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The Cruise Missile Threat and its Proliferation
by John G. Heidenrich
The views expressed in this essay are those of the author and do not necessarily represent the views of his employer, nor its clients, nor of any U.S. Government official, department, agency, or military command.
Executive Summary Whereas the threat posed by ballistic missiles, such as those in the arsenals of North Korea and
Iran, tends to attract major news headlines, the emerging threat to the United States from cruise
missiles gets much less publicity, though it warrants it also. Even a single cruise missile, with a
design either obsolescent or obsolete and its price relatively inexpensive, can wreak horrific
harm upon a civilian target, especially if armed with a chemical, biological, radiological, or
nuclear (CBRN) payload. If launched from a deceptively innocent-looking platform, a civilian
ship or airplane for instance, a cruise missile with even only a short range capability can hit any
of several U.S. ports and cities at risk. Weapons similar to cruise missiles, such as unmanned
armed drones, likewise pose a homeland threat.
Definition and History Without including any craft flown by suicide pilots, a standard cruise missile can be described as
an unmanned, self-propelled, winged, non-recoverable aerial vehicle designed to destroy a
surface target. It can be launched from aircraft, ships, submarines, or ground-based platforms,
fixed or mobile. The popular image of a cruise missile is that of a smart bomband indeed,
with its sophisticated navigational technology, that unofficial type of cruise missile is among the
most advanced and has not been exported widely, at least not yet. However, several types of
early and mid-generation surface-to-surface and sea-skimming anti-ship missiles, such as the
French-made Exocet, have proliferated widely. While not as versatile as, for example, an
armed unmanned aerial vehicle (UAV), the average cruise missile can be deadlier, in part
because around the globe are spread many more cruise missiles than armed UAVs.
John G. Heidenrich is a Senior National Security Analyst at Science Applications International Corporation (SAIC). Over his career of more than two decades he has worked either for or as a paid consultant to the Defense Intelligence Agency, the Central Intelligence Agency, the State Department, and several major commands and offices within the Department of Defense, including the Defense Secretarys Office of Force Transformation (OFT) under the now late Vice Admiral Arthur K. Cebrowski, USN (Ret.). He holds a Master of Public Administration (MPA) degree from Harvard University and a Bachelors degree in Political Science from The American University. He can be contacted at (703) 676-6021 or email [email protected].
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At left, a Super Etendard aircraft drop-launches an Exocet anti-ship cruise missile. At right, top and ottom, the effect of a successful Exocet hit. b
Source: falklandswar.org.uk
Among the reasons for their popularity: the basic technologies associated with cruise missiles
are simple enough, common enough, and inexpensive enough to make them attractive to many
buyers and users. As early as 1907, Ren Lorin, a French artillery officer, suggested that a jet
engine could propel an airframe. A few years later, the First World War saw the creation of the
so-called Aerial Torpedo. Developed by the United States and nicknamed the Bug, it was a
propeller-powered airplane, unmanned, and launched from a special trolley towards a pre-set
target. The Bug carried a payload of 180 pounds (82 kg) of high explosive, out to a range of
about 75 miles (120 km).1
At left, a Kettering Aerial Torpedo is readied for launch. At right, another view of the Bug.
Sources: U.S. Air Force Museum and wikipedia.com
2
World War II witnessed the first
modern cruise missile: the V-1 of
Nazi Germany. Its acronym is
short for Vergeltungswaffen-1, or
Vengeance Weapon-1. British
civilians nicknamed the V-1 the
buzz bomb because its engine
made a distinct buzzing sound.
Having a range of 150 miles
(240 km), the V-1 was noisy and
subsonic as it cruised at some
3,000 feet (900 m), flying a fairly
predictable course after being
launched from the German-
occupied French or Dutch coasts
all factors which made it fairly
vulnerable to Britains aerial
defenses.2 Nevertheless, of the
more than 8,000 V-1s which over-flew the English Channel to terrorize London and other
targeted cities, the great majority did get through. Furthermore, those which the British knocked
down still proved deadly to anyone directly below the missiles 1,875 pounds (850 kg) of high
explosive. At least 6,000 people were killed by V-1 attacks, another 24,000 were wounded, and
hundreds of thousands of civilian homes were damaged or destroyed.3 Remarkably, potentially
much higher casualties were averted because double-agents run by British Intelligence fooled
the Germans into programming many of their V-1s to undershootand thus fall short of
heavily populated London, falling instead into the southern suburbs and countryside.4
Above: a V-1 in flight. Below: damage from a single V-1 attack.
Sources: U.S. Missile Defense Agency (MDA) and Britains National Maritime Museum, London
Though the V-1 was not a weapon of mass destruction (WMD) in the contemporary sense, Nazi
contingency plans did exist to arm it with deadly Tabun (GA) nerve gas.5 Records also suggest
a plan to arm the ballistic V-2 rocket with radiological isotopes, thereby creating a giant dirty
bomb, albeit without a thermo-nuclear explosion.6 The end of the war interrupted these plans,
but if the war had dragged on longer, or if the V-2 rocket had not been developed, the V-1 could
have proven vastly more destructive than it was. In other words, more than half a century ago,
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before the Cold War had even begun, the theory and technical feasibility of a cruise missile as
both a terror weapon and a WMD were already established. The Cold War and its after-years saw the creation of
much more sophisticated cruise missiles, some quite
supersonic and having ranges exceeding 1,500 miles
(2,500 km). Todays long-range cruise missiles have
guidance systems which use internally programmed
terrain contour-matching (TERCOM) navigation
maps, some with satellite uplinks for in-flight course
corrections. Among the most advanced are land-
attack cruise missiles (LACMs) like the U.S. Navys
Tomahawk, their avionics and ranges so extensive
that no more than a dozen countries possess the
requisite technology for their general design and
production.7 Of those few countries, the United States is uppermost.
Main picture: a Tomahawk in flight, this one operated by Britains Royal Navy. Inset photo:the submarine-launch of a Tomahawk LACM.
Source: navy-matters.beedall.com
In contrast to this American advantage, however, the American homeland lies widely exposed to
an attack by almost any type of cruise missileand in 2002, Secretary of Defense Donald
Rumsfeld sent the White House a classified memorandum to that effect. Remarked a senior
official: The issue has gotten peoples attention. 8
Cruise missile technology is not rocket science That attention includes from some quite ordinary, albeit eccentric, individuals. In New Zealand,
a jet-engine enthusiast and self-styled handyman named Bruce Simpson announced in 2003 his
remarkably credible plans to construct, in his garage, his own home-made cruise missile. On
his web-site, InterestingProjects.com, Simpson explained:
Some time ago I wrote an article in which I suggested that it would not be difficult for
terrorists to build their own relatively sophisticated cruise missiles using off-the-shelf
components and materials. [Since then,] Ive received quite a number of emails from
former and currently serving U.S. military personnel who acknowledge that the threat is
one they are very much aware of and for which there is little in the way of an effective
defense available. However, there have also been a number of people who claim Im
overstating the case and that its not possible to build a real cruise missile without
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access to sophisticated gear, specialized tools, and information not readily available
outside the military. So, in order to prove my case, I decided to put my money where
my mouth is and build a cruise missile in my garage, on a budget of just US$5,000. 9
Simpson added this caution:
Obviously, the goal of this web-site is not to provide terrorists or other nefarious types
with the plans for a working cruise missile, but to prove the point that nations need to
be prepared for this type of sophisticated attack from within their own borders....Rest
assured that, while I intend to provide plenty of very interesting detail about what Im
doing, the detail of how some of the critical aspects will not be disclosed here, for
obvious reasons. 10
Bruce Simpson with his garage-built cruise missile. Source: InterestingProjects.com
According to Simpson, he acquired
most of the necessary parts from the
online auction house eBay, including a
Global Positioning System (GPS) he
purchased for only $120delivered
by international airmail in less than a
week and passed through customs
without any problems, he said. He
described his cruise missile as being
crude, like a small aircraft powered by
a jet engine, with a range of 100
kilometers (62 miles) and a payload of
10 kilograms (22 pounds).11
By comparison, even the decades-old
V-1 had twice the range and delivered
a much heavier payloadsome 85
times heavier. To be fair, though, the
V-1 was not built in a garage.
Simpsons personal initiative proved so impressive that the Defence Ministry of New Zealand,
acting reportedly under U.S. pressure, pressed him cease. He refused. If the NZ Government
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thought they were going to kill this project, they were sadly mistaken, he declared on his web-
site, adding:
Id like to thank all those who have emailed me with their opinions, condemnations,
and support. The fact that I get so many emails obviously means that my goal of
raising public awareness is working[U]sing off-the-shelf technology in a suburban
garage, a terrorist can create a weapon against which there is no effective defense. 12
According to a BBC.com news article, Simpson reported that Iran offered to buy the details of
his research, an offer he rebuffed. He plans to write a book about his experience and concerns.
New Zealand officials declare that, for reasons of secrecy, they cannot comment publicly.13
Export is easy, control is not At one point the New Zealand government informed Simpson that, if he wanted to, he could
export his cruise missile technology to Iran quite legallyan admission which stunned him
since, as he explained on his web-site, Iran is widely considered to be a terrorist sponsor, and
similar exports are prohibited in the USA.
Simpsons experience exemplifies the weakness of the Missile Technology Control Regime
(MTCR), a voluntary arrangement between thirty-four (34) countries, including the United States
and New Zealand, which limits the transfer of both the entirety and components of advanced
missile and missile-related systems. Such includes ballistic missiles, space rockets, UAVs, and
cruise missiles capable of delivering a 500-kg payload out to a range of over 300 km. For better
or worse, the MTCR more effectively controls the proliferation of ballistic vice cruise missiles, in
part due to subjective interpretation. Each participating country is supposed to incorporate the
MTCRs guidelines into its own national export control legislation, but uneven compliance still
results. The MTCR is not legally binding and therefore it lacks any enforcement or disciplinary
protocols. Even if it were binding, the technology required to develop long-range cruise missiles
is not very different from that for short-range cruise missiles, the latter technology allowed for
export under the MTCR.14 A report by the U.S. Congressional Research Service (CRS) warns:
In contrast to ballistic missile proliferation, cruise missiles present a particular
challenge for monitoring and control because they exploit technology that is well
understood and well established in the civil aviation industry. Missile airframes,
navigation systems, jet engines, satellite maps, and mission planning computers and
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software all can be purchased on the commercial market. Cruise missile technology
hides in plain sightmaking it difficult to identify a military program. At the same time,
commercial availability generally means relatively low-cost weapons for many nations
and, potentially, non-state actors. 15
Put another way, an aide to Defense Secretary Rumsfeld has explained:
Your car has in it all the sophisticated technology thats necessary to feed a little
actuator inside of a guidance system to make a missile fly more or less where you want
it to go. If you can buy it in your automobile,
you begin to get a sense of how practical it is
for those kinds of weapons systems to be
developed. 16
Components for a caror for a cruise missile? The internal electronics are remarkably similar.
Source: users.tmok.com
Furthermore, the worst proliferators of missiles and
their technologies, such as North Korea for ballistic
missiles, are not MTCR members. The widest
proliferator of cruise missiles, albeit among the
simplest, is the Peoples Republic of China, which
is not an MTCR member.
Out from the sea, into the aironto the land Certainly advanced land-attack cruise missiles can pose a very sophisticated threat to the
United States, but another threat comes from ordinary anti-ship cruise missiles (ASCMs),
especially those ASCMs whose range and payload can be enhanced to achieve limited land-
attack capabilities. Worldwide, there are an estimated 75,000 ASCMs. At least seventy-five
(75) countries develop ASCMsand even more countries possess the technical capability to
convert their ASCMs into LACMs.17
The most proliferated ASCM may well be the Chinese-made Silkworm, which is based on the
old Soviet SS-N-2 Styx. Among the Silkworms purchasers are Iraq, Iran and North Korea. Its
large internal volume allows for the inclusion of more fuel, a heavier payload, and a larger
internal guidance system. Reportedly only minor changes to its HY-4 variant can extend its
range from about 90 miles (150 km) to more than 310 miles (500 km). 18 Such a missile, if
launched from Iran, could reach almost any U.S. surface forces in the Persian Gulf region.
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Moreover, because 300 miles (nearly 500 km) is a distance farther than the territorial limits of
any country, a cruise missile possessing that much range could, if launched from international
waters, strike almost any large civilian target on the American or European seaboard.19
Dennis Gormley, a leading expert on the cruise missile threat, notes that cruise missiles need
not be stabilized at their launch points, whereas ballistic missiles do. For that reason and
because cruise missiles are compact, Gormley warns that a cruise missile can be launched
from a rather innocent-looking commercial ship, the missile threat concealed inside until just
before its flight. Gormley explains:
Even a bulky large Silkwormcan fit into, with some space, a standard 12-meter
shipping container. And you can build a small erector in it to open the top of the
shipping container, and erect it and launch the system out of the container. 20
Above left: a Chinese-made Silkworm ASCM. Above right: a standard shipping container. Below left: shipping containers at sea. Below right: a Silkworm is launched.
Sources: wikipedia.com, containerarchitecture.co.nz, global-oc.com and iranian.com
Upon that launch, the time and distance for detecting and intercepting that cruise missile could
become very short, indeed. For a surface-based radar, its scanning horizon (i.e., the radars
effective range, limited by the Earths curvature and other factors) is only about 13 miles (20 km)
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for detecting a low-flying, incoming cruise missile. If that radar is land-based, facing terrain
features and other obstacles, the detection distance is even less. 21
The dangers of a radiological payload As for the cruise missiles target, it could be anything from a single building to an area covering
hundreds of square miles. Much will depend on the missiles payload and some environmental
factors. If the payload is a simple dirty bomb, that weapon might consist of only some bulk .
The possible effect of a dirty bomb (3,500 curie of cesium-137 with apx. 50 lbs of explosive) detonated at the lower tip of Manhattan Island.
Source: Scientific American (November 2002), page 76.
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radioactive material and an accompanying conventional explosive to scatter it. A much deadlier
dirty bomb could have radioactive pieces or particles mixed directly into the conventional
explosive; upon detonation, that mixture would create a toxic dust cloud that would spread
downwind almost immediately. The resultant deaths would occur first within a few hours and
then over several years, the latter inflicted by cancer. Meanwhile, the contaminated area would
need to be quarantined and cleaned up, taking a financial and psychological toll. If the area is
ever, indeed, fully decontaminated, it may nevertheless remain economically unviable due to
public fears of lingering radioactivity. If it was a port-city, the financial losses could mount into
the billions of dollars.22
The International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) reports that almost every country on the globe
possesses enough radioactive material for each to assemble at least one dirty bomband
also that more than one-hundred (100) of those countries do not maintain adequate controls
over their material.23 Perhaps more ominously, in 2003 the British government reported having
captured documents in Afghanistan which state that al-Qaeda terrorists have already fashioned
a small, rudimentary dirty bomb. Apparently, the actual weapon has yet to be found.24
The dangers of an atomic payload An atomic blast, even a relatively minor one, would generate effects that would dwarf any which
a dirty bomb could inflict. A mere half-kiloton blastthat is, an explosion with less than
one/twenty-fifth (1/25) the energy which devastated Hiroshima in 1945is still equivalent to 500
tons of TNT detonated at once. Incidentally, the size of the first reputed North Korean atomic
test, conducted on October 9, 2006, was reportedly equivalent to 550 tons of TNT.
On Kahoolawe Island, 500 tons of TNT were detonated for Operation Sailor Hat in 1965. At right, the initial explosion. At left, the blast quickly forms a mushroom cloud. The ship nearby suggests the scale of that half-kiloton blast.
Source: U.S. Naval Historical Center
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On September 11, 2001, the Twin Towers of the World Trade Center collapsed only after fires,
ignited by the two airliner crashes, slowly melted the buildings internal structurea decay that
was gradual enough that an estimated 25,000 to 30,000 occupants used that time to evacuate.
By contrast, if a half-kiloton blast had exploded at the base of the Twin Towers, the two
skyscrapers would have toppled more quickly and indeed diagonally, pounding and toppling the
surrounding buildings of lower Manhattan in a giant cascade. Lacking any time for anyone to
evacuate, the resultant deaths would have far exceeded the 9/11 horror. It deserves mention
that most nuclear weapons generate explosive yields far greater than a half-kiloton.
The dangers of a biological or chemical payload A cruise missiles steadiness in flight can enable it, if
so equipped, to spray a deadly biological or chemical
aerosol over a wide area.25 Worth noting, though, is
that in comparison to the specially-designed flying
spray-tanks which U.S. forces once stockpiled to inflict
tactical bio/chemical strikesin particular, the AERO-
14B and the TMU28/Ba cruise missiles bio/chemical
payload would be almost certainly smaller. Still, upon
personal contact, what constitutes a deadly dosage is
merely a few spores of inhaled anthrax, or a tiny drop
of VX nerve agent.
This cruise missile option of a bio/chemical payload
has been considered, reports indicate, by at least
Syria, Iran, and China.26 Iraq under Saddam
Husseins regime did prepare something similar: a few
L-29 Delfin trainer-aircraft were converted into
unmanned drones, each equipped with wing-mounted
tanks to spray anthrax or other agents. In 2002, prior
to the Iraq War, some Iraqi documents confiscated by
United Nations weapons inspectors led a bio-weapons
expert to warn: These aircraft are intended to fly
below radar, so the Israelis cant detect them. The
Iraqis themselves have said so. 27 Meanwhile, in the
Top: an Iraqi F-1 Mirage spraying a bio/chemical agent; this photo comes from the film footage then-Secretary of State Colin Powell briefed to the UN Security Council in 2002. Center: an Iraqi L-29 Delfin converted into a UAV. Below: an ordinary crop-duster in the United States.
Sources: U.S. Central Intelligence Agency, globalsecurity.org and pest.ifas.ufl.edu
11
United States, some of the 9/11 hijackers had first sought to fly ordinary crop-dusters. This fact,
discovered after 9/11, so worried the FBI that all crop-dusters throughout the United States were
kept grounded for a time.28
For a bio/chemical agent to be effectively lethal, it must be released in a specific concentration
or else the atmosphere will dilute it. Even if released in that proper concentration, adverse
environmental conditions can still dilute or even negate that agents effects. (This is why, during
the Cold War, some U.S. chemical munitions were stored in outdoor containers in the deserts of
Arizona and Colorado; for any leakage of agent, the deserts heat and breeze quickly thinned it.)
Such variable conditions are not a reliable defense against the bio/chemical threat that cruise
missiles pose. However, for a perpetrator, these prerequisites do complicate his planning.
The Cruise Missile Threat: How Immediate? Cruise missiles are already widely available: the 75,000 ASCMs estimated to exist worldwide
are only a portion of the global tally of all cruise missile types.* Thus, the cruise missile threat to
the United States is serious and, indeed, is expected to increase as global proliferation
continues of both the missiles themselves and their various technologies. However, against the
American homeland in particular, the cruise missile threat is not yet considered dire. Terrorists
may view suicidal martyrdom operations as easier to mount and more terrifying in their effects
than whatever those terrorists can accomplish with a rudimentary cruise missile. Even an
ordinary truck bomb can carry more conventional explosive than the average cruise missile can.
On 9/11, rather than launch one standard cruise missile against the American homeland,
terrorists transformed four hijacked airliners into immense, human-occupied cruise missiles.
Why then bother with something high-tech?
To this question are three sobering replies. First: most ordinary cruise missiles are not very
high-technot enough to merit any assumption that terrorists, whatever their creed, will never
attempt to acquire a cruise missile of any type. Second: most terrorists would rather not employ
suicide tactics, even if martyrdom is the personal objective of many Islamist terrorists. Third:
terrorists are not the only adversary capable of employing cruise missiles. A regime such as
Irans is quite capable of launching cruise missiles from its national territory and, conceivably,
from even international waters could undertake a covert launch against the U.S. homeland. * Incidentally, because an incoming cruise missile looks the same, whatever its payload, the United States and the Soviet Union signed the Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces (INF) Treaty in 1988. It bans all ground-launched cruise missiles (GLCMs) of a range between 1,000 and 5,500 kilometers (approximately 620 and 3,420 miles, respectively). However, the INF Treaty does not cover ASCMs or LACMs.
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In the best case scenario, a single cruise missile striking the U.S. homeland might cause only
minor physical damage. That missile might be simplistic in its design, and its payload only a
conventional explosive. Yet, this best case scenario could still unleash disproportionately
larger consequences. Whatever the facts of the missile strike, it would represent a propaganda
victory against the United States. The publics knowledge that such an attack was even
attempted could resonate as a profound psychological blow, raising terror. Some Americans,
situated at even the most unlikely of future targets, would feel vulnerable and may over-react.
To guard against approaches by other covert launch platforms, ordinary ships and aircraft might
then be abruptly inconvenienced by reactionary precautions and searches. Commerce and
trade could suffer, at least initially, accompanied by higher prices for increased security and for
more insurance coverage.
On the other hand, whatever the outcome, most Americans might remain remarkably calm and
take the outcomes many consequences in stride, as they have after other crises. But that hope
is not a defense policyespecially since even a single cruise missile carrying a WMD payload
holds a potential which is truly catastrophic. (END)
Top, a table showing various ASCMs with the male figure (left margin) for comparison. At bottom left, the French Apache LACM. At bottom right, the joint India -Russian Brahmos, a supersonic ASCM for export. n
Sources: U.S. Missile Defense Agency (MDA), grime.net and wikipedia.com
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The afore report was based in part upon the article: John G. Heidenrich and William S. Murray, III, Under the Radar Screen? The Cruise Missile Threat to the U.S. Homeland, Comparative Strategy (January-March 2004). Endnotes 1 Lawrence Hargrave, The Aerial Target and Aerial Torpedo the USA, Remotely Piloted Aerial Vehicles (RPAV), www.ctie.monash.edu/hargrave/rpav_usa.html. Accessed (Acd.) on January 24, 2003. Greg Goebel, The Aerial Torpedo, In The Public Domain, www.vectorsite.net/twcruz1.html. Acd. January 24, 2003. 2 Science Museum of London, V-1 Flying Bomb, History of Flight, www.sciencemuseum.org.uk/on-line/flight/flight/v1.asp. Acd. January 24, 2003. 3 John R. Elting, WWII Commemoration: Costs, Casualties and Other Data, Groliers Encyclopedia online, http://gi.grolier.com/wwii/wwii_16.html. Acd. January 24, 2003. 4 Francis Russell, The Secret War (Alexandria: Time-Life Books, 1981), p. 169. 5 Greg Goebel, A history of chemical warfare, In The Public Domain, www.vectorsite.net/twgas2.html and The V-1 Flying Bomb, Third Reich Factbook, www.skalman.nu/third-reich/equipment-bombs-v1.htm. Acd. January 24, 2003. 6 NDIA Systems Assessment Group, Feasibility of Third World Advanced Ballistic & Cruise Missile Threat, Volume 2: Emerging Cruise Missile Threat (Washington: National Defense Industrial Association/NDIA, August 1999), pp. 28-29 and 36-39. 7 Dennis M. Gromley and K. Scott McMahon, Proliferation of Land-Attack Cruise Missiles: Prospects and Policy Implications, Controlling the Spread of Land-Attack Cruise Missiles (Marina del Rey, Calif.: American Institute for Strategic Cooperation, January 1995). Available online at http://www.fas.org/irp/threat/fp/b19ch6.htm. 8 Bradley Graham, Cruise Missile Threat Grows, Rumsfeld Says, Washington Post (August 18, 2002), p. A-1. Available online at www.washingtonpost.com/ac2/wp-dyn/A31153-2002Aug17?language=printer. 9 Bruce Simpson, A DIY Cruise Missile: Watch me build one for under $5,000, www.InterestingProjects.com (updated June 14, 2003). Acd. August 18, 2003. See also Bruce Simpson, The Low Cost Cruise Missile: A looming threat? www.InterestingProjects.com (posted May 20, 2002). Acd. August 18, 2003. 10 Ibid. 11 New Zealand man building cruise missile in garage, posting details on Net, Agence France-Presse (June 3, 2003). 12 Simpson, A DIY Cruise Missile: Watch me build one for under $5,000, loc. cit. 13 DIY Cruise Missile Thwarted, BBC News (December 9, 2003). Available online at http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/world/asia-pacific/3302763.stm. 14 Dennis M. Gormley, Dealing with the Threat of Cruise Missiles (New York: Oxford University Press, 2001), pp. 77-91. 15 Christopher Bolkcom and Sharon Squassoni, CRS Report for Congress: Cruise Missile Proliferation (Washington: Congressional Research Service/CRS, July 3, 2002), p. CRS-2. See pages CRS-3 and CRS-4 for more information about the MTCR. 16 Graham, loc. cit. 17 Gormley, p. 29. 18 Ibid., pp. 30-33. 19 Dennis M. Gormley, Cruise Missile Proliferation: Threat, Policy, and Defenses, Proliferation Brief (Washington: Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, October 9, 1998). Available online at www.nyu.edu/globalbeat/nuclear/ceip100998.html. 20 Ibid. 21 Institute for Foreign Policy Analysis (IFPA), Cruise Missile Defense: Where Does It Fit in the Overall National Security Spectrum? (Washington: IFPA, June 27, 2001), p. 2. 22 Michael A. Levi and Henry C. Kelly, Weapons of Mass Disruption, Scientific American (November 2002), pp. 77-81. 23 Ibid. 24 Ed Johnson, British Agents Say Al-Qaeda Built Dirty Bomb, BBC Reports, Boston Globe (January 31, 2003). 25 Gormley, Cruise Missile Proliferation: Threat, Policy, and Defenses, loc. cit. 26 Central Intelligence Agency (CIA), Unclassified Report to Congress on the Acquisition of Technology Relating to Weapons of Mass Destruction and Advanced Conventional Munitions, 1 July Through 31 December 2001 (Washington: CIA, January 2003), www.cia.gov/cia/publications/bian/bian_jan_2003.htm. Also, China and Weapons of Mass Destruction: Implications for the United States (Washington: National Intelligence Council (NIC),
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November 5, 1999), www.cia.gov/nic/pubs/conference_reports/weapons_mass_destruction.html. Though sponsored by the NIC, the views in this report are not official positions of the U.S. Intelligence Community. 27 Joby Warrick, Iraq Works On Firing Chemical Weapons: Drone Aircraft, Scud Missiles Could Deliver Germs, Poisons, Washington Post (September 5, 2002), p. A-1. 28 FBI imposes news restrictions on crop-dusters, CNN.com (September 23, 2001). Available online at www.cnn.com/2001/US/09/23/inv.crop.dusters/. Also, Poison Plot? Hijacker May Have Planned Aerial Chemical or Biological Attack, ABCNews.com (September 24, 2001). Available online at http://abcnews.go.com/sections/us/DailyNews/WTC_Investigation010924.html.
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