HIROSHIMA RESEARCH NEWS Hiroshima Peace Institute Vol.2 No.2 September 1999

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CONTENTS

List of participants

Tokyo Forum adopts report, calls for immediate actionFabric of international security showing signs of unraveling, report warns

(Alphabetical order)

　　After three days of intensive discussions, members of the Tokyo Forum for Nuclear Non-Proliferation and Disarmament wound up a year of deliberations by adopting a final report calling on nuclear weapon states to take bold steps to reduce their nuclear stockpiles. Twenty representatives from 16 countries participated in the final meeting, held at a Tokyo hotel from July 23 to 25, 1999.　　The 50-page report, titled "Facing Nuclear Dangers: An Action Plan for the 21st Century," calls for the United States and Russia to each reduce their deployed strategic warheads to 1,000, to be followed by a multilateral process of further reductions involving the three remaining declared nuclear powers. Finally, the report calls on all de facto nuclear states to bring their nuclear arsenals to "one step short of zero."　　In Part One of its report, titled "The Nuclear Dangers," the forum surveyed worldwide developments in the second half of the 1990s, outlining the deteriorating situation with respect to nuclear proliferation. Part Two, titled "Mending Strategic Relations to Reduce Nuclear Dangers,"-which is the first of four parts containing recommendations-focused on the three nuclear weapon states of the United States, Russia and China in the global context of nuclear disarmament, as well as on South Asia, the Middle East and Northeast Asia in the regional context.　　In Part Three, titled "Stopping and Reversing Nuclear Proliferation," the forum listed concrete measures to be taken immediately to promote nuclear non-proliferation, such as tightening controls on fissile material and strengthening nuclear export controls. In Part Four, titled "Achieving Nuclear Disarmament," the forum recommended that a process of phased reduction be taken to bring the number of nuclear weapons to "one step short of zero."　　"Key Recommendations," the fifth and final part of the report, consists of 17 important recommendations selected from the whole report. One of the recommendations reads: "No other cities must be put through the devastation wrought by nuclear weapons and the agony of recovering from their effects, endured by Hiroshima and Nagasaki. Nuclear weapon states must reaffirm the goal of elimination and take sustained, concrete steps towards this end."　　While participants tried to achieve a consensus in adopting the draft report, forum members from some countries of which strict demands were being made, expressed dissent toward these particular recommendations.　　On the first and second days, participants split up into four subcommittees to discuss China, the Middle East, South Asia and editorial matters concerning the final report. Some of the discussions ran from early morning until late at night.　　The forum had billed itself as a successor to the Canberra Commission on the Elimination of Nuclear Weapons, which was established by the Australian government in 1995. Comparing the reports drawn up by the two bodies, Yasushi Akashi, a cochairman of the forum, told a press conference held after the meeting, "Our recommendations could be evaluated as having taken a more realistic approach since the international status quo has become more serious than (in 1996), when the Canberra Commission released its report, (which) was based on an optimistic viewpoint of the post-Cold War era."

　　Robert O'Neill, who also participated in the Canberra Commission, said, "Up until just few years ago, we talked about five nuclear weapon states. But now there are ten." In response, he emphasized the importance of such international forums continuing their work, saying, "We see our mission on two levels-education of international public opinion and the offering of the ideas to governments, particularly for immediate and short term measures."　　The Tokyo Forum was organized on the initiative of the Japanese government following nuclear tests conducted by India and Pakistan in May 1998. The forum, cosponsored by the Japan Institute of International Affairs and the Hiroshima Peace Institute, met three times before the final meeting-in Tokyo in August 1998; in Hiroshima in December 1998; and in New York in April 1999.　　Nobuo Matsunaga, also a forum cochairman, emphasized the report's significance, saying, "All the members of the forum shared a strong awareness of the need for specific steps toward nuclear elimination." Referring to Japan's initiative in establishing the forum, Matsunaga added, "Many of (the forum members) have expressed their expectation that Japan would continue to play an active role in this regard."　　The forum did not propose a time frame for the elimination of nuclear weapons, despite requests to do so by NGOs in Hiroshima and Nagasaki. Referring to those requests, Michael Krepon, chairman of the forum's drafting committee, said, "Making a declaration is one approach. But we concluded that the circumstances were so disturbing, and the train line was so negative, that we had an obligation to focus on the near-term, clarifying the dangers that now exist."　　The forum's cochairmen handed the report to Japanese Prime Minister Keizo Obuchi at his official residence on July 26. Obuchi suggested he was willing to use the report to promote Japan's diplomatic role in disarmament issues. "I would like to make every effort to ensure that the recommendations are acted on one by one," Obuchi said. By Kazumi Mizumoto, associate professor at HPI

Tokyo Forum adopts report, calls for immediate actionForum report a 'wake-up call' to the international communityReport adds new dimension to quest for global disarmamentComment on the Tokyo Forum Report by Mitsuru KurosawaComment on the Tokyo Forum Report by Hideo TsuchiyamaForum sets common goal for idealists, realistsFrom Canberra to Tokyo�Need for the triangle partnership for the stable Korean PeninsulaJapan supporting denuclearization efforts in former Soviet UnionTopicsHello from HPI�Diary

Lt. Gen. Nishat Ahmad　Former President of the Institute of� Regional Studies, IslamabadDr. Zakaria Haji Ahamad　Dean, Faculty of Social Science and� Humanities, National University of� Malaysia, SelangorAmb. Marcos Castrioto de Azambuja　Ambassador of Brazil to FranceProf. Sergei Yevgenevich Blagovolin　Deputy Director of World Economics and　International Relations Institute, MoscowAmb. Emilio Jorge Cardenas　Executive Director of HSBC Argentine�　S.A., Buenos AiresDr. Therese Delpech　Director of Strategic Affairs Atomic�　Energy Commission, ParisAmb. Rolf Ekeus　Ambassador of Sweden to the U.S.A.Dr. Robert Gallucci　Dean of School of Foreign Service,�　Georgetown University, Washington D.C.Mr. Hu Xiaodi　Deputy Director-General, Department of�　Arms Control and Disarmament, Ministry　of Foreign Affairs, ChinaAmb. Ryukichi Imai　Distinguished Scholar, Institute for�　International Policy Studies, Tokyo�Dr. Joachim Krause　Deputy Director of the Research Institute�　of the DGAP (German Society for�　Foreign Affairs)

Mr. Michael Krepon　President, Henry L. Stimson Center,�　Washington D.C.Dr. Patricia LewisDirector of UNIDIR, GenevaAmb. Margaret Mason　Director of Council Development,�　Canadian Council for International Peace�　and Security, OttawaProf. Robert O'Neill　Chichele Professor of the History of War,�　All Souls College, University of OxfordDr. Abdel Monem Said Aly　Director, Al-Ahram Center for Political� and Strategic Studies, CairoProf. John Simpson　Director of Mountbatten Centre for�　International Studies, University of�　Southampton, U.K.Amb. Hennadiy Udovenko　Member of Ukrainian Parliament�-Cochairmen-�Mr. Yasushi Akashi　Former President of Hiroshima Peace�　InstituteMr. Nobuo MatsunagaVice Chairman of the Japan Institute of�　International Affairs, Tokyo

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Tokyo forum report discussed at 4th U.N. Conference on Disarmament Issues in Kyoto

Forum report a 'wake-up call' to the international communityConcrete steps needed, forum's drafting committee head says

　　Michael Krepon, president of the Henry L. Stimson Center in Washington, D.C. and chairman of the drafting committee of the Tokyo Forum, stressed the importance of formulating concrete measures toward nuclear disarmament during a lecture on July 28. In his lecture, titled "The next steps in reducing nuclear dangers," sponsored by the Hiroshima Peace Institute and the Hiroshima Peace Culture Foundation, Krepon explained the details of the forum's deliberations and the content of its final report. About 200 citizens attended the lecture, held at the International Conference Center in Hiroshima. Following is the summary of Krepon's lecture:　　When we began our deliberations, our focus was on India and Pakistan. But the longer we worked, the more it became apparent that we had to issue a report that looked at the entire landscape of nuclear danger. There were many negative developments growing in many different ways.　　We saw that the relationships between the major powers were in bad shape-especially between the U.S. and Russia, and between the U.S. and China. We worried about the loose nukes in the former Soviet Union. The CTBT is still stalled by the legislation of the U.S., Russia and China. This treaty is not moving in India, Pakistan, Israel, and North Korea, all of which are required to act on the treaty before it enters into force. We saw a situation in which the existing moratorium on nuclear testing could not be confidently assumed.　　We looked at a number of regions, not just South Asia. We were deeply troubled by developments in Northeast Asia. In Iraq, the United Nations inspections had been suspended. Iran is moving ahead with its nuclear program with help from Russia. And if Iran and Iraq proceed with the development of nuclear weapons and the missiles to carry them, that is going to have major repercussions in the Middle East. We saw (that) the proliferation of missiles...is proceeding at a disturbing pace. We looked around and we asked ourselves what the likely end result of all of these trends will be unless they are stalled and reversed. We looked to the NPT and said collectively that that is where all of these problems will come together.　　The NPT, just four years ago, was extended indefinitely by the international community. That was the culmination of a decade of very good news-START I was ratified, START II was negotiated, and the CTBT was concluded; a decade in which the

Iraqi nuclear program was stopped and a number of important countries joined the NPT, including South Africa, Argentina, Brazil, Ukraine, and Belarus. We had a decade of wonderful news from 1985 to 1995. But now this treaty is in serious jeopardy.　　The language that we use in the Tokyo Forum report reflects the fear that this treaty is in serious danger of unraveling. The forum looked at all of these trends and decided that we needed to issue a wake-up call to the international community.　　Now, what are the actions we recommended? We believe that the NPT is an essential document. We need to deal with the sicknesses that are now evident, and to restore this treaty to good health. The treaty consists of a bargain-a commitment by the nuclear weapon states to eliminate their arsenals, and that of the non-nuclear weapon states to continue to abstain from acquiring these weapons. And this bargain has to be reaffirmed.　　But the Tokyo Forum is not simply making calls for declarations and reaffirmations-we call for specific steps by the nuclear weapon states to progressively reduce and then eliminate their weapons. We call on the U.S. and Russia to combine START II and START III. Moreover, we call on the two countries to do better than START III and to lower the threshold for the next step-down to the thousand deployed weapons. We debated missile defenses a great deal. We believe that zero nuclear weapons on hair-trigger alert are a necessary step toward zero nuclear weapons. We talk about "de-nuclearization."　　Finally, let me talk about what is not in this report. We did not set a timetable because of the seriousness of the situation. The gravity of the situation forced us to concentrate on specific steps that are needed now. Ambitious objectives will not prompt the necessary action. A near-term deadline was so contrary to the trends that exist, and a long-term deadline was not helpful for elimination. So we concluded that our obligation under the current circumstances is to lay out a plan of action to reduce these dangers in the near term-keeping in mind that the long-term goal is the complete elimination of these weapons.

Overview of the conference　　About 60 experts from 24 countries participated in this year's conference, the main theme of which was "Security Concerns and Disarmament Strategy for the Next Decade." Such issues as the prospects for the NPT Review

Conference in 2000, the responsibility of nuclear weapon-states (NWS), the complexities of the Korean Peninsula, missile proliferation, nuclear weapon-free zones and the possibility of convening the fourth Special Session of the U.N. General Assembly on Disarmament (SSOD IV), were among the most contentious.　　Many of the participants shared concern over the contents of the report, however, this article will focus on Akashi's address and ensuing discussions about the forum's report.Summary of Akashi's keynote speech　　Akashi's speech was divided into the following three sections: the genesis of the Tokyo Forum; an overview of the Tokyo Forum's final report; and future prospects after the Tokyo Forum. In emphasizing certain points, Akashi said:

a) that nuclear non-proliferation and disarmament, and regional security concerns are inseparable.

b) that the core of the NPT is partnership between NWS and non-nuclear-weapon- states (NNWS).

c) that security cannot be guaranteed by possessing nuclear weapons.

d) that the deterrence function of nuclear weapons is at best provisional, and the objective of the Tokyo Forum was to achieve the elimination of those weapons.

　　With respect to future prospects after the Tokyo Forum, Akashi illustrated five points. First, NWS may begin negotiations toward concluding a legally binding treaty of negative security assurances for parties to the NPT. Second, technical and financial assistance for Russia is a matter

the Tokyo Forum's final Report, adopted on July 25. Yasushi Akashi, a cochairman of the forum and former president of the Hiroshima Peace Institute, was invited to give a keynote address at the conference. In his speech, Akashi briefed participants on the contents of the report.

　　The Fourth U.N. Conference on Disarmament Issues, held in Kyoto, Japan, from July 27 to 30, was convened in a timely manner, since it offered experts in nuclear non-proliferation and disarmament their first real chance to scrutinize and discuss the contents of

By Masamichi Kamiya

Report adds new dimension to quest for global disarmament

－３－

Ambitious forum report a solid basis for government action

　　One of the most significant features of the Report of the Tokyo Forum is its analysis of the international status quo regarding the problem of nuclear proliferation. The report describes in great detail and with much persuasiveness the growing severity of the situation. It pointed out the deteriorating relationship, in the global context, between the United States and Russia, and the United States and China, with the United States as the sole military superpower, as well as the danger of nuclear proliferation in the regional context, in South Asia, the Middle East and Northeast Asia. The report warns that nuclear nonproliferation and disarmament treaties could become "hollow instruments" unless action is taken to reverse these trends.　　Second, the forum deliberated on a remarkably wide range of issues. It discussed not only nuclear weapons, but also other weapons of mass destruction, including chemical and biological weapons. It also made an in-depth examination of missile defenses and related issues. And it referred not only to relationships between governments, but also to those between terrorist organizations and other sub-state groups.　　Third, each of the recommendations is realistic, and can be acted on immediately or in the short term. The recommendations were made with the intention of righting the current situation, about which forum members share a common anxiety given the increasing threat posed by nuclear weapons. For those who had expected a comprehensive program for nuclear elimination that would go beyond the report of the Canberra Commission, or one that contained a specific time frame, the report might have proved disappointing. But the stance of the Tokyo Forum is based on the recognition that situation has changed since the days of the Canberra Commission, when the world had reason to be optimistic about the prospects for nuclear disarmament, and has instead become more dangerous.　　Fourth, the recommendations make a number of substantive demands on individual governments. It had been feared that the forum's recommendations would be watered down and contain minimal content by the need to reach consensus, particularly since representatives from India, Pakistan and China participated in the forum. However, the final report included areas on which agreement had not been reached, due to a desire to maintain strenuous demands on national

governments. In addition to the 17 key recommendations in Part Five of the report, other sections contain several times more recommendations.　　The fifth significant feature of the report is the linking of nuclear nonproliferation to nuclear disarmament. Since the forum was established following nuclear tests conducted by India and Pakistan, there was a fear that it would focus solely on nuclear nonproliferation and neglect nuclear disarmament. However, one of the report's key recommendations was to emphasize the reaffirmation of the NPT's central bargain-that the treaty requires both disarmament and nonproliferation; in effect, that the nuclear weapon states must make tangible progress in nuclear disarmament, while the non-nuclear weapon states must rally behind the treaty. Strengthening the link between these two elements is a basic tenet of the report.　　Finally, I would like to point out some aspects of the report that could be described as insufficient compared with other disarmament studies. One is that the forum dealt with the issue of "no first-use" only with extreme caution, while acknowledging elsewhere that it believes the only function of nuclear weapons is to deter the use of other nuclear weapons. The other problem is that not a single mention was made of the idea of a Northeast Asian Nuclear-Weapon-Free Zone-even as a topic for the middle- or long-term-even though one of its key recommendations was the denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula.　　The Tokyo Forum was initiated by the Japanese government, and the prime minister and foreign minister have promised to play an active role in promoting the report's recommendations. The Japanese government now has the responsibility to make every effort to help those recommendations put into practice, and it is anticipated that Japan will use the report to play an active role in diplomatic efforts in the area of nuclear disarmament.　　Kurosawa is dean of the Osaka School of International Public Policy at Osaka University.

By Mitsuru Kurosawa

Comment on the Tokyo Forum Report of great urgency for nuclear non-proliferation and disarmament. Third, the United Nations must be reevaluated. On this point, Akashi proposed that a subcentre of the U.N. Regional Centre for Peace and Disarmament in Asia and the Pacific be established in Japan. Fourth, the parameter of disarmament must be expanded as types of conflict change. In other words, other weapons of mass destruction, such as chemical and biological weapons, small arms and light weapons, must be tackled if true disarmament is to be achieved. And fifth, national security has to be viewed from a wider political, economic, social, and even cultural, perspective as the world's landscape changes. According to Akashi, "human security" constitutes a multi-disciplinary notion of which peace and disarmament is a part.General discussion on the Tokyo Forum's report　　On the afternoon of the second day, participants held unscheduled discussions on the contents of the report. A participant from the United States said he was concerned that the tone of the report was too pessimistic; for instance, in the context of the NPT regime's status. A participant from India argued that the report did not fully recognize the responsibility of NWS, and that no mention was made of the issue of the nuclear umbrella. An expert from Japan raised the concern that the Tokyo Forum could have talked more about the issue of "no first use" of nuclear weapons. Doubts were also raised by an American participant about the feasibility of establishing a permanent body of the NPT. A Bangladeshi participant wondered whether or not the Tokyo Forum discussed the feasibility of convening the fourth Special Session on Disarmament, and a Pakistani expert asked whether the forum had considered its position on the question of Kashmir.　　Akashi was joined at the conference by three other members of the Tokyo Forum. They all responded to questions and observations honestly, and urged participants to read the entire text of the Forum report since it contains 40 or 50 recommendations and suggestions, not just the 17 recommendations listed at the end of the document.Conclusion　　Ryukichi Imai, a scholar at the Institute for International Policy Studies and a member of the Tokyo Forum, said during one of the conference sessions, "I only think that just as the Tokyo Forum carried the torch the Canberra Commission had started, some third country will take up the theme and continue the detailed technical, political and legal processes for the elimination of nuclear weapons." In this regard, the recommendations adopted by the Tokyo

Forum are not the last chapter of the story; rather, they are the basis for nourishing an innovative dimension to the cause of nuclear non-proliferation and disarmament.　　On August 4th, following the Tokyo Forum's final meeting, Akashi and Nobuo Matsunaga, cochairmen of the forum, visited the U.N. headquarters in New York to present the report to U.N. Secretary General Kofi Annan. Commending the timely initiative of the Japanese government, Annan said: "The international community will study (the Tokyo Forum's recommendations) with a view to reducing and eliminating nuclear weapons in the

world." The Tokyo Forum's report will soon become an official U.N. document and, it is expected, will stimulate negotiations on nuclear non-proliferation and disarmament at the U.N. level. Kamiya is a visiting research fellow at HPI.

See the full text on HPI's Web site at�http://serv.peace.hiroshima-cu.ac.jp/�

The Tokyo Forum Report

－２－

Tokyo forum report discussed at 4th U.N. Conference on Disarmament Issues in Kyoto

Forum report a 'wake-up call' to the international communityConcrete steps needed, forum's drafting committee head says

　　Michael Krepon, president of the Henry L. Stimson Center in Washington, D.C. and chairman of the drafting committee of the Tokyo Forum, stressed the importance of formulating concrete measures toward nuclear disarmament during a lecture on July 28. In his lecture, titled "The next steps in reducing nuclear dangers," sponsored by the Hiroshima Peace Institute and the Hiroshima Peace Culture Foundation, Krepon explained the details of the forum's deliberations and the content of its final report. About 200 citizens attended the lecture, held at the International Conference Center in Hiroshima. Following is the summary of Krepon's lecture:　　When we began our deliberations, our focus was on India and Pakistan. But the longer we worked, the more it became apparent that we had to issue a report that looked at the entire landscape of nuclear danger. There were many negative developments growing in many different ways.　　We saw that the relationships between the major powers were in bad shape-especially between the U.S. and Russia, and between the U.S. and China. We worried about the loose nukes in the former Soviet Union. The CTBT is still stalled by the legislation of the U.S., Russia and China. This treaty is not moving in India, Pakistan, Israel, and North Korea, all of which are required to act on the treaty before it enters into force. We saw a situation in which the existing moratorium on nuclear testing could not be confidently assumed.　　We looked at a number of regions, not just South Asia. We were deeply troubled by developments in Northeast Asia. In Iraq, the United Nations inspections had been suspended. Iran is moving ahead with its nuclear program with help from Russia. And if Iran and Iraq proceed with the development of nuclear weapons and the missiles to carry them, that is going to have major repercussions in the Middle East. We saw (that) the proliferation of missiles...is proceeding at a disturbing pace. We looked around and we asked ourselves what the likely end result of all of these trends will be unless they are stalled and reversed. We looked to the NPT and said collectively that that is where all of these problems will come together.　　The NPT, just four years ago, was extended indefinitely by the international community. That was the culmination of a decade of very good news-START I was ratified, START II was negotiated, and the CTBT was concluded; a decade in which the

Iraqi nuclear program was stopped and a number of important countries joined the NPT, including South Africa, Argentina, Brazil, Ukraine, and Belarus. We had a decade of wonderful news from 1985 to 1995. But now this treaty is in serious jeopardy.　　The language that we use in the Tokyo Forum report reflects the fear that this treaty is in serious danger of unraveling. The forum looked at all of these trends and decided that we needed to issue a wake-up call to the international community.　　Now, what are the actions we recommended? We believe that the NPT is an essential document. We need to deal with the sicknesses that are now evident, and to restore this treaty to good health. The treaty consists of a bargain-a commitment by the nuclear weapon states to eliminate their arsenals, and that of the non-nuclear weapon states to continue to abstain from acquiring these weapons. And this bargain has to be reaffirmed.　　But the Tokyo Forum is not simply making calls for declarations and reaffirmations-we call for specific steps by the nuclear weapon states to progressively reduce and then eliminate their weapons. We call on the U.S. and Russia to combine START II and START III. Moreover, we call on the two countries to do better than START III and to lower the threshold for the next step-down to the thousand deployed weapons. We debated missile defenses a great deal. We believe that zero nuclear weapons on hair-trigger alert are a necessary step toward zero nuclear weapons. We talk about "de-nuclearization."　　Finally, let me talk about what is not in this report. We did not set a timetable because of the seriousness of the situation. The gravity of the situation forced us to concentrate on specific steps that are needed now. Ambitious objectives will not prompt the necessary action. A near-term deadline was so contrary to the trends that exist, and a long-term deadline was not helpful for elimination. So we concluded that our obligation under the current circumstances is to lay out a plan of action to reduce these dangers in the near term-keeping in mind that the long-term goal is the complete elimination of these weapons.

Overview of the conference　　About 60 experts from 24 countries participated in this year's conference, the main theme of which was "Security Concerns and Disarmament Strategy for the Next Decade." Such issues as the prospects for the NPT Review

Conference in 2000, the responsibility of nuclear weapon-states (NWS), the complexities of the Korean Peninsula, missile proliferation, nuclear weapon-free zones and the possibility of convening the fourth Special Session of the U.N. General Assembly on Disarmament (SSOD IV), were among the most contentious.　　Many of the participants shared concern over the contents of the report, however, this article will focus on Akashi's address and ensuing discussions about the forum's report.Summary of Akashi's keynote speech　　Akashi's speech was divided into the following three sections: the genesis of the Tokyo Forum; an overview of the Tokyo Forum's final report; and future prospects after the Tokyo Forum. In emphasizing certain points, Akashi said:

a) that nuclear non-proliferation and disarmament, and regional security concerns are inseparable.

b) that the core of the NPT is partnership between NWS and non-nuclear-weapon- states (NNWS).

c) that security cannot be guaranteed by possessing nuclear weapons.

d) that the deterrence function of nuclear weapons is at best provisional, and the objective of the Tokyo Forum was to achieve the elimination of those weapons.

　　With respect to future prospects after the Tokyo Forum, Akashi illustrated five points. First, NWS may begin negotiations toward concluding a legally binding treaty of negative security assurances for parties to the NPT. Second, technical and financial assistance for Russia is a matter

the Tokyo Forum's final Report, adopted on July 25. Yasushi Akashi, a cochairman of the forum and former president of the Hiroshima Peace Institute, was invited to give a keynote address at the conference. In his speech, Akashi briefed participants on the contents of the report.

　　The Fourth U.N. Conference on Disarmament Issues, held in Kyoto, Japan, from July 27 to 30, was convened in a timely manner, since it offered experts in nuclear non-proliferation and disarmament their first real chance to scrutinize and discuss the contents of

By Masamichi Kamiya

Report adds new dimension to quest for global disarmament

－３－

Ambitious forum report a solid basis for government action

　　One of the most significant features of the Report of the Tokyo Forum is its analysis of the international status quo regarding the problem of nuclear proliferation. The report describes in great detail and with much persuasiveness the growing severity of the situation. It pointed out the deteriorating relationship, in the global context, between the United States and Russia, and the United States and China, with the United States as the sole military superpower, as well as the danger of nuclear proliferation in the regional context, in South Asia, the Middle East and Northeast Asia. The report warns that nuclear nonproliferation and disarmament treaties could become "hollow instruments" unless action is taken to reverse these trends.　　Second, the forum deliberated on a remarkably wide range of issues. It discussed not only nuclear weapons, but also other weapons of mass destruction, including chemical and biological weapons. It also made an in-depth examination of missile defenses and related issues. And it referred not only to relationships between governments, but also to those between terrorist organizations and other sub-state groups.　　Third, each of the recommendations is realistic, and can be acted on immediately or in the short term. The recommendations were made with the intention of righting the current situation, about which forum members share a common anxiety given the increasing threat posed by nuclear weapons. For those who had expected a comprehensive program for nuclear elimination that would go beyond the report of the Canberra Commission, or one that contained a specific time frame, the report might have proved disappointing. But the stance of the Tokyo Forum is based on the recognition that situation has changed since the days of the Canberra Commission, when the world had reason to be optimistic about the prospects for nuclear disarmament, and has instead become more dangerous.　　Fourth, the recommendations make a number of substantive demands on individual governments. It had been feared that the forum's recommendations would be watered down and contain minimal content by the need to reach consensus, particularly since representatives from India, Pakistan and China participated in the forum. However, the final report included areas on which agreement had not been reached, due to a desire to maintain strenuous demands on national

governments. In addition to the 17 key recommendations in Part Five of the report, other sections contain several times more recommendations.　　The fifth significant feature of the report is the linking of nuclear nonproliferation to nuclear disarmament. Since the forum was established following nuclear tests conducted by India and Pakistan, there was a fear that it would focus solely on nuclear nonproliferation and neglect nuclear disarmament. However, one of the report's key recommendations was to emphasize the reaffirmation of the NPT's central bargain-that the treaty requires both disarmament and nonproliferation; in effect, that the nuclear weapon states must make tangible progress in nuclear disarmament, while the non-nuclear weapon states must rally behind the treaty. Strengthening the link between these two elements is a basic tenet of the report.　　Finally, I would like to point out some aspects of the report that could be described as insufficient compared with other disarmament studies. One is that the forum dealt with the issue of "no first-use" only with extreme caution, while acknowledging elsewhere that it believes the only function of nuclear weapons is to deter the use of other nuclear weapons. The other problem is that not a single mention was made of the idea of a Northeast Asian Nuclear-Weapon-Free Zone-even as a topic for the middle- or long-term-even though one of its key recommendations was the denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula.　　The Tokyo Forum was initiated by the Japanese government, and the prime minister and foreign minister have promised to play an active role in promoting the report's recommendations. The Japanese government now has the responsibility to make every effort to help those recommendations put into practice, and it is anticipated that Japan will use the report to play an active role in diplomatic efforts in the area of nuclear disarmament.　　Kurosawa is dean of the Osaka School of International Public Policy at Osaka University.

By Mitsuru Kurosawa

Comment on the Tokyo Forum Report of great urgency for nuclear non-proliferation and disarmament. Third, the United Nations must be reevaluated. On this point, Akashi proposed that a subcentre of the U.N. Regional Centre for Peace and Disarmament in Asia and the Pacific be established in Japan. Fourth, the parameter of disarmament must be expanded as types of conflict change. In other words, other weapons of mass destruction, such as chemical and biological weapons, small arms and light weapons, must be tackled if true disarmament is to be achieved. And fifth, national security has to be viewed from a wider political, economic, social, and even cultural, perspective as the world's landscape changes. According to Akashi, "human security" constitutes a multi-disciplinary notion of which peace and disarmament is a part.General discussion on the Tokyo Forum's report　　On the afternoon of the second day, participants held unscheduled discussions on the contents of the report. A participant from the United States said he was concerned that the tone of the report was too pessimistic; for instance, in the context of the NPT regime's status. A participant from India argued that the report did not fully recognize the responsibility of NWS, and that no mention was made of the issue of the nuclear umbrella. An expert from Japan raised the concern that the Tokyo Forum could have talked more about the issue of "no first use" of nuclear weapons. Doubts were also raised by an American participant about the feasibility of establishing a permanent body of the NPT. A Bangladeshi participant wondered whether or not the Tokyo Forum discussed the feasibility of convening the fourth Special Session on Disarmament, and a Pakistani expert asked whether the forum had considered its position on the question of Kashmir.　　Akashi was joined at the conference by three other members of the Tokyo Forum. They all responded to questions and observations honestly, and urged participants to read the entire text of the Forum report since it contains 40 or 50 recommendations and suggestions, not just the 17 recommendations listed at the end of the document.Conclusion　　Ryukichi Imai, a scholar at the Institute for International Policy Studies and a member of the Tokyo Forum, said during one of the conference sessions, "I only think that just as the Tokyo Forum carried the torch the Canberra Commission had started, some third country will take up the theme and continue the detailed technical, political and legal processes for the elimination of nuclear weapons." In this regard, the recommendations adopted by the Tokyo

Forum are not the last chapter of the story; rather, they are the basis for nourishing an innovative dimension to the cause of nuclear non-proliferation and disarmament.　　On August 4th, following the Tokyo Forum's final meeting, Akashi and Nobuo Matsunaga, cochairmen of the forum, visited the U.N. headquarters in New York to present the report to U.N. Secretary General Kofi Annan. Commending the timely initiative of the Japanese government, Annan said: "The international community will study (the Tokyo Forum's recommendations) with a view to reducing and eliminating nuclear weapons in the

world." The Tokyo Forum's report will soon become an official U.N. document and, it is expected, will stimulate negotiations on nuclear non-proliferation and disarmament at the U.N. level. Kamiya is a visiting research fellow at HPI.

See the full text on HPI's Web site at�http://serv.peace.hiroshima-cu.ac.jp/�

The Tokyo Forum Report

－５－

From Canberra to Tokyo　　However fragile the flame of the torch may be, it is certainly burning. And the incessant light of the torch may well help show the way on the long road of nuclear elimination. Three years after Australia initiated the Canberra Commission on the Elimination of Nuclear Weapons, Japan carried the torch Canberra had started-by initiating the Tokyo Forum for Nuclear Non-Proliferation and Disarmament.　　The two countries share, in a sense, common historical backgrounds-Japan is the only country to have suffered the nuclear attacks, at the end of the World War II, and in Australia, British nuclear tests took place between 1950s and 1960s. Public sentiments that arose as a result of these experiences pushed the governments to take action following nuclear tests by France in 1995 and by India and Pakistan in 1998.　　Seventeen experts from 12 countries, including former U.S. Secretary of Defense, a Nobel laureate physicist who worked on the atomic bomb during World War II and a representative of NGO, participated in the independent commission, established by the Australian government in November 1995. Its report, published at the end of its fourth meeting in August 1996, was the first of its kind to be sponsored by a government. 　　"Creative initiatives like this," says Rory Medcalf, an Australian Foreign Affairs official and a former member of the commission's secretariat, "can combine the resources of governments, the moral force of statements by NGOs and the analytical credibility of good academic work." The Australian government, in the spirit of cooperation with Japan, sent Medcalf on secondment in a personal capacity to assist the secretariat of the Tokyo Forum.　　"Independent reports like these are not official documents and may therefore be less restricted by the sensitivities of international relations," he explained at a workshop held by the Hiroshima Peace Institute in July. "They are about making concrete contributions to the international debate, and searching for the sort of practical ideas that would make a real difference."　　Ryukichi Imai, a scholar at the Institute for International Policy Studies and a member of the Tokyo Forum, who was also a Canberra Commissioner, had called for the establishment of a Japanese version of the commission since well before the nuclear tests by India and Pakistan. "This is something to be continued until achieving the goal," Imai said. "Since the Canberra Commission was left halfway with the defeat in an election of the then government, I thought somebody should take over it. And I thought Japan was most suitable to serve this purpose. Since this would help wipe away the suspicion that Japan may become a nuclear state," he added.　　In Australia, the Labor government led by then Prime Minister Paul Keating, who initiated the commission, was defeated at a general election, held while the Commission was still deliberating in March 1996. Some commentators

have argued that the conservative coalition government that subsequently came to power, has not done enough to promote the commission's report.　　However copies of the report were circulated among governments-both capitals and large cities-international organizations, and non-governmental organizations, as well as academic institutions, with the executive summary of the report translated into most major languages. The report was presented to the U.N. General Assembly and the Conference on Disarmament, and the report's Web site continues to receive large numbers of hits. Many declarations by governments and NGOs, as well as academic and media articles, including the draft resolution in June 1998 of the New Agenda Coalition, have referred to the report.　　At the Hiroshima Peace Institute workshop, Medcalf said: "The true value of creative initiatives like the Canberra Commission or the Tokyo Forum is not that they produce instant, overnight results. However, if they contain practical ideas, they can help to affect the agendas of government at a deeper level over a longer period of time." During his five months' work in Japan since last March, Medcalf also visited Nagasaki as a member of the Tokyo Forum secretariat, meeting citizens and scholars there and helping to bridge the distance between the two nations, as well as between Tokyo and the two historical cities.　　Observers have noted that, at the same time as sponsoring the Canberra Commission and Tokyo Forum, both Australia and Japan hold security treaties with the United States, which offer the two countries protection under the nuclear umbrella. One argument that officials have used in response to this is that to pursue nuclear disarmament it is necessary to influence nuclear weapon states, and one way of doing that is to remain close to those states.　　International security and political environment has completely changed in the last three years, and so the report of the Tokyo Forum differs from that of the Canberra Commission. In addition to the five nuclear weapon states, as well as Brazil and Sweden, both of which have renounced nuclear options, the forum also included participants from India and Pakistan. "The next agenda would be to include Israel so that all the de facto nuclear weapon states would be involved," said Kazumi Mizumoto, associate professor at the Hiroshima Peace Institute. "It is also an idea to include South Africa, a country that renounced possession of nuclear weapons after developing several nuclear warheads," he added.　　"Once the Tokyo Forum report is published, it would be a tool, a resource for anyone who wants to carry the arguments forward in a convincing way," Medcalf said, adding, "One report is not likely to change world opinion. But a succession of credible reports, each building on the other, may well help influence the agenda." � By Atsuko Shigesawa, editor of Hiroshima Research News

common border.　　Opinion was divided on several recommendations, and careful wording was often called for. For example, the report made a limited reference to the "no first-use" pledge, adding that "in-depth discussion and further efforts will be needed" to secure concrete commitments on this issue. Mistrust of no first-use pledges made in the past by China and the former Soviet Union were behind the forum's guarded approach.　　The forum pointed out that missile defense systems devalue nuclear deterrents, and could increase the risk of nuclear proliferation. While expressing concern over the unilateral approach being taken toward missile defense by the United States, one of the forum's key r e c o m m e n d a t i o n s called on those contemplating the deployment of such systems to "proceed with caution." It is important to consider China's outright opposition to the possible introduction into East Asia of a theater missile defense (TMD) system by the United States, as well as similarly negative reactions toward prospective missile defense systems from Russia, Britain and France.　　The Tokyo Forum strongly and in principle supports the creation of nuclear weapon-free zones (NWFZ). However, it did not call for the establishment of an NWFZ in Northeast Asia; only for the denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula, based on the belief that it is better to begin by removing nuclear weapons from the most unstable areas.　　As for sub-critical experiments, which are not prohibited by the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty (CTBT), the forum recommended the introduction of practical monitoring and transparency mechanisms, rather than an all-out ban, to confirm whether they are consistent with the treaty's objectives and purposes.　　The forum devoted one paragraph to nongovernmental organizations and the New Agenda Coalition to demonstrate its willingness to cooperate with citizen-based movements around the world in their campaign to bring about the elimination of nuclear weapons.

Indeed, the forum made a point of noting its appreciation for the New Agenda Coalition's "recent efforts to provide new impetus to multilateral fora that are mired in competing theologies of nuclear deterrence and time-bound frameworks for nuclear disarmament."　　Finally, I would like to draw attention to the fact that the Hiroshima Peace Institute, a body established by the city of Hiroshima, cosponsored the Tokyo Forum, which was initiated by the Japanese government. Hiroshima was the first place in the world to experience a nuclear attack, followed by Nagasaki. As a result, the abolition of nuclear weapons has been a consistent goal of the people of both cities since the end of World War II. Their ideal has remained unaffected by changes in the international situation.　　The Tokyo Forum report contains realistic

recommendations based on an analysis of nuclear dangers faced by the world, borne of a conviction that those recommendations can be realized under current circumstances. If the ideal of the people of Hiroshima and Nagasaki represents the ultimate goal, the forum's recommendations can be said to be prescriptions for current maladies. Realism without idealism may end up producing nothing more than recognition of the status quo. However, idealistic appeals and realistic recommendations should, I believe, complement each other. The Tokyo Forum has given us all the opportunity to take the ideal of the people of Hiroshima to the stage of realistic proposals.

Mizumoto is associate professor at HPI.

－４－

Forum sets common goal for idealists, realistsForum sets common goal for idealists, realists

By Kazumi Mizumoto

Report's neglect of Japan's nuclear policy a cause for concernBy Hideo Tsuchiyama

　　Unlike diplomatic dialogues between governments, the Tokyo Forum for Nuclear Non-Proliferation and Disarmament was intended to facilitate informal exchange between individuals-the so-called track two conference format. Over the course of the forum's four

meetings, more than 20 people from 18 countries, including the five nuclear weapon states, and India and Pakistan, participated in debates and discussions in a private capacity. Having engaged people from those countries in the formulation of the report, the forum hoped

they would also feel bound by its recommendations.　　We will have to wait for formal responses to the report from individual experts and countries. However, it is already clear that representatives from some countries disagreed with the rigorous demands placed on governments by several of the recommendations. The participant from India, for instance, refused to adopt the report, and his counterpart from China did so only with reservations about some aspects of the document.　　The report cited a reduction by the United States and Russia of deployed strategic nuclear warheads to 1,000 each as the starting point of nuclear disarmament in the global context, and a reduction of such warheads to within "one step short of zero" by all nuclear weapons states as the next step. The report says, "A process of verifiable, phased reductions by all nuclear-armed states to one step short of zero is a goal on which advocates of abolition and deterrence might find common ground and from which all states would reap shared gains." On the other hand, the report called for the "elimination of nuclear weapons through phased reductions," rather than in accordance with a specific time frame.　　Compared with recommended reductions of strategic warheads by the United States and Russia to 2,000 each made by three similar studies in the mid-1990s-the Canberra Commission on the Elimination of the Nuclear Weapons, the National Academy of Sciences and the Henry L. Stimson Center-the Tokyo Forum's numerical goal is more ambitious. In striving to find some common ground between advocates of abolition and those of deterrence, the forum took a new approach absent from the earlier studies.　　With regard to nuclear deterrence, the Tokyo Forum pointed out, as did the three earlier studies, that the only function of nuclear weapons is to deter the use of other nuclear weapons, and that they do not act as a deterrent against chemical and biological weapons. However, the forum said such a function was dependent on the existence of nuclear weapons. "National, regional and global security have not been enhanced by the possession of nuclear weapons," the report said, thereby offering a more restrictive definition of the deterrent function than the three previous studies.　　One of the most important features of the forum's report is that it devotes considerable attention to the issue of regional disarmament. The forum attached particular importance to South Asia, with most of its recommendations in this area aimed at India, Pakistan and China.　　First, it called on India and Pakistan to sign up to the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty as non-nuclear-weapon states, and to take concrete and verifiable steps to reduce their nuclear arsenals. The report acknowledged that India's persistence with its nuclear program was spurred by the deployment by China of its own missiles. The report called on both countries to forgo the deployment of nuclear long-range ballistic missiles and to make a verifiable pledge not to station short-range missiles close to their

　　Allow me to begin by expressing my respect and gratitude to each of the members of the Tokyo Forum for their efforts over the 12 months preceding the release of the report. I would also like to express my sympathy toward the 49-page report, which is based throughout on a strong realization of the crisis facing the international status quo on nuclear weapons. However, I am concerned that the report omitted several areas I believe to be vital to the elimination of nuclear weapons.　　The forum's overall aim was accomplished in the sense that each of the 17 key recommendations contains concrete proposals. However, many of the proposals simply retraced old paths toward the elimination of nuclear weapons via nuclear disarmament. It bore the hallmarks of other major disarmament studies completed in recent years by, among others, the Henry L. Stimson Center, the Canberra Commission and the National Academy of Sciences, as well as the Pugwash Conferences. Frankly, the Tokyo Forum report contains nothing new.　　The Tokyo Forum purportedly regarded the report of the Canberra Commission as its starting point, and hoped to issue a report that went one step farther than the commission's document. However, an "agreement amongst the nuclear weapon states of reciprocal no first-use undertakings," a clause included in immediate steps recommended by the commission, was omitted from the Tokyo Forum report, which simply called for efforts to be made "that will bring to fruition an effective no first-use commitment." One country represented at the forum reportedly took exception to the inclusion of a no first-use clause due to its belief in the logic of nuclear deterrence fuelled by mistrust and suspicion of other countries. Granted, the sixth recommendation calls for zero nuclear weapons on hair-trigger alert, yet the omission of a no first-use clause represents nothing but a retreat from the report of the Canberra Commission.　　Several new ideas can be found in the first recommendation, which calls for the creation of a permanent secretariat and consultative commission to deal with questions of compliance, and to consider strengthening the Non-Proliferation Treaty. The same can be said of the 15th recommendation, which calls for the annulment of the consensus rule at the

Conference on Disarmament. It� �is hoped that the above-mentioned bodies will materialize, although their precise role and foundations will need more clarification.　　I am most concerned that the report does not contain a single recommendation directed toward the Japanese government. Instead, it offers a list of "should dos" aimed at the international community at large. Since Japan is expected to play an active role in pressuring countries to respond positively to the report, it seems unnatural that it has been asked to do nothing with regard to its own nuclear policy.　　Whenever Japan raised objections in the past to nuclear tests conducted by such nations as China, France, India and Pakistan, it was accused of hypocrisy, due to its dependence on the U.S. nuclear umbrella. The report's neglect of Japan's nuclear policy means Tokyo will face difficulty winning the trust and understanding of other countries in its quest for a nuclear-free world.　　For example, the 13th recommendation says, "The Tokyo Forum urges all parties to redouble their efforts to achieve the goal of a denuclearised Korean Peninsula as soon as possible." However, it is hard to imagine North Korea accepting such an idea as long as it is confined to the Korean Peninsula. The problem can only begin to be resolved when Japan is included in a proposal to establish a Northeast Asian Nuclear Weapon-Free Zone. A commitment by Japan to a NWFZ in the region would provide clear evidence that it has no intention of acquiring nuclear weapons after leaving the U.S. nuclear umbrella.　　Realistic recommendations should never serve just as an affirmation of the status quo. Unfortunately, this is precisely the weakness to be found in the Tokyo Forum report, which lacks the impact of the New Agenda Coalition proposals.　　�　　Tsuchiyama is former president of Nagasaki University. He was a corepresentative of the Working Committee for the Hiroshima and Nagasaki Citizens' Meeting Demanding the Abolition of Nuclear Weapons, one of the civic groups that submitted proposals to the Tokyo Forum.

Comment on the Tokyo Forum Report

Analysis of the Report of the Tokyo Forum

－５－

From Canberra to Tokyo　　However fragile the flame of the torch may be, it is certainly burning. And the incessant light of the torch may well help show the way on the long road of nuclear elimination. Three years after Australia initiated the Canberra Commission on the Elimination of Nuclear Weapons, Japan carried the torch Canberra had started-by initiating the Tokyo Forum for Nuclear Non-Proliferation and Disarmament.　　The two countries share, in a sense, common historical backgrounds-Japan is the only country to have suffered the nuclear attacks, at the end of the World War II, and in Australia, British nuclear tests took place between 1950s and 1960s. Public sentiments that arose as a result of these experiences pushed the governments to take action following nuclear tests by France in 1995 and by India and Pakistan in 1998.　　Seventeen experts from 12 countries, including former U.S. Secretary of Defense, a Nobel laureate physicist who worked on the atomic bomb during World War II and a representative of NGO, participated in the independent commission, established by the Australian government in November 1995. Its report, published at the end of its fourth meeting in August 1996, was the first of its kind to be sponsored by a government. 　　"Creative initiatives like this," says Rory Medcalf, an Australian Foreign Affairs official and a former member of the commission's secretariat, "can combine the resources of governments, the moral force of statements by NGOs and the analytical credibility of good academic work." The Australian government, in the spirit of cooperation with Japan, sent Medcalf on secondment in a personal capacity to assist the secretariat of the Tokyo Forum.　　"Independent reports like these are not official documents and may therefore be less restricted by the sensitivities of international relations," he explained at a workshop held by the Hiroshima Peace Institute in July. "They are about making concrete contributions to the international debate, and searching for the sort of practical ideas that would make a real difference."　　Ryukichi Imai, a scholar at the Institute for International Policy Studies and a member of the Tokyo Forum, who was also a Canberra Commissioner, had called for the establishment of a Japanese version of the commission since well before the nuclear tests by India and Pakistan. "This is something to be continued until achieving the goal," Imai said. "Since the Canberra Commission was left halfway with the defeat in an election of the then government, I thought somebody should take over it. And I thought Japan was most suitable to serve this purpose. Since this would help wipe away the suspicion that Japan may become a nuclear state," he added.　　In Australia, the Labor government led by then Prime Minister Paul Keating, who initiated the commission, was defeated at a general election, held while the Commission was still deliberating in March 1996. Some commentators

have argued that the conservative coalition government that subsequently came to power, has not done enough to promote the commission's report.　　However copies of the report were circulated among governments-both capitals and large cities-international organizations, and non-governmental organizations, as well as academic institutions, with the executive summary of the report translated into most major languages. The report was presented to the U.N. General Assembly and the Conference on Disarmament, and the report's Web site continues to receive large numbers of hits. Many declarations by governments and NGOs, as well as academic and media articles, including the draft resolution in June 1998 of the New Agenda Coalition, have referred to the report.　　At the Hiroshima Peace Institute workshop, Medcalf said: "The true value of creative initiatives like the Canberra Commission or the Tokyo Forum is not that they produce instant, overnight results. However, if they contain practical ideas, they can help to affect the agendas of government at a deeper level over a longer period of time." During his five months' work in Japan since last March, Medcalf also visited Nagasaki as a member of the Tokyo Forum secretariat, meeting citizens and scholars there and helping to bridge the distance between the two nations, as well as between Tokyo and the two historical cities.　　Observers have noted that, at the same time as sponsoring the Canberra Commission and Tokyo Forum, both Australia and Japan hold security treaties with the United States, which offer the two countries protection under the nuclear umbrella. One argument that officials have used in response to this is that to pursue nuclear disarmament it is necessary to influence nuclear weapon states, and one way of doing that is to remain close to those states.　　International security and political environment has completely changed in the last three years, and so the report of the Tokyo Forum differs from that of the Canberra Commission. In addition to the five nuclear weapon states, as well as Brazil and Sweden, both of which have renounced nuclear options, the forum also included participants from India and Pakistan. "The next agenda would be to include Israel so that all the de facto nuclear weapon states would be involved," said Kazumi Mizumoto, associate professor at the Hiroshima Peace Institute. "It is also an idea to include South Africa, a country that renounced possession of nuclear weapons after developing several nuclear warheads," he added.　　"Once the Tokyo Forum report is published, it would be a tool, a resource for anyone who wants to carry the arguments forward in a convincing way," Medcalf said, adding, "One report is not likely to change world opinion. But a succession of credible reports, each building on the other, may well help influence the agenda." � By Atsuko Shigesawa, editor of Hiroshima Research News

common border.　　Opinion was divided on several recommendations, and careful wording was often called for. For example, the report made a limited reference to the "no first-use" pledge, adding that "in-depth discussion and further efforts will be needed" to secure concrete commitments on this issue. Mistrust of no first-use pledges made in the past by China and the former Soviet Union were behind the forum's guarded approach.　　The forum pointed out that missile defense systems devalue nuclear deterrents, and could increase the risk of nuclear proliferation. While expressing concern over the unilateral approach being taken toward missile defense by the United States, one of the forum's key r e c o m m e n d a t i o n s called on those contemplating the deployment of such systems to "proceed with caution." It is important to consider China's outright opposition to the possible introduction into East Asia of a theater missile defense (TMD) system by the United States, as well as similarly negative reactions toward prospective missile defense systems from Russia, Britain and France.　　The Tokyo Forum strongly and in principle supports the creation of nuclear weapon-free zones (NWFZ). However, it did not call for the establishment of an NWFZ in Northeast Asia; only for the denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula, based on the belief that it is better to begin by removing nuclear weapons from the most unstable areas.　　As for sub-critical experiments, which are not prohibited by the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty (CTBT), the forum recommended the introduction of practical monitoring and transparency mechanisms, rather than an all-out ban, to confirm whether they are consistent with the treaty's objectives and purposes.　　The forum devoted one paragraph to nongovernmental organizations and the New Agenda Coalition to demonstrate its willingness to cooperate with citizen-based movements around the world in their campaign to bring about the elimination of nuclear weapons.

Indeed, the forum made a point of noting its appreciation for the New Agenda Coalition's "recent efforts to provide new impetus to multilateral fora that are mired in competing theologies of nuclear deterrence and time-bound frameworks for nuclear disarmament."　　Finally, I would like to draw attention to the fact that the Hiroshima Peace Institute, a body established by the city of Hiroshima, cosponsored the Tokyo Forum, which was initiated by the Japanese government. Hiroshima was the first place in the world to experience a nuclear attack, followed by Nagasaki. As a result, the abolition of nuclear weapons has been a consistent goal of the people of both cities since the end of World War II. Their ideal has remained unaffected by changes in the international situation.　　The Tokyo Forum report contains realistic

recommendations based on an analysis of nuclear dangers faced by the world, borne of a conviction that those recommendations can be realized under current circumstances. If the ideal of the people of Hiroshima and Nagasaki represents the ultimate goal, the forum's recommendations can be said to be prescriptions for current maladies. Realism without idealism may end up producing nothing more than recognition of the status quo. However, idealistic appeals and realistic recommendations should, I believe, complement each other. The Tokyo Forum has given us all the opportunity to take the ideal of the people of Hiroshima to the stage of realistic proposals.

Mizumoto is associate professor at HPI.

－４－

Forum sets common goal for idealists, realistsForum sets common goal for idealists, realists

By Kazumi Mizumoto

Report's neglect of Japan's nuclear policy a cause for concernBy Hideo Tsuchiyama

　　Unlike diplomatic dialogues between governments, the Tokyo Forum for Nuclear Non-Proliferation and Disarmament was intended to facilitate informal exchange between individuals-the so-called track two conference format. Over the course of the forum's four

meetings, more than 20 people from 18 countries, including the five nuclear weapon states, and India and Pakistan, participated in debates and discussions in a private capacity. Having engaged people from those countries in the formulation of the report, the forum hoped

they would also feel bound by its recommendations.　　We will have to wait for formal responses to the report from individual experts and countries. However, it is already clear that representatives from some countries disagreed with the rigorous demands placed on governments by several of the recommendations. The participant from India, for instance, refused to adopt the report, and his counterpart from China did so only with reservations about some aspects of the document.　　The report cited a reduction by the United States and Russia of deployed strategic nuclear warheads to 1,000 each as the starting point of nuclear disarmament in the global context, and a reduction of such warheads to within "one step short of zero" by all nuclear weapons states as the next step. The report says, "A process of verifiable, phased reductions by all nuclear-armed states to one step short of zero is a goal on which advocates of abolition and deterrence might find common ground and from which all states would reap shared gains." On the other hand, the report called for the "elimination of nuclear weapons through phased reductions," rather than in accordance with a specific time frame.　　Compared with recommended reductions of strategic warheads by the United States and Russia to 2,000 each made by three similar studies in the mid-1990s-the Canberra Commission on the Elimination of the Nuclear Weapons, the National Academy of Sciences and the Henry L. Stimson Center-the Tokyo Forum's numerical goal is more ambitious. In striving to find some common ground between advocates of abolition and those of deterrence, the forum took a new approach absent from the earlier studies.　　With regard to nuclear deterrence, the Tokyo Forum pointed out, as did the three earlier studies, that the only function of nuclear weapons is to deter the use of other nuclear weapons, and that they do not act as a deterrent against chemical and biological weapons. However, the forum said such a function was dependent on the existence of nuclear weapons. "National, regional and global security have not been enhanced by the possession of nuclear weapons," the report said, thereby offering a more restrictive definition of the deterrent function than the three previous studies.　　One of the most important features of the forum's report is that it devotes considerable attention to the issue of regional disarmament. The forum attached particular importance to South Asia, with most of its recommendations in this area aimed at India, Pakistan and China.　　First, it called on India and Pakistan to sign up to the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty as non-nuclear-weapon states, and to take concrete and verifiable steps to reduce their nuclear arsenals. The report acknowledged that India's persistence with its nuclear program was spurred by the deployment by China of its own missiles. The report called on both countries to forgo the deployment of nuclear long-range ballistic missiles and to make a verifiable pledge not to station short-range missiles close to their

　　Allow me to begin by expressing my respect and gratitude to each of the members of the Tokyo Forum for their efforts over the 12 months preceding the release of the report. I would also like to express my sympathy toward the 49-page report, which is based throughout on a strong realization of the crisis facing the international status quo on nuclear weapons. However, I am concerned that the report omitted several areas I believe to be vital to the elimination of nuclear weapons.　　The forum's overall aim was accomplished in the sense that each of the 17 key recommendations contains concrete proposals. However, many of the proposals simply retraced old paths toward the elimination of nuclear weapons via nuclear disarmament. It bore the hallmarks of other major disarmament studies completed in recent years by, among others, the Henry L. Stimson Center, the Canberra Commission and the National Academy of Sciences, as well as the Pugwash Conferences. Frankly, the Tokyo Forum report contains nothing new.　　The Tokyo Forum purportedly regarded the report of the Canberra Commission as its starting point, and hoped to issue a report that went one step farther than the commission's document. However, an "agreement amongst the nuclear weapon states of reciprocal no first-use undertakings," a clause included in immediate steps recommended by the commission, was omitted from the Tokyo Forum report, which simply called for efforts to be made "that will bring to fruition an effective no first-use commitment." One country represented at the forum reportedly took exception to the inclusion of a no first-use clause due to its belief in the logic of nuclear deterrence fuelled by mistrust and suspicion of other countries. Granted, the sixth recommendation calls for zero nuclear weapons on hair-trigger alert, yet the omission of a no first-use clause represents nothing but a retreat from the report of the Canberra Commission.　　Several new ideas can be found in the first recommendation, which calls for the creation of a permanent secretariat and consultative commission to deal with questions of compliance, and to consider strengthening the Non-Proliferation Treaty. The same can be said of the 15th recommendation, which calls for the annulment of the consensus rule at the

Conference on Disarmament. It� �is hoped that the above-mentioned bodies will materialize, although their precise role and foundations will need more clarification.　　I am most concerned that the report does not contain a single recommendation directed toward the Japanese government. Instead, it offers a list of "should dos" aimed at the international community at large. Since Japan is expected to play an active role in pressuring countries to respond positively to the report, it seems unnatural that it has been asked to do nothing with regard to its own nuclear policy.　　Whenever Japan raised objections in the past to nuclear tests conducted by such nations as China, France, India and Pakistan, it was accused of hypocrisy, due to its dependence on the U.S. nuclear umbrella. The report's neglect of Japan's nuclear policy means Tokyo will face difficulty winning the trust and understanding of other countries in its quest for a nuclear-free world.　　For example, the 13th recommendation says, "The Tokyo Forum urges all parties to redouble their efforts to achieve the goal of a denuclearised Korean Peninsula as soon as possible." However, it is hard to imagine North Korea accepting such an idea as long as it is confined to the Korean Peninsula. The problem can only begin to be resolved when Japan is included in a proposal to establish a Northeast Asian Nuclear Weapon-Free Zone. A commitment by Japan to a NWFZ in the region would provide clear evidence that it has no intention of acquiring nuclear weapons after leaving the U.S. nuclear umbrella.　　Realistic recommendations should never serve just as an affirmation of the status quo. Unfortunately, this is precisely the weakness to be found in the Tokyo Forum report, which lacks the impact of the New Agenda Coalition proposals.　　�　　Tsuchiyama is former president of Nagasaki University. He was a corepresentative of the Working Committee for the Hiroshima and Nagasaki Citizens' Meeting Demanding the Abolition of Nuclear Weapons, one of the civic groups that submitted proposals to the Tokyo Forum.

Comment on the Tokyo Forum Report

Analysis of the Report of the Tokyo Forum

－６－

Japan-U.S.-China framework critical for stability on Korean PeninsulaJapan-U.S.-China framework critical for stability on Korean PeninsulaBy Nobumasa Akiyama

ProgramJuly 2Keynote Speech Fukushiro NukagaSession 1 "Overview of Security Situation in Northeast Asia" Moderator: Richard Armitage Lead-off Speaker: Yang Zhenya, Akihiko TanakaSession 2 "Reviewing the Agreed Framework" Moderator: Harry Barnes Lead-off Speaker: Leon SigalJuly 3Session 3 "Cooperating in Nonproliferation Issues on the � Korean Peninsula" Moderator: John Merrill Lead-off Speaker: Hajime IzumiSession 4 "Economic Cooperation in Northeast Asia" Moderator: Toshiro Ozawa Lead-off Speaker: John MerrillPlenary Session Moderator: Seiichiro Takagi Lead-off Speaker: K.A. Namkung

　　The Hiroshima Peace Institute held a workshop titled "Cooperation on the Korean Peninsula" in Tokyo on July 2 and 3, 1999. The event was cosponsored by the ACT Foundation in Tokyo and the Atlantic Council of the United States. Its aim was to facilitate discussions on the unstable security situation in Northeast Asia, with particular emphasis on confidence-building and the creation of an environment conducive to international cooperation-both of which are necessary if the Korean Peninsula problem is to be resolved. About 30 experts on security and Northeast Asia from Japan, the United States and China, as well as policy makers, participated in the workshop.　　The workshop opened with a keynote speech by Fukushiro Nukaga, a Diet member and former director general of the Defense Agency.

Nukaga noted that the security environment in Asia had not transformed with the end of the Cold War, and cited the divided Korean Peninsula as the main source of instability in the region. He touched on North Korea's suspected nuclear and missile d e v e l o p m e n t

programs, and stressed the need to take counter the threat of proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and the ensuing regional instability. He said that peace and stability in Northeast Asia would depend on confidence-building measures, increased communication and a continuing commitment to the region by the United States. He also expressed a wish to see China take a greater role in ensuring regional peace and stability.　　Several issues were discussed at the workshop, including the trilateral relationship between Japan, the United States and China, North Korea's alleged missile program, the effectiveness and prospects of the Korean Energy Development Organization, engagement with Pyongyang and the prospects for multilateral frameworks for economic cooperation in Northeast Asia, including North Korea.　　The missile issue attracted most attention since, at the time, there were reports that North Korea was about to test-launch a second ballistic missile. A test, or the threat of one, could be interpreted either as a demonstration of North Korea's readiness to enter the international weapons market, or as a diplomatic card to be dealt during negotiations with the United States. Participants were divided over whether the launch would take place. Some asked how the international community should respond to a launch. An American participant said that, in the event of a launch, other countries should continue to engage North Korea, and that sanctions aimed at isolating Pyongyang (such as suspending KEDO) should not be implemented. Engagement, he said, would contribute to the long-term stability of the Korean Peninsula.　　Another participant argued that the United States and Japan should step up development of the theater missile defense system (TMD) to counter the threat posed by missile proliferation. A Chinese participant said that, while China did not wish to see missile proliferation, it would not interfere with North Korea's sovereign right to conduct missile tests. China would also oppose TMD, which it regards as a threat to the balance of power in East Asia, the participant said. There was also a frank exchange of views on the future of KEDO. Some participants said KEDO had been functioning relatively well, and served as a channel for dialogue between North Korea and the United States on the issue of

energy development. Others proposed using KEDO as a model for cooperative bodies in other areas, such as a Korean Peninsula Agricultural Development Organization (KADO). There was a proposal to integrate cooperation with North Korea on comprehensive security into a broader framework. An American participant backed Chinese membership of KEDO after a Chinese colleague pointed out Beijing's support for the organization's activities.　　The Chinese participant said that cooperation should not be limited to the Korean Peninsula, but should be broadened to include the whole of Northeast Asia, such as the Trumen River and areas of the Yellow Sea. Some expressed the desire to see Japan play a more active role in developmental cooperation by, for example, setting up a developmental financial organization along the lines of a Northeast Asian Development Bank.　　Although the Korean Peninsula has been the subject of numerous discussions and dialogues, few have adopted the framework of the Japan-U.S.-China trilateral efforts, despite their notable impact in the region. The recent workshop decided to adopt the framework, since it offers a unique perspective for discussions about the peninsula. Despite differences in their respective roles and interests vis-a-vis the Korean Peninsula, Japan, China and the United States will play a critical role in resolving the region's problems. It is, therefore, essential that analysts and policymakers from the three countries meet regularly to exchange views, deepen mutual understanding and share in their common vision-peace and stability on the Korean Peninsula.　　　　　　　　　　　　　 � Akiyama is research associate at HPI.�

List of Participants<Japan> Fukushiro Nukaga (Member of the Diet, former Director General of� Defense Agency)*Hajime Izumi (Professor, University of Shizuoka)Tomoyoshi Kaneko (Managing Director, ACT Foundation)Kazumi Mizumoto (Associate Professor, Hiroshima Peace Institute)Tetsuo Murooka (Senior Researcher, National Institute for Defense Studies)Toshiro Ozawa (Acting Director, Japan Institute of International Affairs)Seiichiro Takagi (Director of 2nd Research Department, National Institute for � Defense Studies)Akihiko Tanaka (Professor, University of Tokyo)Yasuhide Yamanouchi (Professor, GLOCOM, International University of Japan)* Chairman of the workshop<P.R.C.> Yang Zhenya (President, Asia-Africa Development & Exchange Society of China)Fu Chengli (Research Fellow, Academy of Military Science of People's � Liberation Army)Lu Zhongwei (Vice-Director, Modern International Relations Institute of China)Yang Baoyun (Professor, Beijing University)Yang Xinbin (Assistant Researcher, Asia-Africa Development Research Institute of Development Research Center of State Council)<U.S.A.>Richard Armitage (President, Armitage Associates)Harry Barnes (Director, Program on Conflict Resolution, Carter Center)Kent Calder (Special Advisor to Ambassador, U.S. Embassy in Japan)James Delaney (Senior Associate, Institute for Defense Analyses)John Merrill (Policy Analyst, Department of State)K. A. Namkung (Director, Korea Roadmap Project, Program on Conflict Resolution, � Atlantic Council)Robin Sakoda (Armitage Associates)Jason Shaplen (Senior Advisor, Korean Peninsula Energy Development Organization)Leon V. Sigal (Consultant, Social Science Research Council)

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Denuclearization and disarmament　　The Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty I (START I), signed by the United States and the former Soviet Union in July 1991, was an epoch-making legal framework comparable to the Intermediate Range Nuclear Forces (INF) Treaty, since it committed both super powers to dramatically decreasing their nuclear stockpiles. Under the treaty, the countries agreed to cut the number of deployed strategic nuclear warheads to 6,000 each, and delivery systems to 1,600 each, and to dismantle and dispose of remaining warheads and delivery systems. 　　To accelerate the trend toward nuclear disarmament, the Group of Eight (G-8) countries discussed assisting denuclearization in the former Soviet republics-now the Commonwealth of Independent States-at their summit in Cologne, Germany, in June 1999. At the G-8 foreign ministers meeting held at the same time, the Japanese government announced assistance of U.S.$200 million toward the denuclearization of the CIS. This policy was based on the "Japan-Russian Federation Joint Efforts for Disarmament and Environmental Protection," an initiative announced by Japanese Foreign Minister Masahiko Komura when he visited Russia in May 1999. The initiative comprises the following three plans:1. To dismantle decommissioned nuclear submarines in the Russian Far East.　About half of the nuclear submarines belonging to the Russian Pacific Fleet based in Vladivostok and other cities in the Russian Far East are in the process of decommissioning. Some countries have already adopted policies on the issue, including the United States and Japan. The Japanese government also plans to enhance its programs in this field.2. To promote the conversion of military resources to private industry.Japan plans to increase cooperation in such areas as helping scientists involved in developing nuclear arms to find jobs in private sector industries, and converting military industry to the private sector.3. To manage and dispose of Russian surplus weapons-grade plutonium.　Several countries, including France, Germany and Canada, have made proposals regarding the disposal of weapons-grade plutonium derived from dismantled nuclear warheads in Russia. Japan has offered to assist with the disposal of the plutonium at a fast reactor BN-600 in Beloretsk. The Japan Nuclear Cycle Development Institute, a government-funded research and development organization attached to the Science and Technology Agency, plans to promote technical and financial cooperation with the Research Institute for Atomic Reactors (RIAR) in Dimitrovgrad, and other Russian research institutes in such projects as producing mixed oxide (MOX) fuel from dismantled plutonium, and experiment with reactors' ability to irradiate plutonium.

Disposal of dismantled plutonium　　Most people agree that nuclear disarmament is a worthwhile goal. However, questions remain concerning the disposal of enriched uranium and weapons-grade plutonium taken from nuclear warheads. Experts from around the world have been considering how to overcome this problem since the end of the Cold War. The United States government decided to adopt two measures-using MOX fuel processed from plutonium at commercial lightwater reactors, and disposing of the plutonium through vitrification. In fact, the U.S. Department of Energy has already selected an electric power company, which is managing nuclear power plants and is preparing to manufacture MOX fuel.　　In addition, Russia is also preparing to use MOX fuel at its lightwater reactors, and has started investigating the possible use of BN-600 for this purpose. The Japanese government's initiative is behind these encouraging international efforts to turn "swords into plowshares" in the nuclear field. However, careful preparation and long-term cooperation are necessary for the safe transformation of weapons-grade plutonium for

commercial use.�Japan's efforts in the past　　The recent Japanese initiatives constitute the country's second phase of assistance in the denuclearization of the CIS. The first phase was launched at the G-7 summit in Munich in 1992. In April 1993, Japan pledged to provide the former Soviet republics with assistance totaling U.S.$100 million. It had concluded "agreements with regard to the cooperation for abolition of nuclear weapons" with Russia, Ukraine, Kazakhstan and Belarus by March 1994, and established cooperative committees with each country. Since 1994, Japan's program to assist the denuclearization of the CIS is showing tangible progress.　　As part of a separate program launched after the Chernobyl accident in 1986, Japan is also helping the CIS and former East European countries to safely manage their commercial nuclear reactors. Controlling and protecting nuclear materials in the former Soviet republics took on greater importance with the political and social collapse of the socialist state. The introduction of IAEA safeguards and inspections of nuclear facilities in the republics, all of which, with the exception of Russia, have signed the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty as non-nuclear weapon states, has also taken on added importance. Ministries and nuclear-related organizations in Japan continue to provide technical and financial assistance in this regard. In addition, a program has been set up to provide medical equipment and drugs for the treatment of Ukrainian soldiers exposed to radiation while disposing of radioactive waste dismantled from nuclear warheads. Humanitarian medical support is also being given to people living near the test site in the Semipalatinsk region, and telemedicine consultations are being provided for checkups and treatment. Japan reportedly is to step up assistance in this area.�Prospects for denuclearization　　The aforementioned networks of diplomatic and humanitarian assistance afforded to the former Soviet Union would have been unimaginable during the Cold War. It is important to strengthen these networks to continue the momentum toward the elimination of nuclear weapons. With the end of the Cold War, the goal of denuclearization of the CIS and the United States that lies at the heart of the START treaties has become a practical possibility for the first time. The current climate also offers Japan an excellent opportunity to promote its long-term diplomatic goal of eliminating nuclear weapons. In its report of July 25, 1999, the Tokyo Forum for Nuclear Non-Proliferation and Disarmament made its contribution toward that goal. The report said, "We call on the United States to continue and to increase cooperative threat-reduction efforts in the former Soviet Union. The world community, especially the G-8 states and the European Union, must substantially expand cooperative threat-reduction efforts."　　Yamanouchi is a professor at the Center for Global Communications, International University of Japan.

Japan supporting denuclearization efforts in former Soviet UnionBy Yasuhide Yamanouchi

More information can be accessed from the following Web pages:

Cooperative Threat Reduction (CTR) program: http://www.ctr.osd.mil/

"Japan-Russian Federation Joint Efforts for Disarmament and EnvironmentalProtection-New initiative by the government of Japan in the areas of assistancefor denuclearization, disarmament and nonproliferation":http://www.mofa.go.jp/mofaj/gaiko/kaidan/g_komura/russia99/k_sagyo.html

Cooperation in the denuclearization of the former Soviet republics using Russianfastbreeder nuclear reactors: http://www.jnc.go.jp/jncweb/jncintro.htm

"Facing Nuclear Dangers: An Action Plan for the 21st Century-the Report of

the Tokyo Forum for Nuclear Non-Proliferation and Disarmament":http://serv.peace.hiroshima-cu.ac.jp/

TOPICS

◆July 2-3　　Kazumi Mizumoto, Ikuko Togo and Nobumasa Akiyama attend a workshop titled "Cooperation on the Korean Peninsula," sponsored by Hiroshima Peace Institute, the Atlantic Council of the United States and the Association for the Communication of Transcultural Studies (ACT), at the Center for Global Communications (GLOCOM), International University of Japan.◆July 4-8　　Akiyama acts as a program coordinator at the 13th ACT Transcultural Seminar titled "Achieving International Cooperation in the Asia-Pacific Region in the 21st Century" at Zao, Miyagi Prefecture.◆July 4　　Masamichi Kamiya participates as a panelist in a symposium titled "What international cooperative coordinators should be like in 21st century," sponsored by the AMDA Training Center for International Cooperative Coordinators, at Hiroshima Bunkyo Women's College in Hiroshima.◆July 5　　A workshop is held at the Hiroshima Peace Institute.◆July 7　　Togo and Valentine Seveus, visiting representative of PeaceQuest International, a nongovernmental organization based in Sweden, discuss peace and related issues at the Hiroshima Peace Culture Foundation.◆July 19　　Kamiya attends an organizers' meeting for the Center for Preventive Diplomacy, held at the International House of Japan in Tokyo.◆July21　　Akiyama participates in a workshop on preventive diplomacy, sponsored by Institute of Asia-Pacific Studies, at Waseda University in Tokyo.◆July 22　　Akiyama attends a workshop sponsored by a study group on the issue of nuclear energy, held at the Ministry of International Trade and Industry.◆July 23-25　　The 4th meeting of the Tokyo Forum for Nuclear Non-Proliferation and Disarmament is held at the Takanawa Prince Hotel in Tokyo.

◆July 27-30　　Kamiya participates in the 4th United Nations Conference on Disarmament Issues in Kyoto, sponsored by the U.N. Department for Disarmament Affairs, at Kyoto International Conference Hall.◆July 30　　Akiyama attends a workshop on energy and security, held at and sponsored by GLOCOM. ◆August 1-2　　Akiyama acts as a coordinator at the Strategic Studies Fellowship Program Summer Seminar, sponsored by the Research Institute for Peace and Security, at the International House of Japan in Tokyo.◆August 4　　Kamiya and the cochairmen of the Tokyo Forum visit the U.N. headquarters in New York.◆August 5　　Mizumoto delivers a speech on the global environment that encompasses the problem of nuclear weapons, at a symposium sponsored by Japanese Consumer's Co-operative Union, at Hiroshima YMCA Hall.　　Akiyama acts as a coordinator at a peace forum at the RIHGA Royal Hotel Hiroshima, sponsored by the Japan Junior Chamber.◆August 18　　Akiyama attends a workshop on energy and security, held at and sponsored by GLOCOM.◆August 23　　Mizumoto participates in a meeting of a study group, titled "Exploring Japan's proactive peace and security strategies: the case of the 'nuclear umbrella,'" organized by the National Institute for Research Advancement (NIRA) in Tokyo.◆August 24　　Akiyama attends a workshop sponsored by the Ministry of International Trade and Industry, held at the Institute of Applied Energy.◆August 26　　Akiyama delivers a lecture titled "The Administrative System in Japan" to foreign trainees at the Japan International Cooperation Agency (JICA), at the Hiroshima International Center in Higashihiroshima.

　　A new version of the Hiroshima Peace Institute's Web site appeared on Sept. 1 at http://serv.peace.hiroshima-cu.ac.jp/. The institute hopes the changes to the site will enable visitors to promptly find the information they need, as well as contribute to the promotion of world peace.　　The reconstruction of the Web site, the first since the HPI went online in June 1998, means the site carries more than

three times more information than the original version. In addition to the existing outline of the institute and "What's new"-a section featuring reports on past and upcoming events involving HPI-the new version includes details of research projects, HPI publications and profiles of the institute's researchers.　　An index appearing on the left hand side of the site enables visitors to surf several pages with ease. The site's new "Links" section features the addresses of about 30 other research institutes and nongovernmental organizations involved in peace and disarmament issues. The institute plans to increase the number of links to other institutes and NGOs.　　Those wishing to have their organization included in the links section should contact Ritsuko Ogawa, the Web site's editor, at ogawa@peace.hiroshima-cu.ac.jp.

　　After graduating from the School of International Service at the American University in Washington, D.C. in 1994, Naono established the Nuclear History Institute at the university and, as project director, organized an atomic bomb exhibition titled "Constructing a Peaceful World: Beyond Hiroshima and Nagasaki" in July 1995. She entered the doctoral program in sociology at the University of California, Santa Cruz, in 1996, where she is currently a Ph.D. candidate. Naono joined HPI as a visiting research fellow in September 1999. Her areas of interests include cultural studies, nationalism and memories of war.

Hello from HPIHello from HPI

AKIKO NAONOVisiting research fellow

An article in Hiroshima Research News(Vol. 2, No. 1, Page 3) titled "Hiroshima's

peace role reaffirmed as new centuryapproaches," incorrectly named the World

Conference of Mayors for Peace through Inter-citySolidarity. We apologize for the error.

HPI improves, updates Web site

New researcher joins instituteＴＯ ＰＩ ＣＳ

D I A R YJuly 1 ～ August 31, 1999

「HIROSHIMA RESEARCH NEWS」 Vol.2, No.2 September 30, 1999

●Issued by Hiroshima Peace Institute, Hiroshima City University 　　　　　　　　　　　　 Hiroshima Mitsui Bldg. 12 Floor　2-7-10 Otemachi, Naka-ku, Hiroshima 730-0051 JAPAN

TEL　+81-82-544-7570　FAX　+81-82-544-7573　http://serv.peace.hiroshima-cu.ac.jp/　E-mail：office-peace@peace.hiroshima-cu.ac.jp

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Copyright　1999　HPI All rights reserved

th

Correction

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