How Bodies Come to Matter - Judith Butler

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How Bodies Come to Matter: An Interview with Judith ButlerAuthor(s): Irene Costera Meijer and Baukje PrinsSource: Signs, Vol. 23, No. 2 (Winter, 1998), pp. 275-286Published by: The University of Chicago PressStable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/3175091Accessed: 09-03-2015 13:08 UTC

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Irene

Costera

Meijer

B

au kj e Pr in s

How

Bodies

Come

to

Matter:

An

Interview

with

Judith

Butler

n

May

1996

Judith

utlermade short our

hrough

urope.

t

started

offwith

lightning

isit o

the

Netherlands,

hereherwork s

followed

withmuch nterest.utlerwas theguest f theDepartmentfWomen's

Studies f the

Faculty

fArts t the

University

f Utrecht. o

us,

her

pres-

ence in the flesh eemeda

good

opportunity

o

put

beforeher

our

ques-

tions

concerning

uch

complex

notions as the

performativity

f

gender,

the

construction

f

sex,

and the

abjection

f

bodies,

as set out

in

Gender

Trouble

1990)

and

Bodies

hatMatter

1993).

Butler's

extsmake

for

asci-

nating eadings

ut also left

s with ome ntricate

puzzles.

So,

just

a

few

hours after er

arrival,

utler oundherself

ssailed

by

two

eager

Dutch

interviewers.

t

was the start

f a

rewarding

nd

inspiringxchange

f

views. The

followingday,

an intensive esearch eminar ook

place

in

which

Dutch

women's

tudies

cholars eized he

opportunity

o

pose

their

most

pressing

uestions.

n the

evening

ours,

we

listened

o a

challenging

lecture

n

the imits

f

restraining

nstances

f

hate

speech

by

aw. t

elic-

ited a

lively

iscussion

bout the differences

etween,

nd the

pros

and

cons

of

political

nd

constitutional

egulations

n,

the

United States

nd

the

Netherlands.

o

us,

these vents

provisionally

oncluded

n

extended

and

fruitful

mmersionn

Butler's

thoughts.

The followingnterviews theresult f three oundsofconversation.

To be

well

prepared

orour

confrontation

ith

Butler,

we

spent

everal

animated

fternoonsnd

evenings

iscussing

er

work

nd ts

significance

for

our

own

theorizing

nd research.

he second

round

was

in

writing,

wherein

utler

gave

elaborate

esponses

o our

first et of

questions.

The

face-to-facealk n

Utrecht,

inally,

nabled

both

parties

o

explain

hem-

selves,

ffer

larifications,

ry

o

eliminate

misunderstandings,

nd

have a

few

good

laughs

s

well.

The interviewoncentratesn threenterrelatedssues.First,we won-

der

boutthe

tatus f

Butler's

ork

nd

abouthow

she

expects

er

readers

to

understand t.

What

are

its

feminist

nd

what are

its

philosophical

[Signs:Journal

f

Womenn

Culture nd

Society

998,

vol.

23,

no.

2]

?

1998

by

The

University

f

Chicago.

All

rights

eserved.

097-9740/98/2302-0001$02.00

This content downloaded from 196.24.133.184 on Mon, 09 Mar 2015 13:08:09 UTC

All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions





276

I

Meijer

nd

Prins

claims? s it an

exercisen careful

conceptual nalysis,

r shouldwe read t

as

political

fiction? s it

a

political critiqueconcerning

he

(un)repre-

sentability

f

some) bodies,

or is it a

deconstruction

f the

notion

of

rep-

resentability

tself?

oes it

address

he

epistemological

uestion

f how we

can

possibly

now ur

sexed)

bodies,

or s t an

attempt

o

understand ow

(sexed)

bodies

can

be-

whichwould

be an

ontological uestion?

Butler's

response

s

unequivocal:

her

prime

oncerns

re not

those

of

the

concep-

tually

pure" philosopher

ut

of a

theorist n a much more

political

nd

strategic

ein.She

agrees

hather

laims

oncerning

heexistence

f

abject

bodies are

downright

ontradictory.

ut,

o she tells

s,

they

re

contradic-

tory

n

purpose:pronounced

s

performative

ormulas,

hey

re meant

o

enforce

r invokehis

impossible"

xistence.We

may

ee Butler'sworkas

political

iction-as

long

as we

realizethat t offers ictions hatwant

to

bring

bout "realities.'

econd,

we went

more

deeply

nto the

meaning

f

thenotionof the

"abject.?

Whatkind

of

bodies would

count

s

abject

bod-

ies?

Tramps,

ransvestites,

admen?

he

ragged

body,

he disabled

body,

theveiled

body?

t is clear hat

Butler esists

iving

xamples.

ut

she ex-

plains

n

detail

why

hat s thecase.

Finally,

he nterview

ntroduces

ues-

tionsof sex and

heterosexuality.

re there

not other

xes that

govern

he

exclusion f bodies next o heterosexuality,nddoes one not runthe risk

of

strengthening

recisely

hatwhich

ne wishes o weaken

by presenting

"theheterosexual

matrix"

s the ource

of

all

evil?

Again,

Butler's

esponse

refers o

political

nd

strategic

ather han to

philosophical

r

empirical

motives:

may xaggerate,

he

admits,

ut fear

hat

utting

ther

atego-

riesof exclusion

n a

par

with

heterosexuality

nce

again

eads

to the

"ab-

jection"

f

thehomosexual

nd

especially

he esbian

body.

DepartmentfCommunication

University

fAmsterdam

Meijer)

Department

fPhilosophy

Universityf

Maastricht

Prins)

IRENE

COSTERA

MEIJER

and

BAUKJE

PRINS:

Preparing

or

his

nter-

view,

we

repeatedly

ame

to

wonder

bout

what

kind f

a

work

Bodies

hat

Matter

ctually

s: should

we see t

as

a

philosophical

xercise

n

conceptual

analysis,

s

a

political

ritique,

r

as

a

strategic roject

f deconstructivism?

Carolyn

Heilbrun,

n an

essay

bout

thevalue

of women's

writing,

tated:

"What

matters

s that

ives

do

not

serve

s

models;

only

stories

o

that.

And

it s a hard

hing

o make

up

stories

o

live

by.

We can

only

retell

nd







S

I

G

N S Winter1998

I

277

live

by

the stories

we

have read or heard. We live our lives

through

texts....

Whatever

heir

orm r

medium,

hesestorieshave formed

s

all; theyarewhatwe mustuse to make new fictions, ew narratives"

(1988,

37).

To what

xtent oes

your

work

fit nto uch viewof

women's

writing?

an

your

project

e understood

s a

way

of

telling

s new

stories

to

live

by?

Or would

you

rather

ee it as an

attempt

o

give

us feminists

new

analytical

ools

to criticize ur ives? n other

words,

how would

you

want

your

deal reader

o read Bodies

hat

Matter:

as a form f

political

fiction r

as

a

diagnostic hilosophical

nquiry?

JUDITH

BUTLER:

I

am

sympathetic

ith he

description

f

my

work s

political

fiction,

ut I

think

t

is

important

o

stress

hat not

all

fiction

takes heform f a

story.

he

interesting

itation rom

Carolyn

Heilbrun

emphasizes

stories"

nd

suggests

hat t

s

through

arrativehat

urvival

forwomen

s

to

be

found.That

may

be

true,

ut that

s

not

quite

the

way

in which work. think

hat a

political maginary

ontains

ll

kindsof

ways

of

thinking

nd

writing

hat re

not

necessarily

tories ut which re

fictive,

n thesensethat

hey

elineatemodes

of

possibility.

My

work

has

always

been undertaken ith he aim to

expand

nd en-

hance field f

possibilities

or

bodily

ife.

My

earlier

emphasis

n denatu-

ralization asnotso much nopposition o nature s itwasanopposition

to

the nvocation f nature s a

way

of

setting

ecessary

imits n

gendered

life.

To

conceive f

bodies

differently

eemsto me

part

of

the

conceptual

and

philosophical

truggle

hat eminism

nvolves,

nd t

can relate

o

ques-

tions of

survival

s

well. The

abjection

f certain indsof

bodies,

their

inadmissibility

o codes

of

intelligibility,

oes make tself

nown

n

policy

and

politics,

nd to

ive

s such

body

n

theworld s to ive n

the

hadowy

regions

f

ontology.

'm

enraged

by

the

ontological

laims

hat odes

of

legitimacy akeon bodies ntheworld, ndI try, hen can,to imagine

against

hat.

So,

it

s

not a

diagnosis,

nd not

merely

strategy,

nd

not at

all a

story,

but

some

otherkindof

workthat

happens

t the evel of a

philosophical

imaginary,

ne that

s

deployed y

codes of

legitimacy,

ut

also,

one which

emerges

rom

within hose

codes as the nternal

possibility

f

their

wn

dismantling.

ICM and

BP:

As

we

understand

t,

n

Bodies

hat

Matter

you

address

one ofthethorniestroblems or radical onstructivist,amely, ow to

conceive

f

materiality

n

constructivist

erms.

With he

help

of

thenotion

of the

performativity

f

language,you

manage

o

evoke an

image

of both

the

solidity

nd

contingency

f

so-called

hard

facts.

You

build

a

potent

argument

ith

whichwe

think

ard-boiled

ealistic

rguments

bout

the

undeniability

f

"Death

and

Furniture"

an be

countered

see

Edwards,









S

I

G N S Winter 1998

I

279

vides another

tep,

made

possibleby

the kindof work

thathe does.

This

has to do with

asking

how it is thatcertain

inds

of

discourse

produce

ontological

ffects

r

operate hrough

he

irculation

f

ontological

moves.

In

part,

see

myself

s

working

withindiscourses

hat

operate hrough

ontological

laims "theres no doer behind

he

deed"

and

recirculating

the "there

s" in

orderto

produce

a

counterimaginary

o the

dominant

metaphysics.

ndeed,

I

think t is crucial o recirculatend

resignify

he

ontological

perators,

f

only

to

produce ontology

tself s a

contested

field.

think,

or

nstance,

hat t is crucial o write entences

hat

begin

with

"I

think" ven

though

standthe

chanceof

being

misconstrued

s

adding

he

subject

o the deed. There s no

way

to

counter hosekinds

f

grammarsxcept

hrough

nhabiting

hem n

ways

hat

produce

terrible

dissonance n

them,

hat

say" precisely

hatthe

grammar

tself

was

sup-

posed

to foreclose. he

reason

why repetition

nd

resignification

re

so

important

o

my

work has

everything

o

do with how

I

see

opposition

working

rom

within he

very

erms

y

which

power

s

reelaborated.

he

point

s not

to level

prohibition

gainst sing

ontological

erms

ut,

on

the

contrary,

o use them

more,

o

exploit

nd

restage

hem,

ubject

hem

to abuse so

that

hey

an no

longer

do their sual

work.

There s, however,nother ointhere o bemade, nd trelates ackto

the

question

of

constructivism.

hrases ike "there

s

a

matrix f

gender

relations"

o

appear

o

refer,

ut

they

lso refer

laterally,

ithin

language,

to

the conventions f

ontological

ascription.

They

are

philosophical

"mimes"

n

the ense

hat

rigaray

as described.

They

refer

o certain

inds

of

philosophical

onventions. ut

also want o

claim hat

he

ontological

claim

an never

fully

apture

ts

object,

nd this

viewmakes

me

somewhat

differentrom

oucault

nd

aligns

me

temporarily

ith he

Kantian

radi-

tionas ithasbeen takenup byDerrida.The "there s" gesturesoward

referentt cannot

capture,

ecause

he referents

not

fully

uilt

up

in lan-

guage,

s

not the same

as the

linguistic

ffect.

here s no

access

o it

out-

side of

the

inguistic

ffect,

ut the

linguistic

ffect

s

not

the

same

as the

referent

hat t

fails o

capture.

his s

what llows

for

variety

f

ways

of

making

eference

o

something,

one of

which

can

claim to

be that

to

which

references

made.

ICM

and BP:

The

pun

of

your

itle

s

very

elicitous:

bodies

thatmat-

ter"

simultaneously aterialize,cquiremeaning, ndobtaina legitimate

status.

Bodies

thatdo

not

matter

re

"abject"

bodies.

Such

bodies

are not

intelligible

an

epistemological

laim),

nor

do

they

have

legitimate

xis-

tence

a

political

r

normative

laim).

Hence,

they

ail

o

materialize. ev-

ertheless,

our

laim

s

also that

bject

bodies

"exist,

that

s,

as

excluded,

as a

disruptive

ower.

At this

point,

we feel

bit

ost:

Can

bodies

that

fail







280

I

Meijer

nd Prins

to

materializetill

be"

bodies?

f

you

intend

he

concept

of the

"abject"

to

refer o

bodies that

exist,"

would

it

not be

more

adequate

to

say

that,

althoughbject

bodiesare

constructed,

ave

materialized,

nd

gained

ntel-

ligibility,hey

till ail

o

qualify

s

fully

uman?

n

other

words,

s it not

the case

that

bject

bodiesdo "matter"

ntologically

nd

epistemologically

but do

not

yet

matter"

n

a

normative-political

ense?

JB:

ndeed,

n a

strictlyhilosophical

ense,

t once to

say

that there

are"

abject

bodies and

that

they

o nothave

claim o

ontology ppears

o

be

what

the

Habermassians ould

call a

performative

ontradiction.

ell,

you

could

become kindof medieval nd

scholastic bout

this

nd

say,

h

yes,

ertain

inds

f

beings

have

more

fully ntological

eing

than

others,

etcetera,

tcetera. hen

you

wouldremainwithin certain indof

philo-

sophical

frameworkhat ould

be

conceptually

atisfying.

ut

I

would

like

to ask

a

differentind

of

question,

namely,

ow is it

that he domain

of

ontology

s

itself

ircumscribed

y

power?

That

is,

How

is

it that ertain

kinds f

subjects

ay

claim o

ontology,

ow

is

it

that

hey

ount r

qualify

as real?

n

that ase,

we are

talking

bout

the distribution

f

ontological

effects,

hich s

an

instrument

f

power,

nstrumentalized

or

purposes

f

hierarchy

nd subordination

nd

also for

purposes

of exclusion

nd

for

producing omains funthinkability.his wholedomainofontology hat

the

good,

the

conceptually ure,

philosopher

akes

for

granted,

s

pro-

foundly

ainted rom

he

start.

Now,

we

cannot

ook at

grammar

nd

say,

ifI

say

hat here

re

abject

bodies,

hen

must

be able to

reason

back

from

the

claim

there re"

to a

prior

ntology.

ardly, ardly.

could

say

there

are

abject

bodies,"

nd

that ould

be

a

performative

n which

endow

ntol-

ogy.

endow

ontology

o

precisely

hatwhich

has been

systematically

e-

prived

f

the

privilege

f

ontology.

he

domain

of

ontology

s a

regulated

domain:whatgetsproduced nsideof it,whatgetsexcludedfrom t in

order

or

hedomain

o be constituted

s itself

n

effectf

power.

And

the

performative

an be

one

of

the

ways

n

which

discourse

perationalizes

power.

o,

I

am

performing

performative

ontradiction,

n

purpose.

nd

I am

doing

that

recisely

o confound

he

onceptuallyroper

hilosopher

and

to

pose

a

question

bout

the

econdary

ndderivative

tatus f

ontol-

ogy.

t

is for

me not

a

presupposition.

ven

f

say,

there

re

abject

bodies

thatdo

not

enjoy

certain

ind

of

ontological

tatus,"

perform

hat

on-

tradictionn purpose.

am

doing

that

precisely

o

fly

n the face

of

those

who

would

say,

but

aren't

you

presupposing

..

?" No

My speech

does

not

necessarily

ave

to

presuppose.

..

Or,

f t

does,

fine

erhaps

t's

pro-

ducing

the

effect

f

a

presupposition

hrough

ts

performance,

K?

And

that's

ine Get

used

to

it But

it

is

to

roundly naugurate

n

ontological







S

I G N S Winter 1998

I

281

domain,

t

snot

o

presuppose

n

already

iven

ne. t

is

discursively

o

institute

ne.

ICM andBP: Still,tremainsifficultograsphenotionf he abject"

in

your

work,

which

may

e due to the

highly

bstractharacter

f

most

of

your

efinitions

nd

descriptions.

ou seem omewhateluctant

o

give

more oncrete

xamples

f

what ould

beconsidered

bject

odies.

JB:

Well,

es,

certainly

m.

For,

you

know,

ypologies

re

usually

x-

actly

he

way

n which

bjection

s conferred:onsiderhe

place

of

ty-

pology

within

sychiatric

athologization.

owever,

o

preventny

mis-

understanding

eforehand:he

bject

orme

s n

no

way

estrictedo

sex

and

heteronormativity.

t

relateso

all

kinds

f

bodies

whose ives re

not

consideredo be "lives" ndwhose

materiality

sunderstoodot o"mat-

ter."

o

give omething

f an

indication:

he

U.S.

press

egularly

igures

non-Westernives

n

uch

erms.

mpoverishment

s

anotherommon an-

didate,

s

s

thedomain f hose dentifieds

psychiatric

cases."

ICM

andBP: We

gree

hat

eing

utspoken

n this

ubject

pproaches

the

imitsfwhat

an

be

spoken

f.

till,

ould

you

laborate

n

this ssue?

JB:

OK,

I'll

do

that,

ut

have o

do

something

lse t

the ame

ime.

I

could numerate

any

xamples

f

what

take o

be

the

bjection

f

bodies.Wecannoticet, ornstance,ithhe illingfLebaneseefugees:

the

ways

hat

hose

odies,

hose

ives,

on't

et

figured

s

ives.

hey

an

get

counted,

here's

utrage

enerally,

utthere

s

no

specificity.

have

seen t in

theGerman

ress

whenTurkish

efugees

re

either illed

r

maimed.

ery

ften e

can

get

henames

f he

German

erpetrators

nd

their

omplex amily

nd

psychological

istories,

ut

no

Turk as a com-

plex amily

r

psychologicalistory

hat ie Zeit

verwrites

bout,

r at

least

ot hat

have een

n

my

eading

f his

material.

o,

we

get

kind

ofdifferentialroductionf hehuman ra differentialaterializationf

the

human. ndwe

also

get,

think,

production

f

he

bject.

o,

t s not

as

f

he

nthinkable,

he

nlivable,

he

nintelligible

asno

discursive

ife;

itdoes

ave ne. t

ust

ives

within

iscourse

s the

adically

ninterrogated

and

s the

hadowy

ontentless

igure

or

something

hat

s

not

yet

made

real.

But t

would

be

a terrible

istake

f

one

thought

hat

hedefinition

of he

bject

ould e

exhausted

y

he

xamples

hat

give.

want

o hold

out

for

conceptual

pparatus

hat

llows

or he

operation

f

abjection

tohave kind frelativeutonomy,ven mptiness,ontentlessness--

precisely

o

that t

is

not

captured

y

ts

examples,

o that ts

examples

don't

hen

ecome

ormativef

whatwe

mean

by

he

bject.

What

ery

often

appens

s

that

eople

ive

heir

bstract

heoriesf

omething

ike

abjection,

hen

hey

ive

he

xample,

hen he

xample

ecomes

orma-







282

I

Meijer

nd

Prins

tive

of

everything

lse. t

becomes

paradigmatic

nd comes to

produce

ts

own

exclusions. t becomes

fixed

nd normativen the

rigid

ense.

ICM and BP:

So, abjection

s

a

process?

A discursive

rocess?

JB:

think o I think

t

has

to

be,

yes.

ICM and BP:

So,

it s not about bodies

themselves,

ut about

the

ways

bodies

figure

n

discourse?

We,

for

nstance,

sked ourselveswhether

he

oriental,

heveiled

body,

he

female

ody

that

s

veiled

when

she/it

nters

public space,

counts s an

example

f the

abject.

We

hesitated bout

this,

because this

body,

this

woman,

acts

according

o

an established

orm.

Somehow

we could not

combine

bjection

nd

normativity.

JB:

This

questionopens

up

a

couple

of different

ssues.

So,

let

me

give

you

a

couple

of answers o that. One is that think hatdiscoursesdo

actually

ive n bodies.

They odge

n

bodies;

bodies

n fact

arry

iscourses

as

part

of their wn

lifeblood.And

nobody

can survive

without,

n

some

sense,

being

carried

by

discourse.

o,

I

don't

want

to

say

that here

s

dis-

cursive

onstruction

n the one

hand and

a

lived

body

on the

other.But

the

other

point,

which

may

be

more

mportant

ere,

s

that

we also

have

to

worry

bout certain

ways

of

describing

rientalism

nd

especially

e-

scribing

rientalism

s it

pertains

o

women,

women's

bodies,

and

wom-

en's self-representations.or instance, here remanydebatesabout the

veil.

And

there re

some

scholars,

eminist

cholars,

who

have

argued

hat

the

veil s

actually ery omplex

nd

that

ery

ften

certain

ind f

power

that

women

have within

slamic

countries

o

express

hemselves

nd

to

exercise

ower

s facilitated

y

the

veil,

precisely

ecause

hat

power

s

de-

flected

nd

made ess

easily

dentifiable.

o,

if

you

were

to

say

to

me,

"the

veiled

woman,"

do we

mean

n Iran?

Do we

mean

a woman

of a

certain

class?

n

what

context,

or

what

purpose?

What

s the

action,

what

s the

practicehatwe arethinkingbout? n whatcontextre we tryingo de-

cide

whether

r not

theveiled

woman

s an

example

f

the

abject?

What

worry

bout

s

that,

n certain

ases,

we

would

see that s an

abjection:

n

the sense

that

thiswoman

is

literally

ot

allowed

to

show

her face

and

hence

enter

nto the

public

domain

of faced

humans.

On another

evel,

however,

we

might

ay

that

we as

Westerners

re

misrecognizing

certain

cultural

rtifact,

certain ultural

nd

religious

nstrument

hat

has been

a

traditional

ay

for

women

to exert

ower.

This

particular

ebate

over

the

veilhasplaguedfeministebates.Thequestion

s: Arefeminists

eing

ori-

entalist

when

they

assume

that

the veiled

woman is

always

an

abject

woman?

want

to

keep

that

uestion

pen;

that's

why

think here

must

be

a relative

ncommensurability

etween

he heoretical

laboration

f

ab-

jection

and

the

examples.

And

it

may

well

be that

he

example

works

n

some

contexts

nd

not at

all

n

others.







SI G N S Winter 1998

I

283

ICM

and BP: Now that

you

mention

ontext,

s thisnot theother

ide

of the "there

s"

question?

As

you

said

earlier,

ne of the

functions

f

the

"there s"

formulas that

you engageyourself

n a debateabout

ontology,

of

what

s and

what

can be

thought.

n Gender

rouble,

ou

intervene

n

the debate on the construction

f

gender

dentities.

s

you

notice

here,

"the

nternal

oherence

r

unity

f either

gender,

man

or

woman,

hereby

requires

oth

a

stable

nd

oppositional eterosexuality.

hat nstitutional

heterosexuality

oth

requires

nd

produces

the

univocity

f

each

of

the

gendered

erms hatconstitute he imit f

gendered

possibilities

ithin

an

oppositional,

inary

ender

ystem"

22).

Our

question

concerns

he

assumed

necessity

f the heterosexualharacter f

practices

hat

generate

stable dentities. oes the heterosexualmatrix ot also obscurethe

per-

formative

owers

of

the sexualdivisions

mong

women?Feminist istori-

ans have shown

that

he

stability

f

gender

dentities oes not automati-

cally

depend

on

heterosexual

negotiations

ut also on the

differences

between

"proper"

women and

other

women,

between

"proper"

men and

othermen

Costera

Meijer

1991).

To call the

normativity

f

heterosexuality

nto

question

s a

powerful

gesture,

ut does it not obscure he fact

hat

people

construct

otionsof

differenceot onlythrough enderbutbysexual(izing) ivisionswithin

genders

hrough ategories

f

race, class,

or

physical

bilities? isabled

women ufferrom

being tigmatized

s ess

femininehan heirmore

ble-

bodied

counterparts.

n the

other

hand,

blackwomen

are sometimes

te-

reotyped

s

more

female,

whereas n other

ontexts

they

re

considered

less

adylike

hanwhite

women.The

constructionf

gender

dentities,

e

suggest,

was made

not

only by

repeating

he difference

etweenfemale

and

male,

femininity

nd

masculinity

ut also

by

constantly

ffirming

he

hierarchicaloppositionbetweenfemininitynd unfemininity,etween

masculinity

nd

unmasculinity.

hat

are

your

thoughts

bout the claim

that he

opposite

of

femininity

s

oftennot

masculinity

ut

unfemininity

and

that hese

wo notions

ften

o not

coincide?

JB:

I

very

much

ike the

dea thatthe

opposite

of

masculinity

s not

necessarily

emininity.

have no

problem

with

that.

But the

relationship

between

exuality

nd

gender,

he

way

that

you

frame

t here

s based on

Bodies

hatMatter.n

fact,

n

Gender

rouble

wrote

something ery

imilar

towhatyousuggest ere.AlthoughnBodies hatMatter emphasize hat

sexuality

s

regulated

hrough

he

shaming

f

gender,

hat f

course ould

not

work

f

gender

were

not

itself

endered

proper nly

n

the

context f

a

certain

egulation

f

sexuality.

o,

I

see

no

problem

here.

But I

have

read

much

feminist

istory

hat

ssumes

hat

both

the

proper

nd the

un-

proper"

n

women's

sexuality

re

kinds f

heterosexuality

within

marriage







284

I

Meijer

nd Prins

and outside

marriage

r

domestic nd

prostitution).

he

question

want

to

pose

has to do

withwhat

s

left

utside

hese

binaries,

hat s not even

speakable

s

part

of the

unproper

r

improper.

fear hatthe

question

of

female

omosexuality

ecomesmuted

precisely

hrough

hose

kinds f

feminist istorical

rameworkshatremain

uncritically

ttached o those

kinds f

binarisms.

I

suppose

that

you

want to

suggest

hat

unproper

exuality

s a

larger

rubric,

ne

that

might

ake nto account

ll kinds

f

sexual

practices.

ut

am

worried hat

he

proper/unproper

istinctioneeks

to

elide the

ques-

tion

of

homosexuality.

nd

I think here am

probablywilling

o commit

a sortof rhetoricalxcess n

order

o

keep

the

question

of

homosexuality,

and esbianismn

particular,

live.Which s not the same as

saying

hat ll

scholarship ught

to do thator that t is

the

primary

ppression,

r the

key,

r whatever.

t

rather

ndicateswhere

enter nto

critical iscourse

these

days.

ICM

and BP:

By

putting

eteronormativity

t the

center,

o

you

not

run

the risk f

reproducing

ts

importance?

s it not a

relapse?

When we

want

o

study

he

concept

f

woman

n a certain ime

nd

place,

whenwe

want

to know

who counted

s a

woman

and who did

not,

would it

not

be more nformativeo look"sideways"for nstance,t the notionofthe

unwomanly

r unfeminine?

JB:

Well,

you

know,

what

worry

bout is

this.

f

lesbianism

were to

be understood

s one

amongmany

orms f

mpropriety,

hen he

relation-

ship

between

exuality

nd

gender

emains

ntact

n

the

ense

hatwe don't

get

to

ask

under

what

conditions

esbianism

ctually

nsettles

he

notion

of

gender.

Not

simply

he

question

of what

s a

proper

woman

or an

im-

proper

woman,

but what

s

not thinkable

s

a

woman

at

all

This is where

we come backto the notionof abjection. think hatabjection ries o

signal

what

s left utside

of those

binary ppositions,

uch

that hose

bi-

naries

are

even

possible.

Who

gets

to count

as

an

"improper"

woman?

Who

gets

named

as the

improper

n the

text

hatthe historian

tudies?

What

kinds

of acts

get

classified

r

designated

r named?And which

re

so

unnameable

nd

unclassifiable

hat

hey

re

mproper

o

the

mproper,

that

hey

re

outside

f the

mproper?

am

referring

o acts

hat

onstitute

a domain

of

unspeakability

hat

conditions

he distinction

etween

m-

proper ndproper.

We

are still

not

able

to account

or

hose

cts nd

practices

nd

ways

of

living

hat

were

wildly xpelled

from he

very

binary

f the

proper

nd

the

improper.

hey

are

not

its

benign

prehistory

ut,

rather,

ts

violent

unspeakable

nderside.

nd

that's

what

want

to continue

o turn

o.

ICM

and

BP:

So,

we

come

back

to

the

abject.







S

I

G

N

S Winter 1998

I

285

JB:

I think o.

What's

going

to be

really nteresting

s how

you

do

a

history

f

that;

he racesf which

ave

been,

r are

for hemost

part,

erased. hat saverynterestingroblemor historian.owto read he

traces f

what

oes

et poken.

don't

hinkt s

mpossible

o do

it,

but

think

ts

a

reallynterestingroblem:

ow

to do

a

history

fthat

which

wasnever

upposed

o be

possible.

ICM

and

BP: In

your

esire o extend

he omain f bodies

hat

mat-

ter"

ou

renot lone.

This mbitions

shared

y

ntellectuals

ho

come

from

uite

ifferent

hilosophicalackgrounds.

e

especially

hink

f

ci-

ence tudies

cholarsuch s Donna

Haraway

ndBruno

atour.

owever,

their

roposals

o broaden

our minds n

this ssue are not

exclusively

o-

cused nthedomain f

what

ould

ualify

s)

human odies.

hey

lso

wish o

transform

ur

views f

Nature"nd

Things,"

n

order o

develop

more

adical ccounts

f

ecology

nd

technology.

or

that

eason,

hey

prefer

henotion f he

actor" o

the

humanist)

otion

fthe

subject."

Contrary

o

subjectivity,

gency

s

not he

rerogative

f

humans.

nimals,

trees,

machines,--for

xample,

nything

hat as an

impact

n or

affects

something

lse canbe

perceived

s

an

actor. oth

Haraway

ndLatour

use

thenotion

f he

hybrid"

o refer

o

this ast

ealm

f

ctors hat re

not seen s) human. ow do youassess herelationshipetween our

own

heorizing

f

bject

odies s

disruptive

hallenges

o

what ounts s

fully

uman

ndthe

ffirmationf

nonhuman)

ybrid

ctors

y

cience

studiescholars

uch s

Haraway

nd

Latour?

or

nstance,

oes

your

on-

cept

f

abject"

odies

eave

oom

o

ncludehe

ossibility

or

onhuman

bodies o

come

o

"matter"?

r does t

remain

estricted

o the

realm

f

what s

"livable"s

fully

uman?

JB:

think

hat he

work f

Haraway

nd

Latour

s

very

mportant.

nd

I don'thave a problemwith henotionofthe actor. till, think here re

reasons o

workwith

he

notion f

the

ubject,

easons

hat ave

very-

thing

o

do

with he

way

n

which t is

bound

up

with

he

egacies

f

humanism.

would

uggest

s well

hat

he

notion f

the

ubject

arries

with t a

doubleness

hat

s

crucial o

emphasize:

he

ubject

s

one

who

is

presumed

o be the

presupposition

f

agency,

s

you

suggest,

ut

the

subject

s

also

one

who s

subjected

o a

setof

rules r

aws

hat

recede

the

subject.

his

second

ense

works

gainst

he

humanist

onception

of an autonomouself r self-groundeduman ctor.ndeed, actor"

carries

theatrical

esonance

hat

wouldbe

very

ifficult

or

me

to

adopt

within

my

wn

work,

iven

he

propensity

o

read

"performativity"

s

a

Goffmanesque

roject

f

putting

n

a

mask r

electing

o

play

role.

prefer

o

work

he

egacy

f

humanism

gainst

tself,

nd

think

hat

uch

a

project

s

not

necessarily

n

tension

with

hose

who

seek

o

displace







286

I

Meijer

nd Prins

humanism

hrough

ecourse o vocabularies hat

disperse

gency

cross

the

ecological

ield.

hey

are

two

ways

of

undoing

hesame

problem,

nd

it

seems

important

o have cholars nd activists

ho work

t both

ends

of

the

problem.

References

Butler,

Judith.

990. Gender

rouble:

eminism

nd the

ubversion

f

dentity.

ew

York nd

London:

Routledge.

.1993. Bodies

hatMatter:On

the iscursive

imits

f

Sex."

New

York

nd

London:

Routledge.

CosteraMeijer,rene.1991. "Which ifferenceakes heDifference?n the

Conceptualization

f

Sexual

Difference."

n

Sharing

he

ifference:

eminist

e-

batesn

Holland,

d.

Joke .

Hermsen

nd

Alkelinean

Lenning,

2-46.

New

York ndLondon:

Routledge.

Edwards, erek,

Malcolm

shmore,

nd

Jonathan

otter.995.

Death nd

Fur-

niture:

he

Rhetoric,

olitics

nd

Theology

fBottom

ine

Arguments

gainst

Relativism."

istoryf

heHuman

Sciences

(2):25-49.

Heilbrun,

arolyn

. 1988.

Writing

Womans

ife.

ondon:

Women's

ress.

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How Bodies Come to Matter - Judith Butler

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