(Received 22 December 2000; accepted 10 August 2001)
ABSTRACT. In this paper I argue that coming into existence can benefit (or harm) aperson. My argument incorporates the comparative claim that existence can be better (orworse) for a person than never existing. Since these claims are highly controversial, Iconsider and reject a number of objections which threaten them. These objections raisevarious semantic, logical, metaphysical and value-theoretical issues. I then suggest thatthere is an important sense in which it can harm (or benefit) a person not to come intoexistence. Again, I consider and reject some objections. Finally, I briefly consider what theconclusions reached in this paper imply for our moral obligations to possible future people.
KEY WORDS: betterness relation, existence, identifiability, metaphysics, value
1. THE VALUE OF EXISTENCE VIEW
Presumably, most of us do not want to die – at least, not yet. Many reasonsfor this could be given, but one, and perhaps the strongest, is that it isbetter for us that we survive. Therefore, we would be very grateful indeedif someone were to save us from mortal danger. However, the fact thatpeople can benefit by receiving a further period of life prompts one towonder whether it is not also possible to benefit by receiving life tout court– that is, from coming into existence.1 As Thomas Nagel writes: “All of us,I believe, are fortunate to have been born.”2
Nagel surely intends this to be a value judgement, a judgement to theeffect that there is something good about coming into existence. Further-more, coming into existence is supposed to be of value for the person whocomes into existence. If this were not so, it would be strange to speak ofthat person’s good fortune.
I am inclined to believe that Nagel is right in holding that we (at least,most of us) were fortunate to have come into existence; and in what followsI shall defend:
1 See D. Parfit, Reasons and Persons (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1984), p. 490.2 See T. Nagel, Moral Questions (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1979), p. 7.
The Value of Existence View: Coming into existence can benefit (or harm) a person.
My defence consists partly in an argument to the effect that it can bebetter (worse) for a person to come into existence than never to exist, partlyin an attempt to deal with various objections. Let me just briefly mentiontwo of these objections now. According to the first, we cannot identify thepossible future people who are supposed to benefit if they come into exist-ence. Therefore, the Value of Existence View makes no sense. Accordingto the second, the claim that existence can be better for a person than non-existence is incoherent, since it implies that non-existence can be worse forthis person. How can anything be worse for a person who does not exist?
Before I begin defending the Value of Existence View, I need to clarifyit in several respects. This view does not claim that existence is intrinsicallyvaluable. It is compatible with the more plausible claim that the benefit ofcoming into existence consists in the well-being enjoyed in life (wheremere existence is not an element in well-being). The thought is that aperson is benefited by coming into existence it, on balance, his life is worthliving, and harmed if, on balance, it is worth not living.
There is an issue of to whom the Value of Existence View applies. Letus call people who exist in the actual history of the world – whether in thepast, the present or the future – actual people. These are the people who arebenefited or harmed by coming into existence (although, of course, somemight fall into neither category, having lives that are neither worth living,nor worth not living).
There is, however, also a sense in which the Value of Existence Viewapplies to merely possible people, that is, people who could have existedbut will in fact not. The view tells us that, while such people will neverexist, it is still the case that had they been caused to do so, they may havebenefited (or been harmed) thereby. In other words, had they been actual,such values could have accrued to them. In that sense, then, the Value ofExistence View applies to merely possible people as well.
Although this is not implied by the Value of Existence View, I shalleven argue that merely possible people can be harmed (or benefited) bynot coming into existence. I shall claim that it can harm (or benefit) aperson never to exist. But since this claim goes beyond what is implied bythe Value of Existence View, and since it requires some explanation, I shallnot address it until Section 6.
Another relevant distinction is that between necessary and contingentpersons. A person is necessary relative to a particular comparison ofoutcomes if she exists in all those outcomes; otherwise, she is contingent.Note that a person may be both actual and contingent. She will be bothactual and contingent if we are comparing an outcome in which she exists
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with one in which she does not and the former is actual. Now, we oftencompare different outcomes because we want to make a choice betweenthem. For instance, if we are deciding whether or not to bring a child intoexistence, this child is a contingent person. The Value of Existence Viewapplies to this contingent child since it informs us that, if she is caused toexist, she may thereby benefit (be harmed).
The Value of Existence View may have implications for a number ofmoral issues, including abortion, in vitro fertilization, benefits to familieswith children and, more generally, population policy. This is becauseit brings our concern for possible people within the scope of “person-affecting” morality – i.e., the position that morality is concerned only withthe benefiting and harming of individuals. However, note that the Valueof Existence View does not by itself imply any particular answer to thequestion of what obligations we have towards possible future people. Ishall briefly return to this issue in Section 9.
Nevertheless, since the Value of Existence View brings our concern forpossible people within the scope of “person-affecting” morality, perhaps itcan provide some support for the latter view.3 This is important because, ifit is correct to suppose that morality should take a person-affecting form,various moral theories will have to be abandoned. One such theory is tele-ological egalitarianism. According to this theory it is in one respect goodto bring about an outcome in which everyone is as badly off as the worstoff, since there is then perfect equality. But how can this be in any respectgood if all we are concerned with is benefits and harms? Levelling downbenefits no one.4,5
3 For instance, assuming the Value of Existence View, we can deal with the so-called“non-identity problem” in person-affecting terms (for discussion of this problem, see Parfit,Reasons and Persons, pp. 31–355). Compare outcome A, in which one group of peopleexist and outcome B, in which an entirely different group of people exist. Assume thatthere are equally many people in A and B, that there is perfect equality in each of A and B,and that the people in A are better off than those in B. Clearly, everything else being equal,it would be worse if B came about than if A came about. Assuming the Value of ExistenceView, we can explain why this is so in person-affecting terms. For the people that will existif A comes about will benefit more from coming into existence than the people that willexist if B comes about.
4 For discussion of this objection to egalitarianism, see D. Parfit, “Equality andPriority,” in A. Mason (ed.), Ideals of Equality (Oxford: Blackwell Publishers, 1998); L.S. Temkin, Inequality (New York: Oxford University Press, 1993), Chapter 9; N. Holtug,“Egalitarianism and the Levelling Down Objection,” Analysis 58(2) (1998); N. Holtug,“Good for Whom?” Theoria (forthcoming).
5 It may be objected that if the Value of Existence View places the concern for possiblepeople within the scope of person-affecting morality, this latter view, in effect, becomes animpersonal view. Consider, for instance, total person-affecting act-utilitarianism, accordingto which an act is right if and only if it brings about an outcome with at least as large a
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2. THE MAIN ARGUMENT
It is now time to present my main argument for the Value of ExistenceView. I shall argue that coming into existence can be better (or worse) fora person than never existing – or, for short, that existence can be better (orworse) for a person than non-existence. Again, I should emphasize that Iam claiming here that having a life in which the good outweighs the badcan be better than never existing. I am not claiming that existence as suchcan be better than never existing. Since I argue that existence can be better(or worse) for a person than non-existence, my argument for the Value ofExistence View is based on a comparative judgement.
Let us consider, then, a particular person who, we shall assume, exists– call him Jeremy. What is needed, in order to defend the Value of Exist-ence View, is an evaluative comparison of his existence and non-existence;or, more precisely, an evaluative ranking of them in terms of their valuefor him. It is essential that they are assessed in terms of their value forJeremy, rather than, for instance, in terms of their aesthetic value or valuefor others. What we are interested in is the effect in terms of benefits andharms on the person whose existence is at stake.
Now, since the sort of value we are interested in when comparing exist-ence and non-existence is well-being, the details of the comparison willdepend on the particular theory of well-being assumed. I shall begin byconsidering the implications of a preference theory, and then, much morebriefly, consider a mental state theory and an objective list theory.
The simplest comparison will appeal to an “object” account of prefer-ences, according to which it is the object of an intrinsic preference thathas intrinsic value. This account should be contrasted with a “satisfaction”account, according to which states of affairs consisting of intrinsic prefer-ences and the objects that satisfy them are the bearers of intrinsic value.6
If, then, Jeremy intrinsically prefers reading Rimbaud, what has intrinsic
total sum of benefits to individuals as any other available act. If the value of coming intoexistence counts as a benefit to an individual, this view will generate judgements exactlysimilar to those generated by total impersonal act-utilitarianism, according to which an actis right if and only if it brings about an outcome with at least as large a total sum of benefitsas any other available act (simply because all benefits will be benefits to individuals).Nevertheless, even if these two views coincide in this manner, our reason for acceptingthe impersonal version may be that it coincides with the person-affecting version. That is,we may believe that what matters is benefits to individuals and that since all benefits arebenefits to individuals, the impersonal version captures our view. In this sense, then, ourview may still have a person-affecting form.
6 On this distinction, see W. Rabinowicz and J. Österberg, “Value Based on Prefer-ences: On Two Interpretations of Preference Utilitarianism,” Economics and Philosophy12 (1996), pp. 1–27.
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value on the object account is the state of affairs that he reads Rimbaud,whereas what has such value on the satisfaction account is that hispreference is satisfied.
The object account allows for an assessment of Jeremy’s existence andhis non-existence of the basis of one global preference. Suppose Jeremyintrinsically prefers existing (with all that his particular life includes interms of achievements, enjoyments, sorrows, disappointments and so on)to never existing?7 We then have a ranking of the two objects, the stateof affairs that Jeremy exists and the state of affairs that he does not. Theformer state is better.
In order to conclude that the former state is better for Jeremy, perhapsJeremy’s preference must satisfy certain requirements. Perhaps it must beself-regarding and rational. Now, Jeremy’s preference for existing, it seemsto me, qualifies as self-regarding and it may very well be rational. Forpresent purposes, the most important feature of a rational preference is thatit would survive full (or ideal) information about its objects. Importantly,this condition does not require Jeremy actually to possess full informa-tion about his life and what non-existence would amount to in order torationally prefer existence.
Note that on the object account, the preference on the basis of whicha world is assessed need not exist in that world. Thus, a world in whichJeremy does not exist may be assessed on the basis of Jeremy’s preferencein a world in which he does. Furthermore, while here, I am comparingJeremy’s existence and non-existence on the basis of his preference in theactual world, this is not essential to the argument. Had Jeremy not existed,I might have based the comparison on a preference of his in some otherpossible world.
Now, the object account does not imply that the value of Jeremy’s exist-ence and non-existence should be assessed on the basis of a single globalpreference. But since it provides the simplest comparison, I shall simplyassume such a global version of this account. Since, then, Jeremy prefersexisting to never existing, he has benefited from coming into existence.Had he preferred never to exist, he would have been harmed instead.
Of course, it cannot be known in advance whether a person will cometo prefer having come into existence. So if we were to claim that a personwill benefit from coming into existence, this would need to be taken asa prediction that once she exists she will prefer doing so. Such a claimis fallible, but that does not make it meaningless or incapable of truth. Inany case, all that the Value of Existence View says is that it can benefit(or harm) a person to come into existence, not that one can make reli-
7 This preference is global in the sense that it has an entire life as one of its objects.
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able predictions in advance about whether existence will benefit or harm aperson in a particular case.
The object account does not provide the only preference-based argu-ment for the Value of Existence View. Suppose we accept a satisfactionaccount of preferences instead. It seems that we should then compare thestate of affairs that Jeremy exists and the state of affairs that he does noton the basis of the preference-satisfactions generated by each of the thesestates. The value of each state for Jeremy will thus be determined on thebasis of the preferences he has in that state and the extent to which theyare satisfied.8 And the argument for the Value of Existence View will thenproceed as a two-step procedure. First, the value of each state must beassessed. And then a comparison must be made.
Moreover, one may want to compare existence and non-existence usinga mental state theory or an objective list theory of well-being. Since I donot want to presuppose the truth of any particular such theory, let me justbriefly suggest how the Value of Existence View can be accommodated bythose who accept the satisfaction account of preferences, or a mental statetheory, or an objective list theory.
Let us suppose that Jeremy’s life contains a net surplus of positivevalues (preference-satisfactions, positive mental states or items on anobjective list). What can we say about the value of his non-existence, then?If Jeremy never exists, no positive or negative values accrue to him, andso his non-existence has no value for him. On the basis of these valueassessments, existence seems to be better. After all, it seems to be betterfor a person to have a surplus of positive value than to have no value accrueto him (such an absence of value may of course be realized in either of twoways; by non-existence or a life with no values). Therefore, once again,Jeremy has benefited from coming into existence.
This concludes my main argument for the Value of Existence View. Inow need to consider a number of objections.
3. THE IDENTIFIABILITY OBJECTION
In my main argument, I compared the existence and non-existence of aperson who exists. The identification of this person therefore posed noproblem. But the Value of Existence View also applies to people who might
8 Again, the assessment may be based on either global or local preferences. If localpreferences are employed, the value of a state for Jeremy will be the sum of preference-satisfactions contained in it. Furthermore, perhaps the relevant preferences must satisfycertain conditions, e.g., perhaps they must be self-regarding and rational.
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exist in the future (i.e., possible future people, whether they be actual ormerely possible). Now, it has been argued that possible future people arenot identifiable, because they cannot be picked out by rigid designators9
(a rigid designator is a referring term that denotes one and the same indi-viduals in all possible worlds in which it has denotation). This argumentforces us to reconsider whether the Value of Existence View makes anysense: when it is said that one can benefit (or harm) a person by bringingher into existence, what is the reference of “a person” supposed to be?10
To bring out the point about identifiability more clearly, consider thefollowing case. James and Sharon are planning to have a child. They referto this child by the term “our future child.” However, “our future child”does not refer uniquely; it may refer to any one of the children they mighthave, depending on which sperm fertilises which egg.11 In other words,“our future child” is not a rigid designator, even when uttered by James orSharon. So who is it that they may benefit (or harm)?
The problem of identifiability can be interpreted in three distinct ways.According to one interpretation, the problem is claimed to be that thereare no rigid designators available to us by which to refer to possible futurepeople. However, at least sometimes, we do in fact have access to suchdesignators. Suppose that a doctor is about to micro-inject a sperm into anegg to perform in vitro fertilization. Arguably, in such a case, the term “theperson who will result if this sperm fertilises this egg, and the fertilisedegg is inserted into a woman, and twinning does not occur, and the fetus iscarried to term, and develops a psychology (of a certain complexity)” is arigid designator. It uniquely picks out a particular person.
Here, I am of course assuming that only one person could come intoexistence in the organism that results if the sperm fertilises the egg, twin-ning does not occur, and so on. This might be denied. It might be held thatdifferent psychological features (traits, memories, etc.) could be instanti-ated in this organism, and that a numerically distinct person would emergeif a sufficiently different psychology was instantiated.
However, it is by no means obvious that distinct persons could emergein this way. Suppose Tony Blair (say) had been adopted at birth, taken toBrazil to work in a coffee plantation and so had grown up in an environ-
9 See M. D. Bayles, “Harm to the Unconceived,” Philosophy and Public Affairs 5(3)(1975–1976), pp. 299–300. For a similar point, see J. McKie, “Thinking about PossiblePeople: A Comment on Tooley and Rachels,” Bioethics 15(2) (2001), pp. 146–156.
10 For a critical discussion of the identifiability objection, see also R. M. Hare, “WhenDoes Potentiality Count? A Comment on Lockwood,” Bioethics 2(3) (1988), pp. 219–221;and I. Persson, “Person-Affecting Principles and Beyond,” in N. Fotion and J. C. Heller(eds.), Contingent Future Persons (Dordrecht: Kluwer Academic Publishers, 1997), p. 48.
11 See Bayles, “Harm to the Unconceived,” pp. 299–300.
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ment very different from that in which he in fact grew up. His memories,beliefs and habits of mind would then have been quite different from whatthey actually are. But surely this is something that could have happenedto Tony Blair. In other words, surely Tony Blair – the very man we watchon television – is numerically identical to the person who is adopted andgrows up in Brazil in our imagined possible world.12 It seems, then, thatwhere there is no question of there being more than one organism, signifi-cant psychological variation can be accommodated by one and the sameperson.13
In any case, even if one of several persons could develop in an organism,this need not make it impossible to provide rigid designators for possiblefuture people. We would then just have to make the reference more specificthan suggested above. For instance, we could refer to a person along thelines of “the person who will result if this sperm fertilises this egg (etc.). . . and the fertilized egg develops such and such a psychology.”
To return to the case of James and Sharon, then, we could in principleprovide rigid designators for all the children they could have nine monthsfrom now by itemising possible combinations of gametes and perhapsspecifying certain further conditions. For any one of these children, wecan claim that it would benefit (or be harmed) by coming into existence,in accordance with the Value of Existence View. Note, also, that we canrefer to these possible future children whether or not they actually comeinto existence. Thus in trying to assess claims about the harm or benefit ofcoming into existence, we are not necessarily dealing in senseless claimslacking referents.
However, the problem of identifiability can be interpreted differently.Perhaps the problem is that of identifying, not possible future people, butactual future people – those who will in fact exist in the future. We canidentify children James and Sharon might have in nine months, it mightbe conceded, but this is inadequate: we cannot identify the child they willhave (if any).
What prevents the identification of actual future children? The problemcan take one of two forms. In an epistemic version, it is claimed to be thatthere are no rigid designators available to us which can be known to referto future people. For instance, we do not know, in the case of James andSharon, which sperm will fertilize which egg, and thus we have no way ofuniquely referring to their future child. In a stronger, ontological version,
12 Or, if we do not believe in transworld identity, surely the person who grows up inBrazil is a counterpart of Tony Blair.
13 See also I. Persson, “Genetic Therapy, Identity and Person-Regarding Reasons,”Bioethics 9(1) (1995), pp. 17–25.
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the problem is claimed to be that the identities of future people are not fixedby present states of affairs, and that therefore there are no rigid designatorsavailable to us by which to refer to them. Notice that neither version rulesout the possibility of our possessing rigid designators that refer to possiblefuture people. The epistemic version merely rules out our knowing whetherthey also refer to actual future people. The ontological version merely rulesout its being presently fixed that they refer to such people.
In fact, an inclination to accept the epistemic version puts one underpressure to accept the ontological version as well. An obvious basis onwhich to deny that we can know whether a person will come into existence,at least, is that that issue is not fixed by present states of affairs. Equally, ifthe future existence or non-existence of this person were fixed by presentstates of affairs then, at least ideally, it seems that we could know about it.
As it turns out, however, these epistemic and ontological versions of theproblem of identifiability fail to undermine the Value of Existence View.Suppose s is a rigid designator that picks out a possible future person. Allthat the Value of Existence View claims is that if this person comes intoexistence, he may thereby benefit or be harmed. The fact (if it is a fact)that we do not know whether he will come into existence, and so whether srefers to an actual future person, does not impugn this claim. Nor does thefact (if it is a fact) that it is not presently fixed whether or not he will comeinto existence (and so whether or not s refers to an actual future person).
Having now established the possibility of identifying possible futurepeople, it is worth pointing out that the Value of Existence View doesnot really depend on this possibility, even when applied to possible futurepersons. For the view can be taken to mean that, if one brings a person intoexistence, then whoever she is she may thereby be benefited (or harmed).So suppose we cannot provide rigid designators for the children Jamesand Sharon may have. We can still claim that if they have a child, then,whoever it is, this child may thereby be benefited (or harmed). While wecannot pick out the candidates for being their child (or rather, so we areassuming), we can employ a description – “their child” – and claim thatif, in the future, anything satisfies it, this individual might be benefited (orharmed) by coming into existence.14
It may be objected that this claim does not make any sense, becauseone cannot benefit (or harm) non-identifiable people. Arguably, benefitsand harms accrue only to particular people. But if James and Sharon havea child, they will have a particular child, and so there will be a particularperson to whom the value (or disvalue) of having come into existence
14 To ensure that only one thing satisfies the description, “their first child” or “their nextchild” can be used.
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accrues. The fact that, at some time, this child may not have been identi-fiable does not change the fact that once it exists, values can accrue to it.In short, then, even if possible future people are not identifiable (a dubiousassumption), it seems that we can make sense of the Value of ExistenceView.
4. ON THE LOGIC OF “BETTERNESS”
I have argued for the Value of Existence View by making the compar-ative claim that existence can be better (or worse) for a person thannon-existence. However, some philosophers suggest that it is incoherentto defend the Value of Existence View in this way. Here are representativeobservations, made by Derek Parfit and John Broome, respectively:
Causing someone to exist is a special case because the alternative would not have beenworse for this person. We may admit that, for this reason, causing someone to exist cannotbe better for this person.15
At least, it cannot ever be true that it is better for a person that she lives than that she shouldnever have lived at all. If it were better for a person that she lives than that she should neverhave lived at all, then if she had never lived at all, that would have been worse for her thanif she had lived. But if she had never lived at all, there would have been no her for it to beworse for, so it could not have been worse for her.16
The argument set out by Parfit and Broome seems to have two premises.According to the first, the judgement that it is better (or worse) to exist thannever to exist entails that it is worse (or better) never to exist than to exist.According to the second, it cannot be worse (or better) never to exist.
Presumably, the first premise is based on a claim about the logic of“betterness” relation; and presumably, the second premise is based on thefollowing metaphysical principle:
The No Properties of the Non-Existent Principle: An individual cannot have any propertiesif it does not exist.
It is because a person who does not exist cannot have any properties thatshe cannot be worse (or better) off.
The claim that Parfit and Broome are committed to the No Propertiesof the Non-Existent Principle can be disputed, but their argument is bestexplained by invoking this principle. After all, what reason could there
15 See Parfit, Reasons and Persons, p. 489.16 See J. Broome, “Goodness is Reducible to Betterness: The Evil of Death is the Value
of Life,” in P. Koslowski and Y. Shionoya (eds.), The Good and the Economical (Berlin:Springer-Verlag, 1993), p. 77.
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be for denying that it is worse (or better) never to exist, if not because,in general, a person cannot have properties if she does not exist? Thisinterpretation is also suggested by Broome’s remark that “if she had neverlived at all, there would have been no her for it to be worse for, so it couldnot have been worse for her” (my emphasis). Broome’s point would seemto be that, if a person does not exist, her absence makes it impossible forproperties to “stick” to her.
Let us call this argument against the view that existence can be better(worse) than non-existence the “Metaphysical Argument.” Besides beingpressed into service by Broome and Parfit, it also seems to be endorsed byDavid Heyd, who claims it make no sense to regret having been born:
For if regret means in this case “being better off not born,” who is the subject of this betterstate? The answer is that there is no such subject, and hence . . . such a judgement cannotmake sense.17
Heyd does not make any explicit claims about the logic of the betternessrelation, but he must be assuming that in order for existence to be worsethan non-existence, non-existence must be better than existence. If he werenot assuming this, the truth of the former claim alone would establish areason for regret. Also, Heyd seems to invoke the No Properties of theNon-Existent Principle when he argues that a person who does not existcannot be in a state of being better off (for present purposes we can assumethat being in such a state is equivalent to having the property of being betteroff).
In this section, I briefly comment on the logic of the betterness relation.In the following section, I shall attempt to show how both premises ofthe Metaphysical Argument are in fact compatible with my defence of theValue of Existence View.
What logical property, or properties, of the betterness relation ensurethat the proposition that existence is better (or worse) than non-existenceimplies that non-existence is worse (or better) than existence? Such anentailment might be based on the way “better than” and “worse than” aredefined. So consider the following definition:
(1) y is worse than x, if and only if x is better than y.18
How will (1) help Broome, Heyd and Parfit? If we substitute non-existence and existence for x and y we get:
17 See D. Heyd, Genethics: Moral Issues in the Creation of People (Berkeley: Universityof California Press, 1992), p. 122. See also pp. 30–31.
18 A similar definition is sometimes proposed for the preference relation, see L. J.Savage, The Foundations of Statistics (New York: Dover Publications, 1992), p. 19.
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(2) Existence is worse than non-existence, if and only if non-existence is better than existence.
This may seem to establish the entailment our authors require. However,what is needed is not a two-place but a three-place predicate, since theclaim at issue is that existence can be better (or worse) for a person thannon-existence. So let us consider the following definition:
(3) y is worse for S than x, if and only if x is better for S than y.
(3) states that if existence is better (or worse) for a person than non-existence, non-existence is worse (or better) for her. And the claim thatnon-existence is worse (or better) for her seems to violate the No Propertiesof the Non-Existent Principle. It seems to ascribe to her the property ofbeing worse (or better) off in a possible world in which she does not exist.So (3), then, seems to be just what Broome, Heyd and Parfit need.
5. METAPHYSICS
Let us now examine more closely the second premise in the MetaphysicalArgument – the No Properties of the Non-Existent Principle. What exactlyis it that this principle rules out regarding the properties of non-existentindividuals? Consider what we may call a positive property such as havingblack hair. This property is instantiated in any object that has black hair.Certainly, the No Properties of the Non-Existent Principle rules out thatindividuals can have positive properties if they do not exist.19
Now, according to the Metaphysical Argument, we cannot claim thatexistence is better (or worse) for a person than non-existence, because thisimplies that non-existence is worse (or better) for her than existence, andthis is ruled out by the No Properties of the Non-Existent Principle. Let usnow re-assess this argument. Consider the following (allegedly dubious)proposition:
P: Non-existence is worse for Jeremy than existence.
The question is whether the truth of P can be established without ascribingpositive properties to Jeremy in a possible world in which he does not exist.
19 It may be suggested that, besides positive properties, individuals can have negativeproperties (for instance, the property of not having black hair). I, myself, do not findthis a plausible suggestion [for various arguments for rejecting negative properties, seeD. M. Armstrong, A Theory of Universals (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1978),pp. 23–29]. But in any case, this does not matter for present purposes. All we need to agreeon here is that non-existing individuals do not have positive properties.
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In my main argument, I described different theories of well-being onthe basis of which the Value of Existence View can be defended. Each ofthese theories involves distinctive ontological commitments. Invoking theobject account of preferences, I argued that existence is better for Jeremybecause he prefers existence to non-existence. And it may now be arguedthat, for the same reason, non-existence is worse for him. Here, the truth ofP is established merely by appeal to a preference Jeremy has in a possibleworld – the actual world – in which he exists. In this world, then, he hasthe positive property of having a particular preference. More importantly,the truth of P is established without ascribing any positive properties toJeremy in a possible world in which he does not exist.
The three other theories of well-being on the basis of which I arguedfor the Value of Existence View involved a two-step procedure. First, itwas pointed out that Jeremy’s life includes a surplus of positive value(preference-satisfactions, positive mental states, or items on an objectivelist), and that his non-existence involves no such values. Both of theseclaims are, of course, compatible with the No Properties of the Non-Existent Principle. It was then pointed out that it seems to be better to havea surplus of positive value than to have no value. Contrariwise, it seemsto be worse to have no value than it is to have a surplus of value. Thisjudgement relies only on the nature of positive value and no value. Thus,assuming any of these other theories of well-being, once again, the truth ofP is established without presupposing any dubious ontology.
It may be objected that I have not yet shown that P is metaphysicallyinnocent. It may be argued that, if P is true, it must be true in virtue ofa particular relation that obtains and serves as a truthmaker for P. Moreprecisely, the (triadic) relation x is worse for S than y must obtain betweenthe state of affairs, Jeremy does not exist, Jeremy, and the state of affairs,Jeremy exists. Now, Jeremy exists and thus the state of affairs, Jeremyexists, obtains. But the state of affairs, Jeremy does not exist, does notobtain. So how can the betterness relation obtain, when one of its relatadoes not?
It seems clear that, in fact, a state need not obtain in order to be an objectin a betterness relation. Consider, for instance, the following relation: thestate of affairs that the allies win the war is better than the state of affairsthat the Nazis win the war.
A more plausible requirement, then, is that in order for a relation toobtain, its relata must exist. And while the state of affairs, Jeremy does notexist, does not obtain, it can be sensibly claimed that it exists as an abstract
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entity.20 Since all three relata thus exist, we can claim that the triadicrelation, Jeremy does not exist is worse for Jeremy than Jeremy exists,obtains.21 Therefore, assuming that this relation is indeed the truthmakerfor P, P is true.
Nevertheless, perhaps Broome, Heyd and Parfit’s point is not that Pcannot be true. Perhaps their point is that it cannot be true if Jeremy doesnot come into existence. Indeed, this (counterfactual) situation seems to bewhat Broome aims at in the passage quoted above: “if it were better fora person that she lives than that she should never have lived at all, then ifshe had never lived at all, that would have been worse for her than if shehad lived” (my emphasis). However, (3) does not claim that if existence isbetter for Jeremy than non-existence, then if Jeremy does not exist, non-existence is worse for him than existence. In order for this to follow, wewould have to accept something like:
(4) If x is better (or worse) for S than y, then x is better (or worse)for S than y even if x obtains.
How does (4) challenge my argument for the Value of Existence View? Ihave argued that existence is better for Jeremy than non-existence. (3) thenimplies that non-existence is worse for Jeremy than existence. And giventhis implication, (4) implies that even if Jeremy had not existed, nonexist-ence would be worse for him. But the No Properties of the Non-ExistentPrinciple rules out that Jeremy can have any positive properties, including
20 Thus, it is common for modal actualists (i.e., proponents of the view that everythingthat exists actually exists) to distinguish between existence and obtaining. A merelypossible entity is one that exists but does not obtain (is not instantiated). See R. C. Stal-naker, “Possible Worlds,” and A. Plantinga, “Actualism and Possible Worlds,” both in M. J.Loux (ed.), The Possible and the Actual (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1979).
21 Wlodek Rabinowicz has suggested this account of the relevant relation (personalcommunication). With respect to ontological modesty, it is located between two alternativeaccounts of the relation. On the more modest account, statements about possible (but non-actual) states have actual states as their truthmakers – i.e., what renders them true, whentrue, is the way things actually are (e.g. D. M. Armstrong, A World of States of Affairs(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1997), chapter 10). The relevant relation canthen be claimed to obtain between the state of affairs, Jeremy exists, Jeremy, and (appro-priate) states of affairs serving as truthmakers for claims about Jeremy’s non-existence.This account is ontologically less extravagant in the sense that it does not claim the exist-ence of non-obtaining states of affairs. More extravagant than both this account and thatoffered in the main text is one according to which the relevant relation obtains betweenJeremy and the state of affairs, Jeremy exists, in one world, and the state of affairs, Jeremydoes not exist, in another world. This account relies on an extreme modal realism [fordiscussion and defence of such a realism, see D. Lewis, On the Plurality of Worlds (Oxford:Basil Blackwell, 1986)].
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relational ones, if he does not exist. So it would seem that my claim thatexistence is better for Jeremy than non-existence leads to a contradiction.
However, nothing forces us to accept (4). In fact, assuming the accountof the truthmaking relation suggested above, we may have reason to reject(4), at least in cases in which x implies the non-existence of S. Consideragain P. Since Jeremy exists, P is true in virtue of the obtaining of thetruthmaking relation. But if, instead, we assume that Jeremy does not exist,P does not preserve this truth value for the simple reason that one of therelata, Jeremy, does not exist.22 Thus, we have a perfectly natural explana-tion of why (4) does not hold in such cases. The metaphysical basis for Pis not preserved.
So much for the Metaphysical Argument. Before I move on, note thatnothing in my defence of the Value of Existence View in this section hingeson the fact that Jeremy exists. Even if Jeremy had never come into exist-ence, it would still be true that, had he been caused to exist, he may havebenefited. Had he been caused to exist the relevant relation would obtain(or so we may assume), and so he would have benefited from coming intoexistence.
6. THE HARM OF NON-EXISTENCE
I now want to go further. It can benefit (or harm) a person to come intoexistence; but there is also a sense in which it can harm (or benefit) a personnot to come into existence. To see this, let us first consider the (dis-)valueof death. Suppose a person dies painlessly but prematurely. Suppose also,for simplicity, that we accept hedonism as our theory of well-being. Onthis assumption, since her death was a painless one, it did not intrinsicallyharm her. Finally, suppose that, had this person not died, she would haveexperienced far more future pleasure than pain. Surely, then, there is asense in which her death harmed her. Indeed, I suggest that it extrinsicallyharmed her, where:
(5) x extrinsically harms S if and only if: (a) S would have beenintrinsically better off, had x not occurred, and (b) x does notintrinsically harm S.23
22 It may be suggested that even a merely possible person can be an object in the truth-making relation, namely in so far as such a person (in an appropriate abstract form) mayexist even if he is not instantiated. However, even if we were to grant this, it would hardlyhelp the proponent of the Metaphysical Argument. This is because P could then be trueeven if Jeremy were a merely possible person, which is in accordance with (4).
23 For a somewhat similar definition of “extrinsically bad,” see F. Feldman, Confronta-tions with the Reaper (New York: Oxford University Press, 1992), p. 138, and for the
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This person’s death extrinsically harmed her since she would have beenintrinsically better off, had she survived (she would have enjoyed futurepleasures), and since it did not cause her any pain. In other words, herdeath harmed her since it deprived her of future benefits.24 In fact, I believethat this notion of extrinsic harm provides us with the best account of thebadness of death.
Nevertheless, it may be suggested that if we accept an alternative theoryof well-being, say, a preference theory, then we do not need a concept ofextrinsic harm to explain the badness of death. But this is not so. All plausi-ble theories of well-being will need to appeal to extrinsic harm (I shallargue this in the case of preference theories in the next section). Therefore,extrinsic harm has prudential and moral significance.
Now, just as death may extrinsically harm a person, a person may beextrinsically harmed by never coming into existence.25 After all, had aperson’s non-existence not occurred, that is, had he been caused to exist,he may have been intrinsically better off, since he may then have enjoyedvarious intrinsic benefits (for instance, pleasures). Also, this person’s non-existence does not intrinsically harm him. Therefore, depending on whathis life would have been like, he may be extrinsically harmed (or benefited)by not being caused to exist.26
Note that what makes it true that a person is extrinsically harmed bynot coming into existence is the truth of a counterfactual claim about whatwould be the case if he existed. And as we have seen, if he existed, it mayboth be true that his existence is better for him and that his non-existenceis worse for him. Therefore, once again, there is no dubious metaphysicsin the wings here.
However, if we claim that a person is harmed by his non-existence,does it then not follow by the principle of existential generalization inclassical logic that he must exist?27 Not necessarily. Thus, “S is harmedby his non-existence” may be interpreted as meaning “S does not existand had he existed, his existence would be intrinsically better for him than
suggestion that something like my (b)-clause needs to be added to Feldman’s definition,see Persson, “Person-affecting Principles and Beyond,” p. 55.
24 See Feldman, Confrontations with the Reaper, p. 139.25 Elsewhere, I have denied that it can harm (or benefit) a person not to come into exist-
ence; see N. Holtug, “In Defense of the Slogan,” in W. Rabinowicz (ed.), Preference andValue. Preferentialism in Ethics, Studies in Philosophy (Lund: Department of Philosophy,Lund Univesity, 1996), pp. 75–84, and N. Holtug, “Utility, Priority and Possible People,”Utilitas 11(1) (1999), pp. 22–25. I now believe that my earlier argument was unsatisfactory.
26 See also R. M. Hare, “Abortion and the Golden Rule,” Philosophy and Public Affairs4 (1975), p. 221, and Persson, “Person-Affecting Principles and Beyond,” p. 47.
27 According to this principle, if Fa, then there exists an x such that Fx.
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his non-existence.” Clearly, the latter claim does not legitimate existentialgeneralization; it does not imply that S exists.
7. ACTUAL, POSSIBLE AND CONTINGENT PEOPLE
Sometimes it is suggested that only actual people, or, alternatively, onlynecessary people, can be benefited or harmed. Since these views areincompatible with my claim that non-existence can harm a person and theValue of Existence View, respectively, I want to show that the argumentsfor their adoption are weak.
Bonnie Steinbock denies what I argued in the last section, namely that itcan harm a person never to come into existence. She claims that “it is onlyactual people who can be harmed, not merely possible people.”28 Thus, sheargues that while death can harm a person, never coming into existencecannot:
Death is not merely non-existence, but the termination of someone’s life. Death ends allof one’s plans, projects, concerns, and desires. Feinberg explains why death is a harmin this way: “To extinguish a person’s life is, at one stroke, to defeat almost all of hisself-regarding interests: to ensure that his ongoing projects and enterprises, his long-rangegoals, and his most earnest hopes for his own achievement and personal enjoyment, mustall be dashed.”29
None of this is true of never-existing people. The failure to bring them into existence doesnot thwart their plans, end their relationships, or destroy their hopes of achievement andhappiness. Admittedly, it forecloses the possibility of there ever being these plans, hopes,and relationships, but that is a tragedy for no one. There is literally no one to feel sorry for,or guilty about, when people who might have existed are not brought into existence.30
In this passage it is possible to find two quite distinct arguments tothe effect that while death can harm a person, never coming into exist-ence cannot. According to the first, people who die may have their plans,projects and goals (for short, preferences) frustrated, whereas people whonever exist do not because they have no preferences. We might put thematter thusly: only actual people have actual preferences, and it is onlyactual preferences that give rise to benefits and harms.
However, this view is quite implausible. Consider the following case.A young Buddhist has succeeded in ridding himself of his preferences forthe future. His past preferences were all rather short term and related toobjects that no longer exist. The Buddhist is now killed. Had he not been
28 See B. Steinbock, Life Before Birth (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1992), p. 71.29 See J. Feinberg, Harm to Others (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1984), pp. 81–82.30 See Steinbock, Life Before Birth, pp. 71–72.
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killed, however, he would have formed many new preferences that wouldall have been satisfied. But since these preferences are not actual, his deathdoes not harm him, according to Steinbock. Surely, this must be wrong.
Rather, the Buddhist is harmed when he is killed because, had he notbeen killed, he would have enjoyed a great deal of preference-satisfaction.In other words, he is extrinsically harmed. In order to explain this extrinsicharm, we need to invoke possible (but non-actual) preferences. But thismove, of course, paves the way for the claim that it can harm a personnever to come into existence. Just like the Buddhist, a person who does notcome into existence has possible (but non-actual) preferences and, indeed,misses out on a great deal of preference-satisfaction. So if missing outin this way harms the Buddhist, albeit extrinsically, how are we to resistthe claim that a person who is not brought into existence is extrinsicallyharmed as well?31
However, there is another actualist view that implies that, while deathcan harm a person, never existing cannot. According to this view it is notactual preferences but the preferences of actual people that give rise tobenefits and harms.32 While, of course, all actual preferences are held byactual individuals, actual individuals may have possible, but non-actualpreferences. Thus, since the Buddhist is an actual person, we are entitledto invoke his possible, but non-actual preferences when explaining whydeath harms him. A person who never exists, on the other hand, is notactual, and thus his possible, but non-actual preferences cannot give rise tobenefits or harms. Perhaps, then, this is the view that Steinbock means toendorse in the passage quoted above.
This view certainly entails that death can harm a person, and that neverexisting cannot, but it does nothing to explain why this is so. We need toknow why it harms the Buddhist to miss out on the satisfaction of possible,but non-actual preferences when that does no harm to a person who neverexists. Since what is supposed to harm the Buddhist does not presupposeactuality, it is unclear why only actual people can suffer such harm.
Now, as I said, Steinbock can be understood to be propounding anotherargument in the passage quoted above and perhaps this argument providesa rationale for her focus on actual people. She points out that, if a person isnot caused to exist, this is a tragedy for no one. There is no actual person
31 There is, nevertheless, the following difference between actual and merely possiblepeople: while both can be extrinsically benefited and harmed, intrinsic benefits and harmsaccrue only to actual people.
32 For an account of the difference between actualism regarding preferences andregarding persons, see K. Bykvist, Changing Preferences. A Study in Preferentialism,dissertation (Uppsala University, 1998), Chapter 5. Bykvist asks which preferences mattermorally (not prudentially).
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for whom never existing is a tragedy. This is, of course, true. If a person isactual it cannot be true of her that she never exists. But apart from makingthis trivially true claim, Steinbock is also assuming what needs to beshown, namely that merely possible people cannot suffer tragedies. To besure, they cannot suffer tragedies in the sense that they suffer or have actualpreferences frustrated. But since it may extrinsically harm a person neverto come into existence, there is a sense in which non-existence may be atragedy for him. It may be a tragedy in the same sense that the Buddhist’sdeath is a tragedy.
Note, finally, that the Steinbock passage does not directly contradict theValue of Existence View. According to this view, coming into existencemay benefit (or harm) a person. And, if a person comes into existence, heis actual, and so are his preferences. To the extent that these preferencesare satisfied, then, he may have benefited.33
33 Steinbock apparently misses this point when accepting “the Asymmetry,” accordingto which ceteris paribus we have moral reason not to bring into existence people who willhave lives that are worth not living but no moral reason to bring into existence people whowill have lives that are worth living [Jan Narveson has famously defended this view; seeJ. Narveson, “Utilitarianism and New Generations,” Mind 76 (1967), pp. 69–71. The term“the Asymmetry” is due to Jeff McMahan, see his “Problems of Population Policy,” Ethics92 (1981), p. 100].
Steinbock’s reason for accepting the Asymmetry is that “we should be concerned withthe happiness or unhappiness of beings who have interests” (Steinbock, Life Before Birth,p. 74). Clearly, she must mean here that we should be concerned with actual beings, but itis not entirely clear whether her focus is on actual people or actual preferences [she quotesMary Anne Warren, who also defends the Asymmetry on the basis of actualism, but inWarren’s discussion it is not entirely clear where the focus is either: M. A. Warren, “DoPotential People Have Moral Rights?,” in R. I. Sikora and B. Barry (eds.), Obligations toFuture Generations (Philadelphia: Temple University Press, 1978), p. 25]. But whetherSteinbock’s focus is on actual people or on actual preferences, she provides no support forthe Asymmetry.
If we bring a miserable child into existence, this child will be actual and so will its prefer-ences. Furthermore, its preferences will be largely frustrated, we may assume, since it is amiserable child. Therefore, causing this child to exist is wrong, according to Steinbock. Onthe other hand, if we fail to bring a happy child into existence, it will not be actual. It willtherefore not have any actual preferences; a fortiori it will not have any frustrated actualpreferences. So according to Steinbock, failing to bring this child into existence is notwrong (Life Before Birth, p. 74). Does this not suffice to establish the relevant asymmetry?
It does not. Just as the miserable child will have her actual preferences (largely) frus-trated, the happy child will have her actual preferences (largely) satisfied, if she is causedto exist. Likewise, just as the happy child will not have any actual preferences frustrated,the miserable child will not have any actual preferences satisfied, if he does not come toexist. The focus on actual preferences or on actual persons does nothing to explain theAsymmetry.
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What, then, about the other modal distinction, that between necessaryand contingent people? Does it appropriately distinguish those we canbenefit and harm from those we cannot? It will be recalled that a personis necessary vis-à-vis a particular comparison of outcomes if she existsin all of them; and that otherwise she is contingent. The suggestion thatcontingent persons cannot be benefited or harmed therefore amounts to theclaim that it cannot benefit or harm a person that an outcome in which sheexists comes about rather than one in which she does not (or vice versa).Clearly this suggestion is incompatible with the Value of Existence View.
Now Heyd has argued that we can benefit and harm what he calls“actual people” but not “potential people.”34 His arguments, however, donot exploit this distinction, but trade instead on the distinction betweennecessary and contingent people. In fact, I have already dealt with one ofthese arguments in discussing the Metaphysical Argument. What ensuresthat existence cannot be better for a person than non-existence, accordingto this argument, is the fact that in one of the outcomes considered she doesnot exist and so cannot have any properties. Similarly, the fact that, in oneof the outcomes, she does not exist makes her a contingent person.
But Heyd has another argument against the Value of Existence View. Ifthis argument were sound, it would have to be conceded that the distinc-tion between necessary and contingent people is critical. Consider thefollowing passage:
First, there is no way to compare the amount of suffering of states of actual people andthe state of non-existence of these people. We should resist the temptation of assigning azero-value to non-existence, thus making it quantatively commensurable with either thepositive or the negative net value of the lives of actual people.35
According to Heyd, then, a miserable life cannot be worse than non-existence, because we cannot assign a value, even zero value, to non-existence. And while he does not explicitly tell us why he believes that wecannot assign zero value to non-existence, perhaps it is because he holdsthe following view on values:
The volitional concept of value holds that value is always for human beings; it has to dowith what they – in the broad sense – want or need. In that respect, volitionism drawsan un-Platonic distinction between truth and goodness: truth is an attribute of the world,which is independent of any knowing subject (although knowing it obviously presupposesthe existence of such subjects); value (the good) is dependent on the existence of humanbeings not just for its being known but for its very existence, since it is constituted by thehuman “will.” Unlike truth, the concept of value always requires an answer to the question“for whom.”36
34 See Heyd, Genetics, pp. 97–103.35 See Heyd, Genetics, p. 113.36 See Heyd, Genetics, p. 84.
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Heyd seems to be describing “preferentialism” in this passage (Heydcalls it “volitionism”). According to preferentialists, all value dependson preferences. It is apparently because he accepts preferentialism thatHeyd says, in the first passage, that one cannot assign zero value to non-existence. In a possible world in which a person, S, does not exist, S
has no preferences. In Heyd’s terms, S does not want or need anything.Thus non-existence has no value for S, not even zero value. And sincenon-existence has no value for S – not even zero value – it cannot beevaluatively compared with existence.
First, note that on the object account of preferences, the value of a stateof affairs in one world may be determined on the basis of preferencesthat exist only in another world. Thus, Jeremy’s preference establishes theevaluative ordering of his existence and his non-existence all by itself. Inputting this argument I did not need to invoke a preference from a possibleworld in which Jeremy does not exist.
Furthermore, when assessing existence and non-existence in connec-tion with the satisfaction theory of preferences, I argued that if Jeremy’slife holds a surplus of positive value, existence would seem to be betterfor him than non-existence and the absence of anything of intrinsic value.Thus, I did not assign a value to non-existence.
Also, there seems to be no decisive objection to assigning zero intrinsicvalue to non-existence.37 I am unsure why Heyd thinks that we have to beable to assign zero value rather than no value to non-existence in order toevaluatively compare it to existence. Perhaps it is because he holds that“no value” cannot figure on a value-scale and so cannot be compared toeither positive or negative value.
Let us say that existence (or non-existence) has zero value for a person,if and only if no positive and negative values befall her or the positive andnegative values cancel each other out. Now suppose that a person existsbut that no positive or negative values befall her. Since no positive ornegative values befall her, her life has zero value. Likewise, no positiveor negative values befall a person who does not exist. For the same reason,then, we may assign zero value to her non-existence. In both cases, zerovalue is assigned in the virtue of the absence of positive properties (havingpreference-satisfactions, or positive mental states, etc.) and so the NoProperties of the Non-Existent Principle is not violated.38 Heyd’s second
37 I say zero intrinsic value, because I have claimed that non-existence can extrinsicallyharm or benefit a person. In the remaining part of this section, all the values I speak of areintrinsic.
38 Broome also objects to the ascription of zero value to non-existence (personalcommunication). He argues that having no value is not the same as having zero value.
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argument, then, does not show that contingent persons cannot be benefitedor harmed, and hence the Value of Existence View has not been refuted.
8. FRUSTRATIONISM
Let me consider a final objection to my argument for the Value of Exist-ence View. When exploiting the satisfaction account of preferences, Isuggested that when we cause a person to exist, we benefit her to theextent her preferences are satisfied. However, this is not a case of simplysatisfying her preferences, rather, it is a case of creating (satisfied) prefer-ences. Does this somehow diminish the value of the satisfactions we bringabout?
The view normally taken on the value of preference-satisfaction is“satisfactionism.” According to this view, positive value attaches to satis-fied preferences (it is more valuable that a preference is satisfied than thatit never exists).39 So if a person’s preferences are (largely) satisfied, wecan claim that she has benefited from coming into existence.
Frustrationists deny these claims. They believe that the only valueinvolved in satisfying a preference is that it is not frustrated. So the satis-faction of a preference produces not positive value but zero value, i.e., thevalue of satisfying a preference equals that of not having it. The frustrationof a preference, on the other hand, has negative value.40
According to frustrationists, then, satisfying one’s existing preferencesis valuable in the limited sense that one thereby avoids intrinsic harm, butthere is no value involved in creating preferences that are then satisfied:the package creating and satisfying a preference creates no positive value.But it is exactly this package that we bring about, when we cause a personto exist. So we cannot benefit a person by causing him to exist; at best, wewill not harm him.
Logic has no temperature, but that does not mean it has zero temperature – and thus is, say,colder than the ocean. However, this does not seem to me to be a good analogy. It makesgood sense to restrict temperatures to objects that have certain properties at a molecularlevel. However, as the case of the person to whom no positive or negative values accrueseems to show, there are cases in which it is the absence of certain (positive) properties thatmakes an ascription of zero value correct.
39 Of course, satisfactionism should not be confused with the satisfaction account ofpreferences.
40 For a defence of frustrationism, see C. Fehige, “A Pareto Principle for PossiblePeople,” in C. Fehige and U. Wessels (eds.), Preferences (Berlin: Walter de Gruyter, 1998).Actually, Fehige calls this view “anti-frustrationism.” For a sympathetic discussion (usingthe term “moral ledger model”), see P. Singer, Practical Ethics (Cambridge: CambridgeUniversity Press, 1993), pp. 128–131.
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Frustrationism is connected with a view about our moral reasons forbringing people into existence that many people find appealing. Everythingelse being equal, if a person will have a life that is worth not living, wehave a moral reason not to bring her into existence, while there is no levelof well-being that she could have that will give us a moral reason to bringher into existence.41
In what way are frustrationism and this attractive-looking viewconnected? According to frustrationism, we harm a person by bringingher into existence if she turns out to have frustrated preferences. For thefrustration of her preferences will have negative value for her, and becausepreference-satisfaction only has zero value, this negative value cannot becompensated for by positive value.
On the other hand, we cannot benefit a person by bringing her intoexistence, precisely because there is no positive value to be had in her life.Even if all her preferences were satisfied, this would have only zero value.So there is no level of well-being that a person can have that would give usa reason to bring her into existence.
The only problem with this promising theoretical development is thatfrustrationism is implausible – indeed deeply counter-intuitive. In practice,it entails that we always harm children by causing them to exist, no matterhow happy they seem, since in the nature of things they will always have atleast some frustrated preferences. Other things being equal, it will thereforebe wrong to have a child whose life is much better than the life of anyonewe know. Surely, this cannot be right, and so in accounting for the value ofpreference-satisfaction we should reject frustrationism. And we may thenclaim that coming into existence can benefit (or harm) a person.
Finally, it should be noted that frustrationism, if it were accepted, wouldnot undermine the part of the Value of Existence View that claims that itcan harm a person to come into existence. In fact, the main problem withfrustrationism is that it implies that people are harmed in this way all toooften.
9. CONCLUSIONS
I have defended the Value of Existence View on the basis of the compar-ative judgement that existence can be better (or worse) for a personthan non-existence. I have also argued that a person can be harmed bynot coming into existence. Furthermore, I have considered a number ofobjections to these claims and argued that all of them are flawed.
41 This, of course, is the Asymmetry referred to above.
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If a person can be benefited by coming into existence, it may seem thatwe have some moral reason to cause people to exist. In fact, some peoplemay find the Value of Existence View objectionable precisely because itseems to imply this. However, the Value of Existence View does not entailany particular answer to the question of what our moral obligations areto people we may cause to exist. Indeed, some philosophers argue thatwhile it may benefit a person to come into existence, we do not wrongher by denying her that benefit, since she is then not there to be wronged.42
Nevertheless, I believe that acceptance of the Value of Existence View maymake it difficult to resist the claim that, everything else being equal, weought to cause (happy) people to exist. The Value of Existence View mayeven put a certain amount of pressure on us to hold that there are situationsin which we are obliged to create new people all things considered. Butwhile these issues of population policy are indeed very important, theyrequire a paper of their own.43
ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS
I would like to thank John Broome, Krister Bykvist, Jan Faye, WlodekRabinowicz and two anonymous referees for some very helpful commentson earlier versions of this article. The article was presented at the Oxford-Copenhagen Summit on Ethics in 1999, and at the International Societyfor Utilitarian Studies conference in North Carolina in 2000, and I wouldalso like to thank the participants who commented on my talk on each ofthese two occasions, especially Krister Bykvist, Ingmar Persson and PeterVallentyne.
Department of PhilosophyUniversity of CopenhagenNjalsgade 802300 Copenhagen SDenmarkE-mail: [email protected]
42 See, e.g., M. Roberts, Child versus Childmaker: Future Persons and Present Duties inEthics and the Law (Lanham: Rowman & Littlefield Publishers, 1998), and P. Vallentyne,“Melinda Roberts, Child versus Childmaker: Future Persons and Present Duties in Ethicsand the Law,” Noûs 34 (2000), pp. 634–647.
43 See, e.g., Holtug, “Utility, Priority and Possible People.”
