Fortnight Publications Ltd.

Historic CompromisesAuthor(s): Brian WalkerSource: Fortnight, No. 293 (Mar., 1991), pp. 14-15Published by: Fortnight Publications Ltd.Stable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/25552772 .

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The first Stormont MPs?unionists then were prepared for north-south dialogue

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Historic compromises I1 IRISH HISTORY over the last 70 years

makes fascinating reading. It also con

,_I tains important lessons for political

parties in Northern Ireland and the two govern

ments?especially if one compares northern

and southern politics in the 1920s and 30s.

For northern nationalists, the early decades

of this period were not happy ones. From their

point of view, they were brought into a state not

of their making, they faced a repressive regime and they had no say in the setting up ofthe new

institutions and structures which were to rule

them. In the years that followed the founding of

the state they were marginalised and thereafter

played an insignificant part in political life. Meanwhile, in the south, the republican

minority in Sinn Fein was forced into the

straitjacket of a Free State it did not want, suffered repression in the civil war much worse

than that experienced by northern nationalists, and was left outside the D?il in the formative years ofthe new state. Following a brief further

absence from the parliamentary scene after the

civil war, however, the majority of this group formed Fianna F?il, entered the D?il in 1927 and participated fully. From 1932 it was to dominate Irish politics for nearly 60 years.

Both northern nationalists and southern

republicans faced undesirable political con

texts. But the southern republicans came to

play a strong political role: they entered fully into the system, developed their organisation,

broadened and improved their policies and

increased their electoral support.

By contrast, after northern nationalists fi

nally entered parliament they refused to be

come the official opposition until the mid-60s.

Their organisation remained poor and they

developed few practical or attractive policies.

Undoubtedly they would have found it much more difficult than Fianna Fall to win a politi cal majority, but they could have greatly im

proved their position by appealing to Protes

tants or preventing splits with northern repub licans: they conspicuously failed on both counts.

One wonders if the SDLP is not in danger of

repeating these mistakes. It is still reluctant to

get closely involved in a northern assembly or

governmental institutions and it has failed in

recent years to make significant improvements to its electoral position, in terms of organisa tion or appeal. By rejecting the creative role

played by Fianna Fall in those early years?

ironically, a rejection apparently backed by Fianna Fall today?it is in danger of failing to

play a responsible and effective political role.

In the 1920s, meanwhile, from their per

spective northern unionists faced a recalcitrant

minority unwilling to play a constructive role

in the establishment ofthe new state. Unionists

were confronted first by terrorist attack and

then by political opponents unwilling to par

ticipate effectively in political life. Yet the Free State government faced much this situation and

reacted very differently. The republican wing of Sinn Fein did not go

along with the acceptance of the Anglo-Irish

treaty by the Dail, and the bloody civil war ensued. And after it ended, the republicans

initially would not return to the Dail. But even

tually the majority, reconstituted as Fianna

Fall, agreed to enter the Dail?though they then refused to do so because of the oath of

allegiance. The Free State government, how

ever, using new emergency legislation, obliged them to join the D?il and participate in parlia

mentary affairs. The participation of the 'slightly constitutional' party, encouraged and accepted

by Cumann na Gaedheal (later Fine Gael), ensured the legitimacy and effectiveness of the

new state.

Unlike the Free State government, which

appreciated the need for broad involvement in

politics, the unionist government saw no need

for an important role for nationalists in North

em Ireland. Other democratic governments have

developed structures to allow minority involve

ment, but the unionists were content to believe

in majority rule. This undermined the legiti

macy of the institutions of the state and helped to perpetuate community polarisation.

Are the unionists making the same mistakes

today? Many are still reluctant to participate

fully with nationalists in councils or in a de

volved government. In spite of the obvious

failure of past structures in Northern Ireland to

work effectively or be fully democratic, union

ists still fail to contribute constructively to the

debate as to how all major groups should be

involved in the political community.

Again, there are valuable lessons for union

ists from north-south relations in the early

period. James Craig, Edward Carson and other

leading unionists were keen to support a dia

logue between north and south in the early 1920s. They appreciated the need to deal with their neighbours and had the confidence to

attempt such contact in the proposed but unsuc

cessful Council of Ireland. It was in fact the

south which rejected attempts at co-operation. On a wide range of matters there is clearly

14 MARCH FORTNIGHT

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still a great need for contact between north and

south. Yet, compared to the self-confidence

and dynamism ofthe early unionist leadership, unionists today are strangely lacking in confi

dence and unwilling or unable to get involved

in real dialogue. For the republic's government today there

are also important lessons. The attitude of

southern politicians and governments towards

Northern Ireland was aggressive and uncon

structive in the 20s and 30s. It ranged from

running guns to northern republican groups? in spite of promises from Michael Collins to the

contrary?to economic warfare and then, in the

1930s, to strong verbal attacks, culminating in

the 1937 constitution with its claim to the north.

Interestingly, an alternative policy in north

south relations was offered by unionists in the

early period. The 1920 Government of Ireland

Act advanced the idea of a Council of Ireland to

discuss matters of common interest. Even

though the act contained the aspiration that the

council would lead to a parliament for all

Ireland, unionists were willing to get involved.

In 1921 the Northern Ireland parliament nomi

nated members to the council and Craig ex

pressed support for it as a means to improve trust. Again in early 1924 unionists were will

ing to respond positively to the idea.

Both times, however, southern nationalists

opposed the council and its promise of dia

logue?they hoped to achieve more by other

means. In 1921 they rejected the Government

of Ireland Act because it accepted partition and

only offered a home rule parliament, and so

they rejected the opportunity to make the

Council of Ireland work. In the end, of course,

under the treaty of that year, they had to accept

partition with only some additional powers.

Again in 1924, they opposed the council

because they refused to accept the status of its

northern members, and they wanted a bound

ary commission which they hoped would so

reduce Northern Ireland as to make it non

viable. But the boundary commission did not

report to southern advantage, and it was

scrapped along with the Council of Ireland.

The aggressive approach taken by southern

politicians in this period?later adopted in full

measure by the unionists?brought no benefits

to the south or to north-south relations. Clearly the republic's government of today has moved

away from that stance. Yet Dublin's insistence

on a strong role at the mooted talks on Northern

Ireland reflects an inability to see the value of

establishing trust or to be prepared to enter

genuine dialogue. Its tough position of 'stand

ing up to the unionists' seriously threatens to

undermine political relations in the north and

between north and south.

Finally, the politics of the early period should

bring insights, too, for the British government. In the early 1920s, London was keen to get rid

of the Irish question. It was prepared to support the unionists to a point, but was unwilling to

give them full security or complete confidence

in British support. Left very much to their own devices, the

unionists adopted tough security policies, such

as the forming of the 'B' specials, and such

special measures as abolition of nationalist

controlled councils, to protect their position

against determined republican opposition. If the British government failed the union

ists, it also let down northern nationalists. As

the sovereign authority, it failed to offer them

full protection from hostile local security poli cies and acts of discrimination. This only served

to heighten nationalist alienation.

For the government today, the difficult

balancing job is to help make both unionists

and nationalists feel secure and self-confident.

This will not come simply or quickly, but the

government must persist in its attempts to cre

ate dialogue. To give up would only return us to

division and needless strife.

For unionists and nationalists then, as for

the two governments, there are valuable les

sons to be learned from modern historical

developments in both parts of Ireland.There

were many obstacles to the establishment and

development of democratic structures in North

ern Ireland and in the Free State, particularly in

the 20s and 30s. The strengths and weaknesses

of these democratic experiments have impor tant lessons for us today. e

Do you believe any of the following statements?

1. Partition badly harmed Derry and Newry, because it cut them off from their eco

nomic and social hinterlands. 2. Protestants have a strong tradition of

temperance, hard work and 'good living'. 3 Sinn Fein has always stood unequivo

cally for a republic. 4. Hostility between Protestants and

Catholics has been an incorrigible feature

of life in the north since the plantation.

If you do, you need to read Brian Walker on the myths of Irish history in Fortnight. 294.

FROM THE AWARD-WINNING TEAM OF _

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THE FIELD,, IT OWNS HIM. IT POSSESSES HIM. IT COULD EVEN DESTROY HIM.

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FRANCES TOMELTY and TOM BERRIGAN as The American Production Designer FRANK CONWAY

Photography JACK CONROY Costume Designer JOAN BERGIN Editor J. PATRICK DUFFNER Music ELMER BERNSTEIN

Based on the play "The Field" by JOHN B KEANE Executive Producer STEVE MORRISON

Screenplay JIM SHERIDAN Producer NOEL PEARSON Director JIM SHERIDAN

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