304

CHAPTER XIX.

HALT ON THE MODDER BEFORE MAGERSFONTEIN.*

Reasons The Modder River battle (November 28th, Chap. XV.) had placed

^'[*^

the ist division within twenty miles of Kimberley. Signals were

on made to that town by a Naval searchlight fitted " with a flasher."t

M^Kider. Lord Methuen % halted for a short time on the banks of the

Modder. Horses and men, worn out by the fighting and

marching of the last six days, required rest. Reinforcements

of troops and supplies were on their way to him along the lines

of communication with the coast. Moreover, before he could

attempt to carry out his orders to remove the non-combatant

population of 8,000 Europeans and 25,000 natives from Kim-

berley, it was necessary to restore or replace the railway bridge

which had been wrecked by the Boers. A message from Colonel

Kekewich, who commanded at Kimberley, reached the General

on the 4th December. It was to the effect that the town could

hold out for forty days more. His fears for the immediate safety

of the place thus allayed, Lord Methuen was able to concentrate

his energies on the construction of the temporary (or " devia-

tion ") bridge across the Riet. He also threw up a series of

redoubts on both sides of the river to enable a small garrison to

defend the '^bridge when the column should resume its march on

Kimberley. By dint of great exertions on the part of the Royal

* Map No. 13 and freehand sketch.

t It was not until the 3rd December that the signals were clearly understood,

and an exchange of messages properly established.

{Wounded at the action of the Modder on 28th, he left hospital on 29th,

bu had to return there from 2nd to 6th December.

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ON THE MODDER BEFORE MAGERSFONTEIN. 30J

engineers and the infantry employed with them, the temporary

bridge was completely finished by the loth December.

After the engagement of the 28th November, Lord Methuen Boers select

had reason to beUeve that the Boers would make their next 'hen position

lor stopping

stand at Spytfontein, twelve miles south of Kimberley. This further

was at first their intention, but on the 29th November a Boer'^'^^*"'=^-

council of war was held at Jacobsdal, at which two different

plans of action were discussed. P. Cronje wished to take up

a flank position at Jacobsdal, so as to compel the British troops

to attack him, and thus diverge from their direct line for Kim-

berley. With the Boers so placed, if Lord Methuen had marched

straight upon the town, he would have exposed himself to the

danger of being cut off from his line of supply over the Modder

bridge. De la Rey, on the other hand, desired to make one

more effort to bar the direct road, and his scheme was eventually

adopted. At first the heights of Spytfontein were chosen.

Preparations for their defence were taken in hand on the after-

noon of the 29th, when Cronje and the bulk of his force arrived

from Jacobsdal. But De la Rey realised that if the heights of

Magersfontein, which lay between Spytfontein and the river,

were allowed to fall into the hands of the British, Lord Methuen

could utilise them as artillery positions for a bombardment of the

Spytfontein range. Under cover of this he would be able to

deliver an infantry attack. De la Rey suggested that the

Magersfontein heights should themselves be held as the comer-

stone of the defence. His views prevailed, and the fortification of a

position nearly nine miles in length was at once begun. The fight

at Modder River had demonstrated the advantage of placing

the main firing line so that it should just be able to graze the

surface of the country over which the British had to advance.

He therefore proposed to hold the ground, now to be occupied,

in a similar manner. In the centre, Magersfontein Hill, a grim Its nature,

and rock-bound kopje, rises precipitously from the veld and

dominates the plain, six miles in width, which stretches from its

foot to the Modder River bridge. From this hill the Boer line

extended five miles north-west to Langeberg farm along the

foot of a series of kopjes, in some places sufficiently well

VOL. I. 20

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3o6 THE WAR IN SOUTH AFRICA.

defined to be marked on map No. 13, in others mere hillocks, but

together forming a continuous and formidable line of defence

across the railway. From the south-east of Magersfontein Hill a

low scrub-covered spur, or ridge, three miles in length, runs south-

ward to Moss Drift on the Modder. Though not of sufficient

height to'be fully shown upon the map, it exercised an important

influence upon the course of the battle. From the river the

ground rises gradually towards the heights of Magersfontein.

There are two well-marked knolls upon its surface ; one, equi-

distant between the kopjes and the railway bridge, was chosen

by Lord Methuen to be his Headquarters for the coming battle;

the other, about a mile to the southward of the main hill, was

held by the Horse artillery battery during the engagement.

The greater part of the plain was comparatively free from scrub,

but in the neighbourhood of the low ridge the bush was thick

enough to retard the movement of the troops, and in places it

was so dense as to limit the range of vision to a few yards. Nor

was the scrub the only obstacle for the assailants—two high

wire fences crossed the plain ; one, stretching away towards

the north-east, marked the frontier of the Orange Free State ;

while the other ran across the trenches which guarded the

centre of the Boer position. The reproduction of the freehand

sketch of Magersfontein will show the strength of the ground

taken up by the enemy,

gjjgjj During the twelve days which elapsed between the engage-

pther ment at the Modder and the battle of Magersfontein large rein-

aii forcements reached General Cronje. These additions to his armyquarters. were chicfly due to the energy of President Steyn, who ordered

occupation up every available burgher to oppose the British advance,of the ground,

p^j-^^jgg yf jj^qj^ were Summoned from the commandos watching

the Basuto border ; the Bloemhof and Wolmaranstad com-

mandos, and detachments of Free Staters, were marched south-

ward from the investment of Kimberley ; and the Heilbron,

Kroonstad, and Bethlehem commandos, detached from the Boer

camps in Natal, increased Cronje's fighting power. Nor were

the exertions of the President of the Orange Free State confined

to hurrying fresh troops to the point of immediate danger, for

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ON THE MODDER BEFORE MAGERSFONTEIN. 307

realising that the moral of the Boers had been shaken by the

losses they had already sustained, he went down to the laager

on the 5th December, and by his fiery eloquence infused fresh

life into the somewhat depressed burghers. By the loth

December the right and centre of the enemy were entrenched

along the line of kopjes which runs south-east from Langeberg

farm on the west to Magersfontein Hill on the east ; their left

held the low scrub-covered ridge which extends from Magers-

fontein Hill to Moss Drift on the Modder. Owing to the

fact that many of the Boer field-works at Magersfontein

were constructed after the battle of the nth December, it

is impossible to describe with accuracy the defences which

they had thrown up before that date. On the right and centre

these appear to have consisted of narrow trenches, dug about

150 yards in front of the hills. They were three or four feet in

depth, and owing to the peculiar nature of the soil it was possible

to make them with perpendicular sides—mere narrow slits in

the ground which afforded complete protection from shrapnel

fire. These trenches were not in one continuous line, but were

dug along the waving foot-line of the hills, and so arranged that

they flanked one another. The parapets, slightly raised above

the ground, were well concealed by bushes and stones. On the

Boers' left but little work had been done, and the men who held

this section were largely dependent on natural cover. Cronje's

dispositions were as follows : When the action of the nthDecember began, the right was held by part of the Potchefstroom

commando, who were soon afterwards ordered to reinforce the

left wing. The works in the right centre were manned by another

detachment of the Potchefstroom and part of the Fauresmith

commandos ; while further to the south-east the Ladybrand,

Hoopstad, Kroonstad, Bloemhof, and Boshof commandosdefended Magersfontein Hill. The Scandinavian corps, about

sixty strong, connected the centre with the left wing, which wasposted on the low ridge running southward to the river. Theremainder of the Fauresmith and the Wolmaranstad commandosheld the northern end of this low ridge, the centre of which was

occupied by those of the Potchefstroomers who were transferred

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3o8 THE WAR IN SOUTH AFRICA.

LordMethuen'sreinforce-

mentsanddetachments.

from the right wing. The south end was defended by the menof Lichtenburg, while across the Modder river near Brown's

Drift was posted a detachment of 200 Jacobsdalers with a gun,

under Albrecht. On the right the supervision was entrusted

to A. Cronje, on the left to De la Rey, while the supreme com-

mand was vested in Piet Cronje. As regards the Boer numbersthere is the usual conflict of evidence. A Boer general says

that there were from 5,000 to 6,000 burghers present ; an am-bulance officer reckons them in all at 7,000 ; while two com-mandants estimate them at 4,000. The Boers had five field

guns, distributed along their line ; two pom-poms were posted

on Magersfontein Hill ; while three more pom-poms were

allotted to the defence of the low ridge.

By the loth December all the reinforcements expected byLord Methuen had gradually reached the Modder River camp.These consisted of the 2nd battalion Black Watch and the

2nd battalion Seaforth Highlanders, who, together with the ist

battalion Highland Light Infantry* and the ist battalion Argyll

and Sutherland Highlanders, composed the Highland brigade,

commanded by Major-General Wauchope. The 12th Lancers,

G. battery R.H.A., the 65th (Howitzer) battery R.F.A., and

some details of mounted infantry, also joined the relieving

column. Drafts of sailors and marines raised the strength of

the Naval brigade, now under command of Captain Bearcroft,

R.N., to 375 officers and men, with one 47-in. gun, and four 12-pr.

i2-cwt. Naval guns. The latest arrival, that of the ist batta-

lion Gordon Highlanders, placed under Lord Methuen's commanda total of about 15,000 officers and men. The lines of com-

munication with Orange River were held by the 2nd battalion

Duke of Cornwall's Light Infantry, the 2nd battalion Shrop-

shire Light Infantry, and part of the ist battalion Royal

Munster Fusiliers, strengthened at various points by sections of

P. battery R.H.A. The Royal Canadian regiment of infantry

garrisoned Belmont, and a mixed force of Australians, consisting

of a detachment of Victorian Mounted Rifles, and infantry com-

• This battalion reached the Modder battle-field on the evening of the 28th

November.

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ON THE MODDER BEFORE MAGERSFONTEIN. 309

panics from Victoria and South Australia, Tasmania and Western

Australia, occupied Enslin.

During the halt on the Modder river small affairs had been Minor

of daily occurrence. The patrols had frequently come into"^"sagenien s.

collision with the enemy. On the 7th December, Prinsloo, the

Free State Commandant-General, with about a thousand Boers

and three guns had attacked Enslin station, which at that time

(prior to the arrival of the AustraUans) was held by Captain

H. C. Godley, with two companies of the Northamptonshire.

Prinsloo did not press home the assault, and when the 12th

Lancers and the 62nd battery arrived from the camp on the

Modder, followed by an armoured train carrying the Seaforth

Highlanders, he withdrew to Jacobsdal. Some damage wasdone by the enemy to the railway and telegraph lines, but this

was quickly made good.

When Lord Methuen, on the loth December, issued orders Lord

for an advance, the information which he had been able to information.

obtain from a reconnaissance by Major G. E. Benson, D.A.A.G., °^'^- '°"'-

and from the reports of scouts, patrols, and strong reconnoitring

parties, showed that the enemy's main line of defence ran along

the foot of the hills stretching from Langeberg farm to Magers-

fontein Hill. It was known that the Boers had outposts on

the low ridge, that they held Moss Drift, that they had detach-

ments to the south of the river, and that near Langeberg farm

and Brown's Drift were laagers of considerable extent. TheGeneral estimated the numbers opposed to him at 12,000 to

15,000 men, with six or eight guns.

Various projects for the further movement upon Kimberley pians pro-

had been weighed and found wanting. A purely frontal attack^j^feected

upon .the kopjes between Langeberg and Magersfontein Hill

involved the crossing of a wide extent of open and level ground,

with the danger of a counter-attack by the enemy from the low

ridge held by the left wing of Cronje's army. To the west of

Langeberg farm the country was so waterless as to preclude

any attempt in that direction. A flank march up the Modderriver to Brown's Drift, and thence to Abon's Dam, about 16

miles N.E. of Jacobsdal, seemed feasible, for the British column

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3IO THE WAR IN SOUTH AFRICA.

The plan

finally

chosenfor

Dec. loth

night

attack.

would turn the works of Magersfontein and then fall upon the

eastern flank of Spytfontein, the northern of the two lines of

heights which lay athwart the railway between the Modder and

Kimberley. But before the relieving column could thus swing

clear of Magersfontein and strike off thirteen or fourteen miles

to the eastward through a country cut up by wire fences, the

consequent exposure of Modder River camp, with all its accumu-

lation of stores and its newly-restored railway bridge, had to be

taken into account. Lord Methuen considered its safety, and

that of the line of communication along the railway to the

nearest post at Honey Nest Kloof, essential to his enterprise.

Now the adequate defence of the station and this section of the

railway required a far larger detachment than he could spare

from his divi;ion engaged in making a flank march and an

attack on Spytfontein. The idea of assaulting the left flank of

the Boers was discussed, but abandoned, because it was thought

that the bush-covered ground would diminish the effect of the

artillery and cause an undue loss of life among the infantry.

Therefore, it was finally decided to carry the heights of Magers-

fontein, and after their occupation and entrenchment to make a

turning movement against the left flank of the Spytfontein range.

The tactics of Belmont were to be repeated. After a vigorous

bombardment of the hill of Magersfontein in the late afternoon

of the loth, the Highland brigade was to march at night to its

foot, and at dawn on the nth attack this, the key of Cronje's

position.

Lord Methuen's orders, which are textually quoted at the

end of the chapter, may be thus summarised. A preliminary

bombardment of the main Boer position was fixed for the after-

noon of the loth ; and to facilitate this a column, consisting of

the 9th Lancers, mounted infantry, G. Battery R.H.A., the i8th,

62nd and 75th Field batteries, the 65th (Howitzer) battery,

the Highland brigade, and the 2nd Yorkshire Light Infantry, was

to move forward from the Modder river towards the southern

end of Magersfontein Hill. The main body of infantry was to

halt behind Headquarter Hill, while the 2nd Yorkshire Light

Infantry was to proceed to Voetpads (or Bridle) Drift, and

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ON THE MODDER BEFORE MAGERSFONTEIN. 311

entrench there against attack from all sides. The cavalry and

mounted infantry were to cover the advance on a line from the

railway to the river. After the reconnaissance they were to

retire to the right of the Highland brigade, protect it, and leave

a party to watch the outer flank of the artillery. Major-General

Pole-Carew, with two battalions of the 9th brigade (ist batta-

lion Northumberland Fusiliers and 2nd battalion Northampton),

was to move with the 47-in. Naval gun, which from a position west

of the railway was to co-operate with the artillery engaged in

the bombardment. Major Rimington, with his Guides, was to

guard the left of this column. On the following morning

(the nth December) lire was to be re-opened, care being taken

that the guns were not directed against Magersfontein Hill,

the point at which the Highland brigade was to break into the

enemy's line. The camp on the Modder river was to be garrisoned

by the half-battalion of the North Lancashire regiment, by

details, and by the greater part of the Naval brigade, whose four

i2-pr. guns were mounted in the works on the south side of

the river. The supply column, with five days' rations, under

the escort of half the Gordon Highlanders, was to move off at

4 a.m. on the nth December, and to follow the route taken by

the Highland brigade for two miles. Major-General Colvile,

with the 12th Lancers, the 7th company Royal engineers, the

Guards' brigade, with its Bearer company, the Field Hospitals

of the Guards' and Highland brigades, and the ammunition

column, by 3 a.m. on the nth was to be 500 yards to the left

rear of the ground to be occupied by the brigade division of Field

artillery, i.e., somewhat in rear of Headquarter Hill.

On Saturday afternoon, December 9th, Major-General Wauchope

Wauchope had a conversation with Lord Methuen in the hotel Methuen,

which was used for Headquarters. When he came out he said ^^'^- 9th.

to Colonel Douglas, Lord Methuen's Chief Staff Officer : " I do

not like the idea of this night march." Colonel Douglas urged

him to see Lord Methuen again and frankly tell him so. He,

however, did not go back again to Lord Methuen. The written

orders for the march were received at General Wauchope's

quarters at 7 a.m. on Sunday morning, December loth. Later

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312 THE WAR IN SOUTH AFRICA.

Wauchopeissues

his orders.

Bombardmentof Dec. :oth.

Methuensees

Wauchopeagain.

in the day, Major-General Wauchope assembled the officers

commanding the four battalions of his brigade, and explained

to them the manner in which he proposed to carry out his

mission. The brigade was to form a mass of quarter-columns,

the battalions marching in the following order. The Black Watchwas to lead, with the Seaforth and the Argyll and Sutherland

Highlanders following in succession. The Highland Light

Infantry was to close up the rear. The deployment from massfor attack was to be to the left. The Seaforth would thus be

on the left of the Black Watch, the Argyll and Sutherland on

the left of the Seaforth. The Highland Light Infantry was to

remain in reserve.

Late in the afternoon of the loth December, the preliminary

bombardment took place. The 47-in. gun came into action to

the west of the railway, near the Ganger's Hut, two miles and a

half north of Modder i\iver bridge. The Howitzers went to

a point near Headquarter Hill, the three field batteries took

up a position somewhat more forward and to the east. Asthe artillery was brought into action the infantry waswithdrawn, and the guns shelled Magcrsfontein Hill for twohours. At 6.30 p.m. Lord Methuen ordered the fire to cease.

Soon after the bombardment was over he visited General Wau-chope at his quarters. Shortly afterwards he told Colonel

Douglas that General Wauchope thoroughly understood his orders

and appeared to be quite satisfied with the work he had to do.

Though his guns had provoked no reply from the Boers, Lord

Methuen felt confident that they had not only inflicted loss, but

had produced considerable moral effect on the Boer commandos.This, however, was not the case. The fire had but one important

result, that of warning the enemy that an attack was imminent.

Orders for Attack on Magersfontein Ridge.

1. Enemy in occupation of kopjes to N. and N.E. of camp andalso high ground between Modder and Riet rivers.

2. It is intention of G.O.C. to hold enemy on north, and to

deliver an attack on southern end of Magersfontein ridge (see

map). On the afternoon of loth December the position will be

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ON THE MODDER BEFORE MAGERSFONTEIN. 313

bombarded ; it will be assaulted on the nth. With this end in

view three columns will be formed.

3. No. I Column will assemble on ground N.E. of gth brigade No. i

camp at 3 p.m. on loth December in following formation :

—

° *"""*

gth Lancers.

Mounted Infantry.

G. Battery R.H.A.

Brigade Division R.F.A. and Howitzer Battery.

Highland Brigade (in mass).

Bearer Company, Highland Brigade.

2nd Yorkshire Light Infantry.

Sec. T.B., R.E.

Balloon Sec. R.E.

The C.R.A. will arrange for a portion of the ammunition

column to accompany this force.

4. The advance will be directed on the southern end of

Magersfontein ridge.

5. At 3 p.m. the R.H.A., cavalry and mounted infantry will

advance covering the front from railway to Modder river ; the

mounted infantry forming escort to R.H.A. After the recon-

naissance the cavalry will withdraw to the right flank of Highland

brigade and protect that flank, leaving a party to watch the left

of artillery.

6. At 3.10 p.m. the remainder of the column wUl advance

on the southern end of Magersfontein ridge, keeping well under

shelter of Outpost ridge (concealed from view of enemy) in

following order :

Advance Guard—half-battalion ; followed at 2.30 p.m. by

half-battalion, R.F.A., remainder of force (except 2nd Yorkshire

L.I.) in the order of parade.

7. The R.F.A. will, when within range, open fire on the ridge,

applying to G.O.C. Highland brigade for an escort.

8. The remainder of column will form up concealed to right

rear of artillery in action.

9. The 2nd Yorkshire L.I. will proceed from place of assembly

along the northern bank of Modder river (under guidance of

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314 THE WAR IN SOUTH AFRICA.

Rimington's Guides) to Bridle Drift* four miles up river, where

they will entrench themselves against attack from all sides

—

especially from north-east to south.—Entrenching tools to be

carried. Signal communication to be established (if possible)

with Highland brigade, and with Modder River camp.

10. The Sec. T.B., R.E., will lay a field cable from 9th brigade

camp to Highland brigade as they proceed.

11. G.O.C. will receive reports at head of main body of High-

land brigade.

12. Half rations for nth December will be carried in haver-

sacks ; and half forage for animals on them. These rations and

forage not to be consumed before nth.

13. One blanket per man will be carried (rolled by dismounted

troops). Great coats wUl not be taken, but will be stored in

tents or brigade stores, under charge of details left behind.

14. Tents will not be struck.

15. All horses will be watered immediately before starting.

No. 2 16. On the loth December No. 2 Column, under the commandColumn.

^^ Major-General Pole-Carew, C.B., composed of i battaUon,

9th brigade. Naval brigade (with 4.7-in. gun), and Rimington's

Guides, will assemble at such hour and place as may be fixed by

him, so that the column will be in position at 4 p.m. to co-operate

with No. I Column, making a diversion against Magersfontein

ridge (along the railway).

This force will remain in position on the night of loth, and

will recommence the bombardment on the morning of nth ; but

the fire is on no account to be directed on the southern end of the

ridge which the infantry will be assaulting.

No. 3 17. No. 3 Column, under command of Major-General Sir H.Column,

Colvile, K.C.M.G., C.B., composed as under, will assemble on the

same ground as No. i Column at such hour as the commander

will direct, so as to enable the column to reach 500 yards to the

left rear of the R.F.A. brigade division position (of No. i

Column) by 3 a.m. on the nth December, where the commander

wUl report to an officer of the Divisional Headquarter Staff sent

to meet the column. A Staff Officer of No. 3 Column will accom-

» Jhis was another name for Voetpads Drift j the latter name is used on map No. 13.

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ON THE MODDER BEFORE MAGERSFONTEIN. 315

pany No. i Column to ascertain the position of artillery brigade

division.

The orders regarding great coats, blankets, and tents (para-

graphs 13 and 14) for No. i Column will apply to No. 3 Column.

No. 3 Column will consist of 12th Lancers, No. 7 Field Com-pany R.E., Guards' brigade, Bearer Company Guards'

brigade. Field Hospitals Guards' and Highland brigades

and divisional troops, ammunition column.

18. The Supply Column (with five days' rations), escorted Supply

by half Gordon Highlanders, will assemble at the place of'^° """"'

assembly of Nos. i and 3 Columns at 4 a.m. on the nthDecember, and will follow the route taken by No. i Column for

two miles, and await orders.

19. The Divisional Signalling Officer will arrange for sig- General.

nailing communication being kept up between Nos. i and 2

Columns on the loth December.

20. Outposts protecting Modder River camp will be taken

over by 9th Brigade at 8 a.m. on loth December.

21. No light is to be lit or smoking allowed from 7 p.m. onloth to 4 a.m. on nth.

22. During the absence of the Lieut .-General Commanding,the command at Modder River will, after departure of No. 3Column, devolve on Major-General Pole-Carew, C.B., details

of Nos. I and 3 Columns being attached to 9th brigade.

23. Arrangements will be made by G.O.C. Cavalry brigade

for the care of all horses belonging to Nos. i and 3 Columns left

at Modder River. Horses and men of Divisional Headquarter

Staff left behind wiU be attached to 9th brigade.

24. If any of these orders are not understood, a Staff Officer

should attend at Divisional Headquarters.

By Order,

C. W. Douglas, Col., C.S.O.

Modder River, loth December, 1899.

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