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Hong Kong, SARThe first 10 years under China’s rule

(June 2007)

A report written by

The Hong Kong Transition Project

commissioned by

National Democratic Institute for International Affairs

1982-2008 The Hong Kong Transition Project

Background to the principals

The National Democratic Institute for International Affairs (NDI) is a nonprofit organization working to strengthen and expand democracy worldwide. Since 1997, NDI has conducted a series of assessment missions to Hong Kong to consider the development of the HKSAR's "post-reversion" election framework, the status of autonomy, rule of law and civil liberties under Chinese sovereignty, and the prospects for democratization beyond the 10-year transition period set forth in the Basic Law. In 2002, NDI established a field office in Hong Kong.

NDI works with political parties and democratic activists to encourage public discussion and debate on political reform. The Institute shares information with and provides technical assistance to Hong Kong political parties, political groups, and civil society organizations seeking to increase their ability to increase citizen participation in the HKSAR's political life. NDI does not provide funding to any political party or political group in Hong Kong.

Since 2002, NDI has provided technical assistance to Hong Kong's political parties and political groups to address issues such as: membership recruitment; media relations; communicating with constituents; voter contact; and fundraising. Through multi-party and single-party workshops, as well as consultations with party leaders, NDI has worked with all of the HKSAR's major parties to discuss the external political environment and the parties' internal structural weaknesses. Participating parties and political groups have included the Democratic Alliance for the Betterment and Progress of Hong Kong, the Democratic Party, the Liberal Party, The Frontier, the Hong Kong Progressive Alliance, the Citizens Party, and the Article 45 Concern Group.

The Hong Kong Transition Project1 is a long-term study of Hong Kong people’s transition from British subjects to SAR citizens. Citizenship requires that citizens have the power to elect their own leaders and amend or approve their own constitutional documents. The project focuses on the time period beginning in 1982, when negotiations for Hong Kong’s return commenced without Hong Kong people’s participation as British colonial subjects, until 2007-2008 when under the Basic Law elections under new election rules decided by Hong Kong people themselves are scheduled to take place. It is headquartered at Hong Kong Baptist University, with academic members there, the University of Macau, Hong Kong University of Science and Technology, Lingnan University and the University of Waterloo in Canada.

1 All Figures are in percentages unless otherwise stated in the tables and charts below. The Hong Kong Transition Project is funded via competitive grants from the Research Grants Council of the University Grants Committee of the Hong Kong Government (HKBU 2168/04H & HKBU 2441/06H). None of the institutions mentioned are responsible for any of the views expressed herein.

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Analytical framework of the report

The surveys, the first in April, focused on constitutional reforms and executive leadership and the second in May, focused on political parties and local level reforms, are examined in relation to demographic, as well as associational, participatory and key attitudinal variables. Further results from a survey conducted in November 2006 of both functional constituency registered voters and a random sample of permanent residents will be brought in where appropriate, particularly in the case of constitutional reform issues where the views of functional constituency voters—who control a veto on the issue—become critically important. Demographic details and overall results of the other variables tested against questions in the surveys are listed at the end of this report.2 Significant association of these variables with selected questions will be indicated with cross-tabulations and are labeled ASSOCIATION tables.3 Some sets of questions will be further analyzed for correlation and are labeled as CORRELATION tables. Correlation measures the strength of the association between variables, in other words, how consistently responses to one question line up with another. For example, height and weight are strongly correlated, that is, taller people are almost always heavier than shorter people. Heavier cars always get lower fuel efficiency than lighter ones. In the case of the variables in this survey, for example, correlation measures the strength of the relationship between birthplace and political attitudes or satisfaction with life in Hong Kong and satisfaction with government performance. Most correlation tables will be in the APPENDIX with a few key ones in the text. Significant findings will be marked by the label FINDINGS and one can go through this report using search to go straight to these. The Table of Contents lists sections, tables and charts. The main tables, usually the TREND TABLE contain the question asked in the surveys in full form, with shortened forms used in subsequent tables.

Questions have been analyzed with four main sets of variables:

Demographic variables include: birthplace, years residence in Hong Kong for non-Hong Kong born residents, gender, age, marital status, children, education, occupation, work sector, living quarters, religion, and monthly family income.

Associational variables include: experience living abroad, identity, and frequency of trips to the mainland.

Participatory variables are: registration to vote, attendance at meetings of community/interest groups, contacting government and civil society groups for help or to express concern, demonstrating, petition signing and donating to political groups, and membership or support of political parties or advocacy groups

Key attitudinal variables include: patriotism, satisfaction with life in Hong Kong, support or opposition in principle to direct election of the CE and of all members of Legco, worry about free press, employment, air and water pollution, an aging Hong Kong population, rule

2 See Analytical Variables section below for comparative profiles of the two surveys. The variability of

responses falls within the normal range of random error, +/-4 points at the 95% confidence interval, in surveys

of this size, (approximately 800 respondents). See table of respondents per survey at end of report. 3

Chi-square is a measure of association. The lower the Chi-square number, i.e., the nearer zero in the number

after the symbol p under each table, the less likely that the distribution of responses is a result of just random

variation. Chi-square reliably shows an association at .05 or less. However, Chi-square is less useful when only

small groups show wide variation from the results of other groups.

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of law, and social unrest and street protests, positive or negative assessment of effect of political parties in Hong Kong and optimism or pessimism about Hong Kong’s future prospects as part of China.

Many of these variables will be included in TREND TABLES. Trend Tables show changes over time in responses to questions, which have been posed over a number of years by the Hong Kong Transition Project. Significant differences over time between previous surveys and the surveys from April and May 2007 will be indicated.

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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

The first ten years of the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region have seen many forecasts, fears, hopes and expectations made and held prior to 1 July 1997 not fulfilled. Many events have occurred which were outside any forecasts or fears. No one conceived the SAR would see five straight years of deflation, with housing prices dropping as much as 60 percent. No one expected pandemic disease to threaten Hong Kong’s lives and livelihoods not once, but twice, with bird flu and SARS both nearly unleashing global effects via Hong Kong. Few anticipated that internal dynamics would unleash, proportionately, one of the world’s largest protest marches nor that the very first Chief Executive would resign office mid-term and be replaced by the Chinese Communist Party choosing a British-trained, devout Roman Catholic knighted by the British colonists before they departed as his replacement as Chief Executive. The SAR’s “one country, two system” experiment has survived all this and more, and according to the survey data below, come through with flying colors. Optimism and satisfaction with life and government performance have substantially recovered from very severe knocks.

Hong Kongers have regained much of their optimism about Hong Kong’s future as a part of China. Those Hong Kongers born in China have reaffirmed identity and pride in the nation though their local born compatriots show little sign yet of joining them in renewed nationalism. But satisfaction with the Central Government in ruling China and dealing with Hong Kong affairs has rarely and, by some measures, never been higher. Worry about many issues such as freedom of the press and rule of law has diminished, while worry about air and water pollution have soared. The issues of concern have shifted from ones focused on the political structure and economic survival to social and environmental issues that have more to do with the quality of life. More normal political concerns with a focus on the future for respondents and their families have come to the forefront. Hong Kong is no longer by any measure a borrowed place on borrowed time, a waystation to elsewhere, a place to make money as quickly as possible any way possible. It is home.

The political parties which were first set up only in the early 1990s have over the SAR’s first decade become established parts of the community and of governance. The 2007 surveys show that the major parties have gained the confidence of a clear majority of Hong Kongers as representing or protecting their interests, as having a good effect on governance, and as having clarified their images vis-à-vis the government and each other on a variety of issues. The stage is set for the District Council elections of November 2007 and the Legco elections of 2008 presenting issues of substance and candidates of stature taking clear positions which will have legislative and governing consequences. The contested Chief Executive elections of 2007 have clearly contributed to this strengthening of the parties as part of SAR governance. The populace –86 percent—say they watched the debates and 69 percent a month later recalled Donald Tsang, the re-elected Chief Executive, pledging to provide a roadmap and timetable to democracy within the five years of his term. Public opinion has now been accepted as a critical element to good government and party politics as part of public life. The promise of democracy and a better Hong Kong has been given, and looking back over the first ten years at how promises made even earlier have largely been realized, not as free gifts but as earned accomplishments, not by accident but by hard work and determination to see them honored, the people of Hong Kong appear prepared to forge ahead into the next decade, ready for whatever may occur.

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Outline of Contents

SECTION 1 ASSESSING GOVERNANCE

I Trends and comparisons with colonial rule

Optimism for the future & Satisfaction with life

II Relations with the PRC and patriotism

Identity Trends 1993-2007

III Leadership and government performance

A. Satisfaction with the government

B. Satisfaction with the executive

IV Constitutional reform and political development

A. Assessments of the system: Civil Society participation

B. Assessments of the system: Formal and informal participation

C. Assessments of the system: Fairness

D. Assessments of the system: Barriers to reform

SECTON 2 REFORMING GOVERNANCE

V Reforms by level of governance:

A. Executive

B. Legislative

C. Local level: District Councils

VI Problem solving by government and parties

A. Issues of concern: worry and problems

B. Satisfaction with the parties

C. Perceptions of the 4 largest parties

VII Demographics

Appendix

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Table of Contents

Background to the principals 2

Analytical framework of the Report 3-4

Executive Summary 5

Outline of Contents 6

Table of Contents

Section 1 Assessing Governance

I Trends and comparisons with colonial rule 12

TREND Table 1 How do you feel currently about Hong Kong’s future prospects as a part of China?

Chart of Table 1

Satisfaction with life in Hong Kong

Chart 2: Currently satisfied/dissatisfied with life in Hong Kong

TREND Table 2 Are you currently satisfied/dissatisfied with your life in Hong Kong?

ASSOCIATION Table 3 Satisfaction with life in Hong Kong by Optimism about Hong Kong’s

future with China

Chart 3: Satisfaction with performance of Hong Kong Government

ASSOCIATION Table 4 Satisfaction with life in Hong Kong by Satisfaction with performance of

government

Key: Correlation Table 5

CORRELATION Table 5 Correlation of Optimism with Satisfaction with government and

leadership performance

CORRELATION Table 5b Percent of variation of optimism with satisfaction (rounded)

II Relations with the PRC and patriotism 20

TREND Table 6 Are you currently satisfied or dissatisfied with the performance of the Hong Kong

Government (SAR government) in dealing with the PRC Government?

Chart 4: Satisfaction with performance of SAR GOV dealing with PRC GOV

TREND Table 7 Are you currently satisfied or dissatisfied with the performance of the PRC GOV

in dealing with Hong Kong affairs?

Chart 5 Satisfaction with the performance of the PRC GOV in handling Hong Kong affairs

TREND Table 8 Are you currently satisfied or dissatisfied with the performance of the PRC GOV

in ruling China?

Chart 6: Satisfaction with the PRC GOV in ruling China

Table 9 Dec 1997 Birthplace and years in Hong Kong

ASSOCIATION Table 10 Dec 1997 Identity of HK born versus China born by years in Hong Kong

Table 11 April 2007 Birthplace and years in Hong Kong

ASSOCIATION Table 12 April 2007 Identity of HK born versus China born by years in Hong

Kong

Chart 7 December 1997 Identity Hong Kong born versus China born by years

Chart 8 April 2007 Identity Hong Kong born versus China born by years

Identity Trends 1993-2007 29

TREND Table 13 The following is a list of how you might describe yourself. Which is the most

appropriate description of you?

Chart 9: Identity trends 1993-2007

Table 14 Do you support or oppose the schools to teach: (JULY 1998)


TREND Table 16 How does the celebration of 1st October National Day make you feel?

ASSOCIATION Table 17 Patriotic feelings on 1 Oct by Identity 1997

Chart 11 Patriotic Feelings by Identity, 1997

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ASSOCIATION Table 19 Identity by Age group, all birthplaces 1997


ASSOCIATION Table 21 Identity by Age group, Hong Kong born only 1997


ASSOCIATION Table 23 Identity by Age group, China born only 1997


ASSOCIATION Table 25 Patriotic feelings on 1 Oct by Age group 2007

ASSOCIATION Table 26 Birthplace by Age groups 2007


Table 28 Selected age groups by birth

Figure 2. Social identity and place of birth

ASSOCIATION Table 29 Patriot/non-patriot attitudes toward Hong Kong’s future as part of China

ASSOCIATION Table 30a: Your current life in Hong Kong?

ASSOCIATION Table 30b: The general performance of the Hong Kong Government?

ASSOCIATION Table 30d: The general performance of Chief Executive Donald Tsang

ASSOCIATION Table 30e: The performance of the PRC Government in ruling China

ASSOCIATION Table 30f: The performance of the PRC Government in dealing with HKSAR

affairs

ASSOCIATION Table 30g: The general performance of China’s President Hu Jintao

Correlation Table 31: Patriotism with Optimism and Satisfaction

III Leadership and government performance 44

A: Satisfaction with the government

TREND Table 32 Are you currently satisfied with the general performance of the Hong Kong

Government?


TABLE 33 Reclassified Income Groups $HKD per month family income

CORRELATION TABLE 34a Income with Optimism and Satisfaction, $0-19,000 family income per

month

CORRELATION TABLE 34d Income with Optimism and Satisfaction, $80,000+ p.m.

B. Satisfaction with the Chief Executive 45

Table 35 Are you satisfied or dissatisfied with performance of C. E. Donald Tsang?

Table 36 Nov 2006 RANDOM In general, are you satisfied or dissatisfied with the performance of

Donald Tsang in handling relations with:

Table 37 Nov 2006 FC VOTERS In general, are you satisfied or dissatisfied with the performance

of Donald Tsang in handling relations with:

Table 38 Comparative Dissatisfaction with Tsang’s performance, Ranked by FC voter*

Table 39 In your view, what is the most urgent issue that should be addressed by the candidates?OPEN ENDED, THEN CLASSIFIED FROM NOTES Nov 2006Table 40 Do you support or oppose the following policies? (Nov 2006)Chart 14 Policy support levels, FC and Random compared (Nov 2006)Table 41 If a general election of the Chief Executive were to be held tomorrow, and you had the right to vote, would you vote for Donald Tsang Yam-kuen? (per poll) Table 42 If you could vote directly for one of the currently declared or expected candidates,

Donald Tsang and Alan Leong, who would you vote for as CE? Nov 2006

Table 43 Who would you like to see compete for C.E. in the March 2007 election? Nov 2006 surveyTable 44 If you could have voted for a Chief Executive in this election, who would you vote for:Table 45 Did you watch or listen to the debates between Donald Tsang and Alan Leong?Table 46 Have you heard of: Donald Tsang’s promise to deliver before 2012 a roadmap and

timetable to the universal suffrage elections promised in the Basic Law?

IV Constitutional reform and political development 58

A Assessments of the system: Civil Society participation

Trend Table 47 Have you attended any meetings or activities of one of the following groups in the

last six months? 8

Chart 15 Participation in Civil Society organizations

Chart 16 Cumulative participation

B. Assessments of the system: Formal and informal participation 60

Trend Table 48 Did you express concern or seek help from any of the following groups in the past

12 months?

Chart 17: Expressing concern/seeking help in past 12 months

Chart 18: Expressing concern/seeking help: Formal and informal structures

C. Assessments of the system: Fairness 62

TREND Table 49 Do you think the government currently makes policies in general fairly, helping or hurting all parties equally, or unfairly, favoring the interests of some over others? ASSOCIATION Table 50 Fairness of policy-making by voting registration

ASSOCIATION Table 51 Fairness of policy-making by Education

ASSOCIATION Table 52 Fairness of policy-making by Workforce Sector

ASSOCIATION Table 53 Fairness of policy-making by Occupation

ASSOCIATION Table 54 Fairness of policy making by Income groups ASSOCIATION Table 55 Fairness of policy making by Age Groups ASSOCIATION Table 56 Fairness of policy making by Birthplace ASSOCIATION Table 57 Fairness of policy making by Patriotism Would the following make government policies fairer or less fair? Table 58a. direct election of the

CE

Table 58b. increasing number of eligible voters in the FCs

ASSOCIATION TABLE 58b1 Increasing number of eligible voters in the FCs by: Registered to

vote

Table 58c. widening the representativeness of each FC

ASSOCIATION TABLE 58c1 Widening the representativeness of each FC by Registered to vote:

ASSOCIATION TABLE 58c2 Widening the representativeness of each FC by: Income

Table 58d. Replacing 30 current FCs with 30 members elected from a list of candidates from all

Hong Kong

ASSOCIATION TABLE 58d1 Replacing 30 current FCs with 30 members elected from a list of

candidates from all Hong Kong by: Registered to vote

Table 58e. Abolishing all FCs and electing all Legco members directly from geographic

constituencies

ASSOCIATION TABLE 58e1 Abolishing all FCs and electing all Legco members directly from

geographic constituencies by: Workforce Sector

ASSOCIATION TABLE 58e2 Abolishing all FCs and electing all Legco members directly from

geographic constituencies by: Income groups

Table 58f. replacing current 30 FCs with 18 elected by voters from District Council districts and

12 from a list of candidates from all Hong Kong*

D. Assessments of the system: Barriers to reform 72

Table 59 Do you agree or disagree that: “Hong Kong people are politically mature enough to elect the CE by universal suffrage” Table 60 Of the 4 biggest political parties in Legco (Democratic Alliance for the Betterment of Hong Kong, Democratic Party, Liberal Party, Civic Party) which party if any do you feel represents or protects your interest best? Chart 19 Cumulative Chart of Table 60, on Party representation ASSOCIATION Table 61 Agree/Disagree on “Hong Kong people are politically mature enough to elect CE by universal suffrage” by Which party represents/protects your interests best ASSOCIATION Table 62 Agree/disagree on political maturity by Which main parties represent/protect your interests best May 2007 Table 63 Do you agree or disagree that: “Direct elections in Hong Kong will increase government spending on welfare” Table 64 In your view, would increased spending on welfare be a good effect or a bad effect? (Don’t Knows dropped) May 2007 ASSOCIATION Table 65 Effect of increased welfare spending by Party best represents/protects interest May 2007 Chart 20 Effect of increased welfare spending by Which party represents interest best Table 66 Do you agree or disagree that: “Direct elections in Hong Kong ultimately depends on increasing people’s participation in direct elections in China” Nov 2006

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Table 67 Do you agree or disagree that: “Direct elections in Hong Kong will lead to confrontation with the central government” Nov 2006

Section 2 Reforming Governance

V Constitutional Reforms: 78

A. Executive 78

Table 68 In principle, do you support or oppose direct election of the Chief Executive?

Table 69 When would you implement direct election of the Chief Executive?Table 70 Do you support or oppose CE candidates to be members of a party?Chart 21 Do you support or oppose CE candidates to be members of a party?Table 71 Do you support or oppose turning current CE election committee into a nomination committee to choose candidates who will compete in direct elections?Table 72 Do you approve or disapprove having publicized televised debates among candidates?Table 73 For the C.E. elections do you approve or dissaprove of:

B. Legislative Council 82

Table 74 In principle, do you support or oppose directly electing all members of Legco?

Chart 23 In principle support for directly electing all Legco members

Table 75 When would you implement direct elections of all Legco members?

Table 76 Do you support or oppose reforming the 2008 Legco election methods as permitted by the

April 2004 Standing Committee decision and the Basic Law?

Table 77 Do you support or oppose extending corporate voting in the functional constituencies in

2008 Legco election to all company directors and senior management?

C. District Councils 84

Table 78 Would you support or oppose District Councilors getting power to manage public

facilities in your district, such as:

Table 79 Are you satisfied or dissatisfied with the District Councilors’ management of public

facilities in your district:

Chart 24 Satisfaction with District Councilors’ management of public facilities (4 Reformed

Districts

Table 80 Wanchai District

Table 81 Wong Tai Sin District

Table 82 Tuen Mun District

Table 83 Sai Kung District

Chart 25 Satisfaction by Reformed DC, by Venue

Table 84 Has the DCs management of these facilities improved or deteriorated service levels from

before the reforms (4 Reformed DCs)

Table 85 Do you think giving the DCs power to manage these facilities will improve or deteriorate

present service levels?

Table 86 In principle, do you think the powers and responsibilities of District Councilors should

be:

ASSOCIATION Table 87 Increase/decrease powers of DCs by Which party best represents

interests

Table 88 Do you think giving voters power to elect or reject District Councilors in the coming

election, based on their performance, will affect service levels?

ASSOCIATION Table 89 Elect/reject District Councilors in elections by Which party best

represent interests

Table 90 Do you think elected members do their work on the District Councils better, worse or the

same as appointed members?

ASSOCIATION Table 91 Elected DC members better or worse than appointed by Which party

represents interest

Table 92 Would you prefer to have all DC members appointed, all DC members elected, or stay the

same as now?

ASSOCIATION Table 93 Prefer all appointed, elected or stay same by Which party represents

interest

Table 94 Which of four main parties represents interests best by District Council

ASSOCIATION Table 95 Do you plan to vote in the upcoming November 2007 DC elections by

Which party best represents your interests 10

Table 96 Do you know whether your DC member is a member of a political party or not?

Table 97 Does your District Councilor know your district’s needs?

ASSOCIATION Table 98 Does DC member know your district’s needs by Plan to vote

ASSOCIATION Table 99 DC members knows district needs by Which party represents interests

best

ASSOCIATION Table 100 Do you consider yourself a supporter or member of a political party in

Hong Kong by Plan to vote in November 2007 DC elections

ASSOCIATION Table 101 Do you consider yourself a supporter or member of a political party in

Hong Kong by Which party represents interests best

ASSOCIATION Table 102 Did you give a donation to any political group in the past 12 months by

Plan to vote in November 2007

ASSOCIATION Table 103 Political donors by Which party represents interests best

VI Problem solving by government and parties 95

A. Issues of concern: worry and problems 96

Table 104 Are you currently worried or not about these specific aspects affecting you, your family or Hong Kong (May 2007): Chart 26 Worries of Hong Kong respondents by issue TREND Table 105: Are you currently worried or not worried about: Free press ?

TREND Table 106 Are you worried or not worried about your employment situation ?

TREND Table 107 Are you worried/not worried about social unrest in Hong Kong?

TREND Table 108 Are you worried or not worried about air and water pollution?

TREND Table 109 Are you worried or not worried about rule of law

TREND Table 110 Are you worried or not worried about crime

CORRELATION Table 111 Satisfaction with life in HK by Worries

Table 112 Are you worried or not worried about corrupt officials

Table 113 Are you worried or not worried about corrupt business people

Table 114 Are you worried or not worried about corrupt mainland officials

Table 115 Are you worried or not worried about corrupt mainland business people

Trend Table 116 Which problem of Hong Kong are you most concerned about now personally?*

Chart 27 TREND Problems of concern

TREND Table 117 Are you satisfied with government’s performance on this problem?

B. Satisfaction with the parties 106

ASSOCIATION Table 118 Satisfaction with government’s performance on problem of personal

concern by Which party best represents interests

Table 119 Are you satisfied or dissatisfied with Legco’s performance on this problem?

ASSOCIATION Table 120 Satisfaction with Legco’s performance on this problem by Which party

best represents interests

Table 121 Is this a problem your Legislative Councilor might be able to help solve?

Table 122 Is this a problem your District Councilor might be able to help solve?

Table 123 In general, do you think political parties in Hong Kong are having a good effect or bad

effect on this problem?

ASSOCIATION Table 124 Effect on problem by Which party best represents interests

Table 125 Is there any political party or person in Hong Kong who stands up best for this problemof most concern to you?Chart 28 Open-ended, which party or person stands up best on your problem?Table 126 Do you think there is a political party or person in Hong Kong that stands up best for:March 2006Table 127 Do you think there is a political party or person in Hong Kong that stands up best for:May 2007Table 128 How satisfied or dissatisfied are you with the following parties? May 2007

Chart 29 Satisfaction with the parties, May 2007

Table 129 How satisfied or dissatisfied are you with the following parties? Collapsed* May 2007

Chart 30 Ranked in order of dissatisfaction

Table 130 Comparative Dissatisfaction with party performance

Table 131 Comparative performanceASSOCIATION Table 132 Satisfaction with Democratic Party by Legco district

ASSOCIATION Table 133 Satisfaction with DAB by Legco district

ASSOCIATION Table 134 Satisfaction with Liberal Party by Legco district 11

ASSOCIATION Table 136 Distribution of respondents to Which party represents interests best by

Legco district

ASSOCIATION Table 137 Legco district distribution of Which party represents interests best

C. Perceptions of the 4 largest parties 118

Table 138 Mar 2006 What is your image of Big Four parties by: Attitude toward Government Table 139 May 2007 What is your image of Big Four parties by Attitude toward Government Table 140 Mar 2006 What is your image of Big Four parties by: Attitude toward Democracy Table 141 May 2007 What is your image of Big Four parties by: Attitude toward Democracy Table 142 Mar 2006 What is your image of Big Four parties by: Attitude toward Grassroots and Business Table 143 May 2007 What is your image of Big Four parties by: Attitude toward Grassroots and Business Table 144 Mar 2006 What is your image of Big Four parties by: Attitude toward effectiveness solving problems Table 145 May 2007 What is your image of Big Four parties by: Attitude toward effectiveness solving problems Table 146 Mar 2006 What is your image of Big Four parties by: Attitude toward power & problems Table 147 May 2007 What is your image of Big Four parties by: Attitude toward power & problems ASSOCIATION Table 148 What is your image of the DAB toward democracy by Which party

represents your interests best

ASSOCIATION Table 149 What is your image of the Democratic Party toward democracy by

Which party represents your interests best

ASSOCIATION Table 150 What is your image of the Liberal Party toward democracy by Which

party represents your interests best

ASSOCIATION Table 151 What is your image of the Civic Party toward democracy by Which

party represents your interests best

Conclusion 123

Demographics 124

Appendix 143

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I Trends and comparisons with colonial rule

Exactly 10 years ago in June 1997 the Hong Kong Transition Project released a report

assessing the colonial era and forecasting the new. That report, in partnership with the US based LA Times, surveyed public opinion locally and abroad. Ten years on we report on surveys again, this time locally only but in greater depth than ever, and in partnership with the National Democratic Institute for International Affairs, a US-based NGO focused on fostering democratic development and election-related education. While 1997 was primarily a media event, a showcase for the world at the start of the “one country, two systems” experiment, the 10th anniversary in 2007 is a point of assessment for the promises of “Hong Kong people ruling Hong Kong” under “one country, two systems.” The change of cooperation of research from international media then to an international non-governmental organization today indicates research and publication remains free and the development of democracy continues of interest to the international community. This is not trivial, for many expected neither freedom of research, or of the press, or of cooperation with foreign organizations active in political affairs to survive a decade after the handover. Hong Kongers even appear more willing to state their minds today than during the uncertainties of a decade ago. What were promises, hopes and fears before 1997 have become history, though some aspects of Hong Kong’s transition, such as those on constitutional reform toward democracy, still largely dwell in the arena of promises and fears. Democracy was but one of the promises or fears facing the Hong Kong of 1997, but as the handover approached, Hong Kongers became more optimistic that promises would be fulfilled. Optimism began replacing fear about the future with China. On the eve of reunification our surveys showed that for every 1 person pessimistic about the future, 10 expressed optimism. See Table 1.

TREND Table 1 How do you feel currently about Hong Kong’s future prospects as a

part of China?

Optimistic Neither/DK Pessimistic Feb 1997 62 32 6 June 1997 60 33 7 July 1998 47 36 17 Apr 1999 42 40 17 July 1999 40 42 18 Nov 1999 40 43 17 Apr 2000 42 40 17 Aug 2000 30 48 22 Nov 2000 38 42 20 Apr 2001 30 46 24 June 2001 33 42 26 July 2001 27 37 36 Nov 2001 24 36 41 Apr 2002 26 34 37 Aug 2002 17 36 46 Nov 2002 25 39 37 Mar 2003 18 32 50 June 2003 21 40 38 Apr 2004 33 37 30 May 2004 36 42 22 July 2004 40 39 21 Aug 2004 43 41 16 May 2005 52 36 12 Mar 2006 51 38 11 Apr 2007 51 40 9

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Chart 1 of Table 1 4

FINDING: Optimism about Hong Kong’s future as a part of China has recovered significantly since hitting lows of fewer than one in five being optimistic in 2002-2003. The change of Chief Executive in 2005 has clearly contributed to this recovery although recovery began early 2004. Still, barely half of respondents expressed optimism about the future.

“Hong Kong people’s optimism,” the briefing asserted in 1997, “rests in a fundamental belief in themselves, that they can overcome mountainous obstacles against overwhelming odds. This shouldn’t surprise when many started life here as penniless refugees or as the offspring of poor residents of public housing blocks.” People believed China was and would remain committed to growth and opening up. However, as noted then: “Confidence in overcoming economic challenges is far higher, however, than confidence in the political structures which so many have seen fail so often in China, or in those which are untested under Hong Kong’s new Basic Law under Chinese sovereignty. Achieving and maintaining the peoples’ confidence in the good faith, competence, and incorruptibility of the SAR and the central PRC governments is both the immediate and the long term challenge to local and national leaders.” Over the past ten years Hong Kongers began to doubt the competence and incorruptibility of the SAR government and corruption remains a major problem in China. Charges of government-business collusion, common across the border, began to arise in the SAR. Hong Kongers also began to question whether Hong Kong could compete with mainland China, much less lead China’s economy in the new era. As Table 1 shows,

4 All Figures are in percentages unless otherwise stated. The Hong Kong Transition Project is funded via a competitive grant from the Research Grants Council of the University Grants Committee of the Hong Kong Government (HKBU 2033/01H/HKBU 2441/06H). None of the institutions mentioned above is responsible for any of the views expressed herein.

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pessimism about Hong Kong’s prospects as a part of China began to displace optimism in 2001. The crisis escalated until the massive protest of over half a million took place on 1 July 2003. China handled that crisis carefully, permitting the government to withdraw controversial legislation on Article 23 of the Basic Law which was to legislate against treason, sedition, secession, subversion and association with foreign political entities. The SAR government sacked several ministers that summer, negotiated a series of economic liberalizations with the mainland such as the Closer Economic Partnership Arrangements which allowed Hong Kong a head start on World Trade Organization rules coming into force as part of China’s joining agreement of December 2001, and after a second huge march took place in July 2004, Beijing pressured the first Chief Executive, Tung Chee-hwa, to step aside for the British-trained, devoutly Catholic long-time civil servant Donald Tsang to assume the helm. Over 2004 as the economic reforms took effect and especially after Tsang took office in March 2005, optimism about the future began to prevail once again.

Satisfaction with life in Hong Kong

The same pattern of crisis and recovery appears in satisfaction with life in Hong Kong.

Chart 2: Currently satisfied/dissatisfied with life in Hong Kong

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FINDING: Satisfaction with life in Hong Kong has recovered from lows in 2003, though the level of satisfaction remains about 10 percentage points below the average of 86 percent satisfied with life under the final years of British rule.

TREND Table 2 Are you currently satisfied/dissatisfied with your life in Hong Kong? Satisfied Dissatisfied Don’t know

Nov 91 84 15 1 Feb 93 85 13 2

Aug 93 88 10 2

Feb 94 88 10 2

Aug 94 87 10 3

Feb 95 86 9 5

Sept 95 80 18 2

Feb 96 85 13 2

July 96 88 10 2

Feb 97 90 9 1

June 97 86 12 2

Jan 98 81 16 3

Apr 98 71 26 3

June 98 68 30 2

July 98 74 25 1

Oct 98 70 27 3

Apr 99 72 24 3

July 99 73 26 1

Nov 99 72 26 2

Apr 2000 65 33 2

Aug 2000 65 31 4

Nov 2000 67 30 3

Apr 2001 61 34 5

June 2001 71 25 4

Nov 2001 64 33 3

Apr 2002 66 31 3

Aug 2002 62 34 4

Nov 2002 66 31 3

June 2003 60 37 3

Nov 2003 51 44 4

Dec 2003 57 39 5

Apr 2004 67 27 5

June 2004 62 35 4

July 2004 55 39 6

Aug 2004 63 32 4

Nov 2004 65 32 4

May 2005 78 20 2

July 2005 78 20 2

Nov 2005 73 23 4

Feb 2006 76 22 2

Mar 2006 75 20 4

Nov 2006 80 19 1

Apr 2007 75 22 3

Optimism about Hong Kong’s future as a part of China and satisfaction with life in Hong Kong clearly are linked to one another (See Table 3). Of those optimistic about Hong Kong’s future as a part of China, only 11 percent are dissatisfied with life in Hong Kong, whereas 68 percent of those pessimistic about Hong Kong’s future are also dissatisfied. Of those optimistic about the future with China, 89 percent are satisfied with life in Hong Kong.

16

ASSOCIATION5 Table 3 Satisfaction with life in Hong Kong by Optimism about Hong

Kong’s future with China

Optimistic

about future

Neither Pessimistic

about future

total

Dissatisfied with life in HK 11 27 68 23

Satisfied with life in HK 89 73 32 77

total 100 100 100 100 table contents: Percent of Column Total Chi-square = 130.4 with 2 df p � 0.0001


This association of optimism about Hong Kong’s future with satisfaction with life here is only exceeded in consistency and importance by correlation of satisfaction with life here and

ASSOCIATION tables are cross-tabulations of one variable with another, testing whether those who respond

one way in a question respond consistently on another. The closer to zero the Chi-square number, the less likely

the association of the two variables is by chance. Thus, the lower the Chi-square, the stronger the association.

Normally Chi-square is reported as significant to the <.09 level, which means there is a 90%+ chance that the

association is actual, or conversely, there is less than one chance in ten the association is a statistical accident.

In cross-tabulations, variables across the top forming the columns are by convention the “independent” variable

(meaning the variable forming the rows is assumed to causally depend on the independent variable). Read

cross-tabs usually in columns but always toward the sum total of 100.

17

5

’

satisfaction with the performance of the SAR government. (See trend table for detailed numbers on satisfaction with the performance of the government, Section III below.)

FINDING: Satisfaction with the performance of the Hong Kong government has recovered from dangerous lows of less than one in five registered in 2003, returning to levels averaging slightly above those attained by the colonial government pre-1997.

Table 4 shows that 92 percent of those satisfied with the performance of the Hong Kong government are also satisfied with life in Hong Kong, while 54 percent of those dissatisfied with the government are also dissatisfied with life in Hong Kong.

ASSOCIATION Table 4 Satisfaction with life in Hong Kong by Satisfaction with

performance of government

Dissatisfied with government Satisfied with government total

Dissatisfied with life 54 8 23

Satisfied with life 46 92 77

total 100 100 100 table contents: Percent of Column Total

Chi-square = 208.3 with 1 df p � 0.0001

Indeed, of all aspects measured in terms of satisfaction with performance of the SAR and PRC governments and leaders, the strength of the correlation between optimism about Hong Kong’s future as a part of China and satisfaction with local government performance is only exceeded, and then only marginally, by the correlation of optimism with satisfaction with the SAR government in handling relations with the PRC government. CORRELATION Table 5b converts these numbers into percentages. The square of the coefficient, (coefficient is the number in Table 5) or r square in statistical parlance, is equal to the percent of the variation in

6one variable that is related to the variation in the other.

Key: Correlation Table 5 Optimism How do you feel currently about HK s future prospects as a part of China?

SatLife Are you currently satisfied/dissatisfied with: your current life in Hong Kong?

SatGov Are you currently satisfied/dissatisfied with: the general performance of the SAR government?

SatSar-PRC Are you currently satisfied/dissatisfied with: the performance of the SARGov dealing with

China?

SatCE Are you currently satisfied/dissatisfied with: the general performance of CE Donald Tsang?

SatCGov Are you currently satisfied/dissatisfied with: the performance of the PRCGov in ruling China?

SatCGovSar Are you currently satisfied/dissatisfied with: the performance of the PRCGov dealing with

HKSAR?

SatPresHu Are you currently satisfied/dissatisfied with: the general performance of China’s President Hu

Jintao?

Moderately strong correlations are marked in red in Table 5 and 5b. Correlations showing above a 50 percent

co-variation in responses are very strong. Pearson-Product-Moment Correlation is the most common correlation

test and is used here unless otherwise noted.

18

6

CORRELATION Table 5 Correlation of Optimism with Satisfaction with government

and leadership performance Optimism Satlife SatGov SatSar-PRC SatCE SatCGov SatCGovSar SatPresHu

Optimism 1.000

SatLife -0.544 1.000

SatGov -0.588 0.540 1.000

SatSar-PRC -0.479 0.426 0.597 1.000

SatCE -0.482 0.371 0.586 0.550 1.000

SatCGov -0.361 0.243 0.358 0.386 0.349 1.000

SatCGovSar -0.438 0.312 0.448 0.485 0.462 0.557 1.000

SatPresHu -0.295 0.208 0.254 0.285 0.368 0.458 0.496 1.000

The negative numbers in the Optimism column in Table 5 mean that as the proportion of those dissatisfied with performance rises, optimism falls. This is because the scale of responses for optimism commence with the first response being “Very optimistic” while satisfaction questions begin with the first response being “Very dissatisfied.” There are no negative numbers in Table 5b since this is simply an indication of the percentage of responses which vary directly with each other in the two variables. So the first number in table 5b, 30, indicates 30 percent of respondents who are optimistic about Hong Kong’s future with China are also satisfied with life in Hong Kong or they are both pessimistic about the future and dissatisfied with life in Hong Kong. This is moderately strong correlation.

FINDING: There is a strong network of influence between optimism about Hong Kong’s future as a part of China, satisfaction with life in Hong Kong, satisfaction with the performance of the SAR government, and satisfaction with the performance of the Chief Executive. There is also a strong relationship between satisfaction with the PRC government in ruling China and satisfaction with the way the PRC government deals with Hong Kong. There are also significant relationships between satisfaction with the performance of the SAR government and satisfaction with the way the PRC government deals with the SAR, as well as a significant relationship between satisfaction with President Hu Jintao’s performance and satisfaction with the way the PRC government deals with the HKSAR.

CORRELATION Table 5b Percent of variation of optimism with satisfaction (rounded) Optimism Satlife SatGov SatSar-PRC SatCE SatCGov SatCGovSar SatPresHu

Optimism 1.000

SatLife 30 1.000

SatGov 35 29 1.000

SatSar-PRC 23 18 36 1.000

SatCE 23 14 34 30 1.000

SatCGov 13 5 13 15 12 1.000

SatCGovSar 19 10 20 24 21 31 1.000

SatPresHu 9 4 6 8 14 21 25 1.000

FINDING: See Appendix, CORRELATION TABLES 5c-5f There are very strong correlations between age groups and the questions on optimism and satisfaction. Teen-agers, late career (aged 40-59) and retirement aged 60+ all show strong correlations between satisfaction with the Hong Kong government’s performance and optimism about Hong Kong’s future as a part of China. These groups also show strong correlations between optimism and satisfaction with the performance of the Chief Executive. Early career ages 20-39 do not, showing strong correlation between satisfaction with the SAR government and

19

satisfaction with how it handles relations with the PRC government. As people age, the correlations among the network of factors in the previous finding increase in number and strength, until fully half of those of retirement age directly tie satisfaction with the Chinese governments rule of China with satisfaction on how the PRC government handles the Hong Kong SAR. (square the coefficients in CORRELATION tables to get the percentage of respondents whose responses are linked). This increasing correlation among these factors in the age groups above 40 likely means that as the Hong Kong population rapidly ages in the decades ahead, pressure on both governments in terms of performance will increase.

Given the critical role relations between Hong Kong people and their national government plays in democratization, elections, executive assessments and the economy, Part II will focus on the issue of identity and patriotism, for clearly, as Part I shows, there are strong links among attitudes towards the governments and leaders and attitudes toward life here and Hong Kong’s future. This is the context or matrix within which political development and party politics takes place.

II Relations with the PRC and patriotism

The role of patriotism in the relations between the SAR government and the people of Hong Kong, and between the people of Hong Kong and the government of the PRC should not be understated. While Deng Xiaoping said Hong Kongers could criticize the mainland government and the Communist Party, he also made very clear that the leaders of Hong Kong had to “love China” as well as “love Hong Kong.” The intervention of the National Peoples Congress Standing Committee in April 2004 with an interpretation banning direct election of the Chief Executive in 2007 and of all members of Legco in 2008, was accompanied by conditions for further reform, one of which included the need for “maturity” among Hong Kong voters. It was unclear whether that maturity included accepting that mainland leaders would vet all candidates for Chief Executive prior to their being permitted to run as a candidate. The Basic Law includes a post-election appointment provision –that is, the Central Government appoints the C.E. after his/her election by whatever means, including the present limited franchise election by a committee of 800 – but makes no mention of Central Government intervention on who may stand as a candidate for C.E. When the pan-democratic coalition voted down the SAR government’s reform proposals in December 2005, the SAR and Central Government made clear there would be no reforms prior to the elections of 2012. Pan-democrats decided to contest the 2006 elections for the C.E. Election Committee of 800. This committee has only 30 directly elected members, with 600 returned by small franchise functional constituencies including about 250,000 voters out of over 4.5 million permanent residents aged over 18 and thus nominally qualified to vote in direct elections. In the December 2006 C.E. election committee election, the pan-democratic candidates secured over 130 seats, well over the 100 nominator figure required for a candidate to stand for election by the whole committee. The contested election of 2007 in which Civic Party legislator Alan Leong challenged Donald Tsang was not only the first since the SAR came into being on 1 July 1997, it was apparently also a wake-up call to Beijing not to take its dominance of the 800 member election committee for granted. C.E. Tsang directly addressed the issue of maturity on his re-election, claiming that his election in a contested election demonstrated the maturity of Hong Kong people, and thus stipulating that they had fulfilled the NPC’s pre-condition for reform.

20

The issue of patriotism and its relation to direct elections was raised as the main barrier to election reform by Ma Lik, the leader of Hong Kong’s largest party, the Democratic Alliance for the Betterment and Progress of Hong Kong (DAB), the main supporters of both Beijing and the SAR government in Legco and in the community. Ma asserted that pan-democrats’ demands for an investigation of the June 4, 1989 Tiananmen Square incident was a direct indicator that many Hong Kong people were unpatriotic and immature, and therefore could not be trusted with direct elections. This appears to be a widespread impression in the pro-Beijing camp. Thus the findings in Trend Table 6 may appear puzzling, for they show that Hong Kongers are much more satisfied with the performance of the SAR government’s relations with the PRC government now than at any time since surveys commenced in February 1995.

TREND Table 6 Are you currently satisfied or dissatisfied with the performance of the

Hong Kong Government (SAR government) in dealing with the PRC Government?

Satisfied Dissatisfied Don’t know

Feb 1995 21 46 33

Sept 1995 23 48 29

Feb 1996 30 41 29

July 1996 37 38 25

June 1997 44 41 15

Jan 1998 44 32 24

July 1998 61 25 14

Oct 1998 57 26 17

July 1999 43 42 15

Nov 1999 39 46 15

Apr 2000 42 43 15

Aug 2000 42 45 13

Nov 2000 44 43 13

Apr 2001 32 51 17

July 2001 45 42 13

Nov 2001 36 49 16

Apr 2002 46 40 14

Aug 2002 41 42 18

Nov 2002 46 42 11

Feb 2003 33 49 18

June 2003 36 49 15

Nov 2003 49 37 14

April 2004 33 53 14

May 2004 29 57 15

June 2004 30 64 7

July 2004 39 51 10

Aug 2004 46 43 10

Nov 2004 51 40 9

May 2005 64 24 12

Nov 2005 71 21 9

Mar 2006 67 21 12

Nov 2006 69 23 9

Apr 2007 69 22 10

21

FINDING: Satisfaction with the performance of the SAR government dealing with the central PRC government is at an all time high since the assumption of Donald Tsang to the Chief Executive’s post. Satisfaction deteriorated sharply following the unilateral NPC Standing Committee intervention limiting electoral reforms for the 2007 Chief Executive and 2008 Legislative Council elections.

It is crucial to place the changed response patterns in context. Clearly a strong majority disapproved of the April 2004 NPC Standing Committee intervention, as Chart 4 shows. Dissatisfaction soared. When Beijing pushed the first C.E., Tung Chee-hwa out of office early and replaced him with Donald Tsang, a devout Catholic who attends Mass every morning and who achieved high office under the British, who made him a Knight of the British Empire before they left, sentiment dramatically changed.

Chart 4: Satisfaction with performance of SAR GOV dealing with PRC GOV

The same dramatic change in sentiments can be seen in TREND Table 7, charting satisfaction with the performance of the PRC Government in dealing with Hong Kong affairs.

22

FINDING: The intervention in 2004 was clearly a political crisis in which economics had nothing to do. The SARS pandemic disease threat of early 2003 and the severe economic downturn of 1998-2003 show no effect on this dimension, whereas the District Council elections of November 2003, in which critics of C.E. Tung swept to victory and the April 2004 NPC intervention, clearly do show impacts.

(The November 2007 District Council elections and reforms implemented in 4 of the 18 districts are discussed below.)


PRC GOV in dealing with Hong Kong affairs?


Aug 1993 25 54 22

Feb 1993 23 56 21

Aug 1994 21 63 16

Feb 1995 20 60 20

Sept 1995 17 62 22

Feb 1996 31 49 20

July 1996 27 58 15

June 1997 45 41 14

Jan 1998 61 22 18

Apr 1998 67 17 16

June 1998 68 17 15

July 1998 74 11 15

Oct 1998 67 15 17

Apr 1999 65 19 16

July 1999 60 25 16

Nov 1999 57 26 17

Apr 2000 55 31 13

Aug 2000 56 27 15

Nov 2000 50 36 14

Apr 2001 46 34 21

July 2001 57 29 14

Nov 2001 55 26 19

Apr 2002 59 25 17

Aug 2002 57 25 19

June 2003 57 28 16

Nov 2003 72 18 10

Apr 2004 47 37 17

May 2004 37 50 11

June 2004 38 53 9

July 2004 38 50 12

Aug 2004 47 40 12

Nov 2004 55 32 13

May 2005 64 24 11

July 2005 58 29 12

Nov 2005 64 25 10

Mar 2006 66 23 11

Nov 2006 67 23 10

Apr 2007 69 22 9

23

Chart 5 Satisfaction with the performance of the PRC GOV in handling Hong Kong

affairs

Trend Table 8 and Chart 6 below show fewer and less dramatic instances of volatility with attitudes toward the performance of the mainland Chinese government in ruling China. Clearly, on 1 July 1997 attitudes toward central government rule on the mainland began to change from dissatisfaction to satisfaction. The central government generally stayed out of Hong Kong affairs, pushed forward with World Trade Organization membership, joining in December 2001, and has continued to achieve dramatic levels of growth, a particular contrast with Hong Kong’s five years of deflation and economic distress that only began to improve in 2003 when the mainland government relaxed travel controls on mainland tourists coming into Hong Kong and after the governments negotiated the CEPA, Closer Economic Partnership Agreement, which gives Hong Kong firms advanced access to the tariffs and standards agreed under the WTO accords which will be phased in over 13 years from 2001.

24


PRC GOV in ruling China?


Feb 1993 35 49 16

Aug 1993 26 55 19

Feb 1994 29 53 18

Aug 1994 24 64 12

Feb 1995 22 62 16

Sept 1995 15 62 24

Feb 1996 30 49 22

July 1996 28 56 16

Feb 1997 38 45 17

June 1997 34 51 15

Jan 1998 37 39 24

Apr 1998 43 34 23

June 1998 44 34 22

July 1998 52 24 24

Oct 1998 53 24 23

Apr 1999 49 31 20

July 1999 44 28 27

Nov 1999 49 31 20

Apr 2000 38 37 24

Aug 2000 47 31 22

Nov 2000 47 29 24

Apr 2001 41 33 26

July 2001 53 28 19

Nov 2001 57 20 24

April 2002 60 18 22

Aug 2002 60 18 22

June 2003 61 22 18

Nov 2003 68 15 17

Apr 2004 58 21 21

May 2004 54 25 19

June 2004 56 28 16

July 2004 59 21 20

Aug 2004 58 25 17

Nov 2004 56 25 19

May 2005 59 23 18

Nov 2005 51 29 19

Mar 2006 59 24 17

Nov 2006 57 29 14

Apr 2007 63 23 14

25

Chart 6: Satisfaction with the PRC GOV in ruling China

In general, and particularly in light of such dramatically changed attitudes as those shown in Chart 6 above, the issue of Hong Kongers patriotism seems somewhat settled.

FINDING: Clearly, attitudes of Hong Kongers toward the central government’s rule of China have improved strongly from those held in the early and mid 1990s. In 1997 30 percent of Hong Kong respondents indicated they had not even crossed the border into mainland China in the previous two years. Now about 15 percent say they have not. In 1988 only 52,000 Hong Kongers lived and/or worked on the mainland. Today around 500,000 do. In 1997 mandarin was rarely heard in Hong Kong and mainland tourists were permitted in fairly small numbers and had to travel in tourist-guided groups. Today over 13 million mainlanders come to Hong Kong each year, most without being part of group tours.

Relations appear to have grown substantially over the decade, and dramatically different over the past 20 years. So is the patriotism issue an excuse to slow down reform, or is there some substance to these concerns? The next section examines patriotic attitudes in Hong Kong over the past 10 years. Earlier research has shown that after 10 years or more residency in

26

Hong Kong, those born in China tend to more strongly identify themselves as Hong Kongers while their self-identification as simply Chinese tends to weaken. (See Table 9.) After Hong Kong has been part of China for nearly a decade, that pattern may have changed.

Table 9 Dec 1997 Birthplace and years in Hong Kong

Years in Hong Kong HK born 0-10 11-20 21-30 30+

Count

484

38

65

25

74

%

71

6

9

4

11

ASSOCIATION Table 10 Dec 1997 Identity of HK born versus China born by years in

Hong Kong

Born in HK 0-10 11-20 21-30 30+ total

Chinese 22 68 47 17 41 27

HK Chinese 27 24 32 39 28 27

HK person 47 4 13 33 24 40

Other 4 4 8 11 7 6

total 100 100 100 100 100 100 table contents: Percent of Column Total


Table 10 shows that shortly after reunification, nearly two thirds of those here less than 10 years identified themselves as Chinese, versus 22 percent for those born in Hong Kong. After 20 years here, the percentage of those saying they are Chinese drops while those saying they are a Hong Kong person rises after the first 10 years. The April 2007 survey shows that distribution of years in Hong Kong among those born in China has changed little. However the clear pattern of identity shift from Chinese to Hong Kong person in 1997 after 10 years residence in Hong Kong has weakened in the post-handover period. (See Table 12)

Table 11 April 2007 Birthplace and years in Hong Kong

Years in Hong Kong Count %

HK born 626 70

1-10 40 5

11-20 53 6

20-30 79 9

30+ 91 10

ASSOCIATION Table 12 April 2007 Identity of HK born versus China born by years

in Hong Kong

Born in HK 1-10 11-20 20-30 30+ total

Chinese 22 38 53 41 46 29

HK Chinese 29 35 21 24 22 27

HK person 44 23 15 25 23 38

Other 5 5 11 10 9 6



27

Comparing Chart 7 with Chart 8, which visually portray Tables 10 and 12 respectively, the distribution of identity among Hong Kong born appears little changed while that among the China born has shifted more strongly toward identifying themselves as Chinese. There has been some discussion in the past decade of Hong Kong’s society becoming polarized between the rich and the poor, the Beijing royalists/loyalists and the pro-democrats, and between businessmen and non-businessmen. But another might be added which has clearly developed over the past decade, one which might be even more fundamental to these other polarizations: the division in identity between those born in Hong Kong and those who moved here from their birthplace on the mainland.

Chart 7 December 1997 Identity Hong Kong born versus China born by years

Chart 8 April 2007 Identity Hong Kong born versus China born by years

28

The shift of identities from Chinese to Hong Kong person among Chinese emigrants to Hong Kong explains some, but by no means all, of the variance seen in general patterns of identity in Hong Kong since surveys began in February 1993, as the next section explores.

Identity Trends 1993-2007

The accompanying chart to Table 13 shows clearly that in the run-up to the 1997 reunification with China, identity in Hong Kong began to fluctuate rather dramatically. At one point, self identification as a “Hong Kong person” dropped to around one in four (February 1994). Later this identity clearly recovered and strengthened. Since 2005 however, volatility of identity has begun to increase. This may be due to increased pride in being Chinese due to China’s space program and winning the Olympics for Beijing. It may be related to Donald Tsang, a Hong Kong born Chief Executive, displacing a Shanghai-born Chief Executive but showing as much or even more patriotism than his predecessor. It may be due to the April 2004 intervention on the Basic Law, in which Beijing snapped the whip of control unmistakably over Hong Kong.

TREND Table 13 The following is a list of how you might describe yourself. Which is

the most appropriate description of you? Chinese HK Chinese HK person HK British Overseas Chinese Others

Feb 1993 19 36 37 7 1

Aug 1993 20 34 35 10 1

Feb 1994 21 40 28 8 1

Aug 1994 19 38 32 10 1

Feb 1995 20 32 35 11 1

Aug 1995 22 32 36 8 1

Feb 1996 30 28 35 5 2

July 1996 30 20 45 3 2

Feb 1997 30 28 35 3 3 1

June 1997 25 24 44 4 2 1

Dec 1997 27 27 39 3 2 2

Apr 1998 30 24 41 2 2 2

July 1998 22 27 44 4 1 1

Oct 1998 25 27 43 4 1 1

Apr 1999 20 28 45 3 1 2

July 1999 21 27 46 4 1 1

Nov 1999 23 27 44 3 1 2

Apr 2000 24 30 39 4 1 2

Aug 2000 22 27 45 4 2 1

Nov 2000 24 28 42 3 2 2

Apr 2001 28 24 42 3 2 2

July 2001 26 26 43 3 1 2

Nov 2001 22 26 45 4 1 2

Apr 2002 27 24 43 3 1 2

Aug 2002 28 24 44 2 1 1

Nov 2002 24 25 44 2 1 3

Nov 2003 22 27 44 2 2 4

Dec 2003 25 25 45 3 1 2

Apr 2004 26 27 41 2 1 2

May 2005 25 29 42 1 1 1

July 2005 22 31 41 2 1 2

Nov 2005 29 27 39 2 2 2

Mar 2006 23 31 41 2 1 3

Nov 2006 21 30 44 2 1 2

Apr 2007 29 27 37 1 1 4

29

Chart 9: Identity trends 1993-2007

One clear change, and one hypothesized early on in the Hong Kong Transition Project, was that the “Hong Kong British” identity would diminish rapidly after the handover. It did, but then persisted at a somewhat higher than anticipated level for quite some time. Only since 2005 has it fluctuated at a nominal 1 to 2 percent of respondents base. It now predominately includes only Chinese ethnics born overseas, usually in the UK. But other changes in identity may be more related to events, such as space shots or nationalistic tensions, and longer-term trends such as patriotic education in the schools. In terms of the latter, there have been clear changes in public attitude toward such education between 1998 and 2005.7

These questions will be asked again in a survey to be conducted in July 2007. We usually rotate these

questions in about every two years in the survey cycle.

30

7


Strongly

support

Support Neutral oppose Strongly

oppose

DK

civic education 28 47 14 3 3 4

Basic law NA NA NA NA NA NA

PRC’s pol history to present 21 52 12 3 8 4

Patriotic school plays or lessons

8 35 24 22 7 5

To sing national anthem and have flag raising every day

4 16 23 37 17 2


Strongly

support

Support Neutral oppose Strongly

oppose

DK

civic education 22 58 12 2 -- 6

Basic law 11 55 17 8 1 7

PRC’s pol history to present 15 60 11 6 1 6

Patriotic school plays or lessons

6 44 22 19 2 7

To sing national anthem and have flag raising every day

5 26 26 32 7 4

Chart 10 Comparative 1998 to 2005 Do you support or oppose the schools to teach

FINDING: Opposition to singing the national anthem and holding a daily flag raising ceremony at schools has diminished, as has opposition to patriotic school plays or lessons, though conversely support has not risen much, if any.

31

The local news broadcasts in the evening began to be preceded by the playing of the national anthem (by government mandate as of 1 October 2004) and the playing of a video “Our Home Our Country.” But, as can be seen in Table 16, efforts to generate patriotic feelings by such measures appear to have little effect. While indifference to China’s national day has dropped somewhat, there has been no subsequent rise in feelings of being proud or excited about celebrating the day Mao Zedong stood in Tiananmen Square and told the world that the Chinese people stand up, after so long bowing in shame or subservience.

TREND Table 16 How does the celebration of 1st October National Day make you feel?

July

1998

July

1999

Nov

1999

Nov

2000

Nov

2001

Nov

2004

Nov

2005

Nov

2006

April

2007

Indifferent 70 58 52 51 55 59 57 47 52

Proud 7 12 12 9 12 12 12 13 13

Excited 8 7 12 8 7 8 8 8 9

Another public holiday

11 20 21 30 23 17 20 31 25

Uneasy/Unhappy 2 1 3 2 2 2 2 1 1

Refuse/DK 1 2 1 - 1 2 2 -- 1

Tables 17 and 18 compare how those who identify themselves also feel about China’s national day on 1 October by those feelings in 1997.


Chinese HK Chinese Hong Kong person Other total

Indifferent 61 73 82 62 73

Proud 9 10 3 10 7

Excited 13 7 3 12 7

Another public holiday 13 10 10 17 11

Uneasy/Refuse 5 1 2 0 2

total 100 100 100 100 100 table contents: Percent of Column Total


32


As Charts 11 and 12 make clearer, the feelings respondents have on China’s national day by their identity have changed little in terms of the pattern of indifference rising as identity categories move across Chinese, Hong Kong Chinese to Hong Kong person. But one must look more closely at the two tables and the charts to see that while the pattern of distribution of responses may look largely unchanged from 1997 to 2007, the actual levels of indifference have dropped significantly.

FINDING: In 1997 61 percent of Chinese identity choosers said they felt indifferent about 1 October, but in 2007 only 42 percent, a 19 percentage point fall, feel indifferent. The same shift can be seen with Hong Kong person self-identity, from 82 percent indifferent in 1997 to 61 percent in 2007. Conversely, pride has risen among those who see themselves as Chinese (22 percent in 2007 versus 9 percent in 1997). Overall, the levels of indifference have dropped across the samples from 73 percent in 1997 to 52 percent in 2007, while feelings of pride have risen on average from 7 percent in 1997 to 13 in 2007.


Indifferent Proud Excited Another public holiday Uneasy/Refuse total

Chinese

42

22

15

21

0.4

100

HK Chinese

50

16

11

23

0.4

100

Hong Kong person

61

4

5

29

2

100

Other

57

11

5

27

0

100

total

52

13

9

25

1

100 table contents: Percent of Column Total


33


Nominally, it appears that patriotism has risen among Hong Kongers. Tables 19 and 20, comparing 1997 and 2007 identity by birthplace among age groups, show that when only age group distributions of identity are considered, there has been some narrowing of the gap between Hong Kong person identity and Chinese identity. In the next comparisons the charts of the tables are placed immediately above/below each other while the respective table is attached above, then below the charts, so that the charts can be easily compared.

In the first comparison it appears that identity as Chinese rises with age while those in younger cohorts show much stronger identity as Hong Kong persons. This appears as the case with the 1997 data and the 2007 data. That pattern appears even clearer in the 2007 data. However, Tables 21 and 22, comparing changes of identity by age groups in those born in Hong Kong from 1997 and 2007 and Tables 23 and 24, doing the same for those born in China, shows that within these birth groups age makes no significant difference in response patterns. That is, the significance shown in the Chi-square statistical tests in Tables 19 and 20 immediately below is due much more to birthplace differences between Hong Kongers and China born respondents, not age per se.

34


18-19 20-29 30-39 40-49 50-59 60-69 70-81 total

Chinese Hong Kong Chinese Hong Kong person Other total

30

22

38

11

100

23

28

45

4

100

25

25

44

6

100

26

28

39

8

100

32

38

27

4

100

36

39

21

3

100

39

14

25

21

100

27

27

39

7

100 table contents: Percent of Column Total Chi-square = 33.90 with 18 df p = 0.0130


18-19 20-29 30-39 40-49 50-59 60-69 70-86 total

Chinese 24 21 25 26 35 39 50 29

Hong Kong Chinese 24 32 24 28 32 23 20 27

Hong Kong person 41 44 46 41 29 27 22 38

Other 12 3 6 5 5 11 9 6

total 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 table contents: Percent of Column Total Chi-square = 44.03 with 18 df p = 0.0006

35


18-19 20-29 30-39 40-49 50-59 60-69 70-81 total


22

22

48

7

100

22

26

49

3

100

18

26

51

5

100

22

30

44

4

100

41

36

23

0

100

27

36

36

0

100

13

13

63

13

100

22

27

47

4

100 table contents: Percent of Column Total Chi-square = 15.73 with 18 df p = 0.6113 No significant association


18-19 20-29 30-39 40-49 50-59 60-69 70-86 total

Chinese 14 19 23 23 25 21 44 23

Hong Kong Chinese 21 30 22 28 34 36 25 28

Hong Kong person 50 48 50 44 35 39 31 44

Other 14 4 5 4 6 4 0 5

total 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 table contents: Percent of Column Total Chi-square = 19.75 with 18 df p = 0.3469 No significant association

36


18-19 20-29 30-39 40-49 50-59 60-69 70-81 total


56

11

11

22

100

33

44

17

6

100

58

22

11

8

100

39

28

25

8

100

32

36

29

4

100

41

41

18

0

100

59

18

6

18

100

45

29

18

8



18-19 20-29 30-39 40-49 50-59 60-69 70-86 total


43

29

21

7

100

33

44

22

0

100

30

35

30

4

100

46

24

28

2

100

59

23

17

2

100

51

17

23

9

100

56

19

15

11

100

48

25

22

5


37

The bottom line of these comparisons is what at first appears to be indifference to patriotic holidays by the young and patriotic feelings by the elderly (Table 25) is actually a function of age differences between those born in Hong Kong and those born in China (Table 26).

ASSOCIATION Table 25 Patriotic feelings on 1 Oct by Age group 2007

18-19 20-29 30-39 40-49 50-59 60-69 70-86 total

Proud 2 6 8 11 15 23 37 13

Excited 10 7 5 8 10 13 22 9

Another holiday 19 34 31 28 25 9 2 25

Indifferent 69 52 56 53 50 51 37 52

Uneasy/refuse 0 0 0 1 0 4 2 1

total 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 table contents: Percent of Column Total Chi-square = 98.44 with 24 df p � 0.0001


18-19 20-29 30-39 40-49 50-59 60-69 70-86 total

HK born 67 86 84 82 67 67 67 73

China born 33 14 16 18 34 63 63 27

total 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 table contents: Percent of Column Total Chi-square = 109.8 with 6 df p � 0.0001 q p

38


18-19 20-29 30-39 40-49 50-59 60-69 70-81 total

HK born China born total

73

27

100

87

13

100

76

24

100

68

32

100

40

60

100

33

67

100

28

72

100

70

31



What has been reported as a rise in patriotism among those in their teens is an artifact of people in their teens today having a higher proportion born in China and emigrating to Hong Kong post 1997 than before 1997, as Table 28, taken from 2006 By-census figures shows.

Table 28 Selected age groups by birth

Age group HK born China born Total # China born %

15-19 331,087 94,758 428,849 22

20-29 707,250 157,922 865,172 18

5-14 595,096 104,034 699,130 15 *Source: Hong Kong Census Dept. Calculated from 2006 By-census, Table A120 “Hong Kong Resident Population by Duration of Residence in HK, Marital Status, Place of Birth, Quinquennial Age Group and Sex, 2006.”

This data modifies the claims in a study released in June 2007 by the Department of Psychology at Hong Kong University, “Brief Report: A study of Hong Kong Adolescents’ Social Identification” notes the differences in proportion of students born on the mainland in 1996 and 2006 in Table 1 (from the report) below.

39

Table 1. Demographics of respondents (From “Brief Report”

1996 2006

Sample 9,226 3,993

Gender Male: 44% Male: 50% Female: 56% Female: 50%

Average age 15.40 15.52

Grade Form 3: 33.6% Form 3: 33.3% Form 4: 33.7% Form 4: 33.1% Form 5: 32.7% Form 5: 33.6%

Birthplace Hong Kong: 87.2% Hong Kong: 78.8% Mainland China: 10.9% Mainland China: 18.1%

Others:1.8% Others: 3.1%

Number of participating schools 21 12

Source: Brief Report on Social Identification, p. 1.

But then the report concludes:

- In 1996, there was no relation between feeling responsible for the future of the nation and its people and believing that one had to support the state’s policies to be patriotic (correlation = .08), indicating that even if adolescents felt responsible for the future of the nation and its people, they did not necessarily agree that they have to support the country’s policies to be patriotic.

- However, in 2006, there is a definite relation between the two items (correlation = .17), indicating that the more Hong Kong adolescents felt responsible for the future of the nation and its people, the more they agreed that they had to support the state’s policies to be patriotic. Today, we found that among Hong Kong adolescents, there is a similar tendency for a sense of responsibility for the future of the nation and its people to be accompanied by agreeing that one has to support the country’s policies to be patriotic. This finding deserves prudent consideration from educators who are concerned

8with civic education.

Actually, a correlation of .17 is very weak, and likely more affected by birthplace than anything else. Figure 2 in their report (below) shows a nearly mirror opposite response pattern of those born in China and those born in Hong Kong. Both groups of respondents show more of tendency to assume mixed identity, with weakenings since 1996 in both plain “Chinese” identity among the mainland born and “Hong Kong” identity in Hong Kong born. The Hong Kong born actually show a drop in plain “Chinese” identity while mainland born show a drop in plain “Hong Kong” identity. The increased proportion of China mainland born students over the 1996 sample removes much of the “increase” in correlation from .08 to .17 *(from about 0.6% of sample correlating in responses to 2.9% of the sample correlating –you square the correlations to get the percentage of the samples varying in sync -- and with an increase in mainland born of 66% over the 1996 level, only about 1.9% of sample variance or a correlation difference of 0.137 is unaccounted for). Given the sample

8 Brief Report on Social Identification, p. 7.

40

size of 3,993, this is effectively within the range of error at the 95% confidence level, i.e., no provable change since 1996, and hence, deserves no consideration by educators, much less prudent consideration.

Birthplace: Hong Kong Birthplace: China

50.0%

40.0%

Pe

rc

en

t

30.0%

20.0%

10.0%

0.0%

5.9%

17.6%

42.9%

33.7%

7.3%

12.9%

42.3%

37.5%

2006

1996

Year

Pe

rc

en

t

50.0%

40.0%

30.0%

20.0%

10.0%

0.0%

25.1%

44.1%

24.1%

6.8%

31.7%

37.5%

22.6%

8.2%

Year

1996

2006

HK HK-CH CH-HK CH HK HK-CH CH-HK CH

Social Identity Social Identity

Figure 2. Social identity and place of birth, “Brief Report” p. 3.

The 18-19 year olds in the Hong Kong Transition Project surveys are drawn from the age cohort of 15-19 year olds in the 2006 By-census that shows 22 percent born in China versus those in their 20s who show only 18.25 percent born in China. A few years from now the media may be discussing a sudden drop in patriotism among youth. Those between ages 5 and 14 have only 14.9 percent born on the mainland. Post-1997 family reunification of mainland born children with their Hong Kong born parents was speeded up and expanded considerably, despite reinterpretations of the Basic Law to prevent an even greater flood of such immigrants to the SAR under the new regime.

FINDING: The changes in patriotism and self-identity as Chinese are not among the young, but among the older groups who, post-reunification, have rediscovered or realigned their identity from mainland emigrants to British Hong Kong, to Chinese residents of China’s SAR. Patriotism per se has not increased among the Hong Kong born, though it has increased in Hong Kong due to the China born rediscovering pride in their origins. There appears to be little change in patriotic feelings among those among all age groups born in Hong Kong over the first decade of its reunification with China.

While patriotism may not have increased among Hong Kong born residents, patriotism does make a difference in elections and in the debate over policies. So besides tending to be born on the mainland, who are the patriotic; what is their demographic profile compared to other Hong Kong permanent residents? We take the 22 percent of the sample who responded either proud or excited to the question “How does the celebration of 1st October National Day

41

make you feel” and describe their responses in contrast to the non-patriotic on the matrix of questions asked in Part I.

While 82 percent of patriots are optimistic only 42 percent of non-patriots feel the same. While 11 percent of non-patriots (those responding “indifferent” or “just another holiday”) were pessimistic, only 3 percent of patriots joined them in pessimism.

ASSOCIATION Table 29 Patriot/non-patriot attitudes toward Hong Kong’s

future as part of China

Non-patriots Patriots total

Optimistic 42 82 51

Neutral 47 16 40

Pessimistic 11 3 9



ASSOCIATION Tables 30a-g: Are you currently satisfied or dissatisfied with:

ASSOCIATION Table 30a: Your current life in Hong Kong?


Very dissatisfied 4. 0.5 3

Somewhat Dissatisfied 23 9 20

Somewhat satisfied 70 71 70

Very satisfied 3 20 7



ASSOCIATION Table 30b: The general performance of the Hong Kong Government?


Very dissatisfied 7 2 5






ASSOCIATION Table 30d: The general performance of Chief Executive Donald Tsang


Very dissatisfied 3 0.5 2






42

ASSOCIATION Table 30e: The performance of the PRC Government in ruling China


Very dissatisfied 6 1 5






ASSOCIATION Table 30f: The performance of the PRC Government in dealing with

HKSAR affairs


Very dissatisfied 4 1. 3






ASSOCIATION Table 30g: The general performance of China’s President Hu Jintao

Very dissatisfied Somewhat Dissatisfied Somewhat satisfied Very satisfied total

Non-patriots

1

7

78

16

100

Patriots

0

0.5

64

35

100

total

1

5

74

20



FINDING: These differences among the patriotic, significant though they are, have very little effect in the overall patterns of responses to each of the issues above since the patriotic group comprises only about one in five permanent residents over age 18. The number who are very satisfied or very optimistic about the future is simply too small to swing public opinion significantly.

The patriots do exercise larger influence with the government and with China officials in Hong Kong. Correlation Table 31 shows the small degree of effect patriotic attitudes have on the overall sample results, in each case, under 10 percent of respondents show correlations of patriotic attitudes with satisfaction and optimism.

43

Correlation Table 31: Patriotism with Optimism and Satisfaction

Patriotic Optimism SatLife SatGov SatSar-PRC SatCE SatCGov SatCGovSar SatPresHu

Patriotic

1.000

-0.284

0.256

0.231

0.220

0.209

0.256

0.293

0.244

% influence

8

7

5

5

4

7

9

6

FINDING: It appears that improvements in performance, not increases in patriotism, lie behind the increases in satisfaction with the Hong Kong and PRC governments and their leaders.

The finding above emphasizes the important role improvements in government performance play in building legitimacy and public support. Reform meant to improve performance rather than re-education and propaganda emphasizing patriotic virtues appears the most effective means forward, given the limited impact efforts to foster patriotism have had among the Hong Kong born. Section III therefore examines satisfaction with the performance of the Hong Kong government and the Chief Executive in detail.9 The data appear to demonstrate that satisfaction with performance, be it of government or political parties, becomes the key means of ensuring the political stability of Hong Kong.

III Leadership and government performance

A: Satisfaction with the government

Trend Table 32 and Chart 13 show that after dropping steadily post-handover to a low point of only 16 percent satisfied with government performance in December 2003, satisfaction has recovered to rival the best achievements of the colonial government. Perhaps not insignificantly, the low point post-handover was reached when the first Chief Executive insisted on appointing his supporters to District Councils immediately after an election in which his supporters lost overwhelmingly. And perhaps unsurprisingly, satisfaction has improved following reforms to District Councils, the lowest level of local government, were proposed and approved for 4 of the 18 districts. These District level reforms are examined in greater detail along with problem solving by government and parties later in this report.

See additional demographics of patriot respondents compared with non-patriot respondents in the

demographic section at end of the report.

44

9

TREND Table 32 Are you currently satisfied with the general performance of

the Hong Kong Government?

Satisfied Dissatisfied Don’t know Feb 1993 60 31 9

Aug 1993 57 28 15

Feb 1994 58 28 14

Aug 1994 56 30 14

Feb 1995 43 35 22

Sep 1995 46 45 9

Feb 1996 60 26 15

July 1996 67 21 11

Feb 1997 73 20 7

June 1997 66 27 7

Jan 1998 51 35 4

Apr 1998 48 41 12

June 1998 37 56 7

July 1998 42 49 9

Oct 1998 42 48 10

April 1999 46 43 11

July 1999 40 52 7

Nov 1999 41 51 8

Apr 2000 39 53 8

Aug 2000 30 61 4

Oct 2000 31 62 6

Nov 2000 35 58 7

Apr 2001 32 58 10

June 2001 37 55 7

July 2001 35 59 5

Nov 2001 24 68 7

Apr 2002 31 60 9

Aug 2002 22 72 6

Nov 2002 23 69 9

June 2003 23 69 8

Nov 2003 20 75 5

Dec 2003 16 79 6

Apr 2004 23 67 10

May 2004 24 68 5

June 2004 20 73 6

July 2004 20 72 8

Aug 2004 25 67 8

Nov 2004 33 61 6

May 2005 46 48 7

July 2005 56 34 10

Nov 2005 65 27 4

Feb 2006 61 32 2

Mar 2006 63 33 5

Nov 2006 62 34 4

April 2007 64 31 6

FINDING: That levels of dissatisfaction have dropped significantly must be a relief to Hong Kong and Beijing officials. But that it has not dropped below that seen under British rule, and that even under the British dissatisfaction never fell below one in five, must indicate systemic problems which can only be repaired by systemic reform of governance. These findings underscore the importance of reform.

45


There is some evidence that a major source of ongoing dissatisfaction with the government lies in economic differences. Many scholars and groups in Hong Kong assert the “middle classes” are angry with government. But analysis appears to show that the poorest, not the middle income groups, show the strongest correlations between satisfaction with both the local and national government and their leadership. About 46% of the poorest income families show strong correlation between government performance and optimism about Hong Kong’s future while only 6% among the richest show the same relationship between the two factors. And while 39% of the poorest show correlations between satisfaction with life in Hong Kong and satisfaction with government performance, only 5% of the richest show such correlations. See Tables 33, 34 and 35.

46

’

TABLE 33 Reclassified Income Groups $HKD per month family income

Label Group Count %

Poorest 0-19,999 337 43

Lower middle 20,000-39,000 260 33

Upper middle 40,000-79,999 131 17

Richest 80,000+ 57 7

*Note increments double for upper middle, then open infinitely for richest

Note that the poorest make up 43% of the respondents while the richest comprise only 7% of the sample, thus the difference in terms of population numbers, i.e. 16.7% of all respondents tying satisfaction with life in Hong Kong with government performance versus 0.35% (5% of the 7% richest) do the same among the highest income groups. (Applying the correlation results from Table 34a and 34d to the proportions shown in Table 33.) Yet the richest no doubt have great influence over government decisions and the richest hold veto power in the legislature as well.

Key: Correlation Table 34a and 34d Optimism How do you feel currently about HK s future prospects as a part of China?

SatLife Are you currently satisfied/dissatisfied with: your current life in Hong Kong?

SatGov Are you currently satisfied/dissatisfied with: the general performance of the SAR government?


China?

SatCE Are you currently satisfied/dissatisfied with: the general performance of CE Donald Tsang? SatCGov Are you currently satisfied/dissatisfied with: the performance of the PRCGov in ruling China?


HKSAR?


Jintao?

47

CORRELATION TABLE 34a Income with Optimism and Satisfaction, $0-19,000

family income per month10

Optimism Satlife SatGov SatSar-PRC SatCE SatCGov SatCGovSar SatPresHu

Optimism 1.000

SatLife -0.621 1.000

SatGov -0.676 0.625 1.000

SatSar-PRC -0.521 0.556 0.619 1.000

SatCE -0.588 0.475 0.612 0.585 1.000

SatCGov -0.472 0.327 0.388 0.419 0.355 1.000

SatCGovSar -0.528 0.398 0.489 0.529 0.524 0.608 1.000

SatPresHu -0.372 0.242 0.356 0.352 0.415 0.524 0.511 1.000

CORRELATION TABLE 34d Income with Optimism and Satisfaction, $80,000+ p.m.Optimism Satlife SatGov SatSar-PRC SatCE SatCGov SatCGovSar SatPresHu

Optimism 1.000

SatLife -0.475 1.000

SatGov -0.263 0.226 1.000

SatSar-PRC -0.416 0.038 0.585 1.000

SatCE -0.317 -0.032 0.576 0.697 1.000

SatCGov -0.397 0.008 0.287 0.372 0.292 1.000

SatCGovSar -0.223 -0.085 0.447 0.549 0.412 0.571 1.000

SatPresHu -0.474 0.176 0.074 0.174 0.220 0.494 0.163 1.000

The middle income groups show much weaker correlations among the factors above. Figures in red show moderately strong correlation. Figures in blue note significant correlation differences between the rich and poor. For example, CORRELATION Table 34d shows that among the rich, correlation between satisfaction with life in Hong Kong and satisfaction with the Chinese government handling SAR affairs is much less than among the poor, as is satisfaction with life in Hong Kong and satisfaction with the performance of the Chief Executive. Indeed, these correlations weaken proportionately as income moves up the scale. (See Appendix, Correlation Tables 34a to 34d.) The dominance of society’s poorest in terms of numbers, and the growth of their impoverishment in both absolute and relative terms, as reported by the Census and Statistics Department in June 2007 which cited an increase in the Gini coefficient from 0.483 in 1996 to .500 in 2006 while households under $4,000 per month income grew from 6.7% in 1996 to 9.2% in 2006.11

The poorest face steep barriers in making their numbers felt however, given the systemic limitations of having only half of the members of the Legislative Council being directly elected, and due to the Chief Executive Election Committee being elected almost wholly by the wealthiest members of society. In the next section we examine the assessments of the Chief Executive’s performance by a random sample of respondents, which the poor and lower middle income groups dominate, against a sample of Functional Constituency voters who are dominated by the wealthy. (For a comparison of incomes, see the demographic section below for the November 2006 survey.) This survey was conducted one month after the Chief Executive’s Policy Address in October 2006 and has not been previously released.

10 Correlations of all income groups in the above are in the Appendix.

11 http://www.news.gov.hk/en/category/businessandfinance/070618/html/070618en03006.htm# This is the

news release. The report itself does not appear to be available on the Census and Statistics Department website

as of this writing.

48

B. Satisfaction with the Chief Executive

Dissatisfaction with the performance of Chief Executive Donald Tsang rose steeply immediately following his October 2006 Policy Address, but dropped almost as strongly following his contested re-election. Dissatisfaction with Chief Executive Tung Chee-hwa also fell after his unopposed re-election in 2002, but not as much and returned to even higher than ever levels by late 2002. Avoiding the same fate depends very much on Tsang’s handling of issues and groups, and the policies he chooses to pursue or not. These are assessed below.

Table 35 Are you satisfied or dissatisfied with performance of C. E. Donald Tsang?

Very

Dissatisfied

Somewhat

dissatisfied

Somewhat

Satisfied

Very

Satisfied

DK

May 2005 1 9 67 9 16

July 2005 1 8 52 6 33

Nov 2005 1 8 72 10 9

Mar 2006 2 11 69 9 7

Nov 2006 4 21 66 6 4

April 2007 2 13 71 9 6

Table 36 shows that in November 2006 four issues showed more dissatisfaction than satisfaction among the whole random sample, while Table 37, of Functional Constituency voters, shows a similar pattern of responses but on average a higher level of dissatisfaction. Table 38 compares the dissatisfaction levels of the two groups.

49

**NOV 2006** Table 36 RANDOM In general, are you satisfied or dissatisfied with the performance of

Donald Tsang in handling relations with: Ranked, Most to least satisfied* Rank in

Satisfaction

Nov 2006

Very

dissatisfied

Somewhat

dissatisfied

Somewhat

satisfied

Very

satisfied

DK

Beijing 1 2 9 73 7 9

Media 2 3 18 66 4 9

Civil service 3 2 15 64 5 13

Public in general 4 6 23 64 2 6

Guangdong/Shenzhen

officials

5 4 12 54 4 26

Pro-Beijing groups 6 5 18 51 3 17

Pro-business groups 7 7 22 51 3 16

Legco 8 4 33 53 1 8

People like yourself 9 7 27 49 2 15

Big tycoons 10 9 24 43 6 18

Political consultations like

constitutional reforms

11 10 35 40 1 14

Pan-democratic groups 12 8 34 39 1 18

Economic consultations like W. Kowloon Cultural District

13 11 37 36 2 14

Poor & unemployed 14 17 47 26 1 9

*Rankings are determined by collapsing somewhat and very satisfied categories.

50

**November 2006** Table 37 FC VOTERS In general, are you satisfied or dissatisfied with the

performance of Donald Tsang in handling relations with: Ranked, Most satisfied to

least satisfied. Rank in

satisfaction

Nov 2006

Very

dissatisfied

Somewhat

dissatisfied

Somewhat

satisfied

Very

satisfied

DK

Beijing 1 2 11 77 5 5

Media 2 5 18 69 3 5

Civil service 3 4 15 66 7 7

Public in general 4 9 24 60 3 5

Guangdong/Shenzhen

officials

5 3 12 57 5 22

Pro-Beijing groups 6 5 23 58 3 10

Legco 7 9 32 55 1 3

Pro-business groups 8 9 29 51 4 7

Big tycoons 9 10 28 44 7 11

People like yourself 10 11 32 44 1 11

Consult Constitutional

reform

11 16 34 41 1 8

Pan-democratic groups 12 14 37 39 1 10

Consultations on W.

Kowloon Cultural District

13 14 42 35 2 7

Poor & unemployed 14 16 46 30 1 6

51

**Nov 2006**Table 38 Comparative Dissatisfaction with Tsang’s performance, Ranked by FC voter*

Dissatisfied Random Dissatisfied FC voters

Poor & unemployed 64 62

Economic consultation (WKCD) 48 56

Pandemocrats 42 51

Constitutional reform 45 50

People like yourself 34 43

Legco 37 41

Big tycoons 33 38

Pro-business groups 29 38

Public in general 29 33

Pro-Beijing groups 23 28

Media 21 23

Civil service 17 19

Guangdong/Shenzhen officials 16 15

Beijing 11 13

FINDING: Satisfaction differed most on constitutional reform, with FC voters significantly

less satisfied than the Random group.

Figures in red indicate a majority of respondents dissatisfied. This level of dissatisfaction, particularly among the FC voters, laid a basis for Alan Leong to challenge Donald Tsang in a contested election. But dissatisfaction with Tsang’s performance in certain areas was not

52

enough to win considerable public support, as will be seen below. Some believed Leong could not assure Beijing’s support for Hong Kong’s economy, and that was the bottom line. But when asked about urgent issues any candidates for Chief Executive should address, 39% of random sample respondents did not know or had no urgent issue, matching the 38% who cited a variety of economy-related concerns.

Table 39 In your view, what is the most urgent issue that should be addressed by the candidates? OPEN ENDED, THEN CLASSIFIED FROM NOTES Nov 2006 FC voters Random Group Count % Count % No urgent issue 57 15 104 15 Don’t Know 51 14 172 24 Unemployment 51 14 103 15 Economic growth 43 11 44 6 Poverty/wealth gap 32 9 52 7 Education reform/quality 23 6 43 6 Health care reform/financing 21 6 24 3 Universal suffrage 18 5 25 4 Social welfare 17 5 42 6 Pollution 15 4 21 3 Tax reform 10 3 14 2 Minimum wage/maximum working hours 8 2 18 3 Affordable housing 4 1 4 1 Immigrant problem 3 1 9 1 Domestic violence 3 1 2 0.3 Law & order/cross-border crime 1 0.3 2 0.3 Other 17 5 27 4

*Ranked by FC voter’s responses

53

The results of questions of worry related to employment (see below) indicate that unemployment and economic growth are gut responses of many people, not because they themselves are worried particularly about their job, but because they fear becoming unemployed at any time, for any reason. Hong Kong’s safety net is full of holes, and as the income study of the Census and Statistics Department showed, the bottom income earners who make barely enough to survive have grown in number over the past decade. Questions that raise instinctive responses alone will not give guidance as to what policies and priorities people really want candidates to pursue, so as seen in Table 40 and Chart 14 below, a more objective method must be employed.

Table 40 shows that statistically, support for District Council reforms ranks the same and at the very top with stopping harbor reclamation, actions on the environment, and passing a competition ordinance banning price fixing, monopolies and pressuring suppliers to restrict their business. Stunningly, these are not illegal currently in Hong Kong though legislation is now under draft, though not yet under debate in Legco.

Table 40 Do you support or oppose the following policies? (Nov 2006) FC voters Random

Support Oppose Support Oppose

Stop harbor reclamation 90 10 87 13

Reduce 1st registration tax 30% for environmentally friendly cars

89 11 88 12

District council reforms underway now 89 11 90 10

A plastic bag charge 88 12 78 22

Pass a competition ordinance banning price fixing, monopolies & pressuring suppliers to restrict their business

88 12 90 10

Speed up building Zhuhai-Macau bridge 88 12 85 15

Encourage talented mainlanders to emigrate to Hong Kong

78 22 68 32

Keep civil service same size as now 74 26 70 30

Set minimum wage for cleaners & security guards

73 27 77 23

Abolish all appointed DC seats 70 30 63 37

Allow foreign & mainland students to work part-time while at university

67 33 66 34

Mandatory medical insurance 65 35 61 39

A land-border crossing tax 64 36 52 48

Set a minimum wage for all workers 58 42 67 34

Consider wage rises for civil servants 56 44 42 58

Ban companies from forcing retirement at age 60

50 50 48 52

Set a 5-day workweek for all workers 49 51 54 46

Appoint political assistants to ministers 38 62 44 66

End policy of positive non-intervention 37 63 47 53

A goods & services tax 36 64 28 72

*Ranked in order of support by FC voters

54

Chart 14 Policy support levels, FC and Random compared (Nov 2006)

55

The results of these questions on policy do not show huge gaps between the richest and everyone else as might be expected, nor do they demonstrate a demand among Hong Kongers for welfarism. Indeed, they seem rather sensible if not conservative.

FINDING: The fact that District Council reforms rank so highly should be taken to show that governance reform is highly desired and supported, even if it is not in the forefront of most people’s consciousness. But when raised, respondents rank it as strongly supported as

12clean air and protecting the harbor.

That the election campaign made a difference can be seen not only in the Hong Kong Transition Project studies, but also in those conducted by the Hong Kong University Public Opinion Polling unit conducted by Robert Chung. Chung’s study shows the same dip in support (or rise in dissatisfaction) as the HKTP study.

Table 41 If a general election of the Chief Executive were to be held tomorrow, and

you had the right to vote, would you vote for Donald Tsang Yam-kuen? (per poll)

調�日期Date of survey

樣本人數Total

Sample

會Yes

唔會No

唔知／�難講DK/HS

合計Total

16/3/2005 1041 68% 9% 23% 100.0%

21-24/5/2005 1001 74% 9% 17% 100.0%

26-29/9/2005 1027 79% 8% 13% 100.0%

15-19/12/2005 1016 64% 15% 21% 100.0%

13-17/3/2006 1010 72% 9% 19% 100.0%

1-6/6/2006 1033 75% 11% 14% 100.0%

1-7/9/2006 1007 69% 11% 20% 100.0%

18-20/12/2006 1016 56% 21% 24% 100.0%

*Source: Hong Kong University POP site at http://hkupop.hku.hk/ accessed Jan 2007. Selected

quarterly results from Tsang taking office in March 2005.

Table 42 If you could vote directly for one of the currently declared or expected

candidates, Donald Tsang and Alan Leong, who would you vote for as CE? Nov 2006

FC voters Random

Donald Tsang 47 52

Alan Leong 24 21

Neither 17 16

Don’t Know 12 11

As Table 43 shows, in an open-ended question asked at the same time, the formerly much less well known Alan Leong had pulled even with Anson Chan while Donald Tsang garnered

A study by the Hong Kong General Chamber of Commerce shows Hong Kongers value the harbor at 69 to 73

billion HKD to have the harbor protected and improved, annually! See

http://www.chamber.org.hk/bulletin/story.asp?s=1615#h . That District Council reforms are equally if not more

supported must be taken seriously. See the full harbor development value report at

http://www.harbourbusinessforum.com/eng/downloads/hbf_HarbourValuesStudy.pdf

56

12

tepid support among FC registered voters and between one in five and one in four among random sample respondents.

Table 43 Who would you like to see compete for C.E. in the March 2007 election? Nov 2006 survey

FC voters Random sample Donald Tsang 16 22 Anson Chan 9 11 Alan Leong 9 9 Other 8 3 Henry Tang 2 1 Tsang Yoksing 1 1 James Tien 1 --Don’t Know 53 53

But when asked in April 2007, after the campaign and election, who they would have voted for if they had a vote, 77 percent indicated Tsang was their choice.

Table 44 If you could have voted for a Chief Executive in this election, who would you vote for:

April 2007

Donald Tsang 77

Alan Leong 13

Someone else 6

No one/not vote 4

So what happened between November 2006 and April 2007 to bring about such an increase in support? Tsang took his campaign to the people and agreed to participate in debates which were widely seen, and in those debates, Tsang committed himself to constitutional reform. Table 45 shows 86 percent of respondents watched or listened to the debates, an extraordinarily high proportion of the population.

Table 45 Did you watch or listen to the debates between Donald Tsang and Alan Leong?

April 2007

Yes 86

No 13

Unaware of debates/Don’t know 1

FINDING: In those debates, as Table 46 shows, 69% noted and recalled Tsang’s pledge. Any person working in communication knows that for this proportion of respondents to recall a month after the events queried, that the occasion must have been considered of high importance and significance.

57

Table 46 Have you heard of: Donald Tsang’s promise to deliver before 2012 a

roadmap and timetable to the universal suffrage elections promised in the Basic Law?

Group Count %

Yes 612 69

No 219 25

Don’t Know 58 6

So what accounts for this extraordinary attention to pledges of reform? Part IV assesses the current governance system and probes into what barriers stand in the way of reforms.

IV Constitutional reform and political development

A Assessments of the system: Civil Society participation

TREND Table 47 shows rising levels of participation in Hong Kong’s civil society. (See Chart 16) While political parties do not attract participants as widely, the data do show consistently 2%, or about 100,000 adult permanent residents out of 5 million in Hong Kong may be attending meetings or activities of political parties sometime in the prior six months.

Trend Table 47 Have you attended any meetings or activities of one of the following

groups in the last six months? (Percentage reporting membership/ attendance) TU PA KAI MAC CA POL CHA REC REL OWC EVG

Jan 1998 6 8 7 15 3 1 17 6 20

Oct 1998 5 5 8 10 3 1 16 5 20 12 5

July 1999 5 6 6 8 2 1 13 4 15 11 3

Nov 1999 6 6 5 8 2 1 16 7 16 12 4

Apr 2000 8 10 5 9 2 2 18 6 21 14 5

Nov 2000 6 6 5 6 2 2 16 7 19 14 5

Apr 2001 4 5 5 7 2 2 11 5 17 13 4

Nov 2001 5 6 4 6 2 2 15 7 18 12 5

Apr 2002 5 8 4 6 2 1 15 7 18 12 5

Feb 2003 4 8 6 8 3 3 21 6 20 15 6

Nov 2003 6 8 5 8 2 2 17 7 21 13 6

Apr 2004 6 8 4 7 3 1 16 5 20 15 6

July 2004 5 7 6 10 3 2 17 6 23 16 6

Aug 2004 4 5 6 8 2 2 19 7 22 17 7

Nov 2005 5 6 5 7 3 2 19 6 20 16 7

Mar 2006 4 9 6 10 4 2 22 9 24 22 8

Nov 2006 6 7 9 9 3 1 23 6 24 14 6

Apr 2007 7 8 8 9 5 2 25 9 26 17 7

KEY ABBREV.

Trade Union TU

Professional association PA

Kaifong KAI

Mutual Aid Committee MAC

Clan Association CA

Political/pressure group POL

Charitable Association CHA

Recreational & cultural group REC

Religious group or church REL

Owner’s corporation OWC

Environmental group EVG

58

Chart 15 Participation in Civil Society organizations

Chart 16 Cumulative participation (does not equal 100)

59

FINDING: Civil society has shown a strong recovery and growth from the average participation rates of 1998-2002.

B. Assessments of the system: Formal and informal participation

Trend Table 48 shows the measures of formal and informal means of expressing concern or seeking help. The items in blue represent the formal structures such as government departments and Legco members, to whom people are supposed to go for assistance with their problems. The measures in red are the more informal means people will use, usually when more formal providers of help or avenues of expression appear less useful or open to their views. Note the dramatic rise in protest participation in 2003 and strong rise in signing petitions, with no commensurate rises in contacting government departments or Legco members. Indeed, the formal structures appear to be undergoing a weakening over the 10 years of SAR government, though the Kaifongs, local voluntary neighborhood mutual assistance groups appear to have weakened after initially showing increased demand as the Asian Currency Crisis began to hit. Perhaps the lengthy demands on Kaifongs, then the recovery of economy began to lessen their participation rates. The role of District Councils in delivery of help with problems or avenues of expressing concerns consistently outweighs members of the Legislative Council, yet the District Councils get less attention and respect from government leaders and civil servants than they should for the role they play.

Trend Table 48 Did you express concern or seek help from any of the following groups

in the past 12 months? (% Yes responses only) GOV DEL FEL DC MED KAI POL PRO SIGN SURV DONR

July 1996 8 7 1 5 6 2 8 44 32 11

June 1997 10 6 1 5 7 2 7 43 33 16

Jan 1998 13 3 -- 6 8 2 5 41 37 18

Oct 1998 12 5 1 6 11 3 4 52 48 20

July 1999 10 6 2 5 8 3 6 45 40 15

Nov 1999 12 4 3 6 10 3 5 51 47 17

Apr 2000 17 5 3 6 10 5 5 49 46 17

Nov 2000 12 6 3 5 3 1 4 47 46 12

Apr 2001 11 6 3 3 2 2 3 36 39 15

Nov 2001 11 4 1 6 3 3 1 3 37 37 14

Apr 2002 10 3 1 6 4 2 2 2 25 36 14

Nov 2003 10 3 1 7 5 2 1 26 45 40 16

June 2004 11 4 2 8 3 3 1 25 42 43 15

Nov 2005 11 5 2 10 5 4 3 14 47 53 17

Mar 2006 8 4 2 6 3 2 1 13 44 48 14

Nov 2006 10 3 2 6 4 4 1 11 39 45 11

Apr 2007 13 4 1 8 3 2 1 8 40 47 13

KEY ABBREVIATION

Contact Government Dept. GOV

Contact Direct Elected Legco rep. DEL

Contact Legco Funct Rep. FEL

Contact District Council/Dist officer DC

Contact Mass Media MED

Contact local group/Kaifong KAI

Contact pressure/pol. group POL

Demonstrate/protest PRO

Signature Campaign SIGN

Opinion survey SURV

Donate to pol. party/pol group DONR

60

Chart 17: Expressing concern/seeking help in past 12 months

Chart 18: Expressing concern/seeking help: Formal and informal structures

61

FINDING: District Councils as an avenue of expressing concern and seeking help are employed consistently by more people than Legco members.

C. Assessments of the system: Fairness

Fairness is a fundamental factor in the legitimacy of any system of governance. While perceptions have improved about the fairness of policy-making in Hong Kong since the change of leadership in May 2005, only about a third assess policy-making as fair.

TREND Table 49 Do you think the government currently makes policies in general fairly, helping or hurting all parties equally, or unfairly, favoring the interests of some over others?

Very Fairly

Somewhat Fairly

Unfairly Very Unfairly

DK

Aug 2002 2 18 50 13 16 Nov 2002 3 22 50 15 10 Feb 2003 1 17 50 17 14 Apr 2004 2 19 53 13 14 May 2005 2 26 47 7 17 Mar 2006 2 33 48 5 12 Nov 2006 2 32 49 9 8 Apr 2007 2 32 47 8 10

FINDING: Assessments of policy-making fairness have risen from about one fifth considering the system fair to one third since change of leadership. This means that systemic problems remain considerable. Fairness perceptions also vary dramatically according to demographic and attitudinal variables (See below for specifics).

62

The following tables show that perceptions of policy-making fairness vary according to a number of factors. Table 50 shows that non-voters have much higher perceptions of fairness (40% combined very and somewhat fairly) than functional constituency voters (30% combined).

ASSOCIATION Table 50 Fairness of policy-making by voting registration

Very fairly Somewhat fairly Unfairly Very unfairly DK total

Geographic only 2 30 47 9 12 100

Functional constituency

2 28 57 8 5 100

Not registered 3 38 43 6 9 100

total 3 32 47 8 10 100 table contents: Percent of Row Total

Chi-square = 14.22 with 8 df p = 0.0763

FINDING: Functional constituency registered voters have stronger senses of unfairness in policy-making than geographic only registered voters and non-registrants.

The finding above is the more puzzling because functional constituency voters have two votes to the one accorded geographic constituency voters, and they have far greater power in Legco proportionately to their number. Table 51 shows that university graduates and post graduates tend to have much higher levels of perceptions of unfairness, with post-graduates showing fully two thirds consider policy-making in Hong Kong unfair while only 39 percent of those with no formal education up to primary level 6 feel the same.

63

ASSOCIATION Table 51 Fairness of policy-making by Education

Very

fairly

Somewhat

fairly

Unfairly Very

unfairly

DK total

0-P6 7 39 31 8 16 100

F1-F4 2 32 47 11 8 100

F5 2 34 47 7 10 100

F6-some Univ 1 35 47 7 11 100

Univ grad 3 27 52 8 10 100

Post-grad 3 25 53 13 6 100



ASSOCIATION Table 52 Fairness of policy-making by Workforce Sector

Very fairly Somewhat fairly Unfairly Very unfairly DK total Public 2 35 51 6 6 100 Private 3 29 50 9 9 100 Non-workforce 3 36 41 8 13 100 total 3 32 47 8 10 100

table contents: Percent of Row Total


FINDING: Private sector workers assess policy making as unfair at significantly higher levels than non-workforce members, by 59% to 49% respectively.

64

ASSOCIATION Table 53 Fairness of policy-making by Occupation

Very

fairly

Somewhat

fairly

Unfairly Very

unfairly

DK total

Managers and administrators

2 31 51 8 8 100

Professionals & Assoc Professionals

4 25 56 10 5 100

Clerks 1 30 53 7 9 100

Service workers and shop sales workers

3 35 39 9 14 100

Manual workers 3 29 46 10 12 100

Housewife 3 36 41 9 12 100

Retired 5 39 30 9 17 100

Unemployed 0 27 49 8 16 100

Student 0 36 54 3 7 100

Education Sector 0 26 68 3 3 100



FINDING: Perceptions of unfairness are highest among teachers, professionals, business and administrators, and clerks.

65

ASSOCIATION Table 54 Fairness of policy making by Income groups$0-19,999 $20,000-39,000 $40,000-79,999 $80,000+ total

Very fairly 2. 5 0.8 2 3 Somewhat fairly 40 32 33 31 35 Unfairly 46 58 57 58 53 Very unfairly 12 5 9 9 9 total 100 100 100 100 100 table contents: Percent of Column Total Chi-square = 18.84 with 9 df p = 0.0266

FINDING: The sense of policy-making unfairness appears highest among higher income groups and, as seen in Association Table 55 below, among young career and middle age groups. Hong Kong’s governance crisis may not be so much a matter of middle class stress as middle age and entering career/starting family aged crisis.

66

ASSOCIATION Table 55 Fairness of policy making by Age Groups (collapsed fairness)18-19 20-29 30-39 40-49 50-59 60-69 70-86 total

Fair 49 38 32 33 41 43 74 39 Unfair 51 62 68 67 59 57 26 62 total 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 table contents: Percent of Column Total Chi-square = 28.56 with 6 df p � 0.0001

FINDING: Perceptions of unfairness are also clearly affected by birthplace; however, birthplace appears to be more a counterpart of patriotism than simply birthplace per se, as the section on patriotism above made clear.

ASSOCIATION Table 56 Fairness of policy making by Birthplace HK born China born total

Very fairly 2 4 23 Somewhat fairly 33 44 35 Unfairly 57 43 53 Very unfairly 9 9 9 total 100 100 100 table contents: Percent of Column Total Chi-square = 12.04 with 3 df p = 0.0072

ASSOCIATION Table 57 Fairness of policy making by PatriotismNon-patriotic Patriotic total

Very fairly 2 7 3 Somewhat fairly 31 51 36 Unfairly 58 35 53 Very unfairly 10 8 9 total 100 100 100 table contents: Percent of Column Total Chi-square = 42.82 with 3 df p � 0.0001

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With a majority holding that the current system of policy making by government is unfair, what reforms do people accept as making the system fairer?

Would the following make government policies fairer or less fair?

Table 58a. direct election of the CE

Group Count %

Much fairer 210 24

Fairer 388 44

Stay same 118 13

Less fair 80 9

Much less fair 30 3

DK 63 7

FINDING: Clearly, the vast majority believe direct election of the CE would make government policies fairer.

Table 58b. increasing number of eligible voters in the FCs

Group Count %

Much fairer 165 19

Fairer 455 51

Stay same 83 9

Less fair 70 8

Much less fair 31 3

DK 85 10

FINDING: An even larger majority believe increasing the number of eligible voters in the functional constituencies would make policies fairer. This is particularly the case among FC registered voters (80% say increasing number of eligible voters would make policies fairer).

ASSOCIATION TABLE 58b1 Increasing number of eligible voters in the FCs by:

Registered to vote

Much

fairer

Fairer Stay

same

Less

fair

Much less

fair

DK total

Geographic 18 51 8 9 4 9 100

Functional 27 43 15 8 2 6 100

Not registered 16 56 9 6 2 12 100

total 19 51 9 8 3 9 100 table contents: Percent of Row Total Chi-square = 22.08 with 10 df p = 0.0147

FINDING: Widening the representativeness of each FC also receives more support by FC registered voters than among geographic or non-registrants.

68

Table 58c. widening the representativeness of each FC

Group Count %

Much fairer 144 16

Fairer 476 54

Stay same 74 8

Less fair 66 7

Much less fair 27 3

DK 102 11

ASSOCIATION TABLE 58c1 Widening the representativeness of each FC by

Registered to vote:

Much

fairer

Fairer Stay

same

Less

fair

Much less

fair

DK total

Geographic only 15 52 9 9 3 12 100

FC 24 50 13 6 2 6 100

Not registered 15 57 6 5 3 14 100

total 16 53 8 8 3 11 100 table contents: Percent of Row Total


ASSOCIATION TABLE 58c2 Widening the representativeness of each FC by: Income

$0-19,999 $20,000-39,000 $40,000-79,999 $80,000+ total

Much fairer 13 17 23 21 16

Fairer 50 62 53 54 55

Stay same 8 6 12 12 8

Less fair 8 8 5 4 7

Much less fair 4 2 2 2 3

DK 17 6 5 7 11



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Table 58d. Replacing 30 current FCs with 30 members elected from a list of candidates

from all Hong Kong

Group Much fairer Fairer Stay same Less fair Much less fair DK

Count

145

433

83

77

28

123

%

16

49

9

9

3

14

FINDING: There is even about two thirds support for at-large elections from a list of candidates to replace the 30 Functional Constituencies. Though FC registered voters are not quite as supportive of this idea non-registrants and geographic registered voters.

ASSOCIATION TABLE 58d1 Replacing 30 current FCs with 30 members elected from

a list of candidates from all Hong Kong by: Registered to vote

Much

fairer

Fairer Stay

same

Less

fair

Much less

fair

DK total

Geographic only 18 47 10 10 3 12 100

FC 19 43 15 7 5 12 100

Not registered 13 54 6 7 2 18 100

total 17 48 9 9 3 14 100 table contents: Percent of Row Total Chi-square = 21.85 with 10 df p = 0.0159

There are also high levels of support are for simply abolishing all FCs and directly electing all members of Legco geographically, particularly among those who work in the public or private sector (non-workforce members are less supportive, but still show two thirds support). And higher income groups tend to be more supportive of abolishing all FCs and direct elections.

Table 58e. Abolishing all FCs and electing all Legco members directly from geographic

constituencies

Group Much fairer Fairer Stay same Less fair Much less fair DK

Count

199

436

45

103

25

81

%

22

49

5

12

3

9

70

ASSOCIATION TABLE 58e1 Abolishing all FCs and electing all Legco members

directly from geographic constituencies by: Workforce Sector

Much

fairer

Fairer Stay

same

Less

fair

Much less

fair

DK total

Public 28 47 5 8 4 8 100

Private 24 49 5 13 3 6 100

Non-workforce 18 49 5 12 2 14 100

total 22 49 5 12 3 9 100 table contents: Percent of Row Total


ASSOCIATION TABLE 58e2 Abolishing all FCs and electing all Legco members

directly from geographic constituencies by: Income groups

$0-19,999 $20,000-39,000 $40,000-79,999 $80,000+ total

Much fairer 19 21 30 33 22

Fairer 46 54 50 46 49

Stay same 7 3 5 5 5

Less fair 14 12 8 9 12

Much less fair 3 2 5 2 3

DK 11 8 3 5 8



The only reform NOT supported by a majority, or substantial majority, as improving policy-making fairness is one involving the District Councils. Table 57f contains a variant of the reforms proposed by C.E. Tsang which were turned down in December 2005. His proposal would have added 5 new seats to the FCs, all from the District Councils.

71

Table 58f. replacing current 30 FCs with 18 elected by voters from District Council

districts and 12 from a list of candidates from all Hong Kong*

Group Count %

Much fairer 65 7

Fairer 302 34

Stay same 90 10

Less fair 188 21

Much less fair 48 5

DK 196 22

FINDING: These results, the only reform NOT supported by a majority, may indicate current District Council election arrangements are not seen as representative enough and thus no improvement on the present unfair electoral arrangements for Functional Constituencies. This finding highlights a need to reform District Councils. So if so many variants of reforms are seen as helping to solve the problem of unfairness in policy making, what barriers stand in the way of bringing reform to fruition? Section D of Part IV examines these barriers.

D. Assessments of the system: Barriers to reform

From the analysis to this point there appear ample grounds to conclude governance reforms are needed and supported by majorities to overwhelming majorities, particularly among elite groups and voters. The questions are, what reforms specifically, at what levels, when to implement them, how much to reform at each step, and who opposes them and, respectively, why do they support or oppose certain and/or all reforms. The issue of constitutional reform and these questions troubled the final years of colonial government. They have troubled the first decade of the SAR government. An extraordinary proportion of Hong Kongers – 86% --watched the debates between the candidates in the first contested Chief Executive election in March 2007. A month later 69% recalled hearing the C.E. pledge to provide a roadmap and a timetable for constitutional reforms in these debates. This pledge, to resolve this issue, comprises either the bedrock upon which political and democratic development, including the development of a mature party system and effective governance structures will be built, or the rock on which the ship of state may founder. So what are the barriers blocking reform?

One of the major obstacles to reforms, particularly of Legco, rests in the extraordinary power and exclusive representation given functional constituency voters. The November 2006 survey of random residents and FC registered voters explored four key barriers to reforms.

Table 59 Do you agree or disagree that: “Hong Kong people are politically mature enough to elect the CE by universal suffrage”

FC Nov 2006 All Nov 2006 May 2007 Strongly disagree 5 5 10 Disagree 34 36 35 Agree 45 45 37 Strongly agree 13 10 13 Don’t know 3 5 5

In March 2007 C.E. Tsang directly addressed this issue, exclaiming in his acceptance speech that his election proved that Hong Kong people were politically mature. But the May 2007

72

survey indicates that his proclamation that Hong Kong people are mature enough to directly elect the C.E. failed to sway opinion among a substantial proportion of the electorate, particularly those who see the Democratic Alliance for the Betterment and Progress of Hong Kong (DAB) as best representing or protecting their interests. Table 60 gives the results of the question of interest representation for all parties. Table 61 shows results of the question in Table 59 by the question in Table 60.

Table 60 Of the 4 biggest political parties in Legco (Democratic Alliance for the Betterment of Hong Kong, Democratic Party, Liberal Party, Civic Party) which party if any do you feel represents or protects your interest best?

Mar 2006

May 2007

DAB 15 17 DP 14 18* LP 3 10* CP 18 16 None of them 32 21* Don’t Know 16 19 *Statistically significant change

Key: Comparison ChartDAB Democratic Alliance for the Betterment and Progress of Hong Kong DP Democratic Party LP Liberal Party CP Civic Party

Chart 19 below shows that whereas in March 2006 the four major parties may or may not have represented a majority of Hong Kongers (due to range of error of +/-4 points and a result of exactly 50 percent, in May 2007 the four major parties have clearly increased their stance as protecting or representing the interests of a majority of Hong Kongers.

73

Chart 19 Cumulative Chart of Table 60, on Party representation

ASSOCIATION Table 61 Agree/Disagree on “Hong Kong people are politically mature enough to elect CE by universal suffrage” by Which party represents/protects your interests best (DK responses to Agree/Disagree on maturity dropped)

Strongly disagree Disagree Agree Strongly agree total DAB 32 22 11 10 17 DP 5 13 26 23 18 LP 12 11 11 5 10 CP 5 13 15 35 16 None 30 21 20 15 21 DK 16 20 17 13 18 total 100 100 100 100 100 table contents: Percent of Column Total Chi-square = 89.45 with 15 df p � 0.0001

74

FINDING: Table 61 shows that about a third of those who strongly disagree that Hong Kongers are politically mature see the DAB as best representing their interests. In contrast, the Democrats and Civic Party combined contribute only about 10 percent of those who strongly disagree.

Table 62 takes the same question and responses and shows what proportions of each party affiliated respondents agrees or disagrees on political maturity. Not surprisingly, the pro-democracy supporters of the Democratic Party and Civic Party agree that Hong Kong people are politically mature enough to vote for the Chief Executive by large majorities. Still, significant portions of both parties disagree.

ASSOCIATION Table 62 Agree/disagree on political maturity by Which main parties represent/protect your interests best May 2007

DAB DP LP CP None DK total Strongly disagree 20 3 13 3 16 10 11 Disagree 47 25 39 31 38 42 37 Agree 25 54 41 36 37 38 38 Strongly Agree 8 17 7 31 10 10 14 total 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 table contents: Percent of Column Total Chi-square = 89.45 with 15 df p � 0.0001

In order to probe more deeply into why people oppose or support direct elections, we posed the question in Table 63 and then a follow-up.

Table 63 Do you agree or disagree that: “Direct elections in Hong Kong will increase government spending on welfare”

FC Nov 2006 All Nov 2006 May 2007 Strongly disagree 4 3 4 Disagree 38 41 32 Agree 46 42 44 Strongly agree 3 4 9 Don’t know 9 10 11

75

In the May 2007 survey we added a follow-up question to clarify whether the responses to the question in Table 63 were expressions of disapproval or fear of welfare increases, or expressions of approval and hope for welfare increases. The responses indicate that by far the most see increased spending on welfare as a good effect of direct elections. Those who disagree that direct elections will increase spending on welfare should be considered as dismissing direct elections’ effect on welfare as a matter of concern either way.

Table 64 In your view, would increased spending on welfare be a good effect or a bad effect? (Don’t Knows dropped) May 2007 May 2007 % % Combined Disagree welfare will increase

(37) Removed

Very good effect 13 23 GOOD Good effect 32 52 75 Bad effect 12 19 BAD Very bad effect 4 6 25

The results make very clear that most people consider direct elections of no impact on welfare or that direct elections would have a beneficial impact of increasing spending on welfare. However, those who see one of the four parties representing their interests best show very different responses on whether increased welfare spending is a good or bad effect of direct elections according to party.

ASSOCIATION Table 65 Effect of increased welfare spending by Party best represents/protects interest May 2007

DAB DP LP CP None DK total Good effect 64 85 73 77 70 79 75 Bad effect 36 15 28 23 30 21 25 total 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 table contents: Percent of Column Total Chi-square = 11.85 with 5 df p = 0.0369

76

Chart 20 Effect of increased welfare spending by Which party represents interest best

Tables 66 and 67, from the November 2006 survey, show that a majority agree that direct elections in Hong Kong depends on increasing direct elections in China but that most disagree that direct elections in Hong Kong will lead to confrontation with the central government. Functional Constituency voters disagree more strongly than the average of all respondents that direct elections will lead to confrontation with the central government.

Table 66 Do you agree or disagree that: “Direct elections in Hong Kong ultimately depends on increasing people’s participation in direct elections in China” Nov 2006 FC Random

Count % Count % Strongly disagree 20 5 38 5 Disagree 131 35 203 29 Agree 172 46 360 51 Strongly agree 34 9 57 8 Don’t know 17 5 48 8

Table 67 Do you agree or disagree that: “Direct elections in Hong Kong will lead to confrontation with the central government” Nov 2006 FC Random

Count % Count % Strongly disagree 33 9 63 9 Disagree 227 61 386 55 Agree 93 25 193 27 Strongly agree 7 2 19 3 Don’t know 14 4 45 6

77

FINDING: There are significant proportions of the public who are not sure the Hong Kong public is mature enough for direct elections, but fear of welfare increases does not appear to be a significant factor in the way for the vast majority. Nor do most people believe that direct elections in Hong Kong will lead to confrontation with the central government. Yet the issue of election reform and when to implement direct election reform remains contentious and the recently contested CE election has had significant impact, as Part IV shows.

V Constitutional Reforms: A. Executive

In principle, support for directly electing the C.E. has been and remains at around three out of four in favor. The recent contested C.E. election appears to have lessened opposition to direct election of the C.E. among many who opposed, but it has also strengthened the tiny minority who are strongly opposed to it, from 2 to 3 percent before to 6 percent in May, even though all up, those opposed dropped from 20 percent in November among all respondents to 8 percent in May, a considerable drop.

Table 68 In principle, do you support or oppose direct election of the Chief Executive?

Strongly

support

Support Neutral/DK Oppose Strongly

oppose

Nov 2003 33 48 6 11 2

Dec 2004 20 54 10 13 3

May 2005 33 42 11 11 3

Nov 2005 22 47 19 10 2

Nov 2006 23 50 7 17 3

Nov 06 FC voters 28 50 4 16 2

May 2007 25 51 16 2 6

78

There are no demographic variables associated significantly with this question, only patriotic respondents show a slightly increased propensity to oppose direct election of the CE.

FINDING: There has been a pushing back of when respondents would implement direct C.E. elections, from about two thirds support for 2007-2012 to about 60 percent support for 2012-2017, with a significant plurality agreeing on 2017.

Table 69 When would you implement direct election of the Chief Executive? Nov 2006 May 2007

2007 33

2012 31 16

2017 4 44

2022 4 8

Later 9

Opposed/DK 28 24

Though the date of directly electing the CE may have been pushed back by the results of the March 2007 CE election, the contested election also seems to have lowered objections to the CE being a member of a party, as Table 66 and the chart show.

Table 70 Do you support or oppose CE candidates to be members of a party? Nov 2006 % May 2007 %

Strongly support 2 3 Support 27 32 Oppose 47 42 Strongly oppose 7 4 Don’t know 17 19

79

Chart 21 Do you support or oppose CE candidates to be members of a party?

The election debate also appears to have strengthened support for turning the CE election committee into a nomination committee to chose candidates to compete in direct elections.

Table 71 Do you support or oppose turning current CE election committee into a nomination committee to choose candidates who will compete in direct elections?

Nov 2006 % May 2007 % Strongly support 4 5 Support 49 53 Oppose 19 19 Strongly oppose 4 2 Don’t know 24 21

80

FINDING: The debates, watched by 86 percent of respondents, have generated a strong increase in support for such televised debates in future, going from 87 percent support (17 percent strongly supporting) to 92 percent support, with 29 percent strongly supporting.

Table 72 Do you approve or disapprove having publicized televised debates among candidates?

Nov 2006 % May 2007 % Strongly approve 17 29 Approve 70 63 Disapprove 8 5 Strongly disapprove

1 1

Don’t know 4 3

The recent Chief Executive election has clearly had an impact on attitudes toward competitive elections, party membership, party endorsements of candidates, televised debates and so on. Has its impact extended into attitudes toward legislative reforms, and do they extend down to local level District Council reforms and attitudes toward the parties?

Table 73 For the C.E. elections do you approve or disapprove of:

May 2007 Competition for election

Pol party endorsements

DAB & LP supporting Tsang

DP & Civic Party supporting Leong

Strongly approve 42 7 3 3 Approve 53 66 55 48 Disapprove 3 14 17 21 Strongly disapprove -- 1 2 3 Don’t know 3 12 23 24

81

Chart 22 For the C.E. elections do you approve or disapprove of:

Constitutional Reforms: B. Legislative Council

The contested C.E. election in 2007 and the role of the parties in it may have increased support for directly electing all members of Legco. In March 2006 two thirds supported direct elections of all members while 22 percent opposed. In May 2007 nearly three fourths supported direct elections while 16 percent opposed. A question on the timing of direct elections for Legco finds 31 percent of respondents wanting full direct elections of all members in next year’s elections. This is despite the ruling in April 2004 by the Standing Committee of the National Peoples Congress that such full direct elections could not take place in 2008. An equal proportion, 29 percent, want full direct elections by the following round, in 2012. (See Table 75)

Table 74 In principle, do you support or oppose directly electing all members of Legco?

Nov 2003 Dec 2004 Nov 2005 Mar 2006 May 2007

Strongly support 29 21 24 18 20

Support 48 52 48 48 53

Neutral/DK 9 9 6 15 11

Oppose 13 16 18 16 14

Strongly oppose 1 3 4 3 2

82

Chart 23 In principle support for directly electing all Legco members

Table 75 When would you implement direct elections of all Legco members?

Nov 2006

2008 31

2012 29

2016 4

Later 9

Opposed/DK 27

FINDING: There is stronger support for reforming the 2008 elections since the April 2004 National Peoples Congress Standing Committee has ruled out full direct election of all Legco members in 2008. While 31 percent want direct election of all members in 2008, which has been ruled out, 51 percent support reforming the 2008 Legco elections as permitted.

Table 76 Do you support or oppose reforming the 2008 Legco election methods as

permitted by the April 2004 Standing Committee decision and the Basic Law?

Group Count %

Strongly support Support Oppose Strongly oppose DK

28

431

93

11

326

3

48

10

1

37

There is particular support for reforming the Functional Constituency elections, with 56 percent support to end corporate voting (1 company, 1 vote) by extending the vote to all company directors and senior management.

83

Table 77 Do you support or oppose extending corporate voting in the functional

constituencies in 2008 Legco election to all company directors and senior

management?

Group Count %

Strongly support Support Oppose Strongly oppose DK

44

450

228

36

131

5

51

26

4

15

Clearly, from the above and from the responses to questions about the fairness of policy-making in Hong Kong, support for governance reforms at the executive and legislative levels is strong, despite some concerns about barriers in the way such as political maturity and possible problems with the central government. But does the support for governance reforms extend down to the grass-roots levels of the 18 District Councils? And is the concern for political maturity reflected in attitudes toward the political parties? We turn in the next section to the first question along with the role the parties play in grass-roots reforms, and in Part VI to address problem solving by and the images of the political parties.

Constitutional Reforms: C. District Councils

The District Councils, named District Boards until 1999, were Hong Kong’s first universal suffrage elected representative body upon their establishment in the first elections in 1982. Primarily meant as a forum to express views and to receive government briefings on matters affecting neighborhoods and residents, the District Boards (DB) retained an appointed element until 1993 when Hong Kong’s last British governor ended the practice of appointing approximately one in five members and turned it into Hong Kong’s first fully elected body of governance. Even with appointees and limited resources, the DBs were strongly contested by political parties as means to set up local bases of contact and organization at the neighborhood level. Since DB members receive a small stipend and support for offices to work with neighborhoods, the parties also view winning a DB seat as a means to get funding and organizational presence at the local level. The first past the post method of election has made districts into “strongholds” for members and parties, which parties work hard to extend and build into a base for campaigning for Legco. Governor Patten also turned the District Boards into a source of strong political influence in the final years under Britain by making them the Election Committee that returned 10 members to Legco. This was rescinded as soon as Tung Chee-hwa took power in July 1997. When the Urban and Regional Councils, which had limited tax powers and were the only elected, representative body besides the Executive who could make policy were abolished in 1999, the Tung government won Legco support by promising that the renamed District Councils (DC) would in future get real power over local facilities and some enhanced funding. This promise was not fulfilled until Donald Tsang, who served as a District Officer earlier in his career, took power in March 2005 with Tung’s resignation. Presently, in a slow rollout of the reforms in what is also described as a test prior to possibly expanding the reforms, 4 of the 18 DCs have been granted limited powers over venue use and some additional funding. The reforms are supported by substantial majorities.

84

Tables 74 polls the 14 districts not yet reformed on whether they would support or oppose the reforms being extended to their districts. Table 75 polls the four reformed districts as a whole on how satisfied or dissatisfied residents are with the reforms, and Tables 80-83 poll the four districts separately on attitudes toward the reforms.

Table 78 Would you support or oppose District Councilors getting power to manage

public facilities in your district, such as:

Libraries Community

halls

Leisure

grounds

Sports

venues

Support 60 69 70 62

Neutral 16 11 8 11

Oppose 20 16 18 23

DK 4 4 4 4

Table 79 shows that large portions of residents in the reformed districts do not yet know about the reforms, particularly in the case of DC members’ roles with neighborhood libraries and community halls. But three out of four aspects show a majority satisfied with DC involvement, and no aspect shows significant dissatisfaction. Tables 80-83 show that these sentiments vary widely among the 4 districts.

Table 79 Are you satisfied or dissatisfied with the District Councilors’ management of

public facilities in your district:

Libraries Community

halls

Leisure

grounds

Sports

venues

Satisfied 51 43 56 53

Neutral 17 19 19 16

Dissatisfied 11 10 15 14

DK 21 28 10 17

85

Chart 24 Satisfaction with District Councilors’ management of public facilities (4

Reformed Districts

Wanchai DC shows the highest level of satisfaction across most aspects while Sai Kung DC shows the lowest levels of satisfaction on most aspects.

Table 80 Wanchai District

Libraries Community

halls

Leisure

grounds

Sports

venues


Neutral 16 20 28 16


DK 20 28 8 12

Table 81 Wong Tai Sin District

Libraries Community

halls

Leisure

grounds

Sports

venues


Neutral 21 21 15 15


DK 20 30 10 21

Table 82 Tuen Mun District

Libraries Community

halls

Leisure

grounds

Sports

venues


Neutral 16 22 16 11


DK 24 27 11 13

86

Table 83 Sai Kung District

Libraries Community

halls

Leisure

grounds

Sports

venues


Neutral 17 12 20 22


DK 20 29 12 22

Chart 25 Satisfaction by Reformed DC, by Venue

FINDING: The reformed DCs show consistently higher levels of attending DC arranged or sponsored events, with 15 percent attending such events in reformed DCs versus 10 percent attendance in non-reformed DCs. And attending Mutual Aid Committee meetings is higher in reformed DCs than non-reformed, by 11 percent versus 7 percent respectively. As Table 84 shows, most members of the public in the reformed districts consider service to have improved or remained unchanged, with fewer than one in ten thinking service has deteriorated under the reforms. In Table 85, the unreformed districts show strong majorities expecting the reforms to improve services. Overall, in principle, only 5 in 100 want the powers and responsibilities of DCs decreased while 50 in a 100 want them increased and about a third, 36 percent, want them kept the same (Table 86).

Table 84 Has the DCs management of these facilities improved or deteriorated service

levels from before the reforms (4 Reformed DCs)

%

Greatly improved 3

Somewhat improved 46

No change 26

Deteriorated 7

Greatly deteriorated 2

Don’t Know 15

87

Table 85 Do you think giving the DCs power to manage these facilities will improve or

deteriorate present service levels?

%

Greatly improve 10

Somewhat improve 57

No change 10

Deteriorate 9

Greatly deteriorate 2

Don’t Know 12

Table 86 In principle, do you think the powers and responsibilities of District

Councilors should be:

%

Greatly increased 9

Somewhat increased 41

Kept same 36

Decreased somewhat 3

Greatly decreased 2

Don’t Know 9

ASSOCIATION Table 87 Increase/decrease powers of DCs by Which party best

represents interests

DAB DP LP CP None DK total

Greatly increased 8 9 5 11 10 12 9

Somewhat increased 45 49 33 49 35 34 41

Kept same 38 33 47 37 35 31 36

Decreased somewhat 5 3 4 2 3 1 3

Greatly decreased 2 0 5 0.8 4 0 2

Don’t Know 3 6 6 0.8 12 22 9

total 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 table contents: Percent of Column Total


88

FINDING: Most respondents believe that giving voters the power to elect DC members will improve service levels and a majority of party supporters except in the Liberal Party support increasing the powers and responsibilities of DCs.

Table 88 Do you think giving voters power to elect or reject District Councilors in the

coming election, based on their performance, will affect service levels?

%

Greatly positive effect 23

Some positive effect 54

No effect either way 11

Some negative effect 4

Great negative effect 1

Don’t Know 7

While majorities believe electing DC members will have a positive effect, the two pro-democracy parties show significantly higher levels of such beliefs.

ASSOCIATION Table 89 Elect/reject District Councilors in elections by Which party

best represent interests


Greatly positive effect 21 26 20 33 19 22 23

Some positive effect 52 59 54 59 54 50 55

No effect either way 11 8 19 4 13 12 11

Some negative effect 8 2 4 2 3 2 4

Great negative effect 0.7 0 1 2 1 0 0.7

Don’t Know 7 5 1 0.8 11 13 7



89

The same two parties show even greater differences in believing that elected members do their work on the District Councils better than appointed members. (See Table 91)

Table 90 Do you think elected members do their work on the District Councils better,

worse or the same as appointed members?

%

Much better 11

Better 43

Same 25

Worse 8

Much worse 1

Don’t Know 12

ASSOCIATION Table 91 Elected DC members better or worse than appointed by

Which party represents interest


Much better 7 19 10 20 11 7 12

Better 35 55 41 50 44 35 44

Same 32 17 24 22 27 31 26

Worse 15 3 11 2 7 4 7

Much worse 2 0 4 0 0 1 0.9

Don’t Know 9 6 10 7 12 21 11



FINDING: When it comes to the bottom line question of whether respondents prefer to have all DC members appointed, elected, or keep the same 400 electees/102 appointees as now, the supporters of the two pro-democracy parties clearly prefer election over other options. Only DAB supporters show less than a majority preferring to elect all DC members. (Table 93)

90

Table 92 Would you prefer to have all DC members appointed, all DC members

elected, or stay the same as now?

%

All appointed 6

All elected 58

Stay same 32

DK 4

ASSOCIATION Table 93 Prefer all appointed, elected or stay same by Which party

represents interest


All appointed 11 1 8 3 4 9 6

All elected 38 73 57 79 55 50 58

Stay same 47 24 33 17 35 31 31

DK 2 0 3 0 5 8 3



Table 94 shows the percentage of respondents by which party they believe protects or represents their interests best in each of the 18 District Councils. Since the sample size is only 800 divided by 18 districts (and about 500 of the 800 indicated a party represented their interests while about 300 indicated none or did not know if any party did, so the number per district is smaller than the full 800 sample size divided 18 ways), these figures should only be taken as indicative and not, by any means, as actual indicators of the proportion of supporters in each district. But the election results by District broadly comport with many of these figures. For example, Tai Po and Sai Kung districts are well-known strongholds of the Liberal Party while the DAB has a strong presence in Eastern district on Hong Kong Island. Since the Civic Party as of yet has no official DC members who have contested election, these results may indicate the party as having strengths in Hong Kong Island and fair support in most districts. The overall totals of party supporters by district is a more accurate indicator of political awareness by district.

91

Table 94 Which of four main parties represents interests best by District CouncilCW WC East S YTM SSP Kow WTS KT TW TM YL KT Is N TP Sha SK total

DAB 10 16 24 13 28 24 22 13 19 0 18 21 15 21 16 15 10 5 17

DP 21 12 18 21 24 16 13 21 13 20 11 16 27 16 16 17 21 15 18

CP 26 24 17 11 17 11 17 21 6 15 16 18 12 5 13 15 16 17 15

LP 0 12 5 6 7 11 15 8 13 15 7 9 6 26 9 17 16 12 10 TOTAL 57 64 64 51 76 62 67 63 51 50 52 64 60 68 54 64 63 49 60

DISTRICTS KEY

Group Count

Central & Western CW

Wan Chai** EC

Eastern East

Southern S

Yau Tsim Mong YTM

Sham Shui Po SSP

Kowloon City Kow

Wong Tai Sin** WTS

Kwun Tong KT

Tsuen Wan TW

Tuen Mun** TM

Yuen Long YL

Kwai Tsing KT

Islands Is

North N

Tai Po TP

Shatin Sha

Sai Kung** SK

**Reformed Districts

The location of party supporters should also be compared to their plans to vote in the November 2007 DC elections. The Civic Party has the highest proportion of supporters who say they plan to vote in November, with the DAB and Democratic Party not far behind, while a third of the already smaller contingent of Liberal Party supporters plan now not to vote. And party orientation in terms of which party best performs on interest representation or protection significantly affects propensity to vote, as the contrast of respondents who did not know or said no party represents them show much higher levels of planning not to vote.

ASSOCIATION Table 95 Do you plan to vote in the upcoming November 2007 DC

elections by Which party best represents your interests


Not vote 23 27 33 20 36 42 31

Plan to vote 77 73 67 80 64 58 69



FINDING: While DCs may not get much attention in the media, residents contact them for help or to express concern just as much as they participate in demonstrations and protests. Ten percent of respondents indicated they had joined a protest in the previous 6 months, but 11 percent said they had contacted a DC member in the same period. Only contacting a

92

government department exceeded DC contact, with 13% reporting contacting a government department in the previous 6 months. Of those who contacted a DC member, 65 percent were satisfied with the District Councilor’s response while 35 percent were unsatisfied.

Table 96 Do you know whether your DC member is a member of a political party or

not? (multiple answers, does not add to 100)

Group %

DP 21

DAB 21

LP 6

Frontier 1

Confederation of Trade Unions 1

Federation of Trade Unions 1

Civic Party 1

ADPL 2

League of Social Democrats 1

Other political groups 2

Independents 10

Don’t Know 45

Table 97 Does your District Councilor know your district’s needs?

Group Count %

Very well 67 8

Somewhat well 335 42

Not well 102 13

Not well at all 30 4

Can’t say/DK 266 33

ASSOCIATION Table 98 Does DC member know your district’s needs by Plan to vote

Not vote Plan to vote total

Very well 5 10 8

Somewhat well 30 47 42

Not well 15 12 13

Not well at all 6 3 4

Can’t say/DK 44 29 33



93

FINDING: Residents who believe their DC members knows their district’s needs have a significantly higher propensity to vote in elections.

Table 99 shows that the two pro-democracy parties have significantly higher proportions of those who choose those parties as best representing or protecting their interests who say their DC members knows their district’s needs well.

ASSOCIATION Table 99 DC members knows district needs by Which party

represents interests best


Very well 8 14 5 9 8 5 8

Somewhat well 41 50 38 53 35 33 42

Not well 17 13 17 11 10 11 13

Not well at all 5 1 5 3 4 5 4

Can’t say/DK 28 22 35 24 43 46 34



Clearly those who believe a political party best represents or protects their interests demonstrate much higher propensities to vote. Those who believe a DC member knows their district’s need show a higher propensity to vote. They also tend to consider themselves supporters or members of a political party in higher proportions and plan to vote in greater numbers, and they donate more to political groups.

ASSOCIATION Table 100 Do you consider yourself a supporter or member of a

political party in Hong Kong by Plan to vote in November 2007 DC elections


Supporter/member 34 12 10

Not supporter 96 88 90



94

ASSOCIATION Table 101 Do you consider yourself a supporter or member of a

political party in Hong Kong by Which party represents interests best


Supporter/member 14 17 3 14 4 5 9

Not supporter 86 83 98 86 96 95 91



ASSOCIATION Table 102 Did you give a donation to any political group in the past 12

months by Plan to vote in November 2007


Donor 4 9 8

Non-donor 96 91 92

total 100 100 100 table contents: Percent of Column Total Chi-square = 6.319 with 1 df p = 0.0119

ASSOCIATION Table 103 Political donors by Which party represents interests best


Donor 6 14 5 12 5 4 8

Non-donor 94 86 95 88 95 96 92



So clearly, DC reforms increase political participation and political support for parties, as well as vice versa, support for parties translates into election participation, financial support, and taking part in district affairs. But do the parties solve problems of constituents? Are they seen as taking stances on issues of community concern, and if so, which parties are best associated with these issues? These are the questions addressed in Part VI, the final descriptive and analytical part of this report.

VI Problem solving by government and parties

In most countries with well established party systems solving constituents’ problems is the core of everyday politics. In countries with fully elected leadership in the executive and legislature, the failure to address problems and alleviate worries of voters can cost the politician their job at the next poll date. In Hong Kong the past 10 years have shown that those who ignore the worries of the public, even though they are unelected or elected only indirectly or elected by small franchises, can lose their jobs or risk major public disruption. The massive marches of 2003 and 2004 were responses to the felt failure of government to respond to fears which ranged from loss of freedoms in the face of proposed Article 23 legislation or loss of life and property in the SARS crisis.

95

A. Issues of concern: worry and problems

TREND Table 104 and the following separate TREND tables on specific issues of concern show the pattern of respondents’ concerns over the past decade and more. Table 104 puts these worries in rank order, from least worried about issue, social unrest and street protests, to the one almost everyone has some degree of concern about, air and water pollution.

Table 104 Are you currently worried or not about these specific aspects affecting you, your family or Hong Kong (May 2007):

Not

worried

Slightly

worried

Somewhat

worried

Very

worried

Don’t

Know

Social unrest & street protests 67 17 9 5 1

Your employment situation 58 17 13 10 1

The rule of law 57 20 12 8 3

Corrupt officials 56 23 10 9 2

Crime 54 26 12 8 1

Free press 53 23 15 9 1

Corrupt business people 38 30 17 11 4

Overpopulation (Nov 2006) 34 19 25 21 1

Aging of Hong Kong population 18 26 30 24 1

Corrupt mainland business officials

13 16 25 43 4

Corrupt mainland officials 13 16 25 43 4

Air & water pollution 8 16 29 46 --

Chart 26 below puts the data from the table above into graphic format. It shows that clearly, corruption on the mainland among government officials and business people, as well as air and water pollution (also mainland linked, for Hong Kong gets most of its water and much of its air pollution from the mainland) dominate all other local issues but the aging of the Hong Kong population. There is also a fair degree of concern with local corrupt business people.

96

Chart 26 Worries of Hong Kong respondents by issue

97

TREND Table 105: Are you currently worried or not worried about: Free press ? Not Worried slightly worried fairly worried Very Worried DK

Apr 2001 50 25 13 7 5

July 2001 56 21 11 8 3

Nov 2001 53 23 12 8 4

Apr 2002 58 19 12 7 4

Aug 2002 49 26 16 5 4

Nov 2002 46 23 16 12 3

Feb 2003 47 23 16 10 5

Dec 2003 53 24 14 5 4

Apr 2004 46 26 15 10 2

May 2004 39 28 20 12 1

June 2004 36 27 18 17 3

July 2004 42 29 17 10 2

Aug 2004 41 28 20 10 2

Nov 2004 48 24 17 6 3

May 2005 58 25 10 5 2

Nov 2005 57 26 10 6 2

Mar 2006 55 25 11 8 1

Nov 2006 51 23 16 9 1

Apr 2007 53 23 15 9 1

Fears about damage to Hong Kong’s freedom of the press have diminished from levels in 2003-04, but still just under half have some degree of concern about the free press in Hong Kong.

98

TREND Table 106 Are you worried or not worried about your employment situation ?

Not

Worried

Slightly

worried

Fairly worried Very Worried Don’t know

Oct 1998 53 17 10 17 3

April 1999 54 18 14 13 1

July 1999 50 19 13 17 1

Nov 1999 52 20 14 14 1

Apr 2000 51 20 14 13 2

Aug 2000 53 19 12 14 1

Nov 2000 48 20 13 18 1

Apr 2001 48 20 13 17 3

July 2001 47 20 14 18 1

Nov 2001 38 20 19 21 2

Apr 2002 40 19 15 24 2

Mar 2003 36 21 18 23 3

June 2003 37 20 19 22 1

Dec 2003 40 20 14 21 4

Apr 2004 45 21 14 16 3

May 2004 43 23 15 13 5

June 2004 48 22 15 12 3

July 2004 46 23 15 14 2

Aug 2004 50 21 16 11 2

Nov 2004 42 24 17 14 3

May 2005 51 22 13 12 1

Mar 2006 54 18 13 11 4

Nov 2006 55 18 13 11 3

Apr 2007 58 17 13 10 1

After peaking in 2001-2003, worries about respondent’s employment situation have trended down in intensity, with a majority now not worried about this issue. The continued emphasis on economic development at all costs (including growth to a population size of 10 million as recently advocated by the CE) may not get as strong a support as officials who always assert Hong Kongers care only about economics may believe. Worry about economic affairs will

99

always remain high due to the lack of unemployment insurance and sufficient welfare provisions if injured or disabled, so much of this concern with the economy is instinctive rather than reflective of specific worry about a specific job.

TREND Table 107 Are you worried/not worried about social unrest in Hong Kong?

Not Worried slightly worried fairly

worried

Very Worried Don’t know

Oct 1998 21 27 30 19 3

April 1999 29 32 23 13 2

July 1999 35 29 22 10 3

Nov 1999 25 31 29 12 3

Apr 2000 41 29 19 11 1

Aug 2000 31 31 21 15 1

Nov 2000 41 28 17 14 1

Apr 2001 35 29 19 13 3

July 2001 39 25 20 13 2

Nov 2001 31 23 25 19 1

Aug 2002 21 28 28 20 2

Nov 2002 27 26 26 20 1

Feb 2003 23 32 25 18 3

June 2003 31 31 23 14 2

Apr 2004 35 32 18 10 5

May 2004 35 32 18 12 3

June 2004 34 34 21 10 1

July 2004 37 34 19 8 1

Aug 2004 45 31 15 7 2

Nov 2004 41 29 19 8 3

May 2005 63 19 11 5 2

Nov 2005 59 23 8 8 2

Nov 2006 55 19 15 9 2

Apr 2007 67 17 9 5 1

100

Social unrest is no longer an issue for most, particularly after CE Donald Tsang took office.

TREND Table 108 Are you worried or not worried about air and water pollution?

Not

Worried

slightly

worried

fairly

worried

Very

Worried

Don’t

know

July 1999 6 18 34 35 4

Nov 1999 8 18 36 38 1

April 2000 5 14 31 48 1

Aug 2000 7 17 31 44 1

Nov 2000 7 16 25 52 1

Apr 2001 8 20 30 39 3

July 2001 16 22 28 34 1

Nov 2001 15 23 29 30 2

Apr 2002 14 26 30 28 2

Feb 2003 18 25 29 26 2

Dec 2003 16 29 27 25 3

Apr 2004 16 22 29 30 2

May 2004 15 31 25 26 2

July 2004 16 28 29 25 2

Aug 2004 14 30 31 22 2

Mar 2006 9 20 32 38 1

Nov 2006 8 14 29 48 --

Apr 2007 8 16 29 46 --

In contrast, concerns over air and water pollution have leapt, while those on rule of law and crime have diminished.

101

TREND Table 109 Are you worried or not worried about rule of law Not Worried slightly worried fairly worried Very Worried Don’t know total

July 1999 55 23 13 5 4 100

Aug 2000 39 27 18 12 4 100

Apr 2001 37 26 17 13 7 100

July 2001 45 22 18 11 3 100

Apr 2002 42 25 17 12 5 100

Nov 2002 36 20 24 17 3 100

June 2003 45 23 18 11 2 100

July 2004 45 26 16 9 4 100

July 2005 53 25 12 6 5 100

Nov 2006 52 23 15 8 2 100

Apr 2007 57 20 12 8 3 100

TREND Table 110 Are you worried or not worried about crimeNot Worried slightly worried fairly worried Very Worried Don’t know total

June 2003 37 29 18 12 1 100

July 2004 38 30 19 11 2 100

July 2005 49 29 14 6 2 100

Nov 2006 50 25 17 8 1 100

April 2007 54 26 12 8 1 100

102

There are only weak correlations between all these areas of worry and satisfaction with life in Hong Kong. While there are stronger correlations between worry about the rule of law and crime, and between crime and official corruption as well as official corruption and corruption among business people, by far the strongest correlation is worry between officials on the mainland and mainland business people being corrupt. The correlations between worry about crime and corruption are far stronger than the correlation of worry about the employment situation of a respondent with satisfaction with life in Hong Kong.

CORRELATION Table 111 Satisfaction with life in HK by Worries SAT FREE UNREST AGE AIR LAW CRIME OFF BUS COFF CBUS ECON

SAT 1.000

FREE 0.198 1.000

UNREST 0.092 0.270 1.000

AGE 0.099 0.252 0.210 1.000

AIR 0.156 0.234 0.107 0.344 1.000

LAW 0.213 0.433 0.293 0.183 0.279 1.000

CRIME 0.142 0.287 0.341 0.152 0.225 0.605 1.000

OFF 0.163 0.317 0.287 0.164 0.216 0.498 0.573 1.000

BUS 0.160 0.303 0.266 0.202 0.229 0.413 0.490 0.697 1.000

COFF 0.120 0.242 0.163 0.240 0.277 0.279 0.252 0.312 0.435 1.000

CBUS 0.110 0.259 0.161 0.222 0.274 0.250 0.237 0.260 0.438 0.789 1.000

ECON 0.309 0.230 0.183 0.209 0.127 0.207 0.283 0.265 0.223 0.100 0.134 1.000

KEY: SAT Are you currently satisfied or dissatisfied with your current life in Hong Kong?

All below begin Are you currently worried or not about these specific aspects affecting you, your family

with: or Hong Kong:

FREE Freedom of the press

UNREST Social unrest and street protests

AGE Aging of Hong Kong population

AIR Air and water pollution

LAW Rule of law CRIME Crime

OFF Corrupt officials

BUS Corrupt business people

COFF Corrupt mainland officials

CBUS Corrupt mainland business people

ECON Your employment situation

As TREND Tables 112 to 115 show worries about local officials being corrupt are still low, less than a majority showing concern. There does seem to be some deterioration in local business people which has raised concerns between 2005 and 2007 (Table 113), while concern about corruption among officials and business people on the mainland remains at very high levels.

Table 112 Are you worried or not worried about corrupt officials Not Worried slightly worried fairly worried Very Worried Don’t know total

July 2005 56 24 10 6 4 100

Nov 2006 54 21 14 9 1 100

Apr 2007 56 23 10 9 2 100

103

Table 113 Are you worried or not worried about corrupt business peopleNot Worried slightly worried fairly worried Very Worried Don’t know total

July 2005 44 28 13 7 9 100

Nov 2006 37 27 19 11 6 100

Apr 2007 38 30 17 11 4 100

Table 114 Are you worried or not worried about corrupt mainland officials Not Worried slightly worried fairly worried Very Worried Don’t know total

Nov 2006 12 12 23 49 4 100

Apr 2007 13 16 25 43 4 100

Table 115 Are you worried or not worried about corrupt mainland business peopleNot Worried slightly worried fairly worried Very Worried Don’t know total

Nov 2006 15 15 24 41 5 100

Apr 2007 13 12 26 44 6 100

Open-ended questions show a rise in concern with social rather than economic or political issues. These social issues of course are primary political issues in most developed countries where the political system itself is taken for granted, so these results appear to be showing that Hong Kong is developing more confidence in the stability of the political structure.

Trend Table 116 Which problem of Hong Kong are you most concerned about now

personally?* Jan

98

Apr

98

Apr

00

Apr

01

Apr

02

Mar

03

Apr

04

Aug

04

May

05

Mar

06

May

07

Economic growth rate 38 32 13 12 14 17 23 9 12 7 4

Affordable housing 8 4 1 2 -- 1 1 -- 1 1

Unemployment 11 27 31 40 53 40 26 35 26 28 28

Salary cuts, welfare cuts 6 4 3 7 5 4 4 3 6

Property, stock markets 3 3 1 1 1 2 2 2 2

Int’l competitiveness 3 2 2 3 1 4 1 1 2

Other econ. 1 2 1 -- -- 1 1 --

Economic Issues total 57 63 57 64 75 70 56 55 46 43 43

Education 4 3 6 7 6 3 6 4 9 8 15

Elderly 5 5 3 4 2 1 1 2 4 3 6

Crime 6 5 6 3 1 2 2 3 1 2 2

Medical 2 1 2 2 1 1 1 1 2 5 6

Pollution/overpopulation 1 1 10 4 2 2 2 3 7 11 7

Social Issues total 18 15 27 20 12 9 12 13 23 29 36

Corruption 1 1 1 1 -- 1 1 -- 1 1 --

Political stability 5 4 4 2 2 2 15 12 10 5 2

Freedom of press/speech 2 2 2 1 -- 1 1 8 1 1 1

Freedom to demonstrate 2 1 1 1 -- 1 1 1 -- 1 +

Autonomy of HK 2 1 2 1 -- -- 1 1 -- 1 +

Fair judges/freedom to travel 3 3 1 -- -- 1 -- 1 1 1 +2

Competence of Tung (98-04) Tsang (05-) & civil servants

- - 1 -- 1 1 1 1 -- 1 --

Constitutional development -- 3 3 1 --

Political Issues total 15 12 12 6 3 7 20 27 16 12 5

*None, other, don’t know responses dropped +added together responses less than 1 15 percent said not concerned about a problem in Hong Kong personally in May 2007 or had concerns not of a public affairs nature.

104

Chart 27 TREND Problems of concern

TREND Table 117 Are you satisfied with government’s performance on this problem?

Very

satisfied

Satisfied Dissatisfied Very

dissatisfied

DK Not a gov

problem/none

Nov 2001 1 9 46 32 8 4

Apr 2002 1 11 44 31 9 5

Mar 2003 1 8 38 41 9 3

Apr 2004 1 15 36 32 12 4

Aug 2004 1 13 43 31 8 4

May 2005 1 20 43 22 11 3

Mar 2006 1 28 44 20 5 3

Apr 2007 2 31 39 14 4 10

105

FINDING: While there have been steady improvements in satisfaction with government’s performance on dealing with problems of respondents since C. E. Tsang took over in March 2005, of those who have identified a problem of most concern to them which is within government’s scope of action, 62 percent are unsatisfied with government’s performance on it while 38 percent are satisfied. Satisfaction and dissatisfaction varies widely according to which party respondents see as best representing or protecting their interests. The level of those with no problem has risen from negligible in earlier surveys to 10 percent in the May 2007 survey.

B. Satisfaction with the parties

ASSOCIATION Table 118 Satisfaction with government’s performance on problem of

personal concern by Which party best represents interests


Satisfied 50 32 54 30 32 40 38

Dissatisfied 50 68 46 70 68 60 62

total 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 table contents: Percent of Column Total Chi-square = 20.86 with 5 df p = 0.0009

Legco as a whole fares worse than the government. When the don’t knows and not a government problem or no problem responses are dropped, its ratio of satisfied to dissatisfied is below that of the government’s, 32 percent satisfied, 68 percent dissatisfied, again varying substantially by which party is seen to represent a respondent’s interests best.

Table 119 Are you satisfied or dissatisfied with Legco’s performance on this problem?

Group Count %

Very satisfied 7 1

Satisfied 180 23

Dissatisfied 318 40

Very dissatisfied 76 10

Don’t know 115 14

Not a government problem/none

30 10

106

But Table 120 also shows that no party has more satisfied than dissatisfied supporters, which indicates that Legco as a problem solving, perhaps client orientated, institution has some degree of development yet to make. As a legislative and representative body, Legco would normally be seen as a major vehicle of problem solving performance in most states with fully developed democracies. However, in Hong Kong, with a strong executive and very weak legislative, the role of the legislature in addressing problems is much weaker. Consequently, the executive bears more of the brunt of public dissatisfaction and public expectations for action on problems. That legislators are not seen as particularly able to help solve constituent’s problems can be seen in the responses in Table 121.

ASSOCIATION Table 120 Satisfaction with Legco’s performance on this problem by

Which party best represents interests


Satisfied 29 37 39 38 19 35 32

Dissatisfied 71 63 61 63 81 65 68



The level of don’t knows and maybe/unsure responses, 21 percent, indicates weak performance by Legco as a whole in problem identification and problem-solving as an institution orientation. The results in Table 122, with the same query posed about District Councilors with similar response patterns may indicate that the problems could be addressed at lower levels of government.

Table 121 Is this a problem your Legislative Councilor might be able to help solve?

Group Count %

Yes 100 13

No 457 57

Maybe/unsure 106 13

Don’t know 63 8

None/not a gov problem 74 9

107

Table 122 Is this a problem your District Councilor might be able to help solve?

Group Yes No Maybe/unsure Don’t know None/not a gov problem

Count

86

492

87

61

74

%

11

62

11

8

9

The responses in Tables 121-122 may very well indicate that the executive branch is unnecessarily taking upon itself responsibility for solving constituent problems that can be dealt with at lower and other levels of government. On the other hand, these responses may indicate that more than one in ten respondents would like to see, or perhaps hope for, help with their problems from Legco and DC members.

FINDING: As Table 123 makes clear, most people see the political parties as having a good rather than a bad effect on their problems.

Table 123 In general, do you think political parties in Hong Kong are having a good

effect or bad effect on this problem?

Group Count %

Very good effect 16 2

Good effect 323 40

No difference 238 30

Bad effect 62 8

Very bad effect 17 2

Don’t know 70 9

None/not a problem 74 9

The 42 percent who think parties are having a good effect versus the 10 percent who think parties have a bad effect on the problems of most concern to them divides up very differently by which party respondents think best represents or protects their interests, as Table 124 shows. The Liberal Party shows 16 percent, the largest of the parties, of those who see it as

108

best representing and protecting their interests as believing the political parties are having a bad effect on their problems of most concern. This does seem inconsistent, but all four main parties show some proportion of those who see their party as best representing their interests as believing party politics has a bad effect on their top problem. Logically, however, those who have no problems or none of government concern see party politics as making no difference anyway.

ASSOCIATION Table 124 Effect on problem by Which party best represents interests


Very good effect 3 2 1 4 1 0.6 2

Good effect 41 49 38 58 22 37 40

No difference 34 24 28 20 43 27 30

Bad effect 6 6 13 7 11 5 8

Very bad effect 4 0.7 4 2 3 0.6 2

Don’t know 4 12 6 5 11 14 9

None/not a problem 8 6 10 5 10 16 9



An open-ended follow-up on the problems of greatest concern to respondents also shows a strengthening of party profiles toward problems over the survey of March 2006 which also focused on party development. The accompanying comparison chart to Table 125 and Chart 28 of the same table which shows cumulative comparisons makes clear that there has been considerable improvements in the connecting of problem-solving with parties in the space of one year. While barely one in five in March 2006 named a party as standing up best on or doing the most to solve their problem, the April 2007 survey shows about two in five name a party as doing so. Don’t know responses have been reduced by 10 percentage points.

109

Table 125 Is there any political party or person in Hong Kong who stands up best for this problem of most concern to you?

Mar 2006 May 2007 DAB 5 9 Liberal Party 2 5 Federation of Trade Unions 2 2 The Alliance --Independent (Pro-government) --Independent (Pro-democracy) 0.1 Democratic Party of Hong Kong 6 12 Civic Party 3 5 The Frontier 0.3 1 Confederation of Trade Unions 3 3 ADPL 0.1 1 League of Social Democrats -- 0.3 Neighborhood and Worker’s Service Center 0.3 4 Others 6 2 None of the Above 21 19 Don’t Know 49 38

110

Chart 28 Open-ended, which party or person stands up best on your problem?

FINDING: The Democratic Party and DAB show the greatest gains in being named as the party standing up best on respondent’s priority problem, though the Civic Party and the Neighborhood and Worker’s Service Center also show strengthening of their profiles as standing up best on respondents’ issue of greatest concern. Still, more than half of respondents do not know who stands up on their problems, or name none of the parties (and no one) as addressing their problem of greatest concern. (Those with no problem or ones not of a government-related nature are dropped in the table and charts above.)

Tables 126 and 127 should be contrasted with one another, with 126 representing results of the March 2006 survey and 127 those of May 2007.

111

Table 126 Do you think there is a political party or person in Hong Kong that stands up best for: March 2006

DAB LP FTU IND (PG)

IND (PD)

DP CP FR CTU AD PL

Apr5 NW SC

All Other None DK

Working Class 5 0.4 12 - - 5 2 1 23 1 - 2 4 1 23 19 Middle Class 1 12 1 - - 3 6 0.2 1 0.4 - - 1 - 43 31 Business interests 2 36 - 0.1 - 1 0.2 0.4 0.1 - - - 1 1 21 35 Women’s interests 1 0.1 1 - 0.2 1 1 4 0.1 - - - 0.4 413 41 45 Retirees 2 0.4 1 - 0.1 1 0.4 - 2 0.5 - 0.1 - 1 50 42 Human rights 2 2 0.2 - 0.5 18 11 1 0.2 0.4 1 0.1 1 5 30 28 Environmental protection

2 1 0.2 - - 3 1 1 0.2 0.1 - - - 1214 39 41

Housing problems 4 0.5 0.5 - 0.4 6 0.2 - 1 5 - 0.4 - 4 39 39 Education problem 1 1 0.5 0.1 12 1 0.3 - 0.3 - - - 715 39 37 HK’s autonomy 1 1 0.1 - 0.3 22 7 0.4 - 0.1 - - - 5 33 31 Protect rule of law 2 1 0.1 0.1 0.1 8 22 1 0.1 - - - - 4 33 28 Protect freedom of the press

1 1 0.1 - 0.1 13 8 3 - 0.3 - - - 5 33 34

HK’s prosperity & stability

7 4 0.1 - - 5 2 0.3 0.1 0.1 - - - 8 38 34

Good relations with Beijing

45 3 1 0.1 - 2 1 - 0.1 0.4 - - - 5 17 25

BROWN: Groups GREEN: Issues Red: System

KEY: DAB Democratic Alliance for the Betterment and Progress of Hong Kong LP Liberal Party FTU Federation of Trade Unions IND (PG) Independent (Pro-government) IND (PD) Independent (Pro-democracy) DP Democratic Party of Hong Kong CP Civic Party (Formerly Article 45 Concern Group FR The Frontier CTU Confederation of Trade Unions ADPL Association for Democracy and Peoples Livelihood Apr5 April Fifth Action Group (Long-hair Leung Kwok-hung NWSC Neighborhood and Worker’s Service Center

While there are areas of improvement in raising profiles on specific issues, in general there are still far too many who answer none or don’t know on this list of key issues.

13 Half named the Hong Kong Women’s Development Association then scattered others.

14 Half named Greenpeace, 0.5 percent Greenpower, 1 percent Society for Protection of the Harbour, then

others. 15

One third named the Professional Teacher’s Union, usually affiliated with the Democratic Party.

112

Table 127 Do you think there is a political party or person in Hong Kong that stands up best for: May 2007

DAB LP FTU DP CP FR CTU AD PL

LSD NW SC

All Other None DK

Working Class 9 1 20 8 1 4 19 1 2 2 -- 1 13 20 Middle Class 8 19 1 8 10 1 1 -- -- -- -- -- 19 34 Business interests 3 46 1 2 1 1 1 0 -- 0 -- 0 12 34 Women’s interests 2 2 2 3 3 7 1 -- -- 0 -- -- 30 50 Retirees 5 2 3 5 1 -- 2 1 1 -- 1 -- 34 Human rights 1 3 -- 20 12 3 1 -- 2 0 1 -- 23 34 Environmental protection

2 2 -- 6 4 1 0 -- 1 0 1 -- 37 47

Housing problems 6 1 1 8 1 -- 1 3 1 1 1 0 33 44 Education problem 4 3 -- 16 3 -- 0 1 -- 0 -- -- 35 38 Protect rule of law 3 2 0 10 23 -- -- 0 -- 0 -- -- 24 38 Protect freedom of the press

1 2 0 13 8 4 0 0 1 0 -- 1 23 47

HK’s prosperity & stability

11 10 -- 5 3 -- -- -- -- -- -- 1 33 36

Good relations with Beijing

47 4 2 1 -- 1 -- -- 0 0 -- 1 19 25

BROWN: Groups GREEN: Issues Red: System KEY: DAB Democratic Alliance for the Betterment and Progress of Hong Kong LP Liberal Party FTU Federation of Trade Unions DP Democratic Party of Hong Kong CP Civic Party FR The Frontier CTU Confederation of Trade Unions ADPL Association for Democracy and Peoples Livelihood LSD League of Social Democrats NWSC Neighborhood and Worker’s Service Center

Table 128 shows responses on satisfaction with the performance of the larger, more active parties and quasi-parties as of May 2007. (See Chart 29 below also).

Table 128 How satisfied or dissatisfied are you with the following parties? May 2007

Party Very

dissatisfied

Somewhat

dissatisfied

Somewhat

satisfied

Very satisfied DK

DAB 8 25 39 3 25

FTU 5 18 42 5 31

LP 8 24 39 3 27

DP 13 30 35 2 21

CTU 6 17 43 4 30

Civic 6 17 37 5 36

Frontier 13 26 30 2 30

ADPL 4 17 34 2 44

LSD 26 24 15 2 34

113

Chart 29 Satisfaction with the parties, May 2007

In order to compare performance assessments among parties, the don’t know responses are dropped and the dissatisfied and satisfied responses collapsed in Table 129.

Table 129 How satisfied or dissatisfied are you with the following parties? Collapsed*

May 2007

Party Dissatisfied with

performance

Satisfied with

performance

Difference May

2007**

DAB 44 56 +12

FTU 32 68 +36

LP 43 57 +14

DP 54 46 -8

CTU 32 68 +36

Civic 35 65 +30

Frontier 55 45 -10

ADPL 36 64 +28

LSD 75 25 -50 *Combining very dissatisfied with somewhat dissatisfied, dropping don’t know responses

** Negative number indicates more dissatisfaction than satisfaction

FINDING: Satisfaction with government affiliated political parties is up.

Table 130 shows three key periods of assessment of party performance, just before the 2004 Legco elections (the election comprising the current Legco; the next election is in September 2008), in March 2006 90 days following the defeat of constitutional reforms as proposed by the C.E., and in May 2007, following the election of C.E. Tsang after Hong Kong’s first contested C.E. election in March 2007.

114

Chart 30 Ranked in order of dissatisfaction

Table 130 Comparative Dissatisfaction with party performance

Party Dissatisfied Sept 2004 Dissatisfied Mar 2006 Dissatisfied May 2007

DAB 79 55 44

FTU 62 37 32

LP 49 47 43

DP 48 68 54

CTU 34 39 32

Civic 24 31 35

Frontier 47 52 55

ADPL 28 37 36

LSD -- -- 75

Dissatisfaction is down for the Democratic Party and CTU, up for the Civic Party and Frontier, and extremely high for the newly formed League of Social Democrats in its initial showing on the charts.

115

- - - -

Table 131 Comparative performance

Party Difference +/

Sept 2004

Difference +/

Nov 2005

Difference +/

Mar 2006

Difference +/

May 2007

DAB -58 -16 -10 +12

FTU -24 +28 +26 +36

LP +2 -2 +6 +14

DP +4 -18 -36 -8

CTU +32 +36 +22 +36

Civic +52 +46 +38 +30

Frontier +6 -8 -4 -10

ADPL +44 +42 +26 +28

LSD -- -- -- -50

Tables 132-135 show satisfaction with the four major parties by Legco election district.

ASSOCIATION Table 132 Satisfaction with Democratic Party by Legco district

HKI KW KE NTW NTE total

Dissatisfied 62 56 46 54 49 54

Satisfied 38 44 54 46 51 46

total 100 100 100 100 100 100 table contents: Percent of Column Total Chi-square = 9.216 with 4 df p = 0.0559

ASSOCIATION Table 133 Satisfaction with DAB by Legco district



Satisfied 46 68 62 61 57 56

total 100 100 100 100 100 100 table contents: Percent of Column Total Chi-square = 13.17 with 4 df p = 0.0105

116

ASSOCIATION Table 134 Satisfaction with Liberal Party by Legco district


Dissatisfied Satisfied total

47

53

100

33

67

100

34

66

100

42

59

100

52

48

100

44

57



FINDING: While the three major parties above show a significant association between those who are satisfied or dissatisfied with their performance and the Legco districts, the Civic Party shows no such association, presenting roughly equal satisfaction/dissatisfaction levels in all districts.

ASSOCIATION Table 135 Satisfaction with Civic Party by Legco district



Satisfied 63 62 68 70 64 65



Table 136 shows that distribution of those satisfied and dissatisfied with the parties by Legco district differs from those who see which party represents or protects their interests best.

ASSOCIATION Table 136 Distribution of respondents to Which party represents

interests best by Legco district


DAB 18 26 18 17 12 17

DP 19 20 15 18 18 18

LP 5 9 13 11 14 10

Civic 18 14 14 15 16 16

None 25 14 21 16 23 21

DK 16 17 20 23 18 19



Table 137 takes the same query and shows the distribution of those who say which respective party represents their interest best by their distribution among the districts. For example, all parties but the Liberal party show they have a plurality of such respondents on Hong Kong Island. The Liberal Party finds its largest plurality in the New Territories East district.

117

-

-

ASSOCIATION Table 137 Legco district distribution of Which party represents

interests best

DAB DP LP CIVIC NONE DK total

HKI 30 30 14 33 34 23 28

KW 13 9 8 7 6 8 8

KE 19 15 22 15 17 18 17

NTW 22 22 23 20 16 27 21

NTE 17 25 34 24 27 24.1 25



There is clearly a strengthening of party orientation in Hong Kong over the first 10 years of the SAR. The final section of the report focuses on the perceptions of the four major parties, comparing those perceptions in March 2006 with those of May 2007.

C. Perceptions of the 4 largest parties

Party stance vis-à-vis the government has clarified from March 2006.

Table 138 Mar 2006 What is your image of Big Four parties by: Attitude toward Government Party More anti Government More pro-Government Don’t Know DAB 8 69 23 LP 11 51 38 DP 70 7 23 CP 40 13 47

Table 139 May 2007 What is your image of Big Four parties by: Attitude toward Government Party More anti Government More pro-Government Don’t Know DAB 8 72 19 LP 12 64 24 DP 71 9 21 CP 50 15 35

118

While the stance of the Civic Party on democracy has strengthened from March 2006, shortly after it was established under that name, the other party results appear little changed from the earlier survey.

Table 140 Mar 2006 What is your image of Big Four parties by: Attitude toward Democracy Party Opposes Democracy Supports Democracy Don’t Know DAB 36 37 27 LP 17 48 35 DP 8 73 19 CP 6 62 32

Table 141 May 2007 What is your image of Big Four parties by: Attitude towardDemocracy Party Opposes Democracy Supports Democracy Don’t Know DAB 32 37 31 LP 22 46 32 DP 8 75 17 CP 7 68 25

Table 142 is a somewhat changed scale from March 2006. Rather than anti-business, the question is more oriented toward testing the perspective argued by the League of Social Democrats that the business sector elites and the grassroots who favor increased government spending on welfare and social areas are in competition over resources and power.

Table 142 Mar 2006 What is your image of Big Four parties by: Attitude toward Grassroots and Business Party Anti-business Pro-business Don’t Know DAB 25 42 33 LP 7 68 25 DP 53 16 31 CP 30 20 50

119

Table 143 May 2007 What is your image of Big Four parties by: Attitude toward Grassroots and Business Party Pro-grassroots Pro-business Don’t Know DAB 41 29 31 LP 10 72 18 DP 64 12 24 CP 49 17 34

The change of scale shows that when the DAB is put in that light, respondents change assessment from considering it more pro- than anti business, to considering it more pro-grassroots than pro-business. The Democratic Party also shows strengthening of its profile as does the Civic Party.

Tables 144 and 145 show that the DAB and Liberal Party have improved their image as effective in solving problems. The Democrats and Civic party also show smaller scale improvements in this assessment.

Table 144 Mar 2006 What is your image of Big Four parties by: Attitude toward effectiveness solving problems Party Less effective solving

problems More effective solving problems

Don’t Know

DAB 34 36 29 LP 27 37 35 DP 44 28 28 CP 27 31 42

120

Table 145 May 2007 What is your image of Big Four parties by: Attitude towardeffectiveness solving problems Party Less effective solving

problems More effective solving problems

Don’t Know

DAB 24 45 31 LP 25 47 28 DP 45 33 22 CP 31 38 31

Tables 146 and 147 pose the bottom line question of the image respondents have of a party’s orientation; toward solving their problems or toward gaining and exercising power. Respondents show some shift in considering the Liberal Party as having become more interested in political power since March 2006 while assessments of the Democratic Party and the Civic Party being interested in solving respondents problems have risen. In 2006 the pro-government DAB contested closely with the Democratic Party and the Civic Party on this measure; clearly by May 2007 the two pro-democracy parties have been successful in changing their image toward service instead of power. Nevertheless, large sections of all respondents across all these image issues remain unclear in their image of the parties.

Table 146 Mar 2006 What is your image of Big Four parties by: Attitude toward power & problems Party More interested in political

power More interested in solving your problems

Don’t Know

DAB 49 27 24 LP 50 17 32 DP 46 28 26 CP 34 27 39

121

Table 147 May 2007 What is your image of Big Four parties by: Attitude toward power & problems Party More interested in political

power More interested in solving your problems

Don’t Know

DAB 47 27 23 LP 61 19 20 DP 40 38 22 CP 33 39 27

The final sets of tables assess respondents views on each party’s stance on democracy by responses to the question on which party best represents or protects respondent’s interests. Table 148 shows those who believe the DAB best protects their interests also tend to more highly rate the DAB as supporting democracy while considering the Democratic Party and Civic Party as opposing democracy.

ASSOCIATION Table 148 What is your image of the DAB toward democracy by

Which party represents your interests best


Opposes Democracy 11 45 29 65 31 17 33

Supports Democracy 65 35 44 24 32 24 37

Don’t Know 24 19 27 11 38 59 31

total 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 table contents: Percent of Column Total Chi-square = 187.7 with 10 df p � 0.0001

This pattern appears also when respondents assess the Democratic Party, with those seeing the DP and Civic Party as best protecting their interests rating the two parties far higher than proponents of the DAB.

ASSOCIATION Table 149 What is your image of the Democratic Party toward

democracy by Which party represents your interests best

Opposes Democracy Supports Democracy Don’t Know total

DAB

19

68

13

100

DP

2

96

2

100

LP

14

76

10

100

CIVIC

4

90

6

100

NONE

9

71

20

100

DK

5

53

42

100

total

8

75

17

100 table contents: Percent of Column Total Chi-square = 142.9 with 10 df p � 0.0001

122

Liberal party respondents are somewhat less polarized than the DAB and DP proponents; nevertheless they clearly see the Liberal Party as more pro-democracy than respondents who see other parties best protecting their interests. Also, clearly, the DAB and Liberals share support vis-à-vis the proponents of the Democratic Party and the Civic Party.

ASSOCIATION Table 150 What is your image of the Liberal Party toward democracy

by Which party represents your interests best




Don’t Know 17 24 18 21 38 60 31



The Civic Party receives some of the least polarized responses, with most respondents noting that the Civic party supports democracy, by whoever’s definition.

ASSOCIATION Table 151 What is your image of the Civic Party toward democracy

by Which party represents your interests best




Don’t Know 18 17 19 3 32 55 25



Conclusion: The parties have strengthened their images and gained agreement that they are acting to protect and advance respondent’s interests. Clearly as well, the parties have risen in effectiveness and clarified their profiles in many areas. These surveys show that preparations for the elections of November 2007 and September 2008 and party reorganization and repositioning towards the government and towards selected issues have strengthened their profiles in respondent’s minds and improved their images. There are still large portions of the potential electorate, however, who have yet to form clear views on the parties’ stances particularly on issues such as the environment, retirees and even on the economy. Nevertheless, looking back over the first ten years of the SAR, political parties have become part of the landscape. They are no longer optional accouterments to the executive and clearly, they will not fade away from official neglect or even official opposition. Party members have worked hard to develop their organizations, and they have now begun to assume the role of political institutions within the system of governance.

123

November 2006 Survey Demographics:

FC: 364 Functional Constituency registered voter respondents Random: 706 Randomly sampled respondents

Birthplace: FC Random

Count % Count %

Hong Kong 321 86 512 73

Mainland China 43 11 173 25

Other 10 3 21 3

Gender: FC Random

Male Female

Count

204

170

%

55

45

Count

340

366

%

48

52

Age FC Random

Count % Count %

18-19 20-29 30-39 40-49 50-59 60-69 70-89

2

29

92

142

64

19

11

1

8

26

40

18

5

3

43

99

123

200

131

65

31

6

14

18

29

19

9

4

Comparative Age Pyramid, FC and Random

124

Children: FC Random

Count % Count %

Married, no children 33 9 45 6

1 child 74 20 142 20

2 children 121 34 191 27

3-7 children 32 9 100 14

Total % with children 63 61

Not married/no children 101 28 222 32 *Reclassified into Married no children, married with children, and not married no children.

Education: FC Random

None Primary 1 Primary 2 Primary 3 Primary 4 Primary 5 Primary 6 Form 1 Form 2 Form 3 Form 4/Tech Institute 1st year Form 5/Tech Institute graduate Form 6 Tech Institute F5 1st yr Form 7 Tech college grad/US 1 University 1st year/US 2 University 2nd year/US 3 University graduate Masters/PhD.

Count

2

1

0

0

0

0

2

3

1

10

1

30

3

24

2

3

234

58

%

0.5

0.3

0

0

0

0

0.5

1

0.3

3

0.3

8

1

6.4

0.5

1

63

15.5

Count

22

7

3

7

3

8

46

12

11

71

17

181

21

63

13

22

171

26

%

3

1

0.4

1

0.4

1

6.5

2

1.6

10

2.4

26

3

9

2

3

24

4

Education Reclassified FC Random

0-6 F1-F4 F5 F6-Univ2/US3 Univ grad MA/PhD

Count

5

14

30

32

234

58

%

1

4

8

9

63

16

Count

96

111

181

119

171

26

%

14

16

26

17

24

4

125

Chart: Comparative Educational Attainment

Occupation: FC Random

Count % Count %

Manager/Admin 76 21 ** 91 13

Professionals 128 35 ** 68 10

Assoc/cert professionals 37 10 ** 25 4

Clerks/Secretaries 13 4 † 81 12

Service/sales/police/fire 11 3 † 54 8

Skilled agri & fisheries 2 0.6 5 1

Craft & performers 1 0.3 21 3

Plant & machine operators 6 2 25 4

Elementary occupations -- -- † 19 3

Housewives 5 1 † 84 12

Retired 14 4 † 87 13

Unemployed 1 0.3 † 26 4

Student 3 1 † 66 10

Teachers/principals incl univ 41 11 ** 26 4

Other 23 6 ** 9 1 **Significantly over-represented in FCs proportionately to the workforce/population †Significantly under-represented in FCs Other tends to be dominated by self-employed owners/entrepreneurs and consultants

Occupation Reclassified: FC Random

Manager/administrators Professionals Assoc Professionals/Educ. Service workers Manual workers Non-workforce

Count

99 128 78 24 9 23

%

27 35 22 6 2 6

Count

100 68 51 135 70 263

%

15 10 7 20 10 38

*Teachers grouped with associate professionals. Other with Manager/admin. Clerks & secretaries grouped as

service workers. All others as manual workers. Housewives, Retirees, Students, Unemployed as Non-

workforce.

126

Workforce sector: FC Random

Civil service Privatized public Private sector Non-Profit Organization Non-workforce

Count

86

42

197

18

23

%

24

11

54

5

6

Count

54

29

339

12

263

%

8

4

49

2

38

Living quarters: FC Random

Count % Count %

Villa/Bungalow 11 3 9 1

Private residential block (Own) 258 69 308 44

Private residential block (rent) 28 7 47 7

Gov. Home Ownership Scheme (subsidized) 39 10 110 16

Public Housing Block 25 7 195 28

Modern Village House 5 1 18 3

Traditional Village House 1 0.3 10 1

Temporary housing 1 0.1

Employer provided 5 1 7 1

Living quarters Reclassified: FC Random

Count % Count %

Villa/village houses 17 5 37 5

Private residential block (Own) 258 69 308 44

Private residential block/employer provided (rent) 33 9 54 8

Gov. Home Ownership Scheme (subsidized) 39 10 110 16

Public Housing Block 25 7 195 28 *temporary housing dropped

Religion: FC Random

None Catholic Protestant Buddhist/Taoist Ancestor/Chinese Folk belief Other

Count

202

39

88

15

25

5

%

54

10

24

4

7

1

Count

367

37

107

69

124

2

%

52

5

15

10

18

0.3

Reclassified Religion: FC Random

Count % Count %

None 202 54 367 52

Christian 127 34 144 20

Asian traditional 45 12 195 28

Right of abode: FC Random

Count % Count %

ROA abroad 91 25 74 11

No 277 75 628 89

127

APPROX MONTHLY FAMILY INCOME* FC Random

Count % Count % None 3 1 31 5

Under $5000 3 1 22 3 $5,000-9,999 6 2 55 9

$10,000-14,999 9 3 80 13 $15,000-19,999 8 2 82 13 $20,000-24,999 19 5 88 14 $25,000-29,999 17 5 40 6 $30,000-34,999 25 7 66 10 $35,000-39,999 15 4 21 3

$40,000-49,999** 43 12 45 7 $50,000-59,999 51 14 51 8 $60,000-69,999 17 5 12 2 $70,000-79,999 17 5 11 2 $80,000-89,999 20 6 11 2 $90,000-99,999 46 13 3 0.5 100,000 and up 55 16 20 3

*5% in FC and 10% in Random refused to give an income. These have been excluded in the table above.

**Note change in increments from 5,000 to 10,000 at this point.

FC Mean $51,000

FC Median $50,000-59,999

Random Mean $23,500

Random Median $20,000-24,999

Chart: Income distribution compared, FC and Random samples

128

__________________________________________________________________________________________

INCOME REGROUPED* FC Random

Less than $19,999 $20,000-29,999** $30,000-39,999 $40,000-49,999 $50,000-59,999 $60,000-89,999*** $90,000+

Count

29 36 40 43 51 54 101

%

8 10 11 12 14 15 29

Count

270 128 87 45 51 34 23

%

42 20 14 7 8 5 4

*Regrouped to regularize size of income groupings as much as possible to increase accuracy of analysis when

this variable is tested against others.

**Note change to increments of 10,000 ***Note change in increment to 30,000

April 2007 Survey Demographics

Gender

Group Male Female

Count

433

456

%

49

51

129

Age Groups

Group Count %

18-19 20-29 30-39 40-49 50-59 60-69 70-86

42

126

149

262

165

82

46

5

14

17

30

19

9

5

Count 872 Mean 43.37 Median 44MidRange 52 StdDev 14.5 Range 68

Education Total Cases 878

Group Count %

None 35 4

Primary 1 7 1

Primary 2 1 0.1

Primary 3 7 0.8

Primary 4 4 0.5

Primary 5 5 0.6

Primary 6 44 5.

Form 1 12 1

Form 2 16 2

Form 3 85 10

Form 4/Tech Institute 1st year 14 2

Form 5/Tech Institute graduate 227 26

Form 6 Tech Institute F5 1st yr 26 3

Form 7 Tech college grad/US 1 79 9

University 1st year/US 2 15 2

University 2nd year/US 3 13 1

University graduate 256 29

Masters 29 3

Ph.D 3 0.3

Education ReclassifiedCount %

0-6 103 12

F1-F4 127 14

F5 227 26

F6-Univ2/US3 133 15

Univ grad 256 29

MA/PhD 32 4

130

-

Occupation

Group Count %

Manager/Admin 122 14

Professionals 83 9

Assoc/cert professionals 34 4

Clerks/Secretaries 110 12

Service/sales/police/fire 66 7

Skilled agri & fisheries 2 0.2

Craft & performers 17 2

Plant & machine operators 33 4

Elementary occupations 41 5

Housewives 103 12

Retired 120 13

Unemployed 37 4

Student 72 8

Teachers/principals incl univ 31 3

Other 7 1

Occupation Reclassified: Group Count %

Manager/administrators 129 15

Professionals 83 9

Assoc Professionals/Educ. 65 7

Service workers 176 20

Manual workers 93 11

Non-workforce 332 38

*Teachers grouped with associate professionals. Other with Manager/admin. Clerks & secretaries grouped as


workforce.

Work Sector Group Count %

Public 110 12

Private 439 50


Non-profit workers, civil servants and privatized public workers combined. Non-workforce includes students,

retirees, housewives, and unemployed.

Work Sector Age groups (reclassified for correlation tests)

Civil servant Privatized public Private Non workforce total

18-19 0 0 1 11 5

20-39 41 52 38 20 32

40-59 56 46 56 39 49

60+ 3 3 30 15



131

Approximate monthly family income

Group Count %

None 40 5

<5,000 34 4

5,000-9,999 79 10

10,000-14,999 99 13

15,000-19,999 85 11

20,000-24,999 97 12

25,000-29,999 52 7

30,000-34,999 83 11

35,000-39,999 28 4

40,000-49,999* 50 6

50,000-59,999 52 7

60,000-69,999 19 2

70,000-79,999 10 1

80,000-80,999 9 1

90,000-99,999 8 1

100,000+ 40 5 *Note increment change

Count 785 Mean 6.8 (scale 1-16 or $0 income to $100,000+, see table) Approx $24,000

Median $20,000-$24,999

Income regrouped:

Group $0-9,999 $10,000-19,999 $20,000-29,999** $30,000-39,999 $40,000-49,999 $50,000-59,999 $60,000-89,999*** $90,000+

Count

153

184

149

111

50

52

38

48

%

19

23

19

14

6

7

5

6 *Regrouped to regularize size of income groupings as much as possible to increase accuracy of analysis when

this variable is tested against others.

***Note change in increment to 30,000

Income reclassified to “class” groups

Group Poorest $0-19,000 Lower middle $20,000-39,999 Upper middle $40,000-79,999 Richest $80,000+

Count

337

260

131

57

%

43

33

17

7

132

Are you currently registered to vote in the Geographic or Functional Constituency

elections?

Count %

Geographic only 478 54

Functional only 38 4

Both 93 11

Not registered to vote 267 30

Don’t know 13 2

Total 889 100

Recoded responses Total Cases 876 (used for crosstabs)

Group Count %

Geographic only 478 55

Functional 131 15

Not registered 267 30

Correlation Income regroup

Label Group Count %

Poorest 0-19,999 337 43

Lower middle 20,000-39,000 260 33

Upper middle 40,000-79,999 131 17

Richest 80,000+ 57 7

Living quarters Reclassified:Group Count %

Villa/village houses 48 5

Private residential block (Own) 342 39

Private residential block/employer provided (rent) 79 9

Gov. Home Ownership Scheme (subsidized) 150 17

Public Housing Block 260 30

*temporary housing dropped

Religion (reclassified)

Group Count %

None 450 51

Christian 198 22

Buddhist/Taoist 76 9

Ancestor worship 162 18

133

-

-

Patriot/Non-patriot demographics

Patriotism by Birthplace

HK born China born Other total

Non-patriots 82 66 81 78

Patriots 18 34 19 22

total 100 100 100 100 table contents: Percent of Column Total


Patriotism by Age groups

18-19 20-29 30-39 40-49 50-59 60-69 70-86 total

Non-patriots 88 87 87 82 75 63 41 78

Patriots 12 14 13 18 26 37 59 22

total 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 table contents: Percent of Column Total


Patriotism by Occupation

Managers &

Admin

Professionals Assoc

Prof

Service Manual Non

workforce/

retirees

total

Non-patriots

75 79 86 86 82 72 78

Patriots 25 21 14 14 18 28 22



Patriotism by Work Sector

Public Private Non workforce total

Non-patriots 82 82 72 78

Patriots 18 18 28 22

total 100 100 100 100 table contents: Percent of Column Total


Patriotism by Religion

None Christian Buddhist/Taoist Ancestor total

Non-patriots 80 82 74 72 78

Patriots 20 18 26 28 22



134

-

__________________________________________________________________________________________

Patriotism by Education

Primary 6

or less

Form

1-Form

4

Form 5

graduate

F6, Tech

school

some Univ

Univ

graduate

Post

graduate

total

Non-patriots

67 71 82 84 80 91 79

Patriots 33 29 18 16 20 9 21



May 2007 Survey Demographics

Sex

Group Count %

Male 383 48

Female 417 52

Age

Group Count %

18-19 39 5.000

20-29 118 15.128

30-39 156 20.000

40-49 208 26.667

50-59 156 20.000

60-69 68 8.718

70-92 35 4.487

Birthplace

Group Count %

Hong Kong China Other

568

197

34

71

25

4

Marital status

Group Never married Married Widowed Divorced/separated

Count

250

530

4

15

%

31

66

0.5

2

135

Children

Group 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 11 Not married/no children

Count

56

169

215

72

21

4

1

2

1

1

250

%

7

21

27

9

3

0.5

0.1

0.2

0.1

0.1

32

Education

Group Count %

None 28 4

Primary 1 3 0.3

Primary 2 3 0.3

Primary 3 6 0.7

Primary 4 4 0.5

Primary 5 5 0.6

Primary 6 46 6

Form 1 6 0.7

Form 2 18 2

Form 3 62 8

Form 4/Tech Institute 1st year 15 2

Form 5/Tech Institute graduate 228 29

Form 6 Tech Institute F5 1st yr 19 2

Form 7 Tech college grad/US 1 71 9

University 1st year/US 2 9 1

University 2nd year/US 3 12 2

University graduate 226 28

Masters 32 4

Ph.D 2 0.2

Median F5 graduate Mean F6

Education Reclassified Count %

0-6 95 12 F1-F4 101 13 F5 228 29 F6-Univ2/US3 111 14 Univ grad 226 28 MA/PhD 34 4

Occupation

136

Group Count %

Manager/Admin 99 13

Professionals 51 7

Assoc/cert professionals 24 3

Clerks/Secretaries 104 14

Service/sales/police/fire 50 7

Skilled agri & fisheries 0

Craft & performers 15 2

Plant & machine operators 53 7

Elementary occupations 27 4

Housewives 103 13

Retired 105 14

Unemployed 32 4

Student 70 9

Teachers/principals incl univ 23 3

Other 7 1

Occupation Reclassified:Group Count %

Manager/administrators 99 13 Professionals 51 7 Assoc Professionals/Educ. 47 6 Service workers 154 20 Manual workers 95 13 Non-workforce* 310 41 *Teachers grouped with associate professionals. Other with Manager/admin. Clerks & secretaries grouped as


workforce.

Work Sector

Group Count %

Civil servants 50 6

Privatized Public 21 3

Private Sector 392 49

Non-profits 18 2


Work Sector Recoded

Group Count %

Public 71 9

Private 410 52


137

Type of living quarters

Group Count %

Villa 12 2

Private residential (own) 347 43

Private residential (rent) 62 8

Home Ownership Scheme 116 15

Public Housing 211 26

Village house (modern) 18 2

Traditional village house 12 2

Temporary housing 2 0.25

Employer provided qtrs 6 1

Other 14 2

Living Quarters recoded

Group Count %

Village house/Villa 42 5

Private residential (own) 347 44

Private residential (rent) 68 9

Home Ownership Scheme 116 15

Public Housing 211 27

Religion

Group Count %

None 434 54

Catholic 46 6

Protestant 119 15

Buddhist 55 7

Taoist 1 0.1

Ancestor Worship 141 18

Other 4 1

Religion recode

Group None Christian Buddhist/Taoist Ancestor Worship

Count

434

165

56

141

%

54

21

7

18

Lived outside Hong Kong 1 year or more

Group Yes No

Count

181

619

%

23

77

138

Approximate Family Income per month

Group Count %

None 40 5

<5,000 16 2

5,000-9,999 66 8

10,000-14,999 84 11

15,000-19,999 109 14

20,000-24,999 83 10

25,000-29,999 40 5

30,000-34,999 64 8

35,000-39,999 22 3

40,000-49,999* 52 7

50,000-59,999 43 5

60,000-69,999 14 2

70,000-79,999 9 1

80,000-80,999 5 1

90,000-99,999 4 1

100,000+ 32 4

Refuse to answer 117 15 Mean $23,500 (6.7 on a scale of 0-16 in the table above)

Median $20,000-24,999

Income regrouped:

Group Count %

$0-9,999 122 18

$10,000-19,999 193 28

$20,000-29,999** 123 18

$30,000-39,999 86 13

$40,000-49,999 52 8

$50,000-59,999 43 6

$60,000-89,999*** 28 4

$90,000+ 36 5 *Regrouped to regularize size of income groupings as much as possible to increase accuracy of analysis when this variable is tested against others.

***Note change in increment to 30,000

Income Correlation “class” recoded

Group Poorest $0-19,000 Lower middle $20,000-39,999 Upper middle $40,000-79,999 Richest $80,000+

Count

315 209 118 41

%

46 31 17 6

139

District Council Residency

Group Count %

Central & Western 42 5

Wan Chai** 25 3

Eastern 102 13

Southern 53 7

Yau Tsim Mong 29 4

Sham Shui Po 38 5

Kowloon City 46 6

Wong Tai Sin** 39 5

Kwun Tong 54 7

Tsuen Wan 20 3

Tuen Mun** 45 6

Yuen Long 57 7

Kwai Tsing 33 4

Islands 19 2

North 45 6

Tai Po 48 6

Shatin 61 8

Sai Kung** 41 5

** Reformed districts

Reformed/Non-reformed districts

Group Count %

Non-reformed districts 650 81

Reformed districts 150 19

Residence by Legco district (recoded from DC residency)

Group Count %

Hong Kong Island 222 28

Kowloon West 67 8

Kowloon East 139 17

NT West 174 22

NT East 195 24

Districts by Birthplace of respondents CW WC East S YTM SSP Kow WTS KT TW TM YL KT Is N TP Sha SK total

HK born

64 68 73 77 52 61 72 72 72 75 71 63 64 63 76 77 79 85 71

China born

21 24 26 21 38 37 26 26 23 20 20 33 36 26 24 19 16 15 25

Other 14 8 2 2 10 3 2 3 6 5 9 4 0 11 0 4 5 0 4 total 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100

table contents: Percent of Column Total


140

KEY

Group Count

Central & Western CW

Wan Chai** EC

Eastern East

Southern S

Yau Tsim Mong YTM

Sham Shui Po SSP

Kowloon City Kow

Wong Tai Sin** WTS

Kwun Tong KT

Tsuen Wan TW

Tuen Mun** TM

Yuen Long YL

Kwai Tsing KT

Islands Is

North N

Tai Po TP

Shatin Sha

Sai Kung** SK

141

Report written by: Michael E. DeGolyer

Survey administration and Chinese translation: P.K. Cheung

At the 95% confidence level, range of error is plus or minus 3 points for surveys 900-1,000 respondents and 4

points for those 600-800. Completion rates for the surveys range from 28% to 32% of those contacted by

telephone. Since the project uses a Kish table to randomly identify the correspondents desired and then

schedules a callback if that specific respondent is not at home, the completion rate tends to be lower but the randomization of responses (needed for accurate statistics) tends to be higher than surveys which interview

readily available respondents using the next birthday method. Older respondents with this method tend to use

traditional Chinese calendar where all “birthdays” are celebrated on the second day of the lunar new year, thus

degrading randomization dependent on this method (in lunar calendar using societies in Asia). Respondents are

interviewed in Cantonese, Mandarin, English, Hakka and other languages or dialects as they prefer and as

interviewers with the language skills needed are available. Other surveys referred to above are Hong Kong

Transition Project surveys. The details of those surveys and reports of same may be found on the Hong Kong

Transition Project website at http://www.hkbu.edu.hk/~hktp

The number of respondents in the HKTP surveys: N= Nov 91 902

Feb 93 615 Aug 93 609 Feb 94 636 Aug 94 640 Feb 95 647 Aug 95 645 Feb 96 627 July 96 928 Dec 96 326 Feb 97 546 June 97 1,129 Jan 98 700 April 98 852 June 98 625 July 98 647 Oct 98 811 Apr 99 838 July 99 815 Nov 99 813

Apr 00 704 Aug 00 625; Aug 00 1059 Oct 00 721 Nov 00 801 Apr 01 830 June 01 808 Jul (media ) 831 Jul (party) 1029 Nov 01 759 Apr 02 751 Aug 02 721 Nov 02 814 Mar 03 790 June 03 776 Nov 03 836 Dec 03 709 Apr 04 809 May 04 833 June 04* 680 July 04 * 955 July 04* 695 Aug 04* 781

Sept 04* Nov 04 773 Dec 04 800 Dec FC** 405 (365) May 05 829 May FC**376 July 05 810 Nov 05 859 Mar 06 805 Apr 06 807 July 06 1,106 Nov 06 706 Nov 06 FC** 374

Apr 07 889 May 07 800

*permanent residents, registered voters only (part of a special 2004 election series) **Functional constituency registered voters (voters in September 2004 Legco election)

†Not all surveys are referred to in trend series.

†All Figures are in percentages unless otherwise stated. The Hong Kong Transition Project is funded via a competitive grant from the Research Grants Council of the University Grants Committee of the Hong Kong Government (HKBU 2168/04H) and is a participating research project with the David C. Lam Institute of East-West Studies. None of the institutions mentioned above is responsible for any of the views expressed herein.

142

’

APPENDIX

Key:Optimism How do you feel currently about HK s future prospects as a part of China?

SatLife Are you currently satisfied/dissatisfied with: your current life in Hong Kong? SatGov Are you currently satisfied/dissatisfied with: the general performance of the SAR government?


China?

SatCE Are you currently satisfied/dissatisfied with: the general performance of CE Donald Tsang?

SatCGov Are you currently satisfied/dissatisfied with: the performance of the PRCGov in ruling China?


HKSAR?


Jintao?

CORRELATION TABLE 5c Age with Optimism and Satisfaction, 18-19 year olds Optimism Satlife SatGov SatSar-PRC SatCE SatCGov SatCGovSar SatPresHu

Optimism 1.000 SatLife -0.438 1.000 SatGov -0.669 0.270 1.000 SatSar-PRC -0.421 0.344 0.472 1.000 SatCE -0.594 0.314 0.466 0.474 1.000 SatCGov • 0.155 0.078 0.155 -0.230 1.000 SatCGovSar • -0.050 0.058 0.101 0.208 -0.291 1.000 SatPresHu 0.451 0.186 0.154 0.135 0.157 0.059 0.390 1.000

CORRELATION TABLE 5d Age with Optimism and Satisfaction, Early Career 20-39 Optimism Satlife SatGov SatSar-PRC SatCE SatCGov SatCGovSar SatPresHu

Optimism 1.000 SatLife -0.349 1.000 SatGov -0.492 0.391 1.000 SatSar-PRC -0.457 0.256 0.647 1.000 SatCE -0.350 0.164 0.461 0.465 1.000 SatCGov -0.241 0.060 0.322 0.353 0.281 1.000 SatCGovSar -0.207 0.082 0.381 0.386 0.396 0.514 1.000 SatPresHu -0.070 0.070 0.207 0.181 0.318 0.316 0.398 1.000

CORRELATION TABLE 5e Age with Optimism and Satisfaction, Later Career 40-59 Optimism Satlife SatGov SatSar-PRC SatCE SatCGov SatCGovSar SatPresHu


CORRELATION TABLE 5f Age with Optimism and Satisfaction, Retirement Age 60+ Optimism Satlife SatGov SatSar-PRC SatCE SatCGov SatCGovSar SatPresHu


143

CORRELATION TABLE 34a Poorest: Income with Optimism and Satisfaction, $0-

19,000 per month family income Optimism Satlife SatGov SatSar-PRC SatCE SatCGov SatCGovSar SatPresHu

Optimism 1.000

SatLife -0.621 1.000

SatGov -0.676 0.625 1.000

SatSar-PRC -0.521 0.556 0.619 1.000

SatCE -0.588 0.475 0.612 0.585 1.000

SatCGov -0.472 0.327 0.388 0.419 0.355 1.000

SatCGovSar -0.528 0.398 0.489 0.529 0.524 0.608 1.000

SatPresHu -0.372 0.242 0.356 0.352 0.415 0.524 0.511 1.000

CORRELATION TABLE 34b Lower middle: Income with Optimism and Satisfaction,

$20,000-39,999 per month family income Optimism Satlife SatGov SatSar-PRC SatCE SatCGov SatCGovSar SatPresHu

Optimism 1.000

SatLife -0.348 1.000

SatGov -0.407 0.487 1.000

SatSar-PRC -0.423 0.405 0.598 1.000

SatCE -0.440 0.264 0.477 0.475 1.000

SatCGov -0.185 0.257 0.358 0.340 0.320 1.000

SatCGovSar -0.349 0.230 0.379 0.416 0.362 0.459 1.000

SatPresHu -0.217 0.106 0.206 0.245 0.397 0.393 0.513 1.000

CORRELATION TABLE 34c Upper Middle Income with Optimism and Satisfaction,

$40,000-79,999 per month family income Optimism Satlife SatGov SatSar-PRC SatCE SatCGov SatCGovSar SatPresHu

Optimism 1.000

SatLife -0.491 1.000

SatGov -0.540 0.631 1.000

SatSar-PRC -0.399 0.347 0.567 1.000

SatCE -0.259 0.375 0.604 0.542 1.000

SatCGov -0.252 0.173 0.394 0.354 0.407 1.000

SatCGovSar -0.333 0.333 0.539 0.466 0.476 0.592 1.000

SatPresHu -0.221 0.292 0.356 0.294 0.271 0.419 0.535 1.000

CORRELATION TABLE 34d Richest: Income with Optimism and Satisfaction,

$80,000+ per month family income Optimism Satlife SatGov SatSar-PRC SatCE SatCGov SatCGovSar SatPresHu

Optimism 1.000

SatLife -0.475 1.000

SatGov -0.263 0.226 1.000

SatSar-PRC -0.416 0.038 0.585 1.000

SatCE -0.317 -0.032 0.576 0.697 1.000

SatCGov -0.397 0.008 0.287 0.372 0.292 1.000

SatCGovSar -0.223 -0.085 0.447 0.549 0.412 0.571 1.000

SatPresHu -0.474 0.176 0.074 0.174 0.220 0.494 0.163 1.000

144

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