Hegel on Consciousness 14-10-19 b.doc

8/18/2019 Hegel on Consciousness 14-10-19 b.doc

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Hegel on Consciousness

The Opening Chapters of

A Spirit of Trust : A Semantic Reading of Hegel’s Phenomenology

Bob Brandom

Part One:

Knowing and Representing:

Reading (between the lines of) Hegel’s Introduction to the Phenomenology

Chapter ne: Conceptual Realism and the Semantic Possibility of Knowledge 2

Chapter !wo: Representation and the !perience of rror:

" #unctionalist "pproach to the $istinction between "ppearance and Reality %&

Chapter !hree: #ollowing the Path of $espair to a Bacchanalian Re'el:

The mergence of the Second( True( Ob)ect *+

Part Two:

"ediating the Immediate:

Consciousness and the Inferential Articulation of #eterminate $mpirical Content

Chapter %our: ,mmediacy( -enerality( and Recollection:

#irst .essons on the Structure of pistemic "uthority /%

Chapter %i&e: 0nderstanding the Ob)ect1Property Structure in Terms of egation:"n ,ntroduction to 3egelian 4etaphysics in the Perception Chapter 52%

Chapter Si': 6#orce7 and 0nderstanding8#rom Ob)ect to Concept 5*+

The Ontological Status of Theoretical ntities and the .aws that ,mplicitly $efine Them

Chapter Se&en: ,nfinity( Conceptual ,dealism(

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and the Transition to Self-Consciousness 25/


art ne:

Knowing and Representing:

Reading (between the lines of) Hegel’s ntrodu!tion to the henomenolog

Chapter One

Conceptual Realism and the Semantic ossibilit of Knowledge

I* Classical Representational $pistemolog

59 3egel opens the first paragraph of his Introduction by introducing a model

of cogniti'e faculties that he supposes will be most familiar to his readers in its Kantian

form:

Knowledgetends to be regarded as the instrument with which one ta;es hold of the

absolute or as the medium through which one disco'ers it95

3e thin;s no account that has this general shape can meet basic epistemological criteria

of ade


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The general character of his complaint against construing cogniti'e faculties on

the instrument@or@medium model seems clear enough9 3e offers a two@fold summary9

That model leads to:

aA the con'iction that there is an absurdity in the Concept of e'en beginning a process of ;nowledge designed to gain for consciousness that which is in@

itself( and

bA that there is a strict line of demarcation separating ;nowledge and the

absolute92

The first ob)ection alleges that theories of the sort he is addressing must lead to a ;ind of

s;epticism: a failure to ma;e intelligible the idea of ;nowing how things are inthemsel'es9 The second complaint points to a diagnosis of the reason for this failure: the

model e!ca'ates a gulf separating consciousness from what it is consciousness of9

3e e!pands on both these points9 3e fills in the charge that instrument@or@

medium theories lead to s;epticism by saying:

=,?f ;nowledge is the instrument to ta;e hold of the absolute essence( one is immediately

reminded that the application of an instrument to a thing does not lea'e the thing as it is(

but brings about a shaping and alteration of it9 Or( if ;nowledge is not an instrument for

our acti'ity( but a more or less passi'e medium through which the light of truth reaches

us( then again we do not recei'e this truth as it is in itself( but as it is in and through this

medium9 ,n both cases we employ a means which immediately brings about the opposite

of its own end or( rather( the absurdity lies in our ma;ing use of any means at all9%

,n either case( there is going to be a distinction between what things are for consciousness

the product of the e!ercise of cogniti'e facultiesA and what they are in themsel'es the

raw materials on which the cogniti'e faculties are e!ercisedA9 Something about the

character of this distinction( 3egel seems to be arguing( is incompatible with what things

2 =4>%?% =4>%?

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are for consciousness according to such a picture counting as genuine ;nowledge of how

things really are Din themsel'esEA9

3e elaborates the problem diagnosed in passage bA abo'e9 ,t is that the

instrument@or@medium picture

presupposes notions about knowledge as an instrument and a medium( and also the notion

that there is a difference between ourselves and this knowledge; but abo'e all( it

presupposes that the absolute stands on one side and that knowledge, though it is on the

other side, for itself and separated from the absolute( is ne'ertheless something real9

3ence it assumes that ;nowledge may be true despite its presupposition that ;nowledgeis outside the absolute and therewith outside the truth as well9 By ta;ing this position(

what calls itself the fear of error re'eals itself as a fear of the truth9 +

,t is apparently of the essence of the instrument@or@medium model to see there being such

a Ddifference(E Dseparation(E two DsidesE of one di'ide( and to understand the )ob of

cogniti'e faculties to consist in bridging that di'ide9

This( he thin;s( is )ust the predicament that calls forth an in+?

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Or =ii?( were the absolute only to be brought a bit closer to us by an instrument( perhaps

as a bird is trapped by a lime@twig( without being changed at all( it would surely laugh at

this ruse if it were not( in and for itself( already close to us of its own accord9 #or in this

case ;nowledge itself would be a ruse( pretending through its multifarious effort to do

something other than merely bring forth a relation which is immediate and thus effortless9

Or =iii?( if the e!amination of ;nowledge( which we now represent as a medium( ma;es

us ac%?

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29 To get a better specification of the range of epistemological theories that fall

within the target@area of 3egel7s argument metaphorically labeled as the Dinstrument@or@

mediumE modelA( it will help to begin further bac;9 The theories he is addressing are

representational theories of the relations between appearance and reality9 Representation

is a distincti'ely modern concept9 Premodern originally -ree;A theories understood the

relations between appearance and reality in terms of resemblance. Resemblance(

paradigmatically one of the relations between a picture and what it pictures( is a matter of

sharing properties9 " portrait resembles the one portrayed insofar as it shares with its

ob)ect properties of color and shape( for instance of nose( ear( and chin perhaps as seen

from some perspecti'eA9 The thought behind the resemblance model is that appearance is

'eridical insofar as it resembles the reality it is an appearance of9 ,nsofar as it does not

resemble that reality( it is a false appearance( an error9

The rise of modern science made this picture unsustainable9 Copernicus disco'ered that

the reality behind the appearance of a stationary arth and a re'ol'ing Sun was a

stationary Sun and a rotating arth9 o resemblance( no shared properties there9 The

relationship between reality and its appearance here has to be understood in a much more

complicated way9 -alileo produces a massi'ely producti'e and effecti'e way ofconcei'ing physical reality in which periods of time appear as the lengths of lines and

accelerations as the areas of triangles9 The model of resemblance is of no help in

understanding this crucial form of appearance9 The notion of shared property that would

apply would ha'e to be understood in terms of the relations between this sort of

mathematiFed geometriFedA theoretical appearance and the reality it is an appearance of9

There is no antecedently a'ailable concept of property in terms of which that relationship

could be understood9*

$escartes came up with the more abstract metaconcept of representation re


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generaliFed from to get a new model of the relations between appearance and reality

mind and worldA is the relationship he disco'ered between algebra and geometry9 #or he

disco'ered how to deploy algebra as a massi'ely producti'e and effecti'e appearance of

what following -alileoA he still too; to be an essentially geometrical reality9 Treating

something in linear( discursi'e form( such as Da! I by J cE as an appearance of a

uclidean line( and D!2 I y2 J d E as an appearance of a circle allows one to calculate how

many points of intersection they can ha'e and what points of intersection they do ha'e(

and lots more besides9 These se


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appears merely as a primiti'e speciesA is the ;ey to understanding the relations between

mind and world( appearance and reality(


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are by nature ;nowable only as represented are not in this sense intrinsically intelligible9

Their occurrence does not entail that anyone ;nows or understands anything9

"s , ha'e indicated( , thin; that $escartes was dri'en to this picture by two demands9 On

the one hand( ma;ing sense of the new theoretical mathematiFed scientific forms in

which reality could appear8the best and most efficacious forms of understanding of his

time8re


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reality( ;nowing and the ;nown( that he complains about is this gulf of intelligibility9 3is

critical claim is that any theory of this form is doomed to yield s;eptical results9

%9 Of course( $escartes7s 'iew is not the only one 3egel means to be criticiFing9

Kant( too( has a two@stage( representational theory9 Cogniti'e acti'ity needs to be

understood as the product of both the mind7s acti'ities of manipulating representations in

the sense of representingsA and the relations those representings stand in to what they

represent9 Both what the mind does with its representations and how they are related to

what they represent must be considered in apportioning responsibility for features of

those representings to the things represented( as specified in a 'ocabulary that does not

in'o;e either the mind7s manipulation of representations or the relations betweenrepresentings and representeds that is( things as they are Din themsel'esE =an sich?A or to

the representational relations and what the cogniti'e faculties do with and to

representings9 The latter for Kant yields what the represented things are Dfor

consciousness(E in 3egel7s terminology: contentful representings9

Kant7s theory is not the same as $escartes7s( but shares the two@stage representational

structure that distinguishes the mind7s relation to its representings and its relation to

representeds that is mediated by those representings9 "lthough Kant does sometimes

seem to thin; that we ha'e a special ;ind of access to the products of our own cogniti'e

acti'ity( he does not thin; of our awareness of our representings as immediate in any

recogniFably Cartesian sense9 "wareness is apperception9 The minimal unit of

apperception is )udgment9 To )udge is to integrate a conceptually articulated content into

a constellation of commitments e!hibiting the distincti'e synthetic unity of apperception9

$oing that is e!truding from the constellation commitments incompatible with the

)udgment being made and e!tracting from it inferential conse


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So Kant shares with $escartes the two@stage representational structure( but does not ta;e

o'er the idea that our relation to our own representations is one of immediate awareness9 >

3is 'iew still falls within the range of 3egel7s criticisms( howe'er( because he maintainsthe differential intelligibility of representings and representeds9 Representings are as

such intelligible( and what is represented is( as such( not9 , will call this commitment to a

D strong differential intelligibility of appearance and reality: the claim that the one is the

right sort of thing to be intelligible( and the other is not9 Kant has a new model of

intelligibility: to be intelligible is to ha'e a content articulated by concepts9 ,t is the

concepts applied in an act of awareness apperceptionA that determine what would count

as successfully integrating that )udgment into a whole e!hibiting the distincti'e synthetic

unity of apperception9 But the conceptual articulation of )udgments is a form contributed

by the cogniti'e faculty of the understanding9 ,t is not something we can ;now or assume

to characteriFe what is represented by those conceptual representings( when the

representeds are considered apart from their relation to such representings: as they are in

themsel'es9 On 3egel7s reading( Kant is committed to a gulf of intelligibility separating

our representings from what they are representings of( in the form of the 'iew that the

representings are in conceptual shape( and what is represented is not9

Gust to remind oursel'es how much is at sta;e in 3egel7s criticism of two@stage

representational theories of the relations between appearance and reality that are

committed to the differential intelligibility of the relata( it is worth thin;ing in this

connection also about #rege9 #or #rege( discursi'e symbols e$press a sense =Sinn? and

thereby designate a referent = %edeutung ?9 Senses are what is grasped when one

understands the e!pression( and referents are what is thereby represented: what> $escartes7s commitment to the mind7s awareness of its own representings being immediate in the senseof nonrepresentational )ustified by the regress of representation argumentA did not preclude his treating thecontents of those representings as essentially in'ol'ing their relations to other such contents9 ,ndeed( his'iew of representation as a matter of isomorphism between the whole system of representings and thewhole system of representeds entails )ust such a semantic holism9 3e ne'er( , thin;( resol'es the residualtension between the immediacy of his pragmatics his account of what one is doing in thin;ingA and theholism of his semantics9 Kant7s pragmatics of )udging as integration into a whole e!hibiting the syntheticunity of apperception is not similarly in tension with his 'ersion of the holistic semantic thought9

55


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e!pressing that sense is tal;ing or thin;ing about 9 " sense is a representing in that it is a

Dmode of presentationE = rt des &egebenseins? of a referent9 o more than Kant does

#rege construe grasp of a sense as immediate in a Cartesian sense8according to which

the mere occurrence of something with that sense counts as the mind7s ;nowing or

understanding somethingA9 -rasping a )udgeable content re


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D-enuine Knowledge ConditionE -KCA9 Ob'iously( a lot turns on what counts as

genuine ;nowledge9 But it is clear in any case that this re


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The -enuine Knowledge Condition and the ,ntelligibility of rror Condition are

epistemological constraints9 The semantics presupposed by or implicit in an

epistemological theory must not preclude the intelligibility either of genuine ;nowledge(

or of error: being wrong about how things really are9 Le must be able to understand both

what it is for what there is to appear as it is( and for it to appear as it is not9 "n

epistemological theory that does not ma;e both of these intelligible is not ade


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" second semantic constraint on epistemological theories that , ta;e to be implicitly in

play in 3egel7s understanding of the epistemological -KC is that if the representational

relation is to be understood semantically in a way that can support genuine ;nowledge( itmust portray what is represented as e!erting rational constraint on representings of it9

That is( how it is with what is represented must( when the representation relation is not

defecti'e( pro'ide a reason for the representing to be as it is9 Lhat we are tal;ing

thin;ingA about must be able to pro'ide reasons for what we say thin;A about it9 Le can

call this the Rational Constraint Condition RCCA9 Though he does not argue for this

constraint in the Introduction( , thin; in many ways it is the ;ey premise for the argument

he does offer9 The thought is that the difference between merely responding differentially

to the presence or absence of a fact or property and comprehending it( ha'ing thoughts

that are about it in the sense that counts as ;nowledge if e'erything goes well( depends

on the possibility of that fact or property being able to ser'e for the ;nower as a reason

for ha'ing a belief or ma;ing a commitment9 The central sort of semantic aboutness

depends on being able rationall# to ta;e in how things are( in the sense of ta;ing them in

as pro'iding reasons for our attitudes9

3egel learns from Kant to thin; about representation in normative terms9 Lhat is

represented e!ercises a distincti'e ;ind of authorit# o'er representings9 Representings

are responsible to what they represent9 Lhat is represented ser'es as a ;ind of normative

standard for assessments of the correctness of what count as representings of it correct

or incorrectA )ust in 'irtue of being sub)ect to assessments of their correctness in which

those representeds pro'ide the standard9 The RCC adds that the standard( what is

represented( must pro'ide reasons for the assessments9 ,n fact( in the conte!t of Kant7sand 3egel7s 'iews( this is not a further commitment9 #or neither of them distinguishes

between norms or rulesA and norms or rulesA that are rational in the sense of being

conceptuall# articulated9 ll norms are understood as conceptual norms9 orms or rules

and concepts are )ust two ways of thin;ing about the same thing9 Conceptual norms are

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norms that determine what is a reason for what9 #or a norm to contentful is for it to ha'e

conceptual content: a matter of what it can be a reason for or against and what can be a

reason for or against it9 This is the only ;ind of content they ac;nowledge9 The -erman

,dealists are rationalists about norms( in that norms rulesA are contentful e!clusi'ely in

the sense of conceptually contentful9

The Rational Constraint Condition accordingly fills in the sense of 6representation7 or

6aboutness7 on which the 4ode of Presentation Condition depends9 "nd these two

semantic conditions pro'ide the crucial criteria of ade


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representings of the real9 But then we must as;: is the representational relation( the

relation between representings and what they represent( itself something that is ;nown

representationally( or nonrepresentationallyN ,f it is itself something that is ;nowable or

intelligible only by being represented( it seems that we are embar;ed on a 'icious

Bradleyan regress9 The epistemological enterprise is not intelligible unless we can ma;e

sense of the relation between representations of representational relations and that

representational relation( and then representations of that relation( and so on9 0ntil we

ha'e grasped all of that infinite chain of representings of representings of representings

we are not in a position to understand the representational relation( and hence not the

Dinstrument or mediumE of representation9 Semantic s;epticism8s;epticism about what

it is so much as to purport to represent something8must then be the result9 This

argument is essentially the Cartesian regress@of@representation argument for

nonrepresentational ;nowledge of representings( applied now not )ust to the

representings( but to the relation they stand in to what they represent9

So if epistemology( and so ;nowledge( is to be intelligible( it seems that within this sort

of framewor; we must embrace the other horn of the dilemma( and ta;e it that the

representation relation is something that can itself be ;nown or understoodnonrepresentationally8that in this respect it belongs in a bo! with the representations or

appearances themsel'es9 Responding this way to the dilemma concerning our

understanding of the representational relation is( in effect( ac;nowledging the 4ode of

Presentation Condition9 #or it is saying that part of our nonrepresentational

understanding of appearances representingsA must be understanding them as appearances

representingsA of something9 Their representational properties( their 6of7@ness( their

relation to what they at least purport to represent( must be intelligible in the same sense in

which the representings themsel'es are9

The Rational Constraint Condition says that for appearances to be intelligible as

appearances( representings( modes of presentation( of something they must be intelligible

5>


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as rationall# constrained by what they then count as representing9 This means that what

is represented must be intelligible as pro'iding reasons for assessments of correctness

and incorrectness of appearances or representings9 Reasons are things that can be thought

or said: cited as reasons( for instance( for an assessment of a representing as correct or

incorrect( as amounting to ;nowledge or error9 That is to say that what pro'ides reasons

for such assessments must itself( no less than the assessments( be in conceptual form9

-i'ing reasons for underta;ing a commitment for instance( to an assessment of

correctness or incorrectnessA is endorsing a sample piece of reasoning( an inference( in

which the premises pro'ide good reasons for the commitment9 ,t is to e!hibit premises

the endorsement of which entitles one to the conclusion9 So the reasons( no less than

what they are reasons for( must be conceptually articulated9

Put another way( appearances are to be intelligible( graspable( in the sense that

they are conceptually articulated9 0nderstanding the )udgment that things are thus@and@so

re


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condition on satisfying the -KC and the ,C8then those conditions cannot be satisfied

by a two@stage representational theory that is committed to the strong differential

intelligibility of representing and represented9 ,f not only representings( but the

representation relation must be intelligible in a sense that re


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are claims( in the sense of claimable contents( rather than claimings9 " fact( he is saying(

is not something that corresponds to or is represented by such a sense9 ,t )ust is such a

sense one that is true9 #acts are a subset of claimables( senses( representings( cogniti'e

appearings9 Of course( #rege retains the two@stage representational model for the relation

between senses and their referents8for thoughts( truth@'alues9 "nd this matters for what

he thin;s senses are: modes of presentation of referents9 But as far as the relations

between thoughts and facts are concerned( he does not appeal to that model9 "gain(

Littgenstein says: DLhen we say( and mean( that such@and@such is the case( we8and

our meaning8do not stop anywhere short of the fact but we mean: this8is8so9E / ,n

these cases( the content of what we say( our meaning( is the fact9 Such an approach is

sometimes tal;ed about under the title of an Didentity theory of truth9E5M ,t is sometimes

attributed( under that rubric( to Gohn 4c$owell955

On such an approach( there is no principled gulf of intelligibility between appearance and

reality mind and worldA( because when all goes well the appearances inherit their content

from the realities they are appearances of9 Thoughts in the sense of thin;ingsA can share

their content with the true thoughts in the sense of thin;ablesA that are the facts they

represent9 "s indicated abo'e( this is not the way #rege would put things9 #or him(facts are a ;ind of representing( not in the first instance of representeds9A Representings

are distinct from representeds( so the two@stage representational model is still endorsed9

But they are understood as two forms in which one content can be manifested9

Lhat is most stri;ing about 'iews of this stripe is that they are committed to the

claim( as 4c$owell puts it in 'ind and (orld ( that Dthe conceptual has no outer

/ Philosophical Investigations =ref9? /&95M #or instance( by Gennifer 3ornsby: 5//>A( 6Truth: The ,dentity Theory7( Proceedings of the

ristotelian Societ# QC,,( pp9 5@2+ reprinted in 4ichael P9 .ynch ed9A( !he )ature of !ruth* Classic and Contemporar# Perspectives Cambridge 4" and .ondon: 4,T Press( 2MM5A( pp9 **%@H59 "lso G9 $odd2MMMA( n Identit# !heor# of !ruth .ondon: 4acmillanA955 #or instance( by G9 $odd D4c$owell and identity theories of truthE nal#sis 5//&A &&%A: 5*M@5*&9 ,doubt 4c$owell would be happy with this characteriFation of his 'iews in 'ind and (orld about thenecessity of understanding oursel'es as conceptually open to the layout of reality9

2M


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boundary9E Lhat is thin;able is identified with what is conceptually contentful9 But the

ob)ecti'e facts( no less than the sub)ecti'e thin;ings and claiming about them( are

understood as themsel'es already in conceptual shape9 The early Littgentein( no less

than the later( thought of things this way9 DThe world is e'erything that is the case( the

totality of facts9E "nd what is the case can be said of it9 #acts are essentially( and not

)ust accidentally( things that can be stated 952 iews with these conse


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understood to represent by our thoughts are other thoughts the thoughts of -odA9 Some

of the British ,dealists thought that the reality that appeared to us in thought and belief

consisted of the thought of the "bsolute8and thought they had learned that lesson from

3egel9 4ore recently( $errida using de Saussure7s conceptually pre@Kantian and pre@

#regean terminologyA offers a picture of a world consisting only of signifiers( with the

only things a'ailable to be signified being further signifiers9 "t this point( things ha'e

clearly gone badly wrong9 ,f 3egel7s opening argument has to be filled@in in a way that

has this sort of idealism as its conse9 ,n fact( though( 3egel7s idea is that the criteria of ade


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DsynthesiFingE the unityA is e!truding from the dynamically e'ol'ing unity commitments

that are materially incompatible with the new commitment( and e!tracting and endorsing(

so adding( commitments that are its material conseuences9 Gudging that p is committing

oneself to integrating p with what one is already committed to( synthesiFing a new

constellation e!hibiting that rational unity characteristic of apperception9 #rom 3egel7s

point of 'iew( that e!trusion or e!pulsion of incompatible commitments and e!traction of

and e!pansion according to conse


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impose on the process of )udgment as rational integration: their pro'iding standards for

the normati'e assessment of such integration as correct or successful( settling what one

has committed oneself to do or made oneself responsible for doing in endorsing a

)udgeable content9 But , also said that 3egel7s notion of conceptual content is not a

ps#chological one9 One could mean by that claim that what articulates conceptual

content is normative relations( a matter of what one ought to do( rather than something

that can be read immediately off of what one actuall# does or is disposed to do9 That

distinction is indeed of the essence for Kant and for 3egelA9 But in 3egel7s hands this

approach to conceptual content shows itself to be nonpsychological in a much more

robust sense9 #or he sees that it characteriFes not only the process of thin;ing on the

sub)ecti'e side of the intentional ne!us( but also what is thought about( on the ob)ecti'e

side9

#or ob)ecti'e properties( and so the facts concerning which ob)ects e!hibit which

properties( also stand in relations of material incompatibility and conse


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the claim that some states of affairs necessitate others and ma;e others impossible( the

ac;nowledgment of laws of nature( entails conceptual realism: the claim that the way the

world ob)ecti'ely is is conceptually articulated9 This is a non@psychological conception

of the conceptual in a robust sense( because ha'ing conceptual content( standing in

relations of material incompatibility and conse


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/9 3egel thin;s that underlying this point about the conceptual character of ob)ecti'e

reality is a deeper one9 #or he thin;s that the idea of determinateness itself is to be

understood in terms of standing in relations of incompatibility and conse2&+H@+

2*


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uni'ersalA9 "ristotle had already pointed out a structural asymmetry between these

categories9 ,t ma;es sense to thin; of each property as coming with a converse( in the

sense of a property that is e!hibited by all and only the ob)ects that do not e!hibit the

inde! property9 Has a mass greater than / grams is a property that has a con'erse in

this sense9 But it does not ma;e sense to thin; of obects as coming with con'erses( in

the analogous sense of an ob)ect that e!hibits all and only the properties that are not

e!hibited by the inde! ob)ect9 This is precisely because some of those properties will be

incompatible with one another( and so cannot be e!hibited by a single ob)ect9 The

number / has the properties of being a number( not being prime( being odd( and not being

di'isible by &9 ,f it had a con'erse( that ob)ect would ha'e to ha'e the properties of not

being a number( being prime( being e'en( and being di'isible by &9 But nothing can ha'e

all of those properties9

,t follows that a world that is categoriall# determinate( in that it includes

determinate properties and relationsA and ob)ects distinguishable by their properties and

relationsA( so facts about which ob)ects e!hibit which properties and stand in which

relationsA must be determinate in 3egel7s sense: the properties must stand to one another

in relations of material incompatibility9 ,f they do that( they will also stand to one another in relations of material conse


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need ewtonian physics to get to conceptual realism in this sense the barest "ristotelian

metaphysics is already enough9A This conception of the conceptual is non@psychological

in a 'ery strong sense9

I1* Alethic "odal and #eontic ,ormati&e "aterial Incompatibilit

5M9 ,n this sense( there is no problem seeing both sides of the appearance1reality

distinction as conceptually structured95> So we are not on that account obliged to

e!ca'ate a gulf of intelligibility between them9 #or the same reason( the principal

obstacle to satisfying the Rational Constraint Condition( and therefore the 4ode of

Presentation Condition( is remo'ed9 Though , ha'en7t said anything positi'e about how

they might be satisfied( either9A That means in turn that the semantic presuppositions that

, ha'e been reading 3egel as ta;ing to ma;e it impossible to satisfy the epistemological

criteria of ade/? of the Introduction95/ #or instance( in =4/5?9

2H


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of incompatibility( there will also be relations of conse


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other at that timeA9 But if one ac;nowledges a commitment to some ob)ect7s being pure

copper( it is still possible that one not ac;nowledge commitment to that ob)ect7s

conducting electricity9 ,t is )ust that one ought to9

This is to say that the relations of material incompatibility and conse


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commitment one has underta;en or is considering underta;ingA is be sensiti'e in practice

to the normati'e obligations it in'ol'es9 That means ac;nowledging commitments that

are its conse


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relations articulating the conceptual content of states of affairs to be the isomorphic

ones92M

Because of these relations( normati'ely ac;nowledging a commitment with a

certain conceptual content is ta;ing it that things ob)ecti'ely are thus@and@so8that is( it is

ta;ing a certain fact to obtain9 "nd that is to say that in immediately grasping the deontic

normati'e conceptual content of a commitment( one is grasping it as the appearance of a

fact whose content is articulated by the corresponding isomorphicA alethic modal

relations of incompatibility@and@conse


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• To s;etch the general outlines of an epistemological and semantic approach based

on that conception of the conceptual

• To indicate how such an approach might satisfy the criteria of ade


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Chapter !wo

Representation and the $'perience of $rror:

A %unctionalist Approach to the #istinction between Appearance and Realit

art ne: Strateg

I* Introduction

59 , began my pre'ious chapter by formulating a central criterion of ade


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4odern epistemological theories since $escartes7s ha'e understood ;nowledge as the

product of two factors: the ;nower7s grasp of sub)ecti'e thoughts( and those thoughts7

representational relations to ob)ecti'e things9 Knowers7 cogniti'e relations to those

represented things are accordingly mediated by representings of them9 On pain of an

infinite regress( the relations between the ;nowers and their representings cannot then in

general be understood as themsel'es mediated and representational9 "t least some of the

representings must be grasped immediately( in the sense of nonrepresentationally9

, do not thin; that 3egel re)ects as in principle bro;en@bac;ed all epistemological

theories e!hibiting this two@stage representational structure though some of his rhetoric

in'ites us to thin; otherwiseA9 Re)ecting theories of this form is not an essential element

8and certainly not the essential element8in the metaconceptual re'olution from

thin;ing in terms of categories with the structure of "erstand to thin;ing in terms of

categories with the structure of "ernunft ( which he is recommending9 Rather( 3egel

begins the Phenomenolog# proper with the claim that the two@stage representational

epistemological e!planatory strategy leads ine!orably to s;eptical conclusions if it is

combined with a particular au!iliary hypothesis concerning the difference between

representings and representeds8one that is tempting and in many ways natural92+

This isthe idea that only representings appearances( phenomenaA are in conceptual shape( while

what is represented by them reality( noumenaA is not9 On such a 'iew( cogniti'e

processes must transform or map nonconceptual reality into or onto conceptual

presentations( since the representational relations those processes institute relate

nonconceptual representeds to conceptual representings9 -etting this picture in 'iew is( ,

ta;e it( the point of 3egel7s metaphors of ;nowing as an DinstrumentE or a DmediumE in

the opening paragraphs of the Introduction9 The culprit( the semantic assumption that

threatens to enforce epistemological s;epticism by e!ca'ating a gulf of intelligibility

between thought and the world thought about( is the idea that only what we thin;( and not

the world we thin; about( is conceptually articulated9

2+ The Preface( li;e most prefaces( was written after the body of the boo; Dthe Phenomenolog# properEAwas completed9 0nli;e most( , thin; it is also best read after the rest of the boo;9

%*


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29 The constructi'e suggestion 3egel offers as an alternati'e to this assumption is a

radically new( nonpsychological conception of the conceptual9 "ccording to this

conception( to be conceptually contentful is to stand in relations of materialincompatibility Ddeterminate negationEA and material conse


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principle as unintelligible9 Conceptual realism about the ob)ecti'e world( understood in

terms of the new( nonpsychological conception of the conceptual( is 3egel7s alternati'e

response9

"s , read it( the )ob of the last two@thirds of the Introduction is to s;etch a way of

thin;ing about representation( once the two@stage representational semantic model has

been shorn of the ob)ectionable collateral commitment to understanding representation as

relating conceptual representings to nonconceptual representeds9 This means showing

how to satisfy two of the ;ey criteria of ade


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e!press when we say or thin; something( and what we represent in doing so92* Le can

say both DKant came to belie'e that .ampl was betraying him(E and DKant belie'ed of his

faithful ser'ant that he was betraying Kant9E ,n the first( the declarati'e sentence that

follows the 6that7 e!presses the content of the belief( and in the second( the noun@phrase

within the scope of the 6of7 says what the belief is about9

Lhat , ha'e called D3egel7s nonpsychological conception of the conceptual(E which

construes conceptual contentfulness as consisting in standing in relations of material

incompatibility and conse The


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of the two dimensions of intentionality( which has dominated the philosophical semantics

of the philosophical tradition of the past century that we inherit( as much as it did the

somewhat shorterA philosophical tradition he inherited92H

III* !wo Kantian Ideas

+9 3egel has a big new idea about how to e!plain representational content in terms

of conceptual content( understood nonpsychologically( as he does( in terms of articulation

by relations of material incompatibility and conse


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By pursuing an account with this shape( Kant ma;es urgent the


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These are ought@to@do7s that correspond to the ought@to@be7s that one7s cogniti'e

commitments( )udgments( or beliefs ought to be consistent( complete( and )ustified9 They

are norms of rationality. Lhen e!plicitly ac;nowledged( they are the norms of

s#stematicit#9 Since )udging consists in implicitly committing oneself to fulfill the

critical( ampliati'e( and )ustificatory integrati'e@synthetic tas; responsibilities( in )udging

at all one implicitly underta;es these rational( systematic commitments9 Collecti'ely(

they define the rational( normati'e( synthetic unity of apperception9

III* Hegel’s %unctionalist Idea

&9 3egel sees that this account of the activit# of )udging has immediate

conse


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3egel e!tracts his conception of conceptual contentfulness from what is re


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represented9 Something paradigmatically( a )udgingA is intelligible as being a

representing )ust insofar as it is responsible for its correctness to something that thereby

counts as represented by it9

,n Kant7s terms( the ob)ecti'e form of )udgment is the Dob)ectJQE which e'ery )udgment

as such is responsible to for its correctnessA9 The sub)ecti'e form of )udgment( the D,

thin;E which can accompany e'ery )udging( mar;s the ;nower who is responsible for the

)udgment8that is( responsible for integrating it with the others for which that ;nower

ta;es the same ;ind of responsibility9A ,n the form in which this thought appears in

3egel7s Introduction( represented ob)ects are what ser'es as a normati'e standard

=4astab? for assessments of commitments that count as representing those ob)ects )ust

in 'irtue of that constellation of authority and responsibility9 3egel7s idea is to apply the

functionalist e!planatory strategy( which loo;ed to normati'e role in the synthetic@

integrati'e acti'ity of )udging for understanding the conceptual dimension of )udgeable

contents( also to the understanding of the representational dimension of content9 That is(

he will loo; to what ;nowing sub)ects need to do in order thereby to count as

ac;nowledging the authority of something to ser'e as a standard for assessing the

correctness of a )udgment( in order to understand representational relations9 ,f he cane!hibit that ;ind of doing as an aspect of the synthetic@integrati'e acti'ity in terms of

which the conceptual dimension of content is e!plained( he will ha'e carried out the

conceptualist e!planatory strategy of understanding the representational dimension of

intentionality in terms of the e!pressi'e@conceptual dimension 6of7@intentionality in

terms of 6that7@intentionalityA9

, ta;e it that the main tas; of the last two@thirds of the Introduction to the Phenomenolog#

is to s;etch this way of wor;ing@out the conceptualist e!planatory strategy for

understanding the relations between the two dimensions of intentionality9 The logical

flow as , see it is this9

++


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59 The starting@point is Kant7s normative conception of )udgment( which sees

)udging as endorsing( committing oneself to( ta;ing responsibility for some

)udgeable content9

29 This idea is made more definite by the Kantian account of )udging as integrating anew commitment into a constellation of prior commitments( so as to maintain the

rational normati'e unity distincti'e of apperception9

%9 That idea in turn is filled in by understanding the synthetic@integrati'e acti'ity as

ha'ing the tripartite substructure of satisfying critical( ampliati'e( and

)ustificatory tas;@responsibilities9

+9 To this idea is con)oined the functionalist strategy of understanding )udgeablecontents as articulated by the relations they must stand in in order to play their

role in that acti'ity( as what one is endorsing( committing oneself to( or ta;ing

responsibility for9

&9 ,n light of the tripartite substructure of synthesiFing a constellation of

commitments e!hibiting the rational unity distincti'e of apperception

intentionalityA( this thought yields a conception of )udgeable contents as

articulated by rational relations of material incompatibility appealed to by thecritical tas;@responsibilityA and material conse


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ob)ect insofar as it is responsible to that ob)ect for its correctness( insofar as that

ob)ect e!ercises authority o'er or ser'es as a standard for assessments of its

correctness9

>9 The strategy is then to apply the functionalist idea again( to understandrepresentational content in terms of what is re


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called DrepresentingsE is Dwhat things are for consciousness9E Lhat things are for

consciousness purports to be the appearance of a reality: what things are in themsel'es9

Satisfying the 4PC is saying what it is for something to show up as an appearance of

something9 Le can also tal; about the representing1represented( appearance1reality( what

things are for consciousness1what things are in themsel'es distinction in terms of the

Kantian phenomena1noumena distinction9

The


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Le ha'e seen that the first piece of the puFFle is the idea that for something to be

something for consciousness is to be understood in normati'e terms of the distincti'e

;ind of authorit# it e!ercises o'er assessments of the correctness of the )udgments

consciousness consists in9 Gudgments must be responsible to what is represented( for

their correctness( for them to be intelligible as representing it( being about it( being an

appearance of it9 "s 3egel puts the point( what is represented must ser'e as a normati'e

standard for )udgings9 The ne!t


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Dto consciousnessE is e!pressed without an e!plicit preposition( in the dati'e and

anaphoricA construction Dihm9E%2

H9 Lhat 3egel tells us is something to consciousness is )ust the distinction between

what things are for consciousness and what they are in themsel'es9 , ta;e it that what

something is for consciousness is the content of a )udgment: something that is e$plicit 9

Gudgeable contents are e!plicit in the sense of being thin;able and statable in declarati'e

sentences or 6that7@clausesA9 They are propositional contents9 "s we ha'e seen( 3egel

understands such contents in terms of the relations of material incompatibility and

henceA material conse


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e!plicitly in )udgments9%& But we who are thin;ing about its acti'ity must be able to

attribute to it a grasp of what these concepts ma;e e!plicit( a grasp that is implicit in what

consciousness does9

The normati'e construal of representation teaches us that the role something must play in

practice in order to be functioning as a reality that is represented by or appearing in a

)udgment is that of a normati'e standard for the assessment of its correctness9%* Lhat in

the pre'ious chapter , called the Drational constraint conditionE tells us that what ser'es

as a standard of assessment of )udgeable contents must be able to ser'e as a reason for

the assessment9 This is to say that it must( at least in principle( be a'ailable to

consciousness as a reason9 To be ser'iceable as a reason( what plays the role of a

standard of assessment must be in conceptual shape it must stand to representings and

representables in relations of material incompatibility and conse


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results when a sub)ect finds itself with incompatible commitments9 This process is the

e!perience of error 9

Consider an e!ample9 " naV'e sub)ect loo;s at a stic; half@submerged in the water of a pond and perceptually ac


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Brandom

is implicitly treating them as sharing a topic( as being about the same thing9 To say that

this ac;nowledgment of common representational purport is implicit is to say that the

representational purport is ac;nowledged in what the sub)ect does( rather than e!plicitly(

as the propositional content of a )udgment8a )udgment to the effect that these different

senses conceptual contents( articulated by their relations of material incompatibility and

conse


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,n our e!ample( in relin


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conte!t of collateral beliefs concerning rigidity( what can change the shape of rigid

ob)ects( and the relati'e reliability of 'isual perception under 'arious conditions( the

straight@stic; belief is accepted as a standard for the assessment of the correctness

'eridicalityA of the bent@stic; belief9 Since they are incompatible( the latter is re)ected as

incorrect according to that standard9 The bent@stic; belief is assessed as responsible to

the constellation of commitments that includes the straight@stic; belief9 "ll of this is to

say that as presented in the straight@stic; )udgment( the straight stic; is performing the

normative functional office characteristic of the reality represented by some representing:

it is an authoritati'e standard for assessments of the correctness of representings that

count as about it )ust in 'irtue of being responsible to it for such assessments9 So when

we loo; at the role played by 'arious commitments in the e!perience of error( we see that

the mode of presentation condition is satisfied in the sense re


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Brandom

to consciousness( or implicitly9 #or the sub)ect of the e!perience of error need not

e!plicitly deploy concepts of reality and appearance( represented and representing( what

things are in themsel'es and what things are for consciousness( noumena and phenomena(

in order for what it does in retaining one of the conte!tuallyA materially incompatible

dyad of commitments and re)ecting the other to be intelligible as practically ta;ing or

treating one as presenting how things really are and the other as presenting a mere

appearance9 One is to consciousness what the stic; is in itself straightA( and the other is

to consciousness what the stic; is wasA merely for consciousness9%H This is what 3egel

means when he says that Dconsciousness pro'ides itself with its own standard(E how Din

what consciousness within its own self designates as the in-itself or the true( we ha'e the

standard by which consciousness itself proposes to measure its ;nowledge9E%/

1I* !he !wo Sides of Conceptual Content are Representationall Related

559 On 3egel7s model the conceptual content shared by representing and represented(

appearance and reality( phenomenon and noumenon( commitment and fact is abstracted

from the two different forms that relations of material incompatibility and conse


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side( it means that commitments can be understood as determinate only in the conte!t of

the functional role they play in the process of ac


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bolt them together to get an intelligible picture of their intentional relations9 That

approach( he claims( is doomed so long as a psychological conception of the conceptual

and hence of the intelligibleA restricts conceptual content to the sub)ecti'e side of what

then ine'itably appears as a gulf of intelligibility separating ;nowing and acting sub)ects

from the ob)ecti'e world they ;now about and act on and in9

529 3ow are we to understand the conception of conceptual content articulated by

relations of determinate negation and mediationA as amphibious between its two forms:

sub)ecti'e@normati'e and ob)ecti'e@modalN , thin; it should be understood in terms of

two claims9 #irst( deontic normati'e 'ocabulary is a pragmatic metavocabular# for

alethic modal 'ocabulary9 Second( as a conse


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understand alethic modal 'ocabulary( cannot deploy it with understanding( unless one has

mastered the normati'ely go'erned practices made e!plicit by deontic 'ocabulary9 This

is a claim about practically grasping what is e!pressed by alethic modal 'ocabulary8

about what one must be able to do in order to sa# what it says9 ,t is not a claim about

what must be true for what one sa#s using that modal 'ocabulary to be true9 That is( the

claim is not that unless some claims formulable in deontic normati'e 'ocabulary were

true( no claims formulable in alethic modal 'ocabulary could be true9 ,t is not( and does

not entail( the claim that unless some concept@users could apply normati'e 'ocabulary( no

modal claims would be true9 The claim is that unless one practicall# understands what is

said by normati'e 'ocabulary8can do the things( engage in the practices( that are

specifiable in normati'e 'ocabulary8one cannot understand what is said by modal

'ocabulary9 That is( the claim is that there is a ;ind of sense@dependence of modal

'ocabulary on what is e!pressed by normati'e 'ocabulary( not a ;ind of reference@

dependence9

That distinction can be made clear by an e!ample that has nothing to do with normati'ity

or modality9 Regardless of whether or not this would be a good way to thin; about the

concept of beauty( we can define a response-dependent concept beautyX by stipulatingthat some ob)ect or situation counts as beautifulX )ust in case it would ( under suitable

circumstances( produce a response of pleasure in a suitable sub)ect suitably e!posed to it9

The use , want to ma;e of the e!ample won7t depend on how these 'arious parametric

notions of suitability get filled@in9A Then the property of being beautiful3 is sense@

dependent on that of pleasure: one could not understand the amphibiously

correspondingA concept beautifulX unless one understood the concept pleasure9 #or the

one is defined in terms of the other9 ,t does not at all follow that something could not be

beautifulX unless something responded with pleasure9 On this definition( there were

sunsets that were beautifulX before there were any suitable( pleasure@capable responders(

and they would still ha'e been beautifulX e'en if there ne'er had been such responders9

#or it still could be the case that if there were such responders present( they would

respond or would have respondedA with pleasure9 ,n )ust the same way( if we define a

&H


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planet or star as DsupraterraneanE )ust in case it has a mass more than twice that of the

arth( we are not thereby committing oursel'es to denying that a planet could ha'e that

property in a possible world in which the arth did not e!ist9 $epending on how they are

specified( properties can be sense-dependent on other properties as beautiful3 is on

pleasure and supraterranean is on has at least twice the mass of the $arthA( without

being reference-dependent on them9 That is( something can e!hibit a property P that is

sense@dependent( but not reference@dependent( on a property P7 in a world in which

nothing e!hibits the property P79

The claimed dependence of modal properties 'ia their amphibiously corresponding

conceptsA on norm@go'erned acti'ities of accepting and re)ecting commitments is of the

sense@dependence( rather than the reference@dependence ;ind9 The ob)ecti'e world

would still be conceptually structured in the sense of consisting of facts about ob)ects and

their properties and relations( articulated by alethic modal relations of relati'e

compossibility and necessitation( e'en in worlds that ne'er included ;nowing and acting

sub)ects who applied normati'ely articulated concepts in underta;ing and re)ecting

commitments9 The mind@dependence of the ob)ecti'e world asserted by this dimension

of 3egel7s idealism8call it Dob)ecti'e idealismE8is not the ob)ectionable Ber;eleyanreference@dependence ;ind( but of the much more plausible or at least colorableA sense@

dependence ;ind9 (e can understand and describe possible worlds without sub)ects to

whom deontic normati'e 'ocabulary applies as nonetheless ma;ing applicable alethic

modal 'ocabulary9 But our capacity to ma;e sense of such possibilities depends on our

being able to engage in practices made e!plicit by the application of deontic normati'e

'ocabulary9

The sort of model that 3egel constructs to contrast with two@stage representational

models committed to a strong difference of intelligibility between representings and

representeds depends on an account of conceptual contentfulness committed to the

amphibiousness of conceptual content between a sub)ecti'e form articulated by deontic

&/


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normati'e relations of incompatibility@and@conse


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1II* Conclusion

5%9 , ended Chapter One with a discussion of the two forms conceptual content can be

seen to ta;e( once we adopt 3egel7s non@psychological conception of it as articulated by

relations of material incompatibility and conse


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Brandom

and entitlement and the sub)ecti'e aspect of the notion of material incompatibility they

articulateA( can be understood as in'ol'ing representational purport: as an appearance

what things are for consciousnessA of the realit# what things are in themsel'esA

constituted by the ob)ecti'e states of affairs discussed in alethic modal terms of necessity

and possibility and the ob)ecti'e aspect of the notion of material incompatibility they

articulateA9

Lhat in Chapter One , called the DRational ConstraintE condition is the re


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Brandom


Chapter !hree

%ollowing the ath of #espair to a 4acchanalian Re&el:

!he $mergence of the Second2 !rue2 b5ect

I* Introduction

59 3egel opens the Introduction to the Phenomenolog# by considering an

epistemological picture according to which our cogniti'e faculties are regarded as Dthe

instrument with which one ta;es hold of the absolute or as the medium through which

one disco'ers it9E+2 Philosophers otherwise as di'erse as $escartes( .oc;e( and Kant can

be seen to wor; with 'ersions of such a picture9 ,t seems clear that 3egel thin;s we need

to brea; out of the confines of this DnaturalE way of thin;ing about ;nowledge9 ,n

Chapter One( , tried to say why( and to indicate in general terms the shape of the new

picture he will recommend to succeed this traditional one9

The broadest form of his ob)ection is that theories of the ;ind he is complaining about

ma;e us patsies for s;epticism9 4ore specifically( he thin;s traditional modern

epistemology is conducted within the scope of semantic assumptions that ma;e it

+2 =4>%?

*%


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Brandom

impossible in the end to satisfy what , called the D-enuine Knowledge Condition9E This

is the re+?9 ,n the conte!t of suchan assumption( it is a contradiction to treat ;nowledge as nonetheless genuinely possible9

*+


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gained through it9E++ The result of DsubtractingE its conceptual form from our

understanding would be something unintelligible9 Le cannot understand the relation

between what is intelligible and what is not intelligible( for the simple reason that we

cannot understand what is not intelligible9 " picture of this sort cannot satisfy the

-enuine Knowledge Condition9

29 ,n Chapter One( , suggested that the ;ey to the alternati'e picture 3egel wants to

put in place lies in the non@psychological conception of the conceptual he introduces and

de'elops in the Consciousness section of the Phenomenolog#9 "ccording to this

conception( conceptual contents are articulated by relations of material incompatibility:

his Ddeterminate negationE or De!clusi'e differenceE "ristotelian contrarietyA9 ,t will

follow that conceptual contents also stand to one another in relations of material

conse%?9

*&


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Brandom

This way of understanding the metaphysics of determinateness is by no means

idiosyncratic to 3egel9 Besides its SpinoFist and( indeed( ScholasticA antecedents( it is

the master idea behind contemporary information theory( which understands theinformation con'eyed by a signal in terms of the possibilities its receipt e!cludes for its

recipient9 "nd it can be understood as another way of e!pressing the understanding of a

proposition as a partition of possible worlds into those compatible and those incompatible

with its truth9 But what warrant is there for thin;ing of this metaphysical conception of

determinateness in terms of material incompatibility as a conception of the conceptual N

Gustifying that identification re


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Brandom

characteristic of apperception9 That unity is a rational unity( with critical( ampliati'e( and

)ustificatory dimensions( corresponding to the normati'e obligation to e!trude materially

incompatible commitments( ac;nowledge material conse


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Brandom

,n the second phase of the e!perience of error( a sub)ect responds to the ac;nowledgment

of error by fulfilling the critical tas;@responsibility of repairing the incoherence( by

amending or discarding one of the commitments9 $oing that is treating the amended or

discarded commitment as a mere appearance( and the retained and resulting commitments

as e!pressing how things really are9 ,n this way( through the e!perience of error( the

distinction between what things are in themselves realityA and what things are merely for

consciousness appearanceA becomes something to consciousness itself9 That distinction

is practically implicit in the process that is the e!perience of error9 This is how

consciousness incorporates as a basic aspect of the structure of its functioning a practical

appreciation of its determinate sub)ecti'e commitments as purporting to represent how

things really( ob)ecti'ely are9 ,t treats its commitments as about things in the sense of

answering to how things are in themsel'es for the correctness of how things are for it9

%9 So 3egel7s SpinoFist concept of determinateness( in terms of articulation by

relations of modally robust e!clusion( material incompatibility( or determinate negation(

meets the principal re


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Brandom

follows that the sub)ect ought not to be( that such a sub)ect is obliged to do something to

change the situation: to fulfill the standing critical tas;@responsibility to rectify the

situation by eliminating the incoherence9 On the side of ob)ects( incompatibility of

properties is an alethic modal matter of impossibility on the side of sub)ects(

incompatibility of commitments is a deontic normati'e matter of impropriety9

But the notion of material incompatibility or determinate negation that comes in these

two fla'ors is not simply ambiguous9 #or what one must do( in order thereby to count as

practically taking or treating two ob)ecti'e properties or states of affairs as ob)ecti'ely

incompatible is precisely treat the corresponding commitments as normati'ely

incompatible8in the sense that finding oneself with both obliges one to change one7s

commitment( in ac;nowledgment of an error 9 Treating two commitments as

incompatible in the deontic normati'e sense is representing two properties or states of

affairs as incompatible in the alethic modal sense9 Lhat one must do in order to manifest

practically one7s grasp or understanding of conceptual contents is suitably engage with

them in the practice or process of e!perience( especially the e!perience of error( by

fulfilling one7s obligation to resol'e ac;nowledged incompatibilities9 $oing that is

treating incompatible commitments as representing incompatible states of affairs9

The relation between the sense of Dmaterially incompatibleE that is articulated by deontic

normati'e relations of what one is obliged or entitled to do( on the sub)ecti'e side of

representings what things are for consciousnessA( and the sense that is articulated by

alethic modal relations of what is necessary and possible( on the ob)ecti'e side of

representeds what things are in themsel'esA is one of reciprocal sense@dependence9 ,t is

not that there cannot be ob)ecti'e properties and states of affairs standing in relations of

modal incompatibility to one another unless there are representings of them9 ,t is that one

cannot understand what one is saying or thin;ing in saying or thin;ing that they stand in

such relations( e!cept as part of a story that includes what sub)ects who represent them as

so standing( by practically ac;nowledging their normati'e obligation to do something to

*/


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Brandom

repair the situation when they find themsel'es with commitments to ob)ects ha'ing

incompatible properties( or to incompatible states of affairs more generally9 "nd one

cannot understand the nature of the obligation to alter one7s conceptual commitments

when they turn out to be incompatible unless one understands them as representing

ob)ecti'ely incompatible situations9 This relation of reciprocal sense@dependence is

responsible for the Ganus@faced character of 3egel7s metaconcept of determinate

negation9 On the one hand( it characteriFes the alethic modal relations that as Kant

taughtA structure the ob)ecti'e world9 On the other hand( it characteriFes the norm@

go'erned sub)ecti'e process or practice that is e!perience8which is always( inter alia(

the e!perience of error9 ,n this latter aspect( it is not a matter of static relations( but a

dynamic principle of mo'ement( change( and de'elopment9+&

That one cannot understand the most fundamental structure of the ob)ecti'e world apart

from understanding what one must do to represent things as being so is an essential

element of 3egel7s idealism9 One can put the point by saying that ob)ecti'e substances(

no less than sub)ects( things no less than thoughts( as determinate( are essentially

conceptuall# structured9+* But unless one ;eeps in mind the comple! fine@structure of

3egel7s Ganus@faced non@psychological conception of the conceptual in terms ofdeterminateness as articulated by material incompatibility( one will not understand what

is meant by such a claim9

+& The pure mo'ement of this alienation( considered in connection with the content( constitutes thenecessity of the content9 The distinct content( as determinate( is in relation( is not Win itselfW it is its ownrestless process of superseding itself( or negati'ity=4HM&?+* Lithout endorsing the 3egelian conception of the conceptual in terms of determinate negation( in

particular without in'o;ing the fine@structure that relates its ob)ecti'e alethic modal and sub)ecti'e deonticnormati'e aspects( Gohn 4c$owell ma;es a point of this general shape when he says in 'ind and (orld =3ar'ard 0ni'ersity Press( 5//+? that on the understanding he is recommending and associates with both

Kant and 3egelA Dthe conceptual has no outer boundary9E

>M


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II* !he $mergence of the Second2 ,ew2 !rue b5ect

+9 The greatest hermeneutic challenge in reading the Introduction lies in the three

paragraphs that precede the final one =H&?( =H*?( and =H>?( in 4iller7s numberingA9 #or

here 3egel ma;es two claims that are surprising enough to be worth


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Something is to it the in-itself, but the ;nowledge or the being of the ob)ect for

consciousness is to it still another moment9 ,t is upon this differentiation( which e!ists

and is present at hand( that the e!amination =Prfung? is grounded9 "nd if( in this

comparison( the two moments do not correspond( then it seems that consciousness will

ha'e to alter its ;nowledge in order to bring it into accord with the ob)ect9 =H&?

That is( after the discordance has been repaired and material compatibility restored( the

appearance( what things are for consciousness( should( as far as consciousness is

concerned Dto consciousnessEA( ha'e been brought in line with the reality( what things

are in@themsel'es9

But that is not how 3egel wants us to understand what happens in such

e!perience:

,n the alteration of the ;nowledge( howe'er( the ob)ect itself becomes to consciousness

something which has in fact been altered as well9 #or the ;nowledge which e!isted was

essentially a ;nowledge of the ob)ect: with change in the ;nowledge( the ob)ect also

becomes an other( since it was an essential part of this ;nowledge9 3ence it comes to pass

for consciousness that what had been to it the in-itself is not in itself( or( what was in

itself was so only for consciousness. Lhen therefore consciousness finds its ;nowledge

not corresponding with its ob)ect( the ob)ect itself will also gi'e way9 ,n other words( the

standard =4astab? of the e!amination is changed if that whose standard it was supposed

to be fails to endure the course of the e!amination9 Thus the e!amination is not only an

e!amination of ;nowledge( but also of the standard used in the e!amination itself9 =H&?

This is 'ery odd9 Lhy should we thin; that when a commitment a sub)ect too; to

e!press how things really are that is what it was to itA is re'ealed as e!pressing merely

how things are for consciousness( that the realit# changesN Lhen , realiFe that the stic; ,

too; to be bent is really straight( my 'iew of the stic; changes( but the stic; itself does

not9 That , too; it to be bent is not ( in our ordinary way of thin;ing( an essential feature

of the stick 9 Surely the contrary claim does not follow from what one might )ustifiably

>2


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claim: that its ob)ect( the stic;( was an essential feature of the appearance( the stic;@as@

bent9 The stic; ser'es as a standard for assessments of the correctness of my

commitments as to its shape9 ,n what sense does that standard change when , realiFe that

my shape@commitment does not measure up to the standard( that it gets things wrongN

3egel7s claim here seems e!tra'agant and per'erse9 The argument he offers:

#or the ;nowledge which e!isted was essentially =wesentlich? a ;nowledge of the ob)ect:

with change in the ;nowledge( the ob)ect also becomes an other( since it was an essential

part of this ;nowledge9

appears to trade on an ob'iously unwarranted slide9 'en if we grant that what it is a

claim about what it representsA is essential to the identity of the claim8so that altering

the represented ob)ect would alter the content of the claim8it )ust does not follow that

the content of the claim is correspondingly essential to the identity of the represented

ob)ect8so that altering the content of the claim alters the ob)ect9 DBeing essential toE is

not in general a symmetric relation9 So for instance( we might thin; that the identity of

my parents is essential to my identity9 "nyone with different people as parents would be

someone different from me it is not possible for me to ha'e had different people as

parents9 But when we loo; at the con'erse( it does seem possible that my parents might

ne'er ha'e had any children( or only had some of the children they did( not including me9ssentiality of origin of humans does not entail essentiality of offspring9 ,t is easy to see

3egel here as engaging in a sleight@of@hand( attempting to smuggle in unobser'ed an

implausible idealism that ma;es what is thought about it essential to the identity of what

is thought about9 But that would be to misunderstand the claim he is ma;ing9

The second surprising claim is introduced as part of an account of the basic

structure of e$perience( in the distincti'e technical sense 3egel introduces here:

This dialectical mo'ement( which consciousness e!ercises on its self8on its ;nowledge

as well as its ob)ect8is( in so far as the new, true obect emerges to consciousness as the

result of it( precisely that which is called e$perience. =H*?

>%


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The challenge posed by the earlier passage is echoed here9 3ow are we to understand the

Dmo'ementE which consciousness De!ercisesE on the obect of its ;nowledgeN The ;ey


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be what consciousness practically ta;es or treats as real9 "t the beginning of the

e!perience( the sub)ect in


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0nderstanding that the two Dob)ectsE are the bent@stic; representation when it was

endorsed and the bent@stic; representation when it is no longer endorsed( we are now in a

position to see that on our first reading we misunderstood D;nowledge of the ob)ectE in

the argument

#or the ;nowledge which e!isted was essentially a ;nowledge of the ob)ect: with change

in the ;nowledge( the ob)ect also becomes an other( since it was an essential part of this

;nowledge9

Lhat is ;nowledge to consciousness is what is endorsed( what the sub)ect practically or

implicitly ta;es to be how things really are9 Lhat has( to consciousness( the status of

;nowledge changes in the course of the e!perience( from being the stic; as bent to being

the stic; as straight9 That was ;nowledge of the ob)ect not in the sense in which a

representing is of something represented( but in the sense that the status being to

consciousness ;nowledgeA was possessed or e!hibited by the ob)ect the bent@stic;

representationA9 That the status was possessed by that ob)ect that conceptual contentA is

indeed essential to that ;nowing =Ddenn das 'orhandene Lissen war wesentlich ein

Lissen 'on dem -egenstandeE?9 Lhen the status attaches to something else( a straight@

stic; representation( it is in a straightforward sense a different ;nowing9 Lhat ob)ect

conceptual contentA it attaches to is essential to its being that ;nowing9 "ltering the;nowing( by endorsing a different( incompatible content( alters the status of the original

content( and so alters the Dob)ectE associated with the original ;nowing: its status changes

from being a conceptual content that is endorsed to being one that is re)ected9

So read( the first originally surprising claim becomes so no longer9 The second

surprising claim is one that 3egel himself flags as such:

,n this presentation of the course of e!perience( there is a moment in 'irtue of which it

does not seem to be in agreement with the ordinary use of the term De!perience9E This

moment is the transition from the first ob)ect and the ;nowledge of that ob)ect to the

other ob)ect9 "lthough it is said that the e!perience is made in this other obect, here the

>*


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transition has been presented in such a way that the ;nowledge of the first ob)ect( or the

being@for@consciousness of the first in@itself( is seen to become the second ob)ect itself9

By contrast( it usually seems that we somehow disco'er another ob)ect in a manner >


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This way of obser'ing the sub)ect matter is our contribution it does not e!ist for the

consciousness which we obser'e9 But when 'iewed in this way the se?8the wor;ing title with which 3egel began the pro)ect of writing

what would become the Phenomenolog#9 The particular commitments ac;nowledgement

of whose material incompatibility intiates a process of e!perience are contingent9 Lhat

is necessary about that process is the ac;nowledgement of error( and the subse =HM2?( in the final chapter( bsolute 4nowing 9

>H


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Brandom

*9 3egel tells us that the ;ey to understanding the significance of the change in

perspecti'e he is urging is to thin; through the significance for the threat of s;epticism of

the role of what is made e!plicit in e!perience by the concept of determinate negation9

The penultimate paragraph of the Introduction continues:

"s a matter of fact( the circumstance which guides this way of obser'ing is the same as

the one pre'iously discussed with regard to the relationship between the present in?

Le ha'e put oursel'es in a position to understand this final sentence( about how the

change of normati'e status a )udgeable content undergoes when the sub)ect withdraws a

pre'ious endorsement the Din'ersion of consciousnessEA is intelligible as the emergence

of a new ob)ect9 Lhat does this ha'e to do with the attitude we should ta;e toward

s;epticismN

The issue arises because of the e!pository tra)ectory we ha'e tra'ersed9 ,n

Chapter One( , claimed that we should read the opening of the Introduction as concerned

that epistemological s;epticism not be forced on us already by our semantics9 The more

specific diagnosis was that s;epticism will be forced on us if we construe the relation

between appearance and reality as one in which conceptually contentful representings

confront nonconceptually structured representeds across what then looms as a gulf of

intelligibility9 , claimed further that 3egel7s proposed therapy gestured at in the

Introduction( and de'eloped in the Consciousness chaptersA is to identify conceptual

contentfulness with determinateness( and to understand determinateness in terms of

negation9 This is appealing to the SpinoFist principle DOmnis determinatio est negatio9E

>/


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Brandom

The ;ind of negation in


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with Kant depends on Kant7s grounding of semantics in pragmatics: his account of what

one must do in order to ta;e responsibility for a )udgeable conceptual content9

,n Chapter Two( , rehearsed how 3egel7s account of the e!perience of error8

what he ma;es of Kant7s critical integrati'e tas;@responsibility in synthesiFing a

constellation of commitments that has the rational unity distincti'e of apperception8

underwrites an implicit( practical grasp of representational purport9 $ownstream from

Kant( 3egel7s conception of determinate negation accordingly incorporates an essentially

d#namic element9 ,t arises out of the crucial residual asymmetry between the order and

connection of ideas and that of things9 ,t is impossible for one ob)ect simultaneously to

e!hibit materially incompatible properties or for two incompatible states of affairs to

obtainA( while it is only inappropriate for one sub)ect simultaneously to endorse

materially incompatible commitments9 Representings are articulated by deontic

normati'e relations( while representeds are articulated by alethic modal ones9 #inding

oneself with materially incompatible commitments obliges one to do something( to re'ise

those commitments so as to remo'e the incoherence9 ,t is only in terms of that obligation

to repair that we can understand what it is to ta;e or treat two ob)ecti'e properties or

states of affairs as incompatible in the alethic modal sense9 0nderstanding therepresentational dimension of conceptual content8the relation and connection between

the deontic and alethic limbs of the cogniti'e@practical constellation of sub)ecti'e and

ob)ecti'e8re


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Brandom

But the re'elation that the semantogenic core of e!perience is the e!perience of

error ( that its essence consists in the unmas;ing of something as not real( but as mere

appearance( seems to raise once more the specter of s;epticism9 ,f error is the necessaryform of e!perience( if what one implicitly disco'ers in e!perience is always the

incorrectness and inade9 3egel wants to understand the relation between the two Dob)ectsE( the Dfirst in@itselfE and the Dbeing@ for@consciousness of the in@itselfE as one of negation9 DThis new

ob)ect contains the nothingness =ichtig;eit? of the first( it is what e!perience has made

of itE =H*?9 The idea is that s;epticism consists in ta;ing the sense in which the second

ob)ect is negation of the first to be formal or abstract negation( rather than determinate

negation9 $oing that is Dallowing the result which emerges from an untrue mode of

;nowledgeE to Ddissol'e into an empty nothingness9E The point is that the sense in which

the second ob)ect Dcontains the nothingness of the firstE is not that DThe stic; is bent(E is

succeeded by DThe stic; is not bent9E ,t is that it is succeeded by the realiFation that DThe

stic; is bent(E is not saying how things really are9 ,t is an appearance( a mis@

representation of a straight stick 9 That is the materially incompatible commitment for

which the bent@stic; representation was discarded( changing its normati'e status9 The

original commitment is not re'ealed by its incorrectness as an appearance8but as the

appearance of a realit#9 ,t is genuinely an appearance of that reality: a way that reality

shows up for consciousness9 ,t is wrong( but it is not simply wrong9 ,t is a path to the

truth9

Lhen 3egel says that Dthe result which emerges from an untrue mode of

;nowledgeE must Dbe grasped as the nothingness of that whose result it is, a result which

H2


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Brandom

further but must wait and see whether anything new presents itself to it( and what this is(

in order to cast it into the same abysmal 'oid9 But if( on the contrary( the result is

comprehended as it truly is( as determinate negation( a new form has thereby

immediately arisen =>/?

Only from the point of 'iew he is recommending can we ma;e sense of the fact that in

each e!perience of error something positi'e is learned9 One of the pieces of the puFFle8

and 3egel7s solution8that , hope to ha'e added here is the understanding of how the

representational dimension of conceptual content( no less than the e!pressi'e dimension(

becomes intelligible in terms of the essential constituti'e role determinate negation plays

in the process of e!perience9

onetheless( we can as;: Lhy doesn7t 3egel7s account of e!perience as the

e!perience of error( as the unmas;ing of what we too; to reality as appearance( as the

re'elation of what was to sub)ects the way things are in themsel'es as merely how they

are for consciousness pro'ide e!actly the premise needed for a fallibilist metainductionN

The fallibilist metainduction is the inference that starts with the obser'ation that e'ery

belief we ha'e had or )udgment we ha'e made has e'entually turned out to be false( at

least in detail( and concl

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