How civil aviation threatens national security

How civil aviation threatens national security

Athol Yates & Nara Srinivasan

Received: 14 April 2014 /Accepted: 1 May 2014# Springer Science+Business Media New York 2014

Abstract Privatizing national carriers, allowing foreign investors to purchase airports,carrying citizens who want to train with foreign militias, and transporting gold anddrugs for criminal gangs are just some of the civil aviation-related issues that areregularly claimed to threaten national security. By linking an issue with nationalsecurity, as identified in securitization literature, issues can become elevated to thestatus of national emergencies with all the attention that these receive. This paper usesquantitative methods to examine the discursive securitization technique in which claimsare made that civil aviation issues threaten national security. It identifies the types ofclaimed threats, the propensity of different actors to make such claims, and how oftenexplanations of the link between the claimed threat and national security are provided.

Keywords Aviation security . National security . Securitization

Introduction

Civil aviation is one of the most heavily regulated sectors globally, withgovernments regulating a myriad of issues across the safety, security, economic,environment, consumer protection, and industry promotion spectrum. The highlevel of government intervention is easily seen in economic issues. Despite theworldwide uptake of aviation sector1 liberalization, as seen by the privatization

J Transp SecurDOI 10.1007/s12198-014-0141-7

1The aviation sector is considered to consist of States, international civil aviation organizations, regulators,airline operators, airports, aviation industry (which includes aircraft and related design and production, andmaintenance and repair organizations), ground handling organizations, aviation associations, trainingorganizations, safety organizations and air traffic and navigation service providers.

A. Yates (*)Institute for International and Civil Security, Khalifa University of Science, Technology & Research(KUSTAR), P.O. Box: 127788, Abu Dhabi, United Arab Emiratese-mail: [email protected]

A. YatesDepartment of Engineering and Environment, University of Melbourne, Parkville, Australia

N. SrinivasanSchool of Computer and Security Science, Edith Cowan University, Perth, Australia

of airports and airlines, and the signing of “open skies” agreements, many countries stillregulate issues such as:

& The international and domestics routes that airlines can fly& Ticket prices& Approval of the establishment of an airline& Access to airport boarding gates and runways& Access to and the providers of essential airport services,2 ground handling

services3 and airport retail services4

& Permission for airline mergers& The level of foreign ownership of airlines& The carriage of domestic passengers by foreign carriers (cabotage)& Code sharing arrangements& Foreign construction firms building airport infrastructure.

A consequence of the heavy regulationmeans that governments invariably have tomakea decision for any significant change to the aviation sector. One tool that they use, which isalso used by proponents or opponents of such government action, is to claim that an issuethreatens national security, and hence requires immediate and decisive government actionin line with their claim. Getting an issue accepted as having national security implicationsoften means that the issue becomes treated through national security processes which aretypically less consultative, limited in focus and faster than the normal political–bureaucraticdecisionmaking processes. It can alsomean that government’s role is changed significantlywhich can benefit the proponent or opponent. The latter result is well illustrated in theconsequences of the US Government accepting that aviation security is a national securityissue in 1997. Prior to this, aviation security was considered principally an issue for theaviation industry which was considered at that time to be mainly limited to the FederalAviation Authority (FAA), air carriers, airports, and airport authorities. This limited role ofgovernment was reflected in the 1990 President’s Commission on Aviation Security andTerrorism which stated that the federal government had just “a relatively small operationalrole in air carrier and airport security” (White House 1990, p.41). The lack of USGovernment involvement in aviation security, with the exception of the FAA, reflected aview of that period that risks to aviation through a failure of security did not have nationalsecurity implications, and hence there was no requirement for the government’s nationalsecurity system to be involved in a substantial way.

The history of how aviation security went from being considered principally an airlineand air regulator responsibility to a shared responsibility with the US Governmentinvolved a decade of debate and discussion, air disasters, and Presidential Commissions.

2 Essential airport services are those services that are essential for the operation of the airport such as themaintenance of runways, taxiway, aprons, visual aids and lighting, terminal building, boarding facilities, theprovision of air traffic management, airport safety and security, rescue and fire-fighting, meteorologicalservices, and the use of check-in counters and airline counters.3 Ground handling services are those services related to ramp handling (loading and unloading of passengers,baggage, and freight, aircraft towing and push back, aircraft cleaning, supply of external power and airconditioning, waste disposal); traffic handling (processing of passengers, baggage and freight throughterminals); fuel service (refueling); in-flight catering; aircraft line maintenance and repair; and dispatching.4 Airport rental services including retail shops, restaurants and services such as car rentals, taxis.

A. Yates, N. Srinivasan

A key starting date was 1986 when the US carriers, through their industry association,started lobbying for a greater US Government role in aviation security on the basis thatterrorist attacks were actually aimed at governments, rather than the airlines (WhiteHouse 1990, p.34). The logic was that as the airports and airlines are simply surrogatetargets, the US Government, as the real target, should have a major role in bothpreventing these attacks and securing air travel. Other strands of the argument were thatgovernment should take over the aviation security system as security was essentially apolice function, and security would be more effective if run by government as it hadmoretools to counter terrorism with than industry (Janofsky 1996, p.5).

Following the 1988 terrorist attack on Pan Am Flight 103 (the Lockerbie bombing)which killed 259 on the aircraft and 11 on the ground, the President’s Commission onAviation Security and Terrorism was convened to evaluate the options of preventingterrorist actions involving aviation (White House 1990, p.142). The 1990 report of theCommission did not explicitly recognize that aviation security was a national security issue.While it found that the “U.S. civil aviation security system is seriously flawed and has failedto provide the proper level of protection for the traveling public” (White House 1990, p.i), itmade a series of recommendations to reform government agencies, notably the FAA, and toa far lesser extent the FBI, the Department of State and the Department of Transport. TheCommission also advocated significant changes to the involvement of government incountering terrorism which would reduce the likelihood of aviation terrorism. It advocatedtackling terrorism by pursuing a range of national security measures such as isolatingnations sponsoring terrorism, and pursuing “vigorous policies [which] should includeplanning and training for preemptive or retaliatory military strikes against known terroristenclaves in nations that harbor them … [and] covert operations, to prevent, disrupt orrespond to terrorist acts” (White House 1990, p.ii). The Commission saw that there werenational security implications in aviation terrorism but considered the government’s role inthis context to be providing the “first line of defense [which] is the collection of accurateand timely intelligence concerning the intentions, capabilities and actions of terroristsbefore they reach the airport” and countering terrorism before it occurs, but the aviationsector was responsibility for the “security measures at airports [which] are the last line ofdefense against civil aviation terrorism” (White House 1990, p.69).

While the Government implemented many of the Commission’s 64 recommenda-tions in the form of the Aviation Security Improvement Act of 1991, there wasconsiderable criticism over the next few years about the lack of actual improvementsin security. The reasons for this included that “government and industry often foundthemselves at odds, unable to resolve disputes over financing, effectiveness, technol-ogy, and potential impacts on operations and passengers” (White House 1997, p.28).

Despite the 1990/91 changes, the appropriate role of the government in aviation dueto national security implications continued to be discussed in the following years asillustrated in a 1995 article in the industry-orientated Security Management magazinewhich stated that “the U.S. Government needs to play a larger role in transportationsecurity by treating aviation security as a national defense issue, and supporting it witha concomitant level of funding” (Johnson and Laird 1995, p.58).

Following the suspected terrorist destruction of TWA Flight 800 off the coast ofNew York that killed all 230 on board on 17 July 1996, the link between aviationsecurity and national security again came to the fore. For example, on 29 July 1996Senator Larry Pressler, chairman of the Senate Commerce, Science, and Transportation


Committee, stated “If we are facing a situation in which the threat to aviation comesfrom abroad and really constitutes a threat to our national security, then we may have torethink this problem [who should pay] and look to our national-defense account orother sources for the kind of spending that could become necessary” (Suro R 1996).Within a few months, there were regular statements by aviation officials reflecting theview that aviation security was a national security issue. For example, in December1996 following the release of a raft of recommendations to improve aviation security bythe FAA’s Aviation Security Advisory Committee, the chair of the committee, DickLally, based the logic for this position as “Airports and airlines are surrogate targets.The real targets are the policies and government of the United States” (Pantagraph1996).

Shortly after the TWA Flight 800 crash and because of concern over the public’sconfidence in aviation safety and security in light of this and the 1996 ValuJet Flight592, President Clinton formed the President’s Commission on Aviation Security andTerrorism (the Gore Commission). During testimonies before the Commission, wit-nesses noted that terrorist acts against airlines were actually aimed at the United States,not individuals or airlines, and “accordingly, they recommended that the federalgovernment take the lead in purchasing new detection equipment and expandingcounterterrorism measures” (Washington Times 1996). One of the key recommenda-tions of the final report of the Commission released in February 1997 was that “Thefederal government should consider aviation security as a national security issue, andprovide substantial funding for capital improvements” (White House 1997, p.28).

The acceptance by the US Government that aviation security was a national securityissue is not just a semantic issue. It would result in the Government having to shouldersignificant costs and bear the operational burden of many more aviation securityactivities. As an illustration of the likely huge cost for government, security measuresrecommended by the December 1996 report of the FAA’s Aviation Security AdvisoryCommittee totaled $9.9 billion over 10 years (Pantagraph 1996). Examples of GoreCommission activities to be funded included increasing the number of FBI agentsassigned to counterterrorism investigations, improving intelligence, and crisis response;assessing the potential use of surface-to-air missiles against commercial aircraft;assessing the possible use of chemical and biological weapons as tools of terrorism;expanding the number of FAA-funded bomb-sniffing dogs; conducting airport vulner-ability assessments and developing action plans; developing a national program toincrease the professionalism of the aviation security workforce; and developing a jointgovernment–industry research and development program. It would also require gov-ernment agencies to share information with the aviation sector such as giving properlycleared airline and airport security personnel access to the classified information thatthey need to know; and provide the sector with explosives detection training programs.

The above case study into the recognition by the US Government that aviationsecurity is a national security issue reveals an important observation. Linking an issueto national security is a powerful rationale that can unlock significant governmentfunding for certain aviation stakeholders and transfer unwanted responsibilities togovernment. As will be seen below, aviation stakeholders have a long history ofreferencing national security threats to support their agenda. This paper explores howaviation stakeholders reference national security. The principal research questionsinvestigated in this paper are ‘What civil aviation related threats are claimed to threaten


national security, and who makes these claims?’ In exploring these issues, insights aredeveloped about the frequency and depth of the explanation of how the named threatactually threatens national security. Another output from the analysis is a taxonomy ofaviation-related threats as seen in political discourse. This paper’s analysis has practicalbenefit as it allows such claims to be more critically analyzed and objectively judged,rather than automatically accepted due to the symbolic power of the phrase ‘nationalsecurity’. It will also allow them to be more effectively challenged if they appearfallacious.

Explanatory power of securitization theory

The study of why and how issues become deemed to be security issues is a focus ofsecuritization theory. Although formulated only two decades ago, this theory has“become the principal critical approach to the study of security” (Maltman 2013,p.1). Its attractiveness rests with its promising ability to understand how “particularissues come to be treated as security issues and suggests what the political impact ofthat securitization might be” (Salter & Piché 2011, p.933).

It has been utilized for empirical studies in a large range of areas including the studyof irregular migration (Huysmans 2006), US–Canada border security (Salter & Piché2011), piracy (Vreŷ 2011), avian flu (Youde 2008), terrorism (Buzan 2006), transna-tional crime (Williams 2008) and natural disasters (Hyndman 2007). It has also beenapplied to understanding security dimensions of civil aviation (Salter 2008).

The foundational volume on securitization is Security: A New Framework forAnalysis (Buzan et al. 1998). Securitization theory developed as an alternative approachto understanding security, which has been dominated by state-centric and military-focused classical security studies. This traditional approach examined security based oncharacteristics of power distribution, military capabilities, and polarity, and viewedthreats as self-evident and indisputable, such as an armed attack by foreign forces.Securitization theory comes from the social perspective that examined security in termsof a process. It recognized that security actors are broader than the military anddiplomatic corps, and security encompasses more than international, military andsecurity issues. Specifically, securitization embraces a wide range of security perspec-tives such as human security, environmental security and resource security such as foodand water security. It was developed from a sociological and language perspective.

Securitization, as linked with the Copenhagen School, views security through aradically different lens. It considers that security is socially constructed and ultimately“something is a security problem when the elites declare it so” (Wæver 1995, p.54). Inother words, an issue becomes a security issue not necessarily because a real threatexists, but because the issue is presented as such a threat (Buzan et al. 1998, p.24). Thisconceptualization of security has resulted in the theory being defined as being con-cerned with the “discursive positioning of threats” (McDonald 2008, p.580). Thisdiscursive understanding of security has explanatory power in understanding why ittook over a decade and involved debates and discussion, air disasters, and PresidentialCommissions before the US Government recognized that aviation security was anational security issue. Its acceptance illustrates a gradual process that leads to a shared,socially constructed view of what threatens national security.


At the center of securitization’s constructivist understanding of security is a ‘secu-ritizing move’ also known as a ‘speech act’. This involves an actor claiming that anissue is a security one (or is making a counter-claim that it is not one) and the audiencehearing this claim. If the audience believes that the actor’s claim is legitimate (i.e. thereis intersubjective agreement), then the issue becomes successfully securitized. Con-versely, no acceptance means there is no securitization, only a securitizing move.

Three elements are required for a securitization move. These are a securitizing actor,a referent object that is being threatened, and an audience. Typically, actors are thosewith authority and recognition within the relevant socio–political context whose viewsare treated with respect and consideration by the audience. In the aviation sector, theyinclude those in traditional power structures such as politicians, governments, regula-tors, air carriers, airport owners, aviation industries and unions, as well as outside ofthem including passenger representative groups and relatives of air accidents, andunlawful interference victims.

The referent object is something that is claimed to be facing an existential threat. Itcould be national sovereignty, national ideology, democracy, national stability, nationalunity, national interests and values, group identity, culture, language, or an economicsystem. The referent must be an object that is existentially valued by the audience, andthey need to accept that its continued existence cannot be guaranteed. A founder of theCopenhagen School, Buzan claims the most important referent object are nations asthey are “the principal referent object of security because they are both the frameworkof order and the highest source of governing authority” (Buzan 1991, p.22). Thus, inthe hierarchy of referents, security of the nation is at the peak.

Threats come in many forms and can include excessive debt, the lack of effectiveeconomic governance, irregular immigration, disease, and climate change. Naming thethreat is an important discursive tool in the process of securitization due to its power inhighlighting the vulnerability of a referent (Salter and Piché 2011, p.938). The audienceof the securitization move is those people the actor seeks to achieve intersubjectiveagreement with. The audience can be the voting public, politicians, industry, commu-nity or non-government organizations, or any other segment of the population.

The result of securitization is that because of the existence of an existential threat,urgent and immediate attention by government can be justified. This means thatdecisive action can be taken, often in the form of emergency measures and extraordi-nary power. Conversely, the issue of securitization leads to the suspension of ‘normal’political processes which are commonly perceived as too time-consuming and inevita-bly result in unsatisfactory compromises. In other words, successful securitizationmeans that an issue takes its “politics beyond the established rules of the game andframes the issue either as a special kind of politics or as above politics” (Buzan et al.1998, p.23).

Successfully securitizing an issue does not mean that it becomes elevated automat-ically to the status of a national emergency with all the attention that this receives.Instead, a securitized issue is likely to be processed according to the certain logic andspecific rationality that characterizes the treatment of security issues in that environ-ment. This may actually result in these issues being ‘lowered’ to the status of routinestypical of those that dominate national security issues. These routines commonlyinvolve a lack of scrutiny, contestability and discussion. Regardless of how the issueis treated, successfully securitized issues appear to be treated in a fashion that is


typically less consultative, limited in focus, and faster than the normal political–bureaucratic decision making processes.

Securitization theory and empirical evidence suggests an explanation of why actorsseek to have certain issues become securitized: it enables their issues to avoid thenormal political process and be treated as an emergency issue or by the routines ofnational security issues, both of which can be advantageous to advancing the actor’sbroader agenda. Two examples illustrate this. Firstly, Charrett (2009) showed that usingsecuritization of terrorism leads to the expansion of surveillance technologies, bordercontrols and detention times. Secondly, Nunes (2012) identified that “portraying healthas a threat to national security allows … the invocation of the higher interests of thestate by countries such as India in order to bypass international patent laws and thusdevelop affordable anti-retroviral treatments”. This study utilizes the securitizationmove framework as the basis for empirical research into the characteristics of thesecuritizing actor and named threats.

Methods

This study continues the tradition of using content analysis for examining securityissues. Examples of the application of this method are studying the place of criminol-ogy in the study of terrorism (Onwudiwe 2007), how organized crime is presented inthe British compared to the German press (Young and Allum 2012), the relationshipsbetween terrorism, media and emotions, (Cho et al. 2003), the link between politiciansand organized crime (Ebbe 1999), the crisis of September 11, 2001 (Hart et al. 2002),and how news media represents a common European Union foreign and security policy(Kandyla and de Vreese 2011).

Content analysis is a method for sifting large volumes of data in a systematic fashionto make “inferences by objectively and systematically identifying specified character-istics of messages” (Holsti 1969, p.14.). It involves examining the text itself to identifythe relevant elements of a discourse. This method stands in contrast to discourseanalysis which is concerned with analyzing “the relation of a text to its content (itssource, message, channel, intended audience, connection to other texts and events), aswell as the broader relations of power and authority which shape that context’”(Halperin & Heath 2012, p.310).

Content analysis is methodologically coherent with securitization theory as both arepredicated on a theoretical perspective of social-constructivism. Specifically, securiti-zation theory rests on the idea that the securitization move seeks to socially construct athreat that enables an issue to move from politics to an area of security, while contentanalysis involves analyzing ‘what is said’ which is the foundation of discourse which inturn helps constitute reality.

The first stage of the analysis involved data collection, selecting relevant articles,and then coding them.

Data collection and selecting relevant articles

The research question and securitization theory dictated the type of data required for theanalysis. The data needed to relate to civil aviation and contain a securitization move


where the referent was national security. The best source of data was articles, ratherthan spoken word or images, as articles are more readily available and better suited foranalysis. The Factiva electronic database was used to provide the articles as it containsfull text materials, principally news articles, from across the world over the last fewdecades. While other sources of texts, such as media releases, reports and scholarlypublications, could have provided a suitable data set, the challenges with gatheringsuch a comprehensive multi-country collection over the required time periods made thisan impractical option.

The search approach involved searching for articles which had the Boolean searchstring of national security plus qualifiers, and (“aviation” or “airline”* or “airport”* or“aerodrome”* or “air traffic control”) not “Snowden” where * is a truncation character.5

The inclusion of the search terms “airline”, “airport”, “aerodrome” and “air trafficcontrol” ensured that the search captured the principal elements of the aviation sectorwhich are the central focus of the research question. The reason that “Snowden” wasspecifically excluded was because there was a significant number of articles generatedby his experience at Moscow’s Sheremetyevo airport which were not relevant to theresearch topic. 6 Qualifiers bounding the term ‘national security’ were required togenerate a more targeted group of articles, for without any qualifier, over 5,800 articleswere generated. The qualifiers used were words that are commonly associated withmaking a claim that national security is adversely affected. Examples include wordssuch as ‘affected’, ‘undermine’ and ‘damage’. The words were generated by examiningsecuritization moves in a sample of 400 articles that lacked the inclusion of thequalifiers. The actual search string is below were w/2 indicates that the followingwords need to be within two words of the previous word.

(aviation or airline* or airport* or aerodrome* or air traffic control) and (Affect*w/2 national security OR Breach* w/2 national security OR challenge* w/2national security OR compromise* w/2 national security OR danger* w/2 na-tional security OR demand* w/2 national security OR detriment* w/3 nationalsecurity OR Endanger* w/2 national security OR enhance* w/2 national securityOR handing w/2 national security OR Impact* w/2 national security OR impli-cation* w/2 national security OR Improve* w/2 national security OR Jeopardy*w/2 national security OR matter* w/3 national security OR national securitychallenge* OR national security w/2 implication* OR national security w/2issue* OR National security w/2 protect* OR national security w/2 risk* ORNational security w/2 threat* OR national security w/2 concern* OR nationalsecurity w/2 danger* OR national security w/2 object* OR national security w/2reason* OR national security w/2 risk* OR Protect* w/2 national security ORpurpose* w/2 national security OR risk* w/2 national security OR strength* w/2national security OR threat* w/2 national security OR Undermine* w/2 nationalsecurity OR concern* w/2 national security OR connect* w/2 national securityOR national security w/2 connect* OR national security w/2 component* OR

5 Other parameters of the search were that it excluded blogs, web news, pictures and multimedia sources,republished news, and similar duplicates, and the keywords were only searched for in the heading and leadparagraph.6 Between 1 January 2013 and 1 December 2013, using the search string without excluding “Snowden”, therewere 1229 articles identified. Excluding him reduced the number to 380 articles.


reason* w/2 national security OR question* w/2 national security OR nationalsecurity w/2 question* OR citing w/2 national security OR because w/2 nationalsecurity OR import* w/2 national security OR national security w/2 import* ORobject* w/2 national security OR national security w/2 ground* OR ground* w/2national security OR safeguard* w/2 national security OR national security w/2safeguard* OR vital* w/2 national security) not (Snowden)

The search string was used to scan all articles in the database until 23 December2013 which was the final date of the search. The search generated 997 articles. The dateof the first article was dated 3 September 1977.

From these data sets, relevant articles were selected. The selection involved readingeach article and selecting relevant ones that contained a securitization move where thereferent was national security and involved a named threat arising from an issue withcivil aviation. Operationalizing these requirements meant that a relevant article mustmeet all of the following criteria:

1. The referent is to be ‘national security’. There can also be other referents.2. A threat is named and this threat must arise from an issue with civil aviation. This

means that if the named threat arose primarily from military or general aviation, thearticle is excluded.

3. A claim is made that some aviation issue is or is not a national security issue.Markers in the article of such a claim include that some aviation issues:

a. “is a national security concern”b. “affects national security”c. “poses a threat to national security”d. “jeopardizes national security”e. “raises national security concerns”f. “has to be stopped for national security reasons”g. “is not a national security issue”.

If the article does not include a claim, then it not deemed as a relevant article. Forexample, a 1996 article which discussed the possible merging of aviation compa-nies with the actor stating that a study to be undertaking will look at “what nationalsecurity and industrial competition consequences it [the merger] could have” wasnot considered a relevant article (Agence France-Presse 1996).

4. The actor to whom the claim is attributed must be identified. Examples of markersof attribution in the article include the words that the actor ‘said’, ‘stated’ and‘argued’. Articles are excluded where the actor could not be identified. Forexample, although a 1998 article had a securitization claim as seen in the followingquote, ‘“If the government adopts the draft law elaborated by Defense Ministryofficials prescribing the transformation of Russia’s military air force units intocommercial companies, Russia’s defense and national security will be endangered”(Zavarsky 1998), as the actor making this claim was not referenced in the articlenor was the author’s affiliation given, the article was not deemed a relevant article.Also articles are not selected if there are multiple authors and the actual


securitization move cannot be attributed to one actor. An example of such aexcluded article was a 1991 article that stated “The planned sale to Taiwaninvestors of 40 % of McDonnell Douglas’ commercial airliner operation couldjeopardize tens of thousands of American jobs, national security and the future ofthe entire US aerospace industry” and this view was attributed to a collection of“legislators, labor union leaders and some industry experts” who addressed Con-gress hearings on 1 day (Kramer 1991).

An audience is the third element required for a securitization move. However, as thisstudy does not examine to who the securitization move is directed, it was not necessaryto identify if the article contained an identified audience or not.

After relevant articles were selected, articles that were very similar (e.g. had adifferent heading or new introduction, or were abridged) were identified and only asingle version of the article was included for further analysis. The selection of thearticle was generally based on the longest article as this is most likely the base forwhich the other articles were derived. If the articles contained the identical claim from aparticular actor, even when the articles were over a time period, only a single version ofthe article was included. An example of this was in the articles concerning the formerUK Transport Minister Gavin Strang who claimed that the privatization of Britain’s airtraffic control could jeopardize national security. Between 17 November 1999 and 5November 2000, 11 articles appeared in three UK newspaper where this claim was theonly or principal securitization move.

Coding involved the following process:

1. Applying descriptors indicating the date of the article, and country of the securitizingactor.

2. Selecting a coding unit which is the object of interest. There were four of these,being the securitizing actor, the named threat, the explanation of why the namedthreat threatens national security, and any coincident referent. (The national secu-rity referent was not coded, for to be deemed a relevant article in this study, thereferent must include national security. The coincident referent was any referentthat was identified in addition to national security.)

3. Identifying the relevant textual elements that identify that coding unit. The textualelements may have been a single word, a phrase or a theme which is a “singleassertion about some subject” (Holsti 1969, p.116).

4. Applying the relevant category from the coding frame (see Table 1).

Analysis method

The second stage of the analysis involved identifying patterns of co-occurrence ofvariables to draw out interpretations that help to understand relationships. The keyrelationship was between the actors, named threats, the inclusion of the explanation ofhow the named threat actually threatens national security, and coincident referents.

The analysis used both quantitative and qualitative content analysis. In the context ofcontent analysis, quantitative methods involve “drawing inferences about the meaning


and intention of a text through analysis of the usage and frequency of words, phrases,images, and the patterns they form within a text” while qualitative is a “more interpre-tive form of analysis concerned with uncovering meaning, motives and purposes intextual content” (Weber 1990pp.72, 76). Conclusions and generalizations were pro-duced by inferentially linking the textual data and by examining the numerical data.

The coding was done in two phases. The first phase involved one author and aresearch assistant coding the material. Based on the results of this, the coding framewas revised and a preliminary taxonomy was developed. The second phase involvedboth authors recoding the material and using the preliminary taxonomy to assign namedthreats to each article.

The method used to examine reliability involved calculating the percentage of thenumber of cases that were coded the same way by each coder, divided by the totalnumber of cases. The common sources of unreliability in content analysis are:

& Word meanings, category definitions or other rules in the coding instructions areambiguous

& There is a lack of objectivity in the coding of the article& The coder makes mistakes (Halperin & Heath p.328)

For this study, the first and second sources of unreliability are not significant risksfor the securitizing actor, the country of the securitizing actor, and the presence–absence of coincident referents. This is because the coding relates to the identification

Table 1 The coding frame

Securitizing actor • Government officials, e.g. ministers, bureaucrats, military, police,courts, regulators (Code: GOVT)

• Non-government actors, e.g. opposition politicians, politicalgroups, parties, alliances, interest groups (Code: NON-GOVT)

• Aviation asset owners/operators, e.g. airlines operators (individualairline owners and operators, and associations), airports (indi-vidual airport owners and operators, and associations), aviationindustry (aircraft and related design and production, and main-tenance and repair organizations and their associations), groundhandling organizations, training and safety organizations, airtraffic and navigation service providers (Code: AV_ORGS)

• Employees/unions, e.g. organized labor, employees individually orcollectively making unofficial comments

• Credible individuals, e.g. former government experts, opinionwriters, specialist journalists, lawyers, security experts

Explanation of why the named threatthreatens national security

• Explanation included (Code: YES_ EXPLANATION)

• No explanation included (Code: NO_ EXPLANATION)

Coincident referent • Yes (Code: YES [followed by free text])

• No (Code: NONE)

Country of securitizing actor Name of the country


of facts or presence of easily identified issues. A high level of inter-coder reliability wasachieved between the coders for these three variables. When the two authors coded thearticle, there was 95 % agreement on the securitizing actor, 99 % agreement on thecountry of the securitizing actor, and 93 % agreement on the presence–absence ofcoincident referents. A level of 95 % agreement is suggested as one indicator ofreliability. As is normal practice for disagreement in coding, discussions betweencoders were held to resolve differences in coding. After comparing and discussingeach conflicting assessment, the authors reached 100 % agreement for these variables.

Reliability was expected to decline for the variable of why the named threat threatensnational security. This was because the coders had to interpret words and phrases incontext to determine if what was written could be deemed to be an explanation or not. Itwas straightforward in some cases while difficult in others, as the explanation was moreimplicit than explicit. As agreement between the coder was 82 % in the first phase, toincrease agreement the following guidance was written for the coders:

An explanation exists where there is a one or more statements that describe howthe named threat threatens national security. It may specify the consequences of thenamed threat, the vulnerability of national security to the named threat, or thecontext in which the named threat become a threat to national security.

This resulted in agreement rising to 88 % in the second phase. This low level ofagreement speaks to the difficulty in identifying if an explanation exists or not. Theauthors again reached 100 % agreement after discussion. The original research planincluded a proposal to rate the quality of the explanation in terms of its coherency.However, given the difficulty in assessing the presence–absence of an explanation, itwas deemed impractical to also assess the quality of the explanation. Consequently thiselement of the research was abandoned.

The first coding phase resulted in the identification of dozens of threat types. Thesewere grouped into threat categories. The articles were then re-read and the threat typeswere continually refined during the reading of the articles by constantly comparing thearticles with previous ones and if a suitable threat type was not identified, a new one wasdeveloped or an existing one refined. These ‘grounded codes’ were also continuouslyexamined for opportunities to collapse into smaller numbers. For example, where twothreats were named differently but were similar, agreeing words were used.

The threats were then grouped together under a category heading. As groundedthreat codes reflect usage in different contexts, there is some overlap betweencategories. This means that the classification system developed is not one wherethe categories are mutually exclusive (i.e. a threat can belong to more than onecategory depending on its meaning as defined by the securitizing actor). In otherwords, the taxonomy developed made up of the categories and types of threat is nothierarchical, for if it was, it would mean that the named threats can only have onedimension of classification, implying that the threats are mutually exclusive andjointly exhaustive. Rather, there are multiple dimensions of classification, meaningthat the developed taxonomy is a faceted taxonomy rather than a hierarchical one. Someof the dichotomy divides are perception/reality, materialized failure/vulnerability,normal/abnormal operation, illegal/legal act, and change/failure to change. The multipledimensions mean that multiple codes could be linked to an article’s named threat.


The second coding phase included applying the developed threat taxonomy. Therewas 98 % agreement between coders in identifying the category of threats if there wasonly one code applied to the article (83 % of articles only had one code applied). Therewas 92 % agreement in identifying the type of threats if there was only one codeapplied to the article. Agreement was between 81 and 86 % for articles where morethan one threat code was applied.

Results

Out of the 997 articles identified from the Factiva database using the search string, 122articles were deemed to be relevant because they met the securitization criteria. Table 2contains a summary of the coding results.

Below is a summary of the key results

Securitizing actor The most common actors making a securitization move were gov-ernment officials. Government officials accounted for 58 % of the securitizing actors,followed by non-government actors (20 %), aviation asset owners/operators (3 %),employees/unions (13 %) and credible individuals (6 %).

Table 2 Data summary (numbers of instances as identified in the articles)

Securitizing actor Government officials (71)

Non-government actors (24)

Aviation asset owners/operators (4)

Employees/unions (16)

Credible individuals (7)

Explanation of why the named threatthreatens national security

Explanation included (38)

No explanation included (84)

Coincident referent Yes (23)

No (97)

Country of securitizing actor Armenia (1), Australia (6), Brazil (2), Cambodia (2), Canada (9),China (2), Cyprus (1), Czech (1), France (1), Ghana (1), India (13),Indonesia (2), Iran (1), Israel (1), Japan (1), Liberia (1), Lithuania (1),Malaysia (2), Mexico (2), Nepal (1), New Zealand (1), Nigeria (1),Pakistan (1), Peru (1), Philippines (1), Russia (5), Saudi Arabia (1),Taiwan (3), Tanzania (1), Thailand (1), Turkey (1), Uganda (1),UK (11), US (38), Venezuela (1), Vietnam (1), Zambia (1),Zimbabwe (1)

Year of the article 1982 (1), 1986 (1), 1989 (2), 1990 (1), 1992 (1), 1993 (1), 1994 (2),1995 (3), 1996 (3), 1997 (2), 1998 (1), 1999 (5), 2000 (3), 2001 (5),2002 (9), 2003 (9), 2004 (6), 2005 (9), 2006 (10), 2007 (1), 2008 (9),2009 (6), 2010 (2), 2011 (8), 2012 (12), 2013 (10)


Explanation of why the named threat threatens national security About 31% of articlesincluded an explanation of why the named threat threatened national security. Governmentofficials included explanations only 20% of the time, aviation asset owners/operators 25%,employees/unions 37 %, credible individuals 42 % and non-government actors 54 %.

Coincident referent 19 % of articles (23 out of 122) included a coincident referent. Themost frequently mentioned at 11 were employment matters (referents were jobs (9), andentitlement/pensions (2)). This second was aviation sector viability at eight mentions(referents were commercial viability/growth of domestic carriers (3), airlines industryviability (2), airline competition (2), and growth of domestic carriers (1)). These werefollowed by air safety (6), and public assets (2). Other referents that were mentionedonce were viability of aircraft manufacturers, civil liberties, customs duty, defensereadiness, economy, general aviation viability, industrial harmony, intellectual propertyrights to sensitive defense technology, and competition in the defense industry.

A coincident referent was identified in articles from 12 countries. The US was themost frequent (10), followed by India (5), with all the other countries being mentionedjust once (Australia, Canada, Cyprus, Ghana, Israel, Liberia, Saudi Arabia, Taiwan, US,UK, Zimbabwe).

For securitizing actors, the percentage of articles that included a coincident referent,in descending order of frequency, were employees/unions at 62 %, aviation assetowners/operators at 47 %, non-government actors at 17 % and credible individuals14 %. The lowest were government officials at 11 %.

Named threat The named threats were grouped into six categories which were made up of31 types of threats. Table 3 shows the faceted taxonomy of named threats. To provide clarityabout the meaning of the types of threats, explanatory notes are included under the table.

There were 145 named threats identified in the articles. As can be seen in Table 4, themost common was Aeropolitical issues. This accounted for 42 % of all named threats.The table also shows the categories of named threats which includes an explanation ofwhy the named threat threatens national security. The categories with the highestpercentage of articles that included an explanation were Non-AVSEC issues primarilywithin the control of the government at 53 % and Acts of unlawful interference at 47 %.

In terms of types of threat, the top 11 most frequently mentioned named threats indescending priority were:

1. Increase in foreign ownership and participation (27)2. Reduced government ownership and participation (15)3. A failure of operating procedures, or of corporate security measures, or of

following good business practice that are perceived to reflect deficiencies in thesecurity/safety system (9)

4. Inadequate AVSEC securitymeasures and/or unintended consequences of themeasuresthat may enable or seem to enable acts of unlawful interference to be carried out (8)

5. A failure of or a need to modify operating procedures and/or the built environ-ment of the airport/surrounding area to reflect recent changes in security risks (8)

6. Inadequate passport/visa checking procedures or staff to carry them out (7)7. Release of information on AVSEC operations, incidents, measures, responses and

personnel (6)


Table 3 Faceted taxonomy of named threats

Named threat category (description) [The number oftimes the named threat category appeared in thearticles]

Individual named threats [The number of times thatindividual named threat appeared in the articles]

Acts of unlawful interference (i.e. acts of unlawfulinterference, the tools and techniques to achieve theacts, and the weaknesses in AVSEC measures thatallow the acts to be carried out) [15]

1. An actual or potential act of unlawful interference1

[5]2. A tool or technique that can be used to facilitate

acts of unlawful interference2 [2]3. Inadequate AVSEC security measures and/or

unintended consequences of the measures that mayenable or seem to enable acts of unlawfulinterference to be carried out3 [8]

Non-AVSEC14 issues primarily within the control ofthe aviation sector (i.e. non-AVSEC incidents orsituations primarily within the control of theaviation sector that are perceived as a risk to thesecurity/safety of civil aviation) [18]

4. A failure of operating procedures, or corporatesecurity measures or following good businesspractice that are perceived to reflect deficiencies inthe security/safety system [9]

5. A failure of or a need to modify operatingprocedures and/or the built environment of theairport/surrounding area to reflect recent changes insecurity risks [8]

6. The introduction of a new technology that increasessecurity risks [1]

Public release of information (i.e. public release ofaviation-related information) [9]

7. Release of information on AVSEC operations,incidents, measures, responses and personnel [6]

8. Release of information on non-AVSEC aspects ofthe aviation system [3]

Non-AVSEC issues primarily within the control of thegovernment (i.e. non-AVSEC incidents orsituations primarily within the control of thegovernment agencies that actually, or are perceivedto, undermine or damage sovereignty, nationalinterest, national defense, border integrity and/orforeign relations) [36]

9. Use of civil aviation assets as a tool for espionage,sabotage, acts of foreign interference, politicallymotivated violence, and military attacks [3]

10. Transport of an undesirable person7 [5]11. Transport of illegal immigrants5 [1]12. Transport of illegal or smuggled goods4 [3]13. Transfer of knowledge, processes and technology

that breach export and import trade controls8 [0]14. Existence of direct flights to high risk locations [2]15. Reduction in defense or other government security

capabilities caused by changes in civil aviation13 [3]16. Existence of significant or organized criminal

activities in the aviation sector or the use ofaviation for criminal activities6 [5]

17. Inadequate passport/visa checking procedures orstaff to carry them out [7]

18. Failure to maintain an accurate watchlist andapply it to passenger information [2]

19. Failure to obtain adequate information fromairlines about arriving passengers [3]

20. Inadequate visa regimes [1]21. Inadequate security features of travel documents

and inadequate security control on the creation andissuance of travel documents [1]

22. Inadequate efforts to prevent entry of public healthrisks and locate potential at-risk passengers post-arrival [0]

Aeropolitical issues (i.e. aviation sector governance,structure and performance changes) [61]

23. Reduced government ownership andparticipation9 [15]


Table 3 (continued)

Named threat category (description) [The number oftimes the named threat category appeared in thearticles]

Individual named threats [The number of times thatindividual named threat appeared in the articles]

24. Increase in foreign ownership and participation[27]

25. Changes in private sector ownership andparticipation9, 10 [4]

26. Changes in international and domestic accessarrangements11, 12 [6]

27. Changes in government financial and operationalsupport of both AVSEC and non-AVSEC activities[5]

28. Changes in demand for services and equipment[1]

29. Inadequate skilled staff within the aviation sector[3]

Employment issues (6) 30. Right to organize [2]31. Labor disputes [4]

Explanatory notes1 International Civil Aviation Organization (ICAO)’s definition of ‘acts of unlawful interference’ provides themain types of threats of this category. They are

a. unlawful seizure of aircraft

b. destruction of an aircraft in service

c. hostage-taking on board aircraft or on aerodromes

d. forcible intrusion on board an aircraft, at an airport or on the premises of an aeronautical facility

e. introduction on board an aircraft or at an airport of a weapon or hazardous device or material intended forcriminal purposes

f. use of an aircraft in service for the purpose of causing death, serious bodily injury, or serious damage toproperty or the environment

g. communication of false information to jeopardize the safety of an aircraft in flight or on the ground, ofpassengers, crew, ground personnel, or the general public, at an airport or on the premises of a civil aviationfacility.2 A threat vector is a path or a tool that a threat actor uses to attack the target. Categories include

a. cyber weapons

b. manipulation of the on-board food supply chain

c. man-portable air-defense systems (MANPADs)

d. unmanned aircraft system (UAS)

e. people seeking aviation training who intend to commit acts of unlawful interference.3 The inadequacy may be because the system is compromised, not correctly designed, managed, implementedor integrated, or that it does not address relevant threats. The use of the term AVSEC specifically refers tothose security measures principally designed to prevent acts of unlawful interference. The list is derived fromthe major elements of the ICAO’s Aviation Security Manual (Doc 8973/8) and include:

a. Inadequate legal instruments and international cooperation

b. Inadequate national aviation security programs and quality control

c. Inadequate recruitment, selection and training

d. Inadequate security management systems

e. Inadequate airport security


f. Inadequate cargo and mail security

g. Inadequate treatment of special categories of passengers

h. Inadequate treatment of carriage of firearms

i. Inadequate treatment of unruly or disruptive passengers

j. Inadequate security of caterers, cleaning companies and other airport tenants

k. Inadequate crisis management and responses to acts of unlawful interference.4 Examples are drugs, cigarettes to avoid tax, illicit cash, precious metals and gems.5 Examples are people smuggling, human traffic and stowaway transport.6 Examples are corruption and extortion.7 Examples are people undertaking espionage, illegal foreign interference, terrorist activities or wanting tobecome trained as terrorists, joining a foreign terrorist group, or illegally fighting in a foreign conflict.8 Trade controls are tools to support sanctions and embargoes. The main categories of trade controls are exportand technology transfer controls, and economic sanctions. There are three types of import controls: bans,quotas and surveillance (i.e. where the import of goods is monitored with licenses).9 This is typically through the sale, privatization, corporatization of government aviation assets and services(notably the sale of flag carrier), or the increase in foreign ownership/involvement of domestically ownedaviation assets and services.10 This is typically through the sale, merger or closure of domestic organizations, or the undertaking of anaviation activity by a foreign organization.11 This is typically through code sharing, or the introduction of foreign owned aircraft flying domestic routes.12 This is typically through the inclusion or exclusion of aviation into some bilateral or multipartyarrangements (e.g. General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade).13 This includes changes in air space management, air traffic control, reduction in domestic carriers thatsupport national security activities.14Non-AVSEC issues are issues within the control of airports, airlines or air regulators’ responsibilities butoutside of Annex 17 (Security) to the Convention on International Civil Aviation. They included includesecurity issues such as ticket fraud, on-aircraft theft, vandalism of airport property, airport retail theft, non-security issues such as business continuity, and following standard operating procedures for the safe operationof aircraft

Table 4 Frequency of named threat categories and cases where explanations have been included (numbers ofinstances as identified in the articles)

Frequency of appearanceof the named threat

Cases where an explanation wasincluded stating why the namedthreat threatens national security

Acts of unlawful interference 10 % (15) 47 % (7/15)

Non-AVSEC issues primarily withinthe control of the aviation sector

13 % (18) 28 % (5/18)

Public release of information 6 % (9) 22 % (2/9)

Non-AVSEC issues primarily withinthe control of government

25 % (36) 53 % (19/36)

Aeropolitical issues 42 % (61) 20 % (12/61)

Employment issues 4 % (6) 17 % (1/6)

Total 100 % (144) 25 % (36 out of 144)


8. Changes in international and domestic access arrangements (6)9. An actual or potential act of unlawful interference (5)10. Transport of an undesirable person (5)11. Changes in government financial and operational support of both AVSEC and

non-AVSEC activities (5)

There were 101 articles with one named threat, 19 articles with two named threats,and two with three named threats. Of the articles with two or more named threats, themost common were the categories of

1. Aeropolitical issues (20)2. Non-AVSEC issues primarily within the control of the government (12)3. Acts of unlawful interference (8)4. Non-AVSEC issues primarily within the control of the aviation sector (4).

Table 5 identifies the frequency of naming a threat by securitizing actor.

Countries of the securitizing actor Securitization moves were identified in articles from38 countries of which 32 were non-English speaking countries, and 11 are advancedeconomies.7

Discussion

The data provides insights into the process of securitizing issues in the civil aviationsector. Specifically, it provides empirical information on the type and frequency ofnamed threats, the securitization actor, the explanations linking the named threat withnational security, and the coincident referents. Together, this information allows theprincipal research questions to be answered: What civil aviation related threats areclaimed to threaten national security, and who makes these claims?

Securitization moves were identified across countries and across time. They wereidentified in articles from 38 countries, indicating that the process is a global phenom-enon. As the moves were seen in eight English-speaking and 32 non-English-speakingcountries, this leads to the observation that it transcends language. In addition, asmoves were noted in 11 advanced8 and 27 non-advanced economies, it appears thatthe phenomenon occurs regardless of the state of economic development.

The data reveals that securitization moves have occurred in all decades since the1980s. This reveals that the phenomenon is not just a recent one, but has been occurringfor at least three decades. Because the Factiva electronic database includes few articlesprior to the 1980s, it is not possible to identify when the first securitization move wasreported. While the data shows that the number of articles including a move increased

7 The list of advanced economics came from International Monetary Fund’s World Economic Outlook(International Monetory Fund 2012, p. 180).8 The list of advanced economics came from International Monetary Fund’s World Economic Outlook (IMF180).


in the 2000s, because the Factiva database’s number of publications has increasedwith time, it is not possible to conclude whether or not they have become morefrequent.

An underpinning concept of securitization theory is that it is a discursive processwhere claims and counter-claims are made. However, the data reveals that it was rare forcounter-claims to be included in articles. Only four articles included a counter-claim. Anexample was a 1999 article that contained a securitizationmove by a USDefense officialwho claimed that increased foreign ownership of US airlines may affect a key nationalsecurity program. He said that it would undermine the US Civil Reserve Air Fleetprogram where civil airlines are used to support military operations as foreign-ownedUS carriers “may not agree with US foreign policy objectives”. In the same article, aMexican government official was quoted stating that Mexico “doesn’t see a problemwith the nationality of investors” affecting national security. Instead, his country wel-comed more foreign investment in its aviation industry (Aviation Daily 1999).

The lack of counter-claims may reflect that the issue has become successfullysecuritized, and hence to challenge it would make the actor seem to be against nationalsecurity as well as being unproductive in winning the argument. Alternatively, it maysimply reflect the fact that the article’s author decided not to include a counter argument.

Securitizing literature identifies that actors securitizing an issue seek to have thatissue treated outside normal political processes or through the routines of national

Table 5 Frequency of naming a threat by securitizing actor (numbers of instances as identified in the articles)

Securitizingactor

Acts ofunlawfulinterference

Non-AVSECissuesprimarilywithin thecontrolof theaviationsector

Publicrelease ofinformation

Non-AVSECissuesprimarilywithin thecontrolof thegovernment

Aeropoliticalissues

Employmentissues

Totals

Governmentofficials

8 10 7 22 32 5 84

Non-governmentpoliticians andpolitical/policyinterest groups

4 1 1 4 15 1 26

Aviation assetowners/operators

0 1 1 1 2 0 5

Employees/unions 1 3 0 5 11 0 20

Credibleindividuals

1 3 0 4 2 0 10

Totals 14 18 9 36 62 6 145


security processes. This was illustrated at an operational level in a 2004 article thatreported that a company responsible for training US airport screeners told its trainers toreport any thefts of their laptops as a risk to national security “to assure FBI attention”.This was probably done to ensure rapid assistance in recovering the stolen items as wellas to protect the company from claims of breaching national security. The article alsonoted that the company did not really believe that the material on the laptops actuallyposed a security risk (Dow Jones International News 2004).

The taxonomy developed for named threats recognizes six categories made up of 31types of threats. The faceted nature of the taxonomy means that a named threat may beclassified in multiple categories. For example, a securitizing actor claiming that the saleof a domestic carrier poses a threat to national security may frame this so that the namedthreats are identified as one or more of the following: 1) reducing governmentownership and participation, 2) increasing foreign ownership and participation, and3) changing private sector ownership and participation.

Aeropolitical issues

Named threats in the Aeropolitical issues category were the most frequently invoked inthe articles. They accounted for 42 % of all threats identified. This category containedthe taxonomy’s most frequently named type of threats which were Increase in foreignownership and participation and Reduced government ownership and participation.Examples of named threats from the articles include:

& Privatization and corporatization of the national carrier, airport, and air trafficcontrol systems

& Contracting the management and upgrade work of an airport to a foreign company& Sale of a domestic aviation manufacturer to a Chinese firm& Sale of an airport to foreign companies& “Open skies” policy which facilitates foreign investment& Merger of aviation companies.

The dominance of this category initially surprised the authors as it was expected thatthe most frequent threats would be those that immediately or obviously threaten thesecurity of passengers, or national security priorities such as protecting sovereignty,national interests or borders. Securitization theory offers an explanation for this.

The aviation sector is highly regulated, meaning that significant changes to it usuallyrequire government decisions. These aeropolitical decisions are invariably highlycontentious because they affect a system that is crucial to a large number of stake-holders, results in certain groups winning or losing significant privileges, and/or maygo against strongly held beliefs such as the value of state ownership or concern overforeign ownership. Securitization theory suggests that a successful securitization moveresults in issues being removed from the ‘normal’ political process and moved to anarena where governments can make extraordinary decisions that are widely accepted asappropriate. By elevating an issue ‘above politics’, decisions about it can be expedited.Consequently, there is considerable utility in governments seeking to securitizeaeropolitical issues through invoking the symbolic power of national security as apowerful tool to curtail political debate and win arguments.


Named threats in this category were made by all of the actors. It was also thecategory that was most frequently referenced by each actor as seen in Table 5. Of theactors, the one that most frequently referred to such threats was government officials.As governments are normally the actor that the public considers has the most legiti-macy to claim that something is a threat to national security, it is perhaps not surprisingthat governments would employ this discursive device most frequently. The secondmost frequently actor that invokes this category was non-government actors. This canpossibly be explained by the fact that aviation sector governance, structure andperformance issues are well within the political realm due to their public interest, andhence the non-government actor’s contribution to such debates is to be expected. Inaddition, as securitization theorists have noted, security of the nation is a trump cardin political discourse; it is again logical to expect this actor to use this discursivetechnique.

The actor that cited this category of threats most frequently as a percentage oftheir claimed threats (55 %) was employees/unions. This is likely to be explainedby the observation that these threats, like privatization, corporatization, andoutsourcing, have significant employment impacts and are the principal concernsof employees/unions.

Compared to other categories of named threats, this category has the second lowestpercentage of instances where the article contains an explanation, justifying why thenamed threat actually threatens national security. It was just 20 % compared to about50 % for the categories of Non-AVSEC issues primarily within the control of thegovernment, and Acts of unlawful interference. Reasons that may explain this differenceare that:

(1) The link between the named threat and national security is actually weak andproviding an explanation would weaken the securitization claim

(2) The link is obvious and hence does not need an explanation(3) The article’s author simply did not include it(4) It was not disclosed because it was classified.

The low rate might have been explained by the observations that governmentofficials have the lowest percentage of explanations compared to other actors at just20 %, and for this category of threats, this actor accounted for 32 out of the 62instances. In other words, the low rate may be explained because government officialsdominate this category and rarely provide explanations. However, examining thestatistics in detail reveals that this is not the reason. While they do dominate thiscategory, government officials do not have a uniformly low rate of explanation inclu-sion. For instance, this actor provides explanations in 45 % of instances where namedthreats are from the Non-AVSEC issues primarily within the control of the governmentcategory, 30 % for the Acts of unlawful interference category and just 13 % for theAeropolitical issues category. This shows that for government officials, there is asignificantly lower rate of explanation inclusion for Aeropolitical issues categorycompared to other categories.

Without contacting the article’s author and the quoted actors, it is not possible toexplain definitively the reason for the low frequency of included explanations. How-ever, two factors point towards the reason that the link between the named threat and


national security is weak. Firstly, for those examples where explanations were included,they were rarely supported by detailed reasons and included cause and effect statementsthat linked the named threat with harm to national security. Secondly, it is recognizedthat claiming national security is often used as a pretext for claiming market restrictionsrather than because it is actually threatened. This was argued in one of the articles in thefollowing extract: “The U.S. is abusing the concept of national security to protect itscivil aviation and other markets, and to shut out European firms from federally fundedresearch and development programs in aeronautics … The U.S. increasingly hidesprotectionist objectives by citing national security as the cause of restrictions. A vagueand undefined U.S. concept of national security is beginning to embrace aspects of[US] domestic economic activity” (Aviation Europe 1994, p.2).

An examination of the threat explanations in the articles reveals that the majority aremore appropriately described as assertions rather than arguments supported by reasons.For example, one 2001 article reported that unions are opposed to utilizing privateenterprise to develop airports for national security and other reasons. The article, whichquotes from a union’s newsletter, provides the only argument for this position in thefollowing sentence: “For security reasons of our occupied country, it is irrational to givethe administration of airports over to foreigners” (Reuters News 2001). Anotherexample is a 2001 article where a government official justified his opposition to theprivatization of five Thai airports by stating that “These airports serve the public andthey are connected to national security … Under state administration, the problem ofsecurity can be contained. However, that would not be the case if we need to privatizethese airports to boost efficiency” (Business Day 2001). Another common form ofexplanation is one where there is a lack of specificity of what the threat is or how itrelates to aviation. For example, a 2002 article reported that slums around an airport area matter that concerns national security. The article, which quotes a governmentminister, provides the only support for the argument in the following sentence:“security can only be ensured ‘if the aircraft could move in and out of the runwaywithout any risks’” (The Times of India 2002). In each of these cases, the readers arerequired to guess what the cause and effect chain is between the named threat and howit threatens national security.

One threat supported by more arguments relates to the ability of governments todirect national carriers to undertake tasks that support national political interests.9 Suchinterests include giving preference to employing nationals, developing industries thatare important for national industry policy, or rescuing nationals in dangerous foreignlocations when commercials carriers have suspended their operations. An example ofthe latter argument was used by the Australian Transport Minister in 2008 when he saidthat for reasons of national security, the national carrier, Qantas, must remainAustralian-owned. Using the example of the political protests in Thailand, which shutdown Bangkok’s main airport for a week, he stated that “When Australians werehaving difficulty departing from Thailand I was able to pick up the phone to the chiefexecutive of Qantas, Alan Joyce, and make the request that extra flights be put on”(Agence France-Presse 2008).

9 This category does not include threats that changes in civil aviation will reduce defense and other securitycapabilities as these are within the category of ‘Non-AVSEC issues within the control of the government’.


Non-AVSEC issues primarily within the control of the government

The second most frequently category of named threats cited was Non-AVSEC incidentsor situations primarily within the control of the government agencies that are actuallyor are perceived to undermine or damage sovereignty, national interest, nationaldefense, border integrity and/or foreign relations. Some 25 % of all instances ofsecuritization moves came from this category. This category reflects claims that theaviation sector is the vector for national security risk, whether it carries people or goodsthat are can potentially harm the nation, its people or interests, or facilitates such threatsdue to the nature of its location and activities. Many of the claimed threats relate tofailures of border control and immigration processes, or instances of espionage andorganized crime, all of which are increasingly been seen as national security threats.Examples of named threats from the articles include:

& Photographing out a plane window& Allowing a carrier involved in military cargo operations to fly into the country& The arrival of a foreign politician, activist, missionary deemed to be a national

security risk& A passenger wanting to travel overseas to join or train with an al-Qaida linked

group& Allowing an organized crime figure to fly who is on a watchlist& The existence of people smuggling operations at airports& Smuggling of gold and cash& Direct charter flights between Taiwan and China

This category has the highest percentage of instances where the articles carry anexplanation of why the named threat actually threatens national security. These expla-nations are normally supported by clear arguments. For instance, a 2012 article reportedthat cuts to immigration officers are putting national security at risk. The article, whichquotes a government customs whistleblower, provides the logic in the followingsentence “the specially trained staff we who used to carry out spot checks to findforged passports and visas - often used by terrorists - have been deployed elsewherebecause of cutbacks (The Daily Mirror 2012). Another example is a 2011 article thatreported that the arrest of a man intending to fly overseas to join a terrorist group is adirect threat to their departing nation. The article, which quotes a police spokesman,provides the logic in the following sentence “the issue of radicalization and people fromCanada travelling overseas and receiving that kind of further indoctrination and trainingremains a concern for the RCMP and our partners as far as national security isconcerned” (Guelph Mercury 2011).

A frequently citied type of threat in this category relates to how civil aviationchanges can harm national defense. Because organizations involved in aviation design,manufacturing and maintenance service both military and civil sectors, changes ingovernment or foreign ownership of these organizations are often characterized as asecurity threat to defense. This is because under the new owners defense technologywill to transferred to foreign countries or certain commercial players to the detriment ofthe nation. The link between carriers and defense is also cited as an area of securityconcern. In some countries, national carriers provide a significant airlift capability for


defense. This is best illustrated for the US where during the 1990/1991 Gulf War,commercial aircraft under the Civil Reserve Air Fleet program carried 60 % of thetroops and 25 % of the cargo to the Arabian Peninsula as the military’s own airliftcapability was inadequate for the requirements (Crackel 1998 p.ii). Loosing nationalcarriers or increasing foreign carriers is characterized as a threat to national defense.The high frequency of included explanations is likely to be explained by the obviouslylogically of the link between the threat and national security harm which governmenthas the primary responsibility to prevent.

This category of threats is evoked mostly by government officials. This may beexplained by the observation that these issues are all within the control of the govern-ment and hence government has an obvious legitimacy to make a securitization move.

Non-AVSEC issues primarily within the control of the aviation sector

The named threat category of Non-AVSEC incidents or situations primarilywithin the control of the aviation sector that are perceived as a risk to thesecurity/safety of civil aviation was cited in 13 % of articles. Threats in thiscategory are those that fall outside of Annex 17’s focus but within airports’,airlines’ or air regulators’ responsibilities. Examples of these from the articlesinclude:

& Loss of radio contact between pilots and ATC for such an extended duration thatfighter aircraft were dispatched to intercept the aircraft

& An air traffic control failure due to the sole air-traffic controller on duty fallingasleep

& Theft of computers from airport& Debt of the national airport& The use of Shannon Airport by American troops& Low-level flights over key London landmarks& Operation of an airport near Washington& General aviation flying from airports near Washington

Frequently mentioned types of threats in both this category and the Acts of unlawfulinterference category are situations that are characterized as reflecting deficiencies inthe safety/security system. Thus a failure in one area is seen as reflective of failures inthe AVSEC security. An example of this was in a 2002 article where the Federation forAmerican Immigration Reform noted that 20 employees of a Boston airport were beingsought on suspicion of identity fraud and this was the “clearest indication yet of thenational security threat posed by America's lax and archaic documentation system” (USNewswire 2002).

Acts of unlawful interference

The named threat category of Acts of unlawful interference, the tools and techniques toachieve the acts, and the weaknesses in AVSEC measures that allow the acts to becarried out was cited in 10 % of articles. These threats are those related to Annex 17measures such as screening of passengers and cabin baggage, patrolling of security


areas, staff identification, and dealing with acts of unlawful interference. Examples ofnamed threats from the articles include:

& A passenger attempting to commit a skyjacking& Allowing Libyan students to study aviation in the UK& Allowing Saudi Arabian pilots to fly into the US& Carrying of unverified parcels on flights& Inadequate security measures at regional airports& Employing visa overstayers in aviation operations department& Laptops containing sensitive information about training for US airport screeners

being stolen& Employing refugee claimants to perform security checks at Toronto airport& Employing airport workers who have fraudulent documents

This category had some of the clearest explanations of how the named threat actuallythreatens national security. For example, a 2012 article reported that the deliberatecontamination of airline food with needles was a national security concern. The article,which quotes a former FBI agent, provides the logic in the following sentence: “it’sclearly a hole or vulnerability to get something aboard a plane. I mean, for example,could you put C4 inside a sandwich and get it inside?” (Canada AM 2012).

Public release of information

The named threat category of Public release of aviation-related informationwas cited in 6 % of articles. Examples of named threats from the articlesinclude:

& Publishing information on a foiled plot by al-Qaida’s affiliate in Yemen to destroy aUS-bound airliner prior to clearance from government security authorities

& Publishing air travel security initiatives& Publishing of airport security lapses that have not been previewed by government

security authorities& Releasing airline security information that could expose the vulnerabilities or

failures of the airlines, airports, and government agencies& Publishing information on why a Muslim family was removed from an Austin,

Texas, flight& Releasing detailed information on physical aspects of individual aircraft& Publishing profiles on high-ranking government officials by FAA staff& Releasing flight information regarding the Thai prime minister& Releasing personal travel information from ticketing systems.

Employment issues

The named threat category of Employment issues was cited in 4 % of articles. Laborissues are central political issues for the aviation sector, as labor is one of major costs ofairlines. This makes controlling them critical to maintain an airline’s profitability. In


addition, strikes can result in an airline’s financial downfall and long-term loss ofpatronage. As aviation is a critical infrastructure that is essential for facilitatingeconomic and social activity, disruptions to it can have significant adverse economic,social, and political effects. Consequently, governments are generally motivated toprevent employment issues from disrupting aviation services. Examples of namedthreats from the articles include:

& Strikes& Wages and conditions claims& Collective bargaining rights to airport screeners.

Only government and non-government actors cited this category of threats. Thereason for the absence of aviation asset owners/operators making such claims, giventhat labor issues are a priority for them, may reflect an assessment by them that to do sowould be seen as disingenuous. Explaining this using securitization concepts, theywould not make such a securitization move because they know it is unlikely to beaccepted by their audience.

Of the six articles where Employment issues were the named threats, only oneincluded an explanation of how it threatened national security. The low rate of includedexplanations may again point to a weak link. The logic that needs to be accepted for thesecuritization move to be successful is that economic harm arising from the loss ofaviation services or increased aviation sector costs are actually so significant that theyconstitute a threat to national economic security.

Coincident referents

Employment matters, principally jobs, were the most frequently cited coincidentreferent, followed by aviation sector viability and air safety.

Employees/unions were the securitizing actor that was quoted in articles, with thehighest percentage at 62 % that included a coincident referent alongside nationalsecurity. The high frequency may be explained by the observation that 1) asemployees/unions are focused on improving employment conditions, it is logical toexpect that they would refer to their core concerns in any claims, and 2) referencingnational security adds additional weight to the claim. Most of the other actors had muchlower rates that included a coincident referent. This could be explained by the obser-vation that as the referents of national security trumps all, to include other referentswhen a claim that national security is threatened, does not add additional weight to anargument and may actually undermine it because it detracts attention from the nationalthreat.

Conclusion

This study adds to the literature on empirical securitization studies by examining civilaviation and identifying who securitizes, and on what issues. Further research buildingon this research could be conducted identifying the acceptance of securitization movesunder different conditions, and the quality of the explanation linking a named threat


with harm to national security. As governments will continue to intervene in aviationdue to its heavily regulated nature, this paper’s findings, and further research on thistopic, is valuable as it provides a framework by which claims made by various actors inaviation security relating to national security threats can be more critically analyzed andobjectively judged.

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How civil aviation threatens national security

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