HISTORY OF NUCLEAR ENERGYIN

FRANCE

Christian NADALPresidentEDF INA

cnadal@edfina.com

• 19 plants - 58 Units

• Installed capacity:

Total = 110 GW

Nuclear = 63 GW (57%)

• Net Electric generation:

Total = 549 TWh

Nuclear = 429 TWh (78%)

Nuclear Energy in France Today

Sources: EIA, 2004 - IAEA,2006 - EDF

Source: International Energy Agency, 2004

• Around 40% of total primary energy supply in 2006 (117 Mtep)

• Low Carbon Intensity: 0.26 Metric ton/Thousand $2000 (US = 0.55) and less than 80 Metric tons of CO2 per GWh of electricity in 2004

Nuclear share in generation mix

Renewable share in generation mix

CO2 intensity of power generation (t CO2/GWh)

(t CO2/GWh)

Nuclear Energy in France Today

THE PIONEERS

THE INDUSTRIAL PHASE

LOOKING TO THE FUTURE

1945 1973 199019851960 1974

THE TRANSITION PHASE

ENERGY

• France has no Natural Resources

• Independence is key issue for French Politicians since WW I– e.g. Oil Sector Reorganization Act – 1928

• Stability of Supply

– Nuclear is no exception

Nuclear Energy

Uranium fission resultsin

multiple neutron emission(F. Joliot & al 1939)

Chain Reaction possible

Pre WW II

Nuclear Energy• Pre WW II (Cont’d)

– Patents describe main Features of a Nuclear Reactor

– Young scientists hired for designing/building a nuclear reactor (F. Perrin – 1940)

– Secure Heavy Water supply

THE PIONEERS

BUILDING THE INFRASTRUCTURE

1945 - 1973

THE PIONEERS

KEY DECISIONS

• End of WW II sees French economy left in shambles

• Priority is rebuilding French Infrastructure– Crediting French Historical Tradition

• Strong Government involvement• Centralized decisions

• Create two Government-owned entities– CEA (Commissariat a l’Energie Atomique 10/18

1945)– EDF (Electricite de France 03/29 1946)

CEA and EDF

CEA EDF

R&D Science Industry Defense

Radiation Protection Standards

Raw Material Supply Prospection Mining

Design, Build industrial Scale Nuclear Units

Advise French Government for International Agreements

MonopoliesGeneration

TransmissionDistributionImports & Exports

Design Build Generating Units Operate

POLICY

• Need Long-Term Vision• Dictated by French Situation

– Uranium Enrichment not Practicable• Industrial Capability not adequate• Funding unreasonable

Natural Uranium is the only solution

• Confirmed by International Environment– Mc Mahon Act (08/01 1946)

POLICY

• Consequence is Plutonium– Defense

– Civilian use

• Evaluate consequences of Strategic Orientations– Fuel Reprocessing– Interest for LMFBRs

POLICY

Practical Implemention

Quinquennial Planning

– General Trend constant• Natural Uranium

» Plutonium Separation as an objective» LMFBRs contemplated as early as 1953

– Periodic Reassessment

POLICY

Practical Implementation

Quinquennial Planning

– Marginal modifications tolerated• Scheduling• Technical

– Moderator type (Heavy Water [EL] or Graphite [G])– Output

No Standardization

The Chinon site(mid 60s)

The Gravelines site

(early 80s)

EDF’s APPROACH• Long-term priority is cost-effectiveness

CONTROL PROCESS

LEAD CONTRACTORA.I. (1954)

ENGINEERING CAPABILITY

• General orientations

MASSIVE DEPLOYMENT

(PRICE PERMITTING)1955

PAY OVERHEADS FOR

FIRST UNITS

BASELOAD BASELOAD ENTIRELYENTIRELY

WITH WITH NUCLEAR UNITSNUCLEAR UNITS

INTERNATIONAL CONTEXT

The 50s open new perspectives

– Atoms for Peace

– Geneva Conferences• 1953• 1958

– EURATOM Treaty (03/25 1957)

– Open door for evaluating US technologies

KEY MILESTONES

• G1 (2 MWe – GG) 1956-1968• G2 (40 MWe – GG) 1959-1980• G3 (40 MWe – GG) 1960-1984• Chinon 1 (70e MW - GG) 1963-1973• Chinon 2 (180 MWe - GG)1965-1985• Chinon 3 (360 MWe - GG)1967-1990• SL1 (390 MWe – GG) 1969-1990• SL2 (450 MWe – GG) 1971-1992• Bugey 1 (540 MWe – GG) 1972-1994• Brennilis (70 MWe – HW) 1967-1985

THE TRANSITION PHASE

TIME FOR DIFFICULT DECISIONS

1960 - 1974

THE PIONEERS

THE TRANSITION PHASE

THE NEW CONTEXTThe 60s confirm need for change

• Development of Uranium Enrichment techniques is first step for contemplating LWRs (1967)

• EURATOM treaty gives opportunity for testing US LWRs– CHOOZ (beginning of construction - 1962)– TIHANGE (1967)

• Gas-Graphite technology limited to # 700 MWe

• LMFBR technology (longer term)– RAPSODIE (beginning of construction - 1961)– PHENIX (beginning of construction- 1967)

STRATEGIC APPROACH

• The PEON(1) Committee– Reevaluate available options and propose

graded approach crediting • Security of Supply• Political Independence• Economic Independence (Hard Currency)

– Instability of Fossil Fuel markets

• French Economy Capabilities– Budget– Industry– Cost-effectiveness

(1) Committe advising the French Government for Nuclear

STRATEGIC APPROACH• Most Significant Conclusions

– Keep all options open for further decision

– Access to Plutonium remains an objective• Fast breeders development needed

– Light Water Technology consistent with strategic issues

• BWRs, PWRs potential candidates• Costs will govern decisions

– Develop technologies for Front/Backend of the Fuel Cycle

MILESTONES

– 12/1967 – Authorization for two Gas-Cooled Reactors (GCRs) at Fessenheim (FSH)

– 07/1968 – Appropriateness of GCRs at FSH questioned

– 05/1969 – PEON Committee recommends• Development of FBRs (Beyond PHENIX)• Order for 4 to 5 LWRs before 1975• Decisions on GCRs and Heavy Water Reactors

before 12/1970• Purchase licenses from US vendors

MILESTONES

– 11/1969: French Government decides for Light Water Reactors (LWRs)

• De facto stop for Natural Uranium GCRs• Nuclear Leadership transfered to EDF

– 1970: 2 PWRs at FSH – 1971: 1 PWR at Bugey (BGY)– 1972: EDF decides for 2nd PWR at BGY, instead of

BWR• Cost was decisive

– 08/1975: French Government decides for PWRs• Cost is the most important parameter for decision

THE INDUSTRIAL PHASE

THE PWR CONSTRUCTION

PROGRAM

1973 – 1990

THE PIONEERS

THE INDUSTRIAL PHASE

THE TRANSITION PHASE

TIME FOR DECISIONS• 1973

– Oil share in energy consumption is 69%– OIl prices triple (unacceptably high)

• 1974– Decision to develop a Nuclear Program

• Political Majority is pro-Nuclear• Political Minority Reluctant

– Objective is 30% Nuclear of primary energy supply by 1990

• 1975– 08/06 French Government choose PWRs

36 U + SPX (LMFBR)

6 U

4 U

12 U

0

1000

2000

3000

4000

5000

6000

7000

800019

77

197

8

197

9

198

0

198

1

198

2

198

3

198

4

198

5

198

6

198

7

198

8

199

0

199

1

199

2

199

3

199

6

199

7

199

9

Net

In

stal

led

Cap

aci

ty (

MW

) l

FRENCH PWR PROGRAM

TRENDS AND FLUCTUATIONS

• Before 1981– 42 units decided by the French government– Superphenix– All orders confirmed except 1 (900 MWe)

• After 1981– Program Reevaluation

• Political Reasons (e.g. Plogoff canceled)• Economics: Consumption Growth less than anticipated

– Orders on a Need to Basis• Last 3 1400 MWe units delayed by EDF

FRENCH NUCLEAR PROGRAM

WHY WAS IT A SUCCESS?

• Main reason is Political– Government

• Controlled CEA and EDF– Enforced key Decisions

• Made all decisions• Kept program on track• Provided help for enforcing decisions (at sites)• Industrial Policy (Infrastructure)

– French Society• Favored the Nuclear option

– Though opposition did exist

WHY WAS IT A SUCCESS?• Second reason is

technicalStandardized Program

(series)

• Engineering and Construction cost

• Construction time

• Operating and maintenance cost

• Safety

Creusot Workshop in the 70s

Gravelines Site

Paluel Site

Fleet Standardization

32 3-Loop 900 MWe

20 4-Loop 1300 MWe

4 4-Loop 1450 MWe

Chooz Site

WHY WAS IT A SUCCESS?• Third reason is EDF policy

– Strong involvement in local development

• Relationship with local authorities (information + development)

• Contracts with small businesses

– Public acceptance• ‘Open door’ policy / transparency• Relations with opinion leaders

and scientistsGravelines, France

– Maintaining Infrastructure Capability• Maintenance policy

COMMENTS

• French Government didn’t provide subsidies or tax credits

– Program mostly financed by debt– ‘Advised’ EDF towards loans in $

• Huge financial impact

– Authorized retail prices didn’t reflect real program costs (increases moderate)

LOOKING AT THE FUTURE

THE REP 2000 PROGRAM

1985 – 2007

GEN IV

THE PIONEERS

THE INDUSTRIAL PHASE

LOOKING TO THE FUTURE

THE TRANSITION PHASE

The CHERNOBYL ACCIDENT (1986)

• Huge impact on the european public– Poor Communication by most organizations– Increased NIMBY, BANANA

• Need to factor Severe Accidents into Design• Realization that nuclear issues are

transnational

PROGRAM SHAPING

• Discussions with several Countries

– Agreement with Germany (Political)• Design Approach (EPR)• Regulatory Approach

– Agreements with Belgium, Germany, UK, Spain, Italy (others later)

• International Programs (LWRs)• Common Utility Requirements (EUR)

NUCLEAR WASTES

– Waste issue is key for nuclear– Approach must credit former decisions– Outcomes are

• 12/30/1991 Law (1st Bataille Act)– Defines R&D orientations

– Defines Administrative Measures

• 06/28/2006 Law (2nd Bataille Act)– Confirms R&D orientations

– Sets Deadlines

» Technical Feasibility of Contemplated Solutions

» Site Selection

» Facility Commissioning

GEN IV

– Objectives well in-line with France’s strategy– France decides to join GIF (2000)– French proposals reflect constant strategy

• Fuel cycle closure (Gas-Cooled Fast Reactors)• Waste management (Molten Salt Reactor)

– Former President Chirac decides GEN IV Reactor connected to the grid by 2020

• Only available technology is LMFBR• Renewed interests in LMFBRs

– Agreements underway for• Delineating R&D program• Recreating industrial infrastructure

CONCLUSION

Nuclear Program was a success• Expertise existed• National Commitment

– Long-term Strategy

• Capability to build on experience– Stick to fundamentals– Accept failures in the approach(Gas-Cooled

Reactors)– Endorse alternatives when needed– No stone unturned

» Frontend / Backend of the Fuel Cycle

CONCLUSION• Program was a success (Cont’d)

– Public support• But Chernobyl modified perspective

– Support for operating plants remained strong

– Less support for new constructions

– EDF policy with small business and local communities

• EDF’s Industrial Policy– Applied research on anticipated technologies– Lead contractor / Vendors– Standardization

CONCLUSION

• Program remains a success– Financial performance / largest shareholder

company in Europe

CONCLUSION• Program remains a success (Cont’d)

– Stable electricity prices over long time period