HH&A: How Leaders Learn From Failure

Randal Ford

T he survival of an enterprise depends on the ability of its leaders to shape its des- tiny. When an organization flounders,

the CEO is the one most likely to receive the lion's share of the blame. Stockholders start to analyze the failure, often pointing to a "lack of leadership" or any number of other flaws, real or imaginary. It doesn't matter, though. Not really. The damage is done. According to Bass (1990), the CEO loses suppor t - -whether or not the fault is his or hers. How can strategic leaders antici- pate and learn from failure, then create a stron- ger, more resilient organization out of the chaos?

Making or not making a mistake in itself does not determine success. To paraphrase Frankl (1962), success depends on how we react to our failures, on our frame of mind, and on our atti- tudes. Drucker (1993) claims that the most impor- tant ingredient for success is our ability to draw new knowledge from our mistakes and learn how to apply that knowledge in new and pro- ductive ways. For a leader, then, it is necessary to understand what goes wrong, accept responsibil- itv for the consequences, and avoid similar cir- cumstances in the future. The trick, it seems, is knowing how to fail safe-----easier said than done.

An ultimate failure is defined as those experi- ences in which we fall short of a goal with no other recourse but to cease work. All of our re- sources have been exhausted, and our sustained efforts do not fulfill a desired outcome. From a systems theory perspective, Gall (1978) first pro- posed that a system fails when it fails to fail safe. Failing safe and ultimate failure, however, are not the same.

We fail to fail safe when we are unable to recover and learn from any failure experience. With the prospect of admitting to our mistakes, we are confronted with owning up to the limits of our own competence. We're not perfect. We can't know everything. Our knowledge and per- sonal experiences are limited. Those leaders who

incubate their ego and avoid learning from their failure experi- ences are most likely to give birth to new ones. Researchers Har- ris and Hogan (1992) show that critical flaws in the human charac- ter, as ancient as they are pervasive, tend to preclude effective learning and produce ineffective leaders. Aristotle came to this conclusion 2,500 years ago.

Incoherent thinking and untested assump- tions that lead to ultimate failure are facilitated by our all-too-human tendency toward hubris, hamartia, and anagnosis--HH&A. All leaders are subject to these tendencies. Few understand them. Fewer still know how to manage them. Accord- ing to D6rner (1996), identifying the opportuni- ties in the failure experience requires both a knowledge of its roots and the techniques to change one's behavior and learn from it. Failure can be beneficial to leaders only as long as they understand what role they play in it, and can apply the knowledge gained in new and better ways.

To Err Is H u m a n

Gathering together 30 years of research, Bentz (1985) catalogued the themes associated with failure--playing politics, moodiness, dishonesty, and so o n - - a n d concluded that failed executives had overriding personality defects or character flaws that alienated their subordinates and pre- vented them from building a team. But it was Aristotle who was one of the first Western phi-

HH&A: How Leaders Learn From Failure 17

losophers to note three limiting personality flaws that predispose us, despite our best intentions, to fail: hubris, hamartia, and anagnorisis. For this discussion, however, I have coined the term anagnosis ("without knowledge") to use in place of the third flaw. Aristotle used anagnorisis to refer to a leader "recognizing" past deeds, and always too late to do anything about them. Ac- cording to Aristotle, because a leader acts blindly in the present, at some point in the future he will come to recognize the full consequences of his actions, leading to a tragic downfall from which few recover. In other words, up to the point of recognition (anagnorisis), the leader is acting in a vacuum of ignorance; hence my term anagnosis: "acting without knowledge."

HH&A predisposes all humans to make and repeat mistakes that lead to ultimate failure. But this is especially true for leaders, because they operate within contexts that are constantly chang- ing. They must take action, and their decisions affect the lives of many more people. The ability to recognize these tendencies in themselves and draw important lessons from failure not only increases their chances of failing safe, but also better prepares them to minimize undesirable results in their organizations.

Hubris is an "overweening pride or ego." It implies the violation of a law by failing to recog- nize the limitations of one 's knowledge, regard- ing oneself as equal to the gods. Hubris is an act of will that suggests arrogance. We demonstrate it through behavior that echoes our claims to our superior importance or inherent rights.

Scholars commonly translate hamartia as a "flaw in character" and essentially as psychologi- cal. A person who is doggedly s tubborn and exhibits a terrible temper alienates others, which leads to his or her downfall as a leader. The "character flaw" interpretation is accurate to a point. But hamartia has more to do with the limi- tation of individual perception than a psychologi- cal flaw. Deriving from the Greek, hamartanien, it means "to miss the mark, to err." We tend to lock into a single point of view such that we are often unable to recognize or hit our intended target. We fail by a lack of ability, when left alone, to get outside our limited perspective. Hamartia becomes a flaw in character when the individual forgets about this inherent limitation of humankind.

For Aristotle, the limitations imposed by hu- bris and hamartia go hand-in-hand in undermin- ing a leader's ability to make sound decisions and act effectively. However, these "dark" tendencies are only two points in a strong triangle, which is completed with anagnosis. We can never know all there is to know about any endeavor. Anagno- sis is our lack of knowledge, creating in us an inability to make sense of how everything fits

together to form the big picture. Simply put, if our refusal to listen (hubris) is compounded by our inability to see the whole from our limited perspective (hamartia), we act in a vacuum of ignorance (anagnosis), deprived of the informed knowledge we need to accomplish our goals.

Obvious manifestations of hubris include dogmatism and chauvinism. Dogmatism is the positive assertion of an opinion in an arrogant manner without proof or evidence. For example, after more than 300 years, the Roman Catholic Church lifted its 1663 condemnat ion of Galileo for teaching that the earth orbited the sun, con- trary to the then current dogma that the sun or- bited the earth. The Pontiff finally acknowledged this error officially in 1997.

Chauvinism is the unreasoning devotion to one's race, gender, nationality, or class to the exclusion of, and often with contempt for, others. As reported by Messerschmidt (1996), under enormous pressure from both top management and NASA, senior managers at Morton Thiokol Inc. exhibited chauvinistic behavior when they ignored well-documented and repeated warnings from the entire engineering staff that o-ring ero- sion could result in catastrophic consequences in the launching of a space shuttle.

When one is afflicted with hubris, one 's past achievements will likely foster arrogance. Van Velsor and Leslie (1995) found that executives with derailed careers typically enjoyed early suc- cesses and no significant failure experiences. Their colleagues and managers viewed them as technical geniuses or tenacious problem solvers. They were derailed, however, by performance problems related to insensitivity to others. They were perceived as arrogant, vindictive, untrust- worthy, selfish, emotional, compulsive, overcon- trolling, abrasive, aloof, too ambitious, or unable to delegate decisions or build a team. Such orga- nizational leaders are more likely to presume they know what is best for customers without consulting them, and believe their accomplish- ments result exclusively from their own efforts. They have more of a propensity to use the ideas of others without giving credit, and to be preoc- cupied with their personal needs at the expense of organizational goals.

Hamartia is different from hubris. It is not an act of will. Rather, something obscures one's vision; a mote is lodged in one's eye that, left unattended, could lead to an ultimate failure. Complex problems and situations require abilities beyond our own comprehension, which our ten- dency toward hamartia obfuscates. We experi- ence failure when our circumscribed viewpoint blocks our view of the whole situation.

Consider the timeless tale of the six blind men and the elephant. Only by learning of the unique view of the others does each arrive at a

18 Business Horizons / September-October 1999

more accurate comprehens ion of the whole ani- mal. A holistic view is impossible when we each insist our own view is right, to the exclusion and devaluation of another 's perspective. Hamartia blocks the view of all the necessary points that would give us a more complete perception of realitv. Insisting on our limited individual view, we increase the risk of going astray.

Our systems--social , technological, and orga- n i za t iona l - a r e becoming so complex that every individual act has a myriad unexpected side ef- fects, many of which cannot be anticipated. As the uncertainty and complexity of our systems grow. ever larger portions of the knowledge we need resides in o the r s - -peop le with w h o m we have no relationship. Humans are by nature so- cial beings; we are incomplete when we isolate ourselves from the collective. Isolation creates a state of anagnosis. Leaders who are aware of their capacity to embrace anagnosis are naturally tugged toward adjusting their viewpoint to their situation and learning in an appropriate manner.

A leader's effectiveness is determined by the presence of what Hogan, Curphy, and Hogan (1994) call positive characteristics, as well as the absence of dark characteristics--those irritating tendencies that alienate subordinates and inter- fere with team building. Harris and Hogan (1992) have demonstrated that these dark characteristics are negatively related to ratings of team perfor- mance, and that subordinates are almost always aware of them.

The Triangle for Tragedy

The collusive tension among the three character- istics of HH&A creates the triangle for tragedy (see F igure 1). It grows stronger as the level of complexity in our environment exceeds our com- prehension. The triangle is working when we are tempted to dismiss what we do not understand as irrelevant, blame others for our mistakes, and resort to conspiracy theories---all of which leave us ignorant of reality.

The circumstances of our work conditions conspire with our triangle for tragedy, and we quickly become ill-suited to make effective deci- sions. No wonder Kotter (1995) exhorts leaders to align their organizational goals with all their simultaneous initiatives, projects, and other activi- ties. Even unsuccessful attempts at alignment increase a leader's knowledge of the complexities of the organization. With greater awareness of the complexities and uncertainties, a leader's survival instincts urge the mind into exploring "~ hat if" scenarios to prepare for the unexpected. In such situations, one 's capacity to recognize the tendency to embrace HH&A plays an important role in learning how to fail safe. When leaders are unable to remove these tendencies, which

increase their likelihood for failure, they can only compensate for them. To compensate, however, they must become aware.

Thus, enlightenment possibly begins with admitting the triangle exists, then learning how it drives us as individuals and as leaders. Learning begins when we reflect on our experiences. But why failure? Simply put, success does not provide us with any information on what went wrong. Knowing what doesn' t work and why guides us toward what does.

Reflection and Dialogue

How do we recognize HH&A? And what can we do about it once we recognize it? Argyris and Schon (1978) claim that a useful starting place is our underlying assumptions, our beliefs, and the culture from which they stem, which drive our everyday interactions with our work co l leagues- - those on the same management level, those be- low, and those above. HH&A is an inherent ten- dency in the human condition that is omnipres- ent but mostly subconscious. The potential for HH&A to appear happens any time two people come together to work. The potential is greater in leadership roles, where the leader remains iso- lated and unexposed. It is greater still where difficult and significant decisions must be made and the passions involved are running competi- tively high. Every stakeholder has the potential to build his own personal triangle for tragedy with- out even knowing it.

To avoid painting too bleak a picture, it is important to note that HH&A is not all bad. A healthy ego is important. Leaders must believe in themselves and know they have what it takes to lead well. Self-esteem is necessary. In reporting

Figure 1 Triangle for Tragedy

Hamartia

Hubris Anagnosis

HH&A: How Leaders Learn From Failure 19

similar findings, Bentz (1990) noted that the ex- ecutives promoted to the highest levels were articulate, active, independent, self-confident, emotionally balanced, hard-working, and respon- sible. Thus, a healthy ego fosters trust, courage, and fortitude, not only in the leaders themselves but in their followers as well. Hubris, h o w e v e r - - an "overweening ego"- -des t roys courage and trust and substitutes dogmatism and fear. Employ- ees cannot truly embrace a firm's goals as their own if they fear that making a mistake will cost them their jobs. Self-esteem is at stake.

A limited perspective can also be important. Work endeavors contain inherently conflicting goals, so that the achievement of one threatens the accomplishment of another. Kotter maintains that a unified and limiting perspective (vision) helps a leader align goals, simultaneous initia- tives, projects, and other activities. Without a limited perspective, a leader would blindly follow every tangential idea that sounded good, ulti- mately driving the enterprise into the ground.

The Juran Institute conducted a study to identify specific causes for the excessive time cross-functional teams spent in completing qual- ity improvement projects (Early and Godfrey 1995). One key factor the researchers found was how quickly team members could identify the roots of the problem. When a team becomes distracted with interesting but minor parts of the problem, claim Early and Godfrey, it takes longer to solve. A limited perspective focuses energy and creates forward progression toward accom- plishing an important goal. When hamartia be- comes dangerous, however, is when a leader locks into a single perspective before any under- taking, without considering other divergent views.

Any endeavor reaches a saturation point at which gathering more information will cease to inform and will only muddle our comprehension. Once a certain understanding is achieved, ex- cluding more knowledge becomes an important decision to make in furthering progress. In such moments, anagnosis becomes a virtue. The prob- lem of anagnosis arises when we discard outright any knowledge that may be pertinent in launch- ing an undertaking. Being absolutely certain one knows what is best without gathering more knowledge to verify is fertile ground for an ulti- mate failure to occur.

What makes the destructive aspects of HH&A so pervasive and difficult to apprehend? These dark tendencies are deeply connected to the driving passions necessary for leaders to accom- plish their dreams and visions. Yet when not monitored or readily apparent, they collude to create our own personal triangles for tragedy. Trying to eliminate these tendencies---even if we cou ld - -wou ld be sure folly. What is important is not their eradication, but learning when they are

working for you and when they are getting in the way of effective leadership. The following is an example of HH&A as the cause of problems.

Let's say you 're a CEO, and you walk into an executive management meeting at which your company is deciding whether to go ahead with an important acquisition. The acquisition means gaining core competencies that would not only ensure your company a competitive edge, but would also provide a larger market and double your company 's revenue. So far, so good. How- ever, the deal is not without considerable risk. In essence, your company is at a crossroads and the decision is crucial. Halfway through the meeting, you realize you 're the only one who ever says anything, and you really want and need execu- tive input at this time. Or perhaps you notice you hear only agreement with your ideas-- l ip service, never disagreement. Or you realize that everyone has been avoiding you, except in "must appear" decision meetings. In such a situation, you can bet HH&A is at work getting in the way of your leading effectively. The situation is dysfunctional and symptomatic of much deeper causes.

Think back over your career. Consider each pivotal milestone. Have other similar situations occurred in which the result was a failure, or the outcome was not what you expected and could have been better "if only"? Be honest. Think back prior to this acquisition meeting. Have there been previous instances in which your drive for success and self-gratification induced you to force your decision through, no matter the consequences? Have you ever asked for other points of view, and then did what you and everyone else knew you would do all along? Is a pattern beginning to emerge? If so, hubris and hamartia are probably at work isolating you in a state of anagnosis. Now the question becomes, "What can I do about it?"

Keeping in mind our capacity for HH&A while reflecting on the tough questions we can- not easily answer cleanses us of our arrogance, informs our minds, and reveals our flaws. Once we become aware of how we are acting as lead- ers, we can choose to act differently. Gephart, Marsick, Van Buren, and Spiro (1996) point out that the benefits for the enterprise increase when what is learned is captured, stored, shared, and used to improve and create innovative systems, outcomes, and services.

The skills for reflection through dialogue have been researched and applied by Bohm (1996) and Senge (1994), among others. Group dialogue allows us to clarify our thinking; to identify and communicate values and principles; to extend our individual perception to include the whole. Through dialogue, leaders can access a larger pool of meaning, with each person's view bringing a unique perspective to a larger reality. When they are able to do so, the collusive

20 Business Horizons / September-October 1999

power of their personal HH&A to create a tri- angle for tragedy subsides considerably.

The bottom line? We bring to the surface the mental models we unconsciously formulate, and forge an understanding of how HH&A drives the construction of our perception--its constraints, assumptions, and beliefs. Thus, we can better recover and learn from the experience of failure.

p eter Swartz's experience at Shell Oil illus- trates an important lesson for leaders. In Art of the Long View (1991), he describes

how Shell was able to minimize the negative consequences of the 1974 oil embargo through years of reflection at the highest levels. Its method was the process of creating and exploring the implications of "what if" future scenarios. Com- pany leaders were not predicting the future. They were preparing their minds to comprehend what could occur. If and when it did occur, they were prepared to think about it more deeply.

Is it possible to achieve a breakthrough with- out recognizing the breakdowns? Unlikely. Must we all reinvent the same broken wheel? Not al- ways. Is there an easier way to learn from our mistakes than going through the solitary routine of trial and error? Probably, if we don't insist in trying to go it alone. Individuals cannot explore all the pertinent views of a situation as well as a group, especially using a structured dialogue process. We are by nature social beings, incom- plete when isolated from the collective. Incoher- ent thinking and untested, unconscious assump- tions come from our human tendency to embrace hubris, hamartia, and anagnosis. Again, all lead- ers are subject to these tendencies, but few un- derstand them, and fewer still know how to man- age them. To compensate, however, we must become aware. Enlightenment begins with admit- ting these tendencies exist, then learning how they drive us as individuals and leaders. In doing so, we will lead more effectively and learn to thrive on our little failure experiences by failing safe and avoiding the ultimate downfall, gl

R e f e r e n c e s

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HH&A: How Leaders Learn From Failure 21

P.M. Senge, The Fifth Discipline.. The Art & Practice of The Learning Organization (New York: Doubleday/ Currency, 1994).

P. Swartz, Art of the Long View (New York: Doubleday, 1991).

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Randal Ford is a professor of communications at the Colorado School of Mines in Golden, Colorado. He wishes to acknowledge Gene Morton for the seminal development of some of these ideas, and also to thank Dr. Carl Larson for his guidance through repeated drafts of the article.

22 Business Horizons / September-October 1999