Homeland Security and Sport

Brett A. Burdick, MS, MPA, CSCS

Brett’s Career Path

• Sports:– Intercollegiate Soccer Athlete (D-II)– Played Rugby 1971 through 1996– Coaching Rugby since 1980– Coach Development with USA Rugby and IRB

since 1995– National Team Staff Coach – 2001 - 2002

– MS in Sport Leadership, 2003

– Certificate in Sport Security Management, USM (2012)

– Work with two Olympic National Governing Bodies (USA Taekwondo and US Bobsled and Skeleton Federation) in Coach Development Programs

Brett’s Career Path

• Emergency Management:– BA in Geology and Oceanography(1976)– Graduate School as a Doctoral Candidate– Regulatory Background– Consultant– Hydrogeology - Hazardous Waste Site Cleanup– Underground Storage Tank Program– Hazardous Materials Response

– Terrorism Program Manager (1995) – Virginia’s HAZMAT Program Director (2000)– 9/11 Response (2001)– Master of Public Administration (2007)– Deputy State Coordinator (2008 to present)

The Fan Violence SpectrumN

umbe

r of

Fan

s (n

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o sc

ale)

Degree of Violence

“Normal Fans”

“Boorish and Aggressive Fans”

“The Overbeveraged”

“Fighters”

“Hooligans”

“Terrorists”

What We Will Talk About Today

• What is Terrorism?• What are the Potential Impacts on Sport?• Terrorism Warning Indicators• Protecting Venues, Athletes, and

Spectators

Definition of Terrorism

“The unlawful use of force against persons or property to intimidate or coerce a government, the civilian population, or any segment thereof, in the furtherance of political or social objectives.”

- FBI definition codified at 28 CFR 0.85(l)

Terrorism Simplified

Terrorism involves:

• A Criminal Act• A Cause• Coercion

Reasons for Terrorism• Cheap• Mobile• Deniable (if things get out of hand)• Technology is available• More effective than the political process in

the short term• Less drastic than total warfare – “Warfare

of the Weak”• It works!

Are These Terrorism?

1. An armed assault on a government building by a deranged individual.

2. Violence perpetrated by a street gang in a turf battle.

3. Bombing of a petroleum storage tank to create a diversion for a bank robbery.

4. Picketing of a family-planning clinic by a church group.

5. The armed assault of a sports team bus traveling to an event.

Some Terrorism Thoughts:

1. There is a legal difference between “terrorism” and “terrorism-like” activities.

2. From a practical standpoint, the results are similar or even the same.

3. No matter the cause, we need to pick-up the pieces and get back to normal.

4. We need to be vigilant – not obsessed.5. If we go overboard, the bad guys win.

Why Might Terrorists Target Sports?

What are the Risks?

• Between 1972 and 2004 there were 168 sport-related terrorist attacks worldwide

(Toohey, 2008)

• At least 20 (and counting) since the beginning of 2010

• That is an average of about 4 or 5 per year or 1 every couple of months

• What recent acts of Terrorism and Sport do you recall?

Recent Examples – The Threat is Real• 2002 – Bomb explodes outside hotel of New Zealand Cricket Team in Karachi, Pakistan, killing 12• 2003 – Vehicle bomb was defused at site of Belfast Marathon• 2004 – IOC President Rogge visits Athens prior to Olympics; two firebomb incidents; three bombings 100 days

prior to Olympics• 2005 – OU student detonates suicide bomb outside of a stadium filled with 85,00 fans• 2005 – Northern Ireland bomb defused at Belfast Marathon• 2006 – Pakistan bombing of two buses protesting mixed-gender marathon• 2006 – NFL receives radiological “dirty bomb” threat to several stadiums• 2008 – Sri Lanka, bombing attack at start of a Marathon• 2008 – Suicide bomber detonates vest at sports tournament in Peshawar, Pakistan• 2010 – Togolese Soccer Team attacked on way to African Cup Match in Angola• 2010 – Armed attack on Sri Lankan Cricket Team in Pakistan• 2010 – Suicide bomber in pickup truck kills more than 100 at outdoor volleyball game in Pakistan • 2010 – Bombing of Cricket Stadium in Bangalore, India, kills four and injured more than 50• 2011 – INTERDICTION: Israel foils plot to attack sports stadium with rockets by Hamas• 2011 – Package bombs are sent through the Royal Mail to the Manager and high profile supporters of the Celtic

Football Club in Scotland• 2011 – Shooting allegedly targeting police chief at a soccer match in Torreon, Mexico• 2012 – Soccer riots in Egypt kill 79, 2 from gunshot wounds• 2012 – Nails scattered around a New Zealand horse racing track by person with complaints against racing

industry• 2012 – Hooligan shooting violence in Buenos Aires, Argentina, Soccer stadium• 2012 – Somalia, Olympic Committee President and Football Federation head killed by a bomb• 2012 – Shooting in Toronto following televised broadcast of European Championship soccer game• 2012 – Soccer player Christian Odobo kidnapped in Nigeria; rescued next day• 2012 – Several Muslim men arrested on terror charges near Olympic venues in London 30 days before London

Olympics• 2012 – Russia reports foiling terror plot against Sochi Olympics blaming Chechen separatists• 2013 – Boston Marathon bombing kills 4, injures 170 • 2013 – Iraq: Bomb placed in soccer field kills 12, injures 24• 2013 – Soccer referee killed and dismembered after issuing red card• 2014 – Several bombings in Nigeria kill more than 20 at World Cup Soccer viewing venues• 2014 – PREVENTION: “Tea Flasks” are banned at Wimbledon due to fears over bombings

What Is the Impact?

• International Sport security budgets have skyrocketed

• Data are hard to find• Usually from press reports, not audit

results• In many cases the actual numbers are

impossible to verify

1975 1980 1985 1990 1995 2000 2005 2010 2015$0

$500

$1,000

$1,500

$2,000

$2,500

$3,000

Olympic Security Budget

Year

Do

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rs (

mil

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) Range

Sochi

Lake Placid

Los AngelesSeoul

Barcelona

Atlanta

Nagano

Sydney

Salt Lake City

AthensTurin

Beijing

Vancouver

London

Security Budgets• Sydney Olympics (2000):

• $179 million security budget• $34 per attendee• $16,062 per athlete

• Athens Olympics (2004):• $1.5 billion security budget• $282 per attendee• $142,857 per athlete

(Source: Fussey, 2011; Hall, et al., 2012)• London Olympics (2012):

• $1.6 billion security budget (best estimate)• Sochi Olympics

• $3 billion (a guess at best)

How do we Manage the Risk?

• Understand terrorist’s motives• Understand terrorist’s methods• Understand how to protect ourselves,

sport venues, and our athletes• Understanding how to respond

(conducting realistic drills and exercises)• Determining what “success” is

Terrorist Motives and Targets• Political:

Government institutions, Government/National leadership or authority figures, Icons and symbols

• Religious:Financial institutions, Media, Large public venues (sports stadia, concert halls, churches), Women’s health facilities

• Racial:Minority churches, Facilities and symbols of racial groups

• Environmental:Construction projects, mining, Logging and exploration sites, Potential pollution sources

• Special Interest:Women’s health facilities, Animal research facilities, Technology companies, University research facilities

(Source: DHS, 2009)

Likely Terrorist Methods

• Guns and Bullets• Explosives – IEDs and VBIEDs

– 70% of terrorist attacks are explosives or incendiary devices

• Other weapons– Chemical, Biological, Radiological, Nuclear

• What are most likely in sports attacks? Why?• What are the impacts of a “credible threat”?

Terrorism Attack Indicators

1. Surveillance

2. Elicitation

3. Tests of Security

4. Fund Raising (not always included in the list)

5. Acquiring Supplies

6. Suspicious People

7. Rehearsal/Trial Run

8. Deployment

(Source: FBI)

1. Surveillance

• Suspicious monitoring of site – fixed or mobile

• Unusual photography of site• Creation of maps and diagrams• Attempts to obtain blueprints or other

diagrams• Venue personnel awareness

“See something, say something!”

2. Elicitation

• Attempts to obtain restricted information about people, places, or operations

• Attempts to place individuals in sensitive work areas

• Efforts to find out strengths and weaknesses – alarms, processes, etc.

• Venue personnel awareness

3. Tests of Security

• Conducted by driving by target, attempting to breach security, discover response times

• Gain legitimate employment at site• Unexplained break-ins and tampering of

security• Venue personnel awareness

4. Fund Raising(not always included in the list)

• Mostly law enforcement and national security intelligence – wiretaps and electronic surveillance

• Transfer of funds through bank accounts• Unusual withdrawals – amounts, unknown

persons• Unusual expenditures on credit cards

Estimated Costs of Terrorist Attacks

• East African Embassies (1998) - $50,000• USS Cole (2000) - $10,000• 9/11 (2001) - $500,000• Bali Nightclubs (2002) - $50,000• Madrid Train Bombings (2004) - $10,000• London Train Bombings (2005) - $10,000• Mumbai Attacks (2008) - $750,000• Jakarta Hotels (2009) - $100,000• Boston Marathon Bombing (2013) -

<$1,000 (preliminary)

5. Acquiring Supplies

• Purchase of explosives, weapons, ammunition

• Purchase or stealing of explosive precursors or explosives

• Theft of uniforms – law enforcement, aviation, emergency medical, fire

• Theft of identification badges and credentials

6. Suspicious People

• Identification of suspicious persons• Behaviors that “just don’t fit”• Persons in workplace or area that have

strange demeanor, self-imposed seclusion, or anti-social behavior

• Possession of radical literature• Venue personnel awareness

7. Rehearsal/Trial Run

• Practice sessions at or near target areas• Mapping of routes, monitoring of police

frequencies, determining timing of traffic lights, etc.

• People “wandering around” in strange ways

8. Deployment

• Last chance to intervene before an attack• Persons in possession of firearms and other

weapons• Unusual activities• Vehicles where they shouldn’t normally be• People sitting in parked vehicles• People in unusual areas, especially in uniform,

or with bags or knapsacks nearby• Unattended bags, boxes, etc

Suicide Bombers - ALERT

• A – Alone and nervous• L – Loose and bulky clothing not compatible with

weather conditions• E – Exposed wires• R – Rigid midsection caused by explosive belt or

harness• T – Tightened hands (may hold detonation

device)• Suicide attacks account for 3% of all terrorist

attacks but 48% of all fatalities (Kennedy, 2006)

Suspicious Behaviors – Suicide Bomber(Concern is Raised if you Observe Several of

These):• Young, physically-fit males • Dressing in loose or bulky clothing inappropriate for the

weather • Persons seeming to be nervous or under the influence of drugs • Tightly gripping backpack or luggage • ** Unresponsive to salutation or voice commands • Seemingly deliberate and focused on their route of travel • Perspiring (inappropriately for the weather or level of exertion)• Smiling broadly • Avoiding eye contact • Avoiding security personnel • ** Stiff mid-section or visible wires • ** Chemical stains or odors • Disguises

(Source: Kennedy, 2006)

Security Issues

• “Limited budgets versus infinite demands” • Impossible to protect against every scenario – must

manage risks• Limited resources can be stretched – in first 24 hours

after Centennial Park bombing officials receive more than 100 bomb threats– Each needed to be treated seriously– Each needed to be checked

• Venues announced months or years in advance – lots of time to plan an attack

• Impossible to have risk-free environment in sport entertainment

( Source: Zekulin, 2009)

Protecting Venues (and Spectators)

• Exclusionary Facilities• Sports Facilities

– Open versus Closed Venues• Individuals and Teams

Exclusionary Facilities

• Sandia National Laboratory Model– Detect– Delay– Respond

(Source: Garcia, 2008)

High-Value Target

Sports Facilities

• Protective Measures are designed to meet one or more of the following:– Deter– Detect– Defend– Devalue

(Source: Hall, Cooper, Marciani and McGee, 2012)

Implementing Protective Measures• Physical Security:

Establish Zones and Perimeters, Secure Buildings, Locks, Fences, Personnel (Guards, Law Enforcement)

• Technical Security:Alarms, CCTV, Lighting, Cyber security

• Access Control:Checkpoints and Searches, Tickets and Credentials, Lockdown, Background Checks for Staff

• Emergency Management:Plans, Command and Control, Mutual Aid Agreements, Briefing and Debriefing, Risk Assessment

• Training and Exercising:Licensed/Certified Security Providers, Response and Evacuation, Orientation, Staff Awareness and Roles

(Source: Hall, 2010)

How do we Secure this Venue?

“For many years “security” only meant making sure everyone had a ticket!”

Access Gate

Access Gate

Access Gate

Access Gate

Inner Perimeter

Outer Perimeter

Middle Perimeter

VENUE SECURITY SCHEMATIC

Perimeter Approach• Adjacency Layer – Parking areas and drop-off points – not

the responsibility of venue security except for surveillance.

• Initial Screening – Staff and technology to identify anomalies in the crowd, such as oversized bags, objects of concern, or suspicious behavior. Direct individuals to detailed screening lanes or back to parking areas to discharge anomalous objects.

• Detail Screening – Bag checks, magnetometers, pat-down of ticket-holders.

• Entry Layer - Checking for valid credentials to enter (tickets).

• Anomaly Area – With law enforcement support, checking individuals with suspicious contraband or those that need additional and detailed investigation.

(Source: NCS4, University of Southern Mississippi, 2010)

Perimeter Approach“Rings of Steel” (Zekulin, 2009)

Adjacency LayerOuter Perimeter

Initial Screening

Middle Perimeter Detail ScreeningEntry LayerAnomaly Layer

Inner PerimeterParticipant Areas

(National Center for Spectator Sports Safety and Security, University of Southern Mississippi, 2010)

Perimeter Approach

• Outside Outer Perimeter – streets, parking lots, normal security, traffic direction, patrols

• Outer Perimeter– Exclude vehicular traffic, not pedestrian. Why?– At least 100 feet. More is better. Why?– Jersey barriers, concrete decorative planters, close

roads and streets. Why?

• “If you eliminate the big problems, those that are left become more manageable.”

Bomb Standoff Distances

Perimeter Approach

• Middle Perimeter Security:– First access control of persons and possessions. Why?– No one without ticket or credential/pass enters. Why?

• People:– Visual inspection; open jackets; pat down; magnetometer

wands; x-ray. Why?– Post uniformed officers at gate to observe suspicious behavior

and assist screeners. Why?• Possessions and Objects:

– No large objects. Why?– Inspect handbags. Why?– What about binoculars, briefcases, etc.? Why?

Perimeter Approach

• Middle Perimeter - Gate Access Prohibitions (examples):– Publicize policy on inspections and prohibitions; post

signage; print on tickets– No weapons (guns, knives, scissors)– No bottles and cans– No thermoses– No coolers– No grills, No backpacks– No carts or wagons– No umbrellas– Why?

Perimeter Approach

• Middle Perimeter – What problems do gate delays potentially cause?

Perimeter Approach

• Inner Perimeter Security– Isolate playing field, player’s benches, locker rooms,

official’s areas– VIPs and invited guests present (accommodating their

security staff can be problematic)– No one is allowed in without credentials – these are

CAREFULLY checked– All persons must be screened in advance– Areas frequently screened, inspected, and swept for

dangerous items– Why?

Barriers to Vehicles and Personnel

Vehicle Barriers

Personnel BarriersTarget

Perimeter Approach

• Different Approaches for Different Sports:

Perimeter Approach• Video Security:

– 1,600 CCTV cameras used at Athens Olympics (2004) – staffing requirements?

– One report says 13,000 (Coaffee and Johnson, 2007)– Double as logistical and security tools– Unruly crowd behavior– Use to survey entire area – from outside the Outside

Perimeter to fans and athletes – dummy installations– More useful as preventative or forensic tool?

Perimeter Approach• Facial Recognition:

– Better suited to some tasks than others…

How Do We Secure these Venues?

Securing Open Venues(Little Research)

• “Open Venues” do not have all three perimeters• Examples:

– Marathons– Bicycle Races (Tour de France)– Open Water Swimming– Triathlons– Oceanic Sailboat Races (America’s Cup; Volvo Ocean Race)– Cross Country Ski Races– Off-Road Racing (Baja 1,000; Mint 400; Dakar Rally)

• Large and remote venues• Spectators can get close to competitors• Not generally a “mass casualty” problem• Can target individual athletes or countries (e.g.- Israeli or

USA athletes)

Securing Open Venues

• Monitor perimeter (if possible)• Security Staff and surveillance positioning (How

many? Mobile and stationary? Uniformed and plain clothed? Where? Communications?)

• HIT Team Approach:– Often teams of three– Fire (HAZMAT), Police (Bomb Tech), EMS– Respond to reports via Gator/Golf

Cart– Verify problems and call in required resources

Securing Open Venues - Marathons

Securing Open Venues - Marathons

National Spectator Sport Safety and Security Conference – 2013:• Pre-event planning is critical (FBI). • Boston Marathon was within protocols—could not

have done more under current approaches, so need to expand approach.

• Learn from other events (parades).• “Now state and federal folks are in the room.”• Event managers want to bring 100,000 people to

area; law enforcement wants to restrict/control event.

• “Event managers are not good at security.”

Securing Open Venues - Marathons

National Spectator Sport Safety and Security Conference – 2013:• Assign an emergency management/public safety

individual who is not the event manager. • All public agencies must step-up and provide

assistance to events management. • Behavior detection training, not only for law

enforcement.• Turn 100,000 people into 200,000 eyes looking for

problems. • Also need way to communicate this (text, phone,

etc.). • “Politely, discretely, and professionally educate

everyone.”

Individual and Team Security

• Deterrence – “Highly visible equals highly secure.”• Harden the Target – view/sight lines, transportation

routes, use of technology• Concentric Circles:

– Protectee(s) awareness– Inner Ring – Handlers. Their job is to protect individual(s) at all

costs– Outer Ring – survey crowd, reach out and touch threats, identify

problems before they occur, communicate– Surveillance – scan crowd (directly or through technology),

report potential problems– Communication

Recent Tactical Changes Observed in Terrorism: Mumbai (2008), Baghdad (2010),

Kabul (2011), and others

• Small Unit Assault Tactics – Groups of 7 to 12 in teams of 2 to 4 individuals

• Using both firearms and explosives (IEDs and VBIEDs)• Use of motorcycles and motor scooters• Creating diversions with gunfire and explosives while

other forces maneuver to attack• Seizing and barricading buildings, taking and holding

expendable hostages• Holding high points within targets• Carrying food and water, ammunition, and

communications devices• Maneuvering throughout targets to confuse responders

as to their location

Recent Tactical Changes

• Breaching Tactics: How to get through established security perimeters…

1. Explosives VBIEDs Suicide Bombs IEDs

2. Mechanical Vehicle ramming Small arms Wire cutters

3. Nondestructive Ramps Tunnels Ladders Rugs/Mattresses for crossing fences

Protecting Our Athletes

• Realistic drills and exercises– Know who the protective service people are– Educate athletes about their roles and

responsibilities– Remember the “fire drills” in school?– Talk to athletes about what to do in every

situation– Practice under controlled circumstances– Unannounced drills

Protecting Our Athletes

• Always “advance the trip” – check out routes, “war game” the “what-if” scenarios

• Never leave transportation vehicles (aircraft, buses, cars) unattended from the time of booking

• Pay attention to your surroundings

Questions?