Heidegger Aristotle (Submission)

7/28/2019 Heidegger Aristotle (Submission)

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To appear inEpoch: A Journal for the History of Philosophy 18 (1), forthcoming, Fall 2013.

Do not quote or cite unless given explicit permission by the author.

Heidegger's Sein zum Tode as radicalization of

Aristotles definition ofkinsis

Joseph P. Carter

University of Georgia

Abstract: There is evidence in the early Vorlesungen to suggest that in Sein und ZeitHeidegger's

description of Dasein as Bewegung/Bewegtheitrelies on his reading of Aristotles definition of

motion, given specifically in the 1924 Die Grundbegriffe der aristotelischen Philosophie.

According to Heidegger, Aristotle identifies kinsis with energeia and calls it active

potentiality (ttige Mglichkeit). In this essay, I show how Heidegger's interpretation of

Aristotles definition of motion sheds light on the arguments concerning being-towards-death

(Sein zum Tode) in Sein und Zeit. I argue that self-understanding is Dasein's active potentiality,

since this is its authentic being-towards-death. In turn, I assess Heideggers philological and

philosophical justifications for collapsing the distinction between energeia and kinsis in

Aristotle, showing how Heidegger diverges from Aristotle's doctrines.


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In the opening passages of Division II.5 ofSein und Zeit(SZ),1 where the attention shifts

from the analysis of temporality (Zeitlichkeit/Temporalitt) in Daseins everyday attitude to its

role in the broader account of historicity (Geschichtlichkeit), Heidegger makes a rather curious

claim pertaining to the movedness (Bewegung/Bewegtheit) of Dasein:

The movedness ofExistenz is not the motion of what is present-at-hand. It is determined

out of the stretching of Dasein. The particular movedness of the self-stretching which is

stretched out[erstreckten Sicherstreckens], we call the happenings of Dasein.2

In other words, the being of Dasein concerns a particular motion that accounts for the happenings

of life (Geschehen), which occur in terms of ones own history and continue to expand and grow

so long as one exists. The problem, still, is that there is no apparent account in SZto shed light

on this claim. While Heidegger claims that this spezifische Bewegtheitprovides a way to

understand DaseinsZeitlichkeitand Geschichtlichkeit, in what respect are we even to grasp the

character of such movement when Heidegger says so little about it? What might Heidegger mean

by the movedness of Existence, or what I call Daseins kineticity? What does it mean for its

motion to be das erstreckte Sicherstrecken, the self-stretching which is stretched out?

Furthermore, if temporality is the fundamental aspect of the being of Dasein, then why does

Heidegger also remark that Dasein is constituted in terms of motion? Are these two ways at

odds, or might there be something more to Daseins temporality that is not made explicit in the

For their helpful comments and criticisms on earlier drafts, I thank Elizabeth Brient, StevenCrowell, Edward Halper, Ren Jagnow, Greg Moss, Nathan Vacher, and my anonymousreviewer.1 Martin Heidegger, Sein und Zeit (Tbingen: Max Niemeyer, 2006). All translations from SZand the Gesamtausgabe are my own, unless noted otherwise. ForSZ, I have consulted both theMacquarrie-Robinson (M&R) and Stambaugh (2010) translations, and forDie Grundbegriffe deraristotelischen Philosophie (GA 18), the Metcalf-Tanzer (2009) translation.2SZ, pp. 374-375, emphasis mine.


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text? In all, on what terms must we understand Daseins kineticity as equally ontologically

constitutive as its temporality, if Heidegger makes little argument for it?

To address these issues, I suggest an approach along the same lines as Heideggers

strategy for articulating temporalitythrough Aristotle. If temporality is articulated by

uncovering the existential-ontological assumptions hidden beneath Aristotles vuglare

Zeitbegriff,3 then it makes sense also to approach the question of Daseins kineticity through

Heideggers interpretation of motion in Aristotle. For one reason, in the Physics, Aristotle argues

that there is neither motion without time nor time without motion, since time follows along with

motion (Phy. .10, 218b13-20). In the same vein, just as there is originary time for Dasein

temporalitythere should also be Daseins originary motionkineticity. Yet again, there is no

direct evidence or argument for this in SZ. Instead, at our disposal are various treatments of

motion in Heideggers early Vorlesungen (1921-1927) preceding the publication ofSZ.4 With an

eye to motions connection to Dasein, the most notable Vorlesunganalyzing in detail Aristotles

views on motion is the 1924Die Grundbegriffe der aristotelischen Philosophie [Grundbegriffe].

3, (Phy. .11, 219b1),which Heidegger translates as Das nmlich ist die Zeit, das Gezhlte an der im Horizont des

Frher und Spter begegenden Bewegung (SZ, p. 421). See also Die Grundprobleme derPhnomenologie (GA 24), pp. 331-345. At GA 18, p. 378, Heidegger also ties together the activepotentiality (ttige Mglichkeit) of motion with Daseins located temporality (rtlicheZeitlichkeit)its concrete, temporal context.4 There is a strong consensus amongst commentators that the pre-SZVorlesungen and Seminaresignificantly aided Heidegger as he planned and prepared his manuscript for the 1927 publication

ofSZ. Theodore Kisiel, The Genesis of Heideggers Being and Time (Berkeley, CA: Universityof California Press, 1995) painstakingly details this development, with a substantial discussion

on Aristotles influence (pp. 227-308). For texts where Heidegger deals withBewegung/,both in Aristotle and in general, see the following: GA 18, pp. 269-329, 354-395(Handschriften). Die Grundbegriffe der antiken Philosophie (GA 22), pp. 169-188. GA 24, pp.325-30. Aristoteles, Metaphysik 1-3: Von Wesen und Wirklichkeit der Kraft (GA 33).Phnomenologische Interpretationen ausgewhlter Abhandlungen des Aristoteles zur Ontologieund Logik(GA 62), pp. 101-108, 387. Vom Wesen und Begriff derPhysis: Aristoteles,PhysikB, 1, in Wegmarken (GA 9), pp. 239-301.


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What makes this text unique and most pertinent is that it supplies Heideggers most explicit and

detailed analysis of the definition of motion given in Physics.1-3 with direct reference to its

role in the constitution of Dasein:

Because of this orientation [to uncovering the how of Daseins being], we need to

characterize motion since we will come to know it as a determination of a being

[Seienden], and indeed of the living-being, from which every additional treatment of

Being is assessed. : the guiding thread for the explication of the Being of the

being-there of the human being.5

Therefore, in light of the Grundbegriffe and other supporting texts, I show in 1 how and why

Heidegger uses his interpretation of Aristotles definition of motion to lay the groundwork for

the Daseinsanalytik in SZ.6 Following this, in 2, I show how Heideggers understanding of

5GA 18, pp. 273, emphasis mine. Cf. GA 33, p. 172.6 That Heideggers explication ofPhysics 1-3 in the Grundbegriffe plays a formidable role indeveloping the notion ofSein zum Tode is rarely suggested, even though commentators agree

that Heidegger's early interest in the Physics does help shape the Daseinanalytik. For example,while Kisiel mentions that Physics 1-3 is crucial to Heideggers development of theDaseinsanalytik, there is a significant lacuna in his treatment. Where he analyzes theGrundbegriffe, Kisiel, pp. 286-301, leaves aside the second part of the course, where Heideggerexamines the definition of motion. When translating and analyzing Heideggers famous

Phnomenologische Interpretationen zu Aristoteles (Anzeige der Hermeneutischen Situation)(GA 62), pp. 354-399, Kisiel, pp. 248-271, also ignores Heideggers remarks on bothMetaphysics A 1-2 andPhysics A-E, wherein Heidegger makes plain that is central to thehermeneutical project. Still, this is not to say that no commentator recognizes the general

importance of Aristotle's definition of motion for Heidegger. See Jussi Backman, Divine andmortal motivation: On the movement of life in Aristotle and Heidegger, Continental PhilosophyReview 38, pp. 241-261; Walter Brogan, Double Arch: Heideggers reading of Aristotleskinetic ontology, Angelaki: Journal of the Theoretical Humanities 2 (3), pp. 85-92; Brogan,Heidegger and Aristotle: The Twofoldness of Being(Albany, NY: SUNY 2005); Rudolf Burnet,Die Lehre von der Bewegung bei Aristoteles,Heidegger und die Griechen, Martin-Heidegger-Gesellschaft, vol. 8 (Frankfurt am Main: Klostermann, 2005), pp. 95-122; Francisco Gonzalez,Whose Metaphysics of Presence? Heideggers Interpretation ofEnergeia and Dunamis inAristotle, The Southern Journal of Philosophy (44), pp. 533-568; Servanne Jollivet, DasPhnomen der Bewegtheit im Licht der Dekonstruktion der aristotelischen Physik, Heidegger-Jahrbuch 3 (2007), pp. 130-155; Thomas Sheehan, On the way to Ereignis: Heideggers


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implicitly shapes the arguments in SZconcerning Dasein as being-towards-death (Sein

zum Tode). According to Heidegger in the Grundbegriffe, Aristotle defines as an active

potentiality (ttige Mglichkeit). With this in mind, I show that we should interpret the

towardness (Zu-sein) of being-towards-death as indicating Daseins active potentiality.

Specifically, Daseins self-understanding is its active potentiality, since this is how Dasein

interpretation ofPhysis, in Continental Philosophy in America, eds. H. J. Silverman, et al(Pittsburgh, PA: Duquesne University Press, 1983), pp. 131-164; and Charlotta Weigelt, TheLogic of Life: Heidegger's Retrieval of Aristotle's Concept of Logos, Stockholm: Almquiest &Wiksell, 2002 and (abbreviated version of chapter 5) "Logos as Kinesis: Heidegger's

Interpretation of the Physics in Grundbegriffe der aristotelischen Philosophie." Epoch: AJournal for the History of Philosophy 9 (1), pp. 101-116.Nevertheless, only Bernet, Gonzalez, Jollivet, and Weigelt offer detailed analyses of the

Grundbegriffe and its connection to SZ. Bernet focuses on the role of in theGrundbegriffe, although he also offers more general comments regarding the role of inHeidegger beyond SZ. While Bernet, pp. 95-97, lists the various ways he thinks theGrundbegriffe influences SZ, calling them ausdrcklicher Bezugnahme for theDaseinsanalytik, he thinks Sein zum Tode relates more to the Nicomachean Ethics. Gonzalezstreatment is highly critical of Heidegger, and at times misses the nuances of Heideggersarguments. However, his criticisms of Heideggers sharp distinction between and are helpful for understanding how Heidegger exploits some ambiguities in Aristotle.

Jollivet suggests insightfully that the Grundbegriffe is a deconstructive enterprise which seeksout the existential-ontological elements hidden beneath Aristotles formulation of (p.140). This squares with my proposal that the analysis of Dasein is as much about originary

motion as originary time. She also provides a thoughtful presentation ofBewegtheit in thegeneral philosophical milieu of Heideggers work. Weigelt, while nicely articulating the

commanding role of in Heidegger's interpretation of , hardly addresses theteleological significance of death in the Grundbegriffe's discussion of. As for the others,Backman focuses more on Heideggers reading of Metaphysics 1-3 (GA 33) and theNicomachean Ethics in Platon: Sophistes (GA 19), pp. 21-64. He references the definition ofmotion both in Aristotles text and in the Grundbegriffe only in passing (Backman, 251; 261, fn.62). Brogan and Sheehan devote a great deal of time explicating Heideggers 1939 Phusis essay.Even though Heidegger addresses the definition of motion in this text (GA 9,pp. 283-287),which Brogan and Sheehan recognize, albeit briefly, no significant attempt is made by either

Brogan or Sheehan to make sense of the definition in the context of the Daseinsanalytik.Strangely, while Sheehan reads his interpretation ofEreignis and back into SZ, this is withthe noticeable absence of a substantial discussion of the definition of motion, even thoughSheehan sees as central to Heideggers notion ofEreignis. Gonzalez, however, thinksthere is a significant interpretive shift between the early readings of Aristotle and 1939 Phusistext, which is why he makes no attempt to apply it retrospectively to SZ; see Gonzalez, op. cit.,p. 554.


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authentically moves towards death. This reading of helps us also to make sense of

various aspects of Daseins kinetic structure, e.g. constancy, internal stretching, and Daseins

inherently incomplete being. However, in 3, I assess Heideggers justifications for collapsing

the distinction between and in Aristotle. While Heideggers philological

reasons for the strong identification are insufficient on Aristotles own terms, they illuminate the

philosophical reasons for how and why Heidegger applies his interpretation of to Dasein.

I

The general aim of the Grundbegriffe isto elucidate the being of Dasein as Sein-in-einer-

Welt (In-der-Welt-sein in SZ) in light of Aristotelian concepts.7 While Heidegger is, indeed,

interested in uncovering what he thinks is the originality of Aristotles concepts, the whole

exercise is still executed within the framework of what will become the Daseinsanalytikin SZ.8

As is evident throughout the course, this is accomplished by presenting Daseins worldliness as

if it were originarily an Aristotelian notion.9 Dasein, ordas Dasein des Menschen, is defined as

the practical living being who has speech (, ein Leben, und

zwar, solchen Seiendem, das die Sprache hat) since this is its living activity,

.10 As Heidegger reads , it must be understood in terms of Daseins work or

activity () in a world, since the world is the factual or concrete context (sachliche

Zusammenhang) within which Daseins is revealed. Heidegger correlates with

Daseins authentic activity (die eigentliche Verrichtung) and concern (Besorgen), since these

7GA 18, pp. 36-44. Cf. Bernet, op. cit., p. 96 and Jollivet, op. cit., p. 139.8Cf. Jollivet, op. cit., pp. 134, 139-143.9GA 18, pp. 43-44.10Ibid.


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have meaning only in a concrete context wherein Dasein busies itself. 11 Speaking, for example, is

one manner by which Dasein acts concernfully in the world. For Heidegger, therefore,

is the activity which Dasein performs (verrichten) in a factual contexta world. What we need

to see, however, is why and how is integral to the analysis of Daseins worldliness. To

see this, let us turn to what I take to be Heideggers more explicit argument for reading

as Besorgen. This will provide various clues to lead us to the definition of motion and why,

ultimately, Daseins is.

Our first clue is found in Heideggers translation of the opening passage of the

Nicomachean Ethics (EN A.1, 1094a3), where Aristotle distinguishes activities with external

ends (/Werke) from those whose ends are themselves (): Es zeigt sich, da ein

gewisser Unterschied vorliegt unter den . Die einen sind , die anderen sind

, neben dem Besorgen, und zwar, Werke.12 Admittedly, Heidegger still seems

only to focus on without reference to . However, the way he reasons through

Aristotles claim reveals that motion is an implicit, albeit central component of the interpretation,

given that his examples are from motion, e.g. Spaziergangand Schusterei:

These are of the sort that they give forth [abfallen] from a concern. Alongside the

activity of producing [Verfertigen] the shoe, the shoe gives forth. The points out

that the of concern is something which stands alone for itself. At most, this pertains

to the character of expedience [Beitrglichen].13 In contrast, the activity of going for a

walk [Spaziergang] is, by its , that I go for a walkcontrary to shoemaking

11GA 18, p. 44.12GA 18, pp. 70-71. Cf. pp. 91-92.13Cf., GA 18, p. 57-58. For a nice explanation ofBeitrglichen and its connection to motion, seeBogdan Minca,Poiesis:Zu Martin Heideggers Interpretationen der aristotelischen Philosophie(Wrzburg: Knigshausen & Neumann, 2006), pp. 69-70.


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[Schusterei], which comes to an end in something that has in itself its authentic being

[eigentliches Sein]. It is not that I gosomewhere [hingehen], here and there, that I walk a

definite distance, but that I am out in the air, that I have been going for a walk. The

lies in the . In this way, since I linger in the concern, this doing [Besorgung,

"erranding"] comes to an end, to its . The authenticity of being-finished, of 'going-

for-a-walk,' is grounded in how I go for a walk. There are two different ways of concern

distinguished according to the being-character of what constitutes the .14

Essentially, there are two kinds of activities determined according to two kinds of : those

whose ends lie beyond the work ( ; neben dem Besorgen) and those whose

ends are the acts themselves (; Besorgen). Shoemaking (Schusterei) pertains to the

former, while going for a walk (Spaziergang)belongs to the latter. For, the end of shoemaking

is not the shoemaking itself, but the shoe, whereas the end of going for a walk is itself, since its

end is in the activity itself, an -. The activity is its own end. While one makes a shoe in

order to have a shoe, one goes out for a walk simply for the walking. Therefore, walking is an

, while shoemaking is merely an , orWerk. Heideggers use of Werk illuminates

Aristotles distinction. Werk, like , is typically reserved for acts of labor (Arbeit) and

making(Herstellung), whose ends lie outside of the activity. While there is a kind of working

performed in Spaziergang, it is not merely a Werk, because the activity is done for its own sake

and not for a product. Still, the work of shoemaking is as much a Besorgen as going for a walk.

They are both concerns in which Dasein finds itself in the world. What marks their difference is

the nature of their ends. Keep these activities in mind when we turn to authenticity and

14GA 18, p. 71, emphasis mine.


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inauthenticity in SZ. I will use them to help illuminate the difference between these two modes of

Dasein.

The basic thrust of Heideggers interpretationthe distinction between internal and

external is not the peculiar aspect here. This can be inferred from Aristotles text alone.

What makes Heideggers explanation of the ENpassage so striking is that his example of

Spaziergangactually suggests motion. To be sure, shoemaking is a motion, since

the end of motion lies beyond the activity, and the end of shoemaking is the completed shoe. But,

Aristotle also classifies walking () as a motion, since it is a change of place (). It is

unlikely, therefore, that Aristotle would have agreed to Heideggers use of Spaziergang to

exemplify in this passage. If one were to give a more straightforward reading of

Aristotle's text, then it would be better to use seeing() or thinking (; ) as an

examples of, since neither are motions for Aristotle (Meta. .6, 1048b23-24).

However, I think there is a specific reason why Heidegger uses Spaziergang. It comes

from an exploitation of an initial ambiguity in Aristotles own formulation of in

Metaphysics .3. At the end of.3, Aristotle seems to assume that is (Meta.

.3, 1047a32). While Aristotle qualifies his claim later in theMetaphysics (Meta. .6, 1048b18-

35), it gives Heidegger just enough leverage to play the complicated relationship between

and to his advantage. Spaziergangis the perfect term to exploit this. Heidegger

appeals to Meta. .3, 1047a32 later in the course in order to elucidate what he thinks is the

distinction between and .15 But, I believe Heidegger also assumes this

implicitly in the explication ofENA.1, 1094a3 because it helps make sense ofSpaziergangas an

15GA 18, pp. 295-296. On Metaphysics .3, seeEdward Halper, One and Many in AristotlesMetaphysics: The Central Books (Las Vegas: Parmenides Press, 2005), pp. 208-213. Cf.,GA 33,pp. 51-52, 223-224 and Jollivet, op. cit., pp. 140-41.


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. Spaziergang suggests that the activity of walking must be read in terms of a motion,

since the -gang (gehen) can be taken as aprocess (Gang) which has walking as its purpose. In

other words, the activity is nothing but the motion; togo for a walk is no more than the walking

itself. Even the English translation reflects a motion with an internal teleology: going fora walk.

If going fora walk is inherent to the walking, then the activity of walking, the , is the

motion. It is thereby no surprise that Heidegger uses Spaziergang as the example of

since it exemplifies as.

Nearly all of what I have drawn from the Heideggers translation ofENA 1, 1094a3 has

been made explicit only by way of taking for granted what Heidegger himself holds as a direct

identity between and . But, I do not think I have assumed this without good

reason. As indicated above, Heidegger sees as dasLeitfaden fr die Explikation des

Seins des Daseins des Menschen. As I see it, the entire analysis of Daseins in the

Grundbegriffe holds this identity as a guiding assumption. However, we are now at the point

where this needs to be brought out more clearly.

Heidegger first addresses the definition of motion where he speaks of how a worldly

beingDaseinis there in the world in such a way that the world is inherently usable

(verwendbar). What is usable is constituted in terms of a , a noch nicht. Thus, Dasein

and its world existin terms of an ability-to-be (Seinknnen). Because everything encountered in

everydayness (lltaglichkeit) is ordinarily (durchschnittlich) usable, and since usability

implies motion, or at least its possibility, Daseins everydayness is inherently kinetic. To

elucidate this, Heidegger translates the definition of motion given at Physics 1, 201a10, and

then gives his reasons for the translation:


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"Motion is the , the visibility of beings [Gegenwart des Daseienden], as the

ability of being-there, and indeed the visibility as long as it is able to be there" [

, , ]. Motion is the visibility of the

ability of being-there as such. The wood is able to be a chest, now grasped immediately

and simply. This ability-to-be of the wood supposes this ability-to-be-a-chest. As long as

it is there, the wood is moving. As long as the wood is there in the authentic sense as

chest-ability, the motion is. When the carpenter has the wood at work[es in Arbeit hat],

the wood is there in its ability-to-be. The ability-to-be is visible in the being-at-work, as

long as the carpenter has the wood working in his hands [es unter der Hand hat]. Thus,

Aristotle can define motion hereafter also as . as a way of being-there

is nothing other than the being-at-work of something.16

Initially, Heideggers reading of Aristotle seems seriously flawed. It suggests that even when the

wood (Holz) is merely lying there (da), e.g. on the table not being sculpted or attended to in

anyway, the wood is still moving because it is merely capable of being-sculpted. That is to say, a

thing appears in motion even when it does not show up as a motion, i.e. when it is at rest. 17

However, this reading overlooks Heideggers use of Gegenwart and gegenwrtig. For

Heidegger, Gegenwartdoes not merely mean presence. It suggests that which is recognized

as present, or that which is visiblypresent to Dasein in everyday experience.18 For,

when something is present to Dasein, it appears. It is a phenomenon. Read in this manner, we

16Ibid, emphasis mine.17Ibid. This is the reading that motivates Gonzalezs criticism. See Gonzalez, op. cit., p. 536where he reads Heidegger as identifyingBedeutsamkeitwith .18 GA 18, p. 313. Prior to this, at GA 18, p. 279, Heidegger ties intellection () to discursivethinking () by way of . See also GA 18, p. 392; GA 33, p. 196. In atranslators note (p. 48, fn. 2), Macquarrie & Robinson suggest the sense of bringing vividly tomind.


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can make sense of Heideggers seemingly odd reasoning to find that it is relatively consonant

with Aristotle: I see the wood lying there on the table. Obviously, the wood is not noticeably

moving. Yet, I can still say that it has the potency to become a chest. Why? I have learned from

experience that wood is sufficient materialfor chest-making. But, while I might

suppose that it has the potency to become a chest when it is at rest, such potency is not visible

(gegenwrtig) until I am engaged in the work(Arbeit). This is because the motion of carpentry is

the activity (das In-Arbeit-sein) which brings-out, orphenomenalizes,theKastenseinknnen asa

potency. The activity does not constitute the potency ontologically, but rather reveals it, makes it

manifest to Dasein. For, when there is motion, the potency is recognized as present

gegenwrtigen. When the chest is being made, I can say truly (unconcealedly, -) that the

potency is there, even though it was there all along, albeit latently. This shows,

phenomenologically, that we recognize latent capacities retrospectively. While I might not

recognize a particular potency at this time, when some work is performed, revealing the potency,

I can infer that it wasable to be such-and-such all along. Potentials are revealed in the active

formation, the motion, of something coming to be out of what had the potency all along, but

remained hidden. Thus, if my reading ofGegenwartas visibility is correct, then Heideggers

translation of the definition of motion should be read as the visibility of existing things as the

beings which are able to be there, and indeed visible insofar as it is able to be there (Gegenwart

des Daseienden, als des Daseinsknnenden, und zwar die Gegenwart, sofern es da sein kann).19

In other words, the truth (-) of motion is the uncoveredness (Entdecktheit) of potentiality,

since motion is the visibility of what is able to be there for as long as such ability shows up in the

activity of becoming-there. Heideggers phenomenological reading of Aristotle is, to be sure,

19GA 18, p. 313.


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unconventional. It takes motion as the phenomenological expression of potentiality of Being, the

pressing-out of potentiality into the open in order for Dasein to encounter it. Heidegger reads

Aristotles definition to mean that the being of motion is the disclosure of the potentiality of

Being. From this, we can begin to see Heideggers motivation for defining the how (Wie) of

Daseins being as it is due to the kineticity of Dasein that Dasein discloses the being of

Being as potentiality.

Of course, one might raise an objection to my reading: it still seems to commit Heidegger

to hold ontologically that the wood lying there latent and at rest is not able to be a chest unless it

is actively being worked upon, since it is not clear how the phenomenalization of potentiality in

motion is not also the causal ground for the potential. Heidegger, in the same passage, denies

such implications:

Wood, as a thing which is an available being, is there and at the same time is usable for a

chest. Still, as wood, being-there and 'usable for' are not the same. Moreover, usability

itself, as the being-character of the beings that are there, does not yet characterize these

beings as being situated in motion. One could gather from this that meaningfulness, as the

determination of the beings that are there, which belongs to the being of the world, is not

actually appropriate here, provided that the usability is first there authentically as long as

the wood is at work. But, this is a mistake.20

The wood simply lying there is not being altered in any way, but is usable at the same time

(zugleich). For, even the work of chest-building itself would not be possible, if the wood alone

were to lack the capacity to be the chest. Even while the wood is lying there, it is usable by virtue

of the fact that its meaningfulness (Bedeutsamkeit) is found with reference to something else,

20Ibid., emphasis mine.


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namely the activity of chest-building, the tools, the workshop, the chest and ultimately Dasein

itself. Nevertheless, being there at rest and being usable are not the same (nicht dasselbe), either

ontologically or phenomenologically. For, the woods usability is not necessarily revealed to

Dasein while the wood lies there motionless. True, the wood is always usable, even when at rest.

But, if rest and usability were the same, then merely coming upon the wood while at rest would

reveal its Kastenseinknnen. But, unless one has already learned that the wood is capable of

becoming a chest, it is unlikely that the wood alone would reveal such capacity. Simply

stumbling upon a stack of wood does not immediately disclose its potential to be a chest. Now,

whatever is usable is meaningful, since meaningfulness pertains to referentiality, and whatever is

usable refers to something else, e.g. that for which something is used. But since we know that

motion is the making-visible of a potential, and because usability is a kind of potentiality, it

seemsat firstthat unless something is moving (in Arbeit), then it is not meaningful. This would

entail that something is not usable until it is at work, being used. However, Heidegger finds this

conclusion to be absurd (Tuschung). Because usability and meaningfulness go hand-in-hand,

and yet not all meaningful things are in motion, something need not be moving in order to be

usable. For, usability itself[die Verwendbarkeit selbst] does not yet characterize these [existing

things] as being located in motion.21 That is, there are different modes of usabilityusable, but

not yet involved in a motion and the usability that is active in a motion. Thus, meaningfulness

pertains to both motion and rest, but in different modalities. The point I believe Heidegger is

emphasizing, here, is that meaningfulness is not as readily apparentin rest as it is in motion.

21Ibid., emphasis mine. Cf. Gonzalez, op. cit., pp. 536-537.


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Heideggers interpretation ofPhy. .1, 201a10 reveals that there is a hierarchy of

potencies in Aristotle: active and inactive.22 In hisHandschriften, Heidegger clarifies what is said

in the two passages cited above:

: the visibility of the ability-to-be-a-chest of this wood as such (indicating

[bezogen auf] the ability-to-be-a-chest). The ability-to-be as something being-there, not

as thought, planned, supposed, but rather as something encountered [begegnend] in the

surrounding world. As pertaining to something, the becoming-made is in the workshop.

The being-moved: something in motion. It is neither the chest, the wood, nor the space

for wood-storage that is there, but rather something at work; at the very moment, the

carpenter has it working in hand! [] is the how of the there. This is

: the how of Dasein as being-at-work. Motion, , does not destroy the

potentiality, but rather it holds it precisely within [erhlt], accounting for its therethe

active potentiality.23

Motion, obviously, does not pertain to what is inactive. As the visibility of the woods ability-

to-be-of-the-chest (Gegenwart desKastenseinknnens dieses Holzes),motion is the activeness

of this potentiality(diettige Mglichkeit). It is the potentiality which is busy (ttig). When there

is only a chest, only the wood on the table, or merely the workspace wherein all the tools and

material are housed, there is no motion, since there is no becoming-made active in each of these.

22 Heidegger is not alone in this interpretation. Amongst contemporary Aristotelian scholars,

Myles Burnyeat, De Anima II 5,Phronesis 47 (1), pp. 28-90; Edward Halper, Aristotle on theKnowledge of Nature, Review of Metaphysics 37 (4), pp. 811-835; and L.A. Kosman,Aristotles Definition of Motion, Phronesis 14 (1), pp. 40-62 all argue in one respect oranother that there are levels of potentiality and actuality in Aristotle.23GA 18, p. 378. Cf., GA 33, p. 51: So sagt Aristoteles an einer spteren Stelle (Meta. 3,1047a32): [] so wie Bewegung erscheint, ist sieso etwas wie ein Am-Werke-sein; der nchstallgemeine -Charakter ist .Inwiefern? Wo etwas in Bewegung ist, sagen wir ja: es ist da etwas im Gang, es ist etwas los,

etwas am Werk; da ist eine Ttigkeit, emphasis mine. See also GA 33, pp. 170-171.


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However, because these things can turn into motion, or at least are able to be involved in it, then

they must already have a potential. It is only that such is inactive, latenthidden (ruhend).

Merely because something is not in motion does not mean that a potency does not exist. It simply

means that, like the motion, the potential is not yet visible. As we have said, motion is the

outward-exercising (Ausbung) of the potential.24 The ontological condition that there be a

latent potency when there is no visible activity is preserved, if one holds that motion pertains

only to the making-visible of such potency, while not being a causal groundfor it.25

Now that we have in clear view Heideggers basic understanding of Aristotles definition

of motion, it is appropriate to show how it lays the groundwork for Sein und Zeit, specifically in

regard to Sein zum Tode. There are at least three central criteria by which Heideggers analysis of

motion in the Grundbegriffe shapes the arguments for Sein zum Tode: constancy (Stetige;

Stndigkeit), stretching (Spannung;Erstrecken), and incompleteness (Unfertigkeit; Grenzenlos).

Because motion as does not destroy (vernichtet nicht) potentiality, but instead

holds onto it, it follows that the potentiality is constant(stndig)throughout the entire activity.26

In fact, so long as there is motion, the potential must be ever more sustained so as to continue to

be motion, since if the potential is exhausted, motion comes to an end. An indication of this is

24GA 33, p. 191.25 As such, it would be incorrect to say that Heidegger commits both himself and Aristotle to

Megarianismthe position that potentiality does not exist until there is some activity. For

Heideggers more explicit analysis of Aristotles confrontation with the Megarians in

Metaphysics .3, see GA 33, pp. 160-224 (17-22), especially pp. 182-193 (19). See also GA 9,pp. 286-287 where Heidegger affirms the priority of actuality in Aristotle. Backman, op. cit., pp.249-250, also affirms that Heidegger interprets Aristotle as holding to latent potencies.26GA 18, pp. 381: ein Wie des Da, das , das , es erhlt esim Daes im Unfertigsein halten, da-sein lassen. Heidegger appeals to Themistius, InAristotelis Physica 213, 1ff where Themistius reads the definition of motion to imply that motionis that which preserves () the potential. See also Philoponus, In Aristotelis Physicorum350, 10. Cf. Jollivet, op. cit. 140. Bernet, op. cit., 102-103 overlooks this preservative aspect.


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that motion holds itself together within itself (es sich in zusammenhlt)motion is continuous

(Stetige; ). Heidegger makes this explicit in his translation ofPhysics .1, 200b15-21:

Sofern wir die Bewegung auseinanderlegen, ausgrenzen bzw. durchgegrenzt haben, mu

versucht werden, in derselben methodischen Haltung berzugehen zu dem, was

nchstfolgend ist. [Es ist auch zu handeln von dem, was mit einem Seienden als In-

Bewegung-Seienden mitgegeben ist: Das ist das, was das Phnomen der Bewegung in

sich selbst beschliet.] Die Bewegung scheint etwas zu sein, was zu dem gehrt, das der

Art ist, da es sich in zusammenhltdas Stetige; das Grenzenlose zeigt sich zuerst im

Stetigen [sofern das Stetige sich als das zeigt, bei dem eine an kein Ende

kommt; die positive Bestimmung des ist es gerade, da es ist.] Wo man

das Stetige bestimmen will, da kommt es dazu, da man mit dazu gebraucht, mit meint

den des [wenn man vom Stetigen spricht, spricht man damit an ein

bestimmte Grenzenlosigkeit], gleich als ob das nichts anderes wre als das

. Ferner ist es unmglich, das Bewegtseiende ohne den Ort, die Leere

und die Zeit anzuprechen.27

Motion cannot exhaust a potency while it is active, seeing that the potential is infinite. Thus, the

motion itself is infinite, at least potentially. As infinite, it is never at an endconstantly

incomplete (stetige Grenzenlose). For, insofar as the potential is always present, and because a

potential signifies what is not yet(noch nicht) completewhat is lacks a limit (Grenzenlos)the

infinite is incomplete by nature. For Aristotle, completeness pertains to a limit. So, the infinite is

27GA 18, pp. 291-92. The brackets appear in the Gesamtausgabe text, containing Heideggersinter-translation commentary. Aristotles text is as follows (Phy. .1, 200b15-21): . , , . .


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defined as that in which something more can always be taken (Phy. .4, 204a2-7), or that which

does not come to an end/limit (bei dem eine an kein Ende kommt).Motion also always

follows a magnitude, for magnitudes are continuous and constantly able to be divided without

end. To say that motion is continuous, or is constant, is also to say that it is not constituted as a

summation of discrete points. This is because points presume a continuous, unbroken line (es

sich in zusammenhlt) from which the points may be marked off. Points are generated by

division (), which can be performed potentially infinitely many times. From this, one

might even say that the very activity of dividing the line is the way such potential is made visible

to us, since we cansee, in the actof dividing, how the divisions never seem to exhaust the lines

potential to be divided. The line qua continuous always retains the potential to be divided even

while it is being divided. In this way, division is a motion. The constancy of motion is, therefore,

its continual preservation of a potential within the working-out of such potential, or insofar as the

potential is itself at-work (ttig). It is the nature of motion to preserve its incompleteness

(Grenzenlosigkeit).

From this, we can begin to see what Heidegger means when he suggests that motion, as

, stretches itself out toward the end (spannt sich aus zum Ende):

[in contrast to ] , "stretches itself out

towards the end"also a characteristic of being-there, but such that it determines the

being in its being-there in the manner that it is not there in its being-finished; :

the character of being belonging to the being-graspedin becoming-finished.28

How might we best understand what it means for motion to stretch itself out? Heidegger is not

explicit here, but let me suggest this: as long as there is motion, it draws itself out by making its

28GA 18, p. 296, emphasis mine.


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potentiality increasingly visible. It is this increased visibility that is grasped in an activitys

becoming-finished (Fertigwerden). The end is always near, always imminently not-yet, since

at any moment motion is able to cease as much as it is able to continue. So, the stretching cannot

pertain to any distance from the end.29 Nevertheless, the magnitude of motion, as Heidegger

understands it, pertains primarily to the degree to which motion unfolds (gem) and expands

(sich entbreitet).30 What might this mean? Heideggers paradigm for motion is growth. Even

locomotion has a kind of growth. In going for a walk, the motion grows larger the longer there is

walking. But, the magnitude need not be determined by the distanced walked. For example,

during the time in which I walk in the same place, e.g. in a circle, my capacity to continue

walking becomes more apparent over time. So, what is stretched out, it seems, is the potentials

visibility, at least in the sense of increase. Since the activity is inherently incomplete (because it

is always able to continue), the potential to walk becomes increasingly visible the more the

activity is present. It is this increase with regard to the visibility of the potential that seems to be

what it means for motion to stretch itself out towards the end.

Still, why focus on motions being-toward-the-end, but not being atthe end? Is not the

aim of motion its , and is not the magnitude said with respect to this aim? Does not the

, as an aim, determine the character of the motion? According to Heidegger, means

neitheraim (Ziel) norpurpose (Zweck), but rather a limit(Grenze; ) orend(Ende) in the

29 I thank my reviewer for several criticisms on this issue.30 GA 9, p. 254. Heidegger, GA 18, p. 368 also points to a strong sense of self-alteration(Sichverndernden). Cf. GA 18, p. 368,Maordnung. When explaining motion, Heidegger moreoften emphasizes growth (Gewchsen) than locomotion. In this way, he draws attention to thekind of expansion that he sees to be analogous of the life of Dasein. This is consonant with hisdiscussion of motion at GA 24, pp. 344, where Heidegger argues that motion pertains primarilyto self-elongation (Ausdehnung) and not to spatial change.


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definite sense of being-finished.31 Heidegger justifies this by holding that is grounded in

the more concrete, everyday term , termination, or the end of life.32 Heideggers

reasons are not merely etymological. If motion is to preserve its being by maintaining a potential,

then it cannot aim at the point where it ceases. The means that end atwhich there is no

motion. This means that the is present in the motion only potentially. Thus, the beingof

motion is its incompleteness (; Unfertigkeit). As long as there is activity, the work is

unfinished, which means that the product is outstanding. Once the shoe is finished, for instance,

the activity of shoemaking ceases. When one has had enough of the air, so to speak, one

finishes going for a walkone sits down. Simply taken as the point of cessation, however, the

shoe and the sitting do not reveal the magnitude of the motion. They only show that the motion

has terminated. As for Dasein, the point at which its activity, its worldly concern, disappears, it

dies. Ones death, on its own, does not reveal the span of their life. I must inquire into the

temporality of their motion, their history, in order to discern their span of life.

31GA 18, p. 82.32 GA 18, p. 87. Cf. SZ, pp. 244-246; GA 9, pp. 284-287; Sheehan, Ereignis, pp. 144-145;Gonzalez, op. cit., pp. 542-546. Heideggers discussion of the nature of in Aristotlesthought (GA 18, pp. 80-91 (11)) is beyond the scope of this essay. It is far too rich and nuancedto cover adequately here. It would require an examination of Heideggers reading ofMetaphysics 16, where Aristotle deals with the many ways (complete"; "finished) is said.However, it is important to say a few things about Heideggers analysis since it shapes his

interpretation of the role of in motion. First, in light of Meta. .16, 1021b15-17,Heidegger, p. 85, claims that pertains to that beyond which there is nothing (Worber-hinaus-nichts), or that beyond which there is no more potentiality for Being (es ber das hinaus keine weitere Seinsmglichkeit fr ein Seiendes gibt). See also GA 18, pp. 92-94. Then,from Meta. .16, 1021b23-25, Heidegger, GA 18, pp. 87-88 argues further that means,fundamentally, the absence of something, its being-goneTod. The result of this reading isthat the traditional understanding of as purpose or goal is relegated to a derivative,more abstract sense (pp. 82-83). The priority is given to the concrete meaning associated with

Dasein, namely death.


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The most radical and important aspect of Heideggers interpretation is revealed at this

point: and are sharply distinguished.33 Because the being of activity is

motion, and because activity is present only insofar as its work remains unfinished, the

traditional equivalence between and does not hold for Heidegger.

is defined by Heidegger as Gegenwrtigsein eines Seienden als Ende and Sich-

im-Fertigsein-Halten,34 while , because of its identity with motion, is im Fertigwerden

Begriffensein and Im Selbst der Arbeiter seiner selbst sein.35 The former is fully complete

with nothing outstanding, while the latter is fundamentally incomplete and always not-yet,

always holding itself in the work. The - distinction is evident even in

Heideggers formulations ofSchusterei and Spaziergang. Both exist as activities only when that

which designates their cessation is not yet present. In these activities, what marks them as

inherently kinetic is that for the time during which there is work, their being is necessarily

incomplete. However, even though the absolute always remains outstanding while motion

exists, Heidegger also points out that because the work itself is the beingof motion, then [i]n

diesem Sinne kann man sagen, da das In-Arbeit-Halten das des

ist.36 That is to say, the authentic (eigentlich) of motion is not its cessation, but motion's

own incompleteness. The implication for Dasein is that while it is complete in its constant

incompleteness, death is its and not , since death is that wherein it holds

33 This is why Heidegger, GA 18, p. 321, also remarks that if Aristotle were to have been moreattentive, he would have used in Physics .1 in order to define motion: Sofern Seinletztlich heit In-seinem-Ende-Sein, Sich-in-seinem-Ende-Halten in einem endgltigen Sinne,, mu Aristoteles, wenn ervorsichtigspricht, das Dasein des Seienden-in-Bewegungals bezeichnen, (emphasis mine). At Metaphyiscs K 9, 1065b15-16, where Aristotlerepeats the definition, Aristotle uses instead of, although Heidegger does notrecognize this.34GA 18, pp. 296, 380.35Ibid. Cf.GA 18, p. 380. See also SZ, p. 244-245.36GA 18, p. 321.


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itself in being-done (Sich-im-Fertigsein-Halten) in the sense of being-done with acting. Death

is Daseins being at the end (zu Ende sein). Therefore, the paradoxical nature of Daseins

motion is this: Dasein, while active in motion, is incomplete since it holds its as a

potential. But, it is precisely because of its activity that it is complete as incompleteness since it

is always preserving itself in this way.

Still, in death, Dasein is wholly finished at the very moment it no longer exists, for this is

the moment where it no longer makes visible its potentiality-for-death. In death, what is visibly

present is ones absence (;Abwesenheit), the disappearance of activity.37 The

of Dasein is the presence of its absence, the moment where its being-there-no-more (Nicht-

mehr-Dasein) is. This clearly stands in contrast to the presence of Daseins motion, since such is

not to be atthe end,but rather to be towards it (Sein zum Ende).38 Thus, while it exists, Dasein is

never an . It is always an :

In making, being-made is a determinate way of being-thereonly if one sees it, is it

possible to see what motion is: the being-there of a being that is in the midst of

becoming-finished, but is not yet finished. is , but not .

is a way of being-there, interpreted as .39

Herein, we can see why must be aligned with , at least as Heidegger reads

Aristotle: because there must be a potency for there to be motion, and since motion is something

visibly present (Gegenwart), then such potency must be present in the same way; the visibility of

the potency is in fact nothing but motion. However, such visibility is found only in an activity, an

, for this is the working-out of such potency. As Heidegger sees it, and

37GA 18, p. 89. Cf. GA 9, pp. 296-297.38Cf. GA 18, pp. 89-90, 321.39GA 18, p. 296. Cf. Gonzalez, pp. 553-554.


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must be identical. This, therefore, is the being of Dasein according to the Grundbegriffe: the

being whose Being is always to be actively stretching itself out towards its death by the

continuous preservation and maintenance of the potentiality-for-death. In SZ, this is articulated as

Sein zum Tode. From all of this, we can say with confidence that Heideggers early thoughts on

Aristotles definition of motion provide the basic framework of the Daseinsanalytikin SZ. The

reason we must continue to SZ is to reveal more fully what role Eigentlichkeit plays in this

kinetic structure, for Dasein is authentically when it understands itselfas Sein zum Tode.

II

In many ways, we have seen how Daseins Sein zum Tode is foreshadowed in

Heideggers interpretation of Aristotles definition of motion: constancy, internal stretching, and

incompleteness. These themes will become even more apparent as we proceed through SZ. Still,

what has gone largely unaccounted for is the extent to which Heideggers interpretation of

bears any significance on how authenticity (Eigentlichkeit) and inauthenticity

(Uneigentlichkeit) operate in the arguments forSein zum Tode in SZ. It is, therefore, critical also

to square the analysis of with Heideggers account of authenticity in SZ.

One of the clearest indications that Heidegger articulates Sein zum Tode in terms of

motion is in his argument for the difference between the potentiality belonging to Dasein and

that belonging to things present-at-hand (Vorhanden) or ready-to-hand (Zuhanden). Dasein is

neither what is merely present nor what is equipmentally ready to be used for some purpose,

since the potentiality belonging to the latter is one that is always out foractualization (Aufsein

auf Verwirklichung), or something with the potentiality intendingto be completely actualized:

At the same time, it is necessary to identify being-towards-death as a being-towards-a-

possibility and indeed one that is towards a distinctive possibility of Dasein itself. Being-


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towards-a-possibilitythat is to say, one that is towards a particular possibilitycan

mean: being out for something possible as concern for its actualization

[Verwirklichung]. In the field of things ready-to-hand and present-to-hand we encounter

constantly such possibilities: the achievable, manageable, passable, and the like. The

concernful being-out-for something possible has the propensity to destroy the possibility

of what is possible through the obtainment of it [Verfgbarmachen].40

Anything which is out for actualization pertains to a kind of existence whose aim is to do away

(vernichten) with the potential. In shoemaking, as an example ofHerstellen, the potential for the

leather to become a shoe is such only insofar as the activity aims at being-fulfilled. Shoemaking

does not seek to preserve the potential in the leather; it is to have a completed shoe. Thus, the

potential to be a shoe is one that is out for being-finished. The motion of

shoemaking aims at exhausting the leathers potential to be a shoe precisely because the being of

such activity is grounded in a finished product. Hence, for this kind of potentiality, the

actualization of the is paramount. Here, Heidegger retains the Grundbegriffes sense of

as being-finished. As we shall see, the same sense holds for Dasein's inauthentic attitude

toward death.

And yet, this is exactly the sort of potentiality that is wholly inconsonant with Daseins

Sein zum Tode. The of Daseindeathis not one that is able to be actualized forDasein.

Heidegger insists that Dasein does notindeed, cannotbe out for actualizing its most

fundamental end since that fulfillment entails Daseins termination:

In no way can being-towards-death have the character of concernfully being-out-for its

actualization. First of all, death as something possible is not something possible as ready-

40SZ,p. 261.


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to-hand or present-at-hand, but rather a possibility-of-being of Dasein. Thus, the concern

for actualization ofthis possibility would have to signify the occasioning of ones demise.

With this, however, Dasein would have already stripped itself of the ground for existing

as being-towards-death.41

The being of Dasein is to be moving towarddeath, always to have death as its foremost potential

while it exists. For, if death were a potential of the type found in something usable (zuhanden) or

merely present (vorhanden), then its potentiality would be of the sort to be actualizedforDasein.

However, this contradicts the very being of Dasein as being-towards-death. Dasein exists when

its death is only potentially. Thus, Daseins being cannot be like that of a tool or a thing lying

around. It cannot be something whose activity aims at termination. Heideggers tacit, but primary

point here is that as Sein zum Tode, Dasein must be a particular kind of potential, the potential

that is in some way active, but not fullyttige Mglichkeit. Dasein is not mere latent potential,

like the piece of wood lying there on the table. It acts in the world, since these activities

() are its worldly concerns (Besorgnisse). So, for Dasein to be out for itselfas potential

is for it to be an active potentialitymotion. The authentic being of Dasein is its active pursuit of

itself as potentiality. Therefore, Dasein cannot be out for its actualization, precisely because

what is meant by Verwirklichungis the destruction (vernichten) of the potential.

Still, what might best characterize Daseins activity? What is Daseins ?

Heidegger, shortly after the argument given above, suggests a kind of preservative activity which

Dasein performs with reference to itselfunderstanding:

If, therefore, what is meant by being-towards-death is not an actualization of death,

then it cannot mean dwellingupon the endin its possibility. [] However, in being-

41Ibid.


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towards-death, if it has to make accessible understandingly possibility as has been

characterizedthat is, possibility as suchthen the possibility of death must be

understood so as not to weaken it as a possibility, but cultivated and maintained as a

possibility in our comportment towards it.42

What does it mean for Daseins potentiality not to be attenuated or held back (geschwcht),

but to be understood as a potentiality (als Mglichkeit verstanden), where in this

understanding, the potential is cultivated (ausgebildet) and maintained (ausgehalten) as

such? Obviously, understanding is an activity. But, because it retains a potential, it reveals that

the being of Dasein is a motion. For, if the being of Dasein is not to be atdeath (zu Ende Sein),

not to actualize its own cessation, but to understand itself as always being towards the end,

maintaining its motion so as to keep it unfinished, then Daseins self-understanding is its

authentic motion of being-towards-death. Self-understanding is the activity that does not aim at

the destruction of a potential, but rather at its preservation. Just as Aristotle argues that motion

preserves () its potential, at least according to Heidegger and Themistius, Dasein is to do

the same by understanding its potentiality for death as something to be maintained. Authentic

Dasein cultivates and maintains its potentiality through self-understanding.

However, does not Heidegger interpret in Aristotle, first of all, as the visibility of

potentiality? Before seeing how it preserves Daseins potentiality, how might self-understanding

capture Heideggers initial characterization of motion? We can see this in how Dasein unwraps

(ent-hllen) itselfmakes itself visibly presentby revealing through the anticipatory

(vorlaufende) nature of self-understanding that it is inherently the potentiality-for-death:

42Ibid.


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Being-towards-death is the anticipation of an ability-to-be of some being whose sort of

being is anticipation itself. In the anticipatory revealing of this ability-to-be, Dasein

makes itself accessible for itself with respect to its utmost possibility. To project ones

self, however, upon its ownmost ability-to-be means to be able to understand ones self in

the being of the particular being so revealedthat is, to exist. Anticipation manifests

itself as the possibility of the understanding of ones ownmost distinctive ability-to-be

that is, as the possibility of authentic existence.43

First, what does it mean for Dasein to anticipate death? When Dasein runs-ahead, it is neither

seeking out death so as to actualize it nor supposing that death is distantly detached from

Daseins present moment. Furthermore, to anticipate death is not to lie in wait (erwarten) for

it, since this supposes that death is something actualizable for Dasein.44 Rather, anticipation

entails that Dasein understands death as immanently imminent, such that Dasein grasps for itself

that it is by nature always near death. In understanding itself as the potentiality-for-death, Dasein

knows itself to be Sein zum Tode, since understanding is how it is authentically toward death. It

is here that I think Heideggers interpretation of motionthe making-visibly-present

(Gegenwart; ) of a potential as a potentialhelps us see this even more clearly. We

already know that Daseins understanding is its . Since is defined as the

of a potential, then understanding must somehow be the making-visible of Daseins potentiality.

How so? In Vorlaufen, Dasein understands itself in such a way that it activelyreveals(enthllt)

this potential for death as its own potentialDaseins immanencesuch that Dasein recognizes

that death is always imminent as a possibility. Dasein runs ahead towards death authentically by

seeinghow the termination of its existence in the world is possible at every moment of existence.

43SZ, pp. 262-263, emphasis mine.44SZ, p. 262.


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In this seeing, ones possibility-to-be opens up and is given to Dasein for it to grasp. Thus, the

end is not Daseins genuine concern; rather, it is the towardness to death. Anticipation lays open,

so to speak, the possibility to be as a possibility. In it, Dasein discloses to itself that its being lies

in the sway, the motion, of concrete existence, and not in the actualization of death, the collapse

of possibilities. In this way, Dasein makes its potentiality visible in an activity of taking hold of

ones self in terms of its utmost potential (uersten Mglichkeit). This is, therefore, what

Heidegger means by das vorlaufenden Enthllen: the activity of making-visible the potentiality

of death in anticipationself-understanding. Self-understanding is the how of authentic being-

towards-death, Daseins kineticity, since it is how Dasein properly reveals to itself that it is

always tending towards death.

For the most part, however, Dasein is inauthentic. Dasein often falls (verfallen) and

forgets (vergessen) about its authentic way to be towards its death. But, this does not mean

Dasein no longer remains in motion. Dasein is being-toward-death even while inauthentic.45

Dasein often forgets about its kinetic character, and becomes preoccupied with more everyday,

factical concerns. While it is on average (durchschnittlich) in the everyday mode of life, Dasein

is indeed moving through life, but moving in such a way as to be absorbed in its daily routines

and taking up possibilities mostly given over to it by others. It takes up tasks whose ends are of

primary concernproducts, deadlines, dates, commitments, etc. In forgetfulness, it fails to

understandhow its death is always imminent, and always to be maintainedas such. Dasein loses

sightof its true potentiality for beingdeathby forgetting that it is not something that can be

actualized. Instead, it takes up externally given possibilities in such a way as to be fulfilled, not

45SZ, p. 259. See also pp. 306 & 312.


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as possibilities, but as possibilities that willbefinished.46 Inauthenticity, therefore,

is Daseins forgetfulness of its fundamental kineticity. This is because inauthentic Dasein acts in

the world in order to actualize particularpotentials, since the concerns in which it finds itself are

determined by particular purposes. Inauthentic Dasein exists as being-out-for the exhaustion of

possibilities. One is hired for a specific job on the presumption that it will be successfully

completed. The shoemaker is not asked by a customer either to work indefinitely on the leather,

or even to work for the sake of working, cultivating ones shoemaking ability, but rather to make

successfully a particular shoe. The expediency (Beitrglichkeit) of these possibilities exemplify

Daseins everyday, inauthentic concerns insofar as the focus is upon the completion of the end,

and not the cultivation of the possibility itself.

For the moment, let us return to the Grundbegriffe in order to accentuate further the

distinction between Daseins authentic and inauthentic motions. There, Heidegger infers from

Schusterei and Spaziergangtwo senses ofBesorgen: There are two different forms ofconcern,

which are distinguished according to the being-character of that which accounts for the .47

In what sense are there two forms of concern and how does the character of the of each

differentiate them? The clue is in Heideggers use ofEigentlichkeitin the sentence prior, since it

evinces one of the two senses, and implies the second: The authenticity of completeness [Die

46 Steven Crowell has raised the following concern for my reading here: if death corresponds to

Fertigsein, then one runs the risk of reading being-towards-death as merely "being-towards-perishing," which Heidegger calls "demising" (SZ, pp. 247-248 and p. 251). I agree that there is asense ofFertigsein with which being-towards-death means a kind of perishing. The caveat,however, is that this sense pertains only to inauthenticity. Inauthentic Dasein focuses on ends,even to the extent of fixating on death as that which one must flee, since Dasein sees the need to

finish as many projects as possible before one perishes. On the other hand, for authentic Dasein,Fertigsein does not mean "termination," but instead means the completeness of always beingincomplete. Thus, the orientation is not upon the end, but on being towards the end. I thankCrowell for his thoughts on this issue.47GA 18, p. 71.


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Eigentlichkeit des Fertigseins], that of going for a walk, is grounded in this: how I go for a

walk.48 Not only should we immediately recall Heideggers use ofEigentlichkeitin SZ, but also

its contraryUneigentlichkeit. Spaziergangis theBesorgen that is authentically complete, since

its activity is such that it holds itself together precisely by maintaining its potentiality. That is to

say, Spaziergang can be taken as a whole (ganz) even if it is a motion because it is always

incomplete as long as it exists. Thus, the wholeness of authentic motion is its complete

incompleteness. The authenticity of Dasein is much the same. It is the motion of life defined in

such a way that its genuine activity is to aim at the constancy (Bestndigkeit; Stetige) of its

potentiality.

Conversely, inauthentic Dasein is analogous to Schusterei, because it is the Besorgen

which intends to exhaust particular possibilities. The potential simply finishes, or perishes. If

Spaziergang is authentically complete because it sustains a potential, then Schusterei must be

inauthentic precisely because it aims to destroy a particular potential, to actualize it

(verwirklichen). What is more, the potential given to shoemaking is not self-given, but

determined by something beyond itby others. The motion of shoemaking is absorbed in its

activity similarly as Daseins fallenness in das Man. Shoemaking is only because of the concerns

of others (i.e. needing or wanting shoes), and not by its own activity. In this motion, therefore,

what is forgotten is that genuine (eigentlich) being lies in the motion itself, and neither in its

cessation nor in the concerns of others. So, when Dasein engages in the world in like manner as

Schusterei, it has forgotten about its motion, and neglects the preservation of the towardness in

Sein zum Tode, since it presumes its wholeness pertains to finishing a variety, or even a

summation, of particular projects. It might be said, from this, that in inauthenticity, Dasein

48Ibid.


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forgets how to live. Authentic life is never about coming upon the end, especially any particular

end, but about becoming more and more incomplete, stretching out ones potentiality for arriving

at the end. The completeness of this way of being is simply the constancy of incompleteness. For

Dasein to be in motion inauthentically means, therefore, to be engaged in daily concerns which

are grasped as issues and activities to be resolvedand terminated.

One of the most apparent instances of Daseins complete-incompleteness in SZ is

Heideggers appeal to ripening (das Reifen) as a preliminary way to characterize the Being of

Dasein as Sein zum Tode:

The unripe fruit, for example, goes toward its ripeness. In the course of its ripening, the

not-yet of the fruit is in no way appended to it as what is not-yet-present-at-hand. The

fruit brings itselfto ripeness, and such self-bringing [Sichbringen] characterizes its being

as fruit. Nothing conceivable that one could procure would be able to eliminate the

unripeness of the fruit, had this being not come to ripeness on its own accord. The not-yet

of unripeness pertains not to something else beyond [auenstehendes] the unripeness,

which, with indifference to the fruit, could be present-at-hand in and with it. It pertains to

the kind of being of the fruit in itself. A full summation of what is not-yet is like what is

ready-to-hand indifferently going towards the absent, un-ready-to-hand remainder.

Strictly speaking, however, the not-yet can be neither beyond nor not indifferent to the

ripening. Nevertheless, the ripening fruit is not only not indifferent to the unripeness

[nicht nur nicht gleichgltig gegen die Unreife] as what is other than itself, but more so

that while ripening, the fruit is unripeness. The not-yet is already included in the fruits


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own being; in no way is the not-yet a random determination, but rather is something

constitutive. Analogously, Dasein is always-already its not-yet, so long as it is.49

Daseins towardness is akin to ripening. This is because, as being-towards-death, Dasein is je

schon sein Noch-nicht, it is always already its not-yet. But, what does it mean for Dasein to

be its not-yet? For anything to be not-yet is to be the active potentiality for whatever remains

outstanding. For, to say, the fruit is not yet ripe, is to say that at this point in time, the fruit is

actively ripening. And, even though the fruit has not fully matured, the fact that it is maturing

makes visible that it has been and continues to be on the way to maturation. Like the fruit, the

being of Dasein is its Sichbringen. Thus, for the fruit to be not yet ripe also means that it is still

in the processthe motionof ripening. Being-not-yet is itself something being-at-work (In-

Arbeit-sein; ). What the noch-nichtof the fruit suggests is that thus far(noch) the fruit is

actively the potential to be what remains outstanding, the mature fruit. The reason that the

totality of the fruit is not indicated by the summation(die volle Summe) of all the intermediate

steps the fruit takes along the way to its maturation is that what is not-yet is not something that is

detached from the being of the fruit. Heidegger then ties this to Daseins motion:

Instead, just as Dasein is constantly already its not-yet, so long as it is, so too it is always

already its end. The end, by which we mean death, cannot mean the being-at-the-end [Zu-

Ende-sein] of Dasein, but rather Daseins being-toward-the-end [Sein zum Ende]. Death

is a way to be, which Dasein embraces [bernimmt] as soon as it is.50

Dasein is what is not-yetthe potentiality of death. To be not-yet is a kind of incompleteness.

Furthermore, Dasein is the potential of death because it is Daseins Weise zu sein, its way to be.

Its towardness is not to be atits end, for this would be for Dasein to perish. But, because Dasein

49SZ, pp. 243-44, emphasis mine. Cf.Phy. .1, 201a19 for, coming to maturity.50SZ, p. 245. See also GA 18, pp. 97-98.


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always (stndig) exists in this way, Dasein exists alsganzes Seinknnen, as the being-potential

which is itself whole:

Because anticipation makes accessible in the possibility that cannot be outstripped [i.e.

death] all of the possibilities available for Dasein, what lies within anticipation is the

possibility of an existentiell assurance [Vorwegnehmens] of the whole of Dasein, which is

to say the possibility of existing as a whole ability-to-be.51

What is it that makes Dasein complete if it is always incomplete? It is precisely the fact that

Dasein is always incomplete: Was am Dasein die Unganzheit ausmacht, das stndige

Sichvorweg, ist weder ein Ausstand eines summativen Zusammen, noch gar je ein Dasein als das

Seiende, das es ist, zu sein hat.52 There is, therefore, an inherent dialectic to Daseins kineticity

such that its incompleteness is complete so long as Dasein exists, since it is always the whole

motion at every moment of its existence. Thus, Daseins authentic wholeness is defined by

always being towards its end, attentively preserving itspotentiality-for-death.

To bring this section to a close, let us tie everything together by returning to the issue

with which this essay initially opened: is notself-stretchingan integral aspect of Daseins motion

in SZ? Why is Dasein defined as the motion or the movedness of Being that stretches out by

stretching itself out? It is because of Daseins authentic activityself-understanding:

The nearest nearness of being-towards-death, as a possibility, is as far as possible from

something actualized [einem Wirklichen]. The more uncoveredly one understands this

possibility, the more purely the understanding penetrates within the possibility as the

possibility of the impossibility of existence in general. [] In anticipation of this

possibility, the possibility becomes greater and greater, that is, it reveals itself as what

51SZ, p. 264.52SZ, p. 244, emphasis mine; cf. p. 308.


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knows no measure at all, no more or less, but rather points to the possibility of the

measureless impossibility of existence.53

As I said above, motion need not be measured according to how near (nahe) it is to its cessation,

but according to the temporality of the motion. For, in one respect, Daseins nearest nearness

(nchste Nhe) to death is simply that Dasein is always-already the potentiality-for-death. The

longerDasein exists, however, the greater and greater (immer grer) such potentiality becomes,

since it prolongs death as a potential. As such, the more time it takes to understand itself, the

more Dasein dwells in self-understanding, then the more Dasein stretches out by stretching itself

outdas erstreckte Sicherstrecken. Here, we see how intimately kineticity and temporality are

connected for Heidegger. Because the only thing that can limit such potentiality is the

actualization of death, as long as Dasein exists, its motion confronts no limit, no definite

amount (Ma) of time to be in motion. This is the indefiniteness (Unbestimmtheit) of Daseins

finitude, such that the indefiniteness of Daseins motion is indicated by the constant towardness

of its being-towards-death. Thus, the movedness of Daseins being is such that it indefinitely

stretches itself out towardsdeath by way of a self-understanding.

III

It should be quite evident by now that Heideggers interpretation of Aristotles definition

of motion is one of the driving, albeit tacit, components in theDaseinsanalytik. Still, it cannot be

left unsaid that Heideggers use of Aristotle comes at a cost of misreporting Aristotles text. To

anyone familiar with Aristotle, Heidegger has not merely appropriated Aristotles philosophical

apparatus and applied it straightforwardly to theDaseinsanalytik. To the contrary, the application

actually relies on a fundamental misreading of Aristotle. Above, I suggested, without much

53SZ, p. 262, emphasis mine.


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argument or explanation, that Heideggers reading ofMeta. .3, 1047a30-32 is the key to

recognizing the collapse between and , especially in the definition of motion. In

order to appreciate fully the manner in which Heidegger draws from Aristotle, it is important to

place all that has been said in the context of the degree to which Heidegger manipulates

Aristotles text to his advantage.

It is not immediately apparent why Heidegger thinks such equivalence between

and is originarily argued by Aristotle. When Heidegger first explicates the definition of

motion, neither his translation nor his explanation addresses explicitly the use of in

the definition. Instead, he defers to . Following this, Heidegger tersely comments that if

Aristotle were to have been more attentive, he would have used instead of.

The reason for this, I think, involves a kind of interpretative sleight of hand, which allows

Heidegger to suggest thatAristotle himself sharply distinguishes and , where

the former must be understood as and the latter as the cessation of. Prior to the

initial explication ofPhy. .1, 201a10, Heidegger garners textual support for this identity from

Meta. .3, 1047a30-32, read through the lens of.8, 1050a20:

Fr die Aufklrung der Bedeutung [von ] ist intruktiv eine Stelle aus der

Metaphysik 3: , ,

.

[Heideggers translation:]Es kam nmlich der Name dazu, bertragen zu

werden auch auf das andere, was an Bestimmungen an der Bewegung entgegentritt;

nmlich ist in sich bezogen . ( zu ersetzen


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durch , vgl. ,

).54

Let us first square Heideggers translation with a more traditional, straightforward one.

Heidegger: It came about that the name was also carried over to the other [i.e.

], which is set down in contrast to the determinations of movement, namely that

refers/moves within itself [in sich bezogen] [towards ].

Traditional: The term , which is set down with , has applied to other

things [ : literally, has come upon other things] aside from mostly

motion. For, it is commonly thought that [] is most of all. Heideggers

translation obfuscates Aristotles claim by glossing over much of the text. Aristotle means only

to say, dialectically (), that in contrast to the others who hold that actuality seems to be

ontologically identical to motion, the true meaning of actuality extends further than motion,

e.g. to immaterial, unmoved things. What is peculiar, however, is that Heidegger only translates

1047a30-31. At first, this might seem odd on Heideggers part, since a32 reads for it seems that

is most of all. Why not translate this apparently auspicious claim that

is? I suggest that Heidegger thinks that the equivalence made at a32 is clear on its own in

the Greek. Instead, he focuses more on explaining the character of this equivalence, which he

sees given at 1047a30-31that is insofar as it is the activity which stretches

itself out toward the end.

If we look carefully at Heideggers translation, we can see that in sich bezogen gives us

an important clue to why Heidegger appeals to (that which is stretched out

with/toward another) as a replacement for (that which is referred with another).

54GA 18, p. 295, emphasis mine. Cf. GA 33, p. 224.


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While sich beziehen auf unequivocally means to refer to something linguistically, which

therefore would have been a suitable translation of, Heidegger uses sich beziehen.

Without auf it is not clear whethersich beziehen means to refer or to move ones self into,

i.e. a change of place (). However, what is most significant about sich beziehen in this

context is that, read as sich be-ziehen, it suggests to stretchones self out, since ziehen can

mean to stretch out. Clearly, connotes neither locomotion nor stretching. Like

sich beziehen auf, it has only the logical sense of combining or referencing another term. So,

without a significant caveat, Heideggers use ofsich beziehen is unjustifiable, or at most

ambiguous. But, Heideggers parenthetical remark provides a justification forsich beziehen:

in a30 needs to be replaced (ersetzen) by , which is the participial

equivalent of given at .8, 1050a22.55 means both that which stretches

out towards (obviously Heideggers preference, since it implies ), and that which refers

toanother. This twofold sense is due to the root ofmeaning to stretch

out both literally in terms of a physical elongation and metaphorically as a linguistic term which

indicates how a word tends or stretches toward another in meaningthat is, to refer. This,

55 Even though he does not explicitly cite Diels at this point, Heidegger is clearly relying on

DielsEtymologica, inZeitschrift fr vergleichende Sprachforschung47 (1916), pp. 193-210. InhisEtymologica, p. 201, Diels suggests that, in light of a manuscript discrepancy, should be read as nach 1050a23. However, W.D.Ross,Aristotles Metaphysics:A Revised Text with Introduction and Commentary, vol. 2 (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1958;1924), p. 246 faults Diels for a false parallel between and , seeing thatthe word from which Diels derives occurs only in the active voicefor Aristotle, not in the middle-passive. Ross, therefore, sees no problem with ,saying that it implies that Aristotle was in the habit of connecting the words and together in his lectures (emphasis mine). Ross reading is the most reasonable. Still,it should be noted that it isHeideggerwho is takes advantage of Diels suggestion, since Dielsmakes no argument to the effect that indicates a strong ontological correspondencebetween simpliciterand . In fact, commenting on 1047a30-32, Diels, p. 201,advances a more straightforward reading, inconsonant with Heideggers: Hier scheint derTerminus [], im Gegensatz zu der noch in Bewegunggedachten geradezu denEndpunkt, den Vollendungzustand zu bezeichnen (emphasis mine).


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therefore, allows Heidegger to usesich beziehen, since it expresses bothsenses of.

But, why should Heidegger retain both meanings? It allows him to interpret Aristotle as arguing

that points to in meaning, precisely because, by being,

is what stretches itself out towards the state of being fully finished. That is to say, the linguistic

referentiality of as meaningfully (bedeutsam) pointing to is grounded in its

ontological referentiality (Bedeutsamkeit; ) of being the motion towards a state of

cessation. From this, Heidegger is able to conclude rather straightforwardly that in

contrast to means what stretches itself out towards the end (spannt sich aus zum

Ende). Therefore, Heideggers emendation of Aristotles texts is not simply to correct a

manuscript error or to clarify the text. It is to reveal philosophically that meaningfulness is

authentic only when Dasein understands the logical, referential structure of the world on the

ground of its own motion towards death. Daseins stretching towards death is the ontological

context according to which the referential structure of the world operates. Clearly, therefore,

Heideggers interpretation of as what stretches itself out toward the end strongly

informs the notion of das erstreckte Sicherstrecken, but only because Heidegger identifies

with in Aristotelian ontology.

Another telling piece of evidence suggesting that Heidegger departs from Aristotle's

doctrine of actuality is his interpretation ofENK.6-7, given in the 1924-25 Sophistlectures (GA

19). For Aristotle, one of the most definitive human is the life of contemplation

(). But, even as Heidegger understands this, is nota motion; its authenticity

lies precisely in an actuality bereft of all potentiality, a deathless life. Contemplation is the

highest activity because it is finished () at every moment. As such, is the most


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virtuous activity; it is that activity in which human beings act most excellently. This is why, at

ENK.7, 1177b19-26, it is the highest form of happiness ():

The activity of thinking, which is the life of contemplation, seems both to be superior to

the political life, to aim at no ends beyond itself, and to have the proper pleasure, which

enlarges the activity. Also, as much as humanly possible, self-sufficiency, leisure,

tirelessness, and whatever else assigned to the happy person appear to be those things

pertaining to this activity. Hence, this would be the completehappiness of man, if one

were to have received a complete span of life. For, nothing is incomplete concerning

these things belonging to happiness.56

Because there is nothing about happiness that is , the of happiness must be

complete. Thus, happiness is not a motion. Becominghappy might be some sort of motion or

change, but this is not the unchanging activity that is supposed to be happiness. However,

Aristotle draws the curious conclusion that the contemplative life "would be the complete

happiness of man, if one were to have received a complete span of life." The syntax would have

us think, at least initially, that complete happiness depends upon an unlikely "complete span of

life" (), since for life to be fulfilled in the ways specified at b21-22 is rare and

difficult, if not impossible. In fact, it is for these very reasons that complete happiness seems to

be more divine than human (1177b29-24). Nevertheless, even when there is a complete span of

life, it does not always follow that one has attained complete happiness. People often die never

having achieved much happiness, having lead quite disparate and dissatisfied lives. In ENA.10,

56 , , ( ), , , , .


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1101a17-19, it is precisely on this point that Aristotle disputes Solon, arguing that happiness

ought not to be predicated of a human being after a complete life, but that "since the future is

obscure to us, we set down that happiness, as an end, is complete in everyway and at all times

[]." In this way, livinghumans are called happy (1101a20). Because it is

absurd to predicate an activity to the dead, and since the future is not certainthat is, admits of

changehappiness must be that complete activity which pertains to the living insofar as it is

living. Why then does Aristotle draw this seemingly strange conclusion at 1177b24-25? Why

talk about a complete life? It is to point us to the divine character of , its

motionlessness. As Heidegger reads Aristotle in the Grundbegriffe, means being-

finished, which is the inauthentic sense ofFertigsein. In the Sophist lectures, Heidegger holds

fast to this assumption. In contemplation, happiness is a pure (schlechtinim

reinsten Sinne), since contemplation "is the pure visibility of life with respect to its possibility of

being which has been brought to its end" (Sie ist die reine Gegenwart des Lebenden hinsichtlich

seiner zu Ende gebrachten Seinsmglichkeit).57 It is "the finished presence of life with respect to

its highest possibility of being (das Fertiganwesendsein des Lebenden hinsichtlich seiner

hchsten Seinsmglichkeit).58 In other words, contemplation, as the hchsten Seinsmglichkeit,

ought to coincide with pure happiness when its possibility is fully actualized (zu Ende

gebrachten; das Fertiganwesendsein) for the living human being, even though this is rare and

difficult.Just in this way, motion is not admitted into happiness because motion

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