttime in “ the history of the country

,the American

Army had a real general staff with the power andauthority to “

function .

” It was copied in largemeasure from the French . It worked in this fashion :The Commander-in-Chief is in complete and ind ividual authority. If he decides upon an operation he gives his Chief-of-Stafffl then Major-General James W. M cAndrew—the general idea andobject of the action . Under the Chief-Of-Staff arefive Assistant Chiefs-of-Staff

,known as G-I

, G-2, G-

3 ,

G-4, and G—5 . (G, meaning General Staff Section

OUR 1 10 DAYS’FIGHTING 8 1

1 , etc .) G-I, General Andrews, was in charge of the

administration of the army. G-2, General Dennis

E . Nolan, was in charge of army intelligence . G-3 ,

General Fox Conner, was in charge of operations .G-4, General Mosely, had supply, construction,

transport,etc .

,and G-

5, General Fiske, looked afterthe training of the troops . The French have no G-

5 ,

this work being done under operations,but as train

ing in our army assumed such colossal proportionsit was given a separate head .

Under the Chief-of-Staff’s instructions these or

ganizations get the necessary information aboutthe enemy

,including maps of his defences

,G-2

,

prepare the plans for the attack, G—3 , and get up

the war material necessary, G-4. In the carrying

out of the general pol icies of the army aside fromcombat Operations, G-1 and G-5 are continuouslyactive

,so that men and material may be ready when

battle is decided on . Compared to a business organization

,the Government at Washington is the Board

of Directors, the Commander-in-Ch ief is Presidentof the company, the Chief-Of-Staff is Operating VicePresident

,and the various “

G’s” are department

heads .It all sounds simple and Obvious . Nevertheless

,

the creation of the General Staff of the A.B .E. onthese lines is a landmark in American military history

,

for until the war we never had a general staff thatcould carry out any policy, because the ChiefofOrdnance

,the Quartermaster-General, and the various

bureau heads, always dominated the army—each


working for his own bureau,and all against an army

under unified control . If such a deplorable system hadbeen followed in France

,the Chief of Artillery would

have told General Pershing how many guns he couldhave for an action ; the Chief of the Medical Corpswould have arranged as many hospitals as he saw

fit ; and the Chief of the Air Service would have decided what he would do . A battle under these condirions would have been murder with no extenuat

ing circumstances .The army

,corps

,and divisional Staffs were exact

copies of the organization of the General Staff, exceptthat the army staffs and corps staffs have no G-

5and the division staffs have neither G-

4 nor G-5 .

The staffs thus organized, on a firm foundation butwith little practice in directing battle Operations

,were

to meet their first major test in the biggest battle everfought by American troops .By the second day of the St . Mihiel battle

,before

the operation was really over, long before the papersbegan to ask why the American Army did not exploit its success and follow it up toward Metz,the reserves had started toward Verdun and theArgonne for the last great battle of the war.

CHAPTER V

THE CAMPAIGN OF THE ARGONNE-MEUSE

HE Argonne-Meuse battle,fought by our First

Army,was the largest battle in American h is

tory. General Pershing’s forces engaged weremen Americans and

French . It was a vital element in the conquest of theGerman forces

,and our main contribut ion to the war’s

decision . The first great battle of the new Britisharmies—the Somme—occurred twenty-three monthsafter Great Britain entered the war. Our army wentinto its first great struggle eighteen months afterour declaration . Half of the troops and divisionalstaffs were green

,and our corps and army staffs had

had but the very scanty battle experience acquired inthe Marne-Vesle campaign under the French and ourown operation at St . Mihiel . The place to be at

tacked was extremely difficult,and General von der

Marwitz and his troops were seasoned and formidable opponents . Under the c ircumstances ir wasjust as reasonable to look for a terrible catastrophesuch as befell the British at Gall ipol i, the French inthe Champagne in 1 9 1 7, or the Germans in theChampagne in July

,1 9 1 8, as to look for a decisive

victory—perhaps more so .

The state of our army would naturally have sug83


gested spending five or six months more in preparation for such a task. The state of the war incontinently demanded that we tackle the problem im

mediately in whatever shape we were to handle it .On the morning of the 26th of September the

Allied line from the sea to Switzerland was in contactwith the main first l ines of the Hindenburg system.

TheGermansheld these l ines intact everywhere exceptin the old St . Mihiel salient . The German troopshad the greatest confidence in the strength of theselines and their ab ility to hold them

,and it was en

tirely reasonable for them to feel that their defeatsin preceding months in a war of movement were nocriterion by which to judge what they could dobeh ind their famous defensive system .

Marshal Foch’s plan was for the British army tobreak through these l ines in the neighbourhood of

Cambrai,and push eastward, and for the French

Fourth Army and the American First Army to drivenorthward on either side of the Argonne Fores' t.Th is would crowd the bulk of the German forcesback on the Ardennes Forest where their transportation facilities were the poorest . If this plan couldbe carried out rapidly enough to throw the Germanretreat into confusion a large part of the Germanarmy would be forced to surrender in the same general local ity as the French surrendered at Sedan in1 870 . And this is exactly what occurred . Foch,Pershing

,Haig

,Ludendorff

,and Hindenburg are all

agreed that the German army was beaten andarmistice (which was a surrender) was signed



dayt ime and going without fires at night . The wet

weather made these precautions very uncomfortable .

The troops went by rail, motor, and on foot . A division moving bymotor bus will fill about fourteenmilesof road . Fifteen divisions

,the corps and army troops,

and all the vast stores they need aggregate a terriblelot of humanity and material to put down in front ofa watchful enemy in twenty-one nights without hisknowing about it .There is neither the heroism nor the drama aboutmoving troops that there is about the actual fighting

,but it is one of the most diffi cult and important

parts of the conduct ofwar,and this troop movement

brought our army more praise in Allied militarycircles than many a spectacular combat .To move an army the staffs have to calculate theamount of traffic each road can carry and give eachunit in the whole army an exact schedule of the timeit can be on each road . M ilitary pol ice with fullinstructions must be at every cross-road, for manymiles of the roads are l iterally as full of traffic asFifth Avenue

,New York

,on a winter’s afternoon .

Road d iscipline becomes as important as battle discipline, and it seems about as hard to teach -people .

_

In an army the army,corps, and division staffs are

like the various grades of managers and superin

tendents of an industrial establishment . A manufacturer can get some idea of what it is to move anarmy, either before or during a battle, if he willimagine himself conducting his business with hismachinery and workmen and raw material moving


all over the country and he and his Office staff andthe records following along from town to town

,all

the while keeping in touch with his organization anddirecting operations . Now if the manufacturerwill imagine most of his ofli ce staff and personnelto be fairly green when he started such a conductof his business, he can p icture for himself some ofthe difficulties which the management of a battlelike the Argonne-Meuse entails

,and this conception

will help make clear why war isn’t usually conductedeconomically

,and also why all people who have even

looked at such a problem are so deadly in earnest thatwe have a trained organization if ever we have to trythis kind of thing again . When it is done withouttraining

,the price of ignorance is blood .

But to go back to the Argonne-Meuse battle .Some of the divisions took over the l ine on the 20 th

of September . But a th in screen of French troopswas left in front SO that enemy raids would get noAmerican prisoners from which to identify the forcesagainst them .

A large operation such as the Argonne-Meusebattle is very seldom a complete surprise to theenemy

,but the element of surprise may still remain

In a very useful degree if the enemy cannot find outwhen the attack will begin

,where its main effort will

be, and what kind of troops will conduct it .The Germans knew that the American Army wasgoing to make an offensive in the Verdun

°

district .

It might,however

,start from east of the Meuse River

and go toward the iron district of Briey— toward


Longuyon and Thionville. Or it might go, as itdid

,north between the Meuse and the Argonne .

From prisoners’statements and captured documentsit is certain that the Germans thought that therewould be an attack by the French in the Champagne

,

that there was to be “ a demonstration or an attackbetween the Argonne and the Meuse

,and they were

also fearful of an attack east of the Meuse,as Shown

by General von der M arwitz’s order dated October

which is later quoted in full . Their information onthe time of the battle was good . They knew itsmain purpose . But just how that purpose was to beachieved

,where our main effort was to be

,and how

many and what troops were to make it—On thesethings their information was not very good .

For instance,as late as September 22nd a German

non-commissioned offi cer told a raiding party thatthey must get prisoners because an attack wasfeared and they did not know whether it was to bemade by French

,British

,Ital ians

,or Americans .

A German brigade order Of the 1 st Guard D ivisiondated September 24th (later captured) stated thatwe must count on a big attack to-morrow in Champagne (the French attacked there on September 26th)and against Metz (there was no attack there) . Thewidth of th is attack on our front (they were betweenthe Argonne Forest and the Meuse River) is not yetknown .

”

This report expected our main attack to betoward Metz on the other side of the Meuse fromwhere it occurred

,but they also exp ected some



be toward S edan instead of east of the Meuse . Thisfailure on the part of the High Command to appreciatecorrectly the direction of the main attack is in itselfa tribute to the way in which the concentration of thetroops for the great attack was accomplished .

It seems clear, therefore, that the Germans did notexpect our main attack where it came . This supposition is further confirmed by the fact that a linefrom the Argonne to the Meuse was held by only five(5) German divisions—only one of them being firstclass—the d ivisions in line being the 9th Landwehr,2nd Landwehr, 1 st Guard D ivision

,r1 7th Division,

7th Reserve Division, the 9th Landwehr being partlyin the Argonne in front of our army and partly infront of the French Fourth Army on the left . In theArgonne Forest itselfwas the 2nd Landwehr Divisionmade up ofmen ofmore than thirty-five years of age .

It had held this quiet sector for more than a year .Nexton its right was the 1 st Guard D ivision,

one of thebest in the German Army, but it had suffered severelyin the Chemins des Dames and Marne battles

, and

was sent to this sector to rest and recuperate .The 7th Reserve was S imilarly resting in this sectorafter having been heavily engaged in the battles ofthe spring and summer. The remaining division

,

the l 1 7th Reserve, was composed largely of Polesand Alsatians and on that account was not expectedto be of high morale . These divisions were betweenthe Argonne and the Meuse .

Between the Meuse and the Moselle, also on thefront ofour First Army,were fifteen German divisions


in line and available for the battle between the Meuseand the Argonne

,and in reserve were a total of eight

divisions .OnSeptember 25th, it was estimated that the available reserves would permit the enemy to reénforce theMeuse-Argonne front as followsFirst day of the attack

, 4 divisionsSecond day of the attack

,2 divisions

Th ird day of the attack, 9 divisions

On the fourth and subsequent days of the attack itwas estimated that ten divisions could come from thewest and seven from the east . The availability of

these divisions from the fourth day on depended onother attacks .In other words

,the comparatively weak forces in

line could be re'

enforced on the first two days by sixadditional divisions and on the third day by an addition of nine divisions

, and that from the third day onthe battle would reach its greatest intensity and thegain ofground would necessarily be very slow. Hadthe German commander diagnosed our plan

,however

,

and prepared for our attack on the first tremendouslystrong lines the result would have been very different .Physically and art ificially the 4o-kilometer front

which the American Army was to attack was aboutthe most d ifficult point on the Western Front . TheArgonne Forest had been cons idered impregnablefor four years . We accepted this verdict

,also

,for

the plan of battle was for the French to go up on thewest of it wh ile our army went up east of it, and byoutflanking it render it untenable . The plan was

THE WOODS OF THE ARGONNE-MEU SE BATTLEFIELDThe Argonne Forest gave the Germans a strong protection for one Hank and

the M euse River s imilarly protected the other. The numerous smaller woods

gave fine protect ion for defens ive measures between as .did the h ills both at

M ontfaucon and farther back along the line Romagne, Landres St. George,Grand Pré.



blocks and congestions . Rain and mud did nothelp matters on the only roads available for heavytraffic. Also, there was a serious lack of engineertools and road construction material which the FirstArmy in the limited time available for the purpose ofthe attack was unable to secure . Notwithstandingthese difficulties

,sufficient supplies and ammunition

reached the troops and no serious shortage occurred .

On the whole 4o-kilometer (25 mile) front therewas only one main north and south road— the oneup

,

the Aire valley. The road from Esnes to Montfaucon was very poor, and the one along the Meusewas poor and under fire from the other bank of theriver. Besides these three roads

,one subject to

shellfire, there was one from Bethincourt to Montfaucon

,but as it went diagonally across the direction

of our attack, it crossed the spheres of three differentdivisions which made its use somewhat complicated .

On the map also there are such roads as the one fromAvocourt to Very

,but they were too poor to be of

much help . According to theory each division incombat needs a good road to itself. We had ninedivisions in line . Our communi cat ions, therefore,should have had nine good roads parallel to ouradvance . We had only one . The constant discussion of the diffi culty of advancing without roads givesmany people the same impatient feeling that the talkof low visibility in the North Sea gave them. It i s true,of course

,that the attacking troops go across country. 1

It is likewise true that their ammunition,food

,rolle .

ing kitchens,artillery, e ngineers, supplies, without


which things they can’t fight,must go by road

,and if

there are no roads the infantry will soon get out ofrange of their artillery in its original positions .Attacks with an objective limited to the range of

the artillery belong to the period of the old “fixedposition” warfare . They do not belong to the warofmovement

,and they would have been fatal to the

whole conception of the Argonne-Meuse battle.The lack of roads, the woods, and the hills were thechief physical difficulties to our advance.The artificial difficulties—the defensive lines of

the Germans4 were even more formidable . TheGerman defence systems between Verdun and theArgonne were close together. Immediately in ourfront were f three

,and in places four

,well-prepared

defensive lines . The Hagen Stellung and the VolkerStellung made up the principal parts of what isgenerally known as the Hindenburg Line

,although

this term was somewhat indefinite . Behind thesewas the very strong Kriemhilde Stellung

,and back

of that the surveyed but not finished Freya Stellung.

The easiest way to picture the German defences isto think of three lines of one or more trenches in eachl ine

,the first two close together— the third some dis

tance back. The third, the Kriemhilde line, wasthe basis of the thirty days of German defence in theMeuse-Argonne . These various lines consisted of

trenches,permanent works

,reénforced at places with

concrete. At advantageous posi tions were concretepill boxes . The German artillery was practically allfed by light railways . The dugouts were of per



The two armies side by S ide would thus press northtoward Givet while the British pushed east towardGivet

,and the main German forces would be crowded

in between with their backs to the Ardennes Forest .

With these major purposes in view our GeneralStaff plan was as follows :The V Corps was to drive straight up the middle

of the country lying between the Argonne and theMeuse . It was to be the point of the attack . TheI Corps on its left was to keep the Germans busy inthe Argonne and to advance up the Aire valley tokeep in touch with the main attack. The III Corps

,

on the other side,was to cover the territory between

the main attack and the Meuse . (See map pageThe First Army

,which had taken the St . Mih iel

salient,was to make the Argonne-Meuse attack

,

but it will be noticed that its compos ition was notthe same . Th is army now had in it the I

,III

, and

V Corps instead of the I,IV

,and V Corps as at

St . Mihiel . In the French Army a division belongsnorm ally to a certain corps

,and the corps belongs to a

certain army. With us this was not true . The corpsand divisions were used as interchangeable parts andmoved from army to army and corps to corps asoccasion required . What remains permanent arethe army and corps staff. But as it turned outduring the Argonne-Meuse battle the army commander and every corps commander was changedanother evidence of the immaturity of our organization .

On September 26th General Pershing was still


commander of the First Army as well as being Commander-in-Chief. Major-General Hunter Liggettwas in command of the I Corps . Major-GeneralRobert L . Bullard commanded the III Corps

,and

M ajor-General George H . Cameron the V. Duringthe battle the Commander-in-Chief

,assuming the

direction of both the First and Second armies,gave

up the command of the First Army to General Liggett of the .I Corps . The latter’s place was taken byMajor-General Joseph P . Dickman from the 3rdDivision . General Cameron was succeeded in command of the V Corps by Major-General Charles P .

Summerall from the 1 st Division . When GeneralBullard gave up the III Corps to take command ofthe Second Army he was succeeded byMajor-GeneralJohn L . Hines of the 4th D ivision .

When the attack started,the I Corps opposite

the Argonne Forest and the Aire valley had in linetwo divisions with experience, the 77th and 28th,

and one green division, the 35th . The V Corps inthe centre had three green divisions in l ine, the 9 1 st,the 37th, and the 79th . The III Corps on the righthad one untried division

,the 8oth

,which had never

been engaged,the 3 3rd Division part ofwhich had had

experience with the British,and the 4th which had

fought on the Vesle .

The 1 st, 2nd, 3rd, 26th, 32nd, 42nd, the most trieddivisions

,were

,with the exception of the 3zud, in

volved in the St . Mihiel attack, and could not bebrought up in time for the attack, on September 26th,of the First Army. The 32nd,while not in St . Mihiel,



ess went on at a terrible rate . We had,of Ameri

can make,about 40 per cent . of the motor trans

port needed . The rest came from the French orBritish . With the exception of one or two divisionswhich had the l ight Brown ing

,our men were using

the Chauchat automatic rifle which they did not

l ike and qu ite often threw away. Of minor butuseful appliances, such as smoke bombs for be

clouding the V i sion,we had only small supplies .

We had acquired from the French a suffi cientnumber of tanks . One hundred and forty-two of

these were Operated by our own tank corps . The remainder, 73 , belonged to the French and were mannedby them . The French could not again lend us the helpin the air to the extent they did at St . Mihiel becausethey had an attack going on at the same time .

We consequently had to fight a much larger battlewithout the corresponding increase in the air forces .On the first day of the battle the records Showed 1 93

pursuit planes, 58 bombardment planes, and 3 3 3 ob

servation planes available . On the day of the armistice the corresponding figures were 1 88 pursuit

,80

bombardment,and 242 Observation planes available .

In other words,the replacements about kept up to

the losses . We could have used more planes if wehad had them

,but they were not to be had .

It is hardly worth saying whether we or the enemyhad supremacy of the air

,for that word supremacy

is not very definite in its meaning in this connection .

The ground soldier on either S ide would probablysay that the other side had it . It is certain that


neither we nor the Germans had sufficient superiority to prevent the other side from taking practically all the observations he wanted to . The probability is that the Germans got more use out of theirair force than we did out of ours because they weremore accustomed to using it

,and their infantry and

artillery had longer practice in CoOrdination withtheir air service than ours had .

We were,then

,in many ways somewhat lacking

in experience and equ ipment . On the other hand,we

had numbers and a tremendous offensive spiritthe will to victory which the German militarywriters used to be so fond of writing about . Thiswas as characteristic of the imagination and confi

dence of the command as it was the fighting spirit ofthe troops . This Argonne-Meuse battle had a timel imit to it . Its object must be gained before themain

'

German armies had retreated from the bigsal ient in France . It was a question of breakingevery German line on that front quickly and endingthe war in 1 9 1 8, or fighting another year

,and it is

fortunate we had a general and an army that werewilling to push the fighting, pay the price, and finishthe war.At on the morning of the 26th of Septemberthe bombardment began . It is easier to get a picture of what occurred by taking the action of one ofthe nine attacking divisions rather than trying toenvisage the whole battlefield . Let us take the 4th .

The high-water mark of the terrible German attackson Verdun in the spring of 1 9 1 6 were the two hills,


Le Mort Homme and Hill 304 west of the Meuse .The battle-scarred French trenches on Hill 304was the “ jumping-off” place of the 4th Division.

For the three hours from to in the morningthe division’s artillery

,aided by the larger guns of

the corps and army artillery, filled the German defences with exploding shells

,and a machine gun

battalion Of the division sprayed the ground fromthe first to the second German lines at 75 shots aminute .When the zero hour arrived the men of the 4thDivision “went over the top with a yell . Theactual attacking force

,as is usual

,consisted of two

battalions men each) of infantry,two ma

chine gun companies,and a few wire-cutting teams

of engineers . The two battalions of infantry reptesent one third of one of the two brigades of the division . Immediately beh ind them went two morebattalions as support. The last two battalions ofthe attacking brigade made up the brigade reserve .

The other brigade in the capacity of division reservefollowed within reach in case of emergency but keeping as safe and fresh as possible for the time whentheir turn would come .At the jumping-off place

,the 4th Division

’s Swathwasquite narrow, being less than two thousand yardsacross . Their first task was to cross the ForgesBrook (for which the engineers were carrying footbridges) and the Swamp on both sides of it. Therewas a lane ofWire

'

along the brook, and a maze of

wire lanes beyond before the men reached even the


RELIEF M AP OF MONTFAUCON AREAThe woods (shaded) south of M ontfaucon (point of arrow) are the Cheppy

and M ontfaucon woods through wh ich the 37th Division pushed, the zone ofthe 79th on their right being along the edge of the woods . The 37th and 9 1 stwere on the h ills to the left of M ontfaucon at the end of the first day.


the original plan had some chance of success, and ofcourse if it had succeeded the German army wouldhave been in a hopeless position . That the advancedid not go at the speed hoped for did not changeeither the plan itself or its purpose . But it did meanthat the breaking of the Kriemhilde l ine had to be asomewhat Slow task .

Montfaucon was the stumbling block. It lay inthe path of the 79th Division . The 79th, the draftmen from Maryland and Virginia

,who had trained

at Camp Meade,were entering their first battle .

They metagood deal ofdifficulty from the start. Thewire in front of them was so thick that they did notget through it in the twenty-five minutes allotted .

This meant that they were not ready to go forwardwhen the barrage moved and they were accordinglyleft without its protection . This resulted in theirhaving a harder time overcoming the machine gunnests

,especially those firing at them from the Malan

court,Montfaucon

,and Cuisy woods on their left

and from the town of Malancourt on their right .The total result was that by dusk they were in frontofMontfaucon, some four kilometers miles) behind the line which the 4th Division on their righthad reached atThis was the critical moment at which fate was todecide whether the “more-than-human” advancewas to continue on with a rush or whether the attackwas to slow up to hard plodding. The orders cameto make one more effort to keep the push going.

The 4th, the 79th, and the next two divisions on its


1 10 OUR 1 10 DAYS ’FIGHTING

Montfaucon had fulfilled the mission given it ‘ bythe German general . It had held up the first rushof our attack where it was to go fastest . The mountain and its defences were admirably fitted to do this .

The American command, perhaps a l ittle unreasonably

,hoped to pass it the first day . From the time

we failed to pass this obstacle on schedule,the hope of

running the Germans off their feet and turn ing theirretreating defence into a clear break through hadto be given up . By the night of the 27th it was certain that the “more-than—human” schedule wasbroken . The task then was to keep attacking

,one

attack after another, until the German army in frontwas Slowly beaten and driven out of its defences . Theadvantage of the great artillery preparation whichopened the battle was now gone . Our artillery hadto get new positions and get what ammunition itcould by road . The enemy artillery was in long pre

pared positions with heavy and light railroads to feedthem and convenient, well-protected ammunitiondumps .This means more than it seems to on the surface .

His light railways fed his guns and carried other supplies as well

,leaving h is roads comparatively free .

We,having no light railways

,had to bring not only

the ammunition but everyth ing else over the roads .Our average daily expenditure of ammunition was

shells . If these were all for 75’s it would mean

725 tons . But as much of it was for heavier gunsthe average was probably more than tons a day .

That means a lot of trucking every twenty-four hours

OUR 1 10 DAYS ’FIGHTING 1 1 1

to get it to the distributing points and a lot of workfor the horse transport distributing it to the guns .The German local reserves had gone into l ine andVon der Marwitz, knowing just where the greatthrust was

,could safely send his other reserve

troops to the point where the battle was fixed .

From five divisions in line and nine in reserve on

September 26th,the German forces against us had

grown to twenty-five divisions in l ine and seventeen inreserve on September 3oth . In these four days ourarmy had captured prisoners and 1 0 0 guns . Butalmost more important than the men and guns andground captured was the pulling of the extra Germandivisions from other parts of the front where they weredesperately needed . The Germans saw their mainline of supply threatened .

On the 26th,the first day of the battle

,the Germans

had held their second position,especially at Mont

fauoon,with great tenacity. By this they gained time

for the arrival of reinforcements,and the full value

of our surprise was lost . Th is second position wa spassed, however, on the succeeding days and thethird posit ion reached

,and here the Germans made

a desperate effort to hold . The lack of training and

inexperience of some of our troops account for theirinability to drive the trained enemy from his secondposition on the 26th or to carry the attack throughthe third position on the 27th .

Our army had now left the prepared positionsfrom wh ich it started and was dependent for everything on poor roads and few of them— roads wh ich


had had to be rebuilt entirely across No Man’s Landand repaired in the many places where the Germanshad mined them or blown up bridges . It was fighting in a country which had been in enemy hands fouryears . The Germans

,on the other hand

,not only

knew the positions they were in perfectly, but theyl ikewise knew the positions we were in . Their artillerycould reach every road, town, and piece of cover perfectly. It was all absolutely familiar to them .

And they had great Skill using the advantages thecharacter of the battlefield gave them

,with flank

and cross fire on Our advance from the Argonne Forest and from across the Meuse River. They alsomade particularly effective use of a combination of

single light guns and machine guns supporting eachother.On the 28th of September the two wings of thearmy made progress

,and on the first of October the

centre made a small gain . These might be considered the exploitation of the gains of the first day’Sattack . In the meanwhile

,everyone was working

feverishly to get ready for another general attack onthe morn ing of October 4th .

The severity of the first five days’fighting causedinevitable losses in the 79th, 37th, and 3 5th divisionsand a certain amount of disorganization and mixingof units . It was necessary to relieve these troopsbefore the attack could be pushed further. To re

lieve three divisions means the movement of morethan men in and out of the battle line . Thevery restricted road situation and constant rain made


1 14 OUR 1 10 DAYS’FIGHTING

fidence go home and discuss war with the remnantsof those who went up Lookout Mountain in 1 863 ;and if

,on the one hand

,the heights above the Aire

are not as high as Lookout Mountain,on the other

hand machine guns are much harder to face thansingle-shot rifles .Thus threatened from the flank the Germansbegan to retreat, and by. the night of the roth the77th, the New York City draft d ivision, had the

i

satis

faction of emerging on the north end of the Argonne .

While it was greatly helped in its task by the pressurefrom the sides which was to have caused the Germansto get out of the Argonne, the 77th deserves greatcredit for its part in the business

,for it was cousis

tently ahead of its stated obj ectives,keep ing up an

unexpected pressure on the Germans in the hithertoimpossible country. It was during this period of the77th

’s struggles that Major Whittlesey and the lostbattalion earned its fame .

Wh ile these events were progressing the Frenchwere pushing rap idly forward while our line advancedSlowly and painfully. The battle lines in the papersShowed big French advances for several days untiltheir line bulged out some ten kilometers (6 miles)ahead of ours . The comparison seemed very un

favourabl e to us, and the wise gossips who coin Scandaland talk calamity began to ask what was the

matter with Pershing and his army. After all,was

the American Army too green to succeed? Wildstories of road congestion and terrible losses reachedParis . There were both losses and road congestion


with us,but the real explanation of the rapid French

advance and our slow advance at this juncture of thebattle was perfectly simple and logical

,and without

the tragic accompaniments given it by gossip .

The explanation is the arrangement of the Germandefensive lines . Between September 26th and October 4th we had passed all the German defence linesexcept the Kriemhilde Stellung . So had the French .

The Kriemh ilde Stellung ran d irectly across ouradvance . In front of the French the Brunhilde line,the continuation of the Kriemhilde line

,made a big

bend north following the Aisne River. The map onpage 1 1 5 explains the whole Situation . When theFrench broke the other l ines

,the Germans withdrew

(under pressure) to the Briinhilde line . On the rothof October both our army and the French wereimmediately in front of this German stronghold .

Measured by the German defences that had beenpassed the armies were even . Measured by kilometers of advance we were behind . But defencesare harder to pass than kilometers .Both armies spent the next twenty days knocking

holes—one in the Briinhilde and the other in theKriemh ilde l ine—preparatory to farther advance .It is very d ifficult to give a clear picture of our

fighting at th is period for it was neither like the fighting of previous wars nor of the earl ier p arts of thiswar. The American l ine, for example, was not a lineat all

,nor was the German

,although as a last resort

they had their trench and wire l ines to hold . But theGermans had much more than this . In the first



less frequent counter attacks of the_

Germans theartillery on both sides kept searching for the otherside’s guns

,machine guns, and troops . In this

contest the Germans had the advantage of havmgdugouts and other protection . Our men used thecaptured dugouts where possible

,but mostly they

dug little fox holes and crawled into them . Allover the south side of every hill in this sectionare the American burrows, most of them just bigenough for a man to l ie down in . And all aroundamong them are the Shell holes made by the Germaneffort to make these h illsides untenable . Theseplaces were bad enough . The Shelter in the ruinedvillages was worse, for villages have a particularfascination for all artillerymen .

Some professional op inion believes that the German artillery was a l ittle Short of ammunition

,but it

is doubtful if the men up front noticed it . If therewas a shortage it Showed in the Germans leaving ourtransportation alone at times when they might havereached it . But all agree that their guns were wellserved

.They not only kept all places where our

troops might be under fire, but from time to timethey would pick particular Spots of importance anddeluge them . A German airplane would come overand drop a smoke bomb . Their artillery Observerswould observe the d irection from two different pointsand where the l ines from these two points crossedwould be the spot . In a surprisingly short time afterthe smoke bomb fell the shells would follow, and withadmirable accuracy. If it was an ammunition dump


thatwas the obj ect of attention, the thing to do wasto go away right after the smoke bomb fell.The following extract of a diary by a machine guncaptain will give a fair picture of how this struggleappeared to a line offi cer whose picture of the battlemust be circumscribed by his own immediate locality :

October Third. This dayhas lasted for96 hoursmore or less . On October 3rd we got orders justas we were preparing to go to bed to go into theattack. I was not pleased. When you’ve got yourm ind all set for the hay you hate l ike thunder to haveto go into an attack of any kind . But we packedand moved up into position just behind the frontline. We bivouacked on the ground and got somesleep

,but as it drizzled a little and we were shelled a

little and were scared a little,sleep was not too good .

Our barrage came down early and shortly after thatwe started forward . This warfare

Lis quite Open

and we moved along the roads with our transport .We parked it much farther forward than was safe .The adjutant came running up shortly shoutingabove the roar of the guns : Spread that transportout ! The place is being shelled .

” I ran over to thelimbers and told them to scatter out

,and the words

were hardly out of my mouth before a big shell hitwithin twenty yards of me. It bowled one of mysergeants completely over twice, but he got up unhurt. The transport scattered all right and went inall directions like chickens in front of an automobile

,

and had hardly moved away before a Shell dropped


in the exact place where they had been. I wentand told the adjutant : “They are all scattered,sir

,I said . He answered

,

“ I’m hit,” and he certainly

looked it. It was the best wound I ever saw. Ap iece of the shell that bowled over my sergeant hadgot in the point of his shoulder and had inflicted thenicest blighty that ever a man hoped for. We tiedhim up and laid him in a trench and later he went offto the dressing station . After that the shelling gotworse and we had to get down . I had a little bit ofa trench and was snug as the proverbial bug. Iwent out some time later and went around to seehow the men were getting on. They were scatteredaround in shell holes and were getting on all rightalthough the shelling was hot . I saw one man lying

(down and thought for a second it was good old Larry.

M y heart stood still and I hardly dared look at him.

"

He was quite dead—horribly mashed by a shell,

but thank God,it was not Larry. At five minutes to

five I got an order to send four guns forward with theinfantry who would attack at five o’clock. I ran allthe way to my most advanced guns and told them

,

they must advance at once . I hurried them all Icould to allow them to get through before the counter barrage came down . Our barrage was to havestarted at five but there was so much shelling goingon that you couldn’t tell what was barrage and whatwasn’t . I saw them go forward over the ridge

,and

as they went by I wished them good luck little knowing what was in store for them.

They topped the crest and disapp eared, and


OUR 1 10 DAYS FIGHTING

to think about the rest of the company. A lot of

letters came in from Ned’s fiancée, and that didn’tmake matters any better. It was terrible . Finallya wild-eyed runner came in to say that the platoon’

had advanced to within one hundred yards of theGerman lines and then had had a dozen machine gunsopen on them. He said he had crawled on his handsand knees and the rest of the platoon had beenwiped out . He had seen Ned go down and believedhe had been killed . It was the worst possible news

.

“ I am going mad, I thought . What can I sayto Ned’s girl? How can I ever stay in the army?How can I ever look any one in the eye again?”

And all the time I have to think about to-morrow’sadvance . Finally in comes Ned himself risen fromthe dead . He was crying like a baby and confirmedwhat the previous runner had said : they had walkeddirectly into a machine gun nest

,and only three had

managed to crawl out again on their hands andknees . Ned had been in charge of the platoon ;The Major was there .

“ Have you the order?” he asked .

Yes,

” sobbed Ned, and held out a crumpledpiece of paper. The Major took it and read it . Hehad signed it

,and he handed it to me without a word .

I Swear my hand Shook and I hardly dared look at it .It read as follows : “The infantry will attack at 5P . M .

” My heart leaped into my throat—the mistake was not mine . I almost broke down . The strainhad been horrible but the miracle came later.The p latoon had not been wiped out . Practically


all of them had managed to crawl back. Two werekilled

,five unaccounted for

,seven wounded

,and

twenty untouched . I don’t understand it . It wasbroad dayl ight

,and the Germans let them get within

a hundred yards and there was no cover at all . Itwas a miracle

, and that’s all there was to it .

Uncle Ned keeps writing me about praying. He iscertainly a very devout man . And he probablywould be glad to know that I actually did pray onceor twice during the last attack . It was rather contemptible of me

,too . It is supposing too much to

think that you can turn your back on God the way Ihave done and expect h im to listen to a prayer

,an

instinctive,involuntary

,but nevertheless fervent,

prayer made while a particular shell is coming wh istling down the wind directly toward you . But Iprayed instinctively

,I couldn’t help it

,and so

,I

find,did everyone else . I’ll wager that large-calibre

,

high-explosive shells have caused more fervent prayerin the last four years than all the sermons that everhave been prea

'

ched . No,it’s no good

,if you are

going to pray when you hear the big shel ls you oughtalso to pray at other times

,you ought to pray for

the good of your soul,and for the welfare of others

,

and all that sort of thing . It would be surely contrary to all fairness to be a pagan l ike I am all thetime except when I am Scared green . I think everybody will agree to that . Uncle Ned adds that if Idon’t pray myself there are others at home whopray for me daily

,which is quite comforting

,partly

because I’m glad to have anybody who is interested


enough in me, and partly because the people whoare doing the praying are all devout Christians

,and

the B ible says that “ the effectual,fervent prayer of a

righteous man availeth much .

”

(I’ve got the quota

tion mixed but that’s about it .) I don’t want to die

over here, as I have too much to do yet at home, andif prayer will bring me back then I’m all for it. It’sall very well to figure in the “ Killed and Action”

reports . It sounds heroic and all your family andfriends are glad to have known you

,and write each

other about it,but I’d a darn sight rather figure

among the “ arrivals at Hoboken” next fall,and I’ve

a very strong notion that I’m going to be in the latterlist .

The Kriemhilde defence system is approximatelytwo and a halfmiles in depth . On ‘the l oth of October we had reached it all along the line from theArgonne to the Meuse . It took us the next twentydays to go that two and a half miles . The hillsaround Romagne

,Bantheville

,and Landres-Sr.

George were the backbone of the German resistance.General von der Marwitz was fighting to save themain German communications not only

' for his armybut for all the German armies of Champagne andPicardy. Over the 4—track line from Sedan toCarignan and on to Longuyon and Metz flowed thelife blood of supplies

,munit ions

, and men for a largepart of the German armies in France .

General von der M arwitz’s order of October had

said



general reserve was about gone . On the l oth of‘

Oc

tober,in fact

,informationwas issued to our corps staffs

that the last of the German rested reserves had beenbrought into the battle area .

Although Von der Marwitz did not have as many'

men as he could have wished for,the composition

of his force was rather better than the average of

the German army at that time . On the front of ourFirst Army from September 26th to November 1 1 ththere were , forty-four German and two Austro-Hungarian d ivisions . Of these thirteen were used twiceand two were used three times . The German forceconsisted of three guard divisions, twenty-nine linedivisions

,and twelve reserve and Landwehr divisions .

Fifteen divisions,a third of the force, were rated

first-class shock troops .Of the total force against us about half belonged inthat area . Of the other half seventeen divisionscame from the French front, four from the British, andtwo from the Russian front . Two divisions left ourfront

,one going against the British and the other

against the French .

On our side, in the middle of our line betweentheforest and the river, were the I st

, 3 zud, 42nd, and'

3rd, among the best divisions with which we hadcarried on the attack on the Kriemhilde defences .The fighting was stubborn and hard

,the daily ad

vances were small, the losses were heavy. Therewas much about this fighting like Grant’s advancethrough the Wilderness . The enemy was sufferingbadly

,h is defence

,though stubborn and skillful

,


was limited . The th ing to do was to give him norest

,but to force the fighting and pound him every

day. Little by l ittle, through the latter part of

October,we wore through h is line of defences . When

the 3oth of the month came our troops were throughthe Kriemhilde defences in places

,in others the Ger

mans still held the last fringes of them,but Von der

Marwitz knew that he could not cling to them andthat there was no other l ine beh ind him that wouldsave the precious railroad . He probably knew alsothat the comparative lull of the last few days of

October were preparatory to another general attack.

On the whole Western Front the Germans were in adesperate condition

,a condition d irectly the result

of defeats at the hands of all the Allied armies . Thegreatest German concentration had been againstthe British offensive

,but it had failed as Von der

Marwitz had failed against us .General Haig thus reports the German situationopposite him at the end of October

By this time the rapid succession of heavy blows dealt bythe Brit ish forces had had a cumulat ive effect , both moral andmaterial, upon the German armies . The diffi culty of rep lacingthe enemy’s enormous losses in guns, machine guns, and ammu

nition had increased with every fresh attack, and his reserves ofmen were exhausted . In the Selle batt le the twenty-four Britishand two American divisions engaged had captured a further

prisoners and 475 guns from the thirty-one German

divisions opposed to them, and had advanced to a great depthwith certainty and precision. Though troops could still befound to offer resistance to our initial assault, the German in

fantry and machine gunners were no longer reliable, and cases

OUR 1 10 DAYS ’ FIGHTING

were being reported of their retiring without fighting in frontof our artillery barrage .

The capitulation ofTurkey and Bulgaria and the imminentcollapse of Austria—consequent upon Allied successes whichthe desperate position of her own armies on the Western Fronthad rendered her powerless to prevent—had made Germany’smilitary situation ultimately impossible . If her armies wereallowed to withdraw undisturbed to shorter lines the strugglemight still be protracted over the winter. The British armies,however, were now in a posit ion to prevent this by a directattack upon a vital centre, which should anticipate the enemy

’s

Withdrawal and force an immediate conclusion .

But the enemy was worse off than that and heknew it . He was not only threatened by the Britishwith a d irect attack upon a vital centre

,which he

could not withstand,but he was also threatened by

us with an attack on his main communications,and he

knew he could not withstand th is either. Even if theBritish could not have forced his collapse from infront

,the German withdrawal was impossible if Von

der Marwitz couldn’t hold the Sedan-Longuyon railroad .

By the last of October,then

,the fate of the Ger

man armies was really sealed,and I udendorff and

Hindenburg knew it as they have since frankly said .

However,while the German Government tried to

arrange some terms on which to st0 p,the German

commanders did the best they could to rescue as

much as po ssible from the approaching wreck.

And Foch, having the enemy within h is grasp,st imulated every effort to hasten and enlarge thegreat consummation of four years ofwar.



in the neighbourhood of Sedan . The other partturned east and north in a drive on the eastern s ideof the Meuse toward Longwy .

The race for the railroad began on November first .At 5 :30 , just at the break of dawn, the men of the 77th,79th, 8oth, and, 89th,90 th, and 5th divisions scrambledout of their fox holes and moved forward to enjoy an

experience that no Ameri can troops had had sincethe day the battle opened in September— a progressmeasuring five or six kilometers per day .

The right . and centre corps pushed their attackwith spirit and speed to Barricourt ridge

,breaking

the German defence system and art illery lines . Theright of the left corps kept up but its left could notmake much headway. However

,the completeness

Of the success on the rest of the front demoral izedthe enemy’s whole resistance . He had to cross theMeuse near Dun and Stenay and this meant a generalwithdrawal .Duringthe next two days our attack still maintainedits vigour . The III and V Corps pushed the enemyacross the Meuse while the I Corps

,preceding the

French Fourth Army, drove the German rear guardsnorth along the east bank of the Barre River. ByNovember 9th the enemy was in full retreat . His

rear guards tried hard to delay our advance but hemade no attempt to establish another defensive line,until by November 6th his troops were across theMeuse on our army front from Wadelincourt south ofSedan to south ofDun sur Meuse .

South of Stenay our troops had crossed the river

OUR 1 10 DAYS ’ FIGHTING 1 3 1

in the drive toward Longwy . The operations eastOf the Meuse had

,as a matter of fact

,begun before

November I st . These operat ions were under thecontrol of the French XVII Corps wh ich in turn wasacting as a part of our First Army. This FrenchCorps staff had under it the French Colonial I ICorps and a number of American divisions .AS the American troops on the west bank of theriver pushed northward

,farther

.

and farther awayfrom the old trench lines

,they became more and more

exposed to artillery and machine gun fire from theheights on the east bank. From this fire they sufferedconsiderably and it soon became apparent that anattack on the other side Of the river could not belonger delayed . One American division, the 29th

(Virginia and Maryland National Guard), wasassigned to General Claudel

,the French commander

Of the corps,to take part in the attack

'

with a seconddivision

,the 3 3rd (I ll inois National Guard) , to cross

the Meuse and join up with the 29th Should theoriginal assault succeed .

It was an extremely d ifficult Operation due to thestrength Of the enemy’s defences, the massing of h isforces to protect the Briey basin

,northeast ofVerdun

,

and the problems of transport and supplies becauseof the river and the lack Of sufficient roads . Toovercome all these diffi culties General Claudelcounted principally on the element of surprise

,and to

insure surprise he launched the attack across theenemy’s front instead Of directly against it .This attack

,which began on the morning of Octo


ber 8th, was completely successful, the enemy beingdriven from a series Of important heights includingMalbrouck Hill and Consenvoye Woods . The Illinois troops accomplished an extremely diffi cult taskin getting across the Meuse

,and as soon as they had

joined up with the 29th these two units were subjected to a terrific fire from the enemy’s massedartillery on the Etrayes Ridge and beyond . Theveteran 26th Division then came into the line on theright of the 29th . For several days these troops suffered heavily but they not only held to their positionsbut managed

,after several rebuffs

,to work their way

forward . By October 23rd the 29th, assisted byone regiment of the 26th

,had stormed the Etrayes

Ridge,and four days later the 26th succeeded in

clearing the Bois de Belleu,a l ittle patch of woods

which because of its name and the stubborn defencewhich the Germans put up there recalled the woodOf Similar name near Chateau-Thierry where theMarines first won fame . The New Englanders alsohad to their credit the capture of the Bois d’Ormont ,one of the most formidable heights in this region .

The Americans now had a firm hold on the highwooded ground from which their comrades acrossthe river could be protected in the Operation thatwas then being planned

,and which proved to be the

final phase .Of the Argonne-Meuse battle and of

America’s part in the war.The line east of the river stayed pretty much asit was on October roth until the 5th of November.By that time our line west Of the river was much


THE VERDUN HILLS AND THE WOEVRE PLAINThe hills in the lower left-hand corner hold the famous Douaumont (point of

arrow) and Vaux forts . ByNovember 1 1 th the Germans were not only clear ofthese, as they had been for some time, but pract ically the whole line of bills asshown in th is map was in American hands. Compare with the large mapofArgonne-M euse battle.


bulwark of the heights of the Meuse . With theassistance Of the division on its right the 5th haddriven the enemy into the plain of the Woevre .

When the armist ice was proclaimed the Germanshad lost practically every commanding positionnortheast Of Verdun and had been backed out intothe Woevre plain with no natural defences to relyon

,and no such art ificial defence l ines as those they

had already lost .There is st ill one more element to the p icture . It

is not really a part of the Argonne-Meuse battle butit is closely related to it . Although certain that theGermans must Sign any terms presented to them,

ourarmy was determined to lose none of its advantagesby delay until the armistice was actually in operation .

Wh ile the First Army was preparing to push out

toward Longwy the Second Army, wh ich had beenformed on October 1 2th under Major-General RobertBullard

,was preparing to launch an attack from the

new line across the base of the St . M ihiel salient toward Briey. The beginnings of this action werestopped by the armistice The Second Army’sOperation would have driven a wedge into the German line north Of Metz .

At the same time a l ittle farther south,opposite

Chateau-Salins,there was a French force

,under

General Mangin,ready to go through the Hin

denburg system there, and drive a wedge into theGerman lines south of Metz

,thus isolating that

fortress . TO withstand these attacks there wereonly the German troops in that area and there was


138 OUR 1 10 DAYS ’FIGHTINGH

nowhere for them to get reserves . The cuttingof the Sedan railroad had x practically cut theGerman army in two

,the greater part Of it was

north of Sedan, and if it had had any reservesthey could reach Lorraine only by the roundaboutroute through Belgium . On the other hand

,as our

line and the British had approached nearer eachother

,the French line in between kept getting shorter

and Shorter,and the troops thus relieved could

quickly and easily reach Lorraine where,joined with

ours already there,they could present an over

whelming force against the Germans on that front .The armistice went into effect just in time to save theGermans from this threatened catastrophe to themwh ich b id fair to be more rapid and complete thanany disaster they had previously suffered .

But without this the results of the ArgonneMeuse battle were great enough . We had cut themain German supply l ine of the German westernarmy

,which was their main army. They depended

practically altogether on the four-track line fromMezieres to Carignan and on the rail road system inBelgium (see map on page Having cut theirmain supply l ine at a time when they were in the confusion of retreat made it doubly impossible for themto escape the effects of th is disaster to their transportation system .

At the time of the armistice the Germans had 1 84.combat divisions . We had had against us forty-five ofthem and defeated them. In doing this we had usedup the local reserves normally belonging to that area


and taken careoftwenty-five divisions fromotherfronts .

There were in all about Germans against ourFirst Army. On information captured from Germansources it is estimated that their killed and woundedamounted to about We took prisoners . The American losses— killed

,wounded

,and

prisoners—were about I and the French servingwith us about This is an extraordinary re

sult for a not fully trained army to achieve in attack .

We captured besides men 874 German guns, morethan 30 0 trench mortars, and more than machine guns .The decisiveness and the significance of our greatbattle in France will cont inue to grow as peoplecontinue to study the war . As that study progresses

,

a good many lessons of the struggle will grow plainalso

,and as the p icture gets plainer publ ic apprecia

tion of the valour of our Soldiers and the work of ourline Officers and staffs will continue to grow.

Many offi cers came out Of the battle marked unfitfor combat service .

” When the publ ic real izes howmeagre these men’s training was— regulars

,guards

men,and national army— the cause for wonder will

not be that there were so many Offi cers rel ieved butthat there were enough fit for this kind of combat tomake the th ing a success . If some troops retreatedthree kilometers in the face of a Prussian guard counter attack

,if other troops got so d isorganized in a

rapid advance that they had to be taken to the rearto re-form

,the wonder is not that th is happened but

that it did not happen more . There will be learned


arguments to the effect that if we had used fewertroops we could have avoided some Of the trafficjams that occurred, and that had our battle plansbeen less elemental we might have taken greateradvantage Of terrain

,etc . Before these and similar

criticisms be counted just,they must take into ao

count that it may take more green troops to take a'

position than it does experienced ones,and that the

Simplest battle instructions are plenty complicatedfor Officers half of whom had never been in a b igbattle before, and most of whom had had a uniformon less than eighteen months . A lot ofmen are buriedin the Argonne because people cannot in a Shortt ime learn even the elements of warfare so as notto forget them in the stress Of battle .

Themore the forty-seven days of the Argonne-Meuseis studied the more grateful the American public mustbecome to General Pershing

,his staff

,and the Officers

and men of the American Army, and the more fixedShould become the public resolution never again tomake an American general take the moral responsibility of facing such a task with an army “ hurriedlyraised and hastily trained

,and never again to send

our c itizens into battle in which all the advantagesthat come from prOper training are with the enemy.

The great dec isions of Pershing and his staff totrain for Open warfare

,to push the fighting whether

ready or not,the ab ility to make a million men into

an army that could function without fatal blundersand fight to victory—these things are as great in theannals of the nation as the courage of our men .


CHAPTER VI

W ITH THE ALLIE S

URING the Argonne-Meuse battle there were sixAmerican divisions with the Allies

,and all of

them saw distinguished service . Toward the end Of

October the 37th and g l st divisions, which had beenin the opening Of the battle on September 26th

,were

taken from our army and sent"

to Belgium and assigned to the composite army under the King Of theBelgians who had the French General Degoutte asChief-of-Staff. From the 3 I st Of October on thesedivisions were in action and they acquitted themselveswell . They were among the troops at the point ofthe Belgian advance .

The same was true of the two American divisions,

the 27th and 30 th, that were with the British .

These two divisions were the first troops through theHindenburg Line on the British front in the attacknear Cambrai which began on September 27th .

These two divisions were again in action on the 1 7thOf October in the opening stages Of the battle of theSelle R iver . Their work, on both occasions, receivedthe highest praise from the British . In these twobattles these two divisions took more thanprisoners .Still farther south the 2nd and 36th divisions were

1 42


loaned to the French , and the 2nd Division had herethe honour of being the first to break the German linein its area . The zud took the strong hill Blanc Montand the town of St . Etienne, breaking a line the Germans had held since 1 9 1 4, and playing a consp icuouspart in the wide attack which resulted in a generalGerman retreat to behind the Aisne from Rheims

to the Argonne . The 36th relieved the zud and wasin the French advance following th is German retreat .From this service the 2nd came back and appeared inthe Argonne in the attack ofNovember 1 st .

There is every reason for pride in the record Of

these loaned divisions as there is in the record of

the First Army.

CONCISE OFFICIAL HISTORIE S OF THE COM BATDIVISION S

1 st D IVISION

This division was organized from troops of the U .

S . Regular Army. The first units left the UnitedStates June 14, 1 9 1 7, and the last units arrived inFrance July 2

,1 9 1 7 . The d ivis ion went into the

Gondrecourt (first area) training area for training .

The d ivision InsIgnIa Is a crimson figure “1” on

khaki background . Chosen because the numeralI” represents the number of the division and many

of its subsidiary organizations . Also,as proudly

claimed,because it was the “ First division in France ;

first in sector ; first to fire a shot at the Germans ;


first to attack ; first to conduct a raid ; first to beraided ; first to capture prisoners ; first to inflict casualties ; first to suffer casualties ; first to be citedsingly in general orders ; first in the number of division

,corps, and army commanders and general staff

Officers produced from its personnel .”

It entered the line in the Sommerville sector,ten

kilometers southeast ofNancy, for instructional purposes under French command October Z I St

,and with

drew the night of November 20 , 1 9 1 7. This sectorwas quiet .The division entered the Ansauville sector underthe tactical command Of the French . This sectorwasapproximately twenty kilometers northwest of Toul .Sector quiet with occasional active days . D ivisionwithdrew April grd. The 1 st Artillery Brigade wasthe only American artillery in action during thisperiod .

The division entered the Cantigny sector,five

kilometers west of Montdidier,April 2sth .

The Cantigny operation was carried out the morning of May 28th, the division advancing the line30 0 to 60 0 yards on a yard front . Divisionwas relieved July 7, 1 9 1 8 .

The division entered the line the night of July 1 7,1 9 1 8, for the Soissons Operation, approximately fifteenkilometers southwest of Soissons . The fighting wassevere throughout the attack

,especially July 20 th

and 2 I St . The division was relieved after havingreached Berzy le Sec .Saizerais sector . The I st Division entered the


1 46 OUR 1 10 DAYS’FIGHTING"

To include March 8,1 9 1 9, there had been

casualties,which included 1 0 6 prisoners

,reported

from the division . Three hundred individuals of

this division had been awarded the D istinguishedService Cross up to March 1

,1 9 1 9 . The division

captured 1 65 offi cers and men,numerous ma

chine guns,pieces of artillery of all calibres

, and agreat quantity Of supplies .The 1 st Division made a total advance

,against

resistance, of fifty

-one kilometers .The commanding generals Of the division were as

follows : Maj . Gen . William L . S ibert,June 8

,

1 9 1 7, to December 1 2,1 9 1 7 ; Maj . Gen . Robert L .

Bullard,December 1 2

,1 9 1 7, until he became a corps

commander. On March 1 5, 1 9 1 9, Maj . Gen . E . FM cGlachlin, Jr.

, was in command of the diviSion .

The following units composed the division : the1 6th

,1 8th

,26th

,28th Infantry regiments ; s th, 6th,

7th Artillery regiments ; I St Engineers Regiment andTrain ; zud Field Signal Battalion ; 3rd, 4th, sth,Ambulance companies and Field Hospital .

2nd DIVI SION

The division was organized from elements of theRegular Army and Marines in France during the lastthree months of 1 9 1 7 .

The division insignia is an Indian head on starbackground and shield with colours varying accordingto unit .After a period of training with the division head-v


quarters at Bourmont, Haute-Marne, from October26

,1 9 1 7, to March 1 6, 1 9 1 8, the divISl on entered

the Verdun and Toulon sectors with headquartersat Sommedieu . The division was in sector withthe French, the sector being quiet, no advance beingmade . Constant patrolling and several enemy raidsrepulsed . Division was rel ieved March 24th .

The 2nd Division on this date moved into theChateau-Thierry sector, passing from the VII A.C.

French to the XXI A . C . French as reserve . Thedivision went forward about June I

,1 9 1 8, to meet

a strong enemy attack which had developed on theline west of Chateau-Thierry . The attack of June3 rd and 4th was halted June 4th on the line westof Chateau-Thierry and the division advanced twokilometers in the neighbourhood Of Vaux and inBelleau Wood, between June 6th and July I st .

The relief of the division was completed on nightOf July 9th .

On July 1 6th the 2nd Division entered the sectorsouth Of Soissons and attacked on the morning Of the1 8th and again on the morning of the 1 9th, advancing a total d istance of eleven kilometers after severefighting . The reliefwas completed on July 1 9th-20 th .

On July goth the division moved into reserve position and left the sector.On August 9th the division entered the Marbachsector . Th is was a quiet sector and division wasrelieved on August 24th .

The division entered the line on the St . M ihielsalient September 9th, where there was very active


fighting,withdrawing on September 1 6th, after

having advanced approximately n ine kilometers .Entered the front l ine of the Blanc Mont sector

near Somme Pye under the French . After severefighting the division was relieved October 27th .

The division entered the Meuse-Argonne sectoron October 3oth and attacked November I st

, ad

vancing to the Meuse . D ivision was relieved afterdeclaration of armistice . The division had madean advance of twenty-nine kilometers .Some Of the units of the division

,as a part of the

I st Division, left the United States in June, 1 9 1 7 .

The division captured 228 offi cers, men,

343 p ieces of artillery, machine guns,and made

a total advance of sixty kilometers against resistance .

Its training in France was Obtained in the thirdtraining area which is known as the Bourmontarea .

The units composing the division were the 9thand 23rd Infantry ; s th and 6th Marine Corps regiments ; 1 2th

,1 sth

,and 1 7th Artillery regiments

4th, sth , and 6thMachine Gun battalions ; 2ndTrenchMortar Battery ; I st Field S ignal Battalions ; 2nd EugineerRegiment and Train ; I st, 1 5th, 1 6th, and 23rdAmbulance companies and Field hospitals ; whichcomposed the 2nd Sanitary Train .

Brig. Gen . Charles A . Doyon,U . S . Marine

Corps,commanded the division to include No

vember 7, 1 9 1 7 ; Maj . Gen . Omar Bundy com-7

manded the division from November 8, 1 9 1 7, to July



August 1 1 th, and on August 1 9th was withdrawnto the Reynel training area, and on September 1 st

all units were moved to Vavincourt for furthertraining .

On September 7th troops'

of the s9th Infantrywent into the line in the Toul sector southeast ofVerdun . During this period the balance of thedivision was in reserve in this sector

,except the

artillery which was in action with other d ivisions .The s9th Infantry was relieved September 1 sthand the entire division moved to woods near Lenneson the night of September 1 9th-20 th .

The division,as part of III Corps

,attacked on the

first day In the Meuse-Argonne offensive,September

26th,advancing six and a half kilometers the first day

,

and continued in this Offensive until October l gth,when it was relieved while holding Bois de la CoteLemont and Bois de Brieulles .On October 2oth the division was assigned to theSecond Army ; started to move to Vignot and Luceyareas on October zI st .

On November 4th the division was assignedagain to the First Army and started moving to Blercourt November 6th

,but was reassigned to the Second

Army on November 8th . The division returned toVoid on November 9th, attached to the IV Corps .After the signing of the armistice the division con

centrated around Bourcq on November 1 3 th and

the artillery brigade, which had been kept in actionalmost continuously along the Meuse, rejoined thedivision November 1 4th .


The division began its march into Germany November20 th, under the Third Army, and on December1 6th the division was occupying the Kreises OfAdenauand Cochem, Province of the Rhine, as its permanent area of occupation .

The total battle casualties reported to includeMarch 8

,1 9 1 9, were The number of D is

tinguished Service Crosses awarded to individualsof this divi sion to include March 1

,1 9 1 9, were 66 .

The commanding generals of the division fromthe time of its organization to include the date Of

the armistice were as followsMaj . Gen . Geo . H . Cameron, December 1 0 , 1 9 1 7,

to August 24, 1 9 1 8 ; Brig. Gen . Benj . W. Poore,

August 24, 1 9 1 8, to August 3 1 , 1 9 1 8 ; Maj . Gen .

John L . Hines,August 3 1 , 1 9 1 8, to October 1 7,

1 9 1 8 ; Maj . Gen . Geo . H . Cameron, October 1 7,

1 9 1 8, to October 24, 1 9 1 8 ; Brig. Gen . Benj . W.

Poore,October 24, 1 9 1 8, to November 7, 1 9 1 8 ; Maj .

Gen . Mark L . Hersey, November 7, 1 9 1 8, to November 1 1

,1 9 1 8 .

s th D IVIS ION

In compliance with War Department instructions,

the sth Division (Regular Army) was organized atCamp Logan

,Texas

,in the latter part Of May

,1 9 1 7.

The division was made up from the 6th,1 1 th

,6oth

,

and 6 1 8 1: Regular Army Infantry regiments . The6oth and 6 l st Infantry were organized from the Old7th Infantry ; the 1 9th and zoth Field Artillery or

ganized from the Old 7th Field Artille ry; the 2 1 st Field


Artillery organized from the Old 3rd FieldArtillery ; the7th Engineers Regiment organized from Companies Eand F Of the I st Engineers ; and the 9th Field SignalBattalion organized from personnel Of the s ignal corpsOf the Regular Army. The 1 3 th, 14th, and 1 5th MachineGun battalions ; sth Trench Mortar Battery ; sthHeadquarters Trains and Military Police ; sth Ammunition Train ; sth Sanitary Train, were organized fromRegular Army and National Army drafts . The firstorganization to leave for overseas entrained fromCamp Merritt about the first Of March . D ivisionheadquarters arrived at Havre

,France

,May I , 1 9 1 8 .

The d ivision was sent to the Bar-sur-Aube area fortraining and remained there until June I st, when itmoved by rail to the Vosges . There it entered theColmar sector in conjunction with the 2 1 st Division(French) and remained there until July 1 6th . Thedivision then moved by bus to the St . Die sectorand remained there until the 23 rd of August, when itmoved by bus and foot to the St . Mihiel sector. In

the St . Mihiel operation this d ivision was a part ofthe I Army Corps and was placed in the line northeast Of Regnieville-eu-Haye with the 2nd Divisionon their left and the 9oth D ivision on their right .The division continued in the St . M ihiel offensiveuntil September 1 6th when it moved by road and busto the Argonne front and went into the attack onOctober 1 2th east of Montfaucon . The divisioncontinued in the attack until October 2 2nd when itwas relieved by the 90 th D ivision, and was withdrawn to the vicinity Of Malancourt . On October



6th D IV IS ION

In compliance with War Department instructions

,the 6th D ivision was organized at Camp

Forrest, Ga ., and Camp Mcclellan, Ala .,on No!

vember 26, 1 9 1 7 . This division was a Regular Armydivision and was popularly known as the “ Star Division .

”

On March 1 3 , 1 9 1 8, the d ivision headquartersmoved to Camp Forrest, Ga .

, and later left on May8th and was established at Camp Wadsworth, S . C .

Practically every state in the Union was repre

sented in the volunteer personnel of the division ;however, the majority of the men were from theSouth .

The shoulder insignia of the division is a Six

pointed star of red with the numeral “6” in blue

'

superimposed on the centre Of the star .The division, less artillery and engineers, beganembarking from New York on May 8, 1 9 1 8, and began debarking in England on July 1 7th, the lastunits “arriving in France August 28

,1 9 1 8 . From

England the troops were transported to France, beginning July 2 1 st

,debarking at Le Havre .

Preceding the division,the engineers arr1ved on

May 1 8th at Brest, France, and were engaged in construction work at Gievres before joining the divisionin August near Chateauvillain .

The artillery landed at Le Havre on July 29th andbegan its training at Valdahon .

After training in the vicinity of Chateauvillain,


the division, less artillery, left on August 27, 19 1 8,

for Gerardmer where it occupied, under Frenchcommand

,a sector in the Vosges until October 1 1 ,

1 9 1 8 .

On October 27th the d ivision moved from Gerardmer by rail to the vicinity Of Les Islettes andestablished headquarters at Beauchamlc Farm .

On November 2 , 1 9 1 8, the d ivision began to marchforward in the Meuse-Argonne Offensive . On November 6th the division headquarters was establishedat Stonne .

The army '

objective in this drive having beenreached

,the division then marched to a sector

northeast of Verdun, where it entered the l ine onNovember 14th and maintained th is position untilNovember 2 1 st, when the division was relieved andproceeded by marching to the fourteenth trainingarea . November 3oth the division headquarters wasestablished at Aignay-le-Duc .To include March 8

,1 9 1 9, the 6th Division had

reported 285 casualties during the war of which 3were prisoners ofwar.The commanding generals of the division wereas follows : Brig. Gen . Jas . B . Erwin

,November 26

,

1 9 1 7, to August 3 I , 1 9 1 8 ;Maj . Gen.WalterP.Gordon,

August 3 1 , 1 9 1 8, to November 1 1 , 1 9 1 8 .

To include March 1,1 9 1 9, ten individuals Of this

division had received the Distinguished ServiceCross .The 6th Division was composed of the following

unIts


1 1 th and 1 2th Infantry brigades .s1 st, 52nd, 53rd, 54th Infantry regiments.

1 7th and 1 8th Machine Gun battalions .6th Artillery Brigade .

3 rd, 1 1 th, and 78th Artillery regiments .6th Trench Mortar Battery .

1 6th D ivision Machine Gun Battalion .

3 1 8th Engineer Regiment and Train .

6th Field Signal Battalion .

6th Train Headquarters and Military Police.6th Supply Train .

6th Ammunition Train .

6th Sani tary Train .

20 th, 37th, 38th, 40 th Ambulance companiesField hospitals.

7th D IVI S ION

In compliance with War Department instructionsthis division was organized January 1

,1 9 1 8, at

Chickamauga Park,Ga .

The division insignia consists of two triangleswith apexes touching

,in black

,on red circular base .

Division headquarters arrived at Camp MacArthur,Waco,Texas, February 5 , 1 9 1 8, at which timethe division began assembling and training.

Began leaving Camp M acArthurforCamp Merritt,N. J.

,July 1 8

, 1 9 1 8 . Sailed from Hoboken, N. J.,

on July 3 1 st ; 1 4th Brigade followed during the

next two weeks . The last units arrived in Franceon September 3 , 1 9 1 8 .

On August 1 9th division arrived in fifteenth training



Brig. Gen. C . H . Barth,August 1 0

,1 9 1 8, to Octo

ber 24, 1 9 1 8 ; Maj . Gen . Edmund Wittenmeyer,October 24, 1 9 1 8, to November 1 1

,1 9 1 8 .

To include March 1,1 9 1 9, 30 individuals of the 7th

Division had been awarded the D istinguished ServiceCross .The units composing the division were as follows1 3 th Infantry Brigade .55th, 56th Infantry regiments.zoth Machine Gun Battalion .

1 4th Infantry Brigade .34th, 64th Infantry regiments . )z l st Machine Gun Battalion .

1 9th Divisional Machine Gun Battalion .

7th Art illery Brigade .8th

, 79th, and 8oth Artillery regiments .7th Trench Mortar Battery.

5th Engineer Regiment and Train .

roth Field S ignal Battalion .

7th Train Headquarters and Military Police.

7th Supply Train.

7th Ammunition Train.

7th Sanitary Train, consisting Of the 22nd, 34th,3 5th, and 36th Ambulance companies and Fieldhospitals .

8th DIVIS ION

,The Eighth

,Pathfinder

,

” Divi sion was organizedby letter of the Adjutant General, December 1 7,

1 9 1 7 . At that time some of the organizations nowcomprising the division were as yet unborn, while


some of those that had been organized were widelyscattered . The 1 2th Infantry, and its offshoot, the6zud Infantry, were then at the Presidio, San Francisco

,Cal ifornia . On the morning of January 3 ,

1 9 1 8, the 62nd Infantry left the Presidio and proceeded to Camp Fremont, near Palo Alto, Cal iformia, pursuant to telegraphic instructions fromHeadquarters

,Western Department

,arriving there

January 5 , 1 9 1 8 . The 6zud Infantry was brigadedwith the 1 2th Infantry forming the 1 sth InfantryBrigade ; and the 8th and 1 3th Infantry were bri

gaded, forming the 1 6th Infantry Brigade . Thesetwo brigades constituted the 8th D ivision

,Regular

Army,at the beginning of 1 9 1 8, with station at Camp

Fremont,Cal ifornia . Rout Ine duties in connection

with making the camp habitable were imm ediatelytaken up

,and Shortly afterward intensive schedules

of training were begun with the Obj ect of preparingthe organizat ions for early overseas duty.

In the early part of 1 9 1 8 the zud, 8 1 st , and 83rdField Artillery regiments were added to the d ivision .

The 8 1 st and 83rd Field Artillery regiments wereoriginally cavalry organizations . The three machine gun battalions sprang from the four infantryregiments . The 24th Machine Gun Battal ion wasorganized January 2

,1 9 1 8, under Table 1 0

,Table

Of Organization,as amended by telegram

December 3 1 , 1 9 1 7, its personnel being taken fromthe 8th and 1 3 th Infantry regiments or the 1 6th

Infantry Brigade,then under the command of Colo

nel S . E . Smiley. The 23rd Machine Gun Battalion


was organized February 1,1 9 1 8, its personnel being

taken from the 1 2th and 62nd Infantry regiments .The organ ization of this Machine Gun Battalionwas effected under the supervision of Captain

,now

Lieutenant Colonel, A . C . Gillem,the present com

manding Offi cer thereof. The 2zud Machine GunBattal ion was organized during the latter part ofMarch and early part Of April

,1 9 1 8, under the

direction of Captain James I . Muir who was authorized to take one offi cer from each the 23rd and 24th ,

Machine Gun battalions, and two officers from the

other organizations of the division . On April 1 3,1 9 1 8, nine of the officers transferred from the g 1 3 tD ivision at Camp Lewis, Washington, to the

/

8thD ivi sion were assigned to this Machine Gun Battalion .

The organization of the 8th Train'

Headquartersand Military Pol ice was initiated by the War ’ De

partment December 1 7, 1 9 1 7, the first enlisted personnel for skeleton companies being obtained bytransfer from the infantry regiments of the division .

Colonel William K . Jones, infantry, who was as

signed as Commander Of Trains, reported and assumed command January 1 5 , 1 9 1 8 . In March

,

1 9 1 8, a full quota of Officers was assigned and onApril 4, 1 9 1 8, the organization was effected . On

this latter date the 8th Ammunition Train wasorganized at Camp Fremont and piaced under temposrary command of Captain Len Bond until the arrival of Lieut . Col . John B . Schoeffel who was incommand until he was promoted Colonel and trans



The 8th Motor Supply Train was organized atCamp Joseph E . Johnston

,Jacksonville

,Florida

,

January 26, 1 9 1 8, the offi cers all being in the Quartermaster Corps and the enlisted personnel being transferred from provisional companies

,Quartermaster

Corps, stationed at Jacksonville, Florida . The trainleft Camp Johnston for Detroit

,Michigan

,March

1 2,1 9 1 8 , and on March 20 th and 2 1 st left Detro1t

for Camp Holabird, Baltimore, Maryland, where itmaintained a headquarters until October 30 , 1 9 1 8 .

During this time the commanding Officer and one

half to two thirds of the enlisted personnel were frequently on detached service with companies on theroad engaged in convoy work between Detroit,Washington

,Baltimore, Philadelphia, and other

points . Major Charles D . Kenison, Q . M . C., whowas assigned in command of the supply train August20

,1 9 1 8, was relieved October 24, 1 9 1 8 , and ar;

tached to the train as motor transport officer, 8thDivision . The present command ing offi cer, FirstLieutenant

,now Captain

,Alonzo W . Jones

, Q . M . C.,

was assigned in command of the train October 26,1 9 1 8 .

The 3 20 th Field S ignal Battalion, assigned to the8th Division, was organized at Camp Dodge, DesMoines

,Iowa

,November 1 2

,1 9 1 7 . One hundred

and twenty men of the S ignal Enlisted Reserve Corpsreported

,and approximately 50 men from Des Moines

and the vicinity were added to the organizarCapt . Walter L . Thomas assumed command of thebattalion November 14, 1 9 1 7, and was in command


thereof until December 1 2,1 9 1 7, when Major E .

Mason took command and served as commandingOfli cer until his discharge, January 1 5 , 1 9 1 9 , and theassignment of the present commanding Officer

,

Major William T . Crook. The battalion entrainedfor Camp Fremont January 2

,1 9 1 8, arriving there

January 6,1 9 1 8 .

Bakery Company NO . 338 was organized at CampFremont September 26

,1 9 1 7, as Bakery Company

NO . 50 ; the number being changed to 3 38 in November

,1 9 1 7. Second Lieut . John G . Schronk was

placed in command . The personnel of this companyconsisted Of Regular Army bakers then in the serviceand of men from various schools for bakers andcooks in the Western Department . It might beObserved here that four other bakery companies

,

drawing largely upon Bakery Company No. 3 3 8

for their personnel,were organized at Camp Fremont

,

and that as many as six men from this companywere commissioned Offi cers and assigned to the otherbakery companies .Other organizations of the 8th D ivision were the

3 1 9th Engineers and Train ; d ivision and brigadeheadquarters ; the Trench Mortar Battery and the8th Mobile Ordnance Repair Shop . The 3 1 9th Engineers and Train left Camp Fremont for the American Expeditionary Forces under the command Of

Col . C . W . Otwell in September,1 9 1 8 . Th is Office

does not have at hand the necessary data to furnishthe details of the organization of the 3 1 9th En?

gineers .


In January,1 9 1 8, Col . Elmore F . Taggart

,in

fantry, assumed command of the division and campand was in command thereof until March

, 1 9 1 8 ,

when Colonel Van Denson,artillery

,took com

mand . In April,1 9 1 8, Brig . Gen . Joseph D . Leitch

became the commanding officer and was in command until May when Maj . Gen . John F . Morrisonassumed command . Major General Morrison wasrelieved from this command and placed in commandof the Western Department in July

,1 9 1 8, and Brig

adier General Leitch again commanded the d ivisionuntil the assignment ofMaj . Gen . William S . Gravesthe same month . Major General Graves retainedcommand until September

,1 9 1 8, when he was re

l ieved and placed in command of the Amerl can

Expeditionary Forces in S iberia . The last com

manding general of the 8th D ivision, Maj . Gen .

El i A . Holmick,assumed command thereof in Sep

tember,1 9 1 8 .

The home of the 8th D ivision was Camp Fremont,about one mile from Palo Alto

,California

,and thirty

miles from San Francisco, Situated in one of the mostbeautiful parts of the state, Santa Clara Valley .

The camp was named after that great p ioneer andsoldier Gen . John G . Fremont

,the pathfinder of the

West . The d ivision was therefore called the “ Pathfinder D ivision . At one time all of the organizations comprising the division were at Camp Fremont with the exception of the Motor Supply Trainand the Mobile Field Laboratory NO . 64, wh ichlatter unit was organized at Yale University, New



command of Brig . Gen . Alfred A . Starb ird,were sent

to Fort S ill, Oklahoma, to complete their trainingpreparatory to overseas duty . During this period

,

the 8th Motor Supply Train received valuabletraining in the convoy work it was engaged in between Baltimore, Washington, and other cities .The 8th Train Headquarters and Military Policewere trained as both infantry and cavalry troops

,

and in addition received spec ial training to fit themfor overseas duty . This organization furnished theprovost guard for Camp Fremont and establisheddetached posts in all towns and cities near camp“

for police duty separately and in conjunction with thecivil authorities . The training of the ammunitiontrain was somewhat handicapped by lack of suffi cientcombat wagons

,and mules

,trucks

,and other motor

transportation,but it made the best of the situation

,

substituting other forms of training when necessary.

The training of the other units progressed in accor

dance with arranged schedules and was highly satisfactory.

Practically every organization in the divisionengaged in one or more practice marches

,some of

which were extended over a period of several days .There were also practice marches of whole brigadesat a time . The infantry regiments were given combat practice and trained in the new methods ofwarfare

,using War Department Pamphlet 80 2 as a basis

for the training. Trenches were dug and wire eu

tanglements constructed and the usual course “

of

t raining pursued in accordance with latest schedules


and circulars of training from the War Department .The bayonet training of this division was excep

tionally fine,drawing a great deal of comment from

ofli cers of other camps and divisions, as well as fromforeign Officers . A number of parades and reviews,including one brigade review and two reviews of

the entire d ivision,were held at Camp Fremont .

The two division reviews took place when MajorGeneral Helmick was in command of the divisionand passed before him as reviewing offi cer.One of the fourth oflicers

’ training schools wasconducted at Camp Fremont

,with Major

,now Lieut .

Col .,George G . Bartlett, infantry, in command under

the general jurisdiction of the 8th D ivision . Whenthe training school at Camp Kearny was discontinued

,prior to the movement of the 4oth D ivision

overseas,the infantry of that school were trans

ferred to the school at Camp Fremont for the completion of the course Of training. At the terminationof this school about 1 50 new second l ieutenantswere either assigned or attached to the various organizations of the d ivision .

At the time Major General Graves was in commandof the d ivision

,Brigadier General Leitch commanded

the 1 5th Infantry Brigade and Brig . Gen . John J .

Bradley the 1 6th Infantry Brigade . Brigadier General Leitch was relieved as commanding ofli cer of

the 1 5th Infantry Brigade and transferred to CampLewis as commanding officer of the new divisionbeing formed there about the first of October

,1 9 1 8,

when Brig . Gen . Hugh S . Johnson assumed com


mand of the 1 5th Infantry Brigade . At this timethe commanding Offi cers of the four infantry regiments were as follows : Lieut . Col . Morris M . Keck

,

and later Col . Walter C . Short, 8th ; Col . Charles B .

Hagadorn,1 2th ; Col . L . S . Sorley

,1 3 th ; and CO1.

James R . Lindsay,62nd.

On or about August 3 , 1 9 1 8, instructions were teceived from the Adjutant General’s Office directing the transfer of Major General Graves and partof his staff and some men and nearly 1 0 0

offi cers to American Expeditionary Forces in Siberia .

This was the most serious loss the division ever sustained as it was evidently the cause of a new delayOf several weeks in starting the eastward movementof the division and of the failure to reach France onthe part of most of the organizations comprisingthedivision . About men sailed on the first transports which left Fort Mason

,San Francisco

, Califor

nia,about the middle

-

ofAugust,1 9 1 8, and more than

men sailed from the same port on the secondtransports about September 1

,1 9 1 8 . Major Gen

eral Graves took with him his Chief-of-Staff,the two

assistant division adjutants,a few army field

clerks,the division judge advocate

,and a number

of other offi cers . The line ofli cers and enlisted personnel sent to S iberia were largely drawn from thefour infantry regiments . A number of medical anddental officers and enlisted men,

as well as one fieldveterinary unit

,and a few ordnance and quarter

master corps Ofli cers and men were sent with theseforces .



influenza broke out in a number of cities near CampFremont, and in order to prevent the disease fromspreading among the men

,on October 5th the whole

camp was placed in close quarantine,and no one

except medical officers was permitted to leave orenter the camp without a special pass from divisionheadquarters, which was granted only in case of mostexceptional circumstances . This quarantine wasstrictly enforced and was not lifted until the organizations were about to entrain for Camp Mills

,New

York. While there were, of course,a number of

cases of influenza and some deaths among the menand ofli cers

,it is believed that the precautionary

methods adopted by the division did much to lessenthe seriousness of the s ituation and resulted in savingmany lives .On or about October 1 0

,1 9 1 8, telegraphic instruc

tions were received from the Adjutant General’sOffi ce d irecting movement of the division to CampM ills

,Long Island

,New York

,beginning October

1 8th . Every effort was now made to have all organizations ready to entrain when the appointed timecame . The aforesaid telegraphic instructions, inso far as pert inent, were repeated to the 8th ArtilleryBrigade at Fort S ill

,Oklahoma, and to the 8th Motor

Supply Train at Camp Holabird, Maryland . Theseorganizations were directed to leave their respectivecamps in time to join the d ivision at Camp Mills .The schedule of entraining provided for the departure of six trains each day beginning at 8 A .M .

and at intervals of one and one half hours thereafter.


Major General Helmick delegated Captain,now

Maj .,G . D . Gorton, to act as h is personal

representative with instructions to see that thetrains were properly prepared and moved out ontime . The first train containing one company of

military police,the advance school, and advance

representatives of the staff departed at the exacttime designated

,8 A .M .

,October 1 8

,1 9 1 8 , and all

the other trains moved out as scheduled . The trainswere routed over several different roads and in a wayto prevent congestion . The entire movement tookonly seven days and was conducted in a most orderlyand methodical manner. Many of those whowere leftbehind because of temporary S ickness were later forwarded to Camp M ills on a special train for casuals .Upon arrival of the first train at Camp M ills

,a

headquarters was established,and preparations made

for receiving detachments arriving later . It is es

timated that the trip from Camp Fremont to CampMills took on an average s ix days . Upon arrivalat Camp Mills

,each organization prepared the re

quired passenger l ists and equipped its troops withoverseas caps and helmets . The division had beenwell furnished with the woolen clothes and underwear required for overseas service and there was l ittleor no difficulty in completing its equipment as faras clothing was concerned .

At the time the movement of the division toCamp M ills began

,the staff of Major General Hel

mick consisted in part of:Col . Asa L . S ingleton

,infantry

,Chief-of-Staff ;


Lieut . Col Frank F . Jewett, infantry, Assi stantChief-of-Staff ; Maj . L . S . Schmitt

,A . G.

,Division

Adjutant ; Maj . R . M . Alton,A . G.

,D ivision Per

sonnel Adjutant ; Col . L . L . Smith,M . C.

,D ivision

Surgeon ; Lieut . Col . Ned M . Green,infantry

,

Division M . G . Offi cer ; Lieut . Col . Alfred T . Clifton,

S . C.,D ivision S ignal Ofli cer; Lieut . Col . Clenard

M cLaughlin,infantry

,D ivision Inspector ; Maj .

Rob C . Musser, V. C., D ivision Veterinarian ; Maj .

Charles M . Taylor,D . C.

,Division Dental Offi cer ;

Maj . G . M . Everetts, D ivision Quartermaster ; Maj . George D . R ice

,Chaplain

,Division

Chaplain ; Maj . Joseph J . Kerrigan,infantry

,Divi

sion Intelligence Offi cer .At this time the artillery and infantry brigadeswere commanded as aforesaid

,viz .

,Brig . Gen . Hugh

S . Johnson in command of the 1 5th Infantry Brigade,and Brig . Gen . John J . Bradley in command of the1 6th Infantry Brigade . Lieut . Col ., now Col ., MorrisM . Keck commanded the 8th Infantry at the timeit left Camp Fremont ; Col . Alfred Aloe, the 1 2th

Infantry ; Col . Lewis S . Sorley,1 3 th Infantry ; and

C0 1. James F . M cKinley, the 6zud Infantry. Therehad been no change in the commanding oflicer of the3 20 th Field Signal Battalion up to this time . Thebelow organizations were commanded then

,as they

still are,as follows :

8th Sanitary Train,F. W . Townsend

,Lieut . Col .,

M . C .

22nd Machine Gun Battalion, Frank B . Jordan,Major

,Inf.



Train and Mobile Ordnance Repair Shop,8th Motor

Supply Train ; the 22nd, 23 rd, and 24th Machine Gunbattalions, 8th Sanitary Train, Sanitary Squads No . 83

and No . 84 ; Mobile Field Laboratory No. 64, andBakery Company No . 338 remained at Camp Mills forabout one month .

The organizations remaining at Camp Mills wereunder command of Brig. Gen . Hugh S . Johnson of the1 5th Infantry Brigade . During the period these organizations remained there they engaged in usualcamp duties and drill

,and in addition furnished large

labour and fatigue details for camp work . After thes igning of the armistice, it became necessary to keepthe men constantly busy in order to prevent themfrom nursing their disappointment at not gettingoverseas . A review of the 8th D ivision Detachmentwhich remained at Camp M ills was held before Brig .

Gen . Johnson as reviewing officer November 22 , 1 9 1 8 .

On this occasion Brigadier General Johnson Observedthe troops from an aeroplane . The quarantine underwhich the camp had been ever since the arrival of the8th D ivision was lifted November 14, 1 9 1 8, and themen were then given liberal pass privileges enablingthem to visit New York City and neighbouringpoints of interest .On November 23 , 1 9 1 8, orders were receiveddirecting the movement of all organizations of thisdetachment except the 1 2th and 1 3 th Infantry regi—v

ments to Camp Lee,Virginia . The 1 2th Infantry

was sent to Camp Stuart, Virginia, and the 1 3 thInfantry to Camp Merritt, New Jersey. The first


troops for Camp Lee left Camp M ills at about 9A .M .

,November 25 , 1 9 1 8, and proceeded to Hoboken,

New Jersey, leaving there about 4 P .M . the same dayon the U . S . Transport Pres ident Grant for Norfolk,Virginia

,and arriving about 6 P .M .

,November 26th .

The troops boarded river boats at Norfolk, disem

barking at City Point,Virgin ia

,on the James R iver

,

from whence they were marched a d istance of abouteight miles to Camp Lee . The 1 5th Infantry Brigade Headquarters immediately establ ished itselfwith Brigadier General Johnson still in commandand began its duties as both brigade headquartersand Headquarters for the Detachment 8th D ivisionwhich comprised the 62nd Infantry

,8th Train Head

quarters and M ilitary Police,8th Ammunition Train

and Mobile Ordnance Repair Shop,8th Motor

Supply

’

Train, 3 20 th Field S ignal Battalion, 22nd,

23 rd, and 24th Mach ine Gun battal ions, 8th SanitaryTrain

,Sanitary Squads No . 83 and No . 84, Mob ile

Field Laboratory No . 64, and Bakery Company NO .

338 .

Routine duties were resumed at Camp Lee and inaddition to the drills and other training

,large fatigue

details of as many as men a day at times werefurnished daily by the detachment for camp work .

Brigad ier General Johnson left Camp Lee forWashington,

D . C.,December 1 9, 1 9 1 8, and remained

there on special duty per Verbal orders the Adjutant General’s Offi ce about December 20 ,

1 9 1 8 . In

his absence Col . William K . Jones,the commanding

ofli cer of the 8th Train Headquarters and Military

1 76 OUR 1 10 DAYS ’ FIGHTING

Police, acted as commanding offi cer of the Detachment with Maj . William R . Schmidt, infantry, asadjutant ; on January 6, 1 9 1 9, garrison and postgraduate schools were started pursuant to camporders

,and all line officers were required to attend.

The first organization of the detachment to bedemobilized was Bakery Company No . 338 whichwas finally disbanded January 20

,1 9 1 9 . Telegraphic

instructions from the Adjutant General’s Office,

January 8,1 9 1 9, authorized the discharge of enlisted

personnel of the 8th D ivision eligible for dischargeunder Circular No . 77, War Department, 1 9 1 8, upto 50 per cent . of the strength of the division asreported November 30 , 1 9 1 8 . Under this authorityapplications for the discharge of about 42 per cent .of the detachment’s strength November 30 , 1 9 1 8,

had been approved at these headquarters whentelegraphic instructions from the Adjutant General’sOfli ce, January 1 7, 1 9 1 8, were received directing the

demob ilization of all organizations of the 8th D ivision at Camp Lee except those belonging to theRegular Army . At the time of writing demobiliza

tion is now progressing and it is expected thatwithin the next few weeks all the organizations ofth is detachment except the 62nd Infantry will havebeen demob ilized and finally disbanded .

This division is not mentioned in General Pershing’s cabled communiques . None of the unitsof this division was in action .

The Shoulder insignia of the divis ion was a blackIndian head within an orange circle .



and durIng September and October, 1 9 1 7, the division was transported to France through both Englishand French ports . Division headquarters was established at Neufchateau

,France

,October 3 1 , 1 9 1 7 .

The division went into line in the Chemin desDames sector February 6th ; was relieved from thatsector March 1 8th

,and moved to the La Reine

Sector northwest of Toul,entering the Sector March

3 1 st . The division left this sector June 28th,and

moved by rail to area east of Meaux .

From July 5th to 1 8th the division marched tosupport position behind line Torcy-Belleau-BoisVaux

,northwest of Chateau-Thierry, and took over

the Pas Fini sector .From July 1 8th to 25th it attacked, as a unit of the

I Corps in the Chateau-Thierry offens ive (zud Battleof the Marne) , penetrating to a depth Of seventeenkilometers . Was relieved July 25th and marchedto an area in vicinity of La Ferte . It then movedby rail on August 1 st-3rd to Chatillon training area.

On August 25th the division moved to area northof Bar-le-Duc and from there by marching to theTroyon sector where it entered the l ine . On September 1 2th the division attacked in the St . Mihielsalient

,penetrating as far as Vigneulles . From

September 1 3 th to October 7th it consolidated andoccupied the Troyon sector.On October 8th the division moved to vicinity

of Verdun as army reserve .The d ivision was engaged in operations north of

Verdun from October 1 8th to November 1 1 th.

’


The division was rel ieved and proceeded to theeighth training area where headquarters was established at Montigny-le-Roi, November 23 rd .

The following National Guard units were absorbedin forming the division :M aine: 2nd Infantry, 1 st Regiment Heavy F . A. ;

1 -1 3 Company, C .D .C .

New Hampshire: I st Infantry, M . G . Troop Cavalry ; Battery A. , F . A. ; Company South Carolina ; Field Hosp ital Company No . 1

, 1 to 4th companics C .A .C .

Vermont: I st Infantry.

M assachusetts : 2nd, 5th, 6th, 8th, 9th Infantry ;

Headquarters 2nd Brigade ; Squadron Cavalry ; 1 stand 2nd Regiments F . A. ; 1 st Regiment Engineers ;Ambulance companies 1 and 2 ; I st Field SignalBattalion ; 1 to 1 2th Companies C .A .C .

Rhode I sland: I st Sep . Squadron Cavalry ; I st

Battalion Field Artillery ; Ambulance CompanyNo . 1 .

Connecticut: I st and 2nd Infantry ; I st SquadronCavalry ; Batteries E and F . Field Artillery ; Ambulance Company No . 1 ; Field Hospital No . 1 .

Division commandersBrig. Gen . Peter E . Traub, October 3 1 tO

‘

No

vember 1 1,1 9 1 7 ; Maj . Gen . Clarence R . Edwards,

November 1 1, 1 9 1 7, to October 24, 1 9 1 8 ; Brig . Gen .

Frank E . Bamford,October 24, 1 9 1 8, and in commandNovember 1 1 th .

The following units composed the division5 I st and 52nd Infantrybrigades 1 0 1 st

,1 0 2nd

, 1 0 3 rd,


l o4th regiments Infantry ; ro2nd, 1 0 3 rd Machine Gunbattalions ; s1 st Artillery Brigade ; I oI st , 1 0 2nd, 1 0 3 rdArtillery regiments ; I oI st Trench Mortar Battery ;I o I st Division Machine Gun Battalion ; I oI st Eugineers Regiment and Train ; I o I st Field SignalBattalion ; I oI st Train Headquarters and MilitaryPolice ; 1 0 1 st Supply Train ; I O I st Ammunition Train ;I oI st Sanitary Train ; Io I st, 1 0 2nd, l o3rd, and 1 04th

Ambulance companies and Field hospitals .To include May I 5 , 1 9 1 9, the following losses hadbeen reported from this d ivision :Battle deaths, wounded, prisoners

of war, 45 1 .

To inc lude March 1,

1 9 1 9, two hundred andtwenty-n ine individuals of this division had beenawarded the Distinguished Service Cross .This division captured from the enemy the following : 6 1 offi cers, men

,1 6 pieces of artillery,

1 32 machine guns, and numerous supplies .The division made a total advance against resistance of thirty-seven kilometers .

1 replacements were furnished thi s division

27th D IVIS ION

The division was organized in compliance withWar Department instructions at Camp Wadsworth,South Carolina

,in September

,1 9 1 7 . The New

York National Guard as its nucleus, the followingunits being used :

I st, zud, 3rd, 7th, 1 2th, 14th, 23rd, 71 st, and 74thNew York Infantry.



prisoners, and advanced eleven kilometers against resistance . During active operations it suffered thefollowing losses : killed

,wounded

,

prisoners, 3 offi cers and 225 men .

One hundred and thirty-nine D istinguished ServiceCrosses have been awarded members of the division .

The following organizations composed the divisionl o5th,

~I o6th,l o7th, 1 0 8th regiments Infantry.

1 04th, l o5th, l o6th Machine Gun battalions .l o4th, l o5th, 1 0 6th Field Artillery regiments .1 0 2nd Trench Mortar Battery.

1 0 2nd Engineers .1 0 2nd Field Signal Battalion .

1 0 2nd Headquarters Train and Military Police .1 0 2nd Ammunition Train .

1 0 2nd Supply Train .

1 0 2nd Sanitary Train,consisting of - 1 0 5th, 1 06th,

1 0 7th, 1 0 8th Ambulance companies and 1 0 5th, l o6th,

l o7th, 1 0 8th Field hospitals .1 0 2nd Engineer Train .

28th D IVI S ION

In compliance with War Department Orders the28th Division was organized from units of the Pennsylvania National Guard at Camp Hancock

, Ga .,

August 5 , 1 9 1 7. The majority of the offi cers andenlisted men were from the State of Pennsylvania .

On November 1 sth the division was reorganized toconform to the new Tables of Organization . Thedivision is known as the Keystone D ivision

, and

has for its shoulder insignia a red keystone .


The d ivision commenced leaving the States April2 1

,1 9 1 8, moving through Camp Upton . It landed

at Calais May 1 8th, and trained with the British inthe vicinity of Neilles les Blequin for about twoweeks . It then moved to Connesse where it trainedwith the French for another two weeks’period

,and

then moved to a sector near the Marne .On July 1

,1 9 1 8, two platoons of the 1 1 1 th Infan

try took part in an attack on Hill 204 . On July 1 6thpait of the infantry entered the l ine on the MarneRiver and the entire d ivision was in sector on theOurcq R iver by July 27, 1 9 1 8 .

The division was relieved on the night of July 3oth3 I St, and from then to August 6th was in rest in thevicinity of Jaulgonne on the Marne . On the nightof August 6th-7th it again entered the line on theVesle River, the sector extending from about Courlandon the east to Fismes on the west . Here it remainedactively engaged until September 8th

,when it was

relieved by a French division .

Upon rel ief of the division,it moved to a position

south of the Argonne Forest, and on September 2othtook part of the sector extending from Boureuil

les on the east toCote 285 on the west . It was oneof the attacking divisions in the offensive of September 26th, pushing as far as Chatel Chehery, where itwas relieved on October 9th. It then moved by busto an area northeast of Commercy.

On October 1 6th it took over a sector near Thiacourt extending from northeast of Jaulny on the eastto the southern end of Etang de Lachaussee on the


west . It held th is sector until the signing of thearmistice and then went to the divisional trainingarea .

To include May 1 5 , 1 9 1 9, the d ivision’s casualties

were battle deaths and wounded .

Seven hundred and twenty-Six individuals of thisdivision were taken prisoners by the enemy.

Fifty-eight D istinguished Service Crosses had beenawarded to individuals of this division to includeMarch 1 , 1 9 1 9 .

The commanding generals of the divisIOn wereas follows : Maj . Gen . C . M . Clement to December1 1

,1 9 1 7 ; Maj . Gen . Chas . H . Nuir

,December 1 5 ,

1 9 1 7, to October 24, 1 9 1 8 ; Maj . Gen . Wm . H . Hay,

October 24 to November 1 1 , 1 9 1 8 .

The units composing the division were as follows55th and s6th Infantry brigades .ro9th, 1 1 0 th, 1 r1 th, 1 1 2th Infantry regiments .1 0 8th and l o9th Machine Gun battalions .53rd Artillery Brigade .

1 0 7th, ro8th, and 1 0 9th Artillery regiments .l o3rd Trench Mortar Battery.

1 0 7th D ivisional Machine Gun Battalion .

l o3rd Engineer Regiment and Train .

l o3rd Field S ignal Battalion .

l o3rd Train Headquarters and Military Police .l o3rd Supply Train .

l o3rd Ammunition Train .

1 0 3 rd Sanitary Tram .

1 09th, 1 1 0 th,1 r1 th, I I Zth Ambulance companies

and Field hospitals .



Camp Meucon . The other units of the division thathad landed in England joined the division later inAlsace .The middle of July found the division en route toBelfort and from the 1 7th to 25th of July the divisionwas stationed in b illeting areas near Belfort and undercommand of the XL Corps of the French TenthArmy.

On July 25th infantry units began their movementinto line with the French units occupying the centresector

,Haute Alsace . The French units were grad

ually withdrawn and on August l oth at noon the sector was occupied solely by units of the 29th D ivision,and at that time the command passed from theFrench division commander to the commandinggeneral

,29th Division . From this date until Sep

tember 23 rd the division remained in this sector, being engaged in the usual stationary warfare commonto all quiet sectors .On September 23 rd the ~division, having been withdrawn from sector to the vicinity of Belfort

,was

ordered to the Robert Espagne training area . However

,the Meuse-Argonne offensive having been

planned to begin on the 26th of September, the division after leaving Belfort was placed in First Army(American) Reserve . It remained in First ArmyReserve with P . CS . (Posts of Command) successively at Conde, St . Andre, and Blercourt from September 24th to October 1 st when it was relieved fromthe First Army and placed in reserve of the Frenchu

XVII Corps with P . C . at Citadel , Verdun .


58th Brigade ( 1 1 5 th Infantry, 1 1 6th Infantry,1 1 2th Machine Gun Battal ion) went into action,attached to the French 1 8th D ivision

,the remainder

of the division less l o4th Engineers remaining inFrench XVII Corps Reserve .

Preliminary movements of 2oth Division

In trenches Haute Alsace,July 25th to September

23rd.

September 24th to October I st, First Army Reserve .P. C’s Conde, St . Andre, Blercourt .October 2nd to 7th reserve of the French XVI ICorps P . C . Verdun .

58th Brigade ( 1 1 5th, 1 1 6th Infantry and 1 1 2th

Machine Gun Battal ion) went into action the night ofOctober 7th—8th .

On the afternoon ofOctober 7th the Division P . C .

was moved from the Citadel of Verdun to Vacherauville .On the morning of October 81h

,at 5 o

’clock,the

58th Brigade, consisting of the 1 1 5th, 1 1 6th,and

1 1 2th Machine Gun Battalion,after a night march of

about fourteen kilometers,attacked without artillery

preparation . This attackwas supported by the 1 58thArtillery Brigade, which, on October 2nd, had been re

leased from the V Corps and attached to the 29th

Division .

The action was planned to be a surprise and thatit was such is proven by the fact that the Germanartillery did not react formOre than halfan hour . The


brigade attacked under the orders of the French 1 8thD ivis ion

,wh ich had previously held the sector.

The assaulting battalions of the 58th Brigade wereplaced in a jump-Off position along the canal betweenSamogneux and Brabant in what had formerly beenNo Man’s Land .

”

On the night of October 7th—8th a company of

French infantry was placed in Brabant to cover theformation for the assault and to act as left flankguard . This company did not advance with thebrigade on the following day .

The direction of the attack was due north ; and asthe Meuse from Brabant to S ivry runs northwest

,

the advance of the 58th Brigade opened an increas

ingly wide space between its left flank and the river.During the attack of the 8th this space was fil led

,

and the left flank of the 58th Brigade covered by aregiment of the 3 3rd D ivision . This regiment crossedfrom the west bank of the Meuse

,as the bridges

were made available by the advance of the 58thBrigade .

Until the Consenvoye Woods were reached,late on

the 8th,the ground was open and the troops advanced

without disorganization and in good liaison .

A large number of prisoners was taken on that day,many being in the dugouts where they had beendriven for shelter by the unexpected heavy artilleryfire of the rolling barrage, which was closely followedby the infantry.

The line attained on October 8th ran along the westof the Bois de Consenvoye , from 23 8

-80 4 to



Division were assigned as objectives the Bois d’Ormont and the Bois de Moirey.

The 1 1 3 th Infantry completely obtained its ob

j ect lves ln less than Six hours,capturing 72 prisoners

and 3 guns .The French attack gained only fifty meters on thewest edge of the Bois d’Ormont

,which lay on

"

theflank and in part behind the 1 l 3 th Infantry, so thatit became necessary to put in two companies of thereserve battalion of the l 1 3 th Infantry facing southtoward the Bois d’Ormont .

The position of this regiment changed only Slightlyuntil the attack on the R idge d’EtrayeS, to be mentioned later .The 58th Brigade, in conjunction with the troops

of the 3 3rd D ivision on its left,advanced on the Bois

Plat Chene and the Bois de Consenvoye, encountering very stiff resistance .

The result of this attack was to secure RicheneHill with its observing station ; the l ine at the end ofthe day being Ravin Plat Chene—a point 40 0 metersnorth of the Richene observatory—south edge of

Molleville Farm clearing ; east along the Ravin deMolleville to the eastern tip of the Bois de la Reine,thence bending back along the south edge of the samewoods .At 5 o

’clock on the morning of October 1 1 th thecommand of the 58th Brigade, with its front betweenparallels 24 and 26

,passed from the 1 8th Division

(French) to the 29th D ivision . The 1 1 3 th Infantrystill remained under the command of the French ;


At 6 o’clock, October 1 1 th, an attack was made bythe 58th Brigade due north, encountering an intensemachine gun and artillery fire .

The open ground of the Molleville Farm Ravine layin front of the l 1 6th Infantry on the right of the s8thBrigade, with smooth slopes fully exposed to viewfrom the woods on the north edge of the clearing .

The eastern side of the ravine was also held by theenemy .

The 1 1 6th Infantry advanced across this openground nearly to the farther side but received severemachine gun fire from the edge of the woods on bothfront and flank and could not gain the woods to thenorth .

A counter attack delivered at the junction of the1 1 5th and 1 1 6th regiments

,in the woods on the west

side of the clearing, threatened for a time to causesome loss of ground

,but was repulsed .

The line of the 1 1 6th Infantry was drawn backafter dark to the edge of the woods on the south sideof the clearing, the I I 5th Infantry advancing as muchas possible

,its right flank being held in place by the

check of the 1 1 6th Infantry .

Careful preparation was made before the renewalof the attack on October 1 5th on the hostile pos itionnorth ofMolleville Farm .

In the meanwhile, the 1 8th Division (French) continued to be held up . Its original objective forOctober 8th had never been reached .

On the 1 2th of October it was reenforced by the1 1 4th Infantry, heretofore in corps reserve .


This put all four regiments of the 29th Division inthe line ; one with two battalions ; one with ten com

panies ; a total ofmore than one halfof the division inthe front line ; the two regiments of the 58th Brigadeoperating with one battalion each in the front line .

The front assigned the troops On October 1 2th

was seven kilometers,which gave less than one rifle per

meterOn October 1 2th the 1 8th Division employed the

fresh 1 1 4th Infantry from a jump-off position in theRavin de Coassinvaux . The French 66th Infantry

,

holding the western edge of the Bois d’Ormont andthus lying between the 1 1 3th and 1 1 4th Infantry, wasordered to attack simultaneously with the 1 1 4th

Infantry,the objective of both regiments b eing the

Bois d’Ormont .

The French 66th Infantry made no headway. TheFrench 77th Infantry, on the right of the 1 14th Infantry, also failed to advance .The 1 1 4th Infantry gained and held the south edge

of the woods, but were checked by the failure of theattack on their left and right .The French 1 8th D ivision then threw ' in two companics of the 1 1 3th Infantry, heretofore in reserve,from a point north of and facing the Bois d’Ormont .

The two companies attacked at 1 5 o’clock on the

afternoon ofOctober 1 2th and passed entirely throughthe western half of the woods from north to south .

On October 1 5th the French 1 8th D ivision wasrelieved by the American 26th Division, having beenin action about one week.



right, facing Etrayes Ridge, along the south side ofthe Ravin de Molleville .The Etrayes R idge, extending due east from theMolleville Farm clearing, was densely wooded andheld by the Germans within forty yards of our troopsin the western ridge .

A counter attack launched from it would havebeen a serious threat, striking at the flank and rearof the 58th Brigade .

Defence against such an attack was difficult be?cause the deep open ravine of Molleville Farm layimmediately behind the front line .

The brigades joined at this point .M ovement was So difficult in the thin strip ofwoodsheld that the liaison was more one of information thanof actual strength for combat .The ridge afforded excellent hostile observation .

Ormont Woods had not been taken and it had become apparent that it would not be so long as BelleauWood

,looking down on it, was held by the enemy.

The capture of Etrayes R idge was a necessary preliminary to an attack on Belleau Wood .

Etrayes R idge was captured on October 23rd.

One battalion Of the l o2nd Infantry,26th Division

,

participated with our troops,attacking down the

Molleville Farm Ravine across the face of the 1 1 3thInfantry, with Belleau Wood as its objective .In conference with the 26th Division it was decided

to draw the troops back in the Molleville Farm clearing to allow artillery preparation on the most advanced German machine gun positions .


Up to this time, every day since October 7th hadbeen rainy or foggy .

The safety of the assaulting battalions in the jumpoff position was dependent on secrecy, but for the firsttime in more than two weeks the sky was cloudlessand a full moon made the night almost bright as day.

It happened, however, that fog filled the lowground around the farm, concealing the troops .The attack was preceded by 45 minutes artillerypreparation in which all auxiliaries took part .The three machine gun battalions had been care

fully located , two of them being so placed as to gainan oblique fire on the enemy, one of them almost aflanking

,

fire .

Approximately rounds were fired on theenemy by the machine gun during the day, and manyprisoners stated that this fire was terrific .The advance of the infantry continued until latein the afternoon, when the ridge of Etrayes was completely captured, the success of the 1 1 3 th Infantryin this attack securing our line against the dangerwhich had constantly menaced it from the enemypositions on the ridge .

The line held by the division now lay across thenorth Slope ofHill 375 in the Bois de la Grande M on

tagne, Was drawn in and around the head of the

Ravine d’Etrayes, and continued east along the northand east slopes of Etrayes R idge, joining the 26th

Division near the south edge ofHouppy Bois .The front of the division was now four kilometers,or rifles per meter .

196 OUR 1 10 DAYS’ FIGHTING

The main part of our remaining stay in the frontline was occupied by consolidation of lines gained andgradual relief by the 79th D ivision command passingon October 30 th .

The net result of our Operations was an advanceof seven kilometers

,breaking through all organized

lines of resistance of the enemy, the capture of aboutprisoners, about twelve guns ranging from 7

to 2 1 0 mm .,250 l ight and heavy machine guns, and a

large amount of other military property .

We were in line about three weeks .Our losses were necessarily considerable .

3oth D IVISION

In compliance with War Department instructionsthe 3oth D ivision was organized at Camp Sevier,South Carolina, in October, 1 9 1 7 . This division wasformerly the old 9th National Guard Division ( 1 st,2nd, and 3rd Tennessee Infantry ; 1 st Tennessee FieldArtillery

,Troop D

,Tennessee Cavalry ; 1 st Tennessee

Field Hospital ; 1 st, 2nd, and 3rd North Carolina Infantry ; I st North Carolina Field Artillery ; , 1 st squadron North Carolina Cavalry ; 1 st North CarolinaEngineers ; Company A,

North Carolina Signal Corps ;North Carolina Supply Train ; I st North CarolinaField Hospital ; 1 st North Carolina Ambulance Company ; I st and 2nd South Carolina Infantry ; CompanyA

,South Carolina Signal Corps ; I st South Carolina

Field Hospital ; Troop A, South Carolina Cavalry) .In addition to the above the division was augmentedby draft men from North and South Carolina, Ten



drawn to the Heilly training area immediately afterthe battle, where it was located at the signing of thearmistice . On November 24th the division wasordered to the LeMans area preparatory to returningto the United States .The d ivisional artillery was not present for operations with the division

,but was in active operations

in the Toul sector, St . Mihiel offensive, MeuseArgonne offensive, and the Woevre sector.The commanding generals of the division were :

Maj . Gen . John F . Morrison, from organization toNovember 20

,1 9 1 7 ;Maj . Gen . C . P. Townsley

,No

y omber 20 , 1 9 1 7, to December 1 7, 1 9 1 7 ; Maj . Gen .

George W. Read, April 27, 1 9 1 8, to August 1 0 , 1 9 1 8 ,Maj . Gen . Edward M . Lewis, August 1 0 , 1 9 1 8, toNovember 1 1

,1 9 1 8 .

The division insignia is a monogram in blue of theletters “

0” and “H ” standing for “Old Hickory

,

”

the nickname of Andrew Jackson . The cross bar ofthe “H ” contains the triple “XXX,

” the Romannumerals for thirty . The whole is on a maroon background .

This divISIOn captured from the enemy the following : prisoners, 8 1 p ieces of artillery, and 426machine guns . It made a total advance of twentynine and a half kilometers against resistance .

During active operations the divis ion suffered thefollowing losses as reported to the War Departmentto include May 1 0

,1 9 1 9 : killed in action,

wounded,

number taken prisoner, 6 officersand 7 1 men .


One hundred and seventy-seven D istinguishedService Crosses were awarded to individuals of thisdivision up to March 8, 1 9 1 9 .

The units composing the division were as follows

59th, 60 th Infantry brigades .1 1 7th, 1 1 8th, 1 1 9th, 1 20 th Infantry regiments .1 14th, 1 1 s th Machine Gun battalions .

55th Artillery Brigade .

1 l 3th, r1 4th, l 1 5th, Artillery regiments .1 0 5th Trench Mortar Battery.

l 1 3th D ivision Machine Gun Battalion .


1 0 5th Field S ignal Battalion .

1 0 5th Train Headquarters and Military Police .l o5th Supply Train .

l o5th Ammunition Train .

l o5th Sanitary Train .

1 1 7th, 1 1 8th, r1 9th, r2oth Ambulance companiesand Field hosp itals .

3 I st D IVI SION

In compliance with War Department instructionsthe 3 1 st D ivision (National Guard) was organizedat Camp Wheeler

,Georgia

,on October 1

,1 9 1 7 .

The nucleus of this d ivision was composed of National Guard troops from Georgia

,Alabama

,and

Florida ( I st and 2md regiments, Alabama Infantry ;I st Regiment Alabama Cavalry ; Company A,

Alabama Field S ignal Battal ion ; Field Hosp ital Company NO . 1 ; I st, zud, and 5th Georgia Infantry ; I stSquadron Georgia Cavalry ; I st Battalion Georgia


Field Artillery : Company A, Georgia Engineers ;Georgia Field Hospital NO . The dIV ISIOn wasbrought up to full strength by National Army draftsfrom Illinois and Michigan . The 3 l st D ivision re

mained in training at CampWheeler until September,

1 9 1 8 .

The first units sailed for overseas on September 1 6,

1 9 1 8, and the last units arrived in France on November 9 , 1 9 1 8 . Upon arrival in France the divisionwas designated as a replacement d ivision and orderedto the Le Mans area . The personnel of most of theunits were withdrawn from the division and Sent toother d ivisions as replacements

,causing the 3 1 st to

exist only as a skeletonized division .

The commanding generals of the division wereMaj . Gen . Francis J . Kernan, August 25 , 1 9 1 7, toSeptember 1 8

,1 9 1 7 ; Brig . Gen . John L . Hayden

,

September 1 8,1 9 1 7, to March 1 5, 1 9 1 8 ; Maj . Gen .

Francis H . French,March 1 5 , 1 9 1 8, to May 1 5, 1 9 1 8 ;

Maj . Gen . LeRoy S . Lyon,May 1 5 , 1 9 1 8 , to Novem

ber 1 1,1 9 1 8 . The division insignia is the letters

DD ” back to back,embroidered in red, placed on a

khaki c ircle .The units composing the division were6 l st, 62nd Infantry brigades .56th Field Artillery Brigade .

1 2 1 st,1 22nd, 1 23rd, 1 24th Infantry regiments .

1 1 6th,1 1 7th, 1 1 8th Machine Gun battalions .

1 1 6th, 1 1 7th, 1 1 8th Field Artillery regiments .l o6th Trench Mortar Battery.

l o6th EngIneer Regiment and Train .



sion was changed to a combat division and movedinto Alsace where it took over a front-line sectornear Belfort . The division held this sector untilJuly zrst when it was relieved by the French and

ordered to the Ourcq where it relieved the 3 rd D ivisionin the Aisne-Marne Offensive on July 3oth . In thisoffensive the 3 2nd D ivision broke the German line ofresistance on the Ourcq and drove the enemy back tothe heights north of the Vesle makinga total advanceof nineteen kilometers . On August 28th it enteredthe front line northeast of Soissons as a part

'

of theFrench Tenth Army and contributed to an importantextent to the success of the French in outflanking theGerman line on the Chemin des Dames . In thisdrive the 3 2nd Division captured the strong Germanposition on the Juvigny plateau, advancing to a depthof five and one half kilometers . On September 2ndthe division was relieved by the zud Moroccan Division and sent back to Joinville for a rest period . OnSeptember 20 th the division left the Joinville rest areaand moved by bus to the Meuse-Argonne front . OnSeptember 3oth the d ivision entered the front linebefore the Kriemhilde Stellung near Romagne-sousMontfaucon . In a series of attacks during the nextthree weeks the division penetrated the enemy positionto a depth of eight and one half kilometers . OnOctober 20 th the division was relieved and placed . inthe III Army Corps Reserve until November 6thwhenit again entered the line at the Dun-sur Meuse bridgehead and on November l oth attacked east of theMeuse

,and was in‘line when the armistice was Signed .


The division became part of theThirdArmyupon itsorganization and on November 1 7th began its marchfrom Vi losnes-sur-Meuse to the Rhine, and on December 1 3 th, after marching 30 0 kilometers, crossed theRhine and occupied a sector in the Coblenz Bridgehead with the I st Division on the right and the zudDivision on the left .The commanding generals of the division were :Maj . Gen . Jas . Parker, August 26, 1 9 1 7, to September1 9 , 1 9 1 7 ; Brig . Gen . W. G . Haan (afterward MajorGeneral) September 1 9, 1 9 1 7, to November 20 , 1 9 1 8 ;Maj . Gen . William Lassister

,November 20 th .

The insignia of this division is a flying red arrowwith a red cross bar in the middle .

This division captured from the enemy the following : prisoners, 2 1 p ieces of artillery, and 1 90mach ine guns . It made a total advance of thirtysix kilometers against resistance .

During active operations this division suffered thefollowing losses as reported to the War Departmentto include May 1 0

,1 9 1 9 : killed wounded,

number taken prisoner, 1 officer and 1 55 men .

One hundred and th irty-four Distinguished Service Crosses were awarded to individuals of th is division up to March 8

,1 9 1 9 .

The 3 2nd D ivision was composed of the followingorganizations63rd and 64th Infantry brigades .1 25th, 1 26th, 1 27th, 1 28th Infantry regiments .1 1 9th, l 2oth, 1 2 1 st Machine Gun battalions .s7th Field Artillery Brigade .


1 1 9th, 1 20 th, 1 2 1 st Field Artillery regiments.l o7th Trench Mortar batteries .1 0 7th Engineer Regiment and Train .

1 0 7th Field S ignal battalion .

l o7th Headquarters Train and Military Police .l o7th Ammunition Train .

1 0 7th Supply Train .

ro7th Sanitary Train consisting of 1 25th, 1 26th,

1 27th, and 1 28th Ambulance compan ies and 1 25th,1 26th

,1 27th, and 1 28th Field hospitals .

3 3rd DIVISION

In compliance with War Department instruction,

the 33rd D ivision, popularly known as the PrairieDivision

,was organized at Camp Logan

,Houston

,

Texas,about the middle of August

,1 9 1 7 . The

nucleus of the divisionwas the Illinois National Guard( I st and 2nd Infantry Brigade Headquarters ; 1 st,2nd

, 3rd, 4th, 5th, 6th, and 7th Infantry regiments ;zud and 3rd regiments Field Artillery ; Company A,

S ignal Corps ; 1 st Engineers ; 1 st, 2nd, 3 rd, 4th Fieldhosp itals and Ambulance companies) . The firstorganization left Camp Logan April 23 , 1 9 1 8, for

Camp Merritt . The rest of the d ivision followedshortly afterward and sailed from Hoboken for

France,disembarking at Brest . The last units ar

rived in France June 1 1 , 1 9 1 8 .

Upon arrival in France the division was first sentto the Huppy area, near Abbeville, and on June 9thproceeded to the Eu training area . _On June 2oth

and 2 1 st the d ivision moved into the Amiens sector,



The shoulder insignia of this division is a yellowcrossOn a round black patch .

This division captured from the enemythe following65 offi cers, men, 1 0 0 pieces of artillery, 4 14 machine guns,

‘

20 trench mortars, and other material . Itmade a total advance against resistance of thirty-sixki lometers .During active operation the division suffered the

following losses : killed, I 53 officers and 70 1 men ;wounded

,1 53 ofli cers and men ; missing, 148

men ; prisoners ofwar, 1 officer and 1 7 men .

The following is a list of the decorations conferredon individuals of this divisionCongressional Medals -of Honour

,8 .

D istingu ished Service Crosses,1 1 0 .

British D istinguished Service Orders,1 .

British Military Crosses, 5 .

British Distinguished Conduct Medal, 5 .

British M ilitary Medal, 4 1 .

French Croix de Guerre, 47 .

Belgian Order of Leopold, I .

The following organizations composed this division65th and 66th Infantry brigades .1 29th, 1 30 th, l 3 1 st, and 1 3 2nd Infantry regiments .1 23 rd and 1 24th Machine Gun battalions .58th Artillery Brigade .

1 22nd, 1 23rd, and 1 24th Artillery regiments .1 0 8th Trench Mortar Battery.

1 22nd Divisional Machine Gun Battalion .




l o8th Train Headquarters and Military Police .


1 0 8th Ammunition Train .

1 0 8th Sanitary Train .

1 29th, r3oth, r3 1 st, and 1 3 2nd Ambulance com

panics, and Field hospitals .

34th DIVISION


the 34th D ivision (National Guard) was organized atCamp Cody

,New Mexico, on October 2 , 1 9 1 7, under

General Orders,No . 1 8

,Headquarters

, 34th Division .

The division was made up of National Guard troopsfrom M innesota, Iowa, Nebraska, North Dakota, andSouth Dakota . (Headquarters 1 st Minnesota Brigade ; I st, 2nd,and 3rdM innesota Infantry ;MinnesotaField Hospital and Ambulance companies No . 1 ;

Headquarters I st Iowa Brigade ; I st and zud IowaInfantry ; 1 st Squadron Iowa Cavalry ; I st Iowa FieldArtillery ; I st Battalion Iowa Engineers ; CompanyC, Iowa S ignal Corps ; Iowa Ammunition Train ;Iowa Field hospitals and Ambulance companiesNos. 1 and 2 ; 4th, 5th, and 6th Nebraska Infantry ;Company B

,Nebraska S ignal Corps ; I st Regiment

North Dakota Infantry,and North Dakota Field

Hospital Company No . 1 ; I st Regiment SouthDakota Cavalry.) The 34th Division remainedin training at Camp Cody, New Mexico, until September, 1 9 1 8 . The first units Sailed for overseas onSeptember 1 6

,1 9 1 8 , via England, and the last units

arrived in France on October 24, 1 9 1 8 . Upon ar


rival in France the division was ordered to the LeMans area where it was broken up and ceased to

function as a division . In the early part of December the division began its return to the UnitedStates by individual units .The commandinggeneralsof this divisionwere : Maj .Gen . A . P. Blocksom, September to May 7,1 9 1 8 ;Maj .Gen .WilliamR. Smith, September 28to October Maj . Gen . Beaumont B . Buck

,

October 1 7, 1 9 1 8, to November 7, 1 9 1 8 ; Brig .Gen .JohnA . Johnson,November 7, 1 9 1 8, to November 1 1 , 1 9 1 8 .

The division insignia is a black oval’encircling a redbovine Skull . This division was composed of thefollowing organizations :67th, 68th Infantry brigades .69th Field Artillery Brigade .

1 33 rd, 1 34th, 1 3 sth, and 1 36th Infantry regiments .1 25th, 1 26th, 1 27th Field Artillery regiments .1 0 9th Trench Mortar Battery.

l o9th Field S ignal Battalion .

1 09th Headquarters Train and Military Police .



l o9th Sanitary Train (1 33rd, 1 34th, 1 35th, and1 36th Ambulance companies and Field hospitals) .1 0 9th Field Train .

l o9th Engineer Regiment and Train .

3 sth D IVISION

The division was organized under War Depament orders at Camp Doniphan

,Ft . S ill

,



rival in France the division was ordered to the LeMans area where it was broken up and ceased tofunction as a division . In the early part of December the division began its return to the Un itedStates by individual units .The commandinggeneralsof thisdivisionwere : Maj .Gen . A . P. Blocksom,

September 1 8,1 9 1 7, to May 7,

1 9 1 8 ;Maj .Gen .William R . Smith,September 28

,1 9 1 8,

to October 1 0,1 9 1 8 ; Maj . Gen . Beaumont B . Buck

,

October 1 7, 1 9 1 8, to November 7, 1 9 1 8 ; Brig .Gen .JohnA. Johnson

,November 7, 1 9 1 8, to November 1 1 , 1 9 1 8 .

The division insignia is a black oval’encircling a redbovine skull . This division was composed of thefollowing organizations :67th, 68th Infantry brigades .69th Field Artillery Brigade .

1 33 rd, 1 34th, 1 35th, and 1 36th Infantry regiments .1 25th, 1 26th, 1 27th Field Artillery regiments .l o9th Trench Mortar Battery.

l o9th Field Signal Battalion .

l o9th Headquarters Train and Military Police .


l o9th Supply Train .

1 0 9th Sanitary Train (1 33rd, 1 34th, 1 35th, and1 36th Ambulance companies and Field hosp itals) .

1 0 9th Field Train .

I ogth Engineer Regiment and Train .

3 5th D IVISION

The division was organized under War Department orders at Camp Doniphan, Ft . Sill, Oklahoma,


September 1 3 , 1 9 1 7, from the National Guard unitsof Missouri and Kansas .On April 1 1 th it began leaving camp for CampMills

,NewYork

,and sailed forFrance,April 25, 1 9 1 8,

via Liverpool and Winchester, England, arriving inFrance May 1 1 th . It trained with the British firstin the area of Eu until June 1 1 th, then to June 30 thin the Arches area .

From the training sector it went into the trenches inthe Vosges in the De Galbert and Gerardmer sectors .On September 1 l th it was sent to the St . Mihielsector where it acted as Army Reserve dur1ng theoperations .On September Z I St the division relieved a Frenchdivision in the Grange le Compte sector. It nextwent into the Meuse-Argonne offensive September26th in the Vanquoise sector until October 1 st , whenit was withdrawn and sent to the Vicinity of Condeen-Barrois where it arrived October 1 2th, and takingover the Sommediene sector . From there it was senton November 9th to the training area near Commercy.

Maj . Gen W. M . Wright commanded the divisionfrom August 25, 1 9 1 7, to June 1 5, 1 9 1 8 . Brig. Gen .

N. F. M cClure commanded for a period after June1 5, 1 9 1 8 . Maj . Gen . Peter M . Traub was next giventhe command which he held until the armistice . TheShoulder insignia is the Santa Fé Cross .The division captured from the enemy the following : 78 1 prisoners, 24 pieces of artillery, 85 machineguns, and other material . It advanced twelve and a


rival in France the division was ordered to the LeMans area where it was broken up and ceased tofunction as a d ivision . In the early part of December the division began its return to the UnitedStates by individual units .The commandinggeneralsof this divisionwere : Maj .Gen . A . P. Blocksom,

September 1 8,1 9 1 7, to May 7,

1 9 1 8 Maj .Gen .William R . Smith, September 28, 1 9 1 8,to October 1 0

,1 9 1 8 ; Maj . Gen . Beaumont B . Buck

,

October 1 7, 1 9 1 8, to November 7, 1 9 1 8 ; Brig .Gen .JohnA . Johnson

,November 7, 1 9 1 8, to November 1 1 , 1 9 1 8 .

The division insignia is a black oval’encircling a redbovine skull . This division was composed of thefollowing organizations :67th, 68th Infantry brigades .69th Field Artillery Brigade .

1 33 rd, 1 34th, 1 35th, and 1 36th Infantry regiments .1 25th, 1 26th, 1 27th Field Artillery regiments .1 09th Trench Mortar Battery .

l o9th Field Signal Battalion .

1 0 9th Headquarters Train and Military Police .

l o9th Ammunition Train .

l o9th Supply Train .

1 09th Sanitary Train (1 33rd, 1 34th, 1 35th, and1 36th Ambulance companies and Field hospitals) .

l o9th Field Train .

l o9th Engineer Regiment and Train .

3 sth D IVISION

The division was organized under War Department orders at Camp Doniphan, Ft . Sill, Oklahoma,



half kilometers in the face of resistance . During active operations the following casualties were sufferedkilled

, 960 wounded, captured, 1 69, totalSeventeen Distinguished Service Crosses were

awarded to members of the division up to March 1,

1 9 1 9 .

The following"

organizations composed this division:69th, 7oth Infantry Brigade .1 37th, 1 38th, 1 39th, l 4oth Infantry regiments .1 29th, l 3oth Machine Gun battalions .6oth Artillery Brigade .1 28th, 1 29th, 1 30 th Artillery regiments .1 1 0 th Trench Mortar Battery .

1 28th Division Machine Gun Battalion .

1 1 0 th Engineer Regiment and Train .

1 1 0 th Field S ignal Battalion .

1 1 0 th Train Headquarters and Military Police .1 1 0 th Supply Train .

1 10th Ammunition Train .

1 1 0 th Sanitary Train .

1 37th, 1 38th, 1 39th, l 4oth Ambulance companiand Field hosp itals .

36th DIVI SION

In compl iance with War Department instructionsthe 36th (National Guard) D ivis ion was organizedat Camp Bowie, Texas, during the period extendingfrom August 25 to October 1 5 , 1 9 1 7 . The officersand men were drawn largely from the states of Texasand Oklahoma .


The d1V ISIOn Insignia IS a light blue Indian arrowhead on a round khaki patch with a khaki T superimposed . The division is sometimes popularly knownas the Lone Star or Panther D ivision .

The period of training at this station continueduntil July 4th, when the division left for Camp Mills,L . I . The division sailed from Hoboken,

N . J.,on

July 1 8,1 9 1 8 , units arriving at Brest, St . Nazaire,

Le Havre,and Bordeaux,France,beginning July 3oth,

thence proceeding to the th irteenth training area invicinity of Bar-sur-Aube . On September 27th thedivision left for the Champagne sector, detrainingat Epernay and Vicin ity.

Commencing October 6th the division took an active part in the operations of the French FourthArmy

,advancing a distance of twenty-one kilometers

to the Aisne R iver where it was relieved on thenight of October 27th

—28th and withdrawn to theTriaucourt rest area .

On November 1 8th the troops departed,by march

ing for the sixteenth training area surrounding Tonnerre, arriving in b illets in the Tonnerre area November 28th .

To include March 1,1 9 1 9, 24 individuals of the

36th D ivision had been awarded the D istinguishedService Cross .The losses of this division were as follows : battledeaths, 59 1 ; wounded, prisoners of war, 25 .

Maj . Gen . E . St . John Greble,United States Army

,

organized and commanded the division for some time .

Maj . Gen . W. R . Smith, United States Army, was in


command of the division during the latter part of thewar to include the date of the armistice, November

The units composing the division were as follows7 1 st and 7zud Infantry brigades .r4 1 st, 142nd, 1 43 rd, and 1 44th Infantry regiments .1 3 2nd and 1 33 rd Machine Gun battalions .6 l st Artillery Brigade .

1 3 1 st, 1 3 2nd, and i 33rd Artillery regiments .1 1 1 th Trench Mortar Battery.

1 l 1 th Ammunition Train .

1 3 1 st (divisional) Machine Gun Battalion .

1 1 1 th Field S ignal Battalion .

1 1 1 th Engineer Regiment and Train .

1 1 1 th Supply Train .

14l st, 142nd, 143 rd, and 144th Ambulance companies and Field hospitals, composing the 1 1 1 th Sanitary Train .

To form this division the following National Guardunits were drawn from the states as indicated below ;Oklahoma : I st Infantry

,Squadron Cavalry ; 1

Battalion Engineers ; First Headquarters CompanyNo . 1 .

Texas : I st and zud Infantry brigades,D ivisional

Headquarters Troop ; 3rd, 4th, I st , 5th, 6th, 7th Iufantry ; I st Cavalry ; I st and 2nd Field Artillery Regiment ; I Battalion Engineers ; Battalion S . C. ; Headquarters Trains and Military Police, and Companiesand Field Hospital companies NOS . 1 and 2 .

This division captured from the enemy 1 8 officers,53 1 men, 9 pieces of artillery, 294 machine guns . It



and ammunition train (less small arms section) thedivision was sent to the Bourmont area for training

,

and on August 4th went into the front lines In theBaccarat sector in the Vosges Mountains where ittrained under the French VI Corps .On September 1 6th it was relieved from this sectorand proceeded by rail to the vicinity of Robért

Espagne . After four days it was moved by bus toRecicourt and as part of the V Corps entered theArgonne drive at Avocourt . Relieved on OctoberI st after having advanced to Cierges

,the division

was sent to Pagny-sur-Meuse from which point it wasSent to hold a portion of the line in the St . Mihielsector with headquarters at Euvesin .

After nine days in this sector the division was withdrawn to Pagny-sur-Meuse and on October 1 8th

began its move by rail to Belgium where with division headquarters at Hooglede in the Lys sector itwas attached to the French XXX Army Corps onOctober 22nd . Advancing to and crossing the Escaut R iver the division was relieved from the frontlines on November 4th and 5th and returned to Thielfor rest . On November 8th the division was transferred to the French XXXIV Corps and again enteredthe lines along the Escaut R iver in a sector withSyngem as its headquarters . Forcing a crossing of

the Scheldt (Escaut) R iver on the night ofNovemberIoth-1 1 th the advance was begun early on the 1 1 th§and pushed forward some five kilometers to the townsof Dickele and Hindelgem where the armistice at1 1 A .M . brought the fighting to an end .


The artillery was sent to Camp de Souge for training and assigned to the First Army in the Argonneoffensive, never serving with its own division . Itserved successively with the American IV Corps

,

American Second Army, French Colonial SecondArmy

,and French XVII Corps . At one time the three

regiments of the brigade served with three differentdivisions, the 28th, 3 3rd, and 92nd, and only joinedthe division just prior to its return to the UnitedStates .Maj . Gen . Charles G . Treat was the first com

mander of the division,being relieved Apri l 24th .

On May 8th Maj . Gen . Chas . S . Farnsworth wasassigned to it and commanded until its return to the”

States .The dIV 1SIOn ”made the following captures fromthe enemy : offi cers

,26 ; enlisted men, artil

lery, 1 9, 77’s ; 4, 1 0 5

’S ; 1 0 , 1 55

’s, 7 trench mortars,

machine guns,26 1

,besides many rifles and a great

deal of ammunition of all calibres .This division made a total advance against resis

tance of thirty and three fourths kilometers .During active operations the division suffered

the following losses (as reported to War Department May 1 0

,battle deaths

, 992 ; wounded,prisoners of war

,23 . One thousand two

hundred and fifty replacements were furnished the3 7th D ivision .

To include March I,1 9 1 9, 25 Distinguished Ser

vice Crosses were awarded individuals of this division .


The following units composed this division73 rd and 74th Infantry brigades .145th, 146th, 147th, and 148th Infantry regiments .1 3 5th and 1 36th Machine Gun battalions .62nd Artillery brigade .

1 34th, 1 3 5th, and 1 36th Artillery regiments .1 1 2th Trench Mortar Battery1 34th Division Machine Gun Battalion .

1 1 2th Engineers Regiment and Train .


1 1 2th Train Headquarters and Military Police .1 1 2th Supply Train .



145th, 1 46th, 147th, 1 48th Ambulance companiesand Field hospitals .

37th DIVI SION


the 3 8th Division (National Guard) was organizedat Camp Shelby

,M ississippi

,August 25 , 1 9 1 7. This

division was made up of National Guard units fromKentucky,

West Virginia, and Indiana . ( 1 st IndianaInfantry Brigade Headquarters, I st, 2nd, 3rd, and

4th Indiana Infantry, 1 st Squadron Indiana Cavalry,I st Battalion Indiana Engineers, 1 st BattalionIndiana Signal Corps

,Indiana Ambulance com

panics Nos . 1,2,and 3 , and Indiana Field Hosp ital

companies Nos . 1 and 2 , 1 st, 2nd, and 3rd regiments .Kentucky Infantry Company B ,

Kentucky SignalCorps

,Kentucky Ambulance Company No 1

,and

'



42nd D IV I SION

In compliance with War Department instructions,the 42nd Division was organized August 5 , 1 9 1 7 . Itwas completely assembled at Camp Mills by September 1 3 th . It is composed of National Guardunits coming from every section of the Un ited States .

The following states were represented as Shown :New York (69th Infantry)Iowa (3 rd Infantry)Wisconsin (Companies E .

, F., and G.

,2nd Infan

try)Indiana (I st Field Artillery)Maryland (3rd and 4th Companies C . A . C .)Kansas ( I st Ammunition Train)Oklahoma (Ambulance Company No . 1 )District of Columbia (Field Hospital Company

No . 1 )Ohio (4th Infantry)Pennsylvania (3rd Battal ion 4th Infantry)Illinois (I st Field Artillery)Minnesota ( I st Field Artillery)California ( 1 st Battalion Engineers)New Jersey (Ambulance Company NO . 1 )M ichigan ( 1 st Ambulance Company)Nebraska (Field Hospital Company No . 1 )Colorado (Field Hospital Company No . 1 )Oregon (Field Hospital Company No . 1 )Alabama (4th Infantry)Georgia (Companies B ,

C, and F, 2nd Infantry)Louisiana ( I st

.

Sep . Troop Cavalry)


South Carolina ( 1 st Battalion Engineers)North Carolina (Eng . Train)Texas (Supply Train)Virginia ( 1 st and 2nd Companies C . A . C .)Tennessee (Ambulance Company No . 1 )Missouri ( I st Battalion S ignal Corps)

The d ivision is known as the Rainbow Division,

the shoulder insignia being a rainbow on a field of

black.

On October 1 8,1 9 1 7, the division embarked for

France . Division headquarters landed at St . Nazaire November 1 st . Debarkation completed December 7th . Debarked at St . Nazaire, Brest, andLiverpool . Troops were assembled in the Vancoulers training area . D ivision marched to LaFauche area beginning December 1 2th, thence toRolampont area where it remained until February

,

1 9 1 8 .

On February 1 6,

1 9 1 8, the division moved toV icinity of Luneville where they trained, serving inthe linewith corresponding French units .The d ivision on March 23 , 1 9 1 8, was withdrawnpreparatory to marching to another area

,but orders

were revoked and it relieved the French 1 28th

Division in the Baccarat sector.It was relieved on June 2 1 st and moved by railto Camp de Chalons

,and while preparing to go into

more extensive training,news of impending German

attack caused the division to be thrown into theline in the sectors of Souain and Experance as re


serve,taking up the second position, also portions

of the intermediate and outposts,under the French

XXI Army Corps .On July 1 5 , 1 9 1 8, the German attack against thiscorps was broken and the division was withdrawn byJuly 1 8th, moved by train and camion, and on July25th it took over the front of the U . S . Army I Corpsin the vicinity of Epieds . During subsequent at

tacks it drove the enemy for a distance of fifteenkilometers .Relieved August 3rd, and moved by rail and march

ing to Bourmont area where it went into intensivetraining

,moving to the St . M ihiel salient August ‘

3oth, where it delivered the attack fromthe south,being the centre division of the IV Corps, and ad

vancing nineteen kilometers during two days’attack

,

September 1 2th and 1 3 th .

On October I st the division was relieved, moving tothe Bois de Montfaucon on October 6th as reserve ofthe V Army Corps . It relieved one of the line divisions north of Fleville—Exermont on October 1 3 thin the Argonne

,and attacking

,advanced two kilo

meters . D ivision was relieved October 3 1 st .

The d ivision again advanced to support the attackof November 1 st, relieving a line division, and ad

vanced nineteen kilometers in two days to the MeuseRiver and the heights south of Sedan .

On November 1 0 th the division withdrew andmoved to the Brandeville region, becoming a p art ofthe Army of Occupation .

On December 1 sth it moved to the Kreis ofAMJ'



The battles engaged in bythe42nd Division entitlingorganIzatIons to S ilver bands on , their regimentalcolour staffs were( I ) Luneville sector, Lorraine, France, February

2 1 to March 23 , 1 9 1 8 .

Organ izations entitled to silver bands1 65th Regimental Infantry.

1 66th Regimental Infantry.

1 67th Regimental Infantry .

1 68th Regimental Infantry.

1 49th Machine Gun Battalion .

l 5oth Machine Gun Battalion .

I 5 1 st Machine Gun Battalion .

1 49th Regimental Field Artillery.

I 5oth Regimental Field Artillery.

1 5 rst Regimental Field Artillery.

1 1 7th Regimental Engineers .1 1 7th Field S ignal Battalion .

(2) Baccarat sector, Lorraine, France, March 2 1 ,

toJune 2 1 , 1 9 1 8 . Organizations entitled to silver bandsSame as in(3) Esperance-Souain sector, Champagne, France,

July 4 to July 1 4, 1 9 1 8 . Organizations entitled tosilver bands—Same as in(4) Champagne-Marne defens ive, France, July 1 5

to July 1 7, 1 9 1 8 . Organizations entitled to silverbands—Same as in(5) Aisne-Marne offensive, France, July 25

August 3 , 1 9 1 8 . Organizations entitled to silver ban—Same as in ( 1 ) with exception of the Field Arregiments .


(6) Aisne-Marne offensive, France, July 25 to August I I

,1 9 1 8 . Organizations entitled to silver bands

1 49th Field Artillery, 1 50 th Field Art illery, and 1 5 1 st

Field Artillery.

(7) St . M ihiel offensive, France, September 1 2 toSeptember 1 6, 1 9 1 8 . Organizations entitled to silverbands—Same as in ( I ) .(8) Essey and Pannas . sector, Woevre, France,

September 1 7 to September 30 , 1 9 1 8 . Organizationsentitled to silver band—Same as in ( I ) .(9) Meuse-Argonne offensive, France, October 1 2

to October 3 1 , 1 9 1 8 . Or anizations entitled to silverbands— Same as in( 1 0 ) Meuse-Argonne offensive, France, October 7 to

November 1,1 9 1 8 . Organizations entitled to Silver

bands : 1 49th, r5oth, and 1 5 I St regiments, FieldArtillery.

( 1 1 ) Meuse-Argonne offensive, France, November5 to November 1 0 , 1 9 1 8 . Organizations entitled tosilver bands— Same as in( 1 2) Meuse-Argonne offensive, France, November

5 to November 9 , 1 9 1 8 . Organizat ions entitled toSilver bands—Same as in

77th D IVI S ION

In compliance with General Orders,No . 1 0 1

,Au

gust 23 , 1 9 1 7, the 77th D ivision was organized August3oth at Camp Upton . The majority of the ofli cerswere from New York City and the enl isted menwere sent from New York City and Long Island,New York .


On October 1 0, 1 9 1 7, many of the men were trans

ferred, the vacancies in the different units causedthereby being filled by men from Camp Devens

,

Massachusetts, and from northern New York ' State .The division was popularly named the

“MetropolitanD ivision” and has for its insignia a gold statue ofLiberty on a truncated triangle of flag blue .The division began leaving Camp Upton onMarch

28, 1 9 1 8, and sailed from Boston and Portland,Maine,

via Halifax and New York City. With the excep

tion of the artillery (units) all units proceededthrough Liverpool

,across England

,and landed at

Calais,France . The artillery sailed from New

York in April and went direct to Brest,France .

The division moved immediately to a trainingarea back of the British front near St . Omer andwhile being trained by the British 39th Division,was held in reserve to meet the anticipated Germanattack against the channel ports which never materialized. The artillery brigade on arrival movedto an American training area at Songes .On June 1 6

,1 9 1 8, the division moved by train to

the Baccarat sector .On July 1 2

,1 9 1 8, the artillery brigade relieved the

French artillery in the Baccarat sector. Duringthe time Spent in this sector the division held abroad frontage .On August 4th the division moved to the Veslesector in the neighbourhood of Fismes

,on August

1 1 th entering the line . With French troops on bothflanks and formlng a part of the French Sixth Army,



To include May 1 5, 1 9 1 9, the following losses hadbeen reported for this division : battle deaths

,

Wounded, prisoners of war, 404.

The commanding generals of the division wereas followsMaj . Gen . J . Franklin Bell, August 1 8, 1 9 1 7, to

May 1 8, 1 9 1 8 ; Maj . Gen . Geo . B . Duncan, May 1 8,

1 9 1 8, to August 24, 1 9 1 8 Brig . Gen . Evan M . Johnson,August 24, 1 9 1 8, to August 3 1 , 1 9 1 8 ; Maj . Gen .

Robert Alexander,August 3 1 , 1 9 1 8, to Novembe r 1 1 ,

1 9 1 8 .

The units comprising the 77th Division were asfollows

1 53rd, 1 54th Infantry brigades .30 5th, 30 6th, 30 7th, 30 8th Infantry regiments .3o5th Machine Gun Battalion .

1 52nd Artillery Brigade .3o4th, 30 5th, 306th Artillery regiments.

3o2nd Trench Mortar Battery.

3o4th D ivisional Machine Gun Battalion .

30 2nd Engineer Regiment and Train .

3o2nd Field S ignal Battalion .

3o2nd Train Headquarters and Military Police .30 2nd Supply Train .

30 2nd Ammunition Train .

30 2nd Sanitary Train .

3o5th, 3o6th, 3o7th, 30 8th Ambulance compaand Field hosp itals .The division captured from the enemy the foling : 1 3 officers, 737 men, 44 pieces of artillery,machine guns, and numerous supplies .


The 77th D ivision made a total advance againstresistance of kilometers .The well-known “ lost battalion was a part of the

30 8th Infantry of this d ivision .

78th D IVI S ION

In compliance with General Order No. 1 0 1,War

Department,August 23 , 1 9 1 7, the 78th D ivision

was organized about August 25th at Camp D ix,New Jersey. The majority of the ofli cers were fromNew York State and were trained at Madison Barracks . The enlisted personnel was drawn fromnorthern New York State,New Jersey, and Delaware .

The shoulder insignia of the division consists of ared semi-circle with lightning flash in white .

About the middle of October,1 9 1 7, the division

began the gradual transfer of more than en

listed men,more or less trained

,to other camps .

On May 8,1 9 1 8, the division began movement

overseas . The artillery brigade landed in Franceand proceeded to Brittany for training . The infantry units landed in England on June 4th and 5 th,and crossed to Calais by boat three or four dayslater. The last units of the division arrived inFrance June 1 1

,1 9 1 8 .

Infantry units began training June 1 7, 1 9 1 8, be

hind the Hazebrouck front in the British area . OnJuly 1 9th the division moved to an area east of

St . Pol and trained there until August 1 9th, when theinfantry units moved to the Bourbonne-les-Bainsarea .


On August 3 1 , 1 9 1 8, the division began moving tothe St . Mihiel front, arriving September l oth . Itremained in I Corps Reserve until September 1 sthand 1 6th, when it relieved the zud and 5th divisions .The artillery brigade had meanwhile come up to thisfront and was supporting the 9oth D1V 1SIOn.

The division occupied the Limey sector untilOctober 4th when it was relieved and rejoined bythe artillery brigade and moved to the Argonne Forest .The d ivision relieved the 77th Division on October1 6th and continued in the line until November sth,advancing twenty-one kilometers .On November 6th the division

,less artillery

brigade and ammunition train, moved back to theArgonne camps west of Varennes

,then to Florent

,

Les Islettes, and to the south of Ste . Menehould .

It entrained for the Semur training area on November 1 5th .

This division captured from the enemy 9 ofli cers,‘

392 men, several p ieces of artillery, numerous ma ;chine guns, and quantities of other military supplies .It made a total advance against resistance of twentyone kilometers, or about thirteen miles .To include March 8

,1 9 1 9, 8 1 3 casualties had been

reported from this division,of which 63 were pris

oners of war. To include March I,1 9 1 9, 95 indi

viduals of the 78th Division had been awarded theDl St lngII l Sl

‘

l ed Service Cross .The commanding generals of the division were as

follows : Maj . Gen . Chase W. Kennedy, August23 , 1 9 1 7, “

to December 27, 1 9 1 7 ; Maj . Gen . Hugh L .



units throughout the United States . This continueduntil June, 1 9 1 8 . Approximately men weretrained in this division and Only about re

tained. The later increments came from New York,

Ohio,Rhode Island, and West Virginia . While in

training this division was popularly designated asthe Liberty Division .

The division commenced its overseas movementJuly 9, 1 9 1 8, the majority embarking at Hoboken,New Jersey

,and debarking at Brest . The 1 54th

Field Artillery Brigade embarked at Philadelphiaand debarked in England, proceeding from there to atraining area in France . The last units arrived inFrance August 3 , 1 9 1 8 . This artillery brigade joineddivis ion after the armistice .

The division left Brest for the twelfth training area,

but were diverted to the tenth training area aroundPrauthoy and Champlite .

Left the training area for the Robert-Espagnearea by rail . Subsequently proceeding by bus on

September 1 6th relieved a division in Sector 304(Montfaucon) .The d ivision under the V Corps made its firstoffensive in the Meuse-Argonne drive, advancing !

through Haucourt and Malancourt . On September27th they passed through Montfaucon and on September 28th through Nantillois . “They were re

lieved in this sector on September 3oth and passeto the command of the French Colonial I I Corps,moving October 8th to the Troyon sector (Frosnesen-Woevre-Doncourt) . Were relieved in this sectoflt

OUR 1 10 DAYS’FIGHTING'

23 1

October 26,1 9 1 8 . Entered the Grand Montagne

Sector (right of Meuse) and participated in thesecond phase of the Meuse-Argonne offens ive

,under

the French XVII Corps, advancing through Bronedu-Cornou iller (Hill 376) on November 6th, andthrough Damvillers and Wavrille on November 9th .

Ville-devant-Chaumont was passed on Novemberr1 th.

The division remained in same location and alsotook over area from Meuse River to Fresnes-enWoevre until November 26th. The division movedto Souilly area south ofVerdun

,December 27th .

To include March 8, 1 9 1 9, the total battle casualties of this division as reported were To include March 1 , 1 9 1 9, 80 Distinguished Service Crosseswere awarded individuals of the 79th D ivision .

Maj . Gen . Joseph E . Kuhm,U . S . A.

, commanded the division from August 25 , 1 9 1 7, toinclude the date of the armistice

,November 1 1

,1 9 1 8 .

The division is known as the Liberty D ivision andhas for its shoulder insignia a gray lorraine cross on ablue shield-shaped field

,the whole outlined in gray.

8oth DIVIS ION

In compliance with War Department orders,the

8oth Division was organized August 27, 1 9 1 7, at CampLee; Virginia . The majority of the ofli cers werefrom New Jersey

,Maryland, and Virginia, and the

enlisted men from western Pennsylvania,Virginia,

and West Virginia.

The division is named the Blue Ridge Division


and has for its shoulder insignia a Shield outlined inwhite on a khaki background with three blue mountains superimposed .

The d ivision began leaving Camp Lee on May 1 7,1 9 1 8, and was

l

embarked at Newport News forFrance . Its principal points of entry were St . Nazaire, Bordeaux, and Brest . The assembly point ofthe division was Calais

,from which place it departed

early in June for the Samur train ing area,with the

British . The artillery was not trained in this areabut rejoined the division September 1 3 th . The lastunits of the division arrived in France June 1 9, 1 9 1 8 .

D ivision left Samur training area on July 4th forBritish Third Army sector

,where it arrived July 5th .

All units trained with the British in the Artois sector ;while in th is sector the troops were attached to theBritish and were on active duty;On August 1 8th the un its of the division left this

area and proceeded by rail to the fourteenth trainingarea,where it remained until August 3 I st . On September I st it moved to the Stainville and later to Tronvillearea as reserve during the St . Mihiel operation . During this time one infantry regiment and one machinegun battalion were serving with the French, takingpart in active operations .Commencing September 1 4th, the division movedinto the Argonne and began its preparation for theoffensive in that region . On September 26th, in conjunction with other American divisions, ir attackedat Bethincourt

,advancing a distance of nine kilo

meters in two days . On September 29th it was te



To include M ay 1 5 , 1 9 1 9, there had been reportedfrom this division the following casualties :battle deaths, wounded, and 1 0 1 prisoners ofwar taken by the enemyTo include March 1

,1 9 1 9, 42 individuals of this

division had been awarded the Distinguished ServiceCross .The follow1ng units composed the division1 59th and l 6oth Infantry brigades .3 1 7th, 3 1 8th, 3 1 9th, 32oth Infantry regiments .3 14th, 3 1 5th Machine Gun battalions .1 55th Artillery Brigade .

3 1 3 th, 3 1 4th, 3 1 5th Artillery regiments .30 5th Trench Mortar Battery .

3 1 3th D ivisional Machine Gun Battalion .

3o5th Engineer Regiment and Train .

30 5th Field S ignal Battalion .

30 5th Train Headquarters and Military Police .3o5th Supply Train.

30 5th Ammunition Train .

30 5th Sanitary Train .

3 1 7th, 3 1 8th, 3 1 9th, 3 20 th Ambulance companiesand Field hospitals .

8 1 st DIVI SION

In compliance with War Department instructionsthe - 8 1 st D ivision was organized at Camp Jackson

,

South Carolina,in September, 1 9 1 7 . This division

was made up of National Army drafts from Northand South Carolina and Tennessee . The d ivisionremained in training at Camp Jackson until July

,


1 9 1 8 . The first units embarked for overseas on July3 0 ,

,

1 9 1 8, and the last units arrived in France, viaEngland

,on August 26

,1 9 1 8 . Upon arrival in

France the division was ordered to the Tonnerre(Yonne) training area where it remained in traininguntil the middle of August . The division then proceeded to the St . D ie sector (Vosges) where it held thel ine as a part of the XXXIII French Corps . On October l gth, the division was relieved and ordered to jointhe First Army for the Meuse-Argonne offensive . Thed ivision arrived in the Sommed ieue sector early inNovember and was attached to the Colonial I I Corps(French) as corps reserve . On November 6th, itrelieved the 3 5th Division in this sector, and on November 9th the division attacked the German positions on the Woevre plain, and was in the line whenthe armistice was signed .

On November 1 8th the division moved to thevicinity of Chatillon-Sur-Seine (cote D

’or) and theartillery brigade wh ich had heretofore formed a partof the VIII Corps rejoined the division . On Mayzud the division was placed under the control of theC . G. ,

forreturn to the United States .The commanding generals of this d ivision wereBrig. Gen . Chas . H . Barth, August 25 , 1 9 1 7, to Octoher 8, 1 9 1 7 ; Maj . Gen . Chas . J . Bailey

,October 8

,

1 9 1 7, to November 1 1 , 1 9 1 8 .

The insignia of this division is a silhouette of awildcat on a khaki circle . The colour of the wildcat varies according to the d ifferent arms of theservice .


During active operations the division suffered thefollowing losses : killed, 250 ; wounded, 80 1 ; 5 1 mentaken prisoner .This division captured the following from theenemy : 5 officers, 96 men, 44 machine guns . Thed ivision advanced 53 kilometers against resistance .Nineteen D istinguished Service Crosses wereawarded to individuals of this division up to March8,1 9 1 9 .

The following units composed the division :I 6 I st

,1 62nd Infantry brigades .

3 zrst, 3z2ud, 3 23rd, 3 24th Infantry regiments .3 1 7th, 3 1 8th Machine Gun battalions .1 s6th Artillery Brigade .

3 1 6th, 3 1 7th, 3 1 8th Artillery regiments.30 6th Trench Mortar Battery.

3 1 6th D ivision Machine Gun battalion .


3o6th Field S ignal Battalion .

30 6th Train Headquarters and Military Police .3o6th Ammunition Train .

3o6th Sanitary Train .

3o6th Supply Train .

32 I st, 3 22nd, 3 23rd, 324th Ambulance companiesand Field hospitals .

82nd D IVI SION

In compliance with War Department instructions,the 82nd (National Army) D ivision was organizedAugust 25 , 1 9 1 7, at Camp Gordon, Georgia . Themajority of offi cers were from Georgia, Alabama, and



of Verdun by bus, and on October 6th entered actively the Meuse—Argonne offensive, north of Barennes

,continued in this offensive on the line in the Aire

valley up to St . Juvin and St . George until October3oth, when it was withdrawn to the vicinity of CheneTondu and Camp Bouzon . Thence on November2nd to Florent-Les Islettes area, thence toVaucouleurstraining area, November 4th ; Beaumont trainingarea

,November 1 0 th, and to the tenth training area

on November 1 5th . (Prauthoy.)Sailed from Bordeaux in April

,1 9 1 9 .

To include March 8, 1 9 1 9, casualties hadbeen reported from the 82nd D ivision of which 1 69were prisoners ofwar.Thirty-four individuals of the division had re

ceived the D istinguished Service Cross up to M arch1,1 9 1 9 .

The command ing generals of the division from thetime of its organization were as

'

follows : Maj . Gen .

Eben Swift,August 25, 1 9 1 7, to some t ime in May,

1 9 1 8 ; Brig. Gen .Wm . P. Burnham, some time in May,1 9 1 8 , to October 1 0 , 1 9 1 8 ; Maj . Gen . Geo . B . Duncan

,October ‘

1 0,1 9 1 8, to October 1 7, 1 9 1 8 ; M aj ( Gen .

W . P . Burnham,October 24, 1 9 1 8, to November 7,

1 9 1 8 ; Maj . Gen . Geo . B . Duncan, November 7, 1 9 1 8,to November 1 1

,1 9 1 8 .

The following units composed the division1 63rd, 1 64th Infantry brigade .

325th, 326th, 3 27th, 3a8th Infantry regiments .320 th, 32 1 st Machine Gun battalions .1 57th Art illery Brigade .


3 l gth, 32oth, 32 1 3 t Artillery regiments .30 7th Trench Mortar Battery.

3 1 9th Machine Gun Battalion .


3o7th Train Headquarters and M ilitary Police .


3o7th Supply Train .

3o7th Ammunition Train .

3o7th Sanitary Train .

325th, 3 26th, 3 27th, 3 28th Ambulance companiesand Field hosp itals .Battle Engagements of 82nd Division .

( 1 ) Toul Sector, France, June 25-August 9, 1 9 1 8 .

Organizations entitled to Silver bands on theirregimental colour staffs .325th Regiment Infantry.

326th Regiment Infantry.

327th Regiment Infantry .

328th Regiment Infantry .


(2) Toul Sector, France, July 1 8-August 9, 1 9 1 8 .

Organizations entitled' to silver bands3 l gth Mach ine Gun Battal ion .

(3) Toul Sector, France, July 1 4—August 9, 1 9 1 8 .

Organizations ent itled to silver bands32oth Mach ine Gun Battalion .

32 1 3 t Machine Gun Battalion .

Marbache Sector,Toul

,France

,August 1 7

September 1 1,1 9 1 8 .

Organizations entitled to silver bands325th Regiment Infantry.





3o7th Regiment Engineers.

3 l gth Machine Gun Battalion .

3 20 th Machine Gun Battal ion .

3 2 1 st Machine Gun Battalion .

30 7th Field Signal Battalion .

5) Marbache Sector, Toul, France, August 1 9September 1 1

, 1 9 1 8 .

Organizations entitled to silver bands3 1 9th Regiment Field Artillery .

3 20 th Regiment Field Artillery.

3 2 1 st Regiment Field Artillery .

(6) St . Mihiel Offensive, France, September 1 2

September 1 6,1 9 1 8 .

Organizations entitled to silver bands3 25th Regiment Infantry.


3 27th Regiment Infantry.

3 28th Regiment Infantry.

3o7th Regiment Engineers .3 1 9th Machine Gun Battalion.

32oth Machine Gun Battalion .

32 l st Machine Gun Battalion .

3o7th Field Signal Battalion .

3 19th Regiment Field Artillery.

3 20 th Regiment Field Artillery.

32 1 st Regiment Field Artillery.

(7) Meuse-Argonne Offensive, France, OctoberOctober 3 1 , 1 9 1 8 .



the 9oth sent away great numbers of men to fill upRegular and National Guard divisions and to formspecial organizations of army, corps, andtroops . In the early spring of 1 9 1 8 the divisionwas filled up with men from other camps

,a large

number coming from Camp Dodge,Iowa .

2 . M ove to France. The division commencedleaving Camp Travis early in June for Camp Mills

,

near New York. By June 3oth all units had sailedfrom Hoboken . A few organizations went direct toFrance but the majority of the division landed In

England . The 358th Infantry paraded before theLord Mayor of Liverpool on July 4th, and wasgiven a banquet by the city.

Immediately upon arrival in France the artillerybrigade was sent to a training area near Bordeaux .

The rest of the division was moved by train to theAignay-le-Duc training area, northeast of Dijon .

Headquarters of the division, 1 79th Brigade and

357th Infantry, were at Aignay-le-Duc . Headquar

ters of the 1 80 th Brigade and the 3 59th Infantrywere at Recey—sur—Ource . The 358th Infantry was atMinot

,and the 36oth Infantry was at Rouvres . The

division stayed six weeks in this area, training eighthours a day for the time when it should take itsplace in line .

3 . Relief of F irst Divis ion . In the middle of

August the division was ordered to relieve the I st

Division,which held the Saizerais sector along the

Moselle R iver,near Toul . The division was moved

by train on the 1 8th and 1 9th of August from its


training area to towns in the vicinity of Toul . Therelief of the 1 st Division commenced on the 1 9thof August and was completed on the z4th, GeneralAllen taking command of the sector at 8 o’clock onthe morning of August 24th .

The sector was about nine kilometers in width,

from Remenauville to a point about a kilometerwest of the Moselle R iver . The sector had beenthe scene of heavy fighting in 1 9 1 5 when the French ,with very heavy losses

,had attempted to take the

Bois le Pretre,but S ince 1 9 1 5 had been what was

known as a quiet sector . The front line on the leftran across broken open country just behind Feyen-Haye, and on the right ran through the woods ofthe Bois le Pretre . No Man’s Land was wide andfull of old trenches, wire entanglements, and obstacles of every sort . The rear areas were heavilywooded and filled with all sorts of camps

,dugouts

,old

gun emplacements,and every kind of construction

which had accumulated during three years of trenchwarfare .

“

The regiments went into line in orderfrom left to right—3 57th Infantry (Colonel Hartmann) , 3 58th Infantry (Colonel Leary) , 359th Infantry (Colonel Cavenaugh) , 360 th Infantry (Colonel Price) . General O

’Neil, commanding the 1 79th

Brigade,had his headquarters at Martincourt

,and

General Johnston, commanding the 1 80 th Brigade,

was at Griscourt . Division headquarters was established at Villers-eu-Haye .

The 82nd Division was on the right and the 89thDivision on the left .


On August 27th General Johnston became a MajorGeneral and was given the g 1 3 t D ivision . Brig;Gen . U . G . M cAlexander, who had served with the3 rd D ivision on the Marne, took command of the1 80 th Brigade .4 . St. M ihiel Ofiensive . When the division wentinto line

,preparation had already begun for the St.

Mihiel offensive . Artillery of all calibres was beingmoved into the sector every night and it was obviousto everyone that an operation of some sort was beingplanned . Early in September orders were receivedfrom the I Army Corps which outlined the operation and gave the 90 th D ivision its part in the

attack. The American First Army,which had just

been organized under the personal command of

General Pershing, was to cut Off the St . Mihiel

salient . The general plan was that the V Corpswould attack on the west base of the salient anddrive east

,and that the I and IV Corps on the

east base of the salient would attack north . Whenthe V and IV Corps met

,they would close the

neck of the bottle, and the salient and the Germantroops left in it would be cut off. The advance ofthe I and IV Corps /was to swing forward like adoor with the hinge of the door on the Moselle RivThe divisions on the left of the advance woulforward the farthest

,and by meeting the V

cut off the salient .The 8zud D ivision on the extreme right wasadvance at all

,and the 9oth D ivision on its le

given the mission of protecting the



Lplished their missions . During the night strongpatrols were sent out all along the front to exploitthe success of the day .

On the 1 3 th the 1 80 th Brigade captured the Boisle Pretre with its maze of barbed-wire entanglementsand innumerable mach ine gun emplacements . TheFrench are said to have had more than casualties in 1 9 1 5 in attempting to take this p iece ofground .

On the same day the 1 79th Brigade cleaned out theVencheres woods and advanced their line to the V icinity of St . Marie Farm . One of the battalions of the

357th Infantry encountered two enemy regimentsmoving across our front to counter attack the 5thD ivision and completely broke up their advance .

Ou ' the 1 4th the 1 79th Brigade pushed forward onthe left into the Bois des Rappes to the vicinity of

La Souleuvre Farm, while the 1 80 th Brigade captured Villers-sours-Preny and established a foothold on the he ights beyond .

On the 1 5th the advance was continued, Vandiores taken,

the Bois de Villers and the Bois desRappes cleaned up , and the line established along theHuit Chemins (

“White Chimmy”

) road .

On the 1 6th the front line was pushed forward tothe edge of the woods in front of Preny where itremained until the division was relieved in October.While the 9oth D ivision was carrying all objectives,the rest of the First Army was equally successful .Within twenty-four hours after the attack started,divisions from the IV and V Corps had met atVignuelles in rear of the salient and the whole Ger

OUR 1 10 DAYS’ FIGHTING 247

man position, which had been held since 1 9 14, wascut off . During this first operation of the AmericanArmy more than prisoners, a great amountof artillery, and vast stores of all sorts were captured.

The 90 th Division’s contribution was

,in prisoners

,

1 4 offi cers and 650 men, 8 pieces of artillery, 24 heavytrench mortars, and a large number of rifles

,ma

chine guns, and miscellaneous weapons . The d iviSion’s casualties were 39 ofli cers and 886 men .

6 . From close of St. M ihiel ofiensive to rel ief by 7thDivision . Shortly after the St. M ihiel offensive wasended, the 82nd D ivision on our right was relieved bythe French 69th Division and the 90 th

’s sector wasextended to the Moselle R iver . The 5th D ivision onthe left was relieved by the 78th D ivision , which wasitself Shortly withdrawn

,its sector being turned over

about equally to the 89th and 9oth . This extendedthe 90 th

’s sector approximately four kilometers tothe west . During the last week that the divis ionwas in l ine it was holding a front of approximatelytwelve kilometers . During the period following the St .Mihiel operation the four regiments continued to holdthe line in the same order as before . Colonel Sterlinghad relieved Colonel Cavenaugh in command of the359th Infantry.

During all this period enemy artillery activity wasintense . The front and support lines were almostcontinually bombarded with high explosive and gasshell . Much of the fire came from the flank, andfrom places even in rear of our own line . While there


was no considerable enemy infantry activity duringthis period casualties were heavy from artillery.

Patrolling was active and daring. Scarcely a daypassed that one of the regiments did not bring inprisoners .On the night of September 23 rd the 3 s7th Infantryraided the Hindenburg Line near Sebastapol Farm andbrought in five prisoners with only Slight casualties .On the 26th of September the American First Army

west of the Meuse commenced the last great battleof the war, and the divisions between the Meuse andthe Moselle assisted that operation by carrying outlocal operations to give the impression that the greatattack extended along the entire front . Both infamtry brigades took part in the operation wh ich wasplanned as a deep raid on the enemy positions . Theraid was preceded by a six-hour artillery preparation,as was the big attack west of the Meuse, and the infantry jumped off at the same hour as the troopsmaking the real attack. Statements of prisoners andevidence d iscovered since the armistice prove thatthe division successfully accomplished its mISSion

and that the enemy on our front believed until wellinto the morning of September 26th that a great artack was being made on their front . The successwas attained

,however

,only with very heavy casual

ties,as our raiding parties were caught in an intense

artillery bombardment and heavy machine gun firefrom concrete emplacements all along the Hindon-lburg Line .

7 . Rel ief by 7th Division and move to the M euse.



became exhausted, communications and supply became extremely difli cult and the enemy threw in greatnumbers of reserve divisions

,the advance Slowed

down, and the first stage of the battle was“ concluded .

During the second stage there was continual fightingalong the line but no concerted attack wa

’

s‘ launchedby the ent ire army. The effort was rather on thepart of individual divisions and corps to straightenout the line and reach a position from-wh ich a secondgreat attack could be launched .

9 . Relief of 5 th Division—Capture of B antheville.

The 9oth Division went into l ine near the end of thissecond period . The 1 79th Brigade relieved the l othBrigade of the 5th Division on the night of October2 l st-22nd . The l 8oth Brigade was held in divisionreserve . The 3rd D ivision was on the right and the89th D ivision on the left . At this time the front l ineran from just north of Romaone and Cunel aroundthe northwestern edge of the Bois des Rappes . The89th D ivision had pushed

“

forward and occupied theBois de Bantheville on the left so that the line of the9oth Division formed a pocket a little more than twokilometers in d epth in the front of the corps . In thispocket were the villages of Bantheville and Bourrut .The first mission of the d ivision was to straightenout the line . The 3 57th Infantry attacked at 3o’clock on the afternoon of October 23rd, capturedBantheville and the high ground north and northwestof that town, and established a line from the northeast corner of the Bois des Rappes over the highground north of Bourrut to the northeastern corner


of the Bois de Bantheville where the line joined withthe 89th Division . The 3 58th Infantry in the Boisdes Rappes at the same time extended its left to connect with the 3 57th Infantry north ofBourrut, and thesame night two compan ies of the 3 58th Infantrycrossed the Andon Brook and establ ished a l ine froma point about 50 0 meters southwest of Aincrevillealong the Aincreville-Bantheville road to the lineheld by the 3 57th Infantry. This extremely successful operation

,upon which the division was highly

complimented by the army and corps commanders,

resulted in giving the division an excellent pos itionfromwh ich it could jump off in case of a great attack .

Th is advance position was held until November 1 st,

despite many counter attacks and continuous intenseshelling.

I O . Attack of November I st. With the capture ofBantheville by the 1 79th Brigade, everything was inreadiness for the great attack by the American FirstArmy and the French armies on its left

,by which it

was hoped finally to break the enemy’s last l ine ofresistance and change his retreat into a rout . Thisattack was ordered forNovember I st . On

.

the nightofOctober 3oth the r8oth Brigade relieved the 1 79thBrigade which had suffered heavy casualties duringits e ight days in l ine and was withdrawn into divisionreserve . The 1 80 th Brigade went into line and ar

tacked with the 36oth Infantry on the left and the359th Infantry on the right . The 345th Mach ineGun Battalion and the 343 rd Machine Gun Battalionwere in position on the front line from which they


could cover the advance with overhead fire . On themorning of the I st these companies fired more than

rounds and contributed largely to the verygreat success of the attack.

The plan of the attack was that the 36oth Infantryon the left, on a narrow front and assisted by a concentration of all available artillery, should drive forward through the Carre Farm and the immenselystrong wooded position on the left of the sector up toand beyond Andevanne . With th is attack a successthe 3 s9th Infantry on the right would be able to advance across the open ground west ‘

Of Aincrevillewithout disastrous losses . An extremely heavy ar

tillery preparation opened at A . on the 1 stofNovember, and at A . M . the infantry went overthe top . From the outset the fighting was desperate.The best veteran troops . available in the GermanArmy were thrown in to stop the advance of the division . Machine gun nests were everywhere

,the gun

ners sticking to their guns until wiped out . The

36oth and 359th Infantry, splendidly supported bythe 1 5sth Field Artillery Brigade (80 th Division) ,advanced practically without halt . Grande Carre‘

Farm was taken and mopped up . The woods to thenorth were cleaned out

,Andevanne and Cote 243

captured,and the line pushed a kilometer beyond by

the 360 th . Chassogne Farm and St . MargueriteFarm were captured by the 359th Infantry, and bylate afternoon our troops were on or beyond theirobjectives . The Freya Stellung

,the last known

enemy position,was definitely and completely broken.



was forcing the enemy up the right bank of the river.It was evident that the enemy’s retreat was becomingcompletely disorganized and if our pressure could becontinued he would breakOn the 9th ofNovember the 1 79th Brigade crossedthe Meuse at Sassey

,and by all-night marching oc

cupied Mouzay on the right bank of the river. Thenext day the 3 58th Infantry captured Blanc Fontaine,and after desperate fight ing secured a foothold inStenay. At the same t ime the 3 57th Infantry on theright had advanced over roll ing country

,swept by

mach ine gun and artillery fire, and reached theheights overlooking Baalon and l ater occupied thetown . On this day the enemy threw into l ine againstthe 9oth h is last reserve d ivision on theWestern Front .The 89th D ivision on our left had, in the meantime,

forced a crossing of the river at Pouilly and wasordered to send troops to protect the left flank of the

9oth Division north of Stenay. When these troopswere in position

,it was planned to pass the 1 80 th Bri

gade again through the lines of the 1 79th Brigade andto continue the attack in the direct ion ofMontmedy.

1 1 . The Armistice . Early on the morning of November 1 1 th word was received that the greatestbattle in which American troops had ever been en

gaged was ended by Germany’s acceptance of theAllied terms and that hostilities would cease at 1 1

o’clock . Before that hour patrols from the 3 58thInfantry forced their way into Stenay and completelyoccupied the town

,the enemy having evacuated after

the desperate fight ing of the previous day.


From the armistice until the d ivision started itsmarch into Germany the only activity was patrollingalong the old front l ine to collect returned prisonersof war and civilians and to locate and guard abandoned and surrendered material ofwar.Shortly after the conclusion of the armistice Maj .

Gen . Henry T . Allen left the d ivision to take command of the VIII Corps . Command passed to Brig .

Gen . J . P . O’Neil

,who continued in command dur

ing the march into Germany and until December

3oth when Maj . Gen . C . H . Martin assumed command .

1 2 . M arch to Germany. On the 23 rd ofNovemberthe 9oth Division, having been designated as one ofthe nine divisions of the Army of Occupation (ofwhich only one other

,the 89th, was a National Army

division) , moved forward toward Montmedy. Thedivision marched from Stenay across Luxembourgto Rhenish Prussia

,where, as a part of the VII Corps,

it Shortly before Christmas settled into winter quarters along the Moselle R iver in the vicinity of Berncastel, Germany, occupying the Krieses of Daun,Wittlich, and Berncastel . Here it was joined by the1 65th Field Artillery Brigade .

1 3 . Summary. The average advance madebythe division in the St . M ihiel operation was six kilometers

,in

the Meuse-Argonne twenty-two kilometers . The d ivisionwas under fire from August 2oth to November 1 1 thwith the exception of seven days occupied in changingsectors ; seventy-five days without a relief. Duringthis time it went over the tOp in two major offensives


and seven minor Operations, and was still advancingwhen halted by the armistice .The division captured 42 pieces of artillery

, 36

trench mortars,294 machine guns, 90 3 rifles, and

immense quantities of ammunition and stores . .It

took as prisoners 32 offi cers and men . Casualties amounted to 37 officers and men killed ;62 offi cers and men severely wounded ; 1 23offi cers and men Slightly wounded ; 8 1 offi cersand men gassed . Of the gassed there were1 7 deaths and men were evacuated . Exactfigures cannot be given on the missing for search isbeing made for all in this class and the number is decreasing daily .

The twenty-second division to reach France,it

stands tenth in amount of artillery captured,thir

teenth in number of machine guns captured, andfourteenth in both prisoners captured and total advance .

The division received five ofli cial commendationsfor its ind ividual work in the St . M ihiel and Meuse-eArgonne operations . The 9oth won its place in theArmy ofOccupation by never failing to accomplish amission and by never giving up a foot of ground to theenemy.

To include March I,1 9 1 9, 57 individuals of the

9oth D ivision had been awarded the D istinguishedService Cross .The Shoulder insignia of the d ivision is a monogramcomposed of the letters T and 0 h red . The divis ionis known as the Alamo Division .



On October 1 9th the division passed to the command of the King of Belgium .

From October 3 1 st to November 4th the division

,under the direction of the French Army

,in

Belgium,took part in the Lys-Scheldt offensive

west of the Escaut (Scheldt) River in the vicinity ofAudenarde .From November l oth to November 1 1 th the divi

sion took part in the Lys-Scheldt offensive east of theEscaut (Scheldt) R iver in the vicinity ofAudenarde .

On November 22,1 9 1 8, detachment of d ivision

part ic1pated in the ceremony in connection with theentrance into the city of Brussels of the King andQueen of Belgium .

In December, 1 9 1 8, and January, 1 9 1 9, the divisionmoved to the Le Mans area .

In March and April it embarked for the UnitedStates .To include March 8

,1 9 1 9, casualties

, ofwhich23 were prisoners ofwar, had been reported from thisdivision . To include March 1

,1 9 1 9, 1 9 individuals

of the division had been awarded the DistinguishedService Cross .The commanding generals of the division from itsorganization to include the date of the armistice wereas follows : Maj . Gen . Harry A . Greene

,August 25,

1 9 1 7, to November 24, 1 9 1 7 ; Brig. Gen . Jas . A . Irons,

November 24, to December 23 , 1 9 1 7 ; Brig.

Gen . Frederick S . Foltz,December 23 , 1 9 1 7, to

March 2,1 9 1 8 ; Maj . Gen . Harry A . Greene

,March

2 , 1 9 1 8, to June 1 9, 1 9 1 8 ; Brig. Gen . Frederick S .


Foltz,June 1 9, 1 9 1 8, to August 3 1 , 1 9 1 8 ; Maj . Gen .

Wm. H . Johnston, August 3 1 , 1 9 1 8, to November 1 1 ,1 9 1 8 .

The units composing the division were as followsI 8rst and 1 82nd Infantry brigades .36 l st, 362nd, 363rd, and 364th Infantry regiments.347th, 348th Machine Gun battalions .1 66th Artillery Brigade .

346th, 347th, 348th Artillery regiments .3 1 6th Trench Mortar Battery .

346th D ivision Machine Gun Battalion .



3 1 6th Train Headquarters and Military Police .3 1 6th Supply Train .



36 I st, 362nd, 363rd, 364th Ambulance companiesand Field hospitals .

92nd D IVISION

In compliance with telegraphic instructions Adjutant General’s Office, dated October 26, 1 9 1 7, theg2md (National Army) Divisionwas organized October29th at Camps Funston, Grant, Dodge, Upton,Meade, and Dix, the offi cers and enlisted men coming from all parts of the United States . The divisionis popularly known as the “ Buffaloes

,the shoulder

insignia being a buffalo in black circle on khaki patch .

On June 2 , 1 9 1 8, the division was assembled atCamp Upton for embarkation .


From June 1 0 -27, 1 9 1 8, the division embarked atHoboken

,New Jersey .

On June 1 9, 1 9 1 8, the division headquarters arrivedat Brest

,France .

On August 29 , 1 9 1 8, after a period of training, thedivision entered the line at St . D ie in the quiet Vosgessector. It was relieved on September 2oth .

From September 25th to 30 th the division was inthe reserve of the I Army Corps in the ArgonneMeuse sector. From September 24th to 30 th the368th Infantry was brigaded with the 1 1 th Cuirassiers under command of the XXXVIII Army Corps(French) forming the liaison detachment between theFrench and American armies .October 9th it was in line in the Marbach sector,astride the Moselle R iver from October 9th to November 1 5th .

The artillery brigade joined the division October

To include May I 5 , 1 9 1 9, the reports showed thatthe 92nd Division suffered the following casualties :battle deaths

,1 85 ; wounded, prisoners

,1 7 .

To include March I,1 9 1 9, twenty-one individuals

of th is division had been awarded the D istinguishedService Cross .The division commanders were as follows : Brig.

Gen. Chas . C . Ballou,October 30 , 1 9 1 7, to November

20, 1 91 7 ; Brig . Gen . John E . M cM ahon, November

23 to December 3 , 1 9 1 7 ; Maj . Gen . Chas . C . Ballou,December 3 , 1 9 1 7, to January 1 2

,1 9 1 8 ; Brig. Gen.

Jas . B . Erw in,January 1 2

,1 9 1 8, to March 1 2, 1 9 1 8 ;



who crossed the Marne . On July 2 I St the divisionattacked across the Marne east of Chateau-Thierryand advanced to the Ourcq, where it was relieved onJuly 29th .

On September l oth the 3rd Division entered the St .M ihiel sector and formed a part of the V Corps Reserve in the reduction of the St . M ihiel salient .Was reheved September 1 4th .

The division entered the line September 3othin the Argonne offensive, relieving a line d ivision,and fought continuously until October 27th, ,

whenit was relieved north ofMontfaucon .

On November 1 4th the division entered the lineon the right of the American Third Army andmarched to the Rhine via Conflans and Saaburg,where it occupied the Kreis ofMayon .

The division insignia consists of three white stripeswhich stand for the three operations in which the

3rd Division took part, the Marne, St . Mihiel, andthe Meuse-Argonne . The blue stands for the loyaltyof those who placed their lives on the altar of selfSacrifice in defence of American ideals of liberty anddemocracy. The division is known as the Marnedivision .

The total battle casualties of the division wereas reported up to March 8

,1 9 1 8 . 233 individ

uals of the 3rd D ivision had received the Distinguished Service Cross up to March 1

,1 9 1 9 .

The commanding generals of the division from thetime of its organization were as follows : Maj . Gen .

Jos . T . Dickman,November 28

,1 9 1 7, to February


26, 1 9 1 8 ; Brig. Gen . Jas . A . I rons, February 27, 1 9 1 8,to March 1 8

,1 9 1 8 ; Maj . Gen . Jos . T . D ickman,

April 1 2, 1 9 1 8, to August 3 1 , 1 9 1 8 ; Maj . Gen .

Beaumont B . Buck, August 3 1 , 1 9 1 8 , to October 1 7,1 9 1 8 ; Brig . Gen . Preston Brown, October 1 7, 1 9 1 8, toNovember 1 1

,1 9 1 8 .

Attention is invited to an article in the May, 1 9 1 9,number of the Century M agazine entitled

“TheAmerican Expeditionary Forces at Chateau-Thierry”

by C0 1. R . H . C . Kelton,General Staff, who was

Chief-of-Staff of this division at that time .

A BRIEF H ISTORY OF THE 89th D IVI SION

In compliance with War Department instructionsthe 89th D ivision was organized at Camp Funston,Kansas, in September, 1 9 1 7 . The division was composed of National Army drafts mainly from Kansas,Missouri

,and Colorado.

The division remained in training at Camp Funstonuntil May, 1 9 1 8, when the division moved to CampMills, New York, in preparation for movement overseas . On June 4th division headquarters and themajority of the division embarked from New Yorkand the last units arrived in France on July l oth .

Upon arrival in France the division was ordered tothe Reynel training area (Haute-Marne) except thedivisional artillery which was ordered to Camp Souge,near Bordeaux,

for training. The division remainedin the Reynel area until August s th when it wasmoved by

'

bus to the Toul front where it occup iedthe line between northeast corner of Bois de Bau


chot to the middle of the Etang de Vorgevaux, and

was supported by the 55th Field Artillery and French250 th Regiment Field Artillery. On September 1 2 ththe d ivision participated in the St . Mihiel offensive asthe right division of the American IV Corps and advanced to a depth of twenty-one kilometers includingthe capture of the towns of Beney, Essey, BoullionVille

,Pannes, and Xammes .

On October 7th the division was relieved in thePannes-Fliery-Limey sector by the 37th Divisionand was moved by bus to the Recicourt area andbecame part of the First Army Reserves . On October1 2th the division moved forward in rear of the 3 2ndDivision as part of the American V Corps in theArgonne offensive, and on October 2oth the divisionwent into the line along the Sommerance-Romagneroad just north of the Kriemhilde defence positions .The division attacked on November I st and continued in the assault until the armistice was signedwhen it had crossed the Meuse north of Stenay. Thedivision was placed under the VII Corps of the ThirdArmy and on November 24th began its march intoGermany. The division was assigned the areabounded by Kreise of Prum, B itburg, Trier, and

Saarburg with division headquarters at Kyllburgwhere it was joined by the divisional artillery whichhad been serving with the 28th Division . On May1 9, 1 9 1 9, the division sailed for the United States anddebarked at New York. It was then sentFunston

,Kansas

,where it was demobilize

afterward .



1 64th Artillery Brigade .353rd, 354th, 355th, and 3 s6th Infantry regiments.34oth, 34I St, 34zud Machine Gun battalions .340 th, 341 st, 342md Field Artillery regiments .3 14th Trench Mortar battery.

3 14th Engineer Regiment and Train .

3 14th Field S ignal battalion .

3 14th Headquarters Train and Military Police .3 14th Ammunition Train .

3 14th Supply Train .

3 14th San itary Train consisting of Field Hospitaland Ambulance companies Nos . 353 , 354, 355, and356.

FACTS AND FIGURES OF THE FIGHTINGARMY

STRENGTH FIRST ARM Y .

MAX IMUM FIGURESOct . 6

Oct . 1 0

DAILY AUTOMATIC SUPPLIES ORDERED BY G-4

FOR THE TROOPS OF THE FIRST ARMYSEPTEMBER MEN ANIMALS GASOLINE

23rd

24th I 23 ,0 0 0 1

25th

26th

27th 1 28 ,044 1

28th 83 1

29th

3oth 1

OCTOBER1 st

2nd

3rd

4th

5th

6th

7th

8th

9th

l oth

268

OCTOBER1 I th

1 2th

I 3th

1 4th

I 5th

1 6th

1 7th

1 8th

1 9th

20 th

zrst

22nd

23rd

24th

25th

26th

27th

28th

29th

3oth

3 1 st

NOVEMBERI st

2nd

3 rd

4th

5th

6th

7th

8th

9th

roth

I 1 th

Extract from report of Asst . Chief-of-Staff G-4, First Army,

Showing strength of First Army on various dates.


I 0 3 ,60 0



8 1 3 t . M aj . Gen. C. J . Bailey82ud. M aj . Gen. George B . Duncan8oth. M aj . Gen. William M . Wright90 th. M aj . Gen. Henry T. Alleng1 3 t . M aj . Gen. William H. Johnston

AMERICAN DIVISIONS ENGAGED

The following American d ivisions were engaged in the Meuse

Argonne batt le :

DIV . ARTILLERYs, 6, 7

NATIONAL GUARD26th,New England 1 0 1 , 1 0 2, 1 0 3 , 1 0 4

28th, Pennsylvania 1 0 9, 1 1 0 , 1 1 1 , 1 1 2

29th, Maryland and

Va.

3 2nd,Wis . andMich. 1 25, 1 26, 1 27, 1 28

33rd, I llinois 1 29, 1 30 , 1 3 1 , 1 32

3 5th, Kansas, M o. 1 37, 1 38, 1 39, 1 40

s7th, Ohio 1 45, 1 46, 1 47, 1 48

42nd, Rainbow 1 65, 1 66, 1 67, 1 68

NATIONAL ARMY

77th,New York City 30 5, 30 6, 30 7, 30 8 304, 30 5, 306

78th,N. Y . ,N. J. , Pa. 3 1 1 , 3 1 2 30 7, 30 8, 309

79th,Va . ,Maryland . 3 1 3 , 3 I 4, 3 1 5, 3 I 6 325, 326, 327

REGULAR ARMYINFANTRY

1 6, 1 8, 26, 28

9, 23 Inf. 5 and

Marines4, 7, 30 , 38

58, 591 0 , 6 1

1 1 9, 1 20 , 1 21 ,

1 49, 1 50 , 1 5 1 ,1 48


DIV .

80 th, Pa.,W. Va. ,Va. 3 1 7, 3 1 8, 3 1 9, 3 20

8 1 st,Tenn .,Carolinas 3 2 1 , 322 , 323 , 3 24

82nd,Georgia,Ala. 3 25 , 326, 327, 328

89th, Kansas, M o. 3 53 , 354, 355, 356

90 th,Texas,Okla. 3 57, 358, 359, 360

g1 st, Pacific Coast 36 1 , 362, 363 , 364

FIRST ARMYFRENCH X VII

I CORPS V CORPS I I I CORPS CORPSDivs. Divs . Divs.

79 4, 80 , 33 29, I SP, ZOF

2: 32, 80 3 s 33 79, 26, 26

3 , 5 5, 1 5 RC 33

90 , 5, 32

SPECIAL ARTILLERY USED

The special art illery employed in the Meuse-Argonne bat tle,exclusive of artillery employed as divisional art illery, was as

followsAMERICAN ARTILLERY

1 34th Field Artillery1 35th Field Artillery1 36th Field Art illery1 47th Field Art illery347th Field Art illery348th Field Art illery44th Regt . C.A.C.

43rd Regt . C.A.C.

5 I st Regt . C.A.C.

s3 td Regt . C.A.C.

55th Regt . C.A.C.

ARTILLERY3 1 3 , 3 1 4, 3 1 5

75

75

1 55 ldown

I S5

4-7

1 55 (3 . IX IF .

8-inch How .

I 9O

240-270

34oq nx>8 rflh4.

I SS


56th Regt . C.A.C.

57th Regt . C.A.C.

59th Regt . C.A.C.

6oth Regt . C.A.C.

65th Regt . C.A.C.

Naval Battalion52nd Regt . C.A.C.

FRENCH ARTILLERY

2 1 9th Regiment

238th Regiment

247th Regimentr1 7th Regiment

1 83rd Regiment45rst Regiment

454th Regiment

456th Regiment

6th Foot Art illerysth R.A.P.

1 st R.A.P.

1 5 I St R.A.P.

86th R.A.D.

8 l st R.A.L.

87th R.A.D.

r1 3th Regt .

1 42nd Regt .

30 1 st Regt .

3 1 7th Regt .

330 th Regt .

4o7th Regt .

41 6th Regt .

4 1 3th Regt .

420 th Regt .

1 82nd Foot Art illery3o8th Regt .

289th Regt .

I 55I 558-inch How.

I SS

How.

1 4-inch

8 1 M.

75

75

751 0 5

1 0 5

1 0 51 0 51 0 5

90 to 1 55

95- 1 20 -1 55

1 20 -1 551 20 -L

1 45-1 55I 4S

' I SS1 55 Short

1 55 Short

1 55 Short

1 55 Short

1 55 Short

1 551 55 LongI SS1 55 Long1 20 -1 55-220

1 55-220 T. R

1 55-20 0 M .


OUR 1 10 DAYS ’ FIGHTING274

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AIRPLANES—FIRST ARM Y AIR SERVICE

St. M ihiel Ofiem ive

BOM BARDMENT PURSUITTOTAL AVAIL TOTAL AVAIL

ABLE AB LE65

47

62

53

Average 237 335

FRENCH AERIAL DIVISION

TOTAL

Average

Argonne-M eme Ofiem iw

PURSUIT OB SERVATIONTOTAL AVAIL

ABLE

OB SERVATIONTOTAL AVAIL

ABLE338 245

3 24 245

343 257

336 264

BOMBARDMENTTOTAL AVAIL

AB LE



TOTAL TOTAL TOTAL

40 0

Number of enemy planes destroyed and confirmed—41 7.

Number of enemy balloons destroyed and confirmed—53 .

Number of our planes lost in action—1 99 .

Number of our balloons destroyed—22 .

Balloons in St . Mihiel Offensive—I 6 ( I for each Company on

the front) .Balloons in Argonne-Meuse Ofl

'

ensive—zz.

AMERICAN S! UADRONS IN FIRST ARMY OFFENSIVE

M ihiel:

1 2 Monoplane Pursuit Squadrons.

9 Corps Observat ion Squadrons.

2 Army Observation Squadrons.

I Bombardment Squadron .

I Night Reconnaissance Squadron.

25 TOTAL .

Argonne-M eme

I 3 Monoplane Pursuit Squadrons (1 night) .7 Corps Observation Squadrons.

3 Army Observation Squadrons (I night) .4 Bombardment Squadrons.

I Army Artillery Observation Squadron.

28 TOTAL .


The First Day Bombardment Group joined the Army AirForces on this front on October l 6th With an available strengthOf 85 p lanes . It took the place Of the FrenchNight Bombers .

The records “

of the Air Service during the batt le are best set

out as given in the Official Operations reports. These recordsfollow

ENEM Y CONFIRM ATIONLOSS OF VICTORY

DATE CONFIRMED RE ! UESTED

'


OUR PLANES ENEMY CONFIRMATIONCRASHED OR LOSS OF VICTORY

DATE MISSING CONFIRMED RE ! UESTEDBrought Forward I67Oct . 22 5

C‘

23 7

24 8

25 I

26 3

27 I4.

28 8

29 I4.

30 I 2

3 I 8

I 4

2 3

3 1 8

4 I I

5 1 6

6 I 2

7 2

8 4

9 4

1 0 I

I I 2

Total: 3 24 29 20 5

Our Bombing Groups during the period from Sept . 26th to

Nov. 1 1 th dropped behind the enemy’s lines a total ofkilograms of explosives.



TANKS

The following t ank organizations were employed in the Meuse

Argonne OffensiveAMERICAN TANKS

! I t American Brigade (now 3o4th) —Light344th Battalion345th Battalion

Tota l

FRENCH TANKS

5 0 4th Regiment—Light

1 7th Group50 5th Regiment

—Light1 4th GroupSt . Chamond Group—HeavySchneider Group—Medium

73

Out Of 142 fighting tanks the Americans lost 22 totallydestroyed . The French lost about 25 . The American tankcasualties in men were as follows :

Oflicers —Killed 3 ; wounded 1 8, Total 2 1M en Killed I 6 ; 1 26, 1 42

Grand Total 1 63

The American tanks were used in the advance up the Airevalley While the French were employed in the Bois de Mont

faucon, at Montfaucon, Cune l, Septsarges, Romagne , in the

Bois de Cuisy, and in the valley Of the Andon River. Thesetanks fought with the following divisions : 79th, 37th, 4th, 8oth,3 2md, and 3rd. The French tanks were in action from September 26th to October 1 4th making their last attack on October


9th . The American t anks were used in several stages of the

attack, making their last attack November 2nd. All the tankshad great difficulty in getting across NO Man

’s Land and for

the launching Of the Ofiensive September 26th and the two daysfo llowing. The French tanks had to cross the famous Hill 30 4which was regarded as the worst terrain on the Western Frontas it was covered with shell craters from the battle Of Verdunin 1 9 1 6. The tanks which were destroyed were d irect hits.

Officers Of the Tank Corps report that the anti-tank rifle did

very little damage.

THE END


DeaCIdIfied usnng the Bookkeeperprocess.Neutraliznng agent. M agnesmmOxadeTreatmentDate: MAYPreservationTechnologiesAWORLD LEADER IN PAPER PRES ERVATION

1 1 1 Thomson Park DnveCranberryTownshlp ,

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A WORLD LEADER IN PAPER PRES ERVATION"1 Thomson ParkDnveCranberryTownship ,

PA 16066(724) 779-21 1 1

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