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1
Overview study on the state
of the Rule of Law and justice
sector in Yemen
In support of the Friends of Yemen Rule of Law and Justice
Sector Working Group
April 2010, The Hague
2
Dear reader,
On 27 January 2010 a summit was called in London in connection with the situation in Yemen.
As a result of this high-level meeting a "Friends of Yemen"-group was formed. This group has several working groups,
including one on "Justice and the Rule of Law", which is co-chaired by Jordan
and the Netherlands.
In the weeks after the London conference, our Institute pulled together a first impression
of the most relevant material and knowledge that is available regarding the rule of law in Yemen.
Rule of law has been a key theme for the Hague Institute for the Internationalisation of Law (HiiL)
since its inception in 2005.
HiiL is the driving force behind the Hague Journal on the Rule of Law, a knowledge platform for academics and practitioners, which is published by Cambridge University Press.
In 2009 HiiL established the Hague Visiting Chair on the Rule of Law, the first Visiting Chair dedicated to rule of law. We are very honoured to have Professor Veronica Taylor from the Australian National University as the
first holder of the Chair in 2010.
The Institute also acts as the convenor of the Hague Rule of Law Network, which brings together about 150 experts from practice and academia who share their experiences and knowledge on the most pressing issues
in the field.
HiiL is leader and co-founder of the Innovative Rule of Law Initiative, a partnership with the MicroJustice Initiative, the Centre for International Legal Cooperation and the European Academy on
Law and Legislation geared towards linking societal innovation with effective and sustainable rule of law
promotion initiatives.
Lastly, HiiL finances a large international research project that looks at rule of law development in a globalised environment, how that affects the way rule of law actors behave and what can be learned from that for better
rule of law strategies.
This report is largely built on all of these initiatives, but it benefited most from the insights, data and perspectives we
received from the members of the Hague Rule of Law Network. The members pointed us to much of the writing we
consulted and provided invaluable leads and general impressions.
The report is therefore a collective effort; true „wisdom of the crowds‟ in which experts share information and
knowledge together.
We are grateful to all the friends and colleagues in the Network who contributed and we hope to keep them involved.
Please refer to the bibliography for the full list of reports and articles that we used for this study.
A number of HiiL staff deserve a word of thanks: Ronald Janse, our Rule of Law theme coordinator who led the effort;
Morly Frishman (Research and Programme Officer), who holds the Hague Rule of Law Network together; Wouter van
Cleef, freelance research officer and in-house writer; Marie-Therese Gold, research officer; and Chizoba Edozie, intern.
All put hours into compiling this report on short notice. Furthermore, Hague Rule of Law Network member and Yemen
expert Laila al-Zwaini deserves special thanks for her assistance to this report.
Effective Rule of Law assistance is the cornerstone for a stable and secure living condition and the key to a more human rights abiding society. It is therefore my sincere hope you will find this report a useful aid to the important
work of the Rule of Law and Justice Sector Working Group of the Friends of Yemen.
Sam Muller
Director, Hague Institute for the Internationalisation of Law
3
Bibliography
Of Rule of Law Studies concerning Yemen
4
Summary of studies on the Rule of Law and Justice Sector in
Yemen
General remarks
This summary is based on the papers and reports which have kindly been provided
by members of the Hague Rule of Law Network and staff of the Hague Institute
for the Internationalisation of Law (HiiL) in response to the question: “Which reports and
analyses have been written on rule of law and the justice sector in Yemen?”.
The papers and reports we consulted can be found in the bibliography.
The whole process (from the articulation of the question to this summary
and bibliography) has taken 3 weeks.
HiiL has, within this limited time-frame, not been able to assess the validity
of the points mentioned in this summary; responsibility for the points mentioned below lies
squarely with the authors of the reports and papers.
However, HiiL has summarized those points which seem to be generally accepted;
we have left out points which seem to be disputed by experts.
HiiL has aimed to present the summary in neutral terms.
Rule of law and justice sector in Yemen
The most relevant legal issues for Yemenites are land reform, inheritance, family law, criminal
law and commercial law.
The most prominent actors in the formal justice sector are: the ministries of Justice, Human
Rights and Legal Affairs; the judiciary (Supreme Judicial Council, Judicial Inspection Authority,
the Supreme Court, specialized courts, judges and staff, Niyaba –public prosecutor); the Higher
Judicial Institute, the Yemeni Bar Association, local NGOs and Sana‟a University.
The legal system is a mix of formal state law, shari‟a and customary law.
The vast majority of disputes (more than 80%) are resolved through informal justice
mechanisms, which vary from mediation to arbitration. Advantages of informal justice
mechanisms are perceived to be its relative legitimacy, speed, accessibility, transparency and
limited costs. The formal system, by contrast, is perceived as costly, overloaded, corrupt,
inaccessible and ineffective. It is clear that interest in the justice sector and rule of law in Yemen
cannot be limited to the formal legal system.
There are links between the formal and informal justice sectors. The most important formal link
is the 1992 Law of Arbitration; informal arbitration and mediation are recognized under this Law.
However, many of the rules in the 1992 Law of Arbitration, for instance that decisions need to be
recorded in writing and submitted to formal courts for authorization and archiving, appear not to
be followed generally. The relation between formal and informal justice does not, appear to be
generally antagonistic; state officials, especially in remote areas, often work with tribal
authorities on an ad-hoc basis and often do not stand in the way of the application of informal
law. This is not to deny that formal and informal law and justice are sometimes incompatible.
Some aspects of the formal legal system are generally regarded as by and large satisfying rule
of law standards. This applies first and foremost to the constitution, but also for instance to the
organization of the Niyaba, i.e. the office of the public prosecutor and the Ministry of Human
Rights.
5
There are, however, also concerns regarding the extent to which the formal legal system reflects
the standards of the rule of law. These concerns regard legislation and, more importantly, the
behavior of key players in the justice and executive branches.
The independence of the judiciary is compromised by executive control and interference (which
has a legal basis in strong executive presence in the Supreme Judicial Council), which is partly
caused by a lack of administrative and financial autonomy of the judiciary; the judiciary is said
to suffer from a serious lack of adequate training, resources and staff; a significant group of
judges are reportedly corrupt; law enforcement appears to be weak and uneven, partly because
of corruption of members of the police force; security forces operate outside the law and without
adequate oversight. Access to formal justice appears to be limited, the legal aid system is
insufficiently coordinated (both the Ministry of Justice and NGO‟s like Oxfam play a role), and its
reach and effect is not known.
It is insufficiently clear whether informal justice (tribal law and dispute resolution) is in
conformity with rule of law standards. Are arbitrators sufficiently independent and impartial? Are
due process principles respected? Is enforcement adequate? Are rules sufficiently clear and
predictable? Concerns are voiced in relation to access to justice for women. The options for
women often seem very limited (largely dependent on male familymembers), and their rights
are insufficiently protected and guaranteed.
Donor assistance
Important donors in the justice sector are DFID (UK), USAID (USA), GTZ (Germany), the World
Bank and UNDP. The impact of rule of law and justice sector assistance appears to be limited;
there are no clear success stories.
The broad policy framework of donors is dictated by the realization of the MDG‟s and foreign
policy goals, influenced by counter-terrorism objectives.
Almost all rule of law and justice sector assistance appears to be focused on the formal justice
sector in the cities, despite the importance of informal justice and tribal law to most ordinary
Yemenis, especially outside the cities. There seems to be a consensus that projects would
improve if targeted at rural areas and at linking the informal and formal justice sectors.
Typically projects are targeted at training judges and judicial staff, automating court
management, infrastructure for the judiciary, anti-corruption programs for judges
and police and curriculum reform in law schools and in the Higher Judicial Institute. Some
projects aim to improve access to formal justice, for instance through awareness-raising.
A limited number of projects appear to have been targeted at tribal law and informal justice.
Some examples include training for community arbitrators in basic legal principles (of the formal
system), human rights (focusing on women and children) and dispute resolution methods
(including formal court proceedings). These projects aim to link informal and formal justice in
the sense that decisions by community arbitrators are informed by formal legal standards and
that some types of cases (criminal law cases in particular) are referred to the formal system.
6
Other ideas to link formal and informal justice and improve segments of the rule of law
chain
Awareness raising and improvement of skills for community leaders regarding the formal legal
system;
Improvement of recordkeeping and registration of cases and complaints, in order to increase the
transparency of informal justice jurisprudence and to make the formal justice sector more
accountable and responsive to demands for complying more with rule of law standards;
Mobile or ambulant courts, in order to make the formal justice sector more accessible in remote
areas;
The creation of family arbitration centers, where women and members of marginalized groups
can seek free legal advice and aid;
Organize more forums where representatives of the informal and formal justice sectors meet and
exchange information and knowledge.
Again, programs should not be limited to the cities, but should be executed and visible in rural
and remote areas, as well.
Improving access to justice
The first priority seems to be to measure access to justice in both the formal and informal
sectors. On this basis, strengths and weaknesses as well as useful interventions and programs
can be identified. Here, the Handbook for Measuring the Costs and Quality of Access to Justice
by the Tilburg University research group of Professors Barendrecht and Gramatikov - which has
just been published and is the result of an extensive research project carried out in developing
countries and funded by HiiL - could be of invaluable help. This tool was specifically designed to
measure access to both the formal and informal justice sectors. The Handbook will be launched
officially on April 26 and 27, 2010 in The Hague in cooperation with UNDP, the Open Society
Institute, and the International Development and Law Organisation (IDLO).
Legal awareness is a key to enhancing access to justice. In addition to training of the judiciary,
other officials in the official legal system and of authorities in the informal system, it is
imperative to reach out to ordinary people as well. Radio and television programs have proved to
be useful tools elsewhere. Another innovative idea, which has been developed and tested in
Argentina by the World Justice Project, is to develop educational materials for children, in order
to teach them some basics about the importance of the rule of law. Other ideas include mobile
courts, and efforts to record case law, so as to give better guidance to judges and others in the
justice sector. Opening better possibilities to register and process complaints about both formal
and informal justice may increase transparency and accountability.
7
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ThematicWorkshop20122009.pdf>
accessed 01 April 2010
ACRLI, „Modernization of Criminal Laws in some Arab Countries‟
(note: available only in Arabic)
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accessed 01 April 2010
ACRLI, „National Commercial Law Assessment Report Yemen‟ November 2009
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accessed 30 March 2010
ACRLI, „Regional Report on: The Business Legal Environment in the MENA Region: Status and Reform
Challenges (Lebanon, Tunisia, Yemen and the UAE)‟ May 2009
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accessed 01 April 2010
ACRLI, „Survey on Enforcement of Contract and Recovery of Debt in Yemen‟ October 2009,
(note: available only in Arabic)
<http://www.arabruleoflaw.org/files/pdf2009/ACRLI-MENACLSReportYemen-
ThematicWorkshop20122009.pdf>
accessed 01 April 2010
ACRLI, „The National and Regional Report on the state of the Judiciary in the Arab countries‟
(note: available only in Arabic)
<http://www.arabruleoflaw.org/files/the_national_and_regional_reports_book.pdf>
accessed 01 April 2010
ACRLI, „Workshop Report on Yemen‟
(note: available only in Arabic)
<http://www.arabruleoflaw.org/files/pdf2009/WorkshopYemen112009/ReportWorkshopYemenAr.pdf>
accessed 01 April 2010
Amnesty International, ‟Yemen: The Rule of Law Sidelined in the Name of Security‟ September 2003
<http://www.amnesty.org/en/library/info/MDE31/006/2003>
accessed 29 March 2010
Arab Social Science Research, „Yemen‟
<http://www.assr.org/countries/index.asp?CID=22>
accessed 01 April 2010
C Boucek, „Yemen: Avoiding a Downward Spiral‟ Carnegie Paper September 2009
<http://www.carnegieendowment.org/publications/index.cfm?fa=view&id=23827>
accessed 29 March 2010
8
Cairo Institute for Human Rights Studies, „Yemen‟ in CIHRS „Bastion of Impunity, mirage of Reform:
Human Rights in the Arab Region Annual Report 2009‟
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accessed 29 March 2010
Center for Global Development, „Yemen‟
<http://www.cgdev.org/section/initiatives/_active/mcamonitor/threshold/_yemen>
accessed 01 April 2010
Chatham House, „Reform Priorities for Yemen and the 10 point Agenda‟ February 2010
<http://www.chathamhouse.org.uk/files/16128_180210summary.pdf>
accessed 01 April 2010
AH Cordesman and KR Al-Rodhan, „The Gulf Military Forces in an Era of Asymmetric War: Yemen‟ July
2006
<http://csis.org/files/media/csis/pubs/060728_gulf_yemen.pdf>
accessed 30 March 2010
D Corstange, „Tribes and the Rule of Law in Yemen‟
<http://www.bsos.umd.edu/gvpt/corstange/doc/corstange-tribes.pdf>
accessed 29 March 2010
DFID, „Evaluation of DFID‟s Country Programmes: Yemen 2004 – 2009‟
<https://www.dfid.gov.uk/Documents/publications/evaluation/cnty-prog-eval-ye-summ.pdf>
accessed on 01 April 2010
P Dresch, Tribes, Government, and History in Yemen (Oxford University Press: Oxford 1994).
A Echagüe, „Yemen‟ in FRIDE and DCP (eds), Strategies for Democratic Change: assessing the Global
Response
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response>
accessed 29 March 2010
Freedom House, ‟Countries at the Crossroads 2006: Country Report Yemen‟
<http://www.freedomhouse.org/template.cfm?ccrcountry=143&ccrpage=31&edition=7&page=140§ion=78>
accessed 29 March 2010
Global Integrity, „Global Integrity Report: Yemen 2008‟
<http://report.globalintegrity.org/Yemen/2008/scorecard/91>
accessed 01 April 2010
GRM International, „Yemen Justice and Policing Programme‟. Justice Assessment Report, August 2009
(prepared by Leanne McKay)
GRM International, „Yemen Justice and Policing Programme‟, Annual Report (December 2008-
december 2009)
GTZ, „Conflict Resolution in Yemen Today: A Report for the German Development Cooperation‟ GTZ
Discussion Paper, April 2006
9
Human Rights Watch, „In the Name of Unity: The Yemeni Government‟s Brutal Response to Southern
Movement Protests‟ December 2009
<http://www.hrw.org/en/reports/2009/12/15/name-unity>
accessed 30 March 2010
Human Rights Watch, „Yemen‟
<http://www.hrw.org/en/node/87738>
accessed 01 April 2010
MJ Kassim, „Regulatory Reform and Improving the Quality of Legislation in Yemen‟
<http://www.oecd.org/dataoecd/39/11/38376701.pdf>
accessed 29 March 2010
Ministry of Planning and International Cooperation, September 2005 „Millenium Development Goals
Needs Assessment: Yemen Country Report‟
<http://www.arab-hdr.org/publications/other/undp/mdgr/yemen-nmdgr-05e.pdf>
accessed 01 April 2010
M A Moghram, „Political Culture of Corruption and State of Corruption in Yemen‟
<http://www.u4.no/training/incountry-open/yemen-docs/political-culture-corruption-yemen-
abdomoghram.pdf>
accessed 01 April 2010
National Democratic Institute, „Yemen: Tribal Conflict Management Program Research Report‟ March
2007
<http://www.ndi.org/files/2368_ye_report_engpdf_09122008.pdf>
accessed 30 March 2010
OpenNet, „Yemen‟
<http://opennet.net/research/profiles/yemen>
accessed 01 April 2010
S Phillips, „What comes next in Yemen? Al-Qaeda, the Tribes, and State-Building‟ Yemen: On the Brink:
A Carnegie Paper Series No. 107/March 2010
<http://carnegieendowment.org/files/yemen_tribes.pdf>
accessed 2 March 2010
S Phillips, Yemen's Democracy Experiment in Regional Perspective: Patronage and Pluralized
Authoritarianism (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2008)
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No. 80, February 2007
<http://www.carnegieendowment.org/publications/?fa=view&id=19024>
accessed 30 March 2010
POGAR, „Public Prosecution: Yemen‟
<http://www.pogar.org/activities/marrakech04/yemen-rep-e.pdf>
accessed 01 April 2010
10
Relief Web, „Yemen – Protection/Human Rights/Rule of Law‟
<http://www.reliefweb.int/rw/rwb.nsf/doc116?OpenForm&rc=3&emid=SNAO-74CSS6&secid=8>
accessed 01 April 2010
Y Sayigh, „Fixing Broken Windows – Security Sector Reform in Palestine, Lebanon and Yemen‟ October
2009
<http://www.carnegieendowment.org/events/?fa=eventDetail&id=1463&zoom_highlight=Fixing+Broken
+Windows+%E2%80%93+Security+Sector+Reform+in+Palestine+Lebanon+and+Yemen>
accessed 30 March 2010
N Shamiry, „The Rule of Law in Yemen: Uniting North and South‟ in E Contran and M Yamani (eds), The
Rule of Law in the Middle East and the Islamic World (I.B. Tauris Publishers: London and New York 2010)
G Steinberg, ‟Der Jemen vor dem Staatszerfall? Bürgerkrieg und Seperatismus sind bedrohlicher als al-
Qaida‟ SWP-Aktuell 6/January 2010
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accessed 29 March 2010
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<http://www.undp-pogar.org/publications/judiciary/nbrown/yemen.html>
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<http://www.arab-niaba.org/english/countries/country.asp?cid=22>
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quarterly report‟
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accessed 29 March 2010
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<http://www.undp.org.ye/reports/d_11evaluation2003-2006.pdf>
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<http://www.undp.org/evaluation/documents/ADR/ADR_Reports/ADR_Yemen.pdf>
accessed 29 March 2010
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<http://pdf.usaid.gov/pdf_docs/PNACX728.pdf>
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11
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12
Rule of Law indicators concerning Yemen
13
Summary of indicators on the Rule of Law and justice sector in Yemen
General
The question that formed the basis for this second part of the report was: “What do existing
indicators tell us about the state of the justice sector and rule of law in Yemen?”
The past decade has witnessed a proliferation of indicators and measurement systems for rule of
law and relevant related fields. These indicators employ different methodologies and measure
partly different things (some measure perceptions, others quantitative data, some measure
demand, others supply etc).
Many of the indicators on rule of law have been established recently, and are still a work in
progress. Many countries are not yet covered by these studies.
A comparative analysis of indicators does not exist yet, nor is there a tool which helps
policymakers and scholars navigate through these indicators.1
Experts involved in the major indicators advise to use as many indicators as possible. If many
indicators point in the same direction, it is safe to assume that what they say is largely correct.
Indicators do not provide causal analysis of strengths and weaknesses of the rule of law situation
in countries.
Experts involved with rule of law indicators reject the notion that results generated by indicators
are in themselves sufficient reasons for policy decisions or decisions to allocate funds, in part
because indicators say nothing about causes.
Indicators on rule of law in Yemen
The overview in annex A shows that most of the established indicators in the rule of law field do
not fully take Yemen into account.
Experts from the Hague Rule of Law Network have advised that the World Bank Governance
Indicators, Bertelsmann Transformation Index, Freedom House Index and Transparency
International‟s Corruption Perception Index are applicable and reliable tools to assess the Yemeni
justice system and rule of law situation.
HiiL does not assume responsibility for the impressions and data contained in the studies.
The overall picture for the rule of law and justice sectors in Yemen does not appear to be
positive on the basis of the measurement tools we consulted, but some room for optimism
remains. Some of the scores indicate relative stability in Yemen‟s rule of law and justice sector.
The Freedom House score for instance, though not indicative of a large degree of political
freedoms and civil liberties in the country, has been stable for years.
The indicators do, however, also point to some serious concerns (which can also be found in the
narrative country briefings and reports that form the basis of the first part of this overview
study).
These concerns include: a lack of authority of state institutions; corruption in all sectors of
government and the judicial chain; weak checks and balances between the branches of
government and the judiciary; abuse of civil rights both by state and non-state actors; lack of
access to justice both in private law cases and public law cases. This provides an initial idea of
some of the most pressing issues both in the eyes of international experts and in the eyes of the
Yemeni people.
1 HiiL will fund both a comparative analysis of indicators and a navigation tool for policy-makers. The Hague Journal on Rule of Law will publish a special issue on measuring rule of law in the fall of 2011. HiiL has funded a recently completed measurement tool for access to justice by the Tilburg-based group of Professors Barendrecht and Gramatikov, which will be presented during the April 26 and 27 Hague Rule of Law Network Meeting 2010 in partnership with the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP), the International Development Law Organization (IDLO) and the Open Society Justice Initiative.
14
Failed States Index (Yemen score)
99.7 96.6 93.2 95.4 98.1
0
20
40
60
80
100
120
2005 2006 2007 2008 2009
Year
Sco
re
Detailed results per indicator
Failed States Index
The Failed States Index is composed of twelve indicators over 3 distinct dimensions (social,
political and economic). On the basis of computer based quantitative analysis of a vast amount
of publications and newspaper articles, a score from 0-120 (0 indicates a very high degree of
stability, 120 meaning least stable) on a total of 12 indicators is awarded.
With a score of 93.2 in 2007, Yemen was in the highest risk zone (“alert”). In 2008 and 2009 the
score deteriorated even further to 95.4 and 98.1, respectively. The score for state legitimacy has
significantly decreased over these 3 years, as well as the human rights score. Clearly on the
basis of these data, one can conclude that the writ of the Yemeni state was not in good shape
when it was first measured and has not gotten better since. The potential for acute state failure,
and all the risks associated with it (i.e. large scale strife, refugee streams and terrorism) is
therefore considered to be particularly high.
Bertelsmann Transformation Index
The Bertelsmann Transformation Index measures the progress of countries which have yet to
become fully democratic, rule of law abiding states. It focuses on 3 dimensions: democracy,
market economy and political management. The composite index relates to both a description of
their democratic and market economic state and the country‟s leadership management
performance to steer it on a course of solid transformation.
For 128 states, individual reports are written by a country expert, which is then subject to peer
review by another expert. This narrative report deals with the whole chain of issues mentioned
above. Subsequently scores (1-10) are given by the country experts on the 49 questions asked.
For the present purpose, the political transformation or democracy dimension of the index is
particularly useful, as it also details the degree of “stateness”, separation of power and
institutional stability.
15
Bertelsmann Transformation Index (political
transformation scores Yemen)
3.2
4.07 3.9 4.23
0
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
2003 2006 2008 2010
Year
Sco
re
In 2003 scores were measured on a 5-point scale as opposed to the 10-point scale used in later
studies for the political transformation index. Correcting for this difference, Yemen scored a 3.2
(or 1.6) in 2003 on this dimension. In 2006 it scored a 4.07 indicating a steady improvement. In
2008 the country scored a 3.9, while in 2010 it was up again to a 4.23. Even though this is
indicative of a slight general improvement, according to this indicator it is a weak country where
a lot of work is still to be done.
Freedom House
Each country and territory is assigned a numerical rating, on a scale of 1 to 7. A score of 1
indicates a free society and 7 the least amount of political and civil freedoms. The Freedom
House index, often used in academic and political debates, is composed by experts who review
an extensive collection of data, primarily newspaper reports as well as analysis by think-tanks
and NGO‟s. On the basis of this information, separate reports are written for individual countries,
which subsequently lead to a score on the Freedom House indicators.
Two separate ratings are given; a political rights score and a civil liberties rating. On both
dimensions, scores range from 1 to 7. Yemen has been assessed as of 2002 by the Freedom
House. Its scores are consistently poor, even though there seems to be a slight improvement.
The scores below are an average of the two composite scales produced by the Freedom House
from 2002 onwards.
Freedom House: Yemen Scores
65.5
5 5 5 5 5 5
0
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009
Year
Sco
re
16
Transparency International CPI Index (Yemen scores)
2.6 2.4 2.7 2.6 2.5 2.3 2.1
0
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009
Year
Sco
re
Transparency International: Corruption Perceptions Index
The Corruption Perceptions Index (CPI) indicates the perceived level of public-sector corruption
in a country or territory. The CPI table indicates a country's ranking compared to other countries
in the index. The index is based on data from 13 sources and 10 independent institutions.
These sources measure the prevalence of corruption in the public and political domains. This
assessment is carried out for virtually all of the world‟s countries.
Scores range between 1 to 10, with 1 indicating the worst possible perception of corruption
and 10 indicating the lowest perception of corruption. Yemen has been assessed from 2003
onwards. In this indicator as well, Yemen scores consistently poor with a strong popular
perception of corruption in public and political life. From the assembled data over the last years,
one can even conclude a slight deterioration in the public perception of corruption in Yemen.
World Bank Governance Indicators
An authoritative scientific indicator in the field of law and governance is the World Bank
Governance Indicators. Instead of working with its own data, the World Bank Governance
Indicators Project compiles statistics from various other indices (among which are some of the
indicators used in this study). Data are statistically rescaled to a score from 0 to 1, with a score
of 0 indicating a bad result on a particular variable. Six different dimensions are measured; (1)
voice & accountability, (2) political stability and lack of violence/terrorism, (3) government
effectiveness, (4) regulatory quality, (5) rule of law, (6) control of corruption.
The World Bank Governance indicators result in a percentile rank on each of the six dimensions.
Thus, a percentile rank of 20 on any certain dimension entails that only 20% of the world‟s
countries have a worse score. However, a state which scores 90 means that only 10% of the
world‟s countries do better. Consequently, a high percentile rank indicates better government
performance. Yemen‟s rank on the 6 dimensions can be found in Annex B with a timeline
indicating percentile ranks since 1996. Overall, Yemen‟s governance performance on all six
dimensions generally ranges between 10 and 30 (despite the margins of error indicated).
This means it‟s a weak country from a governance perspective, based on a wide range of
indicators and from a wide range of sources. Still, the regulatory quality and rule of law
dimensions demonstrate relative stability and even slight improvement respectively. However
these observations still fall within the defined margin of error for the statistical instruments used.
17
Annex A: Overview of established Rule of Law indicators
Indicator / Index Data available for Yemen
Bertelsmann Transformation Index YES
Brown University Global E-Government Index PARTLY
CEELI Convention to Eliminate all forms of Discrimination against
Women Assessment)
NO
CEELI Judicial Reform Index / Prosecutorial Reform Index / Legal
Profession Reform Index
NO
CEELI- Legal Implementation Index- International Covenant on
Civil and Political Rights
NO
Center for Systemic Peace YES
EBRD Sector Specific Assessment of Law and Practices NO
EBRD Transition Report NO
EBRD Country Law Assessments NO
Freedom House YES
Institute for Management Development: World Competitiveness
Yearbook
NO
International Budget Project PARTLY
Media Sustainability Index PARTLY
Press freedom index YES
Global integrity report YES
Transparency International: Corruption Perception Index 2009 YES
Transparency International: Global Corruption Barometer / Bribe
Payers Index 2008 / National integrity system assessment
NO
Failed State Index YES
World Bank Indicators YES
World Bank (Doing Business) PARTLY
2010 Index of Economic Freedom YES
Global Competitiveness Report NO
CIRI Human Rights Data Project PARTLY
The Ibrahim Index NO
Amnesty International Report 2009: State of the World´s Human
Rights
YES
World Justice Project Rule of Law Index NO
18
Annex B: World Bank Governance Indicators, Country data report for Yemen 1996-2008
This Data Report provides a summary of the six aggregate governance indicators, together with all of the
publicly-available disaggregated data on which the aggregate indicators are based. The underlying data
as well as methodological issues are described more fully in "Governance Matters VIII: Governance
Indicators for 1996-2008" (June 2009).
The Report displays the country's performance for all available years between 1996 and 2008 in six
governance dimensions: i) Voice & Accountability, ii) Political Stability and Lack of Violence/Terrorism, iii)
Government Effectiveness, iv) Regulatory Quality, v) Rule of Law, and vi) Control of Corruption. Each
page shows the country's percentile rank on one of the six governance indicators. Percentile ranks
indicate the percentage of countries worldwide that rate below the selected country. Higher values thus
indicate better governance ratings. The graph also reports the margins of error displayed in the line
charts by dashed lines, and corresponding to a 90% confidence interval. This means that there is a 90
percent probability that governance is within the indicated range.
Underneath the line charts, the Report also displays data from all the underlying sources used for that
indicator. Individual ratings have been rescaled to run from 0 (low) to 1 (high). These scores are
comparable over time and across countries since most individual measures are based on similar
methodologies over time. Scores from different individual indicators are not however directly comparable
with each other since the different data sources use different units and cover different sets of countries.
The data from the individual indicators are in fact further rescaled to make them comparable across data
sources before constructing the aggregate governance indicators. Note that for some variables we
present an "NP", where "NP" stands for "Not Public", because the data is confidential and cannot be
publicly disclosed at the request of the organizations producing the data. To find out more about each
source/organization click on the provided links. More information about each of the underlying
organization/source can also be found in Appendices A and B of the Governance Matters VIII paper.
Relevant links:
www.govindicators.org
www.worldbank.org/wbi/governance/
Disclaimer:
The data and research reported here do not reflect the official views of the World Bank, its Executive
Directors, or the countries they represent. The WGI are not used by the World Bank Group to allocate
resources.
Source: http://info.worldbank.org/governance/wgi/pdf/c243.pdf
19
Aggregate Indicator: Voice & Accountability
Individual Indicators used to construct Voice & Accountability
20
Aggregate Indicator: Political Stability and Absence of Violence
Individual Indicators used to construct Political Stability and Absence of Violence
21
Aggregate Indicator: Government Effectiveness
Individual Indicators used to construct Government Effectiveness
22
Aggregate Indicator: Regulatory Quality
Individual Indicators used to construct Regulatory Quality
23
Aggregate Indicator: Rule of Law
Individual Indicators used to construct Rule of Law
24
Aggregate Indicator: Control of Corruption
Individual Indicators used to construct Control of Corruption